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This publication is intended to facilitate easy reference to documents relating to the 
application of the competition rules in the telecommunications sector. 
The documents are divided into the following chapters: 
I  Commission Directives 
II  Commission  action,  including  Decisions  under Regulation· No.  17/62 
(Articles  85  and  8&)  and  under Regulation  No.  4064/89  (Mergers)  and 
Notices published in the Official Journal 
Ill  Judgments of the European Court of Justice 
In addition, a number of  press releases have been issued in relation to the above, and, 
where relevant, these have been included in Annex I with a reference to them in the 
Table of Contents.  Annex I also includes some extracts from 'the  Bulletin of the 
European Communities. 
The documents are a partial selection and are thus not intended to be a complete set 
of documents relating to either competition law or the telecommunications sector. 
A companion  volume  is published  on  a reg_ular  basis by  DG  XIII:  this contains a 
number of other official documents relating to European telecommunications policy. 
For ease of reference, the Table of  Contents of  DG Xlll's publication has been inc,luded 
at Annex II.  The documents in this volume therefore do not include a number of other 
directives which are  inclu~ed in the companion document produced by DG  XIII; for 
example on Open Network Provision, public procurement and mutual recognition of 
terminal type approval. 
/Nf)BX  - 1 I.  Commission Directives 
Background Document: 
Communication by the Commission to  the European Parliament and · 
the  Council  on  th~  status  and  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services: 
COM(95) 113 final, 04/04/95  1/3 
A.  · 88/301/EEC: Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on competition 
in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment: 
OJ No. L 131  , 27/05/88 P. 0073  1/49 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/88/251 
B.  90/388/EEC: Commission Directive of  28 June 1990 on competition 
in the markets for telecommunications services: 
OJ No. L 192, 24/07/90 P. 0010  1155 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/92/932 
C.  94/46/EC:  Commission  Directive  of 13  October  1994  amending· 
Directive 88/301/EEC  and Directive 90/388/EEC  in particular with 
regard to satellite communications: 
OJ No. L 268 , 19/10/94 P. 0015  1/63 
See EC Commission Press Release- Ref: IP/94/948 
D.  Draft  Commission  Directive  amending  Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC regarding the abolition of the restrictions in the use of 
cable television networks for the provision of telecommunications 
services: 
OJ C 76, 28/03/95 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/94/1262 
As  stated  above,  this  list does  not include  a  number of other 
directives which are included in the companion.document produced 
by  DG  XIII;  for  example  on  Open  Network  Provision,  public 
procurement and mutual recognition of terminal type approval. 
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Commission Action in Individual Cases 
Background Documents: 
Council Regulation No. 17/62- First Regulation implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty (not included in this volume): amended by 
Regulation No. 59 
OJ ·58, 10 July 1962, p.1655 (Special Edition 1959-62, p.249) 
Regulation No. 118/63/EEC 
OJ 162, 7 November 1963, p. 2696 (Special Edition.1963-64, p.55) 
~egulation (EEC) No. 2822/71 
OJ '285, 29 December 1971, p.49 (Special Edition 1971  (Ill), p.1035) 
Council Regulation No. 4056/89 on the control of  concentrations between 
undertakings (not included in this volume) 
OJ  L  395,  30  December  1989,  p.1:  corrected  in  OJ  L  257,  21 
September 1990, p.13 
The above two background documents are not included in this volume: 
in addition to their publication in the Official Journal, these documents 
have  also  been  published  in  the  European  Commission  publication, 
"Competition  law in  the  European  Communities:  Rules  applicable  to 
undertakings- Situation at 30 June 1994". 
*** 
Commission  Notice  on  the  distinction  between  concentrative  and 
cooperative joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC') No 4064/89 of 
21 December 1989 on the control of  concentrations between undertakings 
OJ C 385,  31  December 1994, p.1  11/3 
Commission  Notice  on  the  notion  of a  concentration  under Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of 21  Decemb~r 1989  on  the control of 
concentrations between undertakings 
OJ C 386, 31  December 1994, p.S  11/7 
Commission  Notice  on  the  notion  of undertakings  concerned  under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of  21  December 1989 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings 
OJ C 385, 31  December 1994, p.12  11/14 
Commission Notice on calculation of turnover under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1  ~89 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings 
OJ C 385,  31  December 1994, p.21  11/23 
Preliminary draft Commission Regulation (EC) of 30 September 1994 on 
the application  of Article 85(3)  of the  Treaty  to  certain  categories  of 
technology transfer agreements 
OJ C 178, 30 June 1994, p.3  11/35 
*** 
Commission Guidelines on the application of  EEC competition rules in the 
telecommunications sector (91/C 233/02) 
OJ C 233, 6 September 1991, p.2  11/47 
. /NIJ£)(- 3 A.  Commission Decisions under  Council Regulation No.17/62 (Articles 
85 and 86) 
1.  82/861/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of 10  December  1982 
relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.877 -British Telecommunications): 
OJ No. L 360 , 21/12182 P. 0036  11/75 
2.  90/46/EEC: Commission Decision of  12 January 1990 relating 
to a proceeding under Article 85 of  the EEC Treaty (IV/32.006 
Alcatel Espace I ANT Nachrichtentechnik): 
OJ No. L 032 , 03/02/90 P. 0019  11/83 
3.  90/446/EEC: Commission Decision of  27 July 1990 relating to 
a proceeding under Article 85  of the EEC  Treaty (IV/32.688 
Konsortium ECR 900): 
OJ No. L 228, 22/08/90 P. 0031  11/91 
4.  91/562/EEC:  Commission  Decision·  of  18  October  1991 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/32. 737 -Eirpage): 
OJ No. L 306, 07/11/~1 P. 0022  11/95 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/91/935 
5.  93/50/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of  23  December  1992 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85  of the  EE~ 
Treaty (IV/32.745 -Astra): 
OJ No. L 020 , 28/01/93 P. 0023  IJ/109 
6.  94/579/EC: Commission Decision of 27 July 1994 relating to 
a proceeding  pursuant to Article 85  of the EC  Treaty  and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case IV/34.857 • BT  -MCI) 
OJ No. L 223·,  27/08/94 P. 0036  11/127 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/94/767 
7.  94/895/EC:  Commission  Decision  of  15  December  1994 
relating  to a proceeding  pursuant to Article 85  of the  EC 
Treaty  and  Article  53  of the  EEA  Agreement  (IV/34.768: 
International Private Satellite Partners): 
OJ  No. L 354 , 31/12/94 P. 0075  11/147 
See EC Commission Press .Release - Ref: IP/94/1236 · 
• 
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B.  Other Commission Action 
1.  MONS: See EC Commission Press Release Ref: IP/89/948 in 
Annex I 
2.  Belgian Leased  Lines: See  EC  Commission Press Release 
Ref: IP/90/67 in Annex I 
Bull EC 1/2-1990, p19 In Annex I 
3.  CEPT Leased Lines 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/90/188 in Annex I 
and Bull1/2-1990, p19 in Annex I 
4.  lnfonet: Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of RegulatJon  No. 
17/62- OJ No. C 7 of 11 January 1992 p3  11/161 
5.  lntrax:  Notice  pursuant to Article  19(3)  of Regulation  No. 
17/62 
OJ No. C 117, of 28 April 1993  11/165 
See EC Commission Press Release • Ref: IP/93/907 in Annex I 
6.  Aerospatiale I Alcatel Espace: Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) 
of Regulation No 17/62 
OJ No C 47, 15 February 1994, p.6  11/169 
7.  GEN:  Notifi'cation  of  a  technical  cooperation  agreement 
between telecommunications organisations 
OJ No. C 55,  23 February 1994, p.2  11/173 
See EC Commission Press Release- Ref: IP/95/443 in Annex I 
8.  Jetphone: Notification of a joint venture between BT Jersey 
and France Cables et Radio 
OJ No. C 134, 17 May 1994, p.5  11/175 
9.  CMC Talkline: Notice pursua·nt to Article 19(3) of Regulation 
No. 17/62 
OJ No. C 221, 9 August 1994  11/177 
10.  ETSI: Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of  Regulation No. 17/62 
OJ No. C 76,  28 March 1995, page 5  11/181 
11.  Unisource/ AT&T: 
See EC Commission Press Release Ref: IP/95/288 in Annex I 
12.  Iridium,  lnmarsat-P  and  Globalstar:  See  EC  Commission 
Press Release Ref: IP/95/549 In Annex I 
/NIJEX- 5 C.  Merger Decisions 
1.  Case No IV/M042 -Aicatei/Telettra:  11/187 
See EC Commission Press Release- Ref: IP/91/303 
2.  Case No IV/M.133 Ericsson I Kolbe:  •  11/197 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/92/42 
3.  Case  No  IV  /M249  Northern  Telecom/Matra 
Telecommunication  11/202 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/92/679 
Case No IV/M.346- JCSAT/SAJAC: 
Case No IV/M.394 - Mannesmann/RWE/Deutsche Bank 
(in German only) 
See EC Commission Press Release- Ref: IP/93/1241 
Case No IV/M.408 - RWE/Mannesmann 
(in German only) 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/94/164 
Case No IV/M.425- BS/BT: 
See EC Commission Press Release - Ref: IP/94/263 
8.- C~se  No IV/M.438: Siemens/ltaltel (not yet available) 
9.  Case No. IV/M.469 - MSG Media Service: 
OJ No L 364, 31/12194, p.1 
10.  Case No IV/M.561: Securicor Datatrak 
11.  Case  No  IV/M.570:  Telenordic/BT/Teledanmark/Telenor (not 
yet available) 
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11/206 
11/209 
11/215 
11/218 
11/225 
11/245 
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Ill.  Judgments of the Court of Justice relating to Telecommunications 
A.  Judgments relating to Articles 85 and 86 EC 
1.  Case 41/83: Italian Republic v Commission of the European 
Communities: 
Judgment of the Court of 20 March 1985 
Abuse  of  a  dominant  position  (Article  86)  -public 
undertakings (Article 90)  -international agreements (Article 
234) -Article 222 -Article 190 of the Treaty: 
1985 ECR 873  111/3 
2.  Case  311/84:  Centre  beige  d'etudes  de  marche  -
Telemarketing (CBEM) SA v Compagnie luxembourgeoise de 
telediffusion SA and Information publicite Benelux SA: 
Judgment of the Court of 3 October 1985 
Abuse of a dominant position (Article 86)- ancillary activity: 
1985 ECR 3261  111/19 
3.  Case  247/86:  Alsatel  -Societe  Alsacienne  et Lorraine  de 
Telecommunications et d 'Electronique vs. A. Novasam 
Judgment of the Court of 5 October 1988 
Reference  for  a  preliminary  ruling  from  the  Tribunal  de 
Grande Instance Strasbourg . Payment of compensation for 
terminating  a  rental  contract  for ·  telephone  installations 
-abuse of a dominant position . 
1988 ECR 5987  111/31 
4.  Case  18/88:  Regie  des Telegraphes  et des  Telephones v 
GB-INNO-BM SA. 
Judgment of the Court of 13 december 1991. 
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de Commerce de 
Bruxelles -Belgium.  Free movement of goods -competition 
-approval of telephone sets. 
1991  ECR 1-5941  111/41 
/N~x-7 B.  Article 90 
1.  Case 202/88, :,French Republic and others v Commission: 
Judgment of the Court of 19 March 1991 
On the legality of  the Commission's directive of 16 May 1988 
on  competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
terminal equipment. 
1991  ECR 1-1223  111/59 
2.  Joined  cases  c-46/90  and  c-93/91:  Procureur  du  Roi  v 
Jean-Marie Lagauche and others. 
Judgment of the Court of 27 October 1993 
Reference  for a  preliminary  ruling:  Tribunal  de  Premiere 
Instance  de  Bruxelles  -Belgium.  National  approval  for 
telecommunications terminal equipment -Authorization for 
the use of such terminals -Articles 30  to 37  and  86  of the 
EEC Treaty -Commission directive 88/301/EEC .. 
1993 ECR 1-5267 (not yet available in English)  111/79 
3.  Joined cases c-271/90,  c-281/90  and c-289/90:  Kingdom of 
Spain,  Kingdom  of  Belgium  and  Italian  Republic  v 
Commission of the European Communities. 
Judgment of the Court of 17 November 1992 
Competition in the markets for telecommunications services. 
1992 ECR 1-5833 (not yet available in English)  111/92 
4.  Case C-69/91: Criminal proceedings against Francine Gillon, 
nee Decoster. 
Judgment of the Court of 27 October 1993 
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Cour d' Appel de Douai 
-France.  Council  directive  83/189/EEC  and  Commission 
Directive. 88/301/EEC  -notification  of the  specifications  in 
relation to telecommunications -independence of the body 
responsible for the rules -penal sanctions. 
1993 ECR 1-5335 (not yet available in English)  111/107 
5.  Case C-92/91.:  Judgment of the Court of 27  October 1993. 
6. 
Criminal proceedings against An nick Neny, nee Taillandier. 
Judgment of the Court of 27 October 1993. 
Reference  for a  preliminary  ruling:  Tribunal  de  Police  de 
Vichy  · -France.  Commission  Directive  88/301/EEC 
-independence of the body responsible for the rules -penal 
sanctions. 
1993 ECR 1-5383 (not yet available in English)  111/125 
Case  C-314/93:  Criminal  proceedings  against  Francois 
Rouffeteau and Robert Badia. 
Judgment of the Court of 12 July 1994. 
Reference  for  a  preliminary  ruling:  Tribunal  de ·Grande 
Instance  de  Reims  -France.  Article  30  of the  EEC  Treaty 
-Directive  88/301/EEC  ·-Telecommunications  Terminals 
-prohibition  on  terminals  which  have  not been  approved 
-re-export. 
1994 ECR 1-327 4  111/137 
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ANNEX I 
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Index to the document: Official Documents on Community Telecommunications Policy 
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Preface 
The European Union is going through a process of rapid adaptation to the realities of the 
coming infonnation society.  Digital technology is transfonning the telecommunications, 
computer, information and audio-visual industries.  The infonnation society is beginning to 
have a profound effect on the economy and the way we work, live, and play.  It influences 
the way we do business, the way we organise ourselves and the way we interact. 
The report "Europe and the Global Information Society", as established according to the 
request by the European Council has given full  consideration to this basic change and 
proposed a comprehensive framework.  In response, the European Heads of States at 
Corfu confirmed this analysis and called for the definition of a clear and stable regulatory 
environment for further development. 
The changes are global.  They effect not only Europe and its principal economic 
competitors, but the very nature of that economic competition itself.  Competing 
effectively today demands the means to access,. process, manipulate, stock and produce 
information, both quickly and efficiently. 
In an increasingly global economy it is vital that European firms are able to maintain and 
reinforce their competitiveness, not only in existing markets, but to take advantage of new 
opportunities and win new markets.  To do so they must be allowed to benefit from the 
widespread diffusion and integration into production processes of new information 
technology.  Naturally,  by stimulating economic growth, competitiveness contributes to job 
creation. 
Technological progress and innovation brings with it the opportunity to offer users an 
increasing choice of services and applications, of superior performance and better suited to 
their particular demands.  This is not only an advantage for business.  For domestic users 
this means the possibility of direct access on demand of new services and entertainment, 
which are not only received by the customer, but also interacted with. 
At the same time special regard must be given to employment aspects in the sector. As set 
out in the Green· Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable 
television networks (COM(94)440final and 682final) increased competitiveness will impact 
employment, both safeguarding jobs which would otherwise have been lost and allowing 
new jobs to  be created as European companies benefit from the competitive advantage 
derived from  new telecommunications technologies and services. Particularly important in 
empioyment terms will be the effects of the new technologies in small and medium sized 
enterprises - traditionally the principle source of employment generation in Europe. 
Experience shows that potential job reductions are offset by new job creation, and that 
overall telecommunication employment has not been impaired by  liberalisation. It will be 
important for the further development that the social dialogue in the sector is intensified. 
The Commission has launched a major study which should give a firmer quantitative basis 
for assessing the extent to which competition is creating new job opportunities. 
I/5 - 4  -
These issues will also be studied and discussed in depth within the framework of the new 
advisory group on information society recently laWlched by the Commission, i.e. the 
Information Society Forum and the High Level Group of Experts on the Social and 
Societal aspects of the Information Society. 
The Action Plan published by the Commission in  response to the conclusions of the 
Corfu summit and the report on Europe and the Global Information Society ("Europe's 
Way to the Information Society", Communication of the Commission of 19 July 1994) 
emphasized the need for continued and accelerated liberalisation of telecommunications. 
Within this context, the Council Resolution 93/C 213/01  of 22 July  1993  on the further 
development of the telecommunications market sets the basic framework for the evolution 
of the regulatory  environmen~ in the European Union and has established 1 January 1998 
as the date for fullliberalisation (with additional transition periods for certain Member 
States).  The Resolution has emphasized the importance of ensuring full  implementation of 
existing legislation, as well as further evolution of this framework in preparation for  1 
January  1998.  On 22 December 1994, the Council adopted Resolution 94/C 379/03 
extending the principle of liberalisation and the agreed timetable for services to the 
liberalisation of the underlying network infrastructures, over which such services are 
carried. 
J/6 
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Commission Directive 90/388/EEC on competition  in the markets for telecommunications 
services has been at the core of EU telecommunications liberalisation to date.  It is, and 
will continue to be, at the centre of the reform process which is now centred on the 
deadline set by the Council of 1998 for liberalisation of all telecommunications  services 
and the infrastructure over which it is carried and for which, according to the Council 
Resolutions mentioned, proposals and measures for the corresponding regulatory 
framework must be made before  1 January  1996.  It also represents the framework within 
which the Commission is responding to requests for earlier action to lift the restrictions 
which are causing bottle-necks in the provision of infrastructure for the services currently 
already liberalised according to the Directive.  In this framework, the Commission adopted 
on 13th October 1994 an amendment Directive drawing satellite netWorks and services 
into the framework of the Directive.  Furthennore, on 21st  December 1994 a draft 
amendment Directive was adopted by the Commission for consultation regarding the use 
of Cable-Television networks for the provision of such services. 
The Council Resolution of 22nd July  1993 emphasized that "there is a need for rapid and 
effective implementation of the current regulatory environment, in particular Directive 
90/388/EEC".  At the same time, the Directive required that the effects of certain measures 
must be assessed by the Commission during  1994.  The Commission therefore considers it 
appropriate to submit at this stage this Communication on the general progress made with 
regard to the implementation of the objectives of the Directive  to the European 
Parliament and the CounciL  · 
1/1 - 6  -
Summary 
Section I outlines the purpose of the Communication and sets it in the context of the past, 
current and future regulatory environment. 
Section II represents a general comment on the progress achieved by the Member States in 
implementing  Directive  90/388.  It includes  a list of the  main elements  which have  been 
monitored and reviewed by the Commission and against which progress is measured. 
Section III  explains and clarifies some particular implementation issues which have  arisen 
over the  past four  years.  These  fall  into three .main  areas:  voice  services for  closed u5er 
groups and corporate networks, data services for  the public and the separation of operation 
and regulation. 
Section IV describes the r.ecent inclusion of  satellite networks and services into the framework 
of the Directive, by way of the amending Directive 94/46/EC. 
Section V explores the future outlook for the Directive and its implementation.  It sets it in  . 
the  broader context  of full  services and  infrastructure  liberalisation and,  in  particular,  the 
preparation for  the  1998 deadline. 
Section  VI  draws  together  the  Commission's  conclusions  on  the  implementation  of the 
Directive and the implications for EU telecommunications policy in general. - 7 -
I  INTRODUCTION 
The Purpose 
Commission Directive 90/388 was published on 28 June, 1990 (hereafter referred to as either 
"the Services Directive" or "the Directive").  It has come to be identified as a cornerstone of 
the EU framework for liberalising the EW'opean telecommunications market.  The Council, 
in. its Resolution of  22 July 1993
1 emphasised the importance of  rapid implementation.  The 
Resolution noted that "there is a need for rapid and effective implementation of the current 
.  regulatory environment, in particular Directive 90/388/EEC". 
It is within this context that the Commission submits this Communication on the status and 
implementation of the Directive2• 
The Communication has three related purposes3: 
i  Description and explanation of the current state of implementation 
li  Identification and clarification of central issues 
iii  Placing the Directive in the context of the package of reforms focused on the 1998 
deadline, according to the 1993 Council Resolution which "supports the Commission's 
intention  to  prepare,  before  1  January  1996  the  necessary  amendments  to  the 
Community regulatory framework on order to achieve liberalisation of  all public voice 
telephony services by  1 January 1998". 
The Context 
The  Services  Directive  set  down  four  dates  by  which  specific  provisions  had  to  be 
implemented : 
o  31  December 1990, for the opening up to competition of  telecommunications services 
other than voice telephony and the simple resale of capacity; 
Council Resolution 93/C23110 1. 
This Communi~ation  does not cover related subjects of  EU-telecommunication policy such as  the 
application of Open Network Provision to leased lines.  These subjects are covered extensively in 
other recent Communications.  See Green  Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks, Part 1/11, COM(94)440 ; COM(94)682 and 
Communication on present status and future approach for open access to telecommunications 
networks and services (Open Network Provision), COM(94)5 13. 
It should be noted that this Communication does not replace in any way the formal procedures 
foreseen under the Treaty to ensure the full  implementation of Community Law. 
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o  1 July 1991, for putting in place an independent body responsible for the granting of 
licences and the surveillance of usage conditions; 
o  30th June 1992, for the notification of any licensing or declaration procedures for the 
provision of packet- or circuit-switched data services for the public ; 
o  ·  31  December  1992,  for  the  opening  up  to  competition  of the  simple  resale  of 
capacity
4
• 
Parliament Resolution A3-0 113/93 of  20 April 1993 called on the Commission to prepare the 
liberalisation of both intra-Community as well as domestic voice telephony and to adopt as 
soon as possible the necessary measures to take full advantage of  the potential of the existing 
infrastructure of  cable networks for telecommunications services and to abolish without delay 
the existing restrictions on the use of cable networks for non-reserved services as well as to 
adopt  measures  to  obtain  optimum  utilization  of the  cross-border  telecommunications 
networks of railway operators and electricity producerss. 
Council Resolution 93/C213/0 1 set out a timetable for the development of  telecommunications 
and confumed the date of 
1 January  1998  for  the  liberalisation  of voice  telephony  services  for  the  general 
public
6
• 
On November  17  1994 the Council adopted a further Resolution confirming the date of 
1 January 1998 also for the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure. 
7 
Following the Commission's action plan of 19th July 1994, published under.the title "Europe's 
way to the information society, an action plan"8, the Union is now profoundly engaged in the 
policy of implementing the  information society.  These Resolutions, the Conclusions of the 
European  Council  at  Corfu
9  as  well  as  the  communication  by  the  Commission  on  the 
consultation on the Green Paper on Mobile and Personal communications 
10 and the results of 
the  ongoing  consultation  on  the  Green  Papers  on  Infrastructure  (part  I I  11) 11  will  set  a 
framework for carrying forward the further amendments to the services Directive towards the 
7  ' 
10 
II 
The Directive also foresaw the possibility of granting deferment, until  1 January  1996, of the date 
for prohibition on the simple resale of capacity in  those  Member States in which the network for the 
provision of the packet or circuit switched services was not yet sufficiently developed. 
OJ No C  150/42 of 31  May  93. 
Although some Member States with less developed networks (i.e. Spain, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal) are granted an additional transition period of up to 5 years. Very small networks 
(Luxembourg)  can also, where justified, be granted a period of up to two years. 
With derogations as  above, see Council Resolution of 22nd December 1994 on the principles and 
timetable for the  liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructures, (94/C 379/03) ; OJ C379/4, 
31.12.1994. 
COM(94) 347. 
Conclusions of the  European Council, Corfu, 24-25  June  1994. 
Towards the personal Communications Environment: Green Paper on a common approach  in  the 
field of mobile and personal communications in the European Union (COM(94)  145  final). 
Op cit. 
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fullliberalisation of the  telecommunications sector. In this context,  ongoing review of the 
actual situation in the Member States will be increasingly important in the years leading up 
to the deadline. 
• 
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II  CURRENT STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
a)  General Comment 
Member  States  were  required  to  implement  the  prov1S1ons  of the  Directive  and  to 
communicate to the Commission the relevant measures adopted, by 31st December  1990, 1 
July  1991  and  31st December  1992
12
•  All  Member  States,  but two,  complied with  the 
notification  requirements13•  In  order  to  a8sess  effective  implementation  of Directive 
90/3 88/EEC  in the  various  Member States however,  a  checklist identifying  the  essential 
constituent elements was  established. Although this does  not represent an exhaustive list, 
progress in effective implementation can best be measured  against the following  i~sues: 
14 
Definition of "voice telephony" for which currently exclusive and special rights can 
still be maintained according to the provisions of the Directiveu. 
Continuation of any other exclusive rights; 
Access by service providets to transmission/routing on PSTN and leased lines; 
Conditions imposed via any licensing or declaration scheme in existence; 
Transparency and openness of procedure for granting authorization. 
Conditions for simple resale of leased capacity for data communications; 
Notification (within deadline) of any special licensing regime regarding such resale; 
Justification of any special regime
16
• 
Conditions of open access to public networks (formal and effective); 
Availability of leased lines within a reasonable time; 
Justification for usage restrictions (if  any) on leased lines. 
1  ustification for any restrictions on the processing of data 
(before or after public network transmission)
17
; 
Ensurance by the Member States of  non-discrimination in usage conditions and charges 
between service providers (including the TO). 
Separateness and independence of effective and  op~rational regulatory body 
Inclusion within its tasks of: granting licences, surveying usage conditions; control of 
type approval and mandatory specifications, and allocation of frequencies. 
On the basis of these points the Commission has found that the extent to which the Directive 
ll 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
As mentioned, the exceptions to the 31/12/90 deadline relate to (a) specifications regarding simple 
resale of data services, 31112/92; and (b) the setting up of an independent regulator,  117/91. 
Italy (provisions only included in the Legge Comunitaria 1994 are incomplete), and Greece 
(measures necessary to  render the independent regulatory authority operational have still not been 
notified). 
For the issues listed see  in  particular Articles  1,  2,  3,  4,  S,  6,  7 of the  Directive. 
Subject to the time deadlines set by the Council  Resolution of 22 July 1993 
i.e.  by the provisions set down  in Article 2 and Article 3 
They must be  demonstrated as necessary for essential requirements or public policy. 
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has been effectively implemented
18 throughout the Union still varies significantly between the 
Member States. V  arlo us Member States will need to undertake further measures before the 
Commission may consider the directive correctly implemented
19 
• 
b)  Formal Procedures 
As far as is possible the Commission has sought to deal with remaining implementation issues 
via bilateral communication and negotiation with the  Member States concerned.  This has 
proved particularly efficient (for both parties)  where  information requested  _is  prompt and 
transparent, and where the will to find rapidly a workable solution is evident. 
Where implementation problems cannot be solved by informal negotiation within a reasonable 
timeframe,  the  Commission is  obliged  to  commence  with  the  formal  procedure  for  non-
implementation of a Directive, as provided for  by Article  169 of the Treaty
20
• 
Currently, a number of  formal procedures are underway.  Two concern Member States' failure 
to notify all required national  implementing legislation
21
•  A further  two concern incorrect 
application of the Directive in Member States22• 
c)  Extension to  the European  Economic Area and Central and Eastern European 
States 
In accordance with the EEA Agreement, the Services Directive (including amendments) also 
applies to the EEA Member States as of 1 July  1994
23
• 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Official notification does not necessarily mean effective implementation 
Section Ill of this Communication goes into this in more detail. Comments on the individual 
Member States' progress is provided in  Annex. 
Article  169 of the EC Treaty deals with failure to fulfil an obligation under the rules of the Treaty, 
including the implementation of Directives. 
Under Article  169 of the Treaty, the procedure is a follows : 
i)  The Commission sets out the points at issue  by  letter of 'fonnal notice' and invites the  relevant 
Member State  to submit its observations. 
ii)  If the Member State does not put an end to the infringement, the Commission gives a (non-
binding) reasoned opinion explaining its views and inviting the Member State to take the 
appropriate measures within a fixed period.  • 
iii)  If the Member State does not comply with the reasoned opinion within the given period, the 
Commission may bring the matter before the  European Court of Justice. 
Italy and Greece. 
Gennany and Spain. 
Under the Competition Annex (XIV) of the  Agreement, Article 90(3) Directives in the 
telecommunications field i.e. the Services Directive and the Tenninals Directive (88/301/EEC) 
became applicable to the EEA  Member States on  I July  1994, as well as subsequent amending 
Directives, e.g. amending Directive 94/46/EEC with regard to satellite communications. 
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Since the Services Directive only specifies the application of Article 90 in conjunction with 
Articles 59 and 86 of the Treaty and the Europe Agreements and Interim Agreements which 
the  Union  has  signed  with  six  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  contain  similar 
provision, the general principles of  this Directive (and any amendments) are also of  relevance 
to these countries. 
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III SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Five main areas have emerged during the implementation of the Directive as requiring 
specific attention  : 
a)  General issues related to voice services 
b)  Enforcement of the voice telephony monopoly 
c)  Corporate networks and Closed tiser Groups (CUGs) 
d)  Data services for the public 
e)  The separation of operation and regulation 
a)  General issues related to voice services 
Although the Directive defines in detail the concept of 'voice telephony'
2
\  various issues 
have arisen
25  over just what is considered to be 'voice telephony.' in the individual Member 
States and, hence, the degree to  which special or exclusive rights
26  on voice services had 
to be abolished
27
• 
According to the Services Directive, the Member States ensure the abolition of special and 
exclusive rights for the provision of telecommunication services other than the voice 
telephony service.  In each case it has to be examined on the basis of the criteria ,set out 
below whether a given service is a voice telephony service.  In order to allow the relevant 
national regulatory authorities to  assess the envisaged service, the service .providers may 
24 
26 
27 
According to Article 1 of the Directive "voice telephony means the commercial provision for the 
public of the  direct transport and switching of speech in real-time between public switched network 
termination points, enabling any user to use equipment connected to such a network termination 
point in order to communicate with anotner termination point." 
See also European Court decision ECR-1 5833 which has guided the Commission in the elaboration 
of the defmition of exclusive and special rights (see below). 
According to Article 2 of amending Directive 94/46/EC (see section IV): 
"exclusive rights" means the rights that are granted by a Member States to one undertaking through 
any  legislative, regulatory or administrative instrument, reserving it the right to provide a 
telecommunications service or undertake an activity within a given geographical area 
"special rights" means the  rights that are granted by a Member State to a limited number of 
undertakings through any  legislative, regulatory or administrative instrument which, within a given 
geographical area, 
limits to two or more the number of undertakings authorised to provide a service or 
undertake an activity, otherwise than according to objective, proportional and non-
discriminatory criteria, or 
designates, otherwise than according to such criteria, several competing undertakings as 
being authorised to provide a service or undertake an activity, or 
confers on any undertaking(s), otherwise than according to such criteria, legal or regulatory 
advantages which substantially affect the ability of any other undertaking to provide the 
same telecommunications service or to undertake the same activity in the same 
geographical area under substantially equivalent conditions. 
According to Article 2 of the Directive, "Member States shall withdraw all  special or exclusive 
rights for the supply of telecommunications services other than voice telephony ... " 
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be required to proYide all the necessary infonnation
28
• 
A regulatory approach that identifies only a limited set of  permissible, non-reserved 
services does not conform to the requirements of  the Directive. 
A voice service may be reserved under national legislation only if it includes all of the 
elements of the Community voice telephony defmition, i.e. it must be provided on a 
commercial basis to the public for the purpose of direct transport and switching of speech 
in real time between public switched network termination points. 
It is useful to consider the significance of each of these elem~nts: 
"Commercial" 
This requires that the simple technical non-commercial provision of a telephone 
connection between two users should be authorized.  "Commercial" should be understood 
in the common sense of the word, i.e. provided against payment and with the intention of 
making a profit (or at least of covering all variable costs and making a contribution to 
existing fixed costs). A leased line, for example, made available on a cost-sharing basis 
between one or more users would  only be considered a commercial activity if additional 
capacity were leased specifically to allow resale. 
It also means that companies should be free to  pool resources, i.e. to rent leased lines and 
benefit from the flet rate rental.  This  permits a more efficient use of the telephone 
network and, in particular, benefits small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
29
• 
"for the. public" 
The term "for the public" is not defined in the Directive and must be understood in its 
common sense: a service for the public is a service available to all members of the. public 
on the  same basis. 
Particular examples of services which should not be considered "for the public", and thus 
should not be made subject to special or exclusive rights, are those provided over 
corporate networks and/or to closed user groups.  Corporate networks and closed user 
groups (CUGs) cover a number of telecommunications services, both voice and data. They 
are fundamental to the Services Directive particularly because they fall outside the scope 
of the voice service which Member States may reserve to their telecommunications 
organiza~ions. 
28 
29 
This will in particular be the case concerning the provision of voice services to closed user groups 
on  leased lines networks connected at different ends to the public switched network.  In this case 
some national regulatory authorities request detailed infonnation, such as clients targeted, draft 
advertisements, envisaged tariffs ... , to  assess the nature of the envisaged service. 
A disadvantage for  SMEs existed previously because they do not generally use the switched 
telephone service sufficiently intensively to  make it worthwhile for them to pay the (high) flat  rate 
rentals for  leased lines.  As a consequence, leased lines were,  in  practice, reserved to  larger 
companies. 
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The particular issues associated with liberalisation of these services are discussed in more 
detail below (IIIc  ). 
''from and to  public switched network termination points" 
"From and to public switched network termination points" means that, to be reserved, the 
voice service has not only to be offered commercially and to the public, but also to 
connect two network termination points of the switched networl2° at the same time.  As 
long as each customer of the service provider is connected via a dedicated leased line, it is 
possible to offer a commercial service which terminates on the public network.31  The aim 
is, again, to ease technical restrictions on the use of leased lines. In this way lines may be 
used for voice telephony offered to non-CUGs,  as long as there is no commercial offer of 
"simple resale" of the switched telephone service.
32  On the other hand,  "simple resale" 
may be legitimate when the service is not offered to the public, but, for instance, is 
provided to a closed user group
33
• 
"direct transport and switching of  speec!z in real time" 
This part of the definition excludes any store and forward or voice mail applications from 
being reserved.  Least cost routing of telephone calls by a service provider on the public 
switched network or credit card telephony, whereby access is given to the voice telephony 
service of a TO in the framework of a financial transaction service, are further examples 
of liberalised voice services as these do  not constitute "direct transport". 
30 
31 
32 
33 
The public switched network is not fonnally defined in the Directive.  It  must be given its common 
meaning, i.e., the public switched telephone network (PSTN) which is the collection of switching 
and transmission facilities used by the telecommunications organisation to provide the normal 
telephony service. 
i.e. as long as they are connected via a dedicated leased line, customers of a liberalised voice 
service do not necessarily need to demonstrate a pre-existing legal or economic relationship with the 
recipients of their calls.  This is  often referred to as  "dial-out" service or "one-ended" service .. 
"Simple resale" refers to the situation where the call is both originated and terminated on the public 
switched network.  It is,  in this sense, offered to the general public since the local call may originate 
from  any user of the public switched network and  the customer itself is  not connected  by the 
service provider via a dedicated leased line 
Such a service may, indeed, include features requiring bypass such  as teleworking, out of office 
hours calls diversion, paging, Centrex services or when small business units, whose call volume 
does  not justify use of leased lines, need to communicate with each other. 
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Since the reservation of .voice services is an exception to the general rule of competition, 
it must be interpreted narrowly.  When new voice services and features are introduced and 
meet demand which is not satisfied by the current telephone service, they should normally 
be considered non-reserved. If they are defined as reserved, the burden of proof, as always 
should fall to the Member State to justify such a restriction
34
• 
Calling card services offer a specific example of services, which can, from the point of 
view of the users, be considered to be different from the reserved voice telephony service. 
They fall outside the definition in as much as the calling card service matches important 
needs which the (normal) voice telephony does not meet, for example as a result of 
additional features such as payment via credit or debit card, least cost routing, destination 
speed dialling etc.  Where additional features such as these, rather than possible lower 
tariffs, are  decisive in prompting users to use the calling card service instead of voice 
telephony, the service should be considered liberalised.  The fact that a calling card market 
is emerging, although  tariffs are in most of cases higher than those of voice telephony35  , 
is evidence that there is  a calling card market which is distinct from the voice telephony 
one.  Calling card providers have developed this new market tailoring the services to the 
customers and billing them accordingly.  This evolution creates new opportunities for the 
users in the Union and should not be delayed by restrictions aimed at preserving the 
traditional voice telephony market. 
The prohibition of  l~ased line routing for the provision of calling card services would put 
providers of calling card services at a competitive disadvantage in this market relative to 
calling card providers with own facilities.  In the absence of the routing facility they are 
merely resellers of voice telephony and would have no  control over their main costs. 
They could therefore hardly compete with the Telecommunications Operators (TOs).  TOs 
have a further advantage in that they  can offer their customers both voice telephony and 
calling card services and develop their card service by building on their database of high 
volume users. 
Such a state of affairs would promote possible scenarios whereby national TO's offering 
calling card services would limit their offer to residents of their national territory without 
entering neighbouring geographic  ~arkets. 
An individual assessment of the envisaged calling card service may,  however, be 
necessary, in particular of the additional features offered, in order to determine the nature 
of the service and upon which market it will be offered.  The criteria used should be the 
34 
35 
To allow the relevant national regulatory authorities to assess the envisaged service, the applicants 
may be required to  provide them with all the necessary information, including draft advertisements 
and  envisaged tariffs lists,  if any. 
"contrary to  widespread belief, cost saving is not the main driver (for the development of calling 
card services).  Indeed.  calling card  and  international direct dial (IDD)  tariff comparisons for 
calls originating from  the EC reveal that convenience is  the main driving factor for a service 
essentially targeted at business users"  .  See : New  forms of competition in  voice telephony 
services in the European Community, BIS  Strategic Decisions, October 1993, study carried out for 
the European Commission. 
Additional features. such as  billing and usage convenience (no  local currency required, operator 
speaking the  same language) seem to be  the main driving factor for this service. 
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degree of functional interchangeability between the services and the possible barriers to 
substitution. Such assessment must take into account the specific circumstances of the 
markets concerned. 
b)  Enforcement of  the Voice Telephony Monopoly in a liberalised environment 
Since certain categories of voice services have been opened up to competition, and since 
such categories may not be defmed in a rigidly technical sense, certain Member States 
feared that service providers would offer what is in effect "voice telephony" and thereby 
by-pass the monopoly.  In fact,  experience has shown that such fears were not founded. 
The main reason is that such "un-official" by-pass will not occur to any significant extent 
without being noticed by the relevant Member State.  A service which is offered to the 
public must be, "ipso facto",  public knowledge. 
In particular, given that any commercial offer would normally involve adveqising (of the 
services available) or, at the very least, issuing price lists, contracts and invoices, such by-
pass should be evident from an early stage.  Furthermore, any breach leading to a 
substantial diversion of traffic on to a competitor's network is rapidly detected by the 
public operator providing the competitor's leased line capacity.  The TO would clearly 
have an interest in bringing the situation to the attention of the appropriate national 
regulatory authority. 
In the framework of the licensing or declaration procedures, various Member States, 
however, still request the applicant to  provide a description of the intended service. 
Where networks are connected to the public switched telephony network (PSTN), for 
example in the case of voice services provided on leased lines, Member States often 
require evidence of how the applicant will prevent dial-in and dial-out facilities being 
available at the same time. It should be noted that, under Article 4 of the Directive, 
technical restrictions may  not be  imposed on the service provider. It suffices that the 
service provider clearly sets out in the contracts, signed with its clients, the extent of 
services authorised. 
New operators generally have shown that they will respect the voice telephony monopoly. 
Service providers do  not want to take the risk of having their authorization rev<?ked or 
having the national regulatory authority requesting the disconnection of the relevant leased 
lines and not being able to  fulfil their obligations towards their clients.  Many service 
providers did therefore, before starting their services, investigate first the matter with the 
national regulatory authorities or with the Commission services. 
c)  Corporate networks and· Closed User  Grou_ps 
As mentioned, the special issue of corporate networks and I or closed user groups (CUGs) 
has been of particular importance amongst the  issues encountered in the course of 
implementation of the Directive . 
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Effective  liberalisation of corporate networks and CUG services is, without doubt, critical 
for the development of advanced business communications and therefore the 
competitiveness of EU industry vis a vis its counterparts in Japan and the US.  It is, thus, 
a central goal of the Directive.  The economics of competition, and markets themselves 
are becoming increasing global.  Where business is denied the clear benefits of lower cost, 
and increased quality and choice which competition ensures, it will ultimately either suffer 
from the competitive disadvantage this implies, or,  where possible, will seek to relocate 
to a  less restrictive environment. 
In this context, the goals of the Directive have still not been achieved  in a number of 
Member States.  Two reasons for this are : 
disputes as to the extent of allowed 'membership' of  CUGs, which are broader 
than strict corporate networks.  This has led to lack of full  or effective 
implementation of the Directive 
ii  bottlenecks in the supply of capacity to the new service providers caused by 
restrictions on use of alternative infrastructure (this will be addressed more fully in 
Section V) 
The Commission has considered the cases where Member States have issued provisions 
under the Directive for authorizing the provision of voice to CUGs.  Various definitions 
have emerged
36
•  On the basis of experience gained,  the Commission will use the 
following definitions
37 
: 
"corporate networks" 
those networks generally established by a single organisation encompassing distinct 
legal entities, such as a company and its subsidiaries or its branches in other 
Member States incorporated under the relevant domestic company law. 
"closed user groups": 
36 
37 
those entities, not necessarily bound by economic links, but which can be identified 
as being part of a group on the basis of a lasting professional relationship among 
themselves, or with another entity of the group,  and whose internal 
communications needs result from the common interest underlying this relationship. 
In general, the  link between the members of the group is a common business 
ac~ivity. 
For country by country  infonnation, see Annex 
The Commission has acknowledged these definitions  in  its "Green Paper on the  liberalisation of 
telecommunications infrastructure and cable television  networks,  Part  I,  Principles and Timetable", 
COM(94)440 final,  Brussels 25.10.1994, p.27. 
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Examples of activities likely to fall  into this category are fund transfers for the 
banking industry, reservation systems for airlines, information transfers between 
universities involved in a common research project, re-insurance for the insurance 
industry, inter-library activities, common design projects, and different institutions 
or services Jof intergovernmental or international organisations. 
Services provided concerning such categories of networks or entities are fully liberalised 
according to the. definition of "voice telephony" in Article 1 of the Directive. Some 
Member States did, however, only authorise such services after further discussions with 
the Commission. 
d)  Data services for the publit?
8 
Article 1  0 of the Services Directive provides that the Commission shall assess the effects 
of the measures adopted by the Member States regarding simple packet~ or circuit-
switched data services under Article 3 of the Directive in  1994, to see whether any 
amendmentS need to be made to the provisions of that Article, particularly in the light of 
technological evolution and the development of trade within the Community. 
During the consultation on the 1987 Green Paper, various Member States stressed the need 
for a special regime for basic switched data network services such as X.25
39
•  No 
justification could be found for  the maintenance of exclusive rights as regards the 
provision of such services per se.  The Commission, however, acknowledged that 
develcped data switching networks might have a structural effect on investments and 
regional planning, and could therefore qualify for a specific regime, set out in Article 3 of 
the Directive, in particular the application of public service specifications in the form of 
trade regulations relating to conditions of permanence, availability, and permanence of 
service. 
38 
39 
Article  1 defines 'packet and circuit-switched data services' as  "the commercial provision for the 
public of direct transport of data between public switched network termination points, enabling any 
user to  use equipment connected to such a network termination point in order to communicate with 
another termination point"  ' 
X.25  is  a standard protocol for packet switched networks.  Another advanced protocol for high 
speed data transfer is  frame-relay. 
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Moreover, given the substantial difference between charges for use of the data 
transmission service on the switched network and charges for  use of leased lines at the 
time of adoption of the Directive, Article 3 allowed that exclusive rights for data services 
which represented "simple resale of capacity"
40 could be maintained until 31  December 
1992, with possible additional deferments until 1 January 1996 for those countries where 
the relevant network for the provision of the packet or circuit switched services were not 
yet sufficiently developed
41
•  The aim was to allow that equilibriwn in such charges would 
be achieved gradually.  Two Member States
42  initially requested such an extension of 
deadline, although in neither case the request  was maintained. 
As regards the special regime, only three Member States43  notified draft specifications to 
the Commission before the deadline provided in the Directive, i.e. 30 June 1992.  The 
Commission has assessed with the Member States concerned, whether the planned 
specifications were objective, non-discriminatory, transparent and proportionate to the aim 
pursued. These bilateral discussions were very useful and provided a basic experience of 
how a liberalised service can be regulated to guarantee certain public service objectives, 
without restricting competition.  It appeared in particular that, given the different starting 
positions of incumbent operators and potential new entrants, special attention should  be 
given to avoid burdening  the latter in a way which could constitute a barrier to entry and 
which would comfirm  the market power of the dominant operator.  In such cases Member 
States should not necessarily impose the same conditions on new entrants as imposed on 
the dominant public operator. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
The Directive defines the  latter as "the commercial provision on leased lines for the public of data 
transmission as  a separate service, including· only such switching,  processing, data storage or 
protocol conversion as  is  necessary for the transmission in real time to and from the public switched 
network". 
Recital  11  of the Directive. 
Greece and Spain 
Three Member States (Belgium, France,  and Spain) have adopted additional licensing conditions for 
the provision of simple resale for packet or circuit-switched services.  In  Spain, for example, there 
is a  scheme regulating the granting of concessions for the provision of packet or circuit switched 
data services which does not tie in completely with  the Commission's comments concerning  this 
area. The scope of the Spanish scheme is too broad, since it applies to data services between 
"network termination points" instead of "termination points of the public switched network". 
Italy was also considering the adoption of additional conditions, but failed to  implement the 
Directive within an appropriate timescale. Given that under the direct effect of Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Directive simple resale of capacity was liberalised in  Italy without any further restrictions, the 
Italian government shall have to provide appropriate justifications for the reintroduction of ar:ty 
additional restrictions in  that respect. 
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Over the last years, rapid technological evolution and, in particular, the development 
alongside the traditional X.25 of A  TM
44
,  has undennined the traditional  justifications for 
the current specific regime for basic data services.  One can assume that in the  near 
future X.25 public backbone networks will continue to co-exist with frame-relay-networks 
and the new emerging AIM-backbones.  Applying the same service-specific regulation to 
such different technologies will prove difficult.  It could delay new offers of virtual 
private networks and value added services and thus limit technical progress in the area. 
Moreover the rationale behind quality or coverage obligations decreases with the 
increasing differentiation of the o:ffer.  The emergence of new services requires a degree 
of flexibility which cannot be steered by regulation. 
The current specific schemes in force in three Member States also have an impact on trade 
between Member States.  The limited number of applicants for authorisations under the 
current schemes in the three  Member State can, in part, be explained by the fact that 
many providers of the relevant service prefer to limit their offer to CUG's instead of 
having to apply for a license under these circumstances. 
On the basis of its assessment, given that most of the Member States have not deemed it 
necessary to adopt specific schemes for data services, without noticeable negative effect as 
regards the public interest objectives pursued by these schemes, the Commission considers, 
. that the requirement for applying specific public service specifications with regard to data 
services should be reviewed in the framework of the general adjustment of the 
telecommunications regulatory framework to  be presented before 1 January 1996 
according to Council Resolution 93/C 213/01, and that the  term~ation of the current 
specific schemes for data services should be considered
45
• 
e)  The Separation of  Operation and Regulation 
The separation of the regulation of the telecommunications sector from the operation of 
the national Telecommunications Organisation was, without doubt, the most fundamental 
condition for achieving reform and liberalisation of the EU telecommunications markets. 
Whatever institutional, legal or· structural means may be used to achieve it,  Article 7
46  of 
the Directive requires that the Member States must separate telecommunications regulatory 
and operational functions. 
44 
45 
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ATM : "Asynchronous Tranfer Mode", advanced high speed communications.  See also Green Paper 
on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks, op. cit. 
However, such schemes may be  required as regards the provision of voice telephony for the public, 
once liberalised.  See  licensing criteria proposed for licensing mobile and personal communications 
networks, as well as for fixed networks (Green Paper for mobile and personal communications, 
Green Paper on the  liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks, 
op. cit .. 
Article 7 requires  Memb~r  Stares to ensure that "from  I July  1991  the grant of operating licences, 
the control of type approval and mandatory specifications, the allocation of frequencies and 
surveillance of usage conditions are carried out y a body  independent of the telecommunications 
organisations" 
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Whilst National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) now formally exist in most Member 
States, the Commission considers that the degree of separation between these and those of 
the operator functions  is still not sufficiently clear in at least five Member States.47• 
This issue of the independence of the National Regulatory Authorities was raised in a 
number of preliminary referrals to the Court of Justice relating to Article 6 of Directive 
88/301/EEC (the 'Terminals Directive') , which required Member States, as of 1 July 1989, 
to ensure that the fixing of technical standards as well as supervision of type approval; 
were carried out by bodies independent from public or private undertakings involved in 
the marketing of telecommunications equipment.  In its judgements of 27 October 1993 
48
, 
the Court found that this requirement had been infringed in France where, at that time, 
departments in the same Ministry were responsible for the commercial exploitation of the 
public network, and the fixing of technical standards, the supervision of conformity and 
the approval of terminal equipment. 
Article 7 of the Services Directive to a large extent mirrors the wording of Article 6 of the 
Terminals Directive.  The implementation by the Member States of the former must be 
considered in view of this past judgement.  A mere legal or administrative separation 
between the functions  - such as that between two services of a Ministry - would only be 
sufficient to comply with Article 7 under the following conditions: 
o  it must be shown that there is a 'real' separation 
o  in particular, there must be financial  independence of one from the other 
o  any movement of  personnel from the regulatory body to  the operational body 
should be subject to  special supervision.  · 
Forms of structural separation offering a reasonable guarantee that such conditions would 
be upheld, include : 
47 
48 
the granting of the regulatory functions to a department of the relevant Ministry 
For example, in the Netherlands, the regulation is carried out by the Ministry for Transport and 
Public  Works through the Directorate General for Post and Telecommunications. The Ministry is, 
however, also the majority shareholder of KPN which has still the  exclu~ive right to install, maintain 
and operate the telecommunications infrastructure, and provides the mandatory services to each 
applicant. 
Some questions have also been raised about how distinct a separation of powers exists between 
regulator and operator in  Belgium, Spain, and Greece.  The Belgian Government has, however, 
stated its intention to respect the complete autonomy of the public operator BELGACOM in the area 
of non-reserved services in  response to Commission concerns. In Spain, the Director General for 
Telecommunications (responsible for  regulation) is also the Government Delegate on the Board of 
directors of Telef6nica, although such a delegate could legally come from another Ministry. 
In Greece, while functions have been formally separated, the continuous movement of personnel 
from the operational body to the regulatory body makes the practical separation of these bodies 
unclear. 
The cases Decoster et al (C-69/91) and Taillandier (C-46/90) 
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when the telecommunications undertaking is itself controlled by private 
shareholders, or 
ii  the granting of the relevant regulatory functions to a body, which is independent 
from the relevant Ministry {except for the control of its accounts and the legality of 
its decisions) when the latter is also acting as sole or dominant shareholder of the 
operator or where a considerable state shareholding in the operator remains. 
Alongside the legal guarantees and general rules implied by the Directive, actual practice 
·and spirit are an important test of compatibility with Article ·7.  How "independence"  i~ 
actually achieved institutionally will therefore vary, to a certain degree, according to the 
legal tradition and experience in each Member State. 
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IV  Inclusion of Satellite Networks and Services 
Directive 94/46/EC 
On 13 October 1994, the Commission adopted Directive 94/46/EC.  This Directive  extends 
the Terminal Directive
49 to include satellite earth station equipment and extends the Services 
Directive to include satellite communications services50• 
a)  The signifzcance of  the amending Directive 
The aim of the Union's policy in the area of  satellite communications, shared by the Council 
and the Commission, is to stimulate without delay greater use of satellite communications in 
the  EU.  This  is  particularly  important  given  the  widening  gap  between  the  delay  in 
development  of EU business satellite commwiications compared to  that which its major 
competitors enjoy. 
The Directive requires the abolition of  all exclusive rights granted for the provision of satellite 
services, and the abolition of all special rights
51  to provide any telecommunications service 
covered by the Directive. 
b)  Voice telepllony 
The amended Directive does not affect restrictions on offering voice telephony for the public 
via satellite network.  However, this must not lead to  te~hnical restrictions.  While recital 16 
states that "in the case of direct transport and switching of speech via satellite earth station 
networks,  commercial  provision  for  the  public  in general  can take  place  only  when  the 
satellite earth station network is connected to the public switched· network", this is merely a 
guide as  to  what is  normally the case.  It should not be  understood as  allowing  technical 
restrictions to  protect the voice  telephony  monopoly.  The  burden of proof that the  new 
service actually constitutes "voice telephony" rests with the regulator. 
49 
so 
Sl 
Commission Directive of 16 May  1988 on competition on the markets in telecommunications 
terminal equipment (88 I 301  I EEC, OJ Ll31 I 73, 27.5.88) 
Directive 94146/EC constitutes the central measure for implementing the liberalisation objectives for 
the satellite sector,  set forth by Council Resolution 92/C 8/01  (based on the Green Paper on 
satellite communications, COM(90)490). 
Other measures in this field are Council Directive 93/97/EEC of 29th October 1993, relating to 
mutual recognition of type approval for satellite terminals and the proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on a policy for the mutual recognition of licences and other 
national authorisations for the provsiion of satellite network services and/or satellite communications 
services, COM(93)652, 4.1.94. 
Special rights is  defined in the Directive as "limiting the number of undertakings authorised to 
provide telecommunications services otherwise than according to objective, proportional and non-
discriminatory criteria or designating otherwise than to such criteria several competing undertakings 
to provide such services". 
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In fact, the provision of  voice for closed user groups will often involve such connections with 
the public switched network, since some members of such groups will not be connected to 
the network via satellite stations'
2
• 
c)  Broadcasting services 
The status of broadcasting services are also unaffected by  Directive 94/46/EC.  One has, 
however,  to  distinguish between  the  content and the  technical  provision of broadcasting 
services.  As  mentioned  in  recital  17,  the  provision of satellite network  services for  the 
conveyance  of  radio  and  television  programmes  is,  by·  its  very  nature,  also  a 
telecommunications service and there is therefore no justification for treating jt differently 
from any other telecommunications service.  The Directive, thus, makes a distinction between: 
* 
* 
the  services  provided  by  the  carrier  (transmission,  switching  and  other  activities) 
necessary for the conveyance of the signals, which are telecommunications services 
liberalised under the Directive, and 
the  activities  of those  bodies  which  control  the  contents  of the  messages  to  be 
broadcasted,  which  are  broadcasting  activities  falling  outside  the  scope· of this 
Directive. 
Satellite broadcasting services which should now be liberalised under this Directive therefore 
include services provided over telecommunications operator's feeder links from studios/events 
to  uplink sites, as well as  uplink services for  point to point, point to  multipoint, direct-to-
home (DTH) satellite broadcast services and services to cable-head ends  .. 
d)  Access to space segment 
Member States are required by the Directive to abolish all restrictions on the offer of space-
segment capacity on their territory. 
This means that the Member States now must ensure that: 
* 
* 
52 
any regulatory prohibition' or restrictions on the offer of space' segment capacity to 
any authorised satellite earth station network operator are abolished, 
any space segment supplier is authorized to verify within its territory that the satellite 
earth station network for use in connection with the space segment of the supplier in 
question,  is  in  conformity  with  the  published  conditions  for  access  to  his  space 
segment capacity. 
According to the definition given, closed user groups are  indeed not to be defined technically, by 
the network to which their members are connected and which should not be accessible by  third 
parties but sociologically by the economic or professional relationship among their members. 
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In its Conununication of 10 JW1e  1994 on satellite communications relating to the provision 
of - and access to - space segment capacity
53
, the Commission announced its intention to use 
the competition rules to remove all national restrictions within the European Union on access 
to space segment.  The discovery procedures set out in Article 3 of the Directive will,  in 
particular, be implemented to gather the necessary information to achieve this purpose. 
e)  International SateUite Organisations 
The  new obligations  related  to  space  segment  do  not  directly  affect  the  position of the 
telecommunications  organizations  as  signatory  of international  organisations.  However, 
Member States are obliged to ensure that there are no restrictive provisions in their national 
regulations which would have the effect of preventing the offer of space segment capacity in 
th~ir territory  by  either another signatory of the  relevant organisations or by  independent 
systems.  Similarly Member States are obliged to ensure that there are no regulatory or non-
regulatory restrictions preventing space segment capacity already leased by a licensed operator 
in  one  Member State  from  being  freely  accessed  from  any  other  Member  State.  Such 
restrictions include those preventing parties other than the signatory in the Member State(s) 
concerned from verifying the technical and operations specifications of  satellite earth stations. 
Article 3 of Directive 94/46/EC requires Member States to communicate to the Commission, 
at its request, the information relating to  international satellite organisations they possess on 
any measure that could prejudice in particular compliance with the competition rules of the 
EC Treaty.  Recital21 explains that this provision aims amongst others to monitor the review 
which is underway within these international organisations to improve access. 
Article 3 of Directive 94/46/EC does  therefore also  not directly  affect the  position of the 
signatories.  However,  if it  appeared  that  signatories  continue  to  maintain  mechanisms 
dissuading  multiple  access  and  thus  favouring  market  sharing  for  the  provision of space 
segment,  the Commission would have  to  assess whether action should be  taken under the 
competition rules of the Treaty against the relevant signatories. 
The  coupling of investment obligations  and  utilisation could  constitute such a  dissuasive 
mechanism, where it dissuades signatories to market space segment by  the threat of having 
to  bear an increased investment share.  With  international organisations, and in particular 
EUTELSA  T,  operating  in  increasingly  competitive  markets,  the  current  investment 
requirements will therefore, if they are not amended, have to be thoroughly assessed under 
the Competition rules. 
S3  COM(94)210 final. 
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f)  Time table for implementation 
The Directive gives Member States nine months to inform the Commission of the measures 
taken  to  transpose  the  Directive  into  national  law.  The  Member  States  should  thus 
communicate to the Commission before 8 August 1995, a copy of the measures taken to 
abolish ~e  current restrictions on the provision of satellite services,  and of any licensing or 
declaration procedure which is  currently  in force  or is being drafted for the operation of 
satellite networks.  The aim is to allow the Commission to assess whether these conditions 
are necessary with a view to satisfying essential requirements. The information provided to 
the  Commission  should  include  possible  fees  imposed  as  part  of these  authorization 
procedures as well as the criteria upon which these fees are based. 
Recital 22 which mentions that the Commission will also take into account the situation of 
those Membe.r States in which the terrestrial network is not yet sufficiently developed must 
be seen in the framework of this notification requirement. Member States which would deem 
necessary a  deferment of the date of full  application of the above mentioned provisions
54 
should request it formally and with the necessary justification within the time period provided 
for the communication of  the implementation mea.Sures of the Directive, i.e. before 8 August 
1995.  The Commission will  then  assess whether  it  should refrain  from  insisting  on the 
immediate liberalisation of the relevant satellite services. This would, however, not prevent 
possible actions in national courts brought by third parties .in these Member States. 
Given the wide variety of satellite services, the  motivation given should, in the first place, 
include  the . list  of  satellite  network  services  for  which  the  deferment  is  requested, 
accompanied by estimates of the markets concerned. 
It should further explain which services of the national Telecommunications Organisations 
would be affected, and on the basis of the turnover of these services and their contribution 
to the financing of  the public network, a potential negative impact on the future development 
of the public  network should be demonstrated. 
The Commission will apply to the ~r~portionality principle.  The Commission will in any case 
insist on, for example, the liberalisation of services which are economically insignificant. 
S4  This derogation can apply up  to  I  st January  1996 at the latest. 
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V  FUTURE EVOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF SERVICES 
AND  INFRASTRUCTURE LffiERALISATION 
While major attention will have to continue to be paid to the full effective implementation 
of  the Services Directive, the future development of  the Directive must be considered within 
the  overall  context,  which  was  determined  by  the  review  carried  out  according  to  the 
provisions of  the Directive during 1992, leading to Council Resolution 93/213/01 of22 July 
1993  on  full  service  liberalisation  by  1  January  1998,  now  supplemented  by  Council 
Resolution 94/C3 79/03 of  22 December 1994, integrating infrastructure liberalisation into this 
time schedule. 
According to  Council Resolution 93/ 213  I 01  the Commission should 
"  ... prepare, before 1st January 1996, the necessary amendments to the Community regulatory 
framework  in  order  to  achieve  liberalisation  of all  public ·voice  telephony  services  by 
l  January 1998 .. " 
Given  its  central  role  in  lifting  the  restrictions  to  competition  and  ensuring  fair  market 
conditions,  amendments  to  the  Services  Directive  will  represent  a  focal  point  of these 
measures. 
As set forth in the Green Paper (Part I) on telecommunications infrastructure liberalisation
55
: 
Under the Directive 90/388 on competition in the markets for telecommunications service·s, 
the provision of all telecommunications services was opened to competition, subject to  four 
significant exceptions 
satellite services 
mobile tel,ephony  and paging services 
radio and TV broadcasting services to the public, and 
voice telephony services to the general public. 
Directive 90/388 in its original form did not address the use of alternative infrastructures and 
cable TV networks for the provision of liberalised services.  Directive 90/388 only required 
the removal of restrictions on the use of a single source of infrastructure, namely leased lines 
provided by the TOs, for the provision of liberalised services. 
As regards the exceptions set out above, the following applies : 
ss  Op cit 
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o  Commission  Directive  94/46/EC
56
,  amending  Directives  88/301/EEC 
(telecommunications  terminal  equipment)  and  90/388/EEC  (telecommuni~ations 
services) in particular with regard to satellite communications, adopted on 13 October 
1994 has lifted the exception with regard to satellite services.  As set out under IV., 
Member States are given ?  mon~  to communicate implementation measures taken. 
o  On 21  December 1994, the Commission adopted, for consultation, a draft amending 
Directive  concerning  the  liberalisation of the  use  of cable  TV  networks  for  the 
services  already  liberalised  according  to  the  Services  Directive,  providing  for 
substantial opening of the further development of these networks, particularly with 
regard to multi-media. 
o  The Commission Communication on the consultations following the Green Paper on 
Mobile  and Personal Communications was  published on 23  November 1994
57
•  It 
proposed the lifting of all special and exclusive rights with regard to mobile services 
by  1 January  1996.  The corresponding amendments to the Services Directive will 
have to be considered. 
Finally, a major issue will be the adjustment of  the telecommunications regulatory framework 
to  the  objectives  of the  Council  resolutions  of 22  July  1993  and  22  December  1994, 
integrating the date of 1 January 1998 for fullliberalisation (with additional transition periods 
for  certain  Member  States),  to  be  proposed  before  1 January  1996.  As  set forth  in  the 
Infrastructure  Green Paper (Part 11)
58
,  such an approach  must aim  at  creating the  optimal 
envirorunent for the future development of the European Union's telecommunications sector 
by combination of both competition policy and sector specific regulation. 
Besides the adjustment of the  existing harmonization Directives in  the  telecommunications 
sector (such as ONP Directives) and the working out of proposals for  maintaining universal 
service and ensuring interconnection, as well as the review of the institutional arrangements 
for  regulating the sector,  this will  in particular require  further  adjustment of the  Services 
Directive. 
At the Council of 17 November, the Commission has welcomed the agreement on the date 
of 1998  as  the  deadline  for  the  liberalisation of infrastructure  for  all  telecommunication 
services.  It has also taken note of the concerns of a number of Member States expressed at 
this Council, to undertake early measures for the liberalisation of alternative infrastructures 
for  services already  liberalised according to  the Services Directive.  This· aspect will  need 
further consideration.  ""' 
S6 
57 
58 
see section IV 
COM(94) 492 final:  Communication to the  European Parliament and the  Council on the 
Consultation on the Green Paper on Mobile and Personal Communications 
Op. cit. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Commission J?irective  90/388/EEC represents the most significant legislative pteasure for 
liberalising EU telecommunications to  date.  The Commission will ensure that maximum 
effort and resources are directed towards  solving identified problems and  filling  gaps  in 
implementation. 
The  1992  Review  revealed  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  measures  liberalising  the 
telecommunications sector (concerning at that stage, in particular the liberalisation of data 
communications,  value  added  services  and  the  provision  of data  and  voice  services  to 
corporate users and closed user groups) was questioned by many service providers and users 
of such  ~ervices.  It has also been understood that implementation of the Services Directive 
is hampered by the non-availability of infrastructure under reasonable conditions. 
In particular, high tariffs for and lack of availability of the basic infrastructure over which 
liberalised services are operated ·or provided to  third  parties have delayed the widespread 
development of high speed corporate networks in Europe, remote accessing of databases by 
both  business  and  residential  users  and  the  deployment  of innovative  services  such  as 
telebanking and distance learning.  Additionally, the regulatory restrictions in many Member 
States still prevent the use of  alternative infrastructure operated by third parties, such as cable 
TV  -networks. and networks owned by energy companies, railways, or motorways to meet their 
internal  communications needs.  Many user associations and companies have stressed that 
European business i~ less competitive, that innovative services are more slowly deployed and 
that the creation and development of pan-European networks and services is being delayed 
as a result. 
The importance of  effective and affordable infrastructure is increasingly recognised in political 
debate within the  Mem~er States themselves.  The European Parliament has called on the 
Commission to  ~dopt, as soon as  possible, the necessary measures. 
The continued bottleneck situation has been emphasized as a key obstacle to the development 
of  the European Information Infrastructure in the report on Europe and the global information 
society.  The  Action  Plan  towards  the  European  Information  Society  adopted  by  the 
Commission in response has set a general framework. 
Further emphasis on effective implementation of the telecommunications Services Directive 
and its future evolution will take account of these general objectives.  It is with this intention 
in mind, that the Commission transmits this Communication to the European Parliament and 
to the Council. 
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ANNEX  I 
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 90/388/EEC 
The following represents a short overview of the state of  implementation of  the Directive in 
individual Member States.  Given the rapid development in this field,  reference sho.uld be 
made to National Regulatory Authorities for more detailed information. 
The overview does not include infonnation with regard to implementation in the European 
Economic Area.  · 
BELGIUM 
The Directive is  implemented in Belgium by the law of 21  March 1991
59
•  With regard to 
telecommunications it transforms the Regie des  Telegraphes et des  Telephones/Regie van 
Telegraaf en Telefoon (RTT) into the public autonomous company BELGACOM. 
As regards the definition of the reserved service in the Belgian law, Article 68  defines the 
'Telephone Service' as the telecommunications service intended for the direct carrying and real 
time switching of vocal  signals at the start and at the destination of the connection points, 
including the services necessary for its operation. In letters of July 1991  and June 1993  the 
Belgian Government confirmed that it interprets the law in the way intended by the Directive. 
Where a provider wishes to supply liberalised services, a list of non-reserved services can be 
established  by  Royal  Decree  which,  by  derogation,  would  automatically  be  authorised 
providing  that  the  applicant  informs  the  IBPT  of the  service.  Thus  far,  however,  the 
Commission is not aware of such a list. In its absence, the applicant must give the IBPT two 
months prior notice of its intention during which time the IBPT can oppose the provision of 
the service if it deems it contrary to  the  1991  law.  Article 89(5) states that the IBPT must 
provide a reasoned decision if it refuses to authorise the provision of a service. 
Belgium is one of three Member States to  have adopted additional licensing conditions for 
the provision of  packet- or circuit-switched data services for the public. This is allowed under 
Article 3 of the 'birective as  long as the Commission approves the conditions, which it did 
in July 1993. 
59  Moniteur Beige, 27  March  1991, p.6155 and corrigendum in  Moniteur Beige 20  July  1991. The 
same  law  also  implements the  Directive on competition in  the  markets for telecommunications 
terminal equipment, Commission Directive 88/301/EEC. - 32  -
Under Article 85 of the  1991  Belgian Law, BELGACOM can only refuse a user access to a 
leased line on the basis of  the essential requirements recognised by Community Law. Further, 
as defmed in the management contract (Art 21(3}),  BELGACOM must satisfy at least 90o/o 
of the  registered applications  for  ONP-leased  lines  within three  months  unless  otherwise 
agreed with the customer.  ·  · 
With respect to the issue of the independence of BELGACOM from the regulatory authority 
as  required by Article 7 of the Directive, under the 1991 law regulatory powers are assigned 
to the Minister responsible (assisted by the  national. regulatory  authority, Institut Belge des 
S~rvices Postaux. et des Telecommunications, IBPn. The Belgian Government has stated that 
it will respect the complete autonomy of BELGACOM in the area of non-reserved services. 
DENMARK 
The Directive has been implemented in Denmark by Law No. 743 of 14 November 1990 and 
the Consolidating Order No.398 of 13  May  1992. 
Under the Act, the Minister of Communications can grant a concession to TeleDanmark on 
the  establishment and operation in relation to public radio and fixed  services as well as  of 
voice  telephony,  text  and  data  communication,  provision  of  leased  lines,  mobile 
communications and satellite services, and transmission of radio and TV  programmes. 
An area of concern,  and  indeed the  issue which led  to  the  commencement of infringement 
· proceedings against Denmark,  was the definition of "voice telephony" which is reserved to 
TeleDanmark.  The  initial  law  reserved  all  of the  non  .. public  transmission  of traffic  to 
TeleDanmark with the sole exception of voice telephony over leased lines between different 
legal entities (i.e. shared use). This clearly left too many restrictions on the usage conditions 
of leased lines in place,  in contravention of the Directive. 
The  Commission closed its  proceedings  after  the  adoption  by  the  Danish  Government  of 
Order No.  905  of 2 November 1994 which allows anyone to provide domestic public voice 
telephony without requiring any form of authorization or declaration. As regards international 
calls, a license is required where calls originating from the PSTN are carried via leased lines 
and  then returned back to  the  PSTN.  Such licence  is  only  granted for traffic to  countries 
which have liberalised voice telephony. 
The Order was adopted under Article 3 of the  1990 Danish Act,  which entitles the Minister 
to issue regulations for the establishment and operation of services which are not covered by 
TeleDanmark's concession or special rights. 
The rules to be applied to packet- and circuit-switched data services after 31  December 1992 
were stated in the Danish Order of December 1992. There is a slight discrepancy between the 
scope of these rules, and that intended by Article 3 of the  Directive since the Order covers 
all data communications services. - 33  -
FRANCE 
The French government has implemented the Directive mainly through the adoption of Law 
No. 90-1170 of 29 December 1990 on the regulation of telecommunications. This Law is a 
modification of  the "Code des Pastes et Telecommunications" (the Code) which gives France 
Telecom an exclusive right to establish telecommunications network infrastructures open to 
the general public. 
Article L  34 specifies that only  services provided to the  public are covered by  the  Law. 
Article L.32-7 .of the Code defines reserved voice telephony as the commercial provision of 
a  system of direct,  real-time  voice transmissions between users connected to  termination 
points  of a .  telecommunications  network.  All  other  services provided  to  the  public  are 
liberalised subject to  a declaration procedure or, for services of 5 Mbits/sec or more, to  a 
licensing procedure
60
• 
According to Article L.34-2, France Telecom is authorised to supply any bearer service (this 
is how the French regulation qualifies the  provision of simple resale of packet or circuit-
switched services).  Other providers need a licence. France has adopted additional licensing 
conditions for the provision of such bearer-service.  A fmal. draft Decree for the application 
of Article  L.34.2  relating  to  bearer  services  was  transmitted  to  the  Commission which 
decided, on 26 November 1992, not to object to its entry into force. The Decree was formally 
adopted on 30 December 1993 and published in the French Official Journal of 31  December 
1993  (p.18276).  This decree sets out a number of conditions relating to: 
the essential requirements, 
the measurement and the publication of the characteristics and the area of coverage 
of the service (Article 2) 
the respect of technical constraints concerning access to the service (Article 3) 
the interconnection with other bearer services (Article 4) 
national defence and public security as regards the encryption of data (Article 5), 
fair competition. 
The authorization of France Telecom to  provide  this service, cannot be  transferred to  its 
subsidiaries.  TRANSP  AC,  which  is  a  subsidiary  of  the  Compagnie  Generale  des 
Communications (COGECOM), itself a 100 % daughter of France Telecom, had therefore to 
request a licence which was granted by  order of 15  July 1993  (French Official Journal of 
.  8 August 1993, p.  11224). 
As regards the separation of regulation and operation (Article 7), the Minister for Industry, 
Posts and Telecommunications and Foreign Trade ensures that the regulations are respected 
by the public operators and, furthermore, that the regulation of  the telecommunications sector 
on the  one hand,  and the  operation of networks and the  provision of telecommunications 
services on the other hand, are performed independently. He exercises his rights through the 
"Direction Generale des Pastes et Telecommunications" (DGPT). 
60  The following companies were granted a licence: SIT  A,  BT, SPRINT, SLIGOS, GSI, EDT and 
ESPRIT TELECOM. 
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GERMANY 
Two German laws adopted on 8 June 1989 define the legal framework for the provision of 
telecommunications  services:  the  Postverfassungsgesetz  (PVG),  which  delimits  the 
organisation and tasks of the  Ministry for  Post and Telecommunications and  of Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom;  and  an  amendment of the  Fernmeldeanlagegesetz (FAG),  defining 
among  other  things,  the  monopoly  retained  by  the  State.  The  legal  framework  was 
substantially amended by Law of 14 September 1994 (Postneuordnungsgesetz -PTNeuOG), 
which came into force on 1 January 1995. 
The new Act did not however alter the· definition of the  "voice telephony"  reserved to the 
DBP Telekom,  although  the  Commission had  in  April  1994  drawn  the  attention  of the 
German Government to the fact that it is broader than that in the Directive.  Essentially three 
issues arise.  Firstly, the definition uses the wording "for third parties" as opposed to "for the 
public".  As  a consequence,  the  switching of voice  for  closed user groups  is  part of the 
monopoly.  Secondly, the terms "switching of vo.ice"  in the Law are interpreted in practice 
as  including  also  mixed  telecommunications (voice combined with data or  images)  in the 
monopoly,  when  the  exchange  of  speech  can  technically  be  dissociated  from  data 
communication as is the case as regards videophony on ISDN.  Finally, the definition covers 
all  switching of voice,  without  distinguishing whether the  voice both originates in and is 
switched to the public switched network.  According to the Directive the switching of voice 
originating in a leased line network or switched to such a leased line network should not be 
reserved. 
Following bilateral contacts, the first issue was provisionally settled to  a large extent.  The 
German  Law (FAG)  reserves voice  telephony  for  third parties,  which  is  more  than voice 
telephony  "for the  public"  as  allowed  according  to  the  Directive.  To  restore conformity 
between  German  and  Community  Law,  the  German  Ministry  for  Post  and 
Telecommunications, instead of  changing the Law, used its licensing powers to allow by order 
(Verfilgung)  No.  1/1993,  of 6  January  1993  and  8/1993  of  13  January  1993,  private 
companies to provide telephony to closed user groups.  The order established a class license 
(Allgemeingenehmigung) for the provision of the service to entities which are economically 
integrated. 
As  regards Article 6 of the  Directive,  Section 29  TKV  provides that a connection licence 
(Anschalteerlaubnis)  is  required  for  terminal  equipment  for  connection  to  the  network 
termination of transmission lines.  The  Commission views such a restriction as  contrary to 
Article 6 of the Directive since it delays the use of equipment, already type approved, used 
in the  switching and  processing of signals (such as  concentrators) to  connect leased lines 
networks with the  public switched telecommunications network.  The issue has been raised 
with the German authorities which will abolish the relevant provision. In the meantime, the 
ministry has granted a class connection licence (Vfg 269/1994). 
The powers referred to in Article 7 of the Directive were until 31  December 1994 exercised 
by The Minister for Posts and Telecommunications. Under the new regime, the Ministry will 
be assisted by a Regulation Council (Regulierungsrat), including representatives of  the Lander 
and the Federal Parliament (Bundestag).  On the other hand, the  government share in  DBP 
Telekom,  which was  transformed into  a joint stock company,  will  now  be· managed  by  a 
distinct office: the  Bundesanstalt ffir  Post und Telekommunikation (BAnst PT). 
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GREECE 
Greece implemented the Directive by means of  Law No. 2075/92. of  21  July 1992, which has 
never been brought fully into effect as the Greek government failed to adopt the order setting 
out the internal working rules of the independent regulatory body set up by the Act.  On 20 
October  1994, this law was replaced by  Law No.  2246/94.  The legislation does also not 
provide a complete regulatory framework and will necessitate further secondary legislation 
which has not yet been adopted. 
Given the failure of the Greek government to adopt timely implementation measures of the 
Services Directive the Commission has started proceedings before the Court of  Justice under 
1 
Article 169 of the Treaty. 
Article 2 (15) of Law No.  2246/94 defines "voice telephony" using the same wording as the 
Directive.  However,  Article  3 (2)  of the  Law  states as  principle  that  voice  telephony  is 
reserved  and  acknowledges  only  in  a second  stage  that  all  other  services  are  liberalised. 
Consequently, there  is  a  threat of a  broader definition of the  reserved voice  telephony  in 
Greece.  Moreover,  this  Article  makes  the  liberalisation of these  services  subject  to  the 
condition that their provision is compatible with the proper fulfilment of the mission assigned 
to the public operator OTE. 
Liberalised services are, according to this Article 3 (2}, subject to either an individual licence 
or to a declaration, depending on the limit of  the capacity of leased lines used.  The threshold 
has not yet been established. 
As regards simple resale of packet - and circuit - switched data transmission, Greece applied 
by letter of 7 February 1992 for the derogation until 1 January 1996 under Recital 11  of the 
Directive.  After the  adoption of Law No.  2075/92, which did not· distinguish packet- and 
circuit~s~tched data transmission from other liberalised telecommunications services, Greece 
confirmed by letter of 27 May  1993, that  it did no longer seek such a derogation and that 
packet- and circuit-switched data transmission was liberalised. 
According to Law No.  2246/94, the independent regulatory authority referred to in Article 7 
of the  .  Directive,  is  the  National  Telecommunications  Commission  (EET),  under  the 
supervision of the  Minister of Transport  and  Communications.  The  EET  is  the  relevant 
authority for  frequency  allocation,  numbering,  licensing and type approval,  as  well  as  for 
ensuring  compliance  with  national  and  EEC  Treaty  competition  rules.  It is  not  yet 
operational.  In the  mean-time, the Ministry exercises its competence. 
IRELAND 
Ireland has adopted specific regulations to  give effect to the Directive. These are contained 
in  "Statutory Instrument S.I.  No.45  of 1992,  European Communities (Telecommunications 
Services)  Regulations  1992."  which  have  amended  the  Postal  and  Telecommunications 
Services Act,  1983. - 36  -
In the area of voice telephony, the definition of "public voice telephony"  expressed in S.I. 
No.45 mirrors that in the Directive. The exclusive right granted to Telecom Eireann under 
Section 87  of the 1983  Act is restricted to offering, providing and maintaining .  the public 
telecommunications network and offering, providing and maintaining voice telephony services 
under Regulation 3(1) of  S.l. No.45.  Value added licences can be obtained under Article 111 
, of the Act of 1983 for provision of  any other service, including voice for  clos~d user groups 
or voice services making use of  only one connection point between leased lines and the public 
switched network.  By end 1994, 20 such licences were granted. 
Statutory Instrument No.45 of 1992 sets out the rights of these licensees as regards access to 
and use of  the public telecommunications network.  The conditions applied must be objective, 
non-discriminatory and published. Similarly, under Regulation 4(3) of the S.I., requests for 
leased lines have to be met within a reasonable period , and there should be no restrictions 
on their use other than to ensure non-provision of  telephone services, the security of network 
operations, the maintenance of network integrity and,  in justified cases, the interoperability 
of services and data protection. 
With respect to Article 7 of the Services Directive, The Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications is responsible for surveillance of  Telecom Eireann according to Regulation 
5 of S.I. No.45. 
ITALY 
The  Directive  has  been  included  in  the  Law  No.  142  of  19  February  1992,  "Legge 
Comunitaria for  1991
11  (LC  1991), which delegated to  the Government the  power to  issue, 
within one year after its coming into force (i.e. by  March 6,  1993), a number of legislative 
decrees for the implementation of the EEC Directives listed in Annexes A and B, including 
the  Services  Directive.  The legislative  decree  implementing  the  Services  Directive  was, 
however,  not adopted within this deadline.  Subsequently, the  Italian Government included 
the Services Directive in Article 54 of Law No. 146 of 22 February 1994 (legge.comunitaria 
1993). 
This Article repeats the specific principles and criteria to  be followed in the preparation of 
the  legislative  decree  implementing  the  Directive,  which  were  mentioned  in  LC  1991. 
Consequently it still .provides for a specific licensing procedure for the supply of packet- or 
circuit-switched data  services  although  the  deadline  set  out  in Article  3  of the  Service 
Directive for the introduction of  such scheme had already elapsed. Given that under the direct 
effect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive simple resale of capacity was liberalised in Italy 
without any  further  restrictions, the  Italian government  shall  have  to  provide  appropriate 
justifications for the reintroduction of any additional restrictions in that respect. 
The legislative decrees have not been adopted yet, and the Commission is considering taking 
Italy to the Court of Justice for failure to notify the implementation measures of the Services 
Directive. 
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In the meantime, Article 1 of  the Italian Postal Code of 1973, stating that "telecommunication 
services ... exclusively  pertain to  the  State"  remains  applicable  although  Article  2 of the 
Directive  implies  that  this  Article,  as  well  as  all  other  provisions  setting  out  the  state 
monopoly for  telecommunicati~ns services, should be changed to allow private operators the 
right to provide all telecommunications services excluding well defined areas reserved to the  . 
State.  According to the Italian legal framework,  only value added services listed in Article 
3(para.2) of the National Regulatory Plan for Telecommunications, enacted by a Ministerial 
Decree of 6 April 1990, may be provided. 
However, in a decision of 10 January 1995, the Italian Antitrust Authority (Autorita Garante) 
stated,  disregarding  the  mentioned  Italian  regulation,  that  a refusal  of Telecom  ltalia to 
provide leased lines to a private company wanting to offer voice services liberalised under 
the  Directive is  an  abuse  of dominant  position and  requested Telecom  Italia61  to  present, 
within 90  days, the  actions taken in order to  remove the  restrictions to  competition in the 
market for voice services for corporate networks/closed user groups, including virtual private 
networks.  The Antitrust Authority bases this decision on the direct effect of Articles 1 and 
2 of the Services Directive in  ~~~.ly.  Telecom ltalia has appealed against the decision. 
With the implementation of  Act 58/92 on the reorganisation of  the telecommunications sector, 
regulatory and operational functions were, in principle, separated by transferring the operating 
bodies of the  Ministry,  namely  ASST,  to  Iritel,  a company  of the  IRI  Group.  A bill  on 
"Public Utility Services Regulatory Authorities" (No.  359) is currently pending at the Italian 
Parliament.,  which  will,  if adopted,  create,  inter  alia,  a  regulatory  body  .  for  post  and 
telecommunications.  However,  no date  is yet anticipated for  its adoption. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Two legislative acts were adopted in 1990 in order to implement the Directive, the Regulation 
(Reglement grand-ducal) of 3 August 1990 establishing the general rules applicable to public 
telecommunications  services  and  the  Regulations  of 8  October  1990  concerning  public 
telephone  service,  telecommunications  leased  lines,  public  luxpac  service,  public  alarm 
transmission service and public automatic telephone service - Serviphone. 
The Luxembourg authorities have,  by  letter of 22 October  1991, declared their intention to 
amend the definition of "basic telephonic service" in the Regulation and add the term "to the 
public". 
The Law of 20 February  1992 transfonned the former Administration des P&T into a public 
undertaking with a separate legal identity, to comply with the requirement of Article 7 of the 
Directive  to  separate  regulatory  and  operational  functions.  The  Minister  for  Posts  and 
Telecommunications exercises all regulatory responsibility in respect of the establishment and 
operation of the telecommunications networks . 
61  Telecom ltalia was created on  18  August  1994 out of a merger between SIP, ltalcable, IRITel, 
Telespazio and SIRM. 
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NETHERLANDS 
The  basic  telecommunications  legislation  in  the  Netherlands  (Act  No.  520  on  the 
telecommunications facilities (Wet op de Telecommunicatievoorzieningen) ("WTV") of 26 
October 1988, which came into force on 1 January 1989, was drafted before the publication 
of the  Commission  Green  Paper  of  1987.  It therefore  uses  a  terminology  which  is 
substantially different from the terminology used in  the Directive. 
Reserved voice telephony  is  defmed  in· Article 2 of Decree No 551  of 1 December  1988 
which lists the mandatory services ofKPN (Koninklijke PTT Netherlands).  According to the 
definition, the reserved service is not limited to a service which is provided on a commercial 
basis. Secondly, it does not limit the monopoly to voice telephony "for the public".  Thirdly, 
it does not take  into  account whether the provision of the service implies the use of two 
connection points of the relevant leased lines.  These issues have been discusied in bilateral 
contacts between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services.  The Dutch authorities 
have· subsequently published ~ notice on 30 May 1994 allowing voice services to closed user 
groups.  However, the  issue of voice  se~ices provided on leased lines and using only one 
connection with the public switched network is still under discussion. 
The Ministry for Transport and Public Works (Verkeer en Waterstaat) is the body entrusted 
with regulatory responsibilities for telecommunications and it may give detailed instructions 
to  KPN  concerning  the  execution  of the  general  Directives  (BART)  and  the  obligations 
relating to  mandatory services.  This ministerial responsibility includes general tariff policy 
for public telecommunications services (which, in application, is similar to 'price capping' in 
the UK). 
PORTUGAL 
As  in  the  case  of the  Netherlands,  the  regulatory  framework  for  telecommunications  in 
Portugal predates the adoption of the Directive. The "Basic Law on the Establishment, the 
Management and the Exploitation of Telecommunications Infrastructures and Services", Law 
88/89, ("Basic Law") was adopted on 11 September 1989 before the adoption of  the Directive. 
This explains  in  part  why  the  terminology  used  often  differs  marke~ly from  that  of the 
Directive.  The Basic Law, and in particular the distinction between complementary and value 
added services,  is technology-based rather than services-based. 
• • 
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On the issue of reserved services, the Portuguese legislation does not define services whose 
provision is reserved to  public carriers as  narrowly as the Conunission Directive. Firstly, 
Article 2(2) of the Basic Law defines  "telecommunications for public use" as all  services 
which are designed to meet the generic collective requirements for transmitting and receiving 
messages and information.  This is  a broader definition than  the concept of public in the 
Directive.  It is true that the Basic Law lists telecommunications for private use in Article 
2(3) and that this list encompasses at point h) "other communications reserved for the use of 
specific public or private entities by means of an authorization granted by the government 
under the terms of  treaties or international agreements or special legislation".  However, since 
the entry into force  of the law, the Portuguese government has not adopted the necessary 
legislation to liberalise voice telephony or telex services provided for closed user groups.  In 
September 1991, the Portuguese government announced the adoption of a ministerial order 
(diploma) on private networks to  resolve this issue. By letter of 18  November  1993,  the 
Portuguese authorities confirmed that they were still studying the issue and, in a subsequent 
bilateral meeting on 31  January 1994, no more precise undertaking on timing could be given. 
Secondly, under Portuguese legislation voice telephony is defined more broadly than in the 
Directive.  The Basic Law does not define voice telephony.  The definition is included in 
Article 1 of the former Regulation of the Public Telephone Service annexed to  the  Decree 
(Decreto-Lei) 199/87 of 30 April 1987.  The Basic Law refers to the technical operation of 
a fixed subscriber access system (which it defines as the set of transmission means located 
between a termination point and the first concentration, switching or processing node) without 
distinguishing between the situation, where this "access system" is a leased line or the PSTN ; 
nor does it take into consideration the number of connections to the leased line which may 
be used. 
A third issue is the  licensing conditions.  According to the Directive,  Member States may 
make the supply of telecommunications services subject to a licensing scheme, but only to 
warrant compliance  with the  essential requirements  listed  in  the  Directive.  However,  the 
Portuguese licensing scheme encompasses other obligations. 
The liberalised services are divided in two categories: "complementary telecommunications 
services"  and  "value added  services"  according  to  a  technical  criterion  : the ·use  of own 
infrastructure, and in particular,  concentration,  processing and switching nodes.  Therefore, 
most liberalised services come within the fixed complementary services category. The two 
types of services each have their own licensing conditions. 
Article  4 paragraph 2 of the  Directive requires Member States to  ensure that there are no 
restrictions on the use of leased lines except those justified by essential requirements or the 
existence  of the  voice  telephony  monopoly.  Article  14  of the  Basic Law  appears  more 
restrictive as it allows only the use of leased lines voice traffic to the suscriber's own use or 
to the provision of complementary and value added services, and even requires a licence for 
the shared use of leased circuits. 
Portugal claims that its  complementary services scheme (Portaria 930/92)  is  in  accordance 
with Article 3 of the Directive. This issue is however not settled. 
Portugal separated regulatory and operational functions in 1989.  According to the Basic Law, 
the Ministry is responsible for supervising and monitoring telecommunications.  This includes 
the planning and co-ordination of the  national public infrastructure and services which are 
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considered essential. 
In practice the regulatory  functions  are  delegated to  the  Institute  for  Communications of 
Portugal (ICP), leaving the Ministry to supervise the ICP and approve directives proposed by 
the ICP. 
SPAIN 
The Ley de Ordenaci6n de las Telecomunicaciones, Law No. 31/1987 of 18 December 1987, 
("LOT") is the legislation in force relating to telecommunications activities in Spain.  In light 
of  the Directive, the LOT has been amended by Law No. 32/1992 of  3 December 1992, which 
limited the reserved services to the basic telephone service, telex and telegrams, and a Royal 
Decree 80411993  of 28 May 1993  implementing Article 3 of the Directive as regards basic 
data switching services. 
As  has  been  the  case  in  some  other  Member  States,  the  major  issue  in  the  Directive's 
implementation has concerned the definition of  voice telephony and, hence, the reserved area. 
The LOT defines "basic voice telephony", in paragraph 15 of its annex, in terms identical to 
the definition of "voice telephony" in the Directive.  However, following a complaint to the 
Commission,  it seems that the Spanish authorities' understanding of this definition was not 
so clear and that, although defined in the Law, an administrative order would be required to 
define  further  Telef6nica's  basic  voice  telephony  monopoly.  This  definition  is  not  yet 
adopted. 
Spain  originally  requested  an  extension  period  for  exclusive  rights  for  simple  resale,  as 
allowed under Recital  11  of the Directive, although such a request was not maintained. As 
regards the grant of concessions for the provision of  packet or circuit switched data services, 
a scheme for its regulation was created by the Royal Decree of 28 May 1993.  The draft had 
been  notified  to  the  Commission,  but  the  text  adopted  did  not  take  account  of all  the 
Commission's remarks. Issues relevant to this, particularly regarding the scope of the scheme, 
are being further discussed with the Spanish authorities 
The regulatory powers referred to  in Article 7 of the Directive are the responsibility of the 
Directorate General for Telecommunications (DOT). The DOT was created by Royal Decree 
of 19  June  1985.  It  grants  concessions,  authorizations  and  administrative  licenses  for 
equipment and services. The Director General for telecommunications is, however, also the 
Government Delegate  on the  Board of Directors of Telef6nica  He  has  the  right to  veto 
decisions of the Board on grounds of public policy.  Moreover, Article 15 of  the LOT allows 
for the appointment by the Government of five other members of the Board. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The  legislation  in  force  applying  to  telecommunications  services  is  the  1984 
Telecommunications Act which predates the Commission's Green Paper and Directive. The 
Aet  has  been  extended  by  a  new  policy  building  on  the  1991  White  Paper  comprising 
amendments to existing licences, extensions of  cable licences to include the provision of  voice 
telephony services and the issuing of new licences. 
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UK legislation  has  generally  preceded  the  Commission's Directive.  For  example,  the 
exclusive rights of  BT to provide the telecommunications services. covered by Article 2 of  the 
Directive were abolished in the UK by section 2 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984. 
Section 5 requires all persons who run telecommunications systems to have a licence (which 
may be an individual or class licence) . 
As regards the provisions of  Article 4 of  the Directive, no precise defmition of  infrastructure, 
such as exists in Germany or the Netherlands has been set down.  Section 4 of  the T A instead 
defmes a "telecommunications system" as: A system for the conveyance, through the agency 
of electric, magnetic, electro-magnetic, electro-chemical or electromechanical eriergy, of 
speech, music and other sounds 
visual images 
signals serving for the impartation (whether as between persons and persons, things 
and things or persons and things) of any matter otherwise than in the form of sounds 
or visual images; or 
signals serving for the actuation or control of machinery or apparatus 
The Secretary of State designates certain of these systems as  "public telecommunications 
systems".  Operators of public  telecommunications  systems  are  authorised  by  individual 
licences and are generally granted PTO status. Around twenty public fixed link operators have 
been granted such licences, as well as  126 cable TV franchisees. 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act,  in conjunction with the Wireless Telegraphy Act  1949 
also ensures that the reguiatory functions specified in Article 7 are carried out independently 
of the Telecommunications Operators. This is largely through the work of OFTEL, a non-
ministerial government department under the Director General of Telecommunications who, 
for the duration of his appointment, is independent of ministerial control.  , 
SWEDEN 
There  has  never  been  a  legal  telecommunications  monopoly  in  Sweden.  The  de  facto 
monopoly of Telia ("Televerket" at the time) was the result of a commercial process. 
The  current  Regulatory  framework  of  telecommunications  is  set  out  in  the 
Telecommunications Act (Telelagen) of 1993.  Under this Act there are no exclusive rights 
to provide telecommunication services (Art. 2.1. and 4).  Any operator has the right to obtain 
a licence and to supply telecommunications services.  Reasons are given in case of refusals 
and Article 37 of the Act states that appeals against such refusals may be lodged with the 
administrative court of Appeal. 
Licences are required only for the operation of public networks and the provision of leased 
lines.  Other services are subject only to a registration procedure. 
There are no restrictions on the  processing of signals before or after transmission via the 
public network (Art.  6.1 ),  nor is  there any discrimination in the conditions of use or in  the 
charges payable (Art. 6.2). 
As  regards  the  separation  of regulation  and  operation  (Article  7  of the  Directive),  the 
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Telestyrelsen (Telecom Agency) is responsible for ensuring that regulations are respected by 
all  operators.  The Agency was set up  on  1 July  1992.  Its functionning  is  laid down in 
Forording 1992:895. The Agency may adopt sanctions, including the revocation of licences, 
against 'operators which do not comply with their obligation. 
The Agency  is  headed by  a Director General,  under the supervision of a board,  which is 
appointed by the Government.  Telestyrelsen has also responsibilities in the defence  area. 
The Agency is financed through fees levied on the basis of gross turnover of licencees and 
parties ·which registered. 
The main telecommunication operator in Sweden is Telia, which was incorporated as a private 
limited liability company  on  1 January  1993  according to  Law  1992: 100.  It is  a  100  % 
publicly owned company, supervised by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
AUSTRIA 
Austria  implemented  the  Directive  mainly  through  its  Telecommunications  Act 
(Fernmeldegesetz) Nr.  908/1993,  which entered  into  force  on  1 April  1994.  Austria has 
however  not  yet  notified  the  implementing  decrees  of this  law,  nor  the  general  usage 
conditions of the public network. 
The  reserved  telephone  service  is  defined  in  Articles  44(2)  and  2(6)  of the  Act.  This 
definition does not fully correspond to the definition in the Directive.  However, no  licenses 
are  required  for  the  provision of liberalised services.  Conditions for  access to  the  public 
network and use  of leased lines  will,  under Article  44(6) of the  Act be  laid down in the 
general usage conditions (  Geschaftsbedingungen). 
The public telecommunications operator is the Post und Telegraphenverwaltung (PTV).  The 
law entrusts the regulatory tasks to the Ministry of Public Economy and Communications. 
FINLAND 
The basic regulatory framework of  telecommunications is the telecommunications act 87/183 
(Teletoimintalaki), which was amended in  1988,  1990 and 1992. 
Under this  framework,  there  are  no  more  special  or  exclusive rights for  the  provision of 
telecommunications  services,  including  voice  telephony,  in  Finland.  The  whole 
tlecommunications  sector  has  been  opened  to  competition.  Public  telecommunications 
networks are operated by organizations with an operating licence granted by the Government. 
Article 1  0 of the Act sets out the rights and duties of subscribers and in particular the right 
to  lease Jines as well as to use them to provide telecommunications services or to sub-lease 
them to others. 
Public switched data communications are subject to notification only (Article 5(2) of  the Act). 
In 1994,  there were 63  organizations with operating licences and  13  notified organizations 
operating public switched data communications. 
Articles 18  - 23  of the Act entrust the  Ministry of Transport and Communications with the 
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general supervision and promotion of telecommunications.  The day to day  enforcement of 
the Telecommunications Act is, however, entrusted to the Telecommunications Administration 
Centre,  which  is  an  agency  under  the  Ministry  of Transport  and  Communications.  In 
principle the costs of the centre are covered by licence and inspection·fees. 
Telecom Finland is  100  %  state-owned but operates at arms length from  the  Ministry of 
Transport  and  Communications,  although  the  members  of its  board  as  well  as  the  top 
executives are appointed by the Government. - 44  -
ANNEX  II 
LIST OF NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES IN THE FIELD OF 
TELECO~~CATIONS 
The survey of the national regulatory framework of the Member .States in annex I has 
been drafted on the basis of the information officially notified to the Commission. 
For more detailed information, interested persons should contact directly the National 
Regulatory Authorities of the Member States.  The full address of these authorities were 
published in the Official Journal C 277/9 of 15  October 1993. 
I 
Belgium  1  Institut beige des services postaux et 
I 
1  des telecommunications  (IBPT) 
I  A  venue de l'Astronomie, 14 
I  . 
I  1  000 Brussels 
---------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------- 1 
Denmark  1  Telestyrelsen 
!  Holsteingade 63 
I  D  K - 2100 Kebenhaven 0 
------------~--------------------------------~--------------------------------------------- 1 
Germany  :  Bundesministerium fur  Po~t 
!  und Telekommunikation 
:  Postfach 80  01 
I 
I  D-53005 Bonn 
---------------------------------------------~---------·---------------------~-------------
Greece  !  Ministry of Transport 
!  Sygrou 49 
,  I  Athens 
---------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------------
Spain  Direcci6n General de 
Telecomunicaciones 
Sa.  planta 
Plaza de Cibeles SIN 
E-28701  Madrid 
---------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------- 1 
France  :  Direction generale des Postes et 
!  Telecommunications 
!  20, avenue de Segur 
I  75700  Paris 
---------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------- 1 
Ireland  1  Department of Transport, Energy 
!  and Communications 
!  Scotch Hause, 
!  Hawkins Street 
I  Dublin 2 
----------------------------------------------L---------------------------------------------
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----------------------------------------------r--------------------------------------------- 1 
Italy  1  lspettorato generate delle 
!  telecomunicazioni 
!  Viale Europa 190 
I  00  144 Roma 
---------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------- 1 
Luxembourg  l  Ministere des Communications 
i  18, mantee de la Petrusse 
l  L - 2945 Luxembourg 
----------------------------------------------r--------------------------------------------- 1 
The Netherlands  :  Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
i  Hoofddirectie telecommunicatie en Post 
!  Postbus 20901 
I  NL - 2500 EX 's Gravenhage 
----------------------------------------------r--------------------------------------------- 1 
Portugal  l  I  CP 
l  A  v.  Jose Malhoa Lote 1683 
I 
I  1000 Lis  boa 
----------------------------------------------r---------------------------------------------
United Kingdom  !  DTI 
!  151  Buckhingham Palace Road 
l  London SW1 W 9SS 
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(A as whose  publication· is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DIRECfiVE 
of 16  May 1988 
on  competitio~ in the markets in  tel~communications terminal equipment  ~·· 
(88/301/EEC} 
THE COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the· European 
Economic  Community,  and  in  particular  Article  90  (3) 
thereof, 
Whereas: 
I.  In  all  the  Member  Statcli,  telcmmmunications  arc, 
either  wholly  or  partly,  a  State  monopoly generally 
granted  in  the  form  of special  or exclusive  rights  to 
one  or  more  bodies  responsible  for  providing  and 
operating  the  network  infrastructure  and  related 
services. Those  rights,  however,  often go  beyond  the· 
provision  of  network  utilization  services  and extend 
to  the  supply  of  user  terminal  equipment  for 
connection  to  the  network.  The  last  decades  have 
seen  considerable  technical  developments  in 
networks,  and  the  pace  of  development  has  been 
especially striking in the area of terminal equipment. 
2.  Several  Member States  have, in  response  to technical 
and economic developments, reviewed  their grant of 
special or exclusive  rights in the telecommunications 
sector.  The  proliferation  _of  types  of  terminal 
equipment and the possibility of the multiple use of 
terminals  means  that  users  must  be  allowed  a  free 
choice  between  the  various  types  of  equipment 
available if they are to  benefit fully from  the techno-
logical  advances  made  in  the  sector. 
3.  Article  30  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  quantitative 
restrictions on imports from other Member States and 
all  measures  having  equivalent  effect.  The grant  of 
special  or  exclusive  rights  to  import  an_p  market 
goods to one organization can, and often does, lead to 
restrictions  on  imports  from  other Member, States. 
4.  Article  37  of  the  Treaty  states  that  'Member  States 
shall  progressively  aqjust  any  State  monopolies  of  a 
commercial characte,r so  as  to  ensure  that when ·the 
transitional  period  has  ended  no  discrimination 
reJ&rding  the  conditions  under  which  goods  are 
procured  and  marketed  exists  between  nationals  of 
Member  States. 
The provisions of this Article shall apply to  any  body 
through  which  a  Member  State,  in  law  or  in  fact, 
either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or 
appreciably  influences· imports  or  exports  between 
Member States. These provisions shall  likewise  spply 
to  monopolies  delegated  by  the  State  to  others.' 
Paragraph  2  of  Article  37  prohibits  Member  States 
from  introducing  any  new  measure  contrary  to  the 
principles  laid  down  in  Article  37  {1). 
5.  The  special  or  exclusive  rights  relating  to  terminal 
equipment enjoyed  by  national  telecommunications 
monopolies  are  exercised  in  such  a  way  as,  in 
practice,  to  disadvantage  equipment  from  other 
Member  States,  notably  by  preventing  users  from 
freely  choosing  the  equipment  that  best  suits  their 
needs in  terms of price  and quality, regardless  of its 
origin.  The exercise  of  these  rights  is  therefore  not 
compatible with Article  37 in  411  the Member States 
except  Spain  and  Portugal,  where  the  national 
monopolies  are  to  be  adjusted  progressively  before 
the end of the transitional period provided for by the 
Act  of  Accession. 
6.  The  provision  of  installation  and  maintenance 
services  is  a key factor  in  the purchasing or rental of 
terminal equipment. The retention of exclusive rights 
in  this  field  would  be  tantamount  to  retention  of 
exclusive marketing rights. Such rights must therefore 
also  be  abolished  'if  the  abolition  of  exclusive 
importing  and  marketing  rights  is  to  have  any 
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7.  Article  59  of the Treaty provides  that 'restrictions on 
freedom  to  provide  services  within  the  Community 
shall  be  progressively  abolished  during  the  transi-
tional period in respect of nationals of Member States 
who  are  established  in  a  State  of  the  Community 
other than that of the  person  for  whom the services 
are  intended.' Maintenance  of  terminals  is  a service 
within  the  meaning of Article  60  of  the Treaty. As 
the  transitional  period  has  ended,  the  service  in 
question, which cannot from  a commercial  point of 
view  be  dissociated  from  the  marketing  of  the 
terminals, must be  provided  freely  and:  in particular 
when  provided  by  qualified  operators. 
8.  Article 90 (1)  of the Treaty provides  that 'in the case 
of  public  undertakings  and  undertakings  to  which 
Member  States  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights, 
Member  States  shall  neither  enact  nor  maintain  in 
force  any measure contrary to  the rules contained in 
this Treaty, in particular to those rules provideo for in 
Article  7  artd  Articles  85  to  94.' 
9.  The market in  terminal  equipment is  still  as  a  rule 
governed  by  a  system  which  allows  competition  in 
the  common · market  to  be  distorted ;  this  situation 
continues  to  produce  infringements  of  the 
competition  rules  laid  down  by  the  Treaty  anf  to 
affect adversely  the development of trade  to  such an 
extent  as  would  be  contrary  to  the  interests  o~ the 
Community.  Stronger  compet.ition  in  the  terminal 
equipment  market  requires  the  introduction  of 
transparent technical specifications and type-approval 
procedures  which  meet  the  essential ·requirements 
mentioned in  Council  Directive  86/361/EEC (1)  and 
allow  the free  movement of  terminal  equipment. In 
tum,  such  transparency  necessarily  entails t  the 
publication  of  technical  specifications  and  type-
approval  procedures.  To  ensure  that  the  latter  are 
applied  transparently, objectively and without  ~scri­
mination,  the  drawing-up  and  application  of !Such 
rules  should  be  entrusted  to  bodies  independent· of 
competitors in  the market in question. It is  essential 
that  the specifications  and  type-approval  proc~ures 
are  published  simultaneously  and  in  an  orderly 
fashion.  Simultaneous  publication  will  also  ensure 
that behaviour contrary to the Treaty is avoided. Such 
simultaneous,  orderly  publication  can  be  achieved 
only by  means of a legal  instrument that is  binding 
on  all  the  Member  States.  The  most  appropriate 
instrument to  this  end  is  a  directive. 
10.  The Treaty entrusts  the  Commission  with  very  clear 
tasks  and gives  it  specific  powers  with  regard  to  the 
monitoring of  relations  between  the  Member States 
and  their  public  undertakings  and  enterprises  to 
(1)  OJ  No  L 217,  5.  8.  1986,  p.  21. 
J/so 
which they have delegated special or exclusive  rights, 
in particular as  regards the elimiflation of quantitative 
restrictions  and  measures  having  equival~nt  effect, 
discrimination  between  nationals  of  Memblr States, 
and competition. The only instrument, therefore,  by 
which  the Commission  can  efficiently carry  out  the 
tasks  and powers  assigned  to  it" is  a  Directive  based 
on Article  90  (3). 
11.  Telecommunications  bodies  or  enterprises  are 
undertakings  within  the  meaning  of  Article  90  (1) 
because  they carry on an organized  business  activity 
involving the  production of  goods  or services.  They 
are  .either  public  undertakings  or private  enterprises 
to which  the Member States  have  granted special  or 
exclusive  rights  for  the  importation,  marketing, 
connection,  bringing  into  service  of  telecommuni-
cations  terminal  equipment  and/or maintenance  of 
such  equipment.  The  grant  and  maintenance  of 
special  and exclusive  rights  for  terminal  equipment 
constitute  measures  within  the  meaning  of  that 
Article. The conditions for  applying the exception of 
Article 90 (2) are not fulfilled. Even if the provision of 
a  telecommunications  network  for  the  use  of  the 
general  public  is  a  service  of  general  economic 
interest  entrusted  by  the  State  to  the  telecommuni-
cations  bodies,  the  abolition  of  their  special  or 
exclusive  rights  to  import  and  market  terminal 
equipment woul.i  not obstruct, in  law  or in  fact,  the 
performance of that service. This is  all  the  more  true 
given  that  Member  States  are  entitled  to  subject 
terminal  equipment  to  type-approval  procedures  to 
ensure  that  they  conform  to  the  essential 
requirements. 
12.  Article  86  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  as  incompatible 
with  the  common  market  any  conduct  by  one  or 
more  undertakings  that  involves  an  abuse  of  a 
dominant position  within  the  common  market  or  a 
substantial  part  of  it. 
13.  The telecommunications  bodies  hold  individually  or 
jointly  a  monopoly on  their  national  telecommuni-
cations  network. The national  networks  are  markets. 
Therefore, the bodies each individually or jointly hold 
a  dominant  position  in  a  substantial  part  of  the 
market in question within the meaning of Article 86. 
The effect of the special or exclusive rights granted to 
such. bodies  by  the  State  to  import  and  market 
terminal  equipment  is  to : 
- restrict users  to  renting such  equipment, when  it 
would  often  be  cheaper for  them,  at  least  in  the 
long  term,  to  purchase  this  equipment.  This 
effectively makes contracts for .the use of networks 
subject  to  acceptance  by  the  user  of  additional 
services  which  have  no  connection  with  the 
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- limit outlets and impede technical progress since 
the  range  of  equipment offered  by  the  telecom-
munications bodies is necessarily limited and will 
not be the best available to meet the requirements 
of  a  significant  proportion  of  users. 
Such conduct is expressly prohibited by Article 86 (d) 
and  (b),  and  is  likely  significantly  to  affect  trade 
between  Member  States. 
At  all  events,  such  special  or  exclusive  rights  in 
regard to the terminal equipment market give rise  to 
a  situation  which  is  contrary  to  the  objective  of 
Article  3  (f)  of  the  Treaty,  which  provides  for  the 
institution of a system  ensuring that competition in 
the  common market is  not distorted, and requires a 
fortiori  that  competition  must  not  be  eliminated. 
Member States  have  an  obligation under Article 5 of 
the Treaty to  abstain from  any measure which could 
jeopardize  the  attainment  of  the  objectives  of  the 
Treaty,  including  Article  3  (f). 
The exclusive  rights  to  import and  market terminal 
equipment  must  therefore  be  regarded  as 
incompatible  with  Article  86  in  conjunction  with 
Article 3, and the grant or maintenance of such rights 
by a Member State is prohibited under Article 90 (1 ). 
14.  To  enable  users  to  have  access  to  the  terminal 
equipment of  their  choice,  it  is  necessary  to  know 
and  make  transparent  the  characteristics  of  the 
termination  points  of  the  network  to  which  the 
terminal  equipment  is  to  be  connected.  Member 
States  must  therefore  ensure  that  the  characteristics 
are  published  and  that  users  have  access  to 
termination  points. 
15.  To be  able  to  market their products, manufacturers of 
terminal  equipment  must  know  what  technical 
specifications they must satisfy. Member States should 
therefore formalize and publish the specifications and 
type-approval  rules,  which  they  must  notify  to  the 
Commission  in  draft  form,  in  accordance  with 
Council  Directive  83/189/EEC (').  The specifications 
may  be  extended  to  products  imported  from  other 
Member States  only insofar as  they are  necessary  to 
ensure  conformity  with  the  essential  requirements 
specified  in  Article  2  (17)  of  Directive  86/361/EEC 
that  can  legitimately  be  required  under Community 
law.  Member States  must, in any event, comply with 
Articles  30  and  36  of  the  Treaty,  under  which  an 
importing  Member  State  must  allow  terminal 
equipment  legally  manufactured  and  marketed  in 
another  Member  State  to  be  imported  on  to  its 
territory,  and  may  only  subject  it  to  such  type-
approval  and  possibly  refuse  approval  for  reasons 
concerning  conformity  with  the  abovementioned 
essential  requirements. 
16.  The  immediate  publication  of  these  specifications 
and procedures cannot be considered in view of their 
(I)  OJ  No  l.  109,  28.  3.  1983,  p.  8. 
complexity. On the other hand, effective competition 
is  not  possible  without  such  publication,  since 
potential  competitors  of  the  bodies  or  enterprises 
with  special  or exclusive  rights  are  unaware  of  the 
precise  specifications  with  which'  their  terminal 
equipment  must,  comply  and  of  the  terins  of  the 
type-approval  procedures  and hence  their  cost  and 
duration. A' deadline should  therefore  be  set for  the 
publication  of  specifications  and  the  type-approval 
procedures. A period of two-and-a-half years will also 
enable the telecommunications bodies with special or 
exclusive  rights  to  adjust  to  the  new  market 
conditions  and  will  enable  economic  operators, 
especially  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  to 
adapt  to  the  new  competitive  environment. 
17.  Monitoring of type-approval  specifications  and  rules 
cannot be entrusted to  a competitor in  the terminal 
equipment market in  view of the o&vious  conflict of 
interest.  Member States  should  therefore  ensure  that 
the  responsibility  for  drawing  up _  .. type-approval 
specifications  and  rules  is  assigned  to  a  body 
independent of the  operator of  the  network  and  of 
any  other competitor in  the  market for  terminals. 
18.  The  holders  of  special  or  exclusive  rights  in  the 
terminal  equipment  in  question  have  been  able  to 
impose  on  their  customers  long-term  contracts 
preventing the introduction of free  competition from 
having .e  practical  effect  within  a  reasonable  period. 
Users  must  therefore  be  given  the  right  to  obtain  a 
revision  of  the  duration  of  their contracts, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
Article 
For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive : 
- 'terminal  equipment'  means  equipment  directly  or 
indirectly  connected  to  the  termination  of  a  public 
telecommunications  network  to  send,  process  or 
receive  information.  A  connection  is  indirect  if 
equipment  is  placed  between  the  terminal  and  the 
termination  of  the  network.  In  either case  (direct  or 
indirect), the connection may be made by wire, optical 
fibre  or electromagnetically. 
Terminal equipment also  means  receive-only satellite 
stations  not  reconnected  to  the  public  network  of  a 
Member State, 
- 'undertaking' means a public or private body, to which 
a Member State grants special  or exclusive  rights  for 
the importation, marketing, connection, bringing into 
service  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment 
and/or  maintenance  of  such  equipment. 
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Article  2 
Member States  which  have  granted  special  or exclusive 
rights  within  the  meaning of Article  1  to  undertakings 
shall  ensure  that  those  rights  are  withdrawn. 
They  shall,  not  later  than  three  months  following  the 
notification of this  Directive,  inform  the Commission of 
the measures taken or draft legislation introduced to that 
end. 
Article 3 
Member States shall ensure that economic ope(8tors 'have 
the  right  to  import,  market, connect,  bring into service 
and  maintain  terminal  equipment.  However,  Member 
States  may: 
- in  the  absence  of  technical  specifications,  refuse  to 
allow  terminal  equipment  to  be  connected  and 
brought into service where such equipment does  not, 
according to a reasoned opinion of the body referred 
to  in Article 6,  satisfy  the essential requirements laid 
down  in Article  2  (17)  of  Directive  86/361/EEC, 
- require  economic  operators  to  possess  the  technical 
qualifications  needed  to  connect,  bring  into  service 
and  maintain  terminal  equipment  on  the  basis  of 
objective,  non-discriminatory  and  publicly  available 
criteria. 
Article  4 
Member States shall ensure that users  have access  to  new 
public  network  termination  points and  that  the physical 
characteristics of these points are  published not later than 
31  December  1988. 
Access  to  public  network  termination  points  existing at 
31  December  1988  shall  be  given  within  a  reasonable 
period  to  any  user  who  so  requests. 
Article  5 
1.  Member  States  shall,  not  later  than  the  date 
mentioned in Article 2,  communicate to  the Commission 
a  list  of  all  technical  specifications  and  type-approval 
procedures which  are  used  for  terminal  equipment, and 
shall  provide  the  publication  references. 
Where they have not as  yet been published in a Member 
State,  the latter shall ensure that they  are  published not 
later  than  the  dates  referred  to  in  Article  8. 
2.  Member States  shall  ensure  that  all  other  specifi-
cations  and  type-approval  procedures  for  terminal 
equipment are  formalized  and published. Member States 
shall  communicate  the  technical  specifications  and 
type-approval  procedures  in  draft  form  to  the 
Commission  in  accordance  with  Directive  83/189/EEC 
and  according  to  the  timetable  set  out  in  AJ1icle  8. 
Article  6 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  from  1  July  1989, 
responsibility for drawing up the  specificatio~s referred to 
in Article  5,  monitoring  their  application  and granting 
type-approval  is  entrusted  to  a  body  independent  of 
public  or  private  undertakings  offering  goods  and/or 
services  in  the  telecommunications sector. 
Article  7 
Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  steps  to  ensure 
that undertakings within the meaning of Article 1 make it 
possible for  their customers to terminate, with maximum 
notice  of  one  year,  leasing  or  maintenance  contracts 
which concern terminal equipment subject to exclusive or 
special  rights  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the 
contracts. 
For terminal equipment requiring type-approval, Member 
States shall ensure  that this  possibility of  termination  is 
afforded by the undertakings in question no later than the 
dates  provided  for  in Article  8.  For terminal  equipment 
not  requiring  type-approval,  Member  States  shall 
introduce this possibility no later than the date  provided 
for  in Article  2. 
Article  8 
Member States shall inform the Commission of  the draft 
technical  specifications  and  type-approval  procedures · 
referred  to  in Article  5  (2) ; 
- not  later  than  31  December  1988  in  respect  of 
equipment in  category  A  of  the  list  in  Annex  I, 
- not  later  than  30  September  1989  in  respect  of 
equipment  in  category  B of  the  list  in  Annex  I, 
- not  later  than  30  June  1990  in  respect  of  other 
terminal equipment in category C of the list in Annex 
I. 
Member:  States  shall  bring  these  specifications  and 
type-approval  procedures  into  force  after  expiry  of  the 
procedure  provided  for  by  Directive  83/189/EEC. 
Article  9 
Member States shall  provide the Commission at  the end 
of  each  year  with.  a  report  allowing  it  to  monitor 
compliance with the provisions of Articles  2,  3,  4,  6 and 
7. 
An  outline  of  the  report  is  attached  as  Annex  II. 
Article  10 
The provisions of this Directive shall be without pre judice 
to the provisions of the instruments of accession of Spain 
and Portugal, and in particular Articles 48 and 208  of the 
Act  of  Accession. 
Article  11 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  16  May  1988. 
For  the  Commission 
Peter  SUTHERLAND 
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ANNEX I 
List of terminal equipment referred to in Article  8 
Additional  telephone  set ; private  automatic  branch  exchanges  (PABXs) : 
Modems: 
Telex  terminals : 
Data-transmission  terminals : 
Mobile  telephones : 
Receive-only  satellite  stations  not  reconnected  to  the  public  network  of  a  Member State : 
First  telephone  set : 
Other terminal  equipment : 
ANNEX II 
Outline of the report provided  for  in  Article 9 
Implementation of Article 2 
I. Terminal  equipement  for  which  legislation  is  being  or  has  been  modified. 
By  category  of  terminal  equipment : 
- date  of  adoption  of  the  measure  or, 
- date  of  introduction  of  the  biii  or, 
- date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  measure. 
2.  Terminal  equipment stiii  subject  to  special  or exclusive  rights : 
- type  of  terminal  equipment and  rights  concerned. 
Implementation of Article 3 
- terminal  equipment,  the  connection  and/or commissioning  of  which  has  been  n·~trictcd, 
- technical  qualifications  required,  giving  reference  of  their  publication. 
Implementation of Article 4 
- references  of  publications  in  which  the  physical  characteristics  are  specified, 
- number  of  existing  network  termination  points, 
- number of  network  termination  points  now  accessible. 
Implementation of Article 6 
- independent  body  or bodies  appointed. 
Implementation of Article  7 
- measures  put  into  force,  and 
- number  of  terminated  contracts. 
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Category 
A 
A 
B 
B 
B 
B 
c 
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·COMMISSION. 
: .. 
COMMISSION DIRECDVE 
of 28 Juac 1990 
oa compcddoa ia the markets for telccommuaications IICn'ic:a 
(90/388/EEC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Havins  reprd to  the  Treaty  establishing 'the  European 
Economic  Community,  and  in  particular  Article  90  (3) 
thereof, 
Whereas: 
( t)  The  improvement  of .telecommunications  in  the 
Community  is  an  essential  condition  for  the. 
harmonious development of  economic activities and a 
competitive market in the Community, from the point 
of  view  of both  service  providen  and  usen.  The 
Commission has therefore adopted a programme, let 
out  in  its  Green  Paper on  the development of the 
common market for telecommunications .erviccs and 
equipment  and  in  its  communication  on  the 
implementation  of the  Green  Paper  by  1992,  for 
progressively  introducing  competition  into  the 
telecommunications  market.  The  programme  does 
not  concern  mobile  telephony  and  paging  ~rvices, 
and  mass communication services such as radio for 
television. The Council, in its resolution of 30 June 
1988 (1), expressed broad suppon for the objectives 
of this programme, and in particular the progressive 
creation  of  an  open  Community  market  for 
telecommunications services.  The last decades have 
seen  considerable  technological  advances  in  the 
tdecommunicat!ons  sector.  These  allow  an 
increasingly varied range of services to be provided, 
notably data transmission services, and also make it 
technically and econ(\mically possible for competition 
to take place between different service providers. 
(2)  In all the Member States the provision and operation 
of telecommunications networks and the provision of 
related services arc generally vested  in one or more 
telecommunications organizations holding exclusive 
or special rights. Such rights are characterized by the 
discretionary  powers  which  the  State  exercises  in 
various degrees with regard to access to the market for 
telecommunications services. 
(') OJ No C 2S7, 4. 10. 1988, p. 1. 
(3)  The organizations entrusted with the provision and 
operation  of the  tclecommunicationa  network  are 
undertakings within the mcaoiDa of Article 90 (1) of 
the  Treaty  because  they  carry  on  an  ~rsanized 
businca  activity.  · namely  the  provision  of 
telecommwdcadons services. They are either public 
untenaldnp or private enterprises to which the State 
has aranted exclusive or special rights. 
(4)· 
(S) 
(6) 
Several  Member  States,  ·  w~ile  ensuring  rhe 
pcrfor mana:  of  public  service  t~sks, have  already 
revised the system of exclusive or special rights that 
used to exist in the telecommunications sector in their 
country. In all cases, the system of exclusive or special 
rights has been maintained in respect of the prov\sion 
and  operation  of the  network.  In  some  Member 
States,  it  has  been  maintained  for  all 
telecommunications  services,  while  in  othen such 
rights cover only certain servic:tS. All Member States 
have  either  themselves  imposed  or  aUowed  their 
telecommunications  administrations  -ro  impose 
restrictions  ·  on  the  free  provision  of 
telecommunications services. 
The grar. · .dg of ttpecial or exclusive rights to one o:-
more  undertakings  to  operate the  network  derives 
from  the  discretionary  power  of  the  State.  The 
scanting. by a Member State of such rights inevitably 
restricts  the  provision  of  such  services  by  other 
undertakings to or from other Member States. 
In  practice,  restrictions  on  the  provisitJn  of 
telecommunications services  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  59  to or from  other Member  States consist 
mainly in the prohibition on connecting leased lines by 
means  of  .:oncentrators,  multiplexers  and  other 
equipment  to  the  switched  telephone  network,  in 
imposing access charges for the  .:.onnection that are 
out  of  proportion  to  ·the  service  provided,  in 
prohibiting the  routing of signals  to or from  third 
panics by means of leased lines or applying volume· 
~ensitive  tariffs  without  economic  justification  or 
refusing  to  give  service  providers  access  to  the .. 
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nenvork. The effect of the uup  ratricdons and the 
exceuive charaes in rcladon to  net  COlt it  to hinder the 
provision to or from other Member Stares of such 
telecommunlatloaa lei'Yicea as: 
- lm'lcet desiped to improve telecommunicadons 
functions, e.a. conversion of the protocol, eode, 
£->rmat or speed, 
- information  servic:ei · providina  access  to  data 
bases, 
- remote data-processing services, 
- message  storing  and  forwarding  servius,  e.g. 
electronic mail, 
- traa~saction services,  e.g.  fanancial  transactions, 
electronic commercial data transfer, teleshopping 
and telereservations, 
"  - teleaction  services,  e.g.  telemetry  and  remote 
monitoring. 
Articles SS, 56 and 66 of the Treaty allow exceptions 
on non-economic grounds to the freedom to provide 
services.  The  restrictions  permitted  are  those 
connected,  even  occ .  .taionaily,  with  .he  exercise  of 
official  authority, and  those connected  with  public 
policy, public security or public health. Since these are · 
exceptions,  they  must  !Je  interpreted  restrictively. 
None of the telecommunications services is connected 
with  the exercise of official  authority involving the 
right to use undue powers compared with the ordinary 
lnw, privileges of public power or a power of coercion 
over  the  public.  The  supply  of telecommunication 
services  cannot  in  itself threaten  public  policy  and 
cannot affect public health. 
The  Court  of  justice  caselaw  also  recognizes 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services if they 
fulfil essential requirements in the general interest and 
public and notify them to the Comminion to enable it 
to al8ftl their proportionality. 
(9)  In this context, the security or netWork  Opel  tltions 
means ensuring the availability of the public network 
in calC of emergency. The technical intqrity of the 
public netWork means ensuriftalta normal operation 
and  the  interconnection or public  netWorks  in  the 
Community  on  the  basis  of  common  technical 
spedficadona.  The  concept  of  interoperability  of 
services  meant  complying  with  such  technical 
specificationa introduced to increase the provision of 
servlca  and  the  choice ·available  to  usen.  Data 
protection  means  measures  taken  to  wanant  the 
confidentiality of communications and the protection 
of personal data. 
(10)  Apan from the essential  requirem~nu which can M. 
included as conditions in the licensing or declaration 
procedures,  Member  States  can  includ~ conditions 
regarding  public-service  requirements  which 
constitute  objective,  non-discriminatory  and 
transparent trade regulations regarding the condition• 
of  permanence,  availability  and  quality  of  the 
service. 
(11)  When  a  Member  State  has  entrusted  a 
telecommunications  organization  with  the  task  of 
pr"v~-~lng packet or circuit switched data services for 
the public  in general and when  this service  may  be 
o~tructed  because  of  competition  by  private 
providers,  the  Commission  can  allow  the  Member 
State to impose additional conditions for the provision 
of such a  servi~, with respect also to geographical 
coverage.  In  assessing  these  measures,  the 
Commission in the context of  the achievemcm of the 
fundamental  objectives of the Treaty  referred  to  in 
Article 2 thereof, including that of strengthening the 
Community's  economic  -and  social  cohesion  as 
refened to in Article 130a, will also take into account 
the situation of those  Member  States  in  which  the 
network  for  the  provision  of the  packet  or  circuit 
switched services is not yet sufficiently developed and 
which could justifiy the deferment for these Member 
States untill january 1996 of the date for prohibition 
on the simple resale of leased line capacity. 
are applied without discrimination and in proportion  (12)  Article 59 of the Treaty requires the abolition of any 
other  restriction  on  the  freedom  of  nationals  of 
Member States who are ntablished in a Community 
country  to  provide  services  to  persons  in  other 
Member  States.  The  maintenance  or  introduccion 
of  any  e1eclusive  or  special  right  which  doe~ not 
correspond to the- ahovementioned criteria is therefore 
a  breach  of  Article  90  in  conjunction  with 
Article 59. 
to the objective. Consumer protection does not make 
it  necessary  to  restrict  freedom  to  provide 
telecommunications services since this objective can 
also be attained through free competition. Nor can the 
protection  of  intellectual  propeny  be  invoked  in 
,his  connection.  The  only  essential  requirements 
derogating  from  Article  59  which  could  justify 
restrictions on the use of the public nerwork are the 
maintenance of the integrity of the netWork, security 
of  network  operations  and  in  justified  cases, 
interoperability and data protection. The restrictions  (13) 
imposed, however, must be adapted to the objectives 
pursued  by  these  legitimate  requirements.  Memher 
States will have to make such restrictions known m the 
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Article 86 of the Treaty prohibits as incomoatible with 
the  common  market  any  conduct  by  one  or  more 
undertakings  that  involves  an  abuse of a dominant 
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pan  of  it. Telecommunications organizations are al10 
undenakinp for the purposes of this Anide because 
they cany out economic actividcs, in particular the 
service they provide by nta  ..  .ing telecommunications 
networlcs  and  services  available  to  users.  This 
provision  of the  network  constitutes  a . separate 
services market as it is not interchangeable with other 
services.  On each national market the competitive 
environment  in  which  the  network  and  the 
telecommunications  scrvica  are  provided  is 
homogeneous enough for the Commission to be able 
to evaluate  the  power  held  by  the  orpnizadons 
providins  1 he  services  on  these  territories.  The 
territories of the Member States constitute distinct 
aeosraphical markets. This is essentially due to the 
existing  difference  between  the  rules  governing 
conditions of access and technical operation, relating 
to the provision of the netWork and of such services. 
Furthermore, each  Member Stare  market  forms  a 
substantial pan of the common market. 
(14)  In  eac:h  national  market  the  telecommunications 
organizations  hold  individually  or  collectively  a 
dominant  po6ition  for  the  creation  and  the 
exploitation of  the netWork because they are the only 
ones with networks in each Member  State covering the 
whole  territory  of those  States  and  bec.ause  tneir 
governments  granted  them  tht exclusive  right  to 
pro·.-ide this network either alone or in conjunction 
with other organizatibns. 
(15)  Where a  State grants special  or exclusive  rights to 
provide  telecomrr.&~nications services to organizations 
which already have a dominant position in creating 
and operating the network, the effect of such rights is 
to strengthen the dominant position by extend  in~ it to 
services. 
(16)  Moreover, the special or exclusive rights granted to 
td~communications organizations  by  the  State  to 
provide  certain  telecommunications  services  mean 
such organizations: 
(a)  prevent  or  restrict  access  to  the  market  for 
these  telecommunications  services  by  their 
competitors,  thus  limiting  consumer  choice, 
which is liable to restrict technological progrc-;s 
to the detri'ment of consumers; 
(h)  compel network users to usc the servicr., suhjt·ct 
to exclusive rights, and thus make the conclusion 
"f network utilization  contracts dependent  on 
acceptance of supplementary setvices having no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
Each of these types of conduct represents a specific 
abuse of  a dominant position which is likely to have an 
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appreciable effect on  trade between Member _;rates, as 
all  the  xrvica in  question  could  in  principle  be 
supplied by provider~  from other Member Statrs. The 
structure of  corn petition within the common market is 
substantially  changed  by  them.  At  all  evenu,  the 
special or  exclusive rights fo.r these services give rise t<.' 
a  situation  which  is  contrary  to  the  objective  in 
Article .1 (t) of the Treaty, which  provides for  the 
institution of  a system ensurinR that  competition in th: 
commun  market  is  not  distorted,  and  &equircs  a 
fortiori  that competition  must  not  be  eliminated. 
Member States have an obligation under Article S of 
the Treaty to abstain &om,any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty. includitlg that of Aniclc 3 (0. 
(17)  The exclusive rights to telecommunications services 
granted to public  undertakings or undertakings to 
which  Member  States · have  granted  special  or· 
exclusive rights for the provision of the network arc 
incompatible with Article 90 (1) in conjunction with 
Article 86. 
(18)  Article 90 (2) of  the Treaty allows derogation from the 
application of Articles 59 and 86 of the Treaty where 
such application would obstruct the performance, in 
law or in fact, of the particular task assigned to the 
telecommunications organizations. This task consists 
in  the  provision  and  exploitation  of  a  una :tersal 
netWork,  i.e.  one  having  general  geographical 
coverage, and being provided to any servic-: provider 
or user upon request within a reasonable period of 
time. The financial resources for the development of 
the network still derive mainly from the operation of 
the telephone service, Consequently,. the opening-up 
of voice  telephony  to  competition  could  threaten 
the  financial  stability  <'f  the  telecommunications 
organizations. The VOICe  telephony service, wncthrr 
provided  from  the  present  telephone  network  or 
forming part of the ISDN service, is currently also the 
most  imponant means of notifying  and  c-alling  up 
emergency services in charge of pu~lic safety. 
(19)  The provision o! leased lines forms an c!-scntial part of 
the tdecommu.tications organizations' ta\ks. There i~ 
at present, in almost all Member States, a !tubstantial 
difference  between  charges  for  use.  of  the:  <.lata 
transmission service on the switched network and for 
use  of leased  lines.  Balancing those  tariffs  without 
~clay could ieopardize this task. Equilibrium in su.::h 
charges must be achieved gradually between now and 
31  December  1992.  In  the  mr.:mtime  it  mcst  be 
possible to require private operators not to offer to 
the public a service consisting merely of the resale of 
leased  :ine  capacity,  i.e.  including  only  such 
processing,  switching of data, storing, or protocol 
conversion  as  is  necessary  for  transmission  in  real 
time. The Me1nber States may therefore establish a 
declaration system through which  p:-ivate operators 
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Howner, no  other  requirement  may  be  imposed 
on  such  operaton to ensure  compliance  with  rhis 
measure. 
(2ll'  These  restrictions  do  nor  affect  rhe  development 
of trade  to  such  an  extent  as  would  be  conttary 
to  the  interests  of  the  Community.  Under  these 
circumstances, these restrictions are compatible with 
Anide 90 (2) of the Treaty. This may also be the case 
as regards the measures adop~  by Member States to 
ensure that the activities of private service providers 
do not obstruct the public switched-data service. 
(21·  The  rules  of  the  Treary,  including  those  on. 
competitinn, apply to telex services; however, the use 
of this servic:r.  is gradually declining throughout the 
Community owing  to  the  emergence  of competing 
means  of telecommunication  such  as  telefax.  The 
abolition  of current  restrictions  on  the  use  of rhe 
MYitched  telephone  network  and  leased  lines  will 
allow telex  mes~~ages to be retransmitted. In view of 
this  particular  trend,  an  individu~  approach  is 
necessary.  Consequently,  this  Directive  should  not 
apply to telex services. 
(12) 
(23; 
The Commission will in any event reconsider in the 
course  of 1992  the  remaining  special  or exclusive 
rights on the provision of services taking account of 
technological development and the evolution towards 
a digital infrastructure. 
Member  States  may  draw  up  fair  procedures  for 
tnsuring .:omplian<:e with the essential  requirements 
w.thout prejudice to the harmonization of the latter at 
Community level within the framework of the Council 
Directives  on  open  network  provision  (ONP).  As 
regards data-switching, Member States must be able, 
as part of such procedures, to require compliance with 
trade regulations from the standpoint of conditions of 
permanence,  availability  and  quality of the  service, 
and  to  include  measures  to  safeguard  the  task  of 
general economic interest which they have entrusted 
to  a  telecommunications  organization.  The 
procedures must be based on specific objective criteria 
and  be applied without discrimination.  The criteria 
should in particular be  justified and proportional to 
the general interest objective, and be duly motivated 
and  published.  The  Commission  must  be  able  to 
examine them in deprh in the light of the rules on free  · 
competition and freedom to provide services. In any 
event,  Member  States  that  have  not  notified  the 
Commission  of their  planned  licensing  criteria  and 
procedures within a given time may no longer impose 
(24)  Member States should  be given more time to draw 
up  aeneral  rules  on  the  conditions  governing  the 
provillon of packet- or circult ..  witched data  !!!~rvicn 
for rhe public. 
~ 
(25)  Telecommunications services should not be subject to 
any restriction, either as regards free access by users to 
the services, or  as regards the processing of  data which 
may be carried out before messages are transmitted 
through  the  network  or after  messages  have  been 
received,  except  where  this  is  warranted  by  an 
essential requirement in proponion to the objective 
punued. 
(26)  The digitization of the network and the technological 
improvement of the terminal equipment connected to 
it have brought about an inaease in the number of 
functions previously carried out within the network 
and which can now be carried out by usen themselves 
with  increasingly  sophisticatc.'CI  terminal equipment. 
It  is  necnsary  to  ensure  that  suppliers  of 
telecommunic~tion  services, and notahly supplien of 
telephone  and  packet  or  circuit·switched  data 
transmission  services  enable operators to use  these 
functions. 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
Pending  the  establishing  of Communiry  standards 
with a view to an open network provision (ONP), the 
technical  interfaces currently in  use  in  the  MemlY.-r 
States should be made publicly available so that firms 
v:ishing  to  enter  the  markers  for  the  services  in 
question can take the necessary steps to adapt their 
services  to  the  technical  chaft~~e'  istic!'  of  the 
networks.  If  the  Member  States  have  not  yet 
~tablished such technical interfaces, they should do 
so  as  quickly  as  possible.  All  such  draft  measures 
should  be  communicated  to  the  Commission  in 
accordance with Council Directive 83/189/EEC (1), 
as la!;t amended  by Directive 88/182/EEG (1). 
Under  national  legislation,  telecommunications 
organizations  are  generally  given  the  function  of 
regulating  telecommunications  services,  panicularly 
as  regards  Jiccn!iiug,  control  of  type-approval  and 
mandatory  interface  spccific•ttions,  frequency 
allocation  and  monitoring of  condit~ons of  use.  In 
some  cases,  the  legislation  lay' down  only  general 
principles  governing  the  operation  of  ,he  licensed 
services  and  le:wes  it  to  the  telecommunications 
organizations  to  determine  the  specific  operating 
conditions. 
This dual regulatory and commercial function of the 
telecommunications oq~anizations has a dirc:ct impact 
any  restrictions  on  the  freedom  to  provide  data  (1)  OJ No l  109,16. 4. 1983, p. R. 
transmission services to the public.  '/  C'  (Q OJ No l  81, 26. J. 1988, p. 75 . 
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. on  finn•  offaing  telecommunic:ado~• RrYicn  in 
eompetition  with  the  organizations  in  queaion. 
By  this  bundlina  of  activities,  the  organizations 
determine or, at the very least, substantially influence 
the aupply of services offered by their competiton. 
The  delegation  to  an  undenaking  whk.h  has  a 
dominant positi,n for the provision and exploitation 
of  th~ network, of  the power to regulate access to the 
m:rket for telecommunication services constitutes a 
srrengthtning  of that  dominant  position.  Because 
of  thr.  conflict  of  interests,  this  is  likely  to 
rettrict  competitor&'  access  to  the  markets  in 
telecommunications  services  and  to  limit  users' 
freedom  of choice.  Such  arrangements  may  also 
limit  the  outlets  for  equipment  for  handling 
telecommunications  r.tessages  and,  l.'Onsequently, 
technological progress in that field. This combination 
of  activities  therefore  constitutes  an  abuse  of 
the  dominant  position  of  telecommunications 
organizations within.the meaning of Anicle 86. If  it is 
the result of a  State measure,  the measure is  also 
incompatible with Aniclt 90 ( 1) in conjunction with 
Anicle 86. 
(30)  To enable the Commission to carry out effectively the 
monitoring lask assigntd to it hy Anicle 90 (3  ), it must 
have  available  cenain  essential  information.  That 
information must in  particular give the Commission 
a clear view of the measures of Member Statts, w 
that it can ensure that access to the network and the 
various  related  services  arc  provided  by  each 
tt.l~communications organization to all its customers 
on non-discriminatory tariff and  other terms. Such 
information 5hould cover: 
(31) 
measures  taken  to  withdr.-w  exclusive  rights 
pursuant to this Directive, 
the  conditions  on  which  licences  to  provide 
telecommunications services are granted. 
Th~ Commission  must  ha\':  such  information  to 
enable it to check, in particular, that all the users of  che 
network and services, including rclccommuraications 
organizations where they are prC~viders of  services, are 
treated equally and fairly. 
and of such amomen to benefit from suc.h services. 
Uscn must therefore be given the right to terminate 
their conrracu within a reasonable length of time. 
(Jl)  Each Member State at present regulates the supply of 
telecommunications  services  according  to its  own 
concepts. Even the dcfinidon of  ccnain services differs 
from one Member State to another. Such differences 
cause  distortions  of  competition  likely  to  make 
the  provision  of crou-frontier telecommunications 
services more difficult for economic opera  ton. This is 
why the Council, in its resolution of 30 june 1988 
considered  that  one  of  the  objectives  of  ~ 
telecommunications  policy  was  the creation  of an 
open  ComMunity  market  for  telecommunications 
services, in panicular through the rapid definition, 
in  the  fonn  of  Council  Directives,  of  technical 
conditions, conditions of  use and principles governing 
charges for an open netwQrk provision (ONP). The 
Commission has presented. a proposal to this end to 
the  Council.  Harmonization  of the  conditions  of 
access is not however the most appropriate means of 
removing  th~  barriers  to  tr3de  resulting  from 
infringements of the Treaty. The Commission has a 
dury to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty arc 
applied effectively and comprehensively. 
(33)  Anicle  90  (3)  assigns  dearly-defined  duties  and 
powers  to  the  Commission  to  monitor  relations 
between Member States and their public undcnakings 
and undertakings to which they have grautcd special 
or  exclusive rizhts, particularly as regards the removal 
of  obstacles  to  trcedom  to  provide  services, 
discrimination  between  nationals  of  the  Member 
Staces and competition. A comprehensive approach is 
netessary in order co end the infringements that persist 
in certain Member States and to give clear guidelines 
to  those  Member  Sto.tes  that  are  revitwing  their 
legislation  so as  to avoid  further  infringements.  A 
Directive within the meaning of Article 90 (3) of the 
Treaty is  therefor~ the most appropriate rncJns  of 
achieving that end, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
1. 
Articlf! J 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
'telecommunication  organizations'  means  public  or 
private  bodies,  and  the  subsidiaries  they  control,  to 
whkh a Member State grants spec;al or exclusive rights 
for the provision of a public telecommunications network 
and. when applicable, telecommunications services, 
- 'special or exclusive rights' means the ri~hts granted by a 
Member State or a public authority to une or more public 
The holders of special or exclusive rights to provide 
telecommunications  !\Crviccs  that  will  in  future  be 
open to competition have  been  able in  the past to 
impose long-term contracts on their customers. Such 
contract!: would in prac.'1ice limit the ability of  any new 
competitors to offer their services to such customers 
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or  private  bodies  thro1,1sh  any  legal,  regulatory  or 
administrative  instrument reserving  them  the risht to 
pwvide a service or undenake an activity, 
- 'pui,Jic lelecommunications network' means the public 
tekcommunications  infrastructure  which  pennits  the 
cor: veyance  of  signals  between  defined  network 
ten:unation points by  wire, by  microwave, by optical 
mt' .ms or by other electromagnetic mea~s, 
- 'td  ·:communications  services'  means  services  whose 
pre vision consists wholly or panly in the transnlission 
and routing of signals on the public telecommunications 
net work  by  means  of telecommunications  processes, 
wit il  the  exception  of  radio-broadca~ting  and 
tch vision, 
- 'nc· .vork  termination  point'  means  all  physical 
cor. :1cctions  and  their  technical  access  specifications 
wh·ch  form  part  of  the  public  telecommunications 
net 'York  and  are  necessary  f\)r  access  to and efficient 
cm;  munication through that public network, 
- •es~··ntial requirements' means the non-economic reasons 
in 1 ': e general interest whir.:h may cause a Member State to 
re~t; ict access to the public telecommunications network 
or; ublic telecommunications services. These rea~ns  are 
!.Cl'. rity of network operations, maintenance of network 
int, ,:tity,  and,  in  justified  cases,  inreroperabiliry  of 
ser' 1ces and data protection. 
Da t  • protection may include protection of  personal data, 
the  ·onfidentialiry of information transmitted or stored 
as  ·.·  dl as the protection of privacy,. 
'vo·  ,. rclephony' means the commercial provision for the 
pul  I( Of the daret:t tranSpOrt and SWitChing or Speech in 
rc.11  rime  between public switched network termination 
po1  1  ~. enabling any  user  to  use  ec,uipment  cunnected 
to  t1ch  a  network  termin:ttion  point  in  order  to 
cor:  ·nunicate with another termination point, 
'telt < service'  means  the commercial  provision  for  the 
puhc  of  direct  trAnlmiuion  or  teln  melllftRC•  In 
IJCI.I ·rdancc  with  the  rdevllnt  Comlt~  consuhlltll 
inr<·  ;1ational  telegraphique  et  telephonique  (CCITT) 
rec'  ,  nmendation  between  public  switched  network 
ten.  mat ion points, enabling any user to use equipment 
cor.  :cered to such a network termination point in order 
to  t.· )mmunicate with another termination point, 
- 'paL  c:t- and  circuit-switched  data  services'  means  the 
con  nercial provision for the public of direct transport of 
dar..  between  public  switched  network  termination 
poi,, r s, enabling any  user  to use  equipment connected 
ro  uch  a  net<Nork  termination  point  in  order  to 
con  nunicate with another termination point, 
'sin·  lc  resale  of  capacity'  means 
pro.  siun  on  leased  lir.es  for  the 
the  commercial 
public  of  dat1 
1 
transmission as a separate service, including only such 
switching,  processing,  data  storage  or  prc~-1-:o~ 
conversion as is necessary (or transmissiou in real time to 
and from the public switched network. 
2.  This  Directive  shall  not  apply  to  telex,  moblle 
radiotelephony, paging and satellite services. 
Article 2 
Without  prejudice  to  Article  1 (2),  Member  States  shall 
withdraw all  special  or exclusive  rishts for  the supply of 
telecommunications services other than voice telephony and 
shall take the measures necessary to ensure that any operator 
is entided to suppJy such telecommunications services. 
Member  States  which  make  the  supply  of .such  services 
subject  to  a licensing  or declaration  procedure aimed  at 
compliance with the essential requirements shall ensure that 
the  conditions  for  the  grant  of  licences  are  objec:tive, 
non-discriminatory and transparent, that reasons are given 
for any refusal, and that there is a procedure for appealing 
against any such refusal. 
Without prejudice to Article 3, Member States shall inform 
the Commission  no  later than  31  December  1990 of the 
measures taken to comply with this Article and shall inform it 
of any  existing  regulations or of plans to introduce  new 
licensing procedures or to change exi•ting procedures. 
Article 3 
A-. regards packet· or circuit-switched dat?. services, Member 
States may, until J 1 December 1992, under the authorization 
r•occdures  reierred  to  in  Anicle  2,  prohibit  economic 
operators from (lffering leased line capacity fot simpte res !'II.: 
to the public. 
Member States shall, no later than JO June 1992, notify to 
the  Commission  at  the  planning  stage  any  licensing  or 
declaration  procedure  for  the  provision  of  packet·  or 
clrcuh·llwhchtd dAIIl tC!rvlcrli (or thf public: which  ar~  ~tlmrd 
at compliance with: 
essential requirements, or 
trade regulations relating to conditions of permanence, 
availability and quality of the serv.ice, or 
measures  to  safeguard  the  task  of general  economic 
interest  which  they  have  entrusted  to  a 
telecommunications  organization  for  the  provision  of 
switched data services, if the performance of that task is 
likely to be obstructed by the activities of private service 
providers. 
The  whole  of  these  conditions  shall  form 
public-service  specifications  and  shall  be 
non-discriminatory and transparent. 
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Member States shall  ensure,  no later than 31  December 
1992, that such licensing or declaration procedures for the 
provision of such aervic:es are published. 
Bd'ore they are implmtented, the Commlsaion shall verify the 
compatibility of these projects with t~e Treaty. 
Article 4 
Member States which maintain •rw.clal or  exclusive rights for 
the provision and operation of public telecommunications 
nerworks  shall  take the necessary  measures to make the 
conditions governing access to the netWorks objective and 
non-discriminatory and publis§t them. 
In panicular, they shall ensure that operators who so request 
un  obtain leased lines within a reasonable period, that there 
are no restrictions on their usc other thttn those justified in 
accordance with Anicle 2. 
Member States shall inform the Commission no later than 
31  December 1990 of the steps they have taken to comply 
with this Anide. 
Each time the charges for leased lines are inaeased, Member 
States shall provide information to the Commission on the 
factors justifying such increases. 
Article 5 
Without prejudice to the relevant international agreements, 
Member States shall ensure that the characteristics of the 
technical interfaces necessary for the use of public networks 
are published by 31  Dec~mbcr 1990 at the latest. 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission, in 
accordance with Directive 83/189/  EEC, any draft measure 
drawn up for this purpose. 
Article 6 
Member  St~.es  sh<ttl,  as  regards  th<!  litovasaon  of 
telecomrr.unications services, and existing restrictions on the 
processing o( signals before their transmission via the public 
network or after their reception, unless the necessity of these 
rr~erlcrion• for  compllanco  wllh  public  policy or euemhal 
requirements is demonstratrd. 
Without prejudice to harmonized Community rules adopted 
by the Council on the provision of  an open network, Member 
States shall  ensure as regards services  providers including 
the  telecommunications  organizations  that  there  is  no 
discrimination either in the conditions of usc or in the  c"arg~s 
payable. 
M~mber  States shall inform the Commission of  the measures 
taken or draft measures introduced in order to comply with 
this Anicle by 31  December 1990 at the latest. 
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Article 7 
Member States shall ensure that from I july 1991 the srant 
of operating  licences,  the  control of type  approval  and 
mandatory specifications, the allocation of frequencies and 
surveillance of usage conditions are carried out by a body 
independent of the telecommunications organizations. 
They shall infonn the Commi11ion of the measures taken 
or draft  measures  introduced  to that end  no  later than 
31  December 1990. 
Article 8 
Member States  sh:llJ  ensure that as soon as the relevant 
special  or  exclusive  rights  have  been  withdrawn. 
telecommunications  organizations . make  it  possible  for 
customers bound to them by a con~ract with more than one 
year to run for the supply of tele~mmunications services 
which was subject to such a right at the time it was concluded 
to tenninate the contract .at six months' notice. 
Article 9 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the 
necessary information to allow it to draw up, for a period of 
three years, at the end of each year, an overall report on the 
application of  this Directive. The Commission shall transmit 
. this repon to the Member States, the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
Artide 10 
In 199  2, the Commission will carry out an overall assessment 
of the situation in the tclrcommunications sector in relation 
to the aims of this Dirrctive. 
!r1  1994,  the  Commission  shall  assess  the  dfects of  the 
measures referred to in Anicle 3 in order to see whether any 
amendments  need  to  be  made  h~ the  provisions  of that 
Anicle, panicularly in  the light of technological evolution 
and the development of trade within the Community. 
Article  11 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at  Brussds, 28 june 1990. 
For the Commission 
Leon BRITTAN 
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COMMISSION  DIRECTIVE f4/46/EC 
of 13  October 1"4 
amending  Directive  11/301/EEC  and  Dlrecdve 90/311/EEC  in  particular with 
regard to aatellite .:ommunieadona 
THE COMMISSION  OP niB EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES. 
Having  regard  to  the Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Cornmunity, and in  particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Wherc-llS: 
1.  The Green  Paper on a common approach in the field 
of  !latellitc  communications  in  the  European 
Com rnunity,  adopted  by  the  Commission  in 
November  1990,  set  c.ut  the  major  chanses  in  the 
regulatory  environment  necessary  to  exploit  the 
potential  of  this  means  of  communications.  This 
Satellite Green Paper called for,  inter alia. full Iibera· 
lization  of  the  sat~llite  services  and  equipment 
sectors,  including  the  abolition  of  all  exclusive  or 
special nights in  this area, subject to licensing proce· 
durc~. as  well  as  for  the  free  (unrestricted  access  to 
spact·  segment capacity. 
2.  The Council Resolution of 19 December 1991  on the 
development  of  the  common  market  for  satellite 
communications  services  and  equipment  (
1~  save 
general  support  to  the  positions  set  out  in  the 
Commission's Satellite  Green  Paper,  and considered 
as  m::jor  goals: the harmoniz11tion  and liberalization 
of th··  market for  appropriate satellite earth stations, 
including where applicable the abolition of exclusive 
or sp•:ci:al  rights  in  this field, subject in  particular to 
thc c·>nditions  necessary  for  compliance with  cucn· 
tial  r.·quircments. 
3.  The  European  Parliament,  in  its  Resolution  on  the 
develtlpment  of  the  common  market  for  satellite 
com•"unications  sr.rvices  and  equ:pment (')  calls 
upon  the  Commission to enact the necessary legisla-
tion  :  n  order  to  create  the  environment  to  enable 
existing constraints to be removed and new activities 
developed  an  thc  field  of  satellite  communications, 
while  stressing the need  to  harmonize and liberalize 
the  markets  in  satellite  equipment and services. 
4.  Sever: ! Mem~r  States have already opened up certain 
satellite communications services to competition and 
have  tntroduced  licensing schemes. Nevertheless. the 
granti :1g of licences in some Member States still docs 
(')  OJ No  C 8,  14.  1.  1992.  p.  1. 
(')  OJ No  C 42,  IS.  2.  1993,  p.  30 . 
not follow  objective,  proportional and  non-discrimi-
natory criteria or, in the case of operators competing 
with the telecommunications organizations, is subject 
to technical restrictions such as  a ban on connecting 
their equipment to be switched network operated by 
the telecommunications organization. Other Member 
States have maintained the exclusive rights granted to 
the  national  public  undertakings. 
S.  Commission  Directive  88/301/EHC of  16  May  19~8 
on  competition  in  the  markets  in  telecommunica-
tions  terminal  equipment (\ as  amended  by  the 
Agreement  on  the  European  Economic  Area, 
provides  for  the  abolition  of  special  or  exclusive 
rishts to import, market, connect, bring into service 
and  maintain  telecommunications  terminal  equip-
ment.  It  does  not  cover  all  types  of  satellite  earth 
station  equipment. 
6.  In its judgment in Case C-202/88, Franct v.  Commis· 
sion (4).  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities  upheld  Commission  Directive 
88/301/BEC. However, in so far as it relates to special 
rishts. the Directive was declared void on the grounds 
that  neither the  provisions  of.  the  Directive  nor  the 
preamble thereto specify the type of rights which are 
actually involved and in what respect the existence of 
such rights is contrary to the various provisions of the 
Treatry. N. far as importation, marketing, connection, 
brinsing into service and maintenance of telecommu-
nications equipment are concerned, special  rights arc 
in  practice rights that are granted by a Member State 
to  a  limited  number  of  undertakings,  through  any 
legislative,  regulatory  or  administrative  instrumcnt 
which,  within  a given  geographical  area, 
- limits to two or more the number of such  under-
taking,  otherwise  than  according  to  objective, 
proportional  and  non-discriminato!)'  criteria,  or 
- designates,  otherwise  than  according  to  such 
criteria,  several  competing  undertakings,  or 
- confen  on  any  undertakins  or  undertakings, 
otherwise than according to such criteria, lesal or 
regulatory  advantases  which  substantially  affect 
(I)  OJ  No  L Ill, 27.  S.  1988,  p.  73. 
(.,  (1991}  ECR  1-1223. 
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the ability of any other undatakinJ to enpae in 
any of the abovementioned activities in the ume 
JeOiflphical  area  under substantially  equivalent 
conditiona. 
This definition is without prejudice to the application 
of  Anicle  92 of the  BC  Treaty. 
7. The  existence  of  exclusive  rlghts  hu the  effect  of 
restricting  the  free  movement  of  such  equipment 
cit 1er  u  regards  the  importation  and  m•rketinJ of 
telecommunication•  equipment  (includina  satellite 
equipment~  because  certain  products  are  not 
marketed, or ~  reprda the connection, bringina into 
service  or maintenance because, takina into account 
th~ characteristics of the market and in panicular the 
diversity  and  technical  nature  of  the  producta,  a 
monopoly has  no incentive to provide these services 
in relation to products which it hu not marketed or 
imported, nor to align its prices on coats, since there 
is no threat of competition from new entrants. Taking 
into account the fact· that in most equipment markets 
there is typically I  large ran,e of telecommunication 
equipment markets there is typically I  tarae ran,e Of 
tel~communication equipment, and the likely deve-
lopment of the markets in which there are u  yet a 
limited  number of manufacturers, any specialy right 
which  directly or indirectly - for  example by  not 
providing for an open and non-discrimnatory autho-
.  rizntion  procedure  - a:mits  the  number  of  the 
ur.denakinp authorized  to import, market, connect, 
bring into service  and  maintain  such  equipment, is 
liahle to have the same kind of effect u  the grant of 
exclusive  riJhts. 
Sue h  exclusive  or special  rights  conslitute  meuures 
having  equivalent  effect  to  quantitative  restrictions 
incompatible with Article 30 of the EC Treaty. None 
of the specific features of satellite eanh stations or of 
the market for their sale or maintenance is such u  to 
justify  their  being  treated  differently  in  law  from 
oth'!r telecommunications terminal equipment Thus 
it  i~  necessary to abolish  all  existing exclusive  rights 
in  the  importation, marketing, connection, bringing 
into service and maintenance of satellite eanh station 
equipment. as well as  those rights having comparable 
effects - that is to say, all special rights except those 
consisting in legal or regulatory advantages conferred 
on one or more undertakings and affecting only the 
ability of other undertakings to engage in any of the 
abovementioned  activities  in  the  same  geographical 
area  under substantially  equivalent  conditions. 
1(64 
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8.  Satellite  earth  station  equipment  must  satisfy  the 
essential requirements harmonized by Council Direc-
tive  93/97/BBC (1)  with  special  reference  to  the cffi· 
cient use of frequencies. It will be possible to monitor 
the application of these nsential requirements partly 
through the licences granttd for  the provision of the 
services concerned. Alipment on the essential requi-
rements will  be achieved  mainly through  the adop-
tion of common technical rules and harmonization of 
the conditions attached to licences. Even where these 
conditions are  not harmonized,  Member  States  will 
nevcrtheleu have to adapt their rules. In .either case, 
Member States must in the meantime ensure that the 
application of such  rules  does  not create  barriers to 
trade. 
9.  The abolition of special or exclusive rights relating to 
the  connection  of  satellite  earth  station  equipment 
makes it necessary to recognize  the right to connect 
this equipment to the switched networks operated by 
the  telecommunications  organizations  so  that 
license$~  operaton  can  offer  their  services  to  the 
public. 
10.  Commission  Directive 90/388/EEC of  28  June 1990 
on competition  in  the  markets  foe  telecommunica-
tions  services (1).  as  amended  by  the  Agreement  on 
the  EBA.  provides  for  the  abolition  of  special  or 
exclusive  riahts granted by Member States  in  ret~pect 
of  the  provision  of  telecommunications  services. 
However,  the  Directive  .exclu!Jes  satellite  services 
from  its  field  of  application. 
II. In  Joined Cues C-271/90, C·281/90 and  C-289/90, 
Spain  v.  Commission(').  the Court of  Justice  of  the 
European  Communities  upheld  this  Co•nmission 
Directive on 17  November  1992.  However,  in  so far 
as  it  relates  to  special  rights,  the  Directive  was 
declared void by the Court of Justice on the grounds 
that neither the  provisions  of  the  Directive  nor the 
preamble thereto specify the t)'pe of  rights which arc 
actually involved and in  what respect the existence of 
such rights is contrary to the various provisions of the 
Treaty. Contequendy, these rights  mus~ be defined in 
this  Directive. As  far  u  telecommunications services 
are  concerned,  special  rights  are  in  practic~  rights 
that  are  granted  by  a  Member  State  to  a  limited 
number  of  undertakings,  through  any  legislative, 
regulatory or administrative instrument which, within 
a  given  geographical  area. 
( 1 )  OJ  No  L 290,  2·1.  II.  1993,  p.  I. 
(J)  OJ  No  L  192,  24.  1.  1990,  p.  10. 
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- limits to two or more, otherwise than accordina to 
objective,  proportional  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria.  the  number of undertaldnp which  are 
authorized  to  provide  any such  service, of 
- desipata,  otherwise  than  accordina  to  such 
criteria. snenl competing undertaldnp u, those 
-hich are authorized to provide any such service, 
or 
- confen  on  any  undenaking  or  undertakinp, 
otherwise than accordina to such criteria, lepl or 
regulatory  advantases  which  substantially  aHcct 
the ability of any other u,-:denaking to provide the 
same  telecommunications  service  in  the  same 
geographical  area  under  substantially  equivalent 
c.Jnditions. 
This definition is without prejudice to the application 
of Article. 9l of the  EC Treaty. 
In  the  field  of  telecommunications  services.  such 
special  lepl or  regulatory  advantages  may  consist, 
among other thinJS, in a  right to  make compulsory 
purchases in the pneral interest, in deroptions from 
law on town·and-country planning, or in the possibi-
lity  of obuining an  authorization without  having to 
so  through  the usual  procedure. 
12.  Where  the  number  of  undertakings  authorized  to 
provide  satellite  telecommunications  services  is 
limi1ed by a Member State through special rights, and 
a fortiori exclusive rights, these constitute restrictions 
that  could  be  incompatible  with  Artide  59  of  the 
Treaty,  whenever such  limitation  is  not  justified  by 
essential  requirements,  since  these  rights  prevent 
other undertakings ·from supplying (or obtaining) the 
serVices  conetmed to (or from) other Member States. 
In the case of aatellite network services, such essential 
requirements  could  be  the  effective  use  of  the 
frequency  speCtrum  and  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
interference  between  satellite  telecommunications 
systems  a  othtr space-based  or  terrestrial  technicad 
syst( ms. Constquently, provided that eqpipment used 
to cffer the aenices satisfies the essential requirement 
applicable to satellite communications, separate legal 
treatment of the latter is  not justified. On the other 
hand, special riJht.s consisting only in special legal or 
resulatory advantages, do not, in  principle, preclude 
othrr  undertakings  from  entering  the  market.  The 
corn patibility of these rights with the EC Treaty must 
therefore be  usessed  on a  ciSe  .. by.cue buis, regard 
befna had to their impact on the effective freedom of 
Qther  entities  to  provide  the  aame · telecommunica· 
tiona ICMce and their pouible justifications rrprdin& 
the activity concerned. 
13.  The exclusive rights that currendy exist in  the satel· 
lite  communications field  were  generally granted  to 
organizations that already  enjoyed  a dominant posi-
tion in creating the terrestrial networks, or to one of 
their  subsidiaries.  Such  rights  have  the  effect  of 
extending  the  dominant  position  enjoyed  by  those 
orpnizations and· therefore  strengthening  that posi-
tion.  The  exclusive  rights  granted  in  the  satellite 
communications field  are conaequendy inc.ompatible 
with Article 90 of the EC Treaty, read in  conjunction 
with  Article  86. 
14. These exclusive  rights  limiting access  to  the  market 
also have the effect of restricting or preventing, to the 
detriment of users,  the use  of Qtellite  communica-
tions  that  could  be  offered,  thereby  holding  back 
technical propss in  this area.  Because  their invest-
ment decisions  are  likely  to  be  hued on  exclusive 
ri&hts.  the  undertakinp  concerned  are  often  in  a 
position to decide to give  priority to terrestrial  tech-
nologies. whereas new entrants might exploit satellite 
technology.  The  telecommunications  organizations 
have generally given  preference  to  the  development 
of optical·fibre terrestrial  links, and satellite commu-
nications have  been  used  chiefly as  a technical solu-
tion of last resort in cases where the cost of the terres-
trial  alternatives  has  been  prohibitive,  or  for  the 
purpose of data broadcasting and/or television broad-
casting, rather than being used as a fully  complemen-
tary  transmission  technology  in  its  own  right Thus 
the exclusive  rights  imply  a restriction  on the  deve-
lopment  of  satellite  communication,  and  this  is 
incompatible with  Article ,90  of  the  Treaty,  read  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86. 
15.  However,  where  the  provision  of satellite  services  is 
concerned,  licensing  or  declaration  procedures  a~ 
justified in order to ensure compliance with  essential 
requirements, subject to the proponionality principle. 
Licensing  is  not  justified  when  a  mere  declaration 
procedure would suffice to attain thte relevant objec-
tive. Por example, in the case of provision of a satel-
lite service which  involves only the use  of a depen-
dent VSAT earth station in a MemJ>er State. the latter 
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I  6.  Article  90 (2)  of the Treaty provides  for an exception 
to  Article  86  in  cues where  the  application  of  the 
latter  would  obttruct  the  performance,  in  law  or 
fnfact. of the particular tub uaJped to the telecom-
munications orpnbadons. Punuant·to that provision, 
Directive  90/388/EBC  allows  exclusive  riJhtl  to  be 
maintained  for  a  transitional  period  in  respect  of 
voice  telephony. 
-voice telephony' is defined in Article  l of Directive 
90/388/BBC  u  the  commercial  provision  for  the 
public of the direct transport and switchinJ of speech 
in  real-time between  public switched network  termi-
nation  points,  enabling  any  user  to  use  equipment 
connected  to  such  a network  termination  point  in 
order  to  communicate  with  another  termination 
poin r.  In the cue of direct transport and switchinJ of 
speech  via  satellite  earth  station  networb.  such 
com mercia!  provision  for  the  public  in  aenenl can 
take  place  only  when  the · satellite  earth  station 
network is connected to the public switched network. 
As  regards all services other than voice telephony, no 
special treatment under Article 90 (2) is justified espe-
cially fn view of the insipi6cant contribution of such 
services  to  the  turnover  of  the  telecommunications 
organizations. 
17.  The  proviSion  of  satellite  network  services  for  the 
conveyance  of  radio  and  television  prognmmes  is  a 
telecommunications  service  for  the  purpose  of  this 
Directive and thus su)>ject to its provisions. Notwith· 
standing the abolition of certain special and exclusive 
right~; in respect of receive-only satellite r.'\rth stations 
not  ronntcted  to  the  public  networit.  of  a Member 
State  and the abolition of Spt( :.1 and uc:luaive rights 
in  re-spect  of satellite  services  provided  for  public or 
priva:e broadcuten, the  cont~nt of satellite broadcu-
ting ;;ervices to the general public or private broadcu-
ters,  the  content of  satellite  broadcutinJ services  to 
the  general  public  provided  via  frequency  bancb 
defined  in  the  Radio  Regulations  for  both  Broadcu· 
ting  Satellite  Services  {BSS)  &nd  Pixed.S.tellite 
Services  (PSS)  will  continue  to be subject  to specific 
rules  adopted  by Member States  in  accordftnce  with 
Community law and  ia  not.  therefore, adbject  to the 
provisions  of  this  Directive. 
18.  This  Directive  does  not  prevent  meuure  being 
adopt!!d in accordance with Community law and exis-
ting  i ntemational  obligations  so  u  to  ensure  that 
nationals  of  Member  States  are  afforded  equivalent 
treatment  in  third  countries. 
I/66 
19. The offerina by satellite  operators  of  apace  segment 
capacity of  national,  priwte or intemational  utciUte 
system•  to  licensed  utellite  earth  station  nl:~.:;o-~t. 
operaton, is  still, in  some  Member States, aubject  tc> 
regulatory  restrictions  other  than  those  compatJble 
with  frequency  and  site  coordination  amnpmenra 
required  under  the  international  commitmenra  of 
Member  States.  These  additional  restrictions  are 
contrary to Article 59, which implies that such utel· 
Ute  opetaton  should  have  full  freedom  to  provide 
their services in the whole Community, once they are 
licensed  in  one  Member State. 
20.  Tests  to  establish  whether  satellite  earth  stationJ  of 
licensed  operators  other  than  national  operators 
conform  to  specifications  perning technical  and 
operational  access  to  intergovernmental  satellite 
systems,  are,  in  most  of  the  Member  States,  carried 
out  by  the  national  Sipatory  of  the  nation  upon 
whose territory the station Is operating. These confor· 
mity  useuments are  therefore  performed  by  service 
providers  which  are  competitors. 
This  is  not  compatible  with  the  Treaty  provisions, 
notably  Articles  3  (g)  and  90,  read  in  conjunction 
with  Article  86.  Member  States  therefore  need  to 
ensure  that  these  conformity  useumenra  can  be 
caned out direct  between  the  satellite  earth  station 
network  operator  concerned  and  the  intergovern· 
mental  organization  itself,  under  supervision  of  the 
regulatory  authorities  alone. 
21.  Most  of  the  available  space  segment  capacity  is 
offered  by  the  international  satellite  organizations. 
The charps for  using such  capacity are  still high  in 
many  Member  States  because  the  capacity  e1n  be 
acquired  only  from  the  sipatory  for  the  Member 
State in question. Such ex<:luaivity, permitted by some 
Member  States,  lHds  to  a  partitioning  of  the 
Common  Market  to  the  detriment  of  cuatomen 
requiring capacity.  In  its  resolution  of  19  December 
1991,  the  Council  consequendy  called  on  the 
Member  States  to  improve  access  to  the  space 
segment  of  the  interpernmental organizations.  ~ 
regards the establishmen·t and use of separate systems, 
restrictive meuure taken under international conven-
tions signed by Member States could also have effects 
incompatible  with  Community  law,  by  limiting 
supply  at  the  expense  of  the  consumer  within 
meaning  of  Article  86  (b).  Within  the  international 
satellite organizations, reviews of the provisions of the 
relevant constituent instruments are  under way,  inltr 
alia. in  respect of improved access  ar.d  in  respect of 
the  establishment  and  use  of  separate  systems.  In 
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order  to  enable  the  Commiaaion  to  carry  out  the 
monirorin1  tuk •lped to  it  by  the  EC  Treaty, 
instrumena  should  be  provided  to  help  Member 
States  to  comply  with  the  duty  of  coopention 
enshrined in the lint pu~~nph of Article J, read  in 
conjunction  with  Article  234  (2~ of  the  Treaty. 
22.  In  assaaina  the  meuuru  of  this  Directive,  the 
Commiuion.  in  the  context  of  the  achievement  of 
the  fundamental  objectiva of the Treaty referred  to 
in  Article  2 thereof,  includina that of strenJlhenina 
the  Community's  economic  and  aocial  cohesion  u 
referred  to  in  Article  130  (a~ will  abo  take  into 
account  the  situation  of  those  Member  States  in 
which  the  teiTCitrial  network  is  not  yet  suffidendy 
dnelopcd and which could  justify the deferment for 
these  Member States. a  regards  satellite tervicn and 
to the extent necessary, of the date of full application 
of  the  provisions  of  this  Directive  until  1 January 
1996, 
HAS  ADOPTBD  THIS  DIRBCI1VE : 
Article  1 
Directive  88/301/EEC  is  hereby  amended  u  follows: 
(a)  The lut sentence of the first  indent is replaced by 
the  followina : 
'Terminal  equipment  also  means. satellite  earth 
:,;ration  equipment'.  · 
(b)  The followina  indents  are  added  after the second 
indent: 
'- •special  rights•  means  risha that  are  pnted 
by  a  Member  State  to  a  limited  number  of 
undertakin~~t through  any  leJialative,  repla-
tory  or  administrative  instnJment,  which, 
within  a Jiven  ppphical area, 
- limiil to  two or more the number of such 
undertakings.  otherwise  than  accordina  t 
objective, proportional and non-diacrimina· 
tory  criteria.  or 
- daipates.  otherwise  than  accordina  to 
such  criteria,  aevenl  competina  underta· 
kings,  or 
- confen  on  any  undertakina  or  underta· 
kinp,  otherwise  than  accordina  to  such 
criteria,  any  lepl or  replatory advantages 
which substantially affect the ability of any 
other  undertakina  to  import,  market, 
connect. brina into service and/or maintain 
telecommunication  terminal equipment in 
the ume ppphical area under substanti· 
ally  equivalent  conditions ; 
- •utellite  earth  station  equipment"  means 
equipment which  ia capable of belna used  for 
the tnnamiuion only, or for  the  tnnsmiuion 
and  reception  rtnnsmit/receive1,  or  for  the 
reception only rreccive-only") of ndiocommu· 
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nlcation siplla by means of utellitn or other 
apace-baaed  ~YStems' 
1. The  fint  pansnph of  Article  2  is  replaced  by  the 
followina  text. 
'Member States  which  habe  pnted apecial  or exclu-
aive  rishts to undcnakinss shall ensure that all exclu· 
sive riahts are withdrawn, u  well u  those special rishts 
which 
(a)  limit  two  or  more  the  number  of  undenakinss 
within  the  meanina  of  Article  1,  otherwise  than 
accordina to objective, proportional and non-discri-
minatory  criteria.  or 
(b)  desipate, otherwise than accordina to such criteria, 
several  competins  undertaldnp  within  the 
mean ins of  Article  1  .' 
3.  The fint indent of Article  3 is  replaced  by  the  folio· 
wina tnt: 
·- in  the  case  of  satellite  earth  station  equipment, 
refuse to allow auch equipment to be connected to 
the  public telecommunications  network and/or to 
be  brouaht into  service  where  it doa not  satisfy 
the  relevant  common  · 'rkhnical  replations 
adopted  in  punuance  of  Council  Directive 
93/97/EEC n  or, in the absence thereof, the cuen· 
till requirements  laid  down  in  Article  4  of  that 
Directive.  In  the  absence  of  common  technical 
ruin of harmonized regulatory conditions, national 
rules  shall  be  proportionate  to  those  essential 
requirementl and shall be notified to the Commis· 
sion in purauance of Directive 83/189/EEC where 
that  Directive  10 requires. 
- in the cue of other terminal equipment, refuse to 
allow  such  equipment  to  be  connected  to  the 
public telecommunication• network where it does 
not utiafy the  relevant common technical  regula· 
tiona  adopted  in  punuance  of  Council  Directive 
91/263/BEC M or,  in  the  absence  thereof,  the 
aaential  rcquirementl  laid  down  in  Article  4 of 
that  Directive. 
(1  OJ  No  L 290,  24.  11.  1993,  p.  1. 
M OJ  No  L 128, .23.  S.  1991,  p.  t.' 
Article  2 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  hereby  amended  11  follows : 
t. Article  1 b  amended  u  follows : 
(a)  Panpph 1 is  amended  u  follows : 
(i)  the  seconds  indent  is  replaced  by  the  folio-
wins: 
·- •exclusive rights• means the rishts that are 
pnted by a Member State to one under-
taking  through  any  lesislative,  regulatory 
or  administrative  in,trument,  reserving  it  • 
the right  to provide  a telecommunication 
service  or  undertake  an  activity  within  a 
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(ii)  The followina is inaertcd u  the third indent : 
·-.  •special  riJhts•  means  the  riahts  tha~ are 
pnted by  1  Member  State  to  1  limited 
number of underraldnp throuah any leal•· 
lative,  ~aulatory or admlnistndve  instN· 
ment which, within  a Biven  popphical 
•rea. 
- limits  to  two  or mo~ the  number of 
auch  undertakinp  authorized  to 
provide a service or undertake an acti-
~ty. othenrite than according to objec-
tive,  proportional  and  non-discrimina-
tory  criteria. or 
- desianates, otherwise than according to 
such criteria. several  competina under-
cakinJI u  beina authorized to provide 
a  tervice  or undertake  an  activity,  or 
- confen on any undertaking or underta· 
kinp. otherwise than according to such 
criteria.  leaaJ  or  ~platory advantap 
which substantially affect the ability of 
any  other undertakina to  provide  the 
ume telecommunications semce or to 
undertake  the  lflme  activity  in  the 
ume popphical am under substan· 
dally equivalent  conditions: 
(iii)  The  fourth  indent  is  replaced  by  the  follo-
wing: 
·- •telecommunications  services•  means 
services whose provision consists wholly or 
pertly  in  the  tnnsmiuion and  routina of 
sianales  on  a  public  telecommunications 
network by  means of telecommunications 
processes, with the exception of ndio- and 
television-broadcasting  to  the  public,  and 
satellite  services.' 
(1v)  ·he  following  indents  are  inserted  after  the 
tourth  indent: 
·- •satellite  earth  station  network•  means  a 
configuntion of two or more earth stations 
which interwork by  means by  means of a 
satellite; 
- •satellite network services• means  the esta-
blishment  and  opention of  satellite  earth 
station  networlc.s ; these  services  consist. u 
a minimum, in the establishment. by satel-
lite earth stations, of radiocommunications 
to  space  segment  \uplinks'").  and  in  the 
establishment  of  radiocommunications 
between  space  segment and  satellite  earth 
stations  \downlinks1 ; 
- •utellite communications  services•  means 
service whose provision  makes use, wholly 
or pertly, of satellite  network  services ; 
- •utellite iervtca• means  the  provision  of 
utelllte  communications  senices  and/or 
the provision of utellite networks service-s ;' 
(v)  the  second  sentence  of  the  sixth  indent  ia 
~placed by  the  followins  text: 
'Those  reuona a~ security of network  opera· 
dons,  maintenance  of network  integrity,  and, 
in  justified  cues,  interopenbility  of  services, 
data  protection  and,  in  the  case  of  aatellite 
network  services,  the  effective  use  of  the 
frequen9  apectrum  and  the  aVoidance  of 
harmful interference between satellite telecom-
munication• systems and other space-based or 
terrestrial  tecnical  systems.' 
(b)  Paragraph  2 ia  replaced  by  the  following : 
•2.  This  Directive  shall  not  apply  to  the  telex 
service  or to  terrestrial  mobile  radiocommunica-
tiona.' 
2.  Article  2 it amended  u  follows : 
(a)  The first paragraph is replaced by the followina : 
'Without  p~judice to Article  1 (2),  Member States 
shall  withdnw all  those  meuures which pnt  : 
(a)  exclusive riahts for the supply of telecommuni· 
cations services otherwise than voice  telephony 
and 
(b)  special  rights  which  limit to  two  or  more  the 
number of  undertakings  authorized  to  supply 
such  telecommunication  senices,  otherwise 
than  according  to objective,  proportional  and 
non-discriminatory  criteria,  or 
(c)  special  rights  •,.,uich  desisnate,  otherwise  than 
accordina  to  such  criteria,  anteral  competing 
undertakings  to  provide  such  telecomm•Jnica-
tion  services.  ' 
They shall  take  the  meuures necessary  to  ensure 
that  any  OP"ntor  is  entitled  to ·supply  any  such 
telecommunications services,  otherwise  than  voice 
telephony'. 
(b)  The following  paragraphs  are  added : 
'Member States shall  communicate  the  criteriP  on 
which authoria.tions are granted, together with  the 
conditions  attached  to  such  authorizations  and  to 
the  declaration  procedures  for  the  opention  of 
tr11nsmitting  earth.  stations. 
Member  States  shall  continue  to  inform  the 
Commission of any  plans to  introduce  new  licen-
sing procedures or to change existing procedures·. 
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3.  Article 6 Ia  amended  u  follows : 
(a)  The  following  pmpphs  are  added  after  the 
second  pmpph  : 
•Member Stata shall ensure that any fees  impoted 
on  providen  of  lm'ica u  part  of authorization 
procedum, shall be baed on objective, transparent 
and  non-discriminatory  criteriL 
Fees.  the criteria upon which  they are  baed, and 
any  chanaa  thereto,  shall  be  publilhed  in  an 
a  ppropriatc and sufficiently detailed manner, 10 u 
to  provide  euy access  to that information. 
Member Stata shall notify to the Commiuion no 
Inter  than  nine  months  after  publication  of  this 
Directive, and  thereafter whenever chanaa occur, 
the  manner  in  which  the  information  is  made 
available. The Commission shall  replarly  pu~tish 
references  to  such  notifications.' 
(b)  The  following  parapph is  added : 
'Member  Stata shall  ensure  that  any  replatory 
prohibition  or restrictions  on  the  offer  of  space-
segment capacity to  any  authorized  satellite earth 
station  network  operator  are  abolished.  and  shall 
autorize  within  their  territory  any  space-segment 
s:.applier  to  verify  that  the  satel1ite  earth  station 
network  for  use  in  connection  with  the  apace 
sepent of the supplier in question  is  in confor· 
mity  with  the  published  conditions  for  access  to 
his  space  segment capacity.' 
A.rtitlt J 
Memb-.:r  States  which  are  party  to  the  international 
conven tiona  setting  up  the  international  organizations 
lntclut.  lnm1111t.  Butelsat  and  lntenputnik  for  the 
purposes  of Mtellite operatons shall communicate to  the 
Co~miuion,  at ita ftCIUCIC, the information they putS on 
any \measure  that could  prejudice  compliance  with  the 
competition rules of the BC Trnty or affect  the aims of 
thia DJrec:dve or of the Cou:tcil Directives on telecommu-
nications. 
.A.rticlt  4 
Member States shall aupply to the  ~mmission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  bu entered  into 
force,  such information u  will  allow the Commission  to 
confirm that Articles I and 2 have been complied with. 
A.rticlt  ' 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twf'ntieth day 
following that of its publication in the 0/firia/ journal of 
tiH  European  Communititl. 
A.rtitlt 6 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Bruuels,  13  October  1994. 
For  the  Commission 
K.a~l VAN  MIEPT 
Mtmbtr oftht Commission 
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Notice  by  the  Commission  concerning  a  draft  Directive  amending  Commis,ion  Directive 
90/388/EEC regarding the abolition of the restrictions on the usc of cable television networks 
for the provision of telecommunications services 
(95/C 76/06} 
The Commission  approved  a  draft Directive  amending  Commission  Directive  901388/EEC 
regarding  the  abolition  of the  resuictions  on  the  use  of cable  television  networks  for  the 
provision of telecommunications services. 
The Commission intends to adopt the ·Directive after having heard the possible comments of all 
parties concerned. 
The Commission  invites  interested  third  panics to submit their possible  observations  on  the 
draft Directive published hereunc;ler. 
Observations must reach the Commission not later than two months following the date of this 
publication. Observations may be  sent to the Commission by  fax  (No (32 2)  296 98  19)  or by 
mail  to the following  address: 
Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), 
Directorate B, 
Office 3/81, 
150 Avenue  de Conenberg/Kortenberglaan 150, 
B-1049 Brussels. 
Draft  CollliDissioo  Directive  amending  Com.missioo  D~ive 90/388/EEC  regarding  the 
abolition  of the  restrictions  on  the  usc  of cable  television  networks  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications services 
THE COMMISSION OF TiiE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to the Treaty establishing  the  European 
Community, and in  particular Article 90  (3)  thereof, 
WHEREAS: 
1.  Under the Directive 901388/EEC on competition in 
the  markets  for  telecommunications  services,  tele-
communications services  other than voice  telephony 
to  the  general  public (')  and  those  services 
specifically  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
directive (I)  were  opened  to  competition  and  the 
Member States were requested  to take the measures 
necessary to ensure  that any operator is  entitled  to 
supply  such  services C).  During  the  public  consul-
(') Council  resolution  93/C 213/01  acknowledges  that  this 
exception can be  terminated by 1 january 1998  with a tran-
sitional period for some Member States. 
(') The  telex  service,  mobile  communications  and  radio  and 
television  broadcastin~  to  the  public.  Satellite  communi-
cations were included m  the scope of the  Directive through 
Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994. 
(')  OJ No L 192, 24.  7.  1990, p.  10. 
tation organized by  the Commission  in  1992  on the 
situation  in  the  telecommunications  sector e),  the 
effectiveness  of the  measures  liberalizing  the .  tele-
communications sector and  in  particular the  liberal-
ization of data communications, value added services 
and  the  provision  of  data  and  voice  services  to 
corporate  users  and  closed  user  groups,  was  ques-
tioned  by  many service  providers  and  users  of such 
services. 
2.  The  regulatory  restrictions  preventing  the  use  of 
alternative  infrastructure  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized  services  are  the  main  cause  of  this 
continued bottleneck situation, and  in  panicular the 
restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV  networks. 
Potential service  providers  must  now  rely  on  trans-
mission capacity- 'leased lines' - provided by  th< 
telecommunications  organizations,  which  often  arc 
also  competitors  in  the  area  of liberalized  services. 
To  remedy  this  problem,  the  European  Parliament 
called  upon  the  Commission  to  adopt  as  soon  as 
possible  the  necessary  measures  to  take  full 
advantage  of  the  potential  of  the  existing  infra-
(")  Following  the  communication  by  the  Commission  of  21 
October  1992  'on the  1992  Review  of the  situation  in  the 
tclcc~rnmunications st·nor' (SEC(92)  1048) 
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structure of cable  netWorks  for  telecommunications 
services  and  to  abolish  without  delay  the  existing 
restrictions in the Member States on the use of cable 
networks for non-reserved services('). 
3.  Following  this  resolution  the  Commission  has 
completed  studies (2)  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks  and  alternative  infrastructures  for  the 
delivery of those telecommunications services which 
have  already  been. opened  to  competition  under 
Community law. The basic findings of these studies 
emphasize  the  potential  role  for,  amongst  other 
things, cable TV networks, in  meeting the concerns 
raised  about  the  slower  pace · of  innovation  and 
delayed  roll-out  of  liberalized  services  in  the 
European  Union.  Opening  such  networks  would 
help to overcome the problems of high pricing levels 
and lack of suitable capacity, which result to a large 
extent  from  current  exclusive  provision  of  infra-
structure  in  most  Member  States.  The  networks 
operated  by  authorized  cable  TV providers  indeed 
offer opportunities  for  the  supply  of an  increasing 
number  of  services,  apart  from  TV  broadcast,  if 
additional  investment  is  achieved.  The  example  of 
the  US  market shows  that new  services  combining 
image  and  telecommunications  emerge  when  regu-
latory barriers are removed. 
4.  Some  Member  States  have  therefore  abolished 
previous  restrictions  on the  provision  of some  data 
and/  or non-reserved telephone services on cable TV 
networks.  One  Member  State  permits  voice 
telephony.  Other  Member  States  have  however 
maintained  severe  restrictions  on  the  pro,!ision  of 
services  other than the distribution of 1V broadcast 
on these networks. 
5.  The current restrictions  imposed  by  Me~ber States 
on the use of cable TV networks for the provision of 
services  other than the  distribution of TV broadcast 
aim  to  prevent  that  public  voice  telephony  be 
provided on networks other than the public switched 
telephone  network,  to  protect  the  main  source  of 
revenues of the telecommunications organizations. 
(')  Resolution  of the  European  Parliament  of  20  April  1993 
(A3-0113/93), OJ No C 150, 31. 5.  1993, p.  39. 
(')  'The effects  of Liberalization  of Satellite  Infrastructure  on 
the  Corporate  and  Closed  User  Group  Market',  Analysis, 
1994; 
'L'impact de  l'autorisation  de  Ia  fourniture  de  services  de 
telecommunications  liberalises  par  les  ciblo-operateurs'  by 
IDATE, 1994. 
6.  Since  these  restrictions  are  brought  about  by  State 
measures and aim,  in  each  of the  national  marketS, 
to  favour  telecommunications  organizations,  which 
the  Member  States  own  and  to  which  they  have 
granted special or exclusive  rights,  these  restrictions 
must  be  assessed  under  Article  90  (I)  of  the  EC 
· Treaty. this Article  requires  Member States  not to 
adopt or maintain  measures  regarding  such  under-
takings  which  remove  the  useful  effect  to Treaty 
provisions, and in particular of the competition rules. 
It  includes  a  prohibition  on  maintaining  measures 
regarding  telecommunications  organizations  which 
result in limiting the free provision of services within 
the Union or lead to abuses of dominant position to 
the detriment of the users of a given service. 
7.  The granting of exclusive rights to the telecommuni-
cations  organizations  to  provide  transmission 
capacity  for  the  provision  of  telecommunications 
services  to  the  public  and  the  resulting  regulatory 
restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  TV  networks  for 
purposes  other  than  the  distribution  of radio  and 
television  broadcasting  programmes,  in  particular, 
for  new  services  such  as  pay  per  view,  interactive 
television  and  video  on  demand  as  well  as 
multimedia-services  in  the  Community,  which 
otherwise cannot be  provided,  necessarily  limits  the 
freedom  to provide  such  services  to  or from  other 
Member States.  Such  regulatory  restrictions  cannot 
be  justified  for  public  policy  reasons  or  essential 
requirements  since  the  latter,  and  in  particular  the 
essential requirement of interworking of networks in 
the  case  of  interconnection  betvieen  cable  TV 
networks  and  telecommunications  network,  can  be 
gu~ranteed  by  less  restrictive  measures,  such  as 
objective,  non-discriminatory  and  transparent 
declaration conditions. 
8.  The  measures  granting  exclusive  ~ights to  the  tele-
communications  organizations  for  the  provision  of 
transmission  capacity  and  the  resulting  regulatory 
restrictions on the use of cable TV infrastructure for 
the provision of telecommunications services  already 
open to competition are therefore a breach of Article 
90 in  conjunction with Article 59 of the Treaty. The 
fact that the restrictions  apply without distinction to 
all  companies  other than  the  relevant  telecommuni-
cations organizations  is  not sufficient to  remove  the 
preferential treatment of the latter from  the scope of 
Article  59  of  the  EC  Treaty.  Indeed  it  is  not 
necessary that all  the companies of a Member State 
are favoured  in  relation to the foreign  companies.  It 
is  sufficient  that the  preferential  treatment  benefits 
certain national operators. 
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9.  Article  86  of the  Treaty  prohibits  as  incompatible 
with  the  common  market  any  conduct  by  one  or 
more  undenakings  holding  dominant  positions  that 
involves  an abuse of a dominant position within the 
common market or a substantial part of it. 
10.  In  each  national  market  the  telecommunications 
organizations  hold  a  dominant  position  for  the 
provision of uansmission capacity because  they are 
the  only  ones  with  networks  covering  the  whole 
territory  of  those  States.  Another  factOr  of  this 
dominant  position  concerns  the  peculiar  charac-
teristics  of the  market  and  in  particular  its  highly 
capital  intensive  nature.  Taking  account  of  the 
amount  of  'investment  needed  to  duplicate  a 
network, there is  a high reliance on use  of existing 
nenvorks. This enhances the structural dominance of 
the  telecommunications  organizations  and 
constitutes a potential barrier to entry. Thirdly, as  a 
result of their market share, the telecommunications 
organizations  funher  benefit  from  detailed 
information  on  telecommunications  flows  which  is 
not available  to potential  new  entrants.  It  includes 
information on subscribers' usage ·patterns, necessary 
to target specific groups of users, and on price elas-
ticities  of  demand  in  each  market  segment  and 
region of the country. Finally, the fact that the tele-
communications organizations enjoy exclusive  rights 
for the provision of voice telephony also contributes 
to their dominance. 
ll. The mere creation of a dominant position within  a 
given market by granting an exclusive right is  not~ as 
such, incompatible with Article  86.  A Member State 
is,  however,  not  allowed  to  maintain  a  legal 
monopoly  where  the  relevant  undertaking  is 
compelled  or  encouraged  to  abuse  its  dominant 
position  in  a  way  that  is  liable  to  affect  trade 
between Member States. 
12.  The  prohibition  of the  use  of other  infrastructure 
and  in  particular CATV  networks  for  the  provision 
of telecommunications  services  has  encouraged  the 
telecommunications  organizations  to  charge  high 
prices  in  comparison with  prices  in  oth.er  countries, 
whereas  innovation  in  European  corporate 
networking and competitive service provision  as well 
as  the  implementation  of applications  proposed  in 
the  Report  on  Europe  and  the  global  information 
society, are critically dependent on the availability of 
infrastructure,  in  particular  of  leased  circuits,  at 
decreasing costs. Tariffs for such high capacity infra-
structure  are  on  average  1  0  times  higher  in  the 
Union  than  equivalent  capacity  over  equivalent' 
distances  in  North  America.  In  the  absence  of  a 
justification, e.g.  in  the  form  of higher  coSLs,  these 
tariffs must be considered as  abusive  in  the  sense  of 
Article 86 (a). 
These high prices  in  the Union  are  a direct conse-
quence of the restrictions imposed by Member States 
on the use of infrastructures other than those of the 
telecommunications  organizations,  and  in  particular 
of those of the cable TV operators, for the provision 
of  telecommunications  services.  Such  high  prices 
cannot only  be  explained  by  the  underlying  costs, 
given.  the  substantial  differences  in  tariffs  between 
Member StateS where similar cost Structures could be 
expected. 
13.  Moreover, the State measures preventing the  CATV 
operators  from  offering  transmission  capacity  in 
competition  with  the  telecommunications  organ-
izations  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  services 
restrict the overall supply of capacity  in  the  market 
and  eliminate  incentives  for  telecommunications 
organizations  to  quickly  increase  the  capacity  of 
their  networks,  reduce  average  costs  and  lower 
tarrifs. The resulting high tariffs applied  by the tele-
communications organizations for,  and. lack of avail-
ability of, the basic infrastructure provided  by  these 
organizations over which  liberalized  services  might 
be ·offered  by  third  parties  have  delayed (')  wide-
spread  development  of  high  speed  corporate 
networks,  remote  accessing  of  databases  by  both 
business  and  residential  users  and  the  development 
of innovative  services  such  as  telcbanking,  distance 
learning,  computer  aided  marketing  etc.  The 
networks  of  the  telecommunications  organiz.ations 
currently fail  to  meet  all  potential  market  demand 
for  transmission  capacity  for  the  provision  of  these 
telecommunications services, as  emphasized  by  users 
and  suppliers  of  such  services (Z).  The  current 
restrictions  on the  usc  of CATV networks  for  the 
provision of such services therefore create a situation 
in  which  the  mere  exercise  by  the  telecommuni-
cations  organization  of their  exclusivity  to  provide 
(I)  AJ  shown in  the communication by  the  Commission  to  :~c 
European Parliament and the Council (COM(94) 440  fmal 1 
of 25  October  1994  'Green  Paper  on  the  liberalizauon  ,,1 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  cable  televisiOn 
networks: Part One'. 
(') 'Communication  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament on the consultation on the review of the situation 
in  the telecommunications sector' COM(93)  159  final  of 28 
April  1993,  p.  5  point  2.  These  findings  made  during  the 
review  thus  showed  that  the  mere  obligation  to  provide 
leased  lines  on  demand  was  not  sufficient  to  avoid 
restrictions on access  to the markeu  in  telecommunications 
services and limiu on users' freedom of choice. 
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transmission capacity for public telecommunications 
services delays, in  the sense  of Article  86  (b)  of the 
Treaty,  the  emergence  of,  in  particular,  new 
applications  such  as  pay  per  view,  interactive 
television  and  video  on  demand  as  well  as 
multimedia  services  in  the  Community,  combining 
both  audiovisual  and  telecommunications,  which 
cannot adequately be  provided  on the  netWorks  of 
the telecommunications organizations. 
On  the  other  hand,  given  the  restnctaons  on  the 
number of services which they may offer, cable TV 
operators  often  postpone  investments  in  their 
networks  and  in  particular  the  introduction  of 
optical-fibre which could be profitable if they could' 
be  depreciated  on  a  larger  number  of  services 
provided.  Consequently,  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
cable  TV netWorks  to provide  services  other than 
broadcasting  also  have  the  effect  of delaying  the 
development  of  new  telecommunications  and 
multimedia services, and thus holding back technical 
progress in this area. 
14.  Lastly,  as  recalled  by  the  Coun of Justice  of  the 
European  Community ('),  a  system  of  undistorted 
competition,  as  laid  down  in  the  Treaty,  can  be 
guaranteed only if equality of opponunity is secured 
between  the various  economic  operators.  Reserving 
to  one  undertaking  which  markets  telecommuni-
cations  services  the  task  of  supplying  the  indis-
pensable  row material, i.e.  transmission  capacity,  to 
all  companies  offering  telecommunications  services 
proved,  however,  tantamount to conferring upon  it 
the power to determine at will  which service can be 
offered  by  its  competitors,  at  which  costs  and  in 
which time periods, and to monitor their clients and 
the traffic generated by its  competitors, placing that 
undenaking  in  an  obvious  adyantage  over  its 
competitors.  · 
15.  For all  these  reasons, the exclusive  rights  granted to 
the  telecommunications  organization  to  provide 
transmission  capacity  for  telecommunications 
services to the public and the resulting restrictions on 
the  use  of cable TV networks  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized  services  are  therefore  incompatible  with 
Article  90  ( 1)  in  conjunction with  Anicle  86  of the 
Treaty. Article 90  (2)  of the Treaty provides  for an 
exception to Article 86 in cases where the application 
of the latter would obstruct the performance, in  law 
or in fact, of the panicular tasks assigned to the tele-
communications  organizations.  Pursuant  to  that 
provision, the Commission investigated the impact of 
the liberalization of the use of the cable networks for 
C)  Judgment  of  19  March  1991,  Case  C-202/88  France  v. 
Commission [1991] ECR 1-1271, paragraph 50. 
the provision of telecommunications and  multimedia 
services. 
According. to Directive 90/388/EEC, Member States 
may  until  a  certain  date  continue  to  reserve  the 
provision  of voice  telephony  to their  national  tele-
communications organization to guarantee sufficient 
revenues  for  the  establishment  of  a  universal 
telephone  network.  Voice  telephony  is  defined  in 
Article  1  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as  the 
commercial  provision  for  the  public  of  the  direct 
transport  and  switching  of  speech  in  real  time 
betWeen public switched network termination points, 
enabling  any  user  to  use  equipment  connected  to 
such  a  network  termination  point  in  order  to 
communicate with another termination point. 
It  appears  that  a  temporary  prohibition  of  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  on  the  cable  TV 
network can be justified for the same reason. Besides 
the  case  of voice  telephony  no  other restriction  is 
justified  pursuant  to  Anicle  90  (2),  in  panicular 
taking  into  account  the  small  contribution  to  the 
turnover of the telecommunications organizatioqs of 
those  services,  currently ·  provided  on  their  own 
. networks, which could be diverted towards the cable 
TV net:Works. 
16.  Notwithstanding  the  abolition  of  the  current 
restrictions on the use  of cable TV netwQrks,  ~,rhere 
the  provision  of  services  is  concerned,  the  same 
licensing or declaration procedures could be foreseen 
as  for  the  provision  of  the  same  services  on  the 
public telecommunications networks. 
17.  Notwithstanding  the  abolition  of  the  current 
restrictions  on  the  use  of the  cable  networks,  the 
broadcasting of TV channels  to the  general  public 
via  these  networks  will  continue  to  be  subject  to 
specific  rules  adopted  by  Member  States  in 
accordance  with  Community  law  and  is  not, 
therefore, subject to the provisions of this Directive. 
18.  In  order  to  allow  for  the  monitoring  of  possible 
abusive  cross-subsidies  between  the  broadcasting 
tasks  of  the  cable  TV  operators,  which  are  often 
provided under exclusive rights, and  their business as 
provider of capacity for telecommunications services 
Member  States  should·  guarantee  transparency  as 
regards  the  use  of resources  from  one  activity  to 
enter  in  the  other market.  Given  the  complexity  of 
the  financial  records  of  network  providers,  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  determine  the  cross  subsidies 
within  it  between  the  reserved  activities  and  the 
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services provided under conditions of competition. It 
is thus necessary tO require these cable TV operators 
to  keep  separate  financial  records,  in  particular 
identifying separately costs  and  revenues  associated 
with  the  provision ·of the  services  supplied  under 
~eir  exclusive  rights  and  those  provided  under 
competitive  conditions.  Thus  hybrid  services,  made 
up  of  elements  falling  within  dte  reserved  and 
competitive services, should distinguish  between  the 
costs of each element. 
19.  Where  Member StateS  grant  the  right  tO  establish 
both cable TV and telecommunications networks to 
the same  undertaking, they put the  relevant  under-
takings in  a  situation where they have  no incentive 
to  attract  users  to  the  network  which  is  the  best 
suited  for  the  provision  of the  relevant  service,  .as 
long  as  they  have  spare  capacity  on  the  other 
n~twork. In that case, they have, on the contrary, an 
interest in  overcharging the  use  of the cable  infra-
StrUcture  for the provision of non-reserved services, 
where allowed,  to increase the traffic on their tele-
communications networks. To allow  the  monitoring 
of such possible abusive behaviour, a clear separation 
of financial records between the two activities is  also 
required. 
20.  In  the  case  where  no other delivery  system  to  the 
home is authorized by the relevant Member State, in 
the  meantime  the  Commission  will  in  any  event 
reconsider the effectiveness of separation of accounts 
to avoid  abusive  practices  and  assess  whether such 
joint provision does not result in  a limitation of the 
potential  supply  of  transmission  capacity  at  the 
expense of the services providers in the relevarft area, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECITVE: 
Article  I 
Directive 90/388/EEC is  hereby amended  as  follows: 
t .  Anicle 1 ( t) is amended as follows: 
The following is insened after the last indent: 
'- ucable  TV  networks"  means  any  wire-based 
infrastructure authorized by  a  Member  State  for 
the delivery of radio and  television  broadcasting 
and  which  is  available  or adaptable  for  telecom-
mu~ications purposes. • 
2.  Article 4 is amended as follows: 
The following is insened after the second paragraph: 
'In addition Member States shall: 
- withdraw  all  restrictions  for  the  supply  of trans-
mission capacity on cable TV networks and allow 
operators  to  use  the  cable  networks  to  deliver 
their services, 
- ensure that interconnection of cable TV networks 
with  the  public  telecommunications  network  is 
authorized  for  such  purpose,  in  panicular  inter-
connection  with  leased  lines,  and  that  the 
restrictions on direct interconnection of cable TV 
networks are abolished. • 
Article  2 
When withdrawing  restrictions  for the  use  of cable-TV 
networks,  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary 
measures  to ensure transparency and  non-discriminatory 
behaviour  where  a  single  operator  provides  both  tele-
communications  and  cable  TV  networks,  and  in 
particular  the  separation  of  financial  accounts  as 
concerns the provision of each network. 
Where  cable  TV  networks  are  used  for  telecommuni-
cations  purposes,  Member  States  shall  also  ensure  that 
these  cable  TV  operators  keep  separate  financial 
accounts  regarding  their  activity  as  network  capacity 
provider for telecommunications  purposes. 
Where  a  si~gle  operator  provides  both  networks  as 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  the  Commission  will,  by  1 
January  1998,  carry  out  an  overall  assessment  of  the 
impact of such  joint provision  in  relation to the  aims  of 
this  Directive. 
Article  J 
Member States shall supply to the Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force, such information as will  allow the Commission  to 
confirm  that Anicles  1 and  2 have  been  complied  with. 
Article  4 
The Directive shall  enter into  force  on  1 January  1996. 
Article  5 
This  Directiye  is  addressed  to the  Member States. 
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COMMISSION 
COMMISSION N01JCE 
on the clistiactioa betweea coaceatrative aacl cooperative joi.ot ventures 
~Council  Replatioa (EEC) No 4064/19 of 21  Dcccmbcr 1989 on the control of coacen-
tratioas between uaclertalda.p 
(9-4/C  385/01) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
L INTRODUCfiON 
No C 385/1 
·· ·t  1.  The purpose of this notice is to provide guidance as 
co  how the Commission  interprcu Anide 3  of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 4064/89 (
1
)  (hereinafter referred to as 
'the Merger Regulation')  in  relation  to joint ventures. 
6.  The structural changes  brought about by  concen-
trations frequendy reflect a dynamic process of restrUc-
turing  in  the  markets  concerned.  They are  permitted 
under the Merger. Regulation unless they result in serious 
damage to the structure of competition by creating or 
strengthening a dominant position. 
t 
2.  This notice replaces the notice on the same subject 
adopted by the Commission on 25 July 1990 (1). Changes 
made in  the current notice  reflect the experience gained 
by  the  Commission  in  applying  the  Merger Regulation 
since  its  entry  into  force  on  21  September  1990.  The 
principles  set  out in  this  notice  will  be  followed  and 
further developed by the Commission's practice in  indi-
vidual cases.  . 
3.  Under  the  Community  competition  rules  joint 
ventures are undertakings which are jointly controlled by 
two  or  more  other  undertakings(').  In  practice  joint 
ventures  encompass  a  broad  range  of operations,  from 
merger-like  operations  to  cooperation  for  particular 
functions such as R&D, production or distribution. 
4.  joint ventures fall  within the scope of the  Merger 
Regulation  if they meet the  requirements of a  concen-
tration set out in  Article  3 thereof. 
S.  According  to recital  23  of the  Merger Regulation 
'it is  appropriate to define the concept of concentration 
in  such  a  manner as  to cover only operations bringing 
about  a  lasting  change  in  the  strUcture  of the  under-
takings concerned ... it is therefore necessary to exclude 
from  the  scope  of  this  Merger  Regulation  those 
operations which have  as  their object or effect the coor-
dination of competitive behaviour of undertakings which 
remain independent .. .'  · 
(')  OJ No C 395, 30. 12. 1989, p.  1, corrected version OJ No l 
257, 21. 9. 1990, p.  13. 
(')  OJ No C 203, 14. 8.  1990, p.  10. 
(I) The con~t  of joint control is  set out in  the notice on the 
notion of a concentration. 
In  this  respect concentrations are to be  contrasted with 
arrangements  between  independent  undenakings 
whereby  they  coordinate  their  competitive  behaviour. 
!he latter do  not,  in  principle,  involve  a lasting change 
m structure of undenakings.  It is  th~refore appropriate 
to  submit  such  arrangements  to  the  prohibition  laid 
down  in  Article  85  (1)  of the EEC Treaty where  they 
affect  trade  betwee;n  Member States  and  have  as  their 
object or effect the  prevention,  restriction or distortion 
of competi.tion within the common market, and they can 
be exempted from this prohibition only where they fulfil 
the  ~equirements of Article 85  (3). For this reason, coop-
erative  arrangements  are  dealt  with  under  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  17 e),  (EEC)  No  1017/68 {
1
),  (EEC)  No 
4056/86 (')  or  (EEC)  No  3975/87 (1)  implementing 
Articles  85  and  86 ('). 
7.  The Merger Regulation  deals  with  the  distinction 
between  concentrative  and  Cooperative  operations  in 
Article  3 (2) (') as  follows: 
'An operation, including the creation of a joint venture, 
which  has  as  iu object or effect the coordination of the 
competitive  behaviour  of  undenakings  which  remain 
(•)  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(•)  OJ No ll75, 23. 7.  1968, p.  1. 
(')  OJ No l378, 31. 12. 1986, p.  4. 
(')  OJ No l374, 31. 12. 1987, p.  1. 
(') See .Cof!lf!lission  Notice concerning the assessment of coop-
.  erattve  JOint  ventures  pursuant  to  Anicle  85  of the  EEC 
Treaty, OJ No C -43,  16. 2.  1993, p. 2. 
r>  ~hilst Anicle  ~ (2)  fi.rst  .subparagraph,  is  not confined  to 
JOint ventures, au  apphcauon to operations other than  joint 
ven~ures  is  not  dealt  with  in  the  context  of the  present 
nouce. 
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independent shall  not constitute a concentration within 
the meaning of paragraph 1 (b). 
The creation of a joint venwre perfonniDg on a ·lasting 
basis  all  the  functions  of  an  auconomous  economic 
entity, which  does ·not ghre  rise  co  coordination of the 
competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves 
or betWeen them and the joint venture, shall constitute a 
concentration within  the  meaning  of paragraph  t  (b).• 
8.  Although Article 3 (2), second subparagraph, refers 
to coordination between parent companies and the joint 
venture, this  has  to be interpreted in  the light of recital 
23  and Article  3 (2), fmt subparagraph, the purpose of 
which is to exclude from the scope of the Merger Regu-
lation  operations  which  lead  to  the  coordination  of 
behaviour  between  'undenakings  which  remain  inde-
pendent'.  For  the  purposes  of the  distinction  between 
cooperative  and  concentrative  joint ventures  therefore, 
the coordination between the parent companies and the 
joint venture  referred to in  the second subparagraph is 
relevant  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  instrument  for 
producing or reinforcing  the  coordination  between  the 
parent companies. 
II.  JOINT  VEN1URES  UNDER  ARTICLE  3  OF  THE 
MERGER REGULATION 
9.  In  order to  be  a concentration within the  meaning 
of Article 3 of the Meger Regulation an operation must 
fulfil  the following  requirements: 
.. 1.  Joint control 
10.  A joint venture  may  fall  within  the  scope  of the 
Merger Regulation where there is  an acquisition of joint 
control by  two or more  undenakings, that is,  its  parent 
companies  (Article  3 (1)  (b)). The concept of control  is 
set  out  in  Article  3  (3).  This  provides  that  control  is 
based  on the  possibility  of exercising  decisive  influenc~ 
on  an  undenaking,  which  is  determined  by  both  legal 
and factual considerations. 
11.  The principles for determining joint control are set 
out in detail in  the Commission's notice on the notion of 
concentration ('
0
). 
2.  Structural change of the undertakings 
12.  Article  3 (2), second. subparagraphs stipulates that 
the joint venture must perform, on a lasting basis, all  the 
functions  of an  autonomous economic entity. 
13.  Essentially  this  means  that the  joint venture  must 
operate on a market, performing the  functions  normally 
carried out by other undenakings operating on the same 
market.  In order to do so  the joint venture  must  have 
sufficient financial and other resources including finance, 
staff,  and  useu (tangible  and  intangible)  in  order  to 
operate a business activity on a lasting basis. In respect of 
intellectual property righu it is sufficient that these rights 
are licensed co the joint venture for iu duration (11). Joint 
· ventures  which  satisfy  this  requirement  are  commonly 
descn'bed as  •full-function' joint ventures. 
14.  A  joint venture  is  not full-function  venture  if  it 
only. takes  over one specific  function  within  the  parent 
companies'  business  activities  without  access  to  the 
market. This is  the case, for example, for joint ventures 
limited  to R&D or production. Such  joint ventures  are 
auxiliary  to  their  parent companies'  business  activities. 
This  is  also  the case  where  a joint venture  is  essentially 
limited · to  the  distribution  or  sales  of  its  parent 
companies' products and, therefore, acts principally as  a 
sales  agency.  However,  the  fact  that  a  joint  venture 
makes usc of the distribution network or oudct of one or 
more  .of  its  . parent  companies,  normally  will  not 
disqualify  it  as  'full-function'  as  long  as  the  parent 
companies  are  acting  only  as  agents  of  the  joint 
venture (
12
). 
15.  The strong  presence  of the  parent  companies  in 
upstream or downstream markets is  a  fact~r to  be  taken 
into consideration in assessing the full-function character 
of a joint venture where this presence leads to substantial 
sales or purchases between the parent companies and the 
joint venture. The fact that the joint venture relies almost 
entirely  on  sales  to  its  parent companies  or purchases 
from  them  only  for  an  initial  st.art-up  period  does  not 
normally  affect  the  full-function  character  of the  joint 
venture.  Such  a  start-up  period  may  be  necessary  in 
order to establish  the  joint venture on  a market.  It will 
normally  not  exceed  a  time  period  of  three  years, 
depending  on  the  specific  conditions  of the  market  in 
question (u). 
Where  sales  from  the  joint  venture  to  the  parent 
companies are intended to be made on a lasting basis the 
essential question is whether regardless of these sales the 
joint venture  is  geared  to  play  an  active  role  on  the 
market.  In  this  respect  the  relative  proportion  of these 
sales  compared  with  the  total  production  of  the  joint 
venture  is  an  important  factor.  Another  factor  is  that 
sales  to the  parent companies are  made  on  the  basis  of 
normal commercial conditions ("). 
(") Case IV /M.236, Ericsson/  Ascom of 8 July  1992  (paragraph 
11). 
(
11
)  Case  IV/M.l02,  TNT/Canada  Post  etc.  of  2  December 
1991; Case JV/M.149, Lucas/Eaton of 9 December 1991. 
(u}  Case IV /M.394, Mannesmann/RWE/Deutsche Bank  of 22 
December 1983 (paragraph 9). 
(I•)  Case  IV/M.266,  Rh6ne-Poulenc  Chimie/SITA  of  26 
November 1992 (paragraph 15), to be contrasted with Case 
IV  /M.t6!!, Flachgb~/VEI.I.A of 13  April  1992 
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In relation to purchases made by the joint venture from 
its parent companies, the full-function  character of the 
joint venture  is  questionable  in  particular  where  little 
value is  addecl to the products or services conc:emecl at 
the  level of che joint YeDture itself. In such a siaaation, 
the joint YeDture ·may be doser to a joint sales agency. 
·However,  in  contraSt  to  this  situation  where  a  joint 
venture  is  active  in  a  trade  market  and  performs  the 
normal functi9ns of a trading company in such a market, 
it normally will not be an auxiliary sales  agency but a 
full-function  joint venture.  A  trade  market  is  charac-
terized by the existence of companies which specialize in 
the  selling  and  distribution  of products  without  being 
vertically integrated in  addition to those which  may  be 
integrated,  and  where  different  sources  of supply  are 
available for the products in question. In addition, many 
trade markets may require operators to invest in specific 
facilities  such  as  outlets,  stockholding,  warehouses, 
depotS,  transport fleetS  and sales  personnel.  In order to 
constitute  a  full-function  joint  venture  in  a  trading 
market, it must have the necessary facilities and be likely 
t 
to obtain a substantial proportion of its supplies not only 
from its parent companies but also from other competing 
sources (11). 
t 
t 6.  furthermore,  the joint venture  must  be  intended 
to operate  on a  lasting  basis.  The  fact  that the  parent 
companies  commit  to  the  joint  venture  the  resources 
described  above  normally  demonstrates  that this  is  the 
case.  In  addition, agreementS  setting  up  a joint venture 
often provide for certain contingencies, for example, the 
failure of the joint venture or fundamental disagreement 
as  between  the  parent  companies (").  This  may  be 
achieved  by  the  incorporation  of  provisions  for  the 
eventual  dissolution  of the  joint  venture  itself  or the 
possibility  for  one  or  more  parent  companies  to 
withdraw from  the joint venture. This kind of provision 
does not prevent the joint venture from being considered 
as operating on a lasting basis. The same is normally true 
where the agreement specifies  a period for the duration 
of the joint venture where this period is  sufficiendy long 
in order to bring about a lasting change in  the structure 
of  the  undertaking  concerned (
11
),  or  where  the 
agreement provides  for the  possible  continuation of the 
joint venture beyond  this  period.  By  contrast,  the  joint 
venture will  not be  considered  to operate  on  a  lasting 
basis  where it is  established  for  a  short finite  duration. 
This  would  be  the  case,  for  example,  where  a  joint 
venture  is  established  in  order  to  construct  a  specific 
project such as a power plant, but it will not be involved 
in  the  operation of the  plant once  its  constrUction  has 
been completed. 
(") Case  IVIM.179,  Spar/Dansk Supermarked  of 3  February 
1992  (food  retail); Case  IV I M.326, T  O)'Ota Motor Corp./ 
Walter  Frey  Holdingffoyota France  of  I  July  1993  (car 
distribution). 
( 16)  Case  IVIM.408, RWE/Mannesmann  of 28  February  1994 
(paragraph 6): 
( 17)  Case IVIM.259, British  AirwaysffAT of 27  October  1992 
(paragraph 10). 
3. Cooperative aspects 
17.  The  creation  of  a  full-function  joint  venture 
normally constitutes a concentration.  within the meaning 
of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation unless its object or 
effect  is  coordination  of the competitive  behaviour of 
independent undertakings which is  likely to result in  a 
restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 
85 (t). In order to assess whether a joint venture is coop-
erative  in  nature  it is  necessary  to  determine  whether 
there  is  coordination  between the  parent companies  in 
relation  to prices,  markets,  output or innovation.  The 
coordination between the parent companies and the joint 
venture referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 
3 (2)  is  relevant only in so far as it is  an instrument for 
producing  or reinfc r.cing  the  coordination  between  the 
parent  companies.  Where  there  is  a  restriction  of 
competition  of this  kind  the  Commission  will  have  to 
examine  the  applicability  of  Article  85  to  the  whole 
operation  by  means  of Regulation  No  17.  Where  the 
factors  leading to this restriction of competition can  be 
separated  from  the  creation of the joint venture  itself, 
the.former will be assessed under Regulation No 17, the 
latter un~r  the rules on merger control (
11
). 
3.1.  Produd market 
18.  The  following  typical  situations  illustrate  \\·here 
coordination of the competitive behaviour of the  parent 
companies  resulting  in  an  appreciable  restriction  of 
competition may or may not occur: 
there  is  no  possibility  of  coordination  of  the 
competiti,·e  behaviour  of independent  undenakings 
where  the  parent  companies  transfer  their  entire 
business  activities  to the  joint venture  or their total 
activities in a given industrial sector, 
coordination  can  normally  be  excluded  where  the 
parent companies are not active in the market of the 
joint venture or transfer to the joint venture all  their 
activities · in  this  market  or where  only  one  parent 
company remains active in the joint venture's market. 
The same  is  true where the parent companies retain 
only  minor  activities  in  the  market  of  the  joint 
venture, 
by  contrast  to  the  above,  there  is  normally  a  high 
probability  of  coordination  where  two  or  more 
parent  companies  retain  to  a  significant  extent 
activities  in  the  same  product  markt~t as  the  joirit 
(
11
)  Case  IV I M.l79,  SpariDansk Supermarked  of 3  February 
1992 (paragraph 8). 
Case  IV IM.263, Aholdl  Jeronimo Martins of 29  Sertembcr 
1992 (paragraph 8). 
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venture  itself in  so  far  as  these  activities  are  in  the 
same geographic market ("), 
there is also a probability of coordination where ·the 
parent companies or the joint venture specialize. in 
specifi~  segments  of  an  overall  product  market, 
unless  these  segments  are  of minor  importance  in 
view of the main activities of the parent companies or 
the joint venture respectively or there are objective 
reasons  for  the  parent  companies  to  retain  their 
activities  outside  the  joint venture,  e.g.  technology 
. related to other activities of the parent companies. In 
the latter case each of the parent companies retains a 
genuine  interest  in  their  specific  segments.  The 
existence  of the  joint  venture  therefore  does  not 
normally  of iuelf  justify  the  assumption  that they 
would  coordinate  their  behaviour  with  regard  to 
these activities, 
where a  network of cooperative  links  already exists 
between the  parent companies in  the joint venture's 
market the main object or effect of the joint venture 
may be to add a funher link and thereby strengthen 
already  existing  coordination  of  competitive 
behaviour {'
0
), 
where the  parent companies  are  active  in  a  market 
which is downstream from the joint venture's market 
coordination  of  their  competitive  behaviour  may 
occur where  the  joint venture  is  their main  supplier 
and relatively little further value is  added at the level 
of the  parent companies;  equally,  where  the  parent 
companies are active  in a  market which  is  upstream 
from the joint venture's market coordination of their 
competitive  behaviour  may  occur where  their  main 
customer is the joint venture either in general or in a 
particular geographic market, 
where  two  or  more  parent  companies  have  a 
significant activity in  a neighbouring market and this 
neighbouring  market  is  of  significant  economic 
importance compared with that of the joint venture, 
the collaboration within the joint venture may lead to 
the  coordination  of  the  parent  companies' 
compeuuve  behaviour  on  this  neighbouring 
market {'1). In this  context a neighbouring market is 
a separate but closely related market to the market of 
the  joint  venture,  both  markets  having  common 
('•)  Case IV/M.088, Elf Enterprise of 24 July 1991  (paragraph 
6); Case IV/M.t 17 Koipe- Tabacalera/Eiosua of 28 July 
1992  (paragraphs  10  to  14).  In  principle,  the  same  would 
apply where, following the creation of the joint venture, the 
parent  companies,  while  no  longer  active  in  the  joint 
venture's market,  nevertheless  remain  potential competitors 
in  this  market.  However,  this  can  normally  be  excluded 
since  it  is  unlikely  that  the  parents  would  re-enter  the 
market on their own,  in  particular, where they have  trans-
ferred  their  respective  activities  to  the  joint  venture,  or 
where  they  commit  significant  investment  to  the  joint 
venture. 
('
0
)  Case  IV/M.176,  Sunrise  of  13  January  1992  (paragraph 
34). 
(") Case  IV /M.293,  Philips/Thomson/SAGEM of 18  January 
1993 (parar,raph 19). 
characteristics  including  technology,  customers  or 
competitors. 
· 3.2. Geographic market 
19.  The parent companies and the joint venture may 
be  active  in  the same  product market but in  different 
geographic markets. In  this  context two situations  may 
be  particularly relevant:  the parent companies  and  the 
joint venture are each in different geographic markets, or 
the parent companies are in the same geographic market 
which  is  nevertheless  different  from  that  of the  joint 
venture. In these situations coordination may or may not 
occur as  follows: 
- where the parent companies and the joint venture are 
all  in  different geographic markets, the  Commission 
will  examine  closely  the  likelihood  of coordination 
between  the  parent  companies.  In  doing  so  the 
Commission  will  consider  interaction  between 
marketS,  and  foreseeable  developments  in  the  A) 
emergence of wider geographic marketS  panicularly ., 
in  the light of the market integration process  in  the 
Community (
22
). The same  applies where one parent 
company  and  the  joint  venture  are  in  the  same 
geographic market while the other parent companies 
are all in different geographic markets, 
- where  the  parent  companies  are  in  the  same 
geographic  market,  which  is  different  from  that of 
the joint venture, there is  scope  for coordination of 
the  competitive  behaviour  of the  parent companies 
where the joint venture's activities  have  a substantial 
economic  importance  when  compared  with  the 
parent  companies'  activities  on  their  home  market 
and  where  there  is  interaction  between  the  parent 
companies' and joint venture's markets or such inter-
action  is  likely  to  evolve  in  the  near  future.  By 
contrast, where  the  joint venture's  activities  account 
for only a small proportion of the overall activities of 
the parent companies in  the products concerned, the 
conclusion  that  collaboration  in  the  joint  venture  a 
would lead to coordination on the parent companies'  • 
market would be justified only in exceptional cases, 
- in  any event, where  the coordination of competitive 
behaviour  of the  parent  companies  takes  place  on 
geographic  markets  outside  the  Community  or the 
EEA  and  has  no appreciable  effect  on  competition 
within  the  Community/EEA  the  joint  venture  is 
considered  to  be  concentrative  despite  this  coordi-
nation. 
20.  In  relation to the abovementioned paragraphs, the 
fact  that  a  joint venture  leads  to  coordination  of the · 
competitive behaviour of the parent companies does  not 
prevent  the  assumption  of a  concentration  where  these 
e')  See  Case  IV  /M.207,  Eureko of 27  April  1992  (paragraph 
16  (b))  which  can  be  contrasted  w1th  Case  IV/M.319, 
BIIF/CCF/Chart<'rhou~<' of 30  Au~ust 199)  (para1~raph 6). 
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cooperative  elemenu  are  only  of  minor  economic 
imporcance  relative  to  the  operation  u  a  whole  (tk 
,.;,;.u). 
However  a  high  acamiulation  of minor  elcmeau  of 
c:oordiawioD may lead to a situation where the operacion · 
as a whole bu to be considered as cooperative. 
Ill. FINAL 
21.  The Commission's interpretation of Article 3 with 
respect to joint v~  is wicbout prejudice to cbe inter-
p.cewion which may be given by the Court of  Justice or 
the  Court  of.  Fam  Instance  of  the  EUI'Opean 
Communities. 
COMMISSION NOTICE 
on the aotion o£ a concca.tration 
under Council Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the control of concen-
trations between uadertakings 
(94/C 385/02) 
(Tat with EM relew.acc) 
I.  INTRODUcnON 
l.  The purpose of this notice is to provide guidance as 
to  how  the  Commission  interpretS  the  notion  of  a 
concentration under Article  3 of Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89 (
1
)  (hereinafter referred tO as the 'Merger Regu-
lation').  It  forms  pan  of  the  initiatives  which  the 
Commission envisaged in  its  report e>  to the Council of 
Ministers of 28 July 1993 in order to improve dte trans-
parency  and  legal  security  of  all  decisions  taken  in 
application of dte  Regulation. This formal  guidance  on 
the  interpretation  of Article  3  should  enable  firms  to 
establish  more quickly whether and  tO what extent their 
operations  may  be  covered  by  Community  merger 
control in advance of any contact with the Commission's 
services. 
I 
This notice deals with paragraphs (1), (3), (4) and (5) of 
Article  3.  The interpretation  of Article  3 in  relation  to 
joint ventures,  dealt  with  in  particular  under Article  3 
(2),  is  set  out  in  the  Commission's  notice  on  the 
distinction  between  concentrative  and  cooperative  joint 
ventures (1). 
2.  The  guidance  set  out  in  this  notice  reflects  the 
experience  of the  Commission  in  applying  the  Merger 
Regulation since  it entered  into  force  on 21  December 
1990. The principles contained  here  will  be applied  and 
further developed by the Commission in individual cases. 
(')  OJ No L 395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  1,  corrected version OJ No 
L 257, 21. 9. 1990, p.  13. 
(I)  Doc.  COM(93)  385  final,  as  amended  by  COM(93)  385 
final/2. 
e>  Commission  notice  regardinJ  the  distinction  between 
concentrative and cooperative JOint ventures under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the 
control of concentrations between undenakings. 
3.  According  to recital  23  of the  Merger Regulation 
cbe  concept  of a  concentration  is  defined  as  covering 
only operations which  bring  about a lasting  change  in 
the strUcture of the undenakings concerned. Article 3 ( 1) 
provides  that such  a structural change  is  brought about 
eithe.r  by a merger between  two previously ind\!pendent 
undenakings  or by  the  acquisition  of control  over  the 
whole or pan of another undenaking. 
4.  The determination  of the. existence  of a  concen-
tration  under  the  Merger  Regulation  is  based  upon 
qualitative  rather than quantitative criteria,  focusing  on 
dte  notion  of  control.  These  criteria  include 
considerations of both law and fact. It follows, therefore, 
that a concentration  may occur on a legal  or a de facto 
basis. 
5.  Article  3  (1)  of  the  Regulation  defines  two 
categori~s of concentration: 
- those arising from  a merger-between previously inde-
pendent undertakings (point (a)); 
- those arising from a acquisition of control (point (b)). 
These  are  treated  respectively  in  sections  1_1  and  III 
. below. 
II.  MERGERS BElWEEN PREVIOUSLY INDEPENDENT 
UNDERTAKINGS 
6.  A merger within the meaning of point (a) of Article 
3  (l)  of the  Merger  Regulation  occurs  when  two  or 
more  independent undertakings  amalgamate  into  a new 
undenaking and cease to exist as different legal  entities. 
A  merger  may  also  occur  when  a  undenaking  is 
absorbed by another, the latter retaining its legal identity 
while  the former ceases  to exist as  a legal  entity. 
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7.  A merger within the meaning of point (a) of Anicle 
3  (  1)  may  also  occur where,  in  the  absence  of a legal 
merger,  the  combining  of the  activities  of previously 
independent  undertakings  results  in  the  creation  of a 
single  economic  unit (•).  This  may  arise  in  particular 
where two or more  undertakings, while  retaining their 
individual  legal  personalities,  establish  contractually  a 
common economic management ('). If this leads to a Je 
facto amalgamation of the undertakings concerned into a 
genuine  common  economic  unit,  the  operation  is 
considered to be  a merger. A prerequisite for the deter-
mination of a common economic unit is  the existence of 
a  permanent,  single  economic  management.  Other 
relevant  factors  may  include  internal  profit  and  loss 
compensation  as  between  the  various  undertakings 
within the group, and their joint liability eXternally. The 
Je facto amalgamation may be reinforced by cross-share-
holdings  between  the  undertakings  forming  the 
economic unit. 
Ill. ACQUISITION OF CONTROL 
8.  Point (b)  of Anicle 3  (1)  provides  that a concen-
tration  occurs  in  the  case  of an  acquisition  of control. 
Such control may be acquired by one undertaking acting 
alone  or by  two  or more  undertakings acting jointly. 
Control  may  also  be  acquired  by  a  person  in  circum-
stances  where  that  person  already  controls  (whether 
solely or jointly} at least one other undertaking or, alter-
natively,  by  a  combination  of  persons  (which  control 
another  undertaking)  and/or  undertakings.  The  term 
'person'  in  this  context extends  to  public  bodies (')  and 
private entities, as  well  as  individuals. 
As  defined,  a concentration  within  the  meaning  of the 
Merger  Regulation  is  limited  to  changes  in  control. 
Internal  restructuring  within  a  group  of  companies, 
therefore, cannot constitute a concentration. 
e>  In  determining  the  previous  independence of .unde~kings 
the  issue of control may be  relevant.  Control  IS  considered 
generally  in. paragraphs  12,  et  seq.,  below.  For this  specifi.c 
issue  mmonty shareholders  are  deemed  to have  control  1f 
they have previously obtained a majority of votes on major 
decisions  at shareholders  meetings. The reference  period  in 
this context is  normally three years. 
C)  This could  apply  for example,  in  the case  of a 'Gieichord-
nungskonzern'  in  German  law,  certain  'Groupements 
d'lnterets  Economiques'  in  French  law,  and  certaan  part-
nerships. 
(')  Including  the  State  itself,  e.g.  Case  IV  /M.I57  - Air 
France/Sabena, of 5 October 1992  in  relation to the Belgian 
State, or other public bodies such  as  the Treuhand in  Ca~e 
IV /M.308  - Kali  und  Salz/MDK/Treuhand,  of  14 
December 1993. 
An exceptional situation exists where both the acquiring 
and acquired undertakings are public companies owned 
by the same State (or by the same public body). In this 
case,  whether the  operation  is  to be  considered  as  an 
internal  reiuucwring  or  not  depends  in  tum.  on  the 
question whether both undertakings were formerlY  pan 
of the same economic unit within 'the meaning of recital 
12  of the  Merger Regulation.  Where the  undertakings 
were formerly part of different economic units having an 
independent  power  of decision  the  operation  will  be 
deemed to constitute a concentration and not an internal 
restruCturing (').  Such  independent  power  of  decision 
does  not  normally  exist,  however,  where  the  under-
takings are within the same  holding company. 
9.  Whether an operation gives rise to an acquisition of 
control  depends  on a  number  of legal  and/  or factual 
elements.  The acquisition  of propeny rights  and share-
holders' agreements are important but are not the only 
elements  involved:  purely  economic  relationships  may  -J 
also  be  determinant.  Therefore,  in  exceptional  circum-
stances a situation of economic dependence may lead to 
control  on  a  factual  basis  where,  for  example,  very 
important  long  term-supply  agreements  or  credits 
provided  by  suppliers  or  customers,  coupled  with 
structural links,  confer decisive  influence ('). 
There may also be  acquisition of control even if it is  not 
the  declared  intention  of the  panies (').  Moreover  the 
Merger Regulation clearly defines control as· 'having the 
possibility  of exercising  decisive  influence'  rather  than 
the actual exercise of such  influence. 
10.  Control  is  nevertheless  normally  acquired  by 
persons  or undertakings  which  are  the  holders  of  tb-· 
rights or are entitled to  rights conferring control (point  ,.. 
(a) of Article 3 (4)). There may be exceptional situations  '41 
where the  formal  holder of a controlling  in~erest ·differs 
from  the  persqn or undertaking  having  in  fact  the  real 
power to exercise  the rights  resulting from  this  irnerest. 
This may be the case, for example, where an undertaking 
uses another person or undertaking for the acquisition of 
a  controlling  interest  and  exercises  the  rights  through 
this  person  or  undertaking,  even  though  the  latter  is 
formally  the  holder  of  the  rights.  In  such  a  situation 
control is  acquired by the undertaking which  in  reality is 
behind  the  operation  and  in  fact  enjoys  the 
(')  Case  IV /M.097  - Pcchiney/Usinor,  of  24  June  1991; 
IV /M.216  - CEA  Industrie/France  Telecom/SGS-
Thomson, 22 February 1993. 
(
1
)  For example  in  the Usinor/Bamesa decision adopted by  the 
Commission under the  ECSC Treaty. See  also  Case IV /M. 
258 CCIE/GTE, of 25 September 1992. 
(')  Case IV /M.157 - Air  France/Sabena, of 5 October 1992. 
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po"tler  to control  the  target  undenaking (point  (b)  of 
Article 3 (  4)). The evidence needed to establish this type 
of indirect control may include factors such as the source 
of financing or family links. 
11.  .  The object of ·control can be one or more under-
takings  which consatute legal  entities, or the  assetS  of 
such entities, or only some of these assets (1'). In the last 
mentioned  situation,  which  could  apply  to brands  or 
licenses, the assets in question must constitute a business 
to which a market turnover can be clearly attributed. 
12.  The acquisition of control may be of sole or joint 
control. In both cases control is defined as the possibility 
to exercise decisive  influence on an undertaking on  the 
basis· of rights,  contracts or any other means  (Anicle  3 
{3)). 
1.  Sole coatrol 
13.  Sole control is  normally acquired on a legal basis 
where an undertaking acquires a  majority of the voting 
rights of a company. It is  not in  itself significant that the 
acquired  shareholding is  SO %  of the share capital  plus 
one share (
11
)  or that it is  100 % of the share capital (n). 
In ·the  absence  of other elements  an  acquisition  v.·hich 
does not include a majority of the voting rights does  not 
normally confer conuol even if it involves the acquisition 
of a majority of the share capital. 
14.  Sole conuol may also be  acquired in  the case of a 
'qualified  minority'. This  can  be  established  on  a legal 
and/  or dt facto  basis. 
C.  On a  legal  basis  it can  occur where  specific  rights  are 
attached  to  the  minority  shareholding.  These  may  be 
preferential  shares  leading  to a  majority  of the  voting 
rights or other rights enabling the minority shareholder 
to determine the strategic commercial  behaviour of the 
target company, such as the power to appoint more than 
half  of the  members  of the  supervisory  board  or  the 
administrative board. 
A minority shareholder may also be deemed to ha,·e sole 
control on a Je facto basis. This is the case, for example, 
where  the  shareholder  is  highly  likely  to  achieve  a 
majority  in  the  shareholders'  meeting,  given  that  the 
('
0
)  Case IV /M.286 ZUrich/MMI, of 2 April  1993. 
(
11
)  Case  IV /M.296  - Cr~dil  Lyonnais/BFG  Bank,  of  II 
january 1993. 
(
11
)  Case IV /M.299 Sara Lee/BP Food  Division, of 8 february 
1993. 
rematnang  shares  are  widely  dispersed (u).  In  such  a 
situation  it is  unlikely  that all  the smaller shareholders 
will  be  present  or  represented  at  the  shareholders' 
meeting.  The  detennination  of  whether  or  not  sole 
control  exists  ·in  a  particular  case  is  based  on  the 
evidence resulting from the presence of shareholders in 
previous  years.  Where, on the basis  of the  number of 
shareholders  attending  the  shareholders'  meeting,  a 
minority shareholder has a stable m~jority of the votes in 
this meeting, then the large minority sh~holder  is taken 
to have  sole control ('
4
). 
Sole  conuol can also  be  exercised by a  minority share-
holder who has the right to manage the aCtivities  of the 
company and to determine its business policy. 
1  S.  An option to purchase or convert shares cannot in 
itself  confer  sole  control  unless  the  option  will  be 
exercised in the near future according to legally binding 
agreements (1
1
). However the likely exercise of such  an 
option  can  be  taken  intO  account  as  an  additional 
element which,  together with other elements,  may  lead 
to the conclusion that there is sole conuol. 
16.  A change from  joint to sole conuol of an  under-
taking  is  deemed  to  be  a  concenuation  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Merger  Regulation  because  decisive 
influence  exercised  solely  is  substantially  different  to 
decisive  influence  exercised  jointly ('
6
).  For  the  same 
reason,  an  operation  involving  the  acquisition  of  joint 
control of one ·pan of an undertaking and sole control of 
another pan, are  in  principle  regarded  as  two separate 
conccnuations under the Merger Regulation ('
7
). 
17.  The concept of control under the  Merger  Regu-
lation may be different from that applied in specific areas 
of legislation  concerning,  for example,  prudential  rules, 
taxation,  air  transport  or  media.  In  addition,  national 
legislation  within  a  Member State  may  provide  specific 
rules  on the structure of bodies representing the  organ-
ization  of  decision-making  within  an  undertaking,  in 
particular,  in  relation  to the rights  of representatives of 
employees.  While  such  legislation  may confer a certain 
power  of conuol  upon  persons  other  than  the  share-
holders,  the concept of control under the Merger Regu-
lation is  related only to the means of influence normally 
enjoyed  by  the  owners  of an  undertaking.  Finally,  the 
prerogatives  exercised  by  a  State  acting  as  a  public 
(u)  Case  IV /M.025 Arjomari/Wiggins Teape, of  10  February 
1990. 
(  ..  )  Case  IV /M.343 - Soci~te Generate de  Belgique/Generalc 
de Banque, of 3 August 1993. 
(") Case  T-2/93  Air  France  v  Commission  (judgment  of  19 
May 1994, not yet pul>lished). 
(") This issue  is  dealt with  in  paragraphs 30 lO  32  of the  notice 
on the notion of undertakings concerned. 
(I') Case  IV  /M.409  ABB/Renault  Automation,  of  9  March 
1994. 
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authority rather than as  a shareholder, in  so  far as  they 
are limited to the protection of the public interest, do not 
constitute  control  within  the  meaning  of the  Merger 
Regulation to the extent that ~ey  have  neither the aim 
nor the effect of enabling the State to cx.erc:ise a decisive 
influence over dte activity of dte undertaking (''). 
. 2.  Joint control 
18.  As  in  the  case  of sole  control, the  acquisition  of 
joint control (which  includes changes  from  sole control 
to joint control) can also be  established on a legal or de 
facto basis. There is joint control if the shareholders (the 
parent  companies)  must  reach  agreement  on  major 
decisions  concerning  the  controlled  undenaking  (the 
joint venture). 
19.  Joint  control  exists  where  two  or  more  under-
takings  or  persons  have  the  possibility  to  exercise 
decisive  influence  over  another  undertaking.  Decisive 
influence  in  this  sense  normally  means  the  power  to 
block actions which determine the Strategic commercial 
behaviour of an  ~:~ndertaking. Unlike  sole  control, wich 
confers  the  power  upon  a  specific  shareholder  to 
determine the strategic decisions in  an  undertaking, joint 
control  is  characterized by  the  possibility of a deadlock 
situation resulting from the power of two or more parent 
companies  to  reject  proposed  strategic  decisions.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that these shareholders must reach a 
common  understanding  in  determining  the  commercial 
policy of the joint venture. 
2.1.  Equality in  voting  rights  or appointment  to  decision-
making bodies 
20.  The  clearest  form  of joint  control  exists  where 
there are only two parent companies which share equally 
the voting rights to the joint venture. In this case it is not 
necessary for a formal agreement to exist between them. 
However, where there is  a formal agreement, it must not 
contradict the  principle  of equality between  the  parent 
companies,  by  laying  down,  for  example,  that  each  is 
entitled  to  the  same  number  of representatives  in  the 
management bodies and that none of the members has  a 
casting  vote e').  Equality  may  also  be  achieved  where 
both parent companies have the right to appoint an equal 
number of members to the decision-making bodies of the 
joint venture. 
(
11
)  Case  IV  /M.493 - Tractebei/Dimigaz II,  of 1 September 
1994. 
('') Case  IV /M.272  Matra/CAP Gemini  Sogeti,  of  17  March 
1993. 
2.2.  Veto rights 
21.  Joint control  may exist  even  where  there  is  no 
.  equality between the two parent companies in votes or in 
representation in decision-making bodies or where there 
are  more  than  two  parent companies. This  is  the  case 
where minority shareholders have additional rights which 
allow them to veto decisions which are essential for the 
strategic commercial  behaviour of the joint venture (1°). 
These  vc;to  rights  may  be  set out in  the  statute  of the 
joint  venture  or  conferred  by  agreement  between  its 
parent  companies.  The  veto  rights  themselves  may 
operate  by  means  of  a  specific  quorum  required  for 
decisions  taken  in  the  shareholders'  meeting  or in  the 
board  of  directors  to  the  extent  that  the  parent 
companies  are  represented  on  this  board.  It  is  also 
possible  that strategic decisions  are subject  to  approval 
by  a  body,  e.g.:  supervisory board, where  the  minority 
shareholders  are  represented  and  form  pan  of  the 
quorum needed for such decisions.  f1 
22.  These  veto  rights  must  be  related  to  strategic 
decisions  on  the  business  policy  of the  joint  venture. 
They must go beyond the veto rightS  normally accorded 
to  minority  shareholders  in  ~rder  to  protect  their 
financial  interests  as  investors  in  the  joint venture.  This 
normal protection of the rights of minority shareholders 
is related to decisions on the essence of the joint venture, 
such  as,  changes  in  the statute,  increase  or decrease  of 
the  capital  or  liquidation.  A  veto  right,  for  example, 
which  prevents  the  sale  or  winding  up  of  the  joint 
venture,  does  not confer joint control on the  minority 
shareholder concerned (2'). 
23.  In  contrast, veto rights which confer joint control 
typically  ~n~lude decisions and issues  such as  the budget,  f 
the business plan,  major investments or the appointment 
of senior management. The acquisition of joint control, 
however,  does  not  require  that  the  acquiror  has  the 
power to exercise  decisive  influence  on  the  day-to-day 
running  of an  undenaking. The crucial element  is  that 
the  veto  rights  ar~  sufficient  to  enable  the  parent 
companies  tO  exercise  such  influence  in  relation  to  the 
strategic  business  behaviour  of  the  joint  venture. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  necessary  to  establish  that  an 
acquiror of joint control of the joint venture will actually 
make  use  of its  decisive influence. The possibility to use 
this  influence and, hence, the mere existence of the veto 
rights,  is  sufficient. 
C
0
)  Case  T-2/93,  Air  France  v  Commission  (ibid).  Case 
IV/M.OOJO Conagra/ldea, of 3 May 1991. 
C')  Case IV/M.062- Eridania/ISI, of 30 July 1991. 
JJ/1 0 31. 12.94  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 385/9 
24.  In  . order  to· acquire  JOIIll  control,  it  is  not 
necessary for a minority shareholder to have all the veto 
rights  mentioned  above.  It may  be  sufficient  that only 
some, or even one such right, exists. Whether or not this 
is the case depends upc)n the precise content of the veto 
right itself and also the imponance  of this  right in the 
conteXt of th~ specific business of the joint venture.  · 
Appointment of management and determination 
of budget 
25.  Normally the most important veto rights are those 
concerning  decisions  on  the  appointment  of  the 
management and th~ budget. The power to co-determine 
the structure of the management confers upon the holder 
the  power  to  exercise  decisive  influence  on  the 
commercial  policy of an  undertaking. The same  is  true 
with  respect to decisions on  the  budget since  the budget 
determines the precise framework  of the activities of the· 
joint venture and,  in  particular,  the  investments  it  may 
t  make. 
Business plan 
26.  The business plan normally provides details of the 
aims  of a  company  together with  the  measures  to be 
taken in order to achieve  those  aims.  A veto  right over 
this  type  of business  plan  may  be  sufficient  to  confer 
joint control even in the absence of any other veto right. 
In  contrast,  where  the  business  plan  contains  merely 
general declarations concerning the business  aims  of the 
joint venture,  the existence  of a veto  right  will  be  only 
one element in  the  general  assessment  of joint control 
but will  not,  on  its  own,  be  sufficient  to  confer  joint 
control. 
Investments 
27.  In  the  case  of  a  veto  right  on  investments  the 
importance  of this  right  depends  on,  first,  the  level  of 
investments  which  are  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
parent  companies  and  secondly,  the  extent  to  which 
investments oonstitute an essential  feature  of the  market 
in  which  the  joint venture  is  active.  In  relation  to  the 
first, where the level of investments necessitating parental 
approval is  extremely high, this  veto right may be closer 
to the  normal  protection  of  the  interests  of a  minority 
shareholder  than  to  a  right  conferring  a  power  of 
co-determination over the commercial policy of the joint 
venture.  With  regard  to  the  second,  the  investment 
policy  of  an  undertaking  normally  is  an  important 
element in assessing whether or not there is  joint control. 
However, there may be  some  markets where investment 
does not play a significant role  in  the  market behaviour 
of an undertaking. 
Market-specific rights 
28.  Apart  from  the  typical  veto  rights  mentioned 
above, there exist a number of other veto  rights  related 
to specific decisions which  are  important in  the  context 
of  the  particular  market  on  the  joint  venture.· One 
example is  the decision on the technology to be  used  by 
the joint venture where technology is  a  key  feature  of 
the joint venture's activities. Another example  relates  to 
markets  characterized  by product differentiation  and  a 
significant degree of iimovation. In such  markets a veto 
right over decisions  relating to new product lines to be 
developed by the joint venture may also be an imponant 
element in establishing the existence of joint control. 
Overall context 
29.  In assessing the relative importance of veto rights, 
where there are a  number of them,  these  rights  should 
not be evaluated in isolation. On the contrary, the deter-
mination of the existence or not of joint control is based 
upon an assessment of these rights as  a whole. However, 
a veto right which  does  not relate  either to  commercial 
policy  and  strategy  or to  the  budget  of business  plan 
cannot  be  regarded  as  giving  joint  control  to  its 
owner (
22
). 
2.3.  Common exeitise of  voting  rights 
30.  Even in the absence of specific veto rights, two or 
more  undertakings  acquiring  minority  shareholdings  in 
another undertaking may obtain joint control. This  may 
be  the  case  where  the  minority  shareholdings  together 
provide the means for controlling the target undertaking. 
This means th.at the minority shareholders, together, will 
have  a  majority of the voting  rights;  and  they  "''ill  act 
together in exercising these voting rights. This can result 
from a legally binding agreement to this effect, or it may 
be  established on a  de /acto  basis. 
31.  The legal means to ensure the common exercise of 
voting rights Can be  in  the form of a holding company to 
which the  minority shareholders transfer their rights,  or 
an  agreement by which they engage themselves  to act  in 
the same way (pooling agreement). 
32.  Very exceptionally, collective action can occur on 
a  de  facto  basis  where  strong  common  interests  exist 
between the minority shareholders to the effect that they 
would  not .act  against  each  other  in  exercising  their 
rights in  relation to the joint venture. 
33.  In  the  case  of  acquisitions  of  minority  share-
holdings  the  prior  existence  of  links  ber"•een  the 
minority  shareholders  or the  acquisition  of  the  share-
holdings  by  means  of concerted  action  will  be  factors 
indicating such a common  interest. 
34.  In  the  case  where  a  new  joint  venture  is  estab· 
lished,  as  opposed  to the  acquisition  of minority·sharc-
(
12
)  Case JV/M.295- SITA-RPC/SCORl~  of 19  March  1993. 
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holdings  in  an  already  existing  company,  there  is  a 
higher probability·that the parent companies are carrying 
out  a  deliberate  common  policy.  This  is  trUe,  in 
particular,  where  each  parent  company  provides  a 
contribution  to the joint venture which  is  "fital  for its 
operation (e.g  specific teChnologies, local  know-how or 
supply  agreements).  In  these  circumstances  the  parent 
companies may be  able to operate the joint venture in 
full cooperation only with each other's agreement on the 
most  important strategic  decisions  even  if there  is  no 
express  provision  for  any veto  rights.  The greater the 
number  of parent  companies  involved  in  such  a  joint 
venture,  however,  the  likelihood  of  this  situation 
occurring becomes increasingly remote. 
35.  In  the absence of strong common interests such as 
those  outlined  above,  the  possibility  of  changing 
coalitions  between  minority  shareholders  will  normally 
exclude the assumption of joint control. Where there is 
no stable majority in the decision·making procedure and 
the majority can on each occasion be any of the various 
combinations  possible  amongst  the  minority  share-
holders,  it cannot be  assumed  that the  minority share-
holders  will  jointly  control  the  undertaking.  In  this 
context,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  there  are  agreements 
between  two  or  more  parties  having  an  equal  share-
holding in  the capital of an  undertaking which establish 
identical  rights  and  powers  benveen  the  parties.  For 
example,  in  the  case  of  an  undertaking  ,·vhere  three 
shareholders each  O'\J.'n  a  third of the  share  capital  and 
each  elect  a  third  of  the  members  of  the  Board  of 
Directors,  the  shareholders  do  not  have· joint  control 
since decisions are required to be taken on the basis of a 
simple  majority. The same  considerations also  apply in 
more complex structures, for example, where the capital 
of  an  undertaking  is  equally  divided  bet'\J.•een  three 
shareholders  and  whose  Board  of  Management  is 
composed of 12  members of which two are each elected 
by shareholders A,  B and  C, two by A B and C  jointly, 
and  the  remaining four  by  the other eight members.  In 
this  case  also  there  is  no  joint control,  and  hence  no 
control  at all  within  the  meaning of the  Merger Regu-
lation. 
2.4.  Other considerations  related to joint control 
36.  Joint control is  not incompatible with the fact that 
one of the  parent companies  enjoys  specific  knowledge 
of and experience in  the business of the joint venture. In 
such a case, the other parent company can play a modest 
or even  non-existent role in  the daily management of the 
joint  venture  where  its  presence  is  motivated  by 
considerations of a  financial,  long-term-strategy,  brand 
image  or  general  policy  nature.  Nevertheless,  it  must 
always  retain  the  real  posc;ihility  of  contesting  the 
•  decisions  taken  by the other parent company,  without 
which there would be sole control. 
37.  For joint control to exist,  there  should not be  a 
casting  vote  for  one  parent  company only.  However, 
there can be joint control when this casting vote can be 
exercised only after a series of stages of arbitration and 
attempts at reconciliation or in  a  very limited  field (
23
). 
2.5.  joint control for a limited period 
38.  Where  an  operation  leads  to  joint control  for  a 
staning·up period e·>  but,  according  to  legally  binding 
agreements,  this  joint control  will  be  .convened  to sole 
control by one of the shareholders, the whole operation 
will  normally  be  considered  as  an  acquisition  of sole 
control. 
3.  Control by  a single shareholder on the  basis  of veto 
rights 
39.  An  exceptional  situation  exists  where,  in  the 
course of an ac.quisition,  only one shareholder is  able  to 
veto strategic decisions in  an undertaking but this share-
holder does not have the power, on his  O"-'ri,  to impose 
such  decisions.  This  situation  occurs  either  where  one 
shareholder  holds  50 %.  in  an  undertaking  whilst  the 
remaining 50 o/o  is  held by two or more minority share-
holders,  or  where  there  is  a  quorum  required  for 
strategic  decisions  which  in  fact  confers  a  veto  right 
upon only one minority shareholder czs).  In these circum-
stances, a single shareholder, possesses  the same level  of 
influence as  that normally enjoyed by several  jointly -
controlling  shareholders,  i.e.  the  power  to  block  the 
adoption  of  strategic  decisions.  However,  this  share- f 
holder  does  not enjoy the  powers  which  are  normally 
·conferred on an undertaking with  sole  control,  i.e.  the 
power  to  impose  strategic  decisions.  Since  this  share-
holder can produce the same deadlock situation as  in  the 
normal  cases  of  joint  control  he  acquires  decisive 
influence  and  therefore  control  within  the  meaning  of 
the Merger· Regulation (2'). 
C')  Case  IV  /M.425  - British  Telecom/Banco  Santander,  of 
28  March 1994. 
(") This starting-up period  must not exceed  thrc.-e  years.  Case 
IV /M.425- British Telecom/Banco Santander, ibid. 
(Z
1
)  Case  IV /M.258  - CCIE/GTE,  of  25  September  1992, 
where the  veto  rights  of onlv  one  shareholder  were  exer-
cisable  through  a  member of the  board  appointed  by  this 
shau:holder. 
(")  Since  this  shareholder is  the  only undertaking  acquiring  a 
controlling  influence  only  this  shareholder  is  obliged  to 
submit a notification under the Merger R<'gul:uion 
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4.  Changes in the structure of control 
40.  A  concentration  may  also  occur  where  an 
operation leads to a change in  the strUcture of conuol 
This  includes  the  change  from  joint  conuol  to  sole 
control as  weU  as  an increase  in  the  number of share-
holders exercising joint control. The principles for deter-
mining the existence of a concentration in these circum-
stances are set out in detail in the notice on the notion of 
undertakings concerned (2'). 
IV.  EXCEPTIONS 
41.  Anicle  3 (5)  sets  out three  exceptional situations 
where the  acquisition of a controlling  interest does  not 
constitute a concentration under the Merger Regulation. 
42.  First,  the  acquisition  of securities  by  companies, 
the  normal  activities  of which  include  transactions  and 
dealings  for  their  own  account  or for  the  account of 
f  others,  is  not  deemed  to  constitute  a  concentration  if 
such  an  acquisition  is  made  in  the framework of these 
business  and  where  the  securities  are  held  only  on  a 
temporary basis  (point (a)  of Article  3 (5)).  In order to 
fall  within  this  exception,  the  following  requirements 
must be  fulfilled: 
(. 
- the  acquiring  undertaking  must  be  a credit or other 
financial  institution or insurance company the normal 
activities of which are described above, 
- the  securities  must  be  acquired  with a view  to their 
resale, 
- the  acquiring  undenak.ing  must  not  exercise  the 
voting rights with a view·to determining the strategic 
commercial behaviour of the  target or must exercise 
these ri·ghts at least only with a view to preparing the 
total or panial disposal  of the  undertaking, its  assets 
or securities, 
- the  acquiring  undenaking  must  dispose  of  its 
controlling interest within one year of the date of the 
acquisition,  that  is,  it  must  reduce  its  shareholding 
within  this  one-year period  at least  to  a level  which 
no  longer confers control. This period, however, may 
be  extended by  the Commission  where the acquiring 
undertaking  can  sho"''  that  the  disposal  was  not 
reasonably possible within the one-year period. 
43.  Secondly, there is  no change of control, and so no 
concentration within  the  meaning  of the  Merger Regu-
lation,  where  control  is  acquired  by  an  office-holder 
according  to  the  law  of  a  Member  State  relating  to 
(")  Paragraphs 30 to 48. 
liquidation,  winding-up,  insolvency,  cessation  of 
payments, compositions or analogous proceedings (point 
(b)  of Article  3 (5)); 
44.  Thirdly,  a  concentration does  not arise  where  a 
financial  holding  company within  the  meaning  of the 
Fourth  Council  Directive  78/660/EEC r')  acquires 
control,  provided  that this  company exercise  its  voting 
rights  only to maintain the full  value  of its  investment 
and does  not otherwise determine directly or indirectly 
the  strategic  commercial  conduct  of  the  controlled 
undenaking. 
45.  In the context of the exceptions under Anicle 3 (5), 
the  question  may  arise  whether  a  rescue  operation 
constitutes  a  concentration  under  the  Merger  Regu-
lation.  A  rescue  operation  typically  involves  the 
conversion of existing debt into a new company, through 
which a syndicate of banks may acquire joint control of 
the company concerned. Where such an operation meets 
the  criteria  for joint control,  as  outlined  above,  it will 
normally  be  considered  to  be  a  concentration ("). 
Although  the  primary  intention  of  the  banks  is  to 
restNcture the  financing  of the  undertaking concerned 
for  its  subsequent resale, the exception set out in  point 
(a)  of Article 3 (5)  is  normally not applicable to such an 
operation.  This  is  so  because  the  restructuring 
programme  normally  requires  the  controlling  banks  to 
determine  the  strategic  commercia  1  behaviour  of  the 
rescued  undertaking.  Funhermore,  it  is  not  normally 
realistic  to  transfer  a  rescued  company  into  a 
commercially  viable  entity  and  to  resell  it  within  the 
permitted one-year period. Moreover, the length of time 
needed  to achieve  this  aim  may  be  so uncenain that it 
would be  difficult to grant an extension of the  disposal 
period. 
V.  FINAL 
46.  The  Commission's  interpretation  of Anicle  3  as 
set out in this notice is without prejudic~ to the interpret-
ation which  may  be  given by the Coun of Justice or the 
Court of First  Instance  of the  European  Communities. 
(")  OJ  No  L 222,  14.  8.  1978,  p.  11,  as  last  amended  by 
D1rective  84/569/EEC, OJ  No L  314,  4.  12.  1984,  p.  28. 
Article  5  (3)  of  this  Directive  defines  financial  holding 
companies as 'those companies the sole objective of which is 
to acquire  holdings  in  other undenakings, and  to  manage 
such  holdings  and  turn  them  to  profit,  without involving 
themselves directly or indirectly in the management of those 
undertakings,  the  aforegoing  without  prejudice  to  their 
rights as shareholders'. 
(l')  Case  IV  /M.116 - Kelt/  American  Express,  of 28  August 
1991. 
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COMMISSION NOTICE 
on the notion of undertakinp concerned · 
under Council Replation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 ~  1989 on the control of concen-
trations hetweea undcrtaldap 
(94/C 385/03) 
(Text with EEA ~) 
!.INTRODUCTION 
1.  This  Commission  notice  aims  at  clarifying  the 
Commission's  interpretation  of  the  notion  of  under-
takings  concerned  in  Anicles  1  and  5  of  Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 ('), as  well  as  at helping to identify 
the undertakings concerned in the most typical situations 
· which have arisen in cases dealt with by the Commission 
to  date.  The  principles  set  out  in  this  notice  will  be 
followed  and  further  developed  by  the  Commission's 
practice in individual cases. 
2.  According to Article  1 of the Merger Regulation, 
this Regulation only applies to operations that satisfy a 
double condition. First, several undertakings must merge, 
or one or more undertakings must acquire control of the 
whole  or  part  of  other  undertakings  through  the 
proposed  operation,  which  must  qualify  as  concen-
trations  within  the  meaning  of Article  3  of the  Regu-
lation. Secondly, those undertakings must meet the three 
turnover thresholds set out in  Article  1. 
3.  From the point of view of determining jurisdiction, 
the  undertakings  concerned  are,  broadly  speaking,  the 
actors  in  the  transaction  in  so  far  as  they  are  the 
merging, or acquiring and acquired  parties; in  addition, 
their total aggregate economic size in  terms of turnover 
will  be  decisive to determine whether the thresholds are 
fulfilled. The concept of undertakings concerned is  used 
only for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, as  the 
Commission's  assessment  of the  competitive  impact  of 
the  operation on  the  market place  will  then  focus  not 
only on  the  activities  of those  undertakings  concerned 
party to the concentration, but also on the activities  of 
the groups to which these  undertakings belong. 
4.  The Commission's interpretation of Articles 1 and 5 
with  respect to the notion of undertakings concerned is 
without  prejudice  to  the  interpretation  which  may  be 
given  by the Court of Justice  or by  the  Court of First 
Instance of the  European Communities. 
(')  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21  December 
1989 on the control of concentrations between  undertakings 
(hereafter  referred  to  as  'the Merger  Regulation'),  OJ No 
L  395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  1,  corrected version  OJ No L 257, 
21. 9.  1990. 
II.  THE NOTION OF UNDERTAKING CONCERNED 
5.  Undertakings concerned are the direct participants 
in  a  merger or acquisition  of control.  In  this  respect, 
Article 3 (1)  of the Merger Regulation provides that: 
'A concentration shall  be deemed to arise where: 
(a)  two  or more  previously  independent  undertakings  fJ 
merge, or 
(b)  - one or more persons already controlling at least 
one und~rtaking, or 
- · one or more undertakings 
acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, 
by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect 
control of the whole or pans of one or more under-
takings'. 
6.  In  the  case  of  a  merger,  the  undertakings 
concerned will  be  the undertakings that are merging. 
7.  In  the  remaining  cases,  it  is  the  concept  of 
'acquiring  control'  that  will  determine  which  are  the 
undenak.ings concerned. On the acquiring side, there can  f 
be  one  or  several  companies  acquiring  sole  or  joint 
control. On the acquired side, there can be one or more 
companies as a whole or pans thereof, when only one of 
their subsidiaries or some of their assets  are the subject 
of  the  transaction.  As  a  general  rule,  each  of  these 
companies will be an undertaking concerned whithin the 
meaning  of  the  Merger  Regulation.  However,  the 
particular  features  of  specific  transactions  require  a 
certain refinement of this principle, as will be seen below 
when analysing different possible scenarios. 
8.  In  those  concentrations other than  mergers  or the 
setting up of new joint ventures,  i.e.  in  cases  of sole or 
joint  acquisition  of  pre-existing  companies  or  pan  of 
them, there  is  an important party to the  agreement that 
gives  rise  to the  operation who  is  to  be  ignored  when 
identifying  the  undertakings  concerned:  the  seller. 
Although  it is  clear that the operation  cannot proceed 
without its  consent, its  role ends when the transaction is 
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completed  since,  by  definition,  from  the  moment  the 
seller has relinquished all control over the company,  its 
links  with  it disappear.  Where  the  seller  retains  joint 
control with the acquiring company (or companies)  it 
will be considered as one of the undenakings concerned.. 
9.  Once  the  undertakings  concerned  have  been 
identified in  a  given uansaction, their turnover for the 
purposes of determining jurisdiction shoula be calculated 
according to the rules set out in Article 5 of the Merger 
Regulation (Z). One of the main provisions of Article 5 is 
that  where  the  undertaking  concerned  belongs  to  a 
group,  the  turnover  of  the  whole  group  should  be 
included in the calculation. All references to the turnover 
of the  undertakings  concerned  in  Article  1  should  be 
therefore  understood  as  the  turnover  of  their  entire 
respective groups. 
10.  The  same  can  be  said  with  respect  to  the 
f  substantive appraisal of the impact of a concentration in 
the market place. When Article 2 of the Merger Regu-
lation  provides  that  the  Commission  shall  take  into 
account  'the  market  position  of  the  undertakings 
concerned and their economic and financial power', this 
includes the groups to which they belong. 
11.  It  is  irr portant  not  to  confuse  the  concept  of 
undertakings  concerned  under  Articles  1  and  5,  with 
tho!lc  other terms used  in  the  Mc1gcr Regulation and  in 
the  Implementing  Regulation (l)  in  referring  to  the 
various  undertakings  which  may  be·  involved  in  a 
procedure.  These  other  notions  are  notifying  parties, 
other involved parties, third parties and parties who may 
be  subject to fines  or periodic  penalty  payments.  They 
are  defined  in  Section  III  of the  Implementing  Regu-
lation, along with their respective  rights  and duties. 
..  III.  IDENTIFYING THE UNDERTAKINGS 
CONCERNED IN  DIFFERENT TYPES  OF  OPERATIONS 
1.  Mergers 
12.  In  a  merger,  several  previously  independent 
companies come together to create a  new company or, 
while remaining separate legal entities, to create a single 
economic  unit.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  undertakings 
concerned are each of the  merging entities. 
C)  The rules for calculating turnover in accordance with  Ani~le 
5 are detailed in  the Commission  Notice  on  Calculation of 
Turnover. 
(>)  Commission  Re~ulation (EC)  No 3384/94 of 21  December 
t 994 on the noufications, time  limits  and  hearings provided 
for  in  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  (hereafter 
referred to as the 'Implementing Regulation') (OJ No L 377, 
31.  12. 1994). 
2.  Acquisition of sole control 
2.1. Acqllisition of  sole control of  the whole company 
13.  Acquisition of sole control of the whole comp~ny 
is  the  most  straightforward  case  of  acquisition  of 
control;  the  undertakings· • concerned  will  be·  the 
acquiring company and the acquired or target company. 
2.2.  Acquisition of  sole  control of  part of  a company 
14.  The  first  subparagraph  of Article  5  (2)  of  the 
Merger  Regulation  stipulates  that  when  the  operation 
concerns the acquisition of parts of one or more under-
takings, only those  parts  which  are the  subject of the 
transaction shall be taken into account with regard to the 
seller. The concept of 'parts' is  to be understood as one 
or  more  separate  legal  entities  (such  as  subsidiaries), 
internal subdivisions within the seller (such as  a division 
or unit),  or specific  assets  which  in  themselves  could 
constitute  a  business  (e.g.  in  certain  cases  brands  or 
licences)  to  which  a  market  turnover  can  clearly  be 
attributed. In this case, the undertakings concerned will 
be  the  acquirer  :lnd  the  acquired  part(s)  of the  target 
company. 
15.  The second subparagraph of Article 5 (2)  includes 
a special provision on staggered operations or follow-up 
deals, whereby if several acqusitions of parts by the same 
purchaser from the same seller occur within  a  two-year 
period, these transactions shall be treated as  one and the 
same  operation  arising  on  the  date  of the  last  trans-
action. In this case,  the undertakings concerned are the 
acquirer and the different acquired part(s) of the  target 
company taken as  a whole. 
2.3.  Acquisition  of sole  control  of previously  reduced  or 
enlarged companies 
16.  The  undertakings  concerned  are  the  acqumng 
company and the target company(ies), in  their configu-
ration at the date of the operation. 
17.  The Commission bases  itself on the configuration 
of the undertakings concerned at the  date  of the  evem 
triggering the obligation to notify under Article  4 ( 1)  of 
the  Merger  Regulation,  namely  the  conclusion  of the 
agreement, the  announcement of the  public  bid,  or the 
acquisition  of  a  controlling  interest.  If  the  target 
company has divested an entity or closed a business prior 
to the date of the event triggering notification or where 
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such  a  divestment or closure  is  a  pre-condition for the 
operation (•),  then sales of the divested entity or closed 
business  would  not  be  included  when  c:alculating 
turnover. Conversely if the target company has acquired 
an entity prior to the date of the event triggering notifi-
cation, the sales of the latter would be  added ('). 
2.4.  Acquisition of  sole  control through a subsu&ry of  a 
group 
18.  Where the target company is  acquired by a group 
through  one  of  its  subsidiaries,  the  undertakings 
concerned for the purpose of calculating turnover are the 
target company and the acquiring subsidiary.  However, 
regarding the acutal notification, this can be made by the 
subsidiary concerned or by its  parent company. 
19.  All  the  companies  within  a  group  (parent 
companies,  subsidiaries,  ete.)  constitute  a  single 
economic entity,  and  therefore  there can only  be  one 
unaen.aking concerned within the one group - i.e. the 
subsidiary  and  the  parent  company  cannot  each  be 
considered  as  separate  undertakings  concerned,  either 
for  the  purposes  of  ensuring  that  the  threshold 
requirements  are  fulfilled  (for  example,  if  the  target 
company · does  not  meet  the  .ECU  250  million 
Community-turnover  thresi1old),  or  that  they  are  not 
(for  example  if  a  group was  split  into  two  companies 
each  with  a  Community  turnover  below  ECU  250 
million). 
20.  However,  even  though  there  can  only  be  one 
undertaking concerned within a group, Anicle  5 (4)  of 
the Merger Regulation provides that it is  the turnover of 
the  whole  group  to  which  the  undertaking  concerned 
belongs  that  will  be  included  in  the  threshold  calcu-
lations ('). 
3.  Acquisition of joint control 
3.1.  Acquisition  of joint  control  of a  newly-created 
company 
21.  In  the  case  of acquisition  of joint  control  of a 
newly-created company, the undertakings concerned are 
(")  See Judgment of the  Court of First  Instance  of 24  March 
1994  in  Case T -3/93 - Air France  v.  Commission  not yet 
published). 
(') The calculation  of turnover  in  the  case  of acquisitions  or 
divestments  subsequently  to  the  date  of  the  last  audited 
accounts is  dealt with  in  the Commission  Notice on Calcu-
lation of Turnover, paragraph 27. 
(') The calculation of turnover in the case of company groups is 
dealt  with  in  the  Commission  Notice  on  Calculation  of 
Turnover, p:tragraphs 36 to 42. 
each  of the  companies  acquiring  control  of the  newly 
set-up  joint venture  (which,  as  it  does  not  yet  exist, 
cannot yet be considered  as  an undertaking concerned 
and furthermore has no turnover of its own yet). 
3.2.  Acquisition of  joint control of  a pre-existing compa,.y 
·22.  In  the  case  of acquisition  of joint control  of a 
pre-existing  company  or  business('),  the  undertakings 
concerned  are  each  of the  companies  acquiring  joint 
control on the one hand,  and the pre-existing acquired 
company on the other. 
23.  Where  the  pre-ex1stmg  company  was  under  the 
sole  control  of one company  and  one  or several  new 
shareholders acquire joint control but the initial  parent 
company remains, the undenakings concerned are each  fJ 
of the joindy-controlling companies (including this initial 
shareholder) and the target company. This situation is  a 
passage  from  sole  to  joint control.  In  so  far  as  sole 
control  and  joint  control  have  a  different  nature,  the 
Commission  has  consistently  considered  that  passing 
from one type of control to another normally constitutes 
a concentration. 
3.3.  Acquisition  of  joint  control  in  order  to  split  assets 
immediately 
24.  In  the  case  where  several  undertakings  come 
together  solely  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  another 
company  and  agree  to  divide  up  the  acquired  assets 
according  to  a  pre-existing  plan  immediately . upon 
completion  of  the  transaction,  there  is  no  effective 
concentration of economic power between the  acquirers  a 
and  the  target company as  the assets  acquired  are  only  " 
jointly held and controlled for a clegal  instant'. This type 
of acquisition in order to split assets up immediately will 
in  fact be considered as several operations, whereby each 
of the  acquiring  companies acquires  its  relevant part of 
the  target  company.  For each  of these  operations,  the 
undertakings  concerned will  therefore  be  the  acquiring 
company, and that part of the target which it is acquiring 
(just as if there was an acquisition of sole control of part 
of a company). 
25.  This scenario is  referred to in  the recital 24  of the 
Merger  Regulation,  which  stipulates  that  the  Merger 
(')  i.e.  two or more companies (companies A,  B,  etc) acquire a 
pre-existing  company  (company  X).  For  chan~es  m  the 
shareholding  in  cases  of jomt  control  of an  exiSting  joint 
venture SC'e  Section 111.6. 
!f/16 • 
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Regulation applies to agreements whose sole object is  to 
divide  up  the  assets  acquired  immediately  after  the 
acquisition. 
4.  Acquisition of control by a joint venture 
26.  In  transactions  where  a  joint  venture  acquires 
control of another company, the question arises whether 
or not, from the point of view of the acquiring pany, the 
joint  venture  shoukl  be  taken  as  a  single  undertaking 
concerned  (the  turnover  of  which  would  include  t~1c 
turnover of its parent companies), or whether each of Its 
parent  companies  should  individually  be  consid~red  ~s 
undertakings  concerned.  In  other  words,  the  1ssue  as 
whether or not io •tift  the corporate veil'  of the  inter-
mediate  undertaking  (the  vehicle).  In  principle,  the 
undertaking  concerned  is  the  direct  participant  _in  the 
acquisition  of control.  However,  there  may  b~ ctrcu_m-
stances where companies set up 'shell' compames, wh1ch 
have no or insir,nificant wrnovrr of their own, or usc  an 
existing  joint  v~nturc which  is  operating on  a  diffcrcm 
m:1rk1·t  from that of the target rompany in  order to carry 
out  acquisitinns  on  behalf  of  the  parent  compani~s. 
\XIhcre the acquired or target company has a Communny 
turnover of less  than  ECU 250  million  the  question  of 
determining the undertakings concerned may be decisive 
for jurisdictional purposes ('). In this type of situation the 
Commission  will  look  at  the  economic  reality  of  the 
operation  to  determine  which  are  the  undenakings 
concerned. 
27.  Where  the  acqutsttton  is  carried  out  by  a  full-
function  joint  venture,  i.e.  a  joint  venture  which  has 
sufficient  financial  and  other  resources  to  operate  a 
(')  The  target  company  hypothcti<:_ally  has  ~~  aggregate 
Community turnover of less than LCU 2SO  n.llllton,  and t.hc 
acquiring parties arc two (or more) undcrtalungs, each ~mh 
a  Community turnover exceeding  ECU 250  million.  If the 
target is  acquired  by a  'shell' company set  up  between  the 
acquirin~ undertakings, there  would  be  only one  cornp~ny 
(the 'shell' company) with a Community turnov.cr cxcccdmg 
ECU 250 million, and thus one of the cumulauve  t~1rcshold 
conditions  for  Community  jurisdiction  would  fatl  to.  be 
fulfilled  (namely,  the  existence  at  least  two  undert~~mgs 
with  a  Community turnover exceeding  ECU  250  m1lhon). 
Conversely  if instead of acting through a  'shell' company, 
the  acquiring  undertakings  acquire  the  target  company 
themselves  then the turnover threshold  would be  met and 
the Merge; Regulation would apply to this transaction. 
business  activity on  a  lasting  basis("), which  is  already 
operating  on  a  market,  the  Commission  will  normally 
consider the joint venture itself and the target company 
to  be  the  undertakings  concerned  (and  not  the  joint 
venture's parent companies). 
28.  Conversely,  where  the  joint  venture  can  be 
regarded  as  a  vehicle  for  an  acquisition  by  the  parent 
companies,  the  Commission  will  consider  each  of the 
parent  companies  themselves  to  be  the  undertakings 
concerned, rather than the joint venture,  together with 
the target company. This is  the case in particular where 
the joint venture is  set up especially for the purpose of 
acquiring  the  target  company,  where  the  joi_m_  ve~t~re 
has  not yet staned  to  operate, where  an  extstmg JOtnt 
\'<"nture  has  no  legal  personality  or  full-function 
character  as  referred  to  above;  or  where  the  joint 
venture  is  an  association  of  undertakings.  The  same 
applies where there are elements which demonstrate that 
the parent companies are in fact the. real  playe~s ~e.hind 
the operation. These elements may mdude a  stgmfacant 
involvement by the  parent companies  themselves  in  the 
initiative,  organization  and  financing  of the  operation. 
Moreover,  where  the  acquisition  leads  to  a  substantial 
diversification  in  the  nature  of  the  joint  venture's 
activities this may also indicate that the parent companies 
arc  the  real  players  in  the operation. This will  normally 
br  the  case  whrn  the  joint  venture  acquires  a  target 
company  oprratinr,  on  a  chffcrcnt  product  market.  In 
those  case  the  parent cnmp:mies  should  he  rcg:udcJ  a~ 
undertakings concerned. 
29.  In  the TNT case ('
0
),  joint  control  over  a  joint 
venture (jVC) was to be acquired by a joint venture (GD · 
NET  BV)  between  five  postal  administrations  and 
another acquiring  company (TNT Ltd}  (sec  below).  In 
this  case,  the  Commission  considered  that  the  joint 
\'rnturc  GO  NET  BV  was  simply  a  vehicle  set  up  to 
enahle  the  parent  companies  (the  five  postal  adminis-
trations) to participate in  the resulting JVC joint venture 
in  order  to  facilitate  decision-making  amongst· them-
selves and to ensure that the parent companic~ spoke and 
acted  as  one; this  configuration  would ensure  that  rhe 
parent companies could exercise a decisive influence v.:ith 
the  other acquiring  company, TNT, over the  resulung 
joint venture JVC and would avoid the situation where 
that other acquircr could exercise sole control becau~e.  of 
the  postal  administrations'  inability  to  reach  a  untftcd 
position  on any decision. 
(') The  rules  determining. the  full-fun~ti?n  natu~e of  a  joint 
venture are contained m  the Comm•sston  Nouce regardmg 
the distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint 
.  ventures, paragraphs 13  to 15. 
('
0
)  Case IV/M.102- TNT/Canada Post, DBP Postdienst, La 
Poste, PTf Post and Sweden Post, of 2 December 1991. 
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joint venture GD NET BV 
Joint venture JVC 
5.  Passage from joint control to sole control 
30.  In  the case of passage from  joint control to sole 
control,  one  shareholder acquires  the  Stake  previously 
held  by  the  other shareholder(s).  In  the  case  of two 
shareholders,  each  of them  has  joint control  over  the 
entire joint venture,  and not sole control over 50 % of 
the joint venture; hence  the sale of all  of his  shares  by 
one  shareholder  to  the  other  does  not  lead  the  sole 
remaining  shareholder  to  pass  from  sole  control  over 
50% to sole  control over  100% of the  joint venture, 
but  rather to pass  from  joint control  to  sole  control  of 
the  entire  company  (which,  subsequently  to  the 
operation, ceases  to be  a 'joint' venture). 
31.  In  this  situation,  the  undenakings  concerned  are 
the  remaining  (acquiring)  shareholder  and  the  joint 
venture.  As  is  case  for  any  other  seller,  the  'exiting' 
shareholder is  not an undenaking concerned. 
32.  The  ICI/Tioxide  case (1')  was  precisely  such  a 
passage  from  joint (50/50) control to  sole  control. The 
Commission  considered  that  ' ... decisive  influence 
exercised  solely  is  substantially  different  to  decisive 
influence  exercised  joindy,  since  the  latter  has  to  take 
into  account  the  potentially  different  interests  of  the 
other  party  or parties  concerned  . . .  By  changing  the 
quality of decisive influence exercised by ICI on Tioxide, 
the transaction will  bring about a durable change of the 
structure of the  concerned parties .. .'.  In  this  case,  the 
undertakings  concerned  were  held  to  be  ICI  (as 
acquirer)  and Tioxide as  a whole  (as  acquired),  but  not 
the  seller Cookson. 
(")  Case IV  /M.023 - ICI/Tioxide, of 28  NO\'t"mber  1990. 
6.  Change in the shareholding in cases of joint control of 
an existing joint venture 
33.  .  The  decisive  element  in  assessing  in  the  share-
holdang of a company is whether the operation leads to a 
change  in  the  qual~ty  of  control.  The  Commission  fJ 
asses~es each operation on a  case-by-case  basis,  but  in 
certam hypotheses, there will  be a presumption that the 
given  operation  ·~ads, or respectively  does  not  lead,  to 
such  a  change  m  the  quality  of  control,  and  thus 
constitutes a  notifiable concentration. 
3~.  A  distinction  must  be  made  according  w  the 
cucumstances  of the  change  in  the  shareholding;  first, 
one or more existing shareholder(s)  can  exit;  secondlv, 
one  o~ more  new  additional  shareholder(s)  can  ent~r, 
and  thtrdly, one or more existing shareholder(s)  can  be 
replaced by one or more new shareholder(s). 
6.1.  Reduction  in  the  number  of shareholders  leading  to 
passage from joint to sole control 
~5:  It is not the reduction of shareholders per se which 
ts  tmportant, but rather the fact that if some shareholders 
sell  their stakes in  a given joint venture, these stakes  are 
then  acquired  by  other (new  or existing)  shareholders, 
and thus that the acquisition of these stakes or additional 
contractual rights may lead to the acquisition of control 
or may strengthen an already existing position of control 
(e.g.  additional  voting  rights  or veto  rights,  additional 
board members, etc.). 
36.  Where the numer of shareholders is reduced, there 
may. be  passage  from  joint control  to  sole  control  (see 
Secuon  III.S.  also},  in  which  case  the  remaining  share-
hol~er acquires sole control. of  .the company. The under-
takmgs  concerned  will  be· the  remaining  (acquiring) 
shareholder and  the  acquired  company  (previously  the 
joint venture). 
!J/1 8 1(':. 
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37.  In addition to the shareholder with sole control of 
the  company,  there  may  be  other  shareholders,  for 
example with minority stakes,  but who do  not have  a 
controlling interest in the company; these  shareholders 
are not undertakings concerned as they do not exercise 
control 
6.2.  Reduction  in  the  number of  shareho/Jers not leading 
to passage }Tom joint to sole control 
38.  Where the operation  involves  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of shareholders  having  joint  control,  without 
leading  to the  passage  from  joint to sole  conuol and 
without any  new  enuy or substitution  of shareholders 
acquiring  control  (see  Section  III.6.3.),  the  proposed 
transaction will  normally be  presumed  not to  lead  to a 
change in the quality of control, and therefore not be a 
notifiable concentration. This would be the case where, 
for example,  five  shareholder initially have  ~qual stakes 
of 20 % each, and where after the operation, one share-
holder would exit,  and the remaining four shareholders 
would each have  equal stakes of 25 %. 
39.  However, this situation would be  different where 
there  is  a  significant  change  in  the  quality  of control 
such  as  where  the  reduction  of shareholders  gives  the 
remaining  shareholders  additional  veto  rights  or 
additional  board  members  which  create  a  new 
acquisition of control by at least one of the shareholders, 
either through the application  of the  existing or a  new 
shareholders'  agreement.  In  this  case,  the  undertakings 
concerned  will  be  each  of  the  remaining  shareholders 
which  exercise  joint  control  and  the  joint  venture.  In 
Avesta  II (
12
), the  fact  that the  number of major share-
holders decreased  from  four to three  led  to one of the 
remaining  shareholders  acquiring  negative  veto  rights 
(which  it  had  not  previously  enjoyed)  because  of the 
provisions  of  the  shareholders'  agreement  which 
remained in  force (1'). This acquisition of full  veto rights 
was considered by the Commission to represent a change 
in  the quality of control. 
6.3.  Any other  changes  in  the  composition  of the  share-
holding 
40.  Finally, in the case where following changes in the 
shareholding, one or more  shareholders acquire control, 
( 12)  Case IV/M.452- Avesta II, of 9 June 1994. 
( 0 )  In  this  case,  a  shareholder  party  to  the  shareholders' 
agreement  sold  its  stake  of  approximately  7 %.  As  the 
exiting  shareholder  had  shared  veto  rights  with  another 
shareholder  who  remained,  and  as  the  shareholders' 
agreement remained unchanged,  the remaining shareholder 
now acquired full  veto rights.  .. 
the  operation  will  constitute  a  notifiable  operation  as 
there is  a  presumption that the operation will  normally 
lead to a change in the quality of control. 
4 t.  Irrespective  of  whether  the  number  of  share-
holders  decreases,  increases  or  remains  the  same 
subsequent to the operation, this  acquisition of control 
can take any of the following fonns: 
- entry of new  shareholder(s)  (either  leading  to  the 
passage  from  sole  to  joint control,  or situation  of 
joint control both before and after the operation); 
- acqulSltlOn  of  a  controlling  interest  by  minority 
shareholder(s)  (either  leading  to  the  passage  from 
sole to joint control, or situation of joint control both 
before and after the operation); 
- substitution  of  shareholder(s)  (situation  of  joint 
control both before and after the operation). 
42.  The  question  ts  whether  the  undenakings 
concerned  are  the  joint  venture  and  the  new  share-
holder(s)  who  would  together  acquire  control  of  a 
pre-existing company, or whether all of the shareholders 
(existing and new)  are to be considered as  undertakings 
concerned acquiring control of a new joint venture. This 
question is  particularly relevant when there is  no express 
agreement between one (or several) of the existing share-
holders  and  the  new  shareholder(s),  who  might  only 
have  had an agreement with the 'exiting' shareholder(s), 
i.e.  the seller(s). 
43.  A change in  the shareholding through the entry or 
substitution of shareholders is considered as  leading to a 
change  in  the  quality  of control.  This  is  because  the 
entry of a  new  parent company,  or the substitution  of 
one parent company ·for another,  is  not comparable  to 
the simple acquisition of pan of a business as  it implies a 
change in the nature and quality of control of the whole 
joint  venture,  even  when,  both  before  and  after  the 
operation, joint control is exercised by a given number of 
shareholders. 
44.  The  Commission  therefore  considers  that  the 
undertakings concerned in cases where there arc changes 
in  the  shareholding  arc  the "shareholders  (l>oth  existing 
and  new)  who  exercise  joint  control  and  the  joint 
venture  itself.  As  mentioned  earlier,  non-controlling 
shareholders are  not undertakings concerned. 
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45.  An  example of such a change in  the shareholding 
is  the  Synthomer/Yule Catto case ('
4
), in which one of 
two  parent  companies  with  joint  conuol  over  the 
pre-existing joint venture was replaced by a new parent 
company. Both parent companies with joint conuol (the 
existing one and the new one) and the joint venwre were 
considered as  undenakings concerned. 
7.  'Demergers' jlnd the break-up of companies 
46.  When  two  undertakings  merge  or set up  a  joint 
venture,  then  subsequently  de-merge  or break  up  their 
joint  venture,  and  the  assets ('
5
)  are  split  between  the 
'demerging'  parties  differently  from  under the  original 
configuration,  there  will  normally  be  more  than  one 
acquisition of control (see  the Annex). 
47.  For  example,  undertakings  A  and  B  merge  and 
then  subsequently  demerge  with  a  new  asset  configu-
ration. There will  be the acquisition by undertaking A of 
various  assets  (which  may  have  been  previously  owned 
hv  it~df.  a!>  well  as  a~~ets  previously  owned  by  under-
t~king  B  and  assets  jointly  acquired  by  the  entity 
~;esulting from  the  merger),  with  similar acquisitions  for 
undertaking  B.  Similarly,  a  break-up of a  joint venture 
can be considered as  the passage from  joint control over 
the  joint venture's entire  assets  to sole control over the 
divided  assets.  (see  Soh•ay-Laporte/lnterox ("). 
48.  A  break-up  of a  company  in  this  way  is  'asym-
metrical'.  For  such  a  demerger,  the  undertakings 
concerned (for each break-up operation) will  be, on the 
one  hand,  the original parties to the merger and on the 
other  the assets that each original party is acquiring. For 
the  break-up  of  a  joint  venture,  the  undertakings 
concerned (for each  break-up operation) will be, on the 
one hand, the original  parties to the joint venture,  ~a~h 
as  acquirer,  and  on  the  other,  that  part  of the  JOlnt 
venture that each  original  party is  acquiring. 
("}  Case  IV /M.376 - Synthomer/Yule Catto, of 22  October 
1993. 
('s}  By  'assets',  reference  is  made  to.  specific  assets  ~~ich in 
themselves  could  constitute  a  busmess  (e.g.  a  substdtary,  a 
division  of a  company,  in  some  cases  brands  or  .licences, 
etc.) to which a market turnover can clearly be attrtbuted. 
('6}  Case No IV/M.197- Solvay-Laporte/lnterox, of 30 April 
1992. 
8.  Swaps of Assets (
11
) 
49.  In  those  tranSactions  where  two  (or  more) 
companies exchange  assets,  regardless of whether these 
constitute  legal  entities  or  not,  each  acquisition  of 
conuol  constitutes  an  independent  concentration. 
Although it is uue that both transfers of assets in a swap 
arc  usually  considered  by  the  parties  to  be  interde-
pendent, that they .are often agreed in a single document, 
and  that they  may  even  take  place  simultaneously,  the 
purpose of the Merger Regulation is  to assess the impact 
of the operation resulting from the acquisition of control 
by each of the companies. The legal or even  economic 
link between those operations is  not sufficient for them 
to qualify as  a single concentration. 
50.  Hence the  undertakings  concerned will  for  each 
property transfer  be  the  acquiring  companies,  and  the  fJ 
acquired companies or assets. 
9.  Acquisitions of control by individual persons 
51.  Article 3 (1) of the Merger Regulation specifically 
provides  that a concentration shall  be  deemed  to arise, 
inter  alia,  where  'one  or  more  persons  already 
controlling at least one undertaking' acquire control of 
the whole  or parts  of one  or more  undertakings.  This 
text indicates  that acquisitions  of control by  individuals 
will only bring about a lasting change in  the structure of 
the  companies  concerned  if those  individuals  carry  out 
economic  activities  of  their  own.  The  Commission 
considers that the undertakings concerned are the target 
company and the individual acquirer (with the  turnover 
of the undertaking(s) controlled by that individual being  f 
included in ·the  calculation of turnover). 
52.  This  was  ·the  view  taken  in  the  Commission 
decision in  the Asko/jacobs/  Adia case (11), where Asko, 
a  German  holding  company  with  substantial  retailing 
assets, and Mr Jacobs, a private Swiss  investor, acquired 
joint control of Adia,  a Swiss  company active  mainly in 
personnel  services.  Mr Jacobs  was  considered  to  be  an 
undertaking concerned because of the economic interests 
he  held in  the  industrial  chocolate,  sugar confectionary 
and coffee sectors. 
(
17
)  See footnote 15. 
(")  Case IV/M.082- Asko/jacohs/Adia, of 16  May 1991. 
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10.  Management buy-outs 
53.  An acquisition of control of a company by its own 
managers is also an acquisition by individuals, and what 
has  been  said  above  is  therefore  also  applicable  here. 
However, the management of the company may pool its 
interests through a 'vehicle company', so that it acts with 
a single voice and also to facilitate decision making. Such 
a  vehicle  company  may  be,  but  is  not  necessarily,  an 
undenaking concerned. The general rule on acquisitions 
of control by a  joint venture  applies  here  (see  Section 
IliA.). 
54.  With  or  without  a  ·vehicle  company,  the 
management  may  also  look  for  investors  in  order to 
finance the operation. Very often, the rights granted to 
these  investors  according to their shareholding may be 
such that control within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Merger Regulation  will  be  conferred  on them  and  not 
on  the  management  itself,  which  may  simply  enjoy 
minority  rights.  In  the  CWB/Goldman  Sachsffarkett 
' 
decision ("), the two companies managing the investment 
funds  taking  part in  the transaction were in  fact those 
acquiring joint control, and not the managers. 
t 
11.  Acquisition of control by a State-owned company 
55.  In  those situations where a State-owned company 
merges  with  or  acquires  control · of another  company 
(") Case  IV/M.395  - CWB/Goldman  Sachs/Tarkett,  of  21 
February 1994. 
controlled by the same State (Z
0
), the question arises as to 
whether  these  tranSactions  really  constitute  concen-
trations  within the  meaning  of Article  3  of the  Regu-
lation or rather internal restructUring operations of the 
'public sector group of companies' (
21
). In this  respect, 
.recital  12  of  the  Merger  Regulation  sets  forth  the 
principle  of non-discrimination  between  the  public  and 
the private sectors and declares that 'in the public sector, 
calculation of the turnover of an undenaking concerned 
in  a concentration needs,  therefore, to take account of 
undenakings making up an economic unit with an inde-
pendent  power of decision,  irrespective  of the  way  in 
which  their capital  is  held  or of the rules  of adminis-
trative supervision applicable to them'. 
56.  A merger or acquisition of control arising between 
two  companies owned by the same State may constitute 
a concentration and, if it does, both of them will qualify 
as  undertakings concerned, since the mere fact that two 
companies  are both  owned by the same  State does  not 
necessarily  mean  that they belong to the  sar;ne  •group'. 
Indeed,  the decisive  issue  will  be whether or not these 
companies  are both part of the same industrial  holding 
and  are  subject to a  cenain coordinated strategy.  This 
was  the  approach  taken  in  the  SGS/Thomson 
decision (2'). 
(2°)  Bv 'State', reference is  made to any legal public entity, i.e. 
Member States but also regional ~r  local public entities such 
as provinces, departments, Under, etc. 
(")  See  also  Commission  Notice  on  the  notion  of a  concen-
tration, par.1graph 8. 
(u) Case  IV /M.216  - CEA  Industrie/France  Telecom/ 
Finmeccanica/SGS-Thomson, of 22  February 1993. 
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Company A 
After merger 
After breaking  up  the  merger 
Company A: 
Divided AssetS  of merged company: 
- some (initial) assets of A 
- some (initial) asseu of B 
- some (subsequent) asseu of the merged company 
Joint venture scenario 
Before JV 
Company A  AssetS of A for the JV 
A/ter JV 
Company A 
After breaking  up  the JV 
Company A  Divided Asseu of joint venture.: 
- some (initial) assets of A 
- some (initial) assets of B 
ANNEX 
Merged c:ompany 
Combined  assetS 
Company B: 
Divi<fed Assets of merged company: 
- some (initial) asseu of A 
- some (initial) assetS of B 
Company B 
- some (subsequent) assets of the merged company 
Assets  of B for the JV  Company B 
Joint venture 
Combined assets 
Company B 
Company B 
Divided Asseu of joint venture: 
- some (initial) assetS of A 
- some (initial) assets of B 
- some (subsequent} asseu of the JV  - some (subsequent) assets of the jV 
(')  By  'assets', reference  is  made  to specific asseu which  in  themselves could constitute a business (e.g. a subsidiary, a division of a company,  in  certain 
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COMMISSION NOTICE 
on calculatio~ of turnover 
uaclcr Couacil Rqulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 ~  1'89 oa. the control of concea.· 
tratioas betwcea ua.dcrtalda.p (')  . 
(94/C 385/04) 
(l'cxt with EF.A relevance) 
1.  The purpose of this  notice  is  to expand  upon  the 
text of Articles 1 and 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (hereinafter referred  to as  'the  Merger Regu-
lation') and in so  doing to elucidate certain procedural 
and  practical  queStions  which  have  caused  .doubt  or 
difficulty. · 
2.  This notice  is  based  on  the  experience  gained  by 
the  Commission  in  applying  the  Merger Regulation  to 
5.  The  fact  that  the  thresholds  of Article  1 of the 
Merger Regulation are purely· quantitative, since they are 
only based  on  turnover  calculation  instead  of  market 
.  share or other criteria, shows that their aim is to provide 
a  simple  and  objective  mechanism  that  can  be  easily 
handled by the comp~nies involved in a merger in  order 
to  determine  if  their  transaction  is  of  Community 
dimension and therefore notifiable.  , 
t 
date.  The  principles  it sets  out will  be  followed  and 
further developed by the Commission's practice in indi-
vidual cases. 
6.  The  decisive  issue  for  Article  1  of  the  Merger 
Regulation is  to measure  the economic strength of the 
undertakings  concerned  as  reflected  in  their respective 
turnover  figures,  regardless  of  the  sector  where  such 
turnover was achieved and of whether those sectors will 
be  at all  affected  by  the  transaction  in  question.  The 
Merger  Regulation  has  thereby  given  priority  to  the 
determination  of  the  overall  economic  and  financial 
resources that are being combined through the merger in 
order  to  decide  whether  the  latter  is  of  Community 
interest. 
t 
3.  The  Merger  Regulation  has  a  two-fold  test  for 
Commission jurisdiction. One test is  that the transaction 
must be  a  concentration within  the  meaning  of Anicle 
3 (2). The second comprises the three turnover thresholds 
contained in Article  1 and which are designed to identify 
those  transactions  which  have  an  impact  upon  the 
Community  and  can  be  deemed  to  be  of 'Community 
interest'.  In  particular,  the  world-wide  turnover 
threshold is intended to measure the overall dimension of 
the  undenakings  concerned,  the  Community  turnover 
threshold  seeks  to determine  whether they carry  on  a 
minimum  level  of activities  in  the  Community  and  the 
two-thirds  rule  aims  to exclude  purely  domestic  trans-
actions from  Community jurisdiction. Turnover is  used 
as  a proxy for the economic resources and activity being 
combined  in  a  concentration,  and  it  is  allocated 
geographically  to  reflect  the  geographic  distribution  of 
these  resources and activity. 
4.  The  thresholds  as  such  are  designed  to  establish 
jurisdiction and not to assess  the market position of the 
panics  to  the  concentration  nor  the  impact  of  the 
operation.  In  so  doing  they  include  turnover  derived 
from,  and  thus  the  resources  devoted  to,  all  areas  of 
activity  of  the  parties,  and  not  just  those  directly 
involved  in  the  concentration.  Article  1 of the  Merger 
Regulation  sets  out  the  thresholds  to  be  used  to 
determine  a  concentration  of  'Community  dimension' 
while  Article  5  explains  how  turnover  should  be 
calculated. 
(I)  OJ No L 395, 30.  12.  1989,  p.  1,  corrected version  OJ  No 
L 257, 21. 9.  1990. 
(2)  The concept of concentration  is  defined  in  the  Notice  on 
'the notion of concentration'. 
7.  In  this  context,  it  is  clear  that  turnover  should 
reflect as accurately as  possible the economic strength of 
the  undenakings  involved  in  a  transaction.  This  is  the 
purpose of the set of rules contained in  Article  5 of the 
Merger Regulation which are designed to ensure that the 
resulting  figures  are  a  true  representation  of economic 
reality. 
8.  The Commission's interpretation of Articles  1 and  5 
with  respect  to  calculation  of  turnover  is  without 
prejudice to the interpretation which may be given by the 
Coun of Justice  or the  Court of First  Instance  of the 
European Communities. 
I.  'ACCOUNTING' CALCULATION OF TURNOVER 
1.  Turnover as a reflection of activity 
1.1.  The  concept of  turnover 
9.  The concept of turnover as  used in Article  5 of the 
Merger  Regulation  refers  explicitly  to  'the  amounts 
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derived  from  the  sale of productS  and  the provision of 
services'.  Sale,  as  a  reflection  of  the  undenaking's 
activity,  is  thus  the  essential  criterion  for  calculating 
turnover,  whether  for  products  or  the  provision  of 
services. •Amounts derived from sale' generally appear in 
company accounts under the heading •sales'. 
10.  In  the  case  of  productS,  turnover  can  be 
determined  without  difficulty,  namely  by  identifying 
each  commercial  act  involving  a  transfer of ownership. 
1  1.  In the case of services, the factors to be taken into 
account_ in calculating turnover are much more complex, 
since  the  commercial  act involves  a  transfer of 'value'. 
12.  Generally  speaking,  the  method  of  calculating 
turnover in the case of services does not differ from that 
used in the case of productS: the Commission takes into 
consideration  the  total  amount  of  sales.  Where  the 
service  provided  is  sold directly  by  the  provider  to  the 
customer,  the  turnover  of the  undertaking  concerned 
consists of the total amount..of sales for the provision of 
services  in  the last financial  year. 
13.  Berause  of the  complexity  of the  service  sector, 
this  general  principle  may  have  to  be  adapted  to  the 
specific  conditions  of  the  service  provided.  Thus,  in 
certain  sectors  of activity  (such  as  tourism  and  adver-
tising), the service may be sold through the intermediary 
of  other  suppliers.  Because  of  the  diversity  of  such 
sectors,  many  different  situations  may  arise.  For 
example,  the  turnover  of a  service  undertaking  which 
acts as an  intermediary may consist solely of the amount 
of commissions which  it receives. 
14.  Similarly,  in  a  number  of  areas  such  as  credit, 
financial  services  and  insurance,  technical  problems  in 
calculating  turnover  arise'  which  will  be  dealt  with  in 
section  III. 
1.2.  Ordinary activities 
15.  Article 5 (1) states that the amounts to be included 
in  the  calculation  of turnover  must  correspond  to  the 
'ordinary activities'  of the  undertakings concerned. 
16.  With  regard  to  aid  granted  to  undertakings  by 
public  bodies,  any  aid  relating  to one  of the  ordinary 
activities  of  an  undertaking  concerned  is  liable  to  be 
included in the calculation of turnover if the undertaking 
is  itself the recipient of the aid and if the aid is  directly 
linked  to  the  sale  of  products  and  the  provision  of 
services by the undenaking and is  therefore reflected in 
the price ('). For example, aid towards the consumption 
of a product allows the manufacturer to sell  at a higher 
price than that acwaUy paid by consumers. 
17.  With regard to services, the Commission looks at 
the  undertaking's  ordinary activities  involved  in  estab-
lishing the resources required for providing the  service. 
In  its  Decision  in  the Accor/Wagons-Lits  case e),  the 
Commission decided to take into account the item 'other 
operating proceeds' included in  Wagons-Lits' profit and 
loss  account.  The  Commission  considered  that  the 
components of this  item  which  included  certain  income 
from its car-hire activities were derived from  the sale of 
product$  and  the  provision  of services  by  Wagons-tits 
and were  pan of its  ordinary activities. 
2.  'Net' turnover 
18.  The  turnover  to  be  taken  into  account  is  'net' 
turnover,  after  deduction  of  a  number  of components 
specified in  the Regulation. The Commission's aim  is  to 
adjust t1,1rnover in such a way as to enable it to decide on 
the real  economic weight  of the undertaking. 
1.2.1.  The deduction of  rebates and taxes 
19.  Article  5 (1)  provides  for the  'deduction of sales 
rebates and of value  added tax and other taxes  directly 
related  to  turnover'.  The  deductions  thus  relate  to 
business components (sales  rebates)  and  tax components 
(value  added  tax  and  other  taxes  directly  related  to 
turnover). 
20.  'Sales rebates' should be  taken to mean  all  rebates 
or  discounts  which  are  granted  by  the  undertakings 
during  their  business  negotiations  with  their  customers 
and  which  have  a  direct  influence  on  the  amounts  of 
sales. 
21.  As  regards  the  deduction  of  taxes,  the  Merger 
Regulation  refers  to  VAT  and  'other  taxes  directly 
related  to  turnover'.  As  far  as  VAT  is  concerned,  its 
(')  See  Case  IV  /M.156 - Cereal/Continentale ltaliana  of 27 
November  1991.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  excluded 
Community aid from the calculation of turno\'er because the 
aid was  not intended to suppon the sale of products manu· 
facti.lred  by one of the undenakings involved  in  the merger, 
but the producers of the  raw  materials  (grain)  used  by  the 
undenaking, which specialized in the crushing of grain. 
(")  Case IV/M.126- Accor/Wagons-Lits, of 28 April  1992. 
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deduction does  not in  general  pose  any problem. The 
concept of 'taxes directly related  to wrnover' is  a clear 
reference to indirect taxation since it is directly linked to 
turnover,  such  as,  for  example,  taxes  on  alcoholic 
beverages. 
2.2.  1be deduction of  'internal' turnover 
22.  The first subparagraph of Anicle 5 (1)  states that 
'the  aggregate  turnover  of an  undertaking  concerned 
shall not include the sale of products or the provision of 
services between  any of the undertakings referred to in 
paragraph 4', i.e. those which have links with the under-
taking concerned (essentially parent companies or subsi-
diaries). 
23.  The  aim  is  to  exclude  the  proceeds  of business 
dealings within a group so as to take account of the real 
economic  weight  of each  entity.  Thus,  the  'amounts' 
taken into account by the Merger Regulation reflect only 
the transactions which take place between the group of 
undertakings on the one hand  and third parties on the 
other. 
3.  Adjustment  of  turnover  calculation  rules  for  the 
different types of operations 
3  .1.  The general  rule 
24.  According  to Article  5  (1)  of the  Merger Regu-
lation 'aggregate turnover within the meaning of Article 
1 (2)  shall  comprise the amounts derived by the under-
takings  concerned  in  the  preceding  financial  year  from 
the  sale  of products  and  the  provision  of services  .. .'. 
The  basic  principle  is  thus  that  for  each  undertaking 
concerned the  turnover to be  taken  into  account  is  the 
turnover of the closest financial  year to the  date of the 
transaction. 
25.  This provision  shows  that since  there  are  usually 
no audited accounts  of the  year ending the  day before 
the  transaction,  the  closest  representation  of a  whole 
year of activity· of the  company  in  question  is  the  one 
given by the turnover figures of the most recent financial 
year. 
26.  The  Commission  seeks  to  base  itself  upon  the 
most accurate and reliable figures  available. As  a general 
rule  therefore,  the  Commission  will  refer to audited or 
other definitive accounts. However, in cases where major 
differences  between  the  Community's  accounting 
standards  and  those  ·of  a  non-member  country  are 
observed,  the  Commission  may  consider it necessary  to 
restate  these  accounts  in  accordance  with  Community 
standards in  respect of turnover. The Commission is,  in 
any case,  reluctant to  rely  on  provisional,  management 
or any  other form  of provisional  accounts  in  any  but 
exceptional  circumstances  (see  the  next  paragraph). 
Where  a  concentration  takes  place  within  the  first 
months· of  the  year and audited  accounts  are  not yet 
available for the most recent fmancial year, the figures to 
be taken  into account are those relating to the previous 
year. Where there is a major divergence between the two 
sets of accounts, and in particular, when the final  draft 
figures  for  the  most ·recent  years  are  available,  the 
Commission may decide to take those draft figures  into 
account. 
27.  Notwithstanding  paragraph  26,  an  adjustment 
must  always  be  made  to  account  for  acquisitions  or 
divestments  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  audited 
accounts.  This  is  necessary  if  the  true  resources  being 
concentrated  are  to  be  identified.  Thus  if  a  company 
disposes  of a  subsidiary or closes  a  factory  at any time 
before  the  signature  of  the  final  agreement  or  the 
announcement of the public  bid or the acquisition of a 
controlling  interest  bringing  about  a  concentration,  or 
where such a divestment or closure is a pre-condition for 
the  operation e>  the  turnover  generated  by  that 
subsidiary  or  factory  must  be  subtracted  from  the 
turnover  of  the  notifying  pany  as  shown  in  its  last 
audited accounts. Conversely, the turnover generated by 
assets o£ which control has been acquired subsequent to 
the preparation of the most recent audited accounts must 
be  added  to  a  company's  turnover  for  notification 
purposes. 
28.  Other  factors  that  may  affect  turnover  on  a 
temporary basis  such  as  a decrease of the  orders of the 
product or a slow-down of the production process within 
the period prior to the transaction will be ignored for the 
purposes  of calculating  turnover.  No adjustment to the 
definitive accounts will  be  made  to incorporate them. 
29.  Regarding the geographical allocation of turnover, 
since  audited  accounts  often  do  not  provide  a 
geographical  breakdown  of  the  sort  required  by  the 
Merger Regulation, the Commission will  rely on the best 
figures  available  provided  by  . the  companies  in 
accordance with the rule laid down in Article 5 (  1) of the 
Merger Regulation  (see  Section  11.1). 
3.2.  Acquisitions of  parts of  companies 
30.  Article  5  {2)  of the  Merger  Regulation  provides 
that 'where the concentration consists  in  the acquisition 
of parts, whether or not constituted as  legal  entities,  of 
one or more  undertakings  only the  turnover relating to 
the parts which are the subject of the transaction shall be 
taken  into  account with  regard  to the  seller or sellers'. 
(')  See  Judgment  of  24 · March  1994  of  the  Court  of  First 
Instance  in  Case T-3/93 -Air France  v.  Commission  (not 
yet published). 
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3 t .  This provision states that when the acquiror does 
not purchase an entire group, but only one or pan of iu 
businesses,  whether or not constituted  as  a  subsidiary, 
only the turnover of the pan effectively acquired should 
be included in the turnover calculation. In fact,· although 
in  legal  terms the seller as  a whole  (with  all  its  subsi-
diaries) is an essential party to the transaction, since the 
sale-purchase  agreement  cannot  be  concluded  without 
him,  he  plays  no  role  once  the  agreement  has  been 
implemented. The possible  impact of the  transaction  in 
the  marketplace will  exclusively  depend  on the combi-
nation of the economic and financial  resources  that are 
the  subject  of  a  propeny  transfer  with  those  of  the 
acquiror and not on the part of the seller who remains 
independent. 
3.3.  Staggered operations 
32.  Sometimes certain successive transactions are only 
individual Steps within a wider strategy between the same 
parties. Considering· each transaction alone, even if only 
for  determining  jurisdiction,  would  imply  ignoring 
economic  reality.  At  the  same  time,  whereas  some  of 
these  staggered  operations  may  be  designed  in  this 
fashio 1  because  they  will  better  meet  the  needs  of the 
parties, it is  not excluded than others could be structured 
like  this  in  order to  circumvent  the  application  of  the 
Merger Regulation. 
33.  The  Merger  Regulation  has  foreseen  these 
scenarios  in  Article  5  (2),  second  subparagraph,  which 
provides  that  'two  or  more  transactions  within  the 
meaning  of  the  first  subparagraph  which  take  place 
within  a  two-year period  between  the  same  persons  or 
undertakings  shall  be  treated  as  one  and  the  same 
concentration arising on the date of the last transaction'. 
34.  In  practical  terms,  this  prov1s1on  means  that  if 
company  A  buys  a  subsidiary  of  company  B  that 
represenu 50 % of the overall activity of B and one year 
later it acquires the other subsidiary (the remaining 50% 
of B),  both transactions will  be  taken as  one. Assuming 
that each of the  subsidiaries  only attained a turnover in 
the Community of ECU 200 million, the first transaction 
would not be notifiable. However, since the second takes 
place  within  the  two-year-period,  both  have  to  be 
notified as  a single  transaction when  the  second occurs. 
35.  The Importance  of the  provision  is  that previous 
transactions  (within  two  years)  become  notifiable  with 
the  most  recent  transactions  once  the  thresholds  are 
cumulatively met. 
3.4.  Tumowr of  groups 
36.  When  an  undertaking  concerned  in  a  concen-
uation within die meaning of Article. 1 of the Merger 
Regulation (') belongs  to a  group,  the turnover of the 
group as a whole is to be taken into account in order to 
determine  whether the thresholds  are  met.  The  aim  is 
again  to  capture  the  total  volume  of  the  economic 
resources that are being combined through the operation. 
37.  The  Merger  Regulation  does  not  define  the 
concept  of  group  in  abstract  terms  but  focuses  on 
whether  the  companies  have  the  right  to  manage  the 
undenaking's affairs as the yardstick to determine which 
of the companies that have some direct or indirect links 
with  an  undenaking  concerned  should  be  regarded  as 
part of its  group. 
38.  Article  S (4)  of the  Merger Regulation  provides 
the following:  fJ 
'Without prejudice to paragraph 2 (acquisitions of paru) 
the  aggregate  turnover  of  an  undertaking  concerned 
within the meaning of Anide 1 (2) shall be calculated by 
adding  together  the  respective  turnovers  of  the 
following: 
(a)  the undertaking concerned; 
(b)  those·  undenakings  in  which  the  undertaking 
concerned directly or indirectly: 
- owns  more  than  half  the  capital  or  business 
assets, or 
- has  the  power  to  exercise  more  than  half  the 
voting rights, or 
- has  the  power  to  appoint  more  than  half  the 
members  of the supervisory board, the  adminis- f 
trative  board  or bodies  legally  representing  the 
1 
undertakings, or 
- has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs; 
(c)  those  undertakings  which  have  in  the  undertaking 
concerned the rights or powers listed in (b); 
(d)  those  undenakings  in  which  an  undertaking  as 
referred  to  in  (c)  has  the  rights  or powers  listed  in 
(b); 
(e)  those  undertakings  in  which  t"-'O  or  more  under-
takings  as  referred  to in  (a)  to (d)  jointly have  the 
rights or powers listed in (b).' 
(
6
)  See  Commission  Notice  on  the  notion  of  undenakings 
concerned. 
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This  means  that the turnover of the  company  directly 
involved· in  the  transaction  (subparagrap,h  (a))  should 
include its subsidiaries (b), its  parent companies (c), the 
other subsidiaries  of its  parent companies  (d)  and  any 
other undertaking joindy controlled by two or more of 
the  companies  belonging  to  the  group  (e).  A  graphic 
example is  as follows: 
The unclertakias coacemed and its group: 
a: The undertaking concerned 
b: Its subsidiaries and their own subsidiaries (bt  and b2) 
c: Its parent companies and their own parent companies (ct) 
d: Other subsidiaries  of the  parent  companies  of the  under-
taking concerned 
e:  Companies jointly controlled by two (or more)  companies of 
the group 
Note:  These letters correspond to the relevant subparagraphs of 
Anicle S (4). 
Several remarks can be  made  from  this  chart: 
(1)  As  long as  the test of control of subparagraph (b)  is 
fulfilled,  the  whole  turnover  of  the  subsidiary  in 
question will be  taken into account regardless of the 
actual shareholding  of the  controlling  company.  In 
the  example,  the  whole  turnover  of the  three  sub-
sidiaries· (called h)  of the undertaking concerned (a) 
will be included. 
(2)  When any of the companies identified  as  belonging 
to the group also control others, these should also be 
incorporated to in  the  calculation.  In  the  example, 
one of the subsidiaries of a (called b)  has  in  tum its 
own subsidiaries b 1 and b2. 
{3)  When  two  or more  companies  jointly  control  the 
undertaking  concerned  (a)  in  the  sense  that  the 
agreement of each and all of them is needed in order 
to manage the undertakings affairs,  the turnover of 
all  of them should be  included (').  In  the example, 
the  two  parent  companies  (c)  of the  undertaking 
concerned (a) would be taken into account as well as 
their  own  parent  companies  (ct  in  the  example). 
Although the Merger Regulation does  not explicitly 
mention this  rule  for those  cases  where  the  under-
taking  concerned  is  in  fact  a  joint  venture,  it  is 
inferred  from  the  text  of subparagraph  (c),  which 
uses  the  plural  when  referring  to  the  parent 
companies. This interpretation has  been consistently 
applied by the Commission. 
(  4)  Any intra-group sale  should be subtracted from  the 
turnover of the group (see paragraph 22). 
39.  The  Merger  Regulation  also  deals  with  the 
specific  scenario  that arises  when  two  or more  under-
takings concerned in  a transaction exercise joint control 
of another company.  Pursuant  to  point  (a)  of Article 
5 (5), the turnover resulting from the sale of productS or 
the provision of services  between  the  joint venture  and 
each  of  the  undertakings  concerned  or  any  other 
company  connected  with  any  one  of them  should  be 
excluded. The purpose of such a rule  is  to avoid  double 
counting.  With  regard  to  the  turnover  of  the  joint 
venture generated from activities with third parties, point 
(b)  of Article  5 (5)  provides that it shall  be  apportioned 
equally  amongst  the  undertakings  concerned,  to  reflect 
the joint control (
1
). 
40.  Following  the  principle  of point  (b)  of Article  5 
(5)  by. analogy,  in  the  case  of joint ventures  between 
undertakings  concerned  and  third  parties,  the 
Commission's practice has so far been to allocate to each 
of  the  undertakings  concerned  the  turnover  shared 
equally  by  all  the  controlling  companies  in  the 
(')  See  Commission  Notice  on  the  notion  of  undertakings 
concerned  for  acquisitions  of  control  by  a  joint  venture 
(paragraphs 26 to 29). 
(
1
)  For  example,  company  A  and  company  B  set  up  a  joint 
venture C. These two parent companies exercise at the same 
time  joint control of company D, although A has  60 %  and 
B 40 %  of the capital. When calculating the  turnover of A 
and  B at the time they set up  the new joint venture C,  the 
turnover of D with third parties  is  attributed in  equal  parts 
to A and B. 
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joint venture.  In  all  these  cases  however,  joint control 
has to be  demonstrated. 
41..  It should be noted that Article S (4) refers only to 
the groups that already exist  at the time  of the tranS-
action,  i.e.  "the  group  of  each  of  the  undertakings 
concerned in an operation, and not to the new strUctUres 
created as  a result of the concentration. For example, if 
companies  A  and  B,  together .with  their rspective  sub-
sidiaries, are going to merge, it is A and B and not the 
new entity that qualify as undertakings concerned, which 
implies  that  the  turnover  of each  of the  two  groups 
should be  calculated independently. 
42.  Since the aim of this provision is simply to identify 
the  companies  belonging  to the  existing  groups for the 
purposes  of turnover calculation,  the test of having  the 
right to manage the undertaking's affairs in Article 5 (4) 
is  somewhat different to the test of control set out in 
Article 3  (3), which  refers to the acquisition of control 
carried out by means of the transaction subject to exam-
ination.  Whereas  the  former  is  simpler  and  easier  to 
prove on the basis of factual evidence, the latter is more 
demanding because  in  the ·absence of an acquisition of 
control no concentration arises. 
3.5.  Turnover of  State-owned companies 
43.  While  Anicle  5  (4)  sets  out  the  method  to 
determine  the  economic  grouping  to  which  an  under-
taking concerned belongs for the purpose of calculating 
turnover,  the  Article's  provisions  should  be  read  in 
conjunction with  recital  12  of the Regulation in  respect 
of  State-owned  enterprises.  This  recital  states  that  in 
order  to  avoid  discrimination  between  the  public  and 
private sector, account should be  taken 'of undertakings 
making up  an economic u.nit with an independent power 
of decision  irrespective of the way in  which their capital 
is  held  or  of  the  rules  of  administrative  supervision 
applicable  to  them'.  Thus  the  mere  fact  that  two 
companies  are  both  State-owned  should  not  auto-
matically  lead  to  the  conclusion that they are  part of a 
group  for  Article  5  purposes.  Rather  it  should  be 
considered  whether  there  are  grounds  to  consider that 
both  companies  constitute  an  independent  economic 
unit. 
44.  Thus where a State-owned company is  not pan of 
an  overall  industrial holding company and is  not subject 
to any coordination with other State-controlled holdings, 
it  should  be  treated  as  an  independent  group  for  the 
purposes  of  Article  5,  and  the  turnover  of  other 
companies owned by that State should not be taken into 
account. Where, however, a Member State's intereSt$ are 
grouped  together  in  holding  companies,  are  managed 
together,  or  where  for  other  reasons  it  is  clear  that 
State-owned companies  form  part of an 'economic unit 
with  an  independent  power  of  decision',  then  the 
turnover of those businesses should be considered part of 
the  undertaking concerned's group for the purposes of 
Article 5. 
II.  GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOGATION  OF TURNOVER 
1.  General rule 
45.  The second  and third thresholds set by  Article  1 
select cases which have sufficient Community turnover to 
be of Community interest and which are primarily cross-
border  in  nature.  They  both  require  turnover  to  be 
allocated  geographically  to  achieve  this.  The  second 
subparagraph of Anicle 5 (1)  provides  that the location 
of turnover is determined by the location of the customer 
at the time of the transaction. 
'Turnover,  in  the  Community  or in  a  Member  State, 
shall  comprise  products  sold  and  services  provided  tO 
undertakings or consumers, in the Community or in that 
Member State as  the case may be.' 
46.  The  reference· to  'products  sold'  and  'sen·ices 
provided'  is  not intended to discriminate between goods 
and services by focusing on where the sale takes place in 
the  case  of  goods  but  the  place  where  a  service  is 
provided  (which  might  be  different  from  where  the 
service  was  sold)  in  the  case  of services.  In  both  cases 
turnover  should  be  attributed  to  the  place  where  the 
customer is located because that is,  in most cirumstances, 
where  a  deal  was  made,  where  the  turnover  for  the 
supplier  in  question  was  generated  and  where 
competition with alternative suppliers took place('). The 
second subparagraph of Article  5 (1)  does  not focus  on 
where a good or service  is  enjored or the benefit of the 
good or service derived. In  the case of a mobile good, a 
motor  car  may  well  be  driven  across  Europe  by  its 
purchaser  but  it  was  purchased  at  only  one  place  -
Paris, Berlin or Madrid say. This is  also true in  the case 
of  those  services  where  it  is  possible  to  separate  the 
purchase of a service  from  its  delivery. Thus in  the  case 
of package holidays, competition for the sale of holidays 
through travel  agents  takes  place  locally,  as  with  retail 
shopping, even though the service  may be  provided in  a 
number of distant locations. This turnover is,  however, 
earned locally and not at the site of an eventual holiday. 
47.  This  applies  ev<"n  where  a  multinational 
corporation  has  a  Community  buying  strategy  and 
(')  Where  the  place  where  the  customer  was  located  v.•hen 
purchasing  the  goods  or service .  and  the  place  where  the 
billing was  subsequently made are differnt, turnover should 
be allocated to the former. 
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sources all  its  requirements  for a  good or service  from 
one  location.  The  fact  that  the  components  are 
subsequently used in  10  different plants  in a  variety of 
Member StateS  does  not alter the  fact  that the  trans-
action with  a  company outside  the group occurred in 
only one country. The subsequent distribution to other 
sites  is  purely  an  internal  question  for  the  company· 
concerned. 
48.  Certain sectors do, however, pose very particular 
problems with  regard to ,the  geographical  allocation of 
turnover {see  Section III). 
2.  Conversion of tumovet into ecus 
49.  When convening turnover figures  into ecus great 
care should be taken with the exchange rate used. The 
annual turnover of a company should be converted at the 
average rate for the 12  months concerned. This average 
can  be  obtained  from  the  Commission.  The  audited 
annual turnover figures should not be broken down into 
component quarterly,  monthly,  or weekly sales  figures 
and converted individually at the corresponding average 
quarterly,  monthly  or weekly  rates  and  then  the  ecus 
figures summed to give  a total for the year. 
50.  When  a  company  has  sales  in  a  range  of 
currencies,  the  procedure  is  no  different.  The  total 
turnover given  in  the consolidated audited accounts and 
in  that company's  reporting  currency  is  converted  into 
ecus  at  the  average  rate  for  the  12  months.  Local 
currency sales should not be  converted directly into ecus 
since these figures are not from the consolidated audited 
accounts of the  company. 
lll.  CREDIT AND  OTHER  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 
AND INSURANCE UNDERTAKINGS 
1.  Defmitions 
51.  The  specific  nature  of  banking  and  insurance 
activities  is  formally  recognized  by  the  Merger  Regu-
lation which includes specific provisions dealing with the 
calculation  of turnover  for  these  sectors (1°).  Although 
the Merger Regulation does  not provide a definition of 
the  terms,  'credit  institutions  and  other financial  insti-
tutions' within the meaning of point (a)  of Article 5 (3), 
(1°)  See Article 5 (3) of the Merger Regulation. 
the Commission in  its  practice has  consistently adopted 
the definitions provided in  the first and second banking 
directives: 
- 'Credit  institution  ·means  an  undertaking  whose 
business  is  to  receive  deposits  or other  repayable 
funds from the public and tO grant credits for its own 
account' ("). 
- 'Financial institution shall mean an undertaking other 
.  than  a  cr~dit  institution,  the·  principal  activity  of 
which is to acquire holdings or to carry one or more 
of  the  activities  listed  in  points  2  to  12  in  the 
Annex' {
12
). 
52.  From the definition of 'financial institution' given 
above it is  clear that on the one hand holding companies 
shall  be  considered as  financial  institutions and, on the 
other  hand,  that  undertakings  which  perform  on  a 
regular basis as a principal activity one or more activities 
expressly mentioned in points 2 to· 12  of the abovemen-
tioned Annex shall also be considered as  financial  insti-
tutions within the meaning of point {a) of Article 5 (3) of 
the Merger Regulation. These activities include: 
- lending (inter alia,  consumer credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring, ...  ), 
- financial leasing, 
- money transmission services, 
- issuing and managing instruments of payment (credit 
cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts), 
- guarantees and commitments, 
- trading on own  account or on account of customers 
in  money  market  instruments,  foreign  exchange, 
financial  futures  and  options,  exchange  and  interest 
rate instruments, and transferable securities, 
- participation  in  share  issues  and  the  provision  of 
services related to such issues, 
- advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial 
strategy and related questions and advice and services 
relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings, 
(")  First  Council  Directive  (77/780/EEC)  of  12  December 
1977 on the coordination of laws,  re~ulations and  adminis-
trative  provisions  relating  to the  takmg  up  and  pursuit  of 
the business of credit institutions, Article  1 (OJ No L 322, 
17.  12.  1977, p.  30). 
(
12
)  Second  Council  Directive  (89/646/EEC) of  15  December 
1989 on the coordination of laws,  regulations and  adminis-
trative  provisions  relating  to  the  takin~  up  and  pursuit 
of the business  of credit institutions, Antcle  1 (6)  (OJ No 
L 386, 30.  12.  1989, p.  1). 
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- money braking, 
- ponfolio management and advice, 
- safekeeping and administration of securities. 
2.  Calculation of turnover 
53.  The methods of calculation of turnover for credit 
and other financial institutions and for insurance under-
takings  are  described  in  Article  5  (3)  of the  Merger 
Regulation and examples are provided in guidance notes 
one and two  respectively,  annexed to Form CO. These 
provisions remain in  force. The purpose of this section is 
to provide an answer to supplementary questions related 
to turnover calculation for the abovementioned types  of 
undertaking which were raised during the fim years of 
the application of the Merger Regulation. 
2.1.  Credit and financial institutions (other than financial 
holding companies) 
2.1.1.  General 
54.  There  are  normally  no  panicular  difficulties  in 
applying the rule of one-tenth of total assets for the defi-
nition  of the  world-wide turnover to credit institutions 
and other kinds of financial institutions. However, diffi-
culties  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  calculation  of 
Community-wide turnover and the determination of the 
turnover  within  Member  States  for  the  purpose  of 
application  of the two-thirds rule. 
55.  Difficulties  also  arise  with  some  financial  insti-
tutions which do not provide loans and advances c  stricto 
senstl,  or when the credit granted, if any exists,  is  not a 
relevant indicator of the economic activity and weight of 
the  undertakings  concerned.  This  is  the  case,  for 
example,  with  asset  management  companies,  merchant 
banks,  credit  card  companies,  tradings  in  foreign 
exchange,  money  market  instrUments,  financial  futures 
and  options,  as  the  companies  in  question  are  mainly 
firms  providing  financial  services  rather  tha,n  granting 
credit to business or individuals  ..  In such cases, the deter-
mination of Community-wide turnover using the criteria 
established by the Merger Regulation cannot be  applied 
meaningfully. 
56.  Therefore,  with  regard  to  the  calculation  of 
Community-wide  turnover  and  turnover  within  a 
Member  State,  the  concept  of  cloans  and  advances' 
should  be  interpreted  broadly  in  order  to  include  any 
kind of activity which could be assimilated to some form 
of credit activity.  For example,  the  fact  that a financial 
institution  has  a portfolio of bonds  and  other  interest-
bearing securities has been assimilated for the purpose of 
the application of the Merger Regulation to a means of 
granting  credit  and  therefore  the  securities  held  have 
been considered as  loans and advances ('s). 
2.1.2.  Turnover of leasing companies 
57.  There is  a fundamental distinction to be made, for 
the purpose of application of point (a) of Article 5 (3) of 
the  Merger  Regulation,  between ·  financial  leases  and 
operating leases.  Basically, financial  leases  are  made  for 
longer  periods  than  operating  leases  and  ownership  is 
generally transferred to the lessee at the end of the  lease 
term by means of a bargain purchase option included  in 
the  lease  contract.  Under  an  operating  lease,  on  the 
contrary, ownership is not transferred to the lessee at the 
end of the lease term and the cost of maintenance, repair 
and insurance of the leased  equipment are  included  in 
the lease payments. A fmancial lease therefore functions 
as  a loan by the lessor to enable the lessee to purchase a 
given  asset.  A  financial  leasing  company  is  thus  a 
financial  institution within the meaning  of point (a)  of 
Article  5  (3)  and  its  turnover has  to be  calculated  by 
applying  the  specific  rules  rdated to the calculation  of 
turnover for credit and other financial institutions. Given 
that  operational  leasing  activities  do  not  have  this 
lending function,  they are not considered as  carried out 
by financial institutions, at least as primary activities, and 
therefore the general turnover calculation rules of Article 
5 (1)  should apply ('
4
). 
2.1.3.  Turnover of fund management companies 
58.  In  the case  of a fund  management company,  the 
relevant assets to be taken into account in the calculation 
of turnover by the one-tenth of assets rule are only those 
belonging  to  the  fund  management company itself  and 
not the assets  being  managed on behalf of clients.  The 
assets  being  managed  do  not  belong  to  the  fund 
management company; they are held on  a fiduciary basis 
and  therefore  either  they  are  booked  in  'off  balance 
sheet' accounts (not included in the total assetS  figure  of 
the  fund  management  company)  or  they  have  to  be 
booked  in  financial  statements  completely  independent 
of  the  accounts  of  the  fund  management  company. 
However,  commission  generated  by  asset  management 
should  be  counted,  as  such,  as  turnover  of  a  fund 
management  company.  Hence  the  turnover  of a  fund 
management  company,  which  manages  both  its  own 
(u)  See  Case  IV/M.l66  - Torras/Sarri6.,  of  24  February 
1992. 
(,.)  S<'e Case JV/M.234- GECC/Avis Lease,  IS July  1992 
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assets  and assets belonging  to clients, will  be  calculated 
as  follows: 
Own assets  x  1/ 10 
Commission  or  fees  generated  by 
management of clients' assets 
Total turnover 
2.2.  Insurance undertakings 
2.2.1.  Gross premiums written 
X 
y 
X+ y· 
59.  The application of the concept of gross premiums 
written  as  a  measure  of turnover  for  insurance  under-
takings  has  raised  supplementary  questions  notwith-
standing the definition provided in point (b)  of Article 5 
(3)  of the  Merger  Regulation.  The  following  clarifi-
cations are appropriate: 
- 'gross'  premiums  written  is  the  sum  of  received 
premiums  (which  may  include  received  reinsurance 
premiums if the undertaking concerned has activities 
in  the  field  of reinsurance).  Outgoing  or outward 
reinsurance  premiums,  i.e.  all  amounts  paid  and 
payable  by the  undertaking  concerned  to  get  rein-
surance  cover,  are  already  included  in  the  gross 
premiums written within  the  meaning  of the Merger 
Regulation, 
- wherever  the  word  'premiums'  is  used  (gross 
premiums,  net  (earned)  premiums,  outgoing  rein-
surance premiums etc.) these premiums are related not 
only  to  new  insurance  contracts  made  during  the 
accounting  year  being  considered  but  also  to  all 
premiums related to contracts made in  previous years 
which  remain  in  force  during  the  period  taken  into 
consideration. 
2.2.2.  Investments of insurance undertakings 
60.  In  order  to  constitute  appropriate  reserves 
allowing  for  the  reimbursement  of  claip}s,  insurance 
undertakings, which  are  also  considered  as  institutional 
investors, usually hold a huge portfolio of investments in 
shares, interest-bearing securities, land and  property and 
other assets  which  provide  an  annual  revenue  which  is 
not considered  as  turnover  for  insurance  undertakings. 
61.  However,  with  regard  to  the  application  of  the 
Merger Regulation, a major distinction  should  be  made 
between  pure  financial  investments,  in  which  the 
insurance undertaking is  not involved in the management 
of  the  undertakings  where  the  investments  have  been 
made, and those investments leading to the acquisition of 
a  controlling  interest  in  a  given  undertaking  thus 
allowing  the  insurance  undertaking  to  exert  a  decisive 
influence  on the ·business  conduct  of the  subsidiary  or 
affiliated company concerned. In such cases Article 5 (  4) 
of the Merger Regulation would apply, and the turnover 
of the subsidiary or affiliated company should be  added 
to  the  turnover  of the  ins~rance undertaking  for  the 
determination of the thresholds laid down in the Merger 
Regulation("). 
2.3.  Financial holding companies 
62.  A  financial  holding company is  a  financial  insti-
tution  and  therefore  the  calculation  of  its  turnover 
should  follow  the  criteria  established  in  point  (a)  of 
Article  5 (3)  for  the  calculation  of turnover  for  credit 
and  other financial  institutions.  However,  as  the  main 
purpose of a financial  holding is  to acquire and  manage 
participation  in  other  undertakings,  Article  5  (  4)  also 
applies,  (as  for insurance undertakings),  with  regard  to 
those  participations  allowing  the  financial  holding 
company to exercise a decisive influence on the business 
conduct of the undertakings in  question.  In  such  cases, 
the  turnover  figures  of  those  undertakings  obtained 
directly  from  the  audited  financial  statements,  or 
requiring special  calculations  (for example,  turnover of 
. banking and .insurance undertakings)  are  simply  added 
together in order to obtain the relevant turnover which 
will  be  used  to determine whether the  case  falls  under 
the Merger Regulation. 
63.  In  these  cases  different  accounting  rules,  in 
particular  those  related  to  the  preparation  of 
consolidated  accounts,  which  are  to  some  extent 
harmonized  but  not  identical  within  the  Community, 
may need to be taken into consideration. This applies  to 
any type of undertaking concerned by the  Merger Regu-
lation  but  it  is  particularly  important  in  the  case  of 
financial  holding  companies (
16
)  where  the  number  and 
the diversity of enterprises controlled and  the  degree  of 
control  the  holding  holds  on  its  subsidiaries,  affiliated 
and participated companies requires careful examination. 
64.  This method of calculation, of which  an  example 
is  given  in  the  following  paragraphs,  may  in  practice 
prove  onerous.  Therefore  a  strict  and  detailed 
. application of this method will be necessary only in  cases 
where  it  seems' that the  turnover of a financial  holding 
company is  likely to be  close to the Merger  Regulation 
thresholds; in other cases it may well be  obvious that the 
turnover is  far from the thresholds of the  Merger Regu-
lation, and therefore the published accounts are adequate 
for the establishment of jurisdiction. 
(u)  See Case IV/M.018- AG/AMEV, of 21  No\'cmbcr 1990. 
('•)  See  for  example  Case  IV /M.l66 - Torras/Sarri6,  of 24 
February  1992,  Case  IV /M.213  - Hong  Kong  and 
Shanghai  Bank/Midland,  of 21  May  1992,  IV/M.I92  -
Banesto!Totta, of 14 April 1992. 
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Example of  the cakulation of  turnover of  financitd holding 
companies 
(a)  Initially,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
non-consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the  financial 
holding company instead of the group consolidated 
accounts.  Although  this  type  of  undertaking  may 
have  assets  such  as  cash,  plant  property  and 
equipment, the major pan of the assets of a financial 
holding  company  are  normally  constituted  by 
investments  in  shares,  bonds  and  other  interest 
bearing securities. 
At  the  end  of the  most  recent  financial  year  the 
non-consolidated balance sheet of a financial holding 
company may  be  presented  as  follows,  according to 
published financial statements: 
(ECU million) 
Markeuble 
Securities 
Assets 
Participations 
Total Assets 
2 000 (I)  Debt 
2 000 (1)  Equity 
Liabilities 
4 000  Total Liabilities 
1500 
2 500 
4000 
( ')  Marketablt Securities are constituted by  bonds and other interest 
bearing securities and shares held as pure  financial  in"estments in 
undertakings  on  which  the  holding  company  does  not  exercise 
any kind of influence. 
(')  Participations represent investment in shares on a long·term basis 
in companies on which the holding company exerts some kind of 
influence. 
(b)  As  the  assets  as  presented  do  not  provide  the 
necessary information for the calculation of turnover 
under the  Merger Regulation, a different breakdown 
of assets is  required:· 
(ECU miUion) 
(i)  Bonds and other interest bearing 
securities 
(ii)  Shares  in  undertakings  not  controlled 
by the financial holding ('
7
) 
(iii)  Shareholding in undenakings 
controlled: 
I 500 
1 500 
3 000 
of which  insurance undertakings 
industrial undertakings 
500 
500 
I 000 
Total Assets  4 000 
(
11
)  'Controlled' in  the sense of Article  5 (4) (b)  of the  Merger 
Regulation. 
The  following  additional 
details are required: 
Total  value  of  gross 
premiums  written  by 
insurance  undertakings 
controlled  (excluding 
intra-group  contracts  and 
after deduction of taxes)  ECU 300 Million 
Total turnover of industrial 
undertakings  controlled 
(not  including  intra-group 
sales and excluding VAT)  ECU 2 000 Million 
(c)  To calculate  the  aggregate  world-wide  turnover  of 
the  financial  holding  company  account  should  be 
taken  separately  of  the  turnover  of  the  different 
activities  of  the  group  (industrial,  financial  and 
, insurance) and then the amounts should be added in 
order  to  get  the · final  amount.  Turnover  for 
insurance and  industrial activities  are  already given 
(ECU  300  million  and  2 000  million  respectively). 
Assets  which  are  not  related  to  shareholding  in 
undertakings  controlled  .1.  amount  to  ECU  3 000 
million  (see  (i)  and  (ii)  above).  Therefore  total 
world-wide turnover is as follows: 
- Turnover  related  to  financial 
activities 
1/ 1o X  3 000 
- Turnover  related  to  insurance 
activities 
gross premiums written 
- Turnover of industrial activities 
Total  worldwide  turnover  Group 
ABC 
ECU Million 
300 
300 
2 000 
2 600 
Community-wide  turnover and turnover in  Member 
States calculations should follow  the same  principle. 
For Community-wide  and  Member  States  turnover 
calculations related to financial  activities, bonds and 
other interest-bearing securities should be considered 
as loans and advances. 
3.  Geographical  allocation  of turnover  of banking  and 
insurance undertakings 
65.  The  geographical  turnover  of  banking  and 
insurance undertakings is in principle allocated according 
to the place of residence of the beneficiaries of loans and 
ll/32 t 
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advances for credit and  other financial  institutions,  and 
of customers who pay insurance premiums in the case of 
insurance undertakings  as  stated  in  Article  5  (3)  of the 
Merger ~egulation. 
66.  A  particular problem  which  arises  with  financial 
institutions is how to allocate loans, and in particular the 
frequently  large  volumes  of overnight  interbank  loans 
when the client is  not a subsidiary as  such, but a branch 
or division  of a  company  or bank, incorporated  in  a 
different country. Since the branch or division to which 
the loan is made is  most likely to be the place where the 
loan  will  be . used,  it  is  only  rational  to  allocate 
geographically that loan to the branch or division rather 
than the place of incorporation of the debtor company 
or bank, even  if this  is  what the banks themselves  take 
i~to account for risk assessment purposes (
11
). 
( 11)  See  Case  IV  /M.213 - Hong Kong  and  Shanghai  Bank/ 
Midland, of 21  May 1992. 
67.  The  current  practice  of  the  Commission  is  to 
consider, for banking and  insurance  undertakings,  that 
branches, pivisions and other undertakings operating on 
a  lasting basis but not having a legal  personality should 
be considered as residents in the countries in which they 
have been established. 
4.  Ecu  exchange rate applicable  to .credit  and fmaocial 
institutions 
68.  The question  of the  appropriateness  of average 
annual  exchange  rates  for  financial  institutions  arises, 
since for such institutions turnover calculations are based 
on data derived from the balance sheet, which represents 
a  financial situation at a panicular date, rather than the 
profit and loss account which represents· financial  flows 
through  time.  However,  in  order  to  avoid  using  a 
separate  method  for  this  particular  sector,  the  balance 
sheet asset values should be converted at the average rate 
for the  12  months  preceding the  balance  sheet date,  in 
conformity with the general rule. 
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE COMBINED NOMENCLATURF (CN) 
(Classification of goods) 
(94/C 385/05) 
Publication of  explanatory notes  made  in accordance  with Article 10 (  1) of  Council Regulation 
(EEC)  No  2658187  on  the  tariff and statis#cal  nomenclature  and  on  the  Common  Customs 
Tariff(l) as  last amended by Regulation (EEC) No  2HJ/93 (
2
) 
The 'Explanatory Notes to the combined nomenclature of the European Communities' (') are 
amended as  follows: 
Page  218:  . 
4805 60 10 
4805 60 90 
Strawpaper and strawboard 
Strawpaper  and  strawboard  are  sized  'papers  and  boards  made  mainly  of 
unbleached  straw  pulp,  generally  weighing  more  than  100 g/m2,·  naturally 
yellowish  in  colour or dyed  throughout the  mass.  They are  used  as  packing 
paper of board or -less often- for corrugated paper or board. 
Other 
The text of the subheading is to be deleted. 
(') OJ No L 256, 7. 9.  1987, p.  I. 
(!)  OJ No L 241, 27. 9.  1993. 
(S)  OJ No C 342, 5.  12.  1994. 
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Cama1  'e~doe ,..,....a &o ArticleS of c:o..diRepladoa No lt/65/EEC of 2 Marcia 1965 
•  die 1pp!c•d- of Article 15 (.J) of die Traty co catepdn of apcemeau ucl coacerced 
pncdca 
(M/C 171/03) 
(Tnt willa !EA ....._, 
The Commission  inviw all  inceresced  panies  10 send  their commenu on  the  attached  draft 
Commission  Rqulation  (EC)  on the  application .of Anicle  85 (3)  of me  Treal)'  to  certain 
ca~e~ories of cechnolOCY transfer qreemenu by no later than 28 Ausust  1994 to the following 
addrcu:  · 
Commi11ion of the European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Competition, 
Directorate for General Competition Policy and Coordination, 
I  SO Aveaue de Cortenbers, 
Jl..l 049 Brussels. 
PrclimiaarJ clnft Coaaaaisaioa  Rqalatioa  (EC)  of JO  Septemher  I tt4 oa  the  appUcation  of 
Article 15 (l) of dac Treaty to ccrtaia caceaorin of ccclmoloQ uusfer aarcemeats 
1liE COMMISSION OF niE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNmES, 
Havins  regard  10 the Treaty establishinc the  European 
Community, 
HaYinc regard to Council Rqulation No 19/65/EEC of 
2 March t 965 on the application of Anicle 15 (3) of the 
Treal)' to ccnain e&leiOries of asreemenu and concerted 
practices('), as last amended by me lv:t of Accession of 
Spain  and  Ponusal, and  in  particular Anicle  l  thereof, 
Havins published a dnft of this  Rqulation, 
~r  consultinc  &he  Advisory Committee on  Restrictive 
Practices and  Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
I. Rqulation  No  19/65/EEC  empowen  the 
Commission 10 apply Article IS (3) of the Treal)' by 
Rqulation to cenain cacesories  of acreemenu  and 
concencd practices falling within the scope of Article 
IS (I) v.·hich include restrictions  imposed in relation 
to the acquisition or use of industrial property rishu 
(') OJ No 36, 6. 3. 196S, p. S33/6S. 
- in panicular of patenu, utility models, desigl'!s or 
trade  marks  - or  to  the  rishu  arising  out  of 
conuacu  for  auisnment  of,  or  the  right  to  use,  a 
method of manufacture or knowledge relating to the 
use or to the application of industrial processes. 
2.  The  Commission  has  made  use  of  this  power  by 
adoptins Replation (EEC)  No  2349/84  of  2~ July 
1984  on  the  applicatio~  of  Anicle  85 (3)  of  the 
Trell)'  to  certain  categories  of  patent  licensing 
asreemenu ('), as  amended  by  the  Act of Accession 
of Spain  and  Ponugal,  and  Resulation  (EEC)  No 
S56/89 of .)0 November  1988 on  the  application  of 
Anicle  85 (.)) of the Treaty to certain categories  of 
know-how  licensina  agreemenu ('),  both  amended 
by Commission  Rqulation (EEC) No  151/93 of 23 
December 1992 (•). 
3.  These  two  block exemptions  ousht to  be  comb~ned 
into a single Resulation covering cechnology transfer 
agreemenu, and the rules governing patent licensing 
11reemenu  anc'  a1reemenu  for  the  communication 
of know-how to be harmonized and simplified as far 
as  possible,  in  order to encourage the dissemination 
of cechnical  knowledge  in  the  Community  and  to 
promote the manufacture of technically more sophis-
ticated goods. 
(')  OJ No L 219,  16. 8. 1984, p.  15. 
Corristndum: OJ No L 280, 22. 10. 1985, p.  32. 
(') OJ No L 61, 4.  3.  1989, p.  I. 
(•)  OJ No L 21, 29.  I. 1993, p. 8. 
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The new Regulation should apply to the licensinc of 
Member Staccs' own paccnu, Community paccnu (1), 
and  European  paccnu (')  (•pure'  patent  licensinc 
agreemenu). It should  also apply to qreemenu for 
the  communication of non-patented technical  infor-
mation  such  as  descripdons  of  manufacturinc 
processes,  recipes,  formulae,  desips or drawincs, 
commonly  tenned  'know-how'  ('pure'  know-how 
licensinc  acreemenu),  and  to combined  patent  and 
know-how  licensins  acreemenu,  which  are  playing 
an  increuinaly  important  role  in  the  transfer  of 
technoloay ('mixed' agreemenu). 
A number of tenns are defined in Article  10. 
4.  Patent  licensing  agreemenu and  agreemenu  for  the 
communication  of  know-how  are  agreemenu 
whereby  one  undertaking  which  holds  a patent  or 
know-how  ('the  licensor)  permiu  another  under-
taking  ('the  licen~e· to exploit  the  patent  thereby 
licensed,  or communicates  the  know-how  to  it,  in 
particular  for  purposes  of  manufacture,  use  or 
putting on the market. 
In  the  light  of  experience  acquired  so  far,  it  is 
possible to define a catesory of licensins agreemen•.s 
coverins all or pan of the common market which are 
capable of fallins  within the  scope  of Article  IS (I) 
but ..-hich can normally be ft'llrded as satisfyins the 
conditions laid down in Anicle 15 (3), where patents 
are  (essential) for the achievement of the  objec:u of 
the  licensed  technoloay  or  where  know-how  -
whether it  is  ancillary  to pa&enu or independent of 
them  - is  seem, substantial  and  identifi~~ in  any 
appropriate  form.  These  definitions  are  m:ended 
only  to  ensure  that  the  communication  -:,;  the 
kno·••·how or the grant of the patent licence justifies 
a  block  exemption  of  oblisations  restrictinc  the 
exploitation  of  the  teehnoloay  in  Community 
Member  States  by  the  licensor  or  licensee,  which 
oblig:\tions  must  be  wholly or panly related  to the 
exploi tadon of the licensed know-how or to patenu 
rqist~red in  Member  Sta'", and  mus'  satisfy  the 
other tesu laid down in the Regulation. 
S.  It is  appropriate  to extend  the  scope  of this  Regu-
lation  to  pure  or  mixed  asrer.menu  containing 
ancilla. ry  provisions  rtlatins to intellectual  property 
rishu other than patenu (in panicular, trade marks, 
copyright and desicn righu). 
(')  Convcnrion for the Europtan patent for the common market 
(Community Pa&ent Connntion) of IS  Octtmber 197S, OJ 
No l17. 26.  1. 1976, r. I. 
(')  Convention  on  the  srant of Europtan  patrnu  (European 
Pattnt Convention) of S October 1973. 
However,  such  acnemenu,  too,  can  only  be 
rqarded as fulfillins the conditions of Article  as (3) 
for the purposes of this Replation where patenu are 
(essential)  for the achievement of the objecu of the 
licensed  technoloiY  or  the  know-how  is  secret 
subStantial and identified.  ' 
6.  Where  such  pun  or  mixed  licensing  agreements 
contain  not  only  obligations  relating  to  territories 
within  the  common  market  but  also  obligations 
relating  to  non-member  countries,  the  presence  of 
the  latter  does  not  prevent  the  present  Regulation 
from  ~pplyinc to  the  obligations  relating  to  terri-
tories within the common market. 
However,  where  licensing  ag~emcnu  for 
non-member  countries  or  for  territori~s  which 
extend  beyond  the  frontiers of the Community  have 
effectS  within  the  common  market  which  may  fall 
within  the  scope  of Anide 85 (1),  such  :agreements 
should  be  covered  by  the  Regulation  to  the  same 
extent as would agreements for territories within the 
common market. 
To  the  extent  that  licensing  agreemenu  to  which 
undertakings in only one Member State are pany are 
capable o( affecting trade between  Memb~r  States, it 
is  appropriate  to  include  them  in  the  exempted 
catqory. 
7.  The objective being to facilitate  the dissemination of 
technoloay  and  the  improvement  of manufacturing 
processes,  the  Regulation  should  apply  only  where 
the  licensee  himself  manufactures  the  licensed 
produc:u or has  them  manufactured  for  his account. 
The  scope  of  the  Regulation  should  therefore 
exclude  agreements  solely  for  the  purpose  of  sale, 
which  are  governed  by  Commission  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  1983/83  of  22  June  1983  on  the 
application·  of  Article  85 (3}  of  the  Treaty  to 
catqories  of  exdusi\·e  distribution  agreements C), 
except  where  the  licensor  undertakes  for  a 
preliminary  period  befo.re  the  licensee  himself 
commences production using the licensed technology 
to  supply  the  licensed  products  for  sale  by  the 
licensee.  Also excluded  from  the  scope  of the  regu-
lation  are  agreements  relating  to  marketing 
know-how  communicated  in  the  context  of  fran-
chising  arrangements  and  licensing  agreemenu 
entered  into  in  connection  with  arrangemenu  such 
as  joint  ventures  or  patent  pools  and  other 
arrange{ftenu  in  which  a  licence  is  granted  in 
exchan~e  for  other  licenses  not  ~lated  to 
improvements to or new  applications of the  licensed 
technology; such agretmenu pose different problems 
which  cannot at  present  be dealt with  in  one  Regu· 
ladon (Article: S). 
(')  OJ Not 173, JO. 6.  198J, p.  1. 
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8.  Given  the  similarity  between  sale  and  exclusive 
licensins,  and  the  danger  that  the  requircmenu  of 
the  Rqulation  micht  be  evaded  by  prcsentinc  as 
assisnmenu  what  arc  in  faa  exc:lusivr  licences 
restrictive  of  competition,  the  Regulation  should 
apply  10 agreements concerning  the  assignment  and 
acquisition  of patents  or know-how  where  the  risk 
associated  with  exploitation  remains  with  the 
assignor. It should also apply to licensing agreements 
in  which the licensor is  not the  hoader of the patent 
or  know-how  but  is  authorized  by  the  holder  to 
grant the licence (as  in the case of •ub-licences) and 
licensins  agreements  in  which  the  parties'  rights  or 
obligations  are  assumed  by  connected  undertakings 
(Anicle 6). 
9.  Exclusive  licensing  agreements, ).e.  agreements  in 
which  the  licensor  undenakes  not  to  exploit  the 
licensed  technology  i~ the  licensed  territory himself 
or  to  grant  funher  licenses  there,  may  not  be  in 
themselves  incompatible  with  Anicle  8S (I)  wherr 
they  are  concerned  with  the  introduction  and 
protection  of  a  new  technology  in  the  licensed 
territory,  by  reason  of  the  scale  of  the  research 
which  has  beer.  undenaken,  of the  increase  in  the 
level  of competition, in panicular interbrand compe-
tition,  and  of  the  compt'titiveness  of  the  under-
takings  concerned  resulting  from  the  dissemination 
of  innovation  within  the  Community.  In  so  far  as 
agreements of this  kind  fall,  in  other circumstances, 
within the scope of Anicle 85 (l), it is appropriate 10 
include them in Anicle  I  in order that they may also 
benc:fit from the exemption .. 
In  a similar way, exron bans on the licensor and on 
the  licensees  may  not  in  themselves  be  incompatible 
with  Anicle  BS (I),  by  reason  of  the  prote<..1ion 
afforded by national legislations on patents or by the 
convention  on  the  Community  patent  as  from  its 
entrY  into  force.  The exemption of these  bans  does 
not 'prejudice any developments  in  the  jurisprudence 
of the Coun in relation to these agreements, notably 
with  respect to Anicles  30  10 36  and  85 (1). This  is 
also  the  case,  in  panicular,  regarding  the  limitation 
of the exemption 10 only a few yean of a prohibition 
on  the  licensee  from  selling  the  licensed  produce  in 
territories cranted to other licensees (passive compe-
tition) foreseen by the present Regulation. 
I  0.  The  obligations  listed  in  Anicle  I  generally 
contribute to improving the production of goods and 
to  promoting  technical  progress.  They  make  the 
holdc.-rs  of  patenu  or  know-how  more  willing  to 
srant  licences  and  licensees  more  inclined  to 
undc:rQke  the  investment  required  to  manufacture, 
use and put on the market a new product or to use a 
new process. This is trUe, in panicular, of obligations 
on the  lict>nsor and on the  lict>nsee not to exploit the 
licen~rd  technology  in,  and  in  panicular  .not  to 
expon  the  licensed  product  into,  the  licensed 
terrilory in the case of the licensor and the territories 
rcsenoed  for  the  licensor  in  the  case of the  licens~e  i 
and  it  is  also  true  of an  obligation  on  the  licensee 
not to manufacture or usc the product or to conduct 
an active marketing polity on the territories of other 
licenstcs.  Such  obligations  can  be  pt"rmiued  und~r 
the  Regulation  in  respect  of  territories  where  the 
licensed  product  is  protected  by  parallel  patents  · 
which already exist when the agreement is concluded 
or which  are  applied  for  within  one  year  of that 
date, and as long as the patents remain  in' force. The 
Regulation should not  apply to pure patent licensing 
asreements  containing  obligations  which  limit  the 
exploitation  of  the  technology  in  Member  States 
where there are no parallel patents. 
The  point  at  which  know-how  ceases  to  be  secret 
can  be difficult to determine,  so that  in  the  case  of 
territories  wht>re  the  licenst'd  technology  comprises 
know-how only, either because tht're never were any 
patents  there  or because  tht'  necessary  patents  have 
expired,  it  is  appropriate  to  limit  to  a fixed  number 
of yt'ars  the  periods  of territorial  protection  of  the 
licensor  and  tht'  licensee  from  one  another  and  of 
tht'  licensee  against  manufacture,  usc  or active  sale 
by other liccnst>es.  Exemption under Anicle .85 (3) of 
longer periods of territorial  protection,  in  panicular 
to  protect expensive  and  risk~ investment  or where 
the  panics  were  not already ¢ompetitors  before  the 
grant  of  t~e licence,  can  only  be  granted  by  indi-
vidual  decision.  On the  other hand, panics  are  free 
to extend the term of their agreements to exploit any 
subsequent  improvements  and  to  provide  for  the 
payment  of additional  royalties.  However,  in  such 
cases,  funher  periods  of  territorial  protection, 
staning  from  the  date  of  licensing  of  the 
improvements  in  tht  Community,  may  be  allowed 
only  by  individual  decision,  in  panicular where  the 
impronments. to or new  applications of the  licensed 
technology  arc  substantial  and  not  of  significantly 
less  imponance than the technology initially granted 
or require new expensive and risky investment. 
Since licensing  agreements arc frequently  negotiated 
after the goods or services incorporating the licensed 
technology  have  proved  successful  on  the  market,  it 
is appropriate to take as the staning-point for such a 
period  in  each  licensed  territory  the  date  on  which 
the  product  is  first  put  on  the  market  in  the 
Community. 
The  Reg~lation should  also  allow  an  obligation  on 
the  licensee not to put the  product on  the  market  in 
the  territories  of other  licensees  in  a period  which 
should  be  limited  to  a few  years  from  the  date  on 
which  the  lictnsed  product  is  put  on  the  market  in 
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"-~hnology ccmprises know-how,  patents or both  in 
the  territories concerned  (this obligation would  ban 
nol  just  active  competition  but  passive  competition 
too). 
The exemption of territorial pr\ltection should apply 
for the whole duration of &he periods thus permitted, 
as  long  as  the  patents  remain  in  force  or  the 
know-how  remains  secret  and  substantial,  enabling 
the  panics  to  a  mixed  patent  and  know-how 
licensing asreement.to take  advan~ge in a particular 
territory of the penod of protectaon  conferred  by  a 
patent  application  or  by  the  use  of  knoTt-how, 
whichever is the longer. 
1  1.  The obligations listed in Anicle  1 also generally fulfil 
the  other  conditions  for  the  application  of  Anicle 
85 (3).  Consumers  will  as  a l'\lle  be  allowed  a  fair 
share of the benefit resulting  from  the  improvement 
in the  supply of goods on the  market. To safeguard 
this  eff«t, however,  it  is  right  to  exdud~ from  the 
application of Anicle  1 cases where the panics agree 
to  refuse  to  meet  demand  from  users  or  rescUers 
within  their  respective  territories  who  would  resell 
for cxpon, or to take other steps to impede parallel 
imports, or where the licensee is  oblig~d to refu'.e to 
meet  unsolicited demand  from  the territory of other 
licensees ('passive' sales). The obligations referred to 
abo"e thus do  not impose  restrictions which  are not 
indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  the  abovemen· 
tioned  objectives.  However,  if  dominant  under-
takings  were  to secure exclusive  licenses they  might 
prevent access  by third panies to the  market of the 
technology and eliminate  com~ition in. resP;"' of a 
subStantial pan of the products  10 questaon i an order 
to  ensure  that  this  does  not  happen,  the  block 
exemption  should  not  apply  where  the  licensor 
undertakes  to  crant  no  other  licenses  for  the 
licensee's  territory,  and  the  licensee's  share  of  the 
market  in  the  licensed  produCts  and  goods 
considered  by  consumers  to  be  similar  exceeds  a 
cenai n  threshold  at  the  time  the  agreement  is 
concluded, or the parties are operating on an .oligo· 
polistic market. It can be presumed that there  as such 
a market where the panics and one other competitor 
hold  together  more  than  SO %  of  the  market.  In 
such  cases  an obligation of this kind on the licensor 
may be exempted only by an individual decision. In a 
similar way,  undenakings that have a strong  ~a~~et 
position  must  also  be  excluded  fr~m the  po~sabalaty 
of  benefitting  from  the  automauc  exemption  of 
export  bans,  thus  contributing  to  a  substantial 
apportionment of the markets. 
The  ~ame applies  in  the  case  of  ~greemenu. which 
grant  exclusive  licences  for  a terruory  covenng  the 
whole  of  the  common  market  where  there  is  the 
possibility  of parallel  impons  from  third  countries, 
or where there  are other competing technologies on 
the  market,  since the territorial exclusivity  may  lead 
to  gre~ter marke-t  integration  and  stimulate  Com· 
munity-wide interbrand competition. 
12.  h  is  desirable  to  list  in  the  Regulation  a number of 
obligations  that  are  commonly  found  in  licensing 
agreemrnu  but  are  normally  not  restrictive- of 
competition,  and  to  provide  that  in  the  event  that 
because of the  panicular economic: or legal  circum-
stances  they  should  fall  within  Article  85 (I), they 
too  will  be  covered  by  the  exemp•ion.  This  list,  in 
Anicle 2, is not exhaustive. 
t 3.  The  Regulation  must  also  specify  what  restrictions 
or  provisions  may  not  be  included  in  licensing 
agreements  if  these  are  to  benefit  from  the  block 
exemption.  The  restrictions  listed  in  Ankle  3 may 
fall  under  the  prohibition  of  Article  85 (1),  but  in 
their case  there  can  be  no  general  presumption  that 
they  will  ltad  to  the  positive  effects  required .  by 
Anicle 85 (3), as would bt necessary for the granung 
of  :a  block  exemption.  Such  restrictions  can  be 
drc:lared  exempt  only  by  an  individual  decision, 
taking  account  of  the  scale  of  the  undertakings 
concerned  and  the  degree  of  concentration  on  tht 
relevant market. 
The  fact  that  an  agrt'ement  contains  restrictive 
clauses  which  fall  outside  Anicles  t  :and  2 of  the 
Re-gulation but which are not listed  in  ~rticle 3 do~s 
not  preve-nt  the  exemption  from  covermg  :an~ obli-
gations  which  do  fall  within  the  scope  of  Arttcles  I 
and  2,  without  prejudice  to  tht  application  of 
national  provisions  on  total  or  panial  invalidity  of 
contracts. These  clauses  however  remain  subject  to 
the  prohibition  in  Anicl~ . 85 (  1  ),  and  ':'lust,  in 
accordance  with  the  prov1s1ons  of  Counc1l  Regu-
lation  17/62 (
1
),  be  notifie-d  to  bentfit  from  ~he 
protection  afforded  b>:  Anicle  15 (5)  of  R~gu.lauon 
17i~·2 and, where applicable, from  the apphcauon of 
Anicle  85 (3).  In  the  assessment  of  licensing 
agreements between panies whose  market shares are 
relatively small,  special  attention  will  be  paid  to  the 
beneficial  effects  such  agreements  can  have  on 
competition.  But  if  the  panics  have  appreciable 
market shares  it  will  have to be considered carefully 
whether the adverse effeCts on competition outweigh 
the  positive  ones. This  will  be so  particularly  where 
the  panies  are  competitors,  or  where  the  relevant 
market  is  an  oligopolistic  one,  or  where  the 
agreement is between dominant undenakings. 
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14.  U  individual  agrcemenu  exempted  by  chis  Rccu· 
lalion  nC'Yenhclesa  have  effeeu  which  are  incom-
patible  wich  Anicle  85 (3),  che  Commission  may 
wichdraw the benefit of the block exemption (Anicle 
7). 
IS.  The  list  in  anicle  2  includes  obligations  on  the 
licensee  to cease usinc the  licensed technology afcer 
the  termination  of  the  agreement  ('post-term  use 
ban')  (Anicle  2 (1) (3))  and  to  make  improvemenu 
available co the licensor ('grant-back clause') (Anicle 
2 (I) (4)). The posc·term use ban may be regarded as 
a  normal  feature  of  licensing,  as  otherwise  the 
licensor  would  be  forced  to transfer  his  know-how 
or patents  in  perpecuicy  and  chis  could  inhibit  the 
transfer  of technology.  Moreover,  undertakings  by 
che  licensee  to  grant  back  to  the  licensor ·I licence 
for  improvrmenu to the  licensed  know-how and/or 
patents  · ·e generally not testrictive of competition if 
the  licensee  is  entitled  by  the  contract. to  share  in 
future  experience  and  inventions  made  by  the 
licensor and the licensee  ~cains the right to disclose 
experience acquired or gnnt lic~nces to third panics 
where  to  do  so  would  not  disclose  the  licensor's 
know-how. 
On  the  other  hand,  a restrictive  c-ffect  on  compe-
tition  arises  where  the  agreement  contains  an  obli-
gation on the licensee to assign to the licensor, righu 
to  improvemenu  of  the  originally  licensed  tech-
nology  that  he  himself  has  brought  about  (Anicle 
3 (6)). 
16.  The  list  in  Article  2 also  includes  an  obligation  on 
the  licen~ to keep paying royalties until the end of 
the  agreement or the  regular upiry of the  patenu, 
independently  of  whether  or  not  the  licenst'd 
know-hnw  or patenu  have  ente~d into  the  public 
domain  through  the  action  of  third  panics  (Anicle 
2 (I) (7)).  As  a  rule.  panics  do  not  need  to  be 
protected  against  the  foreseeable  financial  conse-
quences  of  an  agreement  freely  entered  into,  and 
should  therefore  not  be  restricted  in  their choice of 
the  appropriate  means  of  financing  the  technology 
transfer  and  sharins  between  them  the  risks  of 
exploitation,  and  panicularly  the  risk  that  patenu 
micht be invalidated before the expiry of the period 
of protection conferred by the patent. 
However,  the  setting  of  rates  of  royalcy  so  as  to 
achieve  a  restrictive  objective  which  is  excluded 
pursuant  to  Anicle  3  of  the  Regulation,  and  in 
particular  the  choice  _of  m~ods of  ~IC1.!1ating 
royalties  which  are  neather  dtrecdy  nor  andarealy 
related  to  the  exploitation  of  the  licensed  teCh-
nology,  would  rt'nder  the  agreement  ineligible  for 
the block exemption. 
17.  An  obligation  on  the  licensee  to  restrict  his  exploi-
tation  of  the  licensed  technology  to  one  or  more 
technical  fields  of application  ('fields  of use')  or to 
one  or  more  product  markeu  is  not  caught  by 
Anide  IS (I)  eicher  (Anicle  2 (I) (8)).  This  obli-
cation  is  not  restrictive  of  competition  since  the 
licensor  can  be  regarded  as  having  the  right  to 
transfer the  technology  only  for  a limited  purpose. 
Such  a  restriction  must  however  not  constitute  a 
disguised means of customer allocation. 
18.  Restrictions  whereby  the  panics  allocate  customers 
within  the  same  technological  field  of  use  or  the 
same product market, either by an actual prohibition 
on  supplying certain classes of customer or through 
an  obligation  with  an  equivalent effect,  would  also 
render  the  agreement  ineligible  for  the  block 
exemption (Article 3 (4)). 
This  does  not  apply  to  cases  where  the  patent  or 
know-how  licence  is  granted  in  order  to  provide  a 
single  customer  with  a second  source  of  supply.  In 
such  a  case,  a  prohibition  on  the  licensee  from 
supplying  persons  other  than  the  customer 
concerned  is  necessary  for  the  grant of a licence  to 
the  second supplier,  since  the  purpose  of the  trans-
action is not to create an independent supplier in the 
market. The same awlies to limitations.on the quan-
tities  the  licensee  may  supply  to  the  customer 
concerned (Article 2 (I) (14)). 
19.  Besides  the  clauses  already  ~entioned, the  list  in 
Anicle  3  also  includes  restrictions  regarding  the 
selling  prices  of the  licensed  product  or  the  quan· 
tities to be manufactured or sold, since they limit the 
extent co which  the  licensee can exploit the  licensed 
technology  and  particularly  since  quantity 
restrictions  may  have the same effr.ct  as expon bans 
(Anicle 3 (I) and  (5)). This does  :-.ot apply  where  a 
licence  is  granted  for  use  of  the  technology  in 
specific  production  facilities  and  where  both  a 
specific  know-how  is  communicated  for  the 
Setting-up,  operation  and  maintenance  of  these 
facilities  and  the  licensee  is  allowed  to  increase  the 
capacity of the facilities or to set up furhtcr facilities 
for iu own use on  normal commercial terms. On the 
other hand,  the  licensee  may  lawfully  be  prevented 
from  using  the  licensor's  specific  know-how  to  set 
up facilities for t.hird parties, since the purpose of the 
agreement is not to permit the licensee to  give other 
producers access 1.0 the licensor's te('hnology while it 
remains  secret  or  protected  by  patent  (Anicle 
2 (I) (13)). 
20.  Agreemenu which come within the terms of Anicles 
I  and  2 and  which  have  neither the  object  nor  the 
effect  of  restricting  competition  in  any  other  way 
need  no  longer  be  notified.  Ncvenheless,  under-
takings will  still  have the right to apply in  individual 
cases for negative clearance pursuant to Anicle  2 of 
Rqulation  No  17  or  for  exemption  pursuant  to 
Anicle 8S (3), 
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HAS  ADOPTED TillS REGULATION: 
.Articlt  I 
I.  Pursu:ant to Anicle 85 (3) of the Treaty and subject 
to the provisions of this· Regulation, it  is hereby declared 
that Anicle  85 (I) of the Treaty shall  not apply to pure 
patent  lic~nsing or know·how licensing  agreements  and 
to  mixed  patent  and  know·how  licensing  agreements, 
including  those  agreements  containing  ancillary 
provisions  relatinc  to  intellectual  propeny  richts  other 
than  patents,  to which only two undenakincs are pany 
and  which  indude one or more  of the  following  obli· 
cations: 
t.  an  obli}~ltion  on  the  licensor  not  to  license  other 
unden~kings to exploit the licensed 'echnology in  the 
licensed  territory; 
2.  an  obl.igation  on  the  lict'nsor  not  to  exploit  the 
licensed technology in the licensed territory himself i 
J.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee  not  to  exploit  the 
licensed  technology  in  territories within  the  con1mon 
market which are reserved for the licensor; 
4.  an  obligJtion  on  the  licensee  not  to  mar.u!Jcture  or 
uSC'  the  I icensed  product, or use  the licensed  process, 
in  territories  within  the  common  market  which  are 
licensed to other licensees; 
S.  an  obligation on the licensee not to pursue an  active 
policy  of putting the licensed  product on the  market 
in the territories within the common market which are 
licensed  to  other  licensees,  and  in  panicular  not  to 
engage  in  advenising specifically aimed  at those terri· 
torirs  or  to  establish  any  branch  or  maintain  any 
distribution depot rhere; 
6.  an  oblig:nion  on the  licetnee not to  put  the  licensed 
product  l•n  the  market  in  the  territories  licensed  to 
other liccnSC'eS within the  wOmmon  market; 
7.  an obligation on the licensee to use only the licensor's 
trade  m.uk  or  get  up  to  distinguish  th.e  licensed 
product during  the  term  of the  agreement,  provided 
that  the  licensee  is  not  prevented  from  identifying 
himself  a~ the manufacturer of the licensed productS; 
8.  an obligation on the licensee to limit his production of 
the  licensed  product to the  quantities  he  requires  in 
manufacturing  his  own  proclucu  and  to  sell  the 
licensed  product  only  as  an  integral  pan  of  or  a 
replacement pan for his own productS or otherwise in 
connection  with  the  sale  r.i  his  own  producu, 
provided  that such quantities are freely determined b)' 
the licensC"e. 
/1(40 
2.  Where  the  agreement  is  a  pure  pattnt  lictnsing 
agreement,  the exemption  of the obligations  referred  to 
in  paragrap~ I  is granted only to the extent that and  for 
as  long  as  the  licensed  product  is  protected  by  parallel 
patents,  in  the  territories  respectivtly  of  the  licensee 
(points  I, 2,  7 and  8),  the  licensor  (point  J)  and  llthtr 
licensees  (points  4  and  5). (The exemption  of the  obli· 
gation  referred  to  in  paragraph  I (6)  is  granted  for  a 
period  not exceeding  five  yean from  the date when  the 
product  is  fint  put  on  the  market  within  the  common 
market by the licensor or one of his  licensees,  inasmuch 
and  for  as  long  as,  in  these  territories,  this  product  is 
protected by  parallel patenu.) 
3.  Where the agreement is  a pure know-ho-.· licensing 
agreement,  the  period  for  which  the  exemption  of the 
obligations  .referred  to  in  paragraph  J (I)  to  (S)  is 
granted may not exceed  I  0 years from  the date when the 
licensed  product  is  first  put  on  the  market  in  the 
Community by  the  licensor or one of his  licensees. 
The exemption of the obligation referred to in  paragraph 
I (6)  ~s  granted  for  a  period  not  rxceeding  fivr  yurs 
from  the  date  -.·hen  the  product  is  first  put  on  the 
market within the common m:.rket by the licensor or one 
of his  licensees. 
The  obligations  referred  to  in  paragraph  I (7)  and  (8) 
are exempted  for  the  lifetime  of  thC'  agrrement. 
However, the exemption  in  par:agraph  I  shall  apply only 
where the panies have identified in any appropriate form 
the  initial  know-how  and  any  subsequent  improo;ements 
to  it,  which  becomt  available  to  one  p:any  and  are 
communicated  to  the  other pany pursu:ant  to the  terms 
of the agreement and  fur  the  rurpose thereof, and  only 
for  as  long  as  the  know-how  remains  secrrt  :md 
substantiaL 
4.  Whert'  the  :agrrement  is  a  mixed  patrnt  and 
know·how  licensing  agreement,  the  exemption  of  the 
obligations  referred  to  in  paragraph  J (I)  to  (5)  shall 
apply in  Mrmbrr Statts in  which  the licensed  technology 
is  protected  by  (essenti:ll)  patents  for  as  Inn,;  as  the 
licensed product or process  is  protected m those  Member 
States by  such  patents  if the duration of such  protection 
exceeds  the periods specified  in  paragraph  J. 
(The  duration  of  the  exemption  provided  under 
flaragraph  I (6) cannot C'XCeed  the  five  year period.) 
However, these  agreemenu qualify for the exemption  in 
paragraph  I  only  for  as  long  as  the  patenu  remain  in 
force and provided the know·how is identified and for  as 
long  as  it  remains  secret  and  substantial. 
5.  The exemption  in  paragraph  1 (1) of the obligation 
on  the  licrnsor  not  to  grant  other licences  shall  apply 
.only  provided: 
- that the products manufactured by the licensee which 
are  .;apable  of  being  improved  or  replaced  by  the 
contract products  and  other goods  manufactured  by 
• 30.6.94  Official Journal of the European Communities  N'> C 178/9 
him which are considered by usen to be equivalent in 
view  of their charaaeristics, price  and  intended  use 
account for no more than 40 o/o  of the entire market 
in  &hose  producu  in  the  common  market  or  a 
subsuntial pan of it, and 
- that the  licensee  is  not opcratins on an  olisopolistic 
market; for purposes of this rqulation the market  is 
to be  considered  u  an  olisopolistic  one  if  on  the 
relevant product and aeosraphic market three under-
takinas or ~ss hold toaethttr a markttt share of more 
than  SO  0/o,  or  if  five  undenakinss  or  less  hold 
toaether a market share of more than ·two thirds and 
provided that the licensee  is one of the unden.akinss 
which  make  up  this  aroup of co~panics and  that it 
holds a market share of more than  10 %. 
6.  The  rxemption  of  the  obligations  referred  to  in 
paragraph  I (2) to (6) shall  apply only  where  the  pany 
which  is  proteeled  by  such  obligations  holds  a market 
share of no  more than  20 °/o. 
7.  The  exemption  provided  for  in  paragraph  I  shall 
also  apply  where  in  a panicular  agreement  the  panies 
undenake  obliaations  of the  typts  referred  to  in  that 
paraaraph  but  with  a  more  limited  scope  than  is 
pcrmincd by that paraararh. 
Articlt 2 
1.  Anicl~ I  shall  apply  notwithStanding  the  presence 
in  panicular of any of .the followins  obligations,  which 
are sene rally  not restrictive of competition: 
I. an  obligation  on  the  licensee  not  to  divulge  the 
know-how  communicated  by  the  licensor;  the 
license~  may  be  held  to  this  obligation  after  the 
agrcen,tnt has expired; 
2.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee  not  to  grant 
sub-licences or assign the licence; 
3.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee  not  to  exploit  the 
licensed  know-how  or patenu  after  termination  of 
the  agreement  in  so  far  and  as  long  as  the 
know-how  is  still  secret  or the  patenu  arc  still  in 
force; 
4.  an  ,bli~ation on the licensee to communicate to the 
licensor  any  experience  gained  in  exploiting  the 
licensed  technolc. .... · and  to  grant  him  a  licence  in 
respeCt  of  improvc..ncnu  to  01  new  applications  of 
that technology, providtd that the communication or 
licenct'  is  not  exclusive  and  that  the  licensor  has 
accepted  an  obligation, whether exclusive or not, to 
com:-:unicate his own improvemcnu to the licensee; 
S.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee  to  observe  minimum 
quality specifications  for  the  licensed  product  or  t<~ 
procure aoods or services from  the  licensor or from 
an  undenakins desisnated by the  licensor, in  so  far 
as  such  quality  specifications,  products  or  services 
are necessary for: 
(a)  a  technical!y  satisfactoey  exploitation  of  the 
licensed technology; or 
(b)  for  ensuring  that  the  product  of  the  licensee 
conforms  to  the  quality  standards  that  arc 
respected by the licensor and '.>ther licenstes; 
and to allow the licensor to carry out related  ch~cks; 
6.  obligations: 
(a)  to inform the licensor of misappropriation of the 
know-how  or of infringements  of  the  lictnst'd 
patenu; or 
(b)  to take  or to  assist  the  lict'nsor  in  taking  legal 
aetion  against  such  misappropriation  or 
infringemenu; 
7.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee,  .in  the  event  of  the 
know-how  becoming  publicly  known  or the  patents 
prematurely losing their validity other than  by action 
of the licensor, to continut' paying the  royalties  until 
the end of the agreement or the regular expiry of the 
patenu,  in  the  amounts,  for  the  periods  and 
according  to the  metl-ods  frctly  determined  by  the 
panies,  without  prejudice  to  the  payment  of  any 
additional  damages  in  the  event  of  the  know-how 
becomina publicly known or the  patents losing  their 
validity by the action of the licensee  in bruch of the 
agreement; 
8.  an  obligation  on  the  licensee  to  restrict  his  exploi-
tatio.,  of the  licensed  technology  to  one  or  more 
techr.ical fields of application covered by the licensed 
technology or to one or more product markets; 
9.' an obligation on the licensee to  give  th~ licensor the 
option to continue to use the  improvem~nts after the 
licensee's  right  to  exploit  the  licensor's  know-how 
comes  to  an  end,  if  at  the  same  time  the  lic~nsor 
relinquishes  the  post-term  use  ban  or  agrees,  aft~r 
having  had  an  opponunity to  t'xamine  the  liccm.~e·s 
improvemenu,  to  pay  appropriate  royalties  for  their 
usc; 
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10.  an  t"blication  on  the  licen1ee  to  pay  a  m1n1mum 
royalty  or to  produce  a  minimum  quantity  of  the 
lic~nsed product or to carry out a minimum number 
of operations nploitinc th~ licensed cechnoloey; 
11.  an  oblicatiun  on  the  licensor  to crant the  licen~e 
any  more  favourable  terms  that  the  licensor  may 
crant to another undertakinc after the acreement is 
entered into; 
12.  an  oblication  on  the  licensee  to  mark  the  licensed 
product with an  indication of the licensor's name or 
of the licensed patent; 
13.  :an  obligation on the licensee not to use the licensor's 
know-how  to consuua  facilities  for  third  panies; 
this  is  without prejudice to the  right of the  licensee 
to  increase the capacity of  his  facilities  or to set up 
additional  facilities  for  his  own  use  on  normal 
comme.cial  terms,  includinc  the  payment  of 
additional royalties; 
14.  an oblication on the licensee to supply only a limited 
quantity  of  the  licensed  product  to  a  panicular 
customer, where a know-how licence was granted at 
that  customer's  request  so  that  he  might  have  a 
second  supplier  inside  a  licensed  territory;  this 
provision  shall  also  apply  where  th~ customer is  the 
licc:nsee, and the licence which was granted in order 
to provide  a second  source  of supply  provides  that 
the  customer is  himself to manufacture the  licensed 
producu or to have them manufactured by a subcon· 
uactor. 
2.  In  the  rvent  that,  because  of  panicular  circum· 
stances,  the  obligations  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  fall 
within  the  scope  of  Anicle  85 (1),  they  shall  also  be 
exemptc:-d rven if they are not accompanied by any of the 
obligations exempted  by Anicle  I. 
).  The  exemption  in  paragraph  2  shall  also  apply 
where  in  an  agreement the parties undenake obligations 
of the  types  referred  to in  paragraph  1 but with  a more 
limited  scope  than  is  permitted  by  that paragraph. 
Articlt J 
Anicles  1 and  2 (2) shall  not  apply  where: 
I. one  piny is  restricted  in  the determination of prices, 
componenu  of  prices  or  discounu  for  the  licensed 
producu; 
2.  one  pany is  restriaed from  competing with  the other 
pany.  with  undenakings  conneard  with  the  other 
pany or with  other undrnakings within  the  common 
market  in  respect  of  research  and  developmtnt, 
production,  use  or distribution  of producu  deriving 
from  research  and  d~·elopment or from  the  exploi· 
tation of the interested pany'1 own processes, without 
prejudice  to an  obligation  on  the  licensee  to  use  his 
best endeavcuu to exploit the licensed technology; 
3.  one or both of the panics :ue required: 
(a)  to  refuse  without  any  objtctively  justifitd  reason 
to  meet  dtmand  from  users  or  rt.stllers  in  their 
respeaive territories who  would  market  producu 
in other territories within thr common market; 
(b)  to make  it difficult  for  users or resrllers  to obtain· 
the  products  from  other  resellers  within  the 
common  market,  and  in  panicular  to  exerrise 
intellectual property rights or take  measures  so  as 
to  prevent  users  or  resellers  from  obu.ining 
outside,  or  from  putting  on  the  market  in  tht 
licensed  territory  products  which  ha\'t'  bten 
lawfully  put  on  the  market  within  the  common 
market by the licensor or with his consent; 
or do  so  as  a result of a concerted  practice  between 
them; 
4.  one  party  is  restricted  within  thr  same  technological 
field  of use  or within  thr same  product  market  as  to 
the  customers  he  may· strve,  in  particular  by  being 
prohibittd  from  supplying  cenain  cl.usts  of  user, 
employing  cenain  forms  of distribution  or,  with  the 
aim  of  sharing  customers,  using  ctrt:ain  Lyprs  of 
packaging  for  the  produ""ts,  savt  as  provided  in 
Anicle  I (I) (7) :ind Aniclt 2 (I) (14); 
5.  the  quantity  of  the  licensed  producu one  p:my  may 
manufacture  or  sell  or  the  number  of  operations 
exploiting  tht licenlf'd  ttchnology  he  may  carry  out 
are  subject to limitations,  save  as  provided  in  Anicle 
I (I) (8) and Aniclt 2 (I) (14). 
6.  the licensee is obliged to assign  in  wholt or in  pan to 
the  licensor  righu  to  improvemenu  to  or  new 
applications of the licensed technology. 
Articlt  4 
If a  purr  or  mixed  licensing  agrremrnt  include~ obli-
gations  within  the  scope  of  Articles  I  and  2  and  obli-
gations  which  rtstrict competition  but  which  do  not  fall  · 
within  thr scope  either of Articles  I  :md  2 or of  Aniclt 
3, the  presence  of those  restriaivr  obligations  shall  not 
prevent this  Regulation  from  applying  to the  obligations 
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which do fall  within  the  scope of Anicles  I  and  2. The 
oblisations which  are  not  thus  exempted  shall continue 
10 be governed, by Anides IS (I) and  (2) of the Trea\y. 
Articlt ' 
1.  This  Regulation  sht~ll not apply to: 
1.  acrecmenu  bftwec.,  memben  of  a  patent  or 
kno.,·.how  pool  whir.h  relate  to the  pooled  techno-
loaies; 
2.  licensing acreemenu betwun competing undenakings 
whic-h  hold  interesu  in  a  joinc-nnture, or between 
one  of  them  and  the  joint  venture,  if  th~  lic~nsinc 
arrcrmenu relate to the  activiti~s of the joint venture; 
3.  agrecmenu  und~r  whi~h one pany granu the other a 
patent and/or know-how licence and the other pany, 
albeit  in  separate  agreemenu  or through  connected 
undcnakinp,  granu  the  fine  pany  a  patent,  trade 
mark  or know-how  licence  or exclusive  sales  richu, 
where  tht panits are  competiton in  relation  to the 
produces covered by those acreemenu; 
4.  agrecmenu  includinc  the  licensinc  of  intellectual 
property richu other than patenu (in panicular trade 
marks, copyrisht and design richu) or the licensinc of 
sofrware except where these riahu or the software are 
of assistance  in  achinins the  object of the  licensed 
t«hnology and there are no oblicacions restrictive of 
compeciti""'  other  than  those  also  attached  to  the 
Hcenscd  Lno•·-hoYi  or patenu  and  exempted  under 
the present Regul;ation. 
2.  This  R~gulation shall  nevenheless  apply: 
1.  to  a~rt>em~nts to which paragr•ph  I (2) applies,  und~r 
'klti, h t\  ratfnt Untlfttt\klna art\HI\ tl\f ,t\h\1  \'fHtUI't' t\ 
p~lC'Ill  or  know-how  lkt'nCt',  pnwidtd  th.at  th&' 
licen)cd  producu  and  the  othtr  products  of  the 
panicipatinc  undenakings  which  are  c9nsidered  by 
users  to be  ~quivalent in  view  of their characteristics, 
price· and intendtd usc rt'pt'f'srnt: 
- in case of a licence limited to production not mort 
than 20 OJo, and 
- in case of a licence covtring production and distri· 
bution not more than  I 0 "'o, 
of the  market  for  all  such  products  in  the  common 
mark•:t or a substantial pan thtrtof; 
2.  to agrtements to which paragraph  I (I) applies and to 
reciprocal  lictnccs  within  tht mtaning  of paragraph 
I (3), provided the panics are not subitct to any tt'rri· 
torial  rtstriction  within  the  common  market  with 
reaard  to  the  manufacture.  Ult  or  putting  on  the 
market or the licensed  products Or  on  the  Ult of tht 
lietnwd or rooled technologies. 
~rticlt 6 
This Regulation  shall  :also  apply  to: 
I. aarecments  ~hert the licensor is  not tht holdrr of the 
know-how  or the  pattntte, but  is  authoriled  by  the 
holder  or  thr  pattntet'  to  grant  a  licence  or  a 
sub-licence; 
2.  assignments of know-how,  patents or both  whtre the 
risk  associated  with  exploitation  re-mains  with  the 
:assignor,  in  panicular  whtre  tht  sum  payablt  in 
consideration of the  assignment -is  dcptndent on  the 
turnovtr  obtained  by  tht'  assignte  in  rtsptct  of 
products  made  using  the  know-how  or  thr  patents, 
the  quantity  of  such  producu  manufactured  or  the 
number  of  operations  carried  out  employing  the 
know-how or the patenu; 
). licensing -'&recments  in  which  riahts or obligations of 
the  licenli<':- or the  licensee  arc  assumed  by  under· 
takings connected with them. 
Articlt  7 
The Commission may withdraw the bentfit of this Rcgu· 
lation,  pursuant  to  Aniclt  7  of  Rr,;ulation  No 
19/6S/EEC, whtrt'  it  finds  in  a pani"·ular  cast that  an 
agreement exempted  by  this  Regulation  nr,·enhC'Irss  has 
cenain  effects  which  art  incompatible  with  the 
conditions laid down  in Aniclt RS (3)  llf the Treat)'• and 
in  panicular whrrt': 
1.  '"' .. u,,-, ,,, '"' "" ..  '""'""'  ,, "' '''"'""' '"" '""!''"''  rroducu from  being  upor.t"d  h.l  tfftc:ti\'t'  ~;ompt"UUOn 
an  tht'  licenstd  territory  from  idtntical  products  or 
products considertd by  ustrs as  tquivalt>nt  in  virw  of 
thtir characteristi<'s. price '"d intrndtd usr; 
2.  without  prrjudict  to  Aniclt  I (I) (6),  the  lie:~~  sec 
rrfuses,  without  valid  reason,  to  meet  unsol1c1ted 
demand  from  u~n or  rtsrlltrs  in  the  territory  of 
othtr lictnsees; 
).  the panics: 
(a)  .,·ithout  any  objectively  justified  reason  refuse  to 
mrtt  demand  fn,m  users  or  rtsrllers  m  their 
rtsptctin  ttrritories  "'·ho  would  market  thr 
producu  in  other tt'rritories  within  tne  common 
marktt; or 
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(b)  make ic clifraculc for UJCn or mellen co obcain che 
producu from ocher mellen within the common 
marbc,  and  in  particular  where  they  exercise 
intellectual propeny riahu or cake rneuurn 10 u 
co  prevenc  mellen  or  u~en  from  obtainina 
ouuide.  or f10111  puuJna  on  the  market  in  the 
1icented  cerricory  proclucu  which  have  been 
lawfully  puc  on  the  markec  within  the  common 
market by the limuor or with hit conaenc; 
4.  the  partie• were already compecicon before the arant 
of  thr  licence  •ncl  obtiaationt  on  the  licensee  to 
produce  a  minimum  quandty  or  co  uae  hit  best 
endeavoun  u  referred  co  in  Anicle  2 (I) (10)  and 
Anicle  3 (2) have the effect of preventina the licensee 
from  u~ina compecina cechnoloaiea.  . 
.Artitlt I 
I.  For  purpoaea of thi1  Repladon: 
(a)  patent application•; 
(b)  ucilicy modela; 
(c)  applic;ations for re1iscradon of utility II"'dels; 
(d)  cenificau  d'ucilitf  and  cenilicau  d'addition  under 
French Jaw; 
(t}  application•  lor  cenificau  d'ulitf  and  ceniOcau 
d'addition under French law; and 
(f)  tupplementary  protection  cenificaces  for  medicinal 
producu  or  other  producu  lor  which  such 
supplementary  procection  certificates  may  be 
obtained; 
shall  be  deemed  co  be  palt'nU. 
2.  This  Resulation  shall  also  apply  to  agreemenu 
rrlatin1  to  the  exploitation  of  an  il'•:ention  if  an 
application  within the meanin1 of para1~aph I is made in 
respect  of  the  invention  for  a  licenstd  ttrri10ry  within 
one year fwm the date when the asreement ooas entered 
into. 
.Artitlt  9 
The prohibi1ion  i11  Anicle  8S  (I) of the Trraty shall  noc 
apply  in  thr  period: 
- I January  to 30 june J  995 to asrremenu in foru on 
I  Januar:'  1995  and  which  tatisfied  the  exemption 
condition; of Re&ulation (EEC) No 2349184, 
- J January  1995 to ll Dtumber 1999 to agrremrnu 
in  force  on  I  January  1995  and  which  satisfy  che 
exemption  Regulation (EEC) No SS6/89. 
Rqulacion  (EEC)  No  SS6/89  shall  not  aprly  co 
a1rcrmenu which come into forte alter I january  1995. 
Articlt  10 
For purpose• of this  Reaulation the followin& terms shall 
have  che  followin1  meaninss: 
I. 'know-how•  mtans  1  body of ttchnic:al  information 
th11 is secm, substantial and identified in any appro· 
priace form;  · 
2.  ahe  term 'secret'  means  that the  know-how  packagco 
11  a  body  or  in  the  P'"fcist  configuration  and 
assembly  of iu components  is  noc  gcontrally  known 
or easily accessible,  so that pan of its value consists 
in  the  lead  which  the  licenser  aains  when  it  is 
communicated co him; it is not limitrd to che narrow 
senst  chat  each  individual  tomponenc  of  che 
know-how  should  be  totally  unknown  or  unob· 
cainable ouuide the licensor's business; 
3.  the  term  'substantial'  means  chat  thr  know-how 
includes  information  which  is  of imponance for the 
whole or ~a si1nificanc pan of: 
(a)  a manufacturing process; or 
(b)  a rrodua or scorvice; or 
(c)  for the drvelopmrnt therrof; 
ar1d  rxcludes  informacion  which  is  trivial;  such 
know-how  must  thu·s  bt useful,  i.t.  can  rrasonably 
br  expected  at  thr  datr  of  conclusion  of  thr 
agreement  to  be  capable  of  improving  tht 
romprtitivr  position  of thr lirensrr,  for  rxamplt  by 
helpina  him  to tnttr a nrw marktt or sivinK  him  an 
advanta'e  in  competition  with  other  manufacturtn 
or provtdrrs  of servicrs  who  do  not  havt  acceu  to 
the  licenttd  secret  know-how  or othrr comparablt. 
stcret know-how; 
4.  the  term  'idt>ntifitd'  mrans  U'Jl  the  know-how  is 
drscrih<J or recorded in such a manner as to make it 
pouiblr to .-eri!y  ,bJ~ it fulfils  t~r criteria of secrecy 
!'nd  substanti&l~cy and  :o t-nsurr  that  the  licrnstt is 
not  unduly  rrstriard  in  his  exploitation  of his  own 
technology i  to  bC'  identified  tht  know-how  can 
eithtr be  K"t  out  in  the  liun~ a&~~mcont or  in  a 
separate documenc  or recorded  in  any other a{'Pro-
priacr  form  at  d1t'  lattst  whrn  the  know-how  is 
transferrell  or  shonly  therraflt'r,  provided  that  theo 
separatt'  document  or  other  record  can  be  made' 
available if the ne-ed  arises; 
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5.  neceswy paccnu  •~  paccnu which conuibute to the 
punin1 into effect of the  liccnled ccchnoloay  in  10 
far  u,  in  their  ab~enct,  the  ~alizadon  of  the 
licrnteei technoloiY would  not be polliblt or would 
only be pouibae co a lcs~er nccnt or in 11101e difracult 
or coady eondidons; 
6.  tht  tcnn  'liccnud  ccchnoiOIY'  means  dte  initial 
know-how or dte necessary patl'nu, or both, eximna 
at  the  time  the  fim  liccnaina  qreement  is 
concluded, and· impnwemenu  sub~tqutndl made co 
the  know-how  or pawnu,  irrespective  of whechcr 
and  tO what nccnt they arc cxploiced by the panics 
or by other liccn~ees; 
7.  'the  licensed  producu'  arc  aoods  or  ~erviccs thr 
production or provision of which requim the usc of 
the licensed t«hnolOI)'; 
8.  'm:arkct  share'  means  the  proponion  which  thr 
lict .ued  producu,  products  capable  of  btin1 
imrroved  or replaced  by the contraa proclucu  and 
oth('r 1ood1 or ll'ft'iCCI provided  by tM  licensor or 
the  licensee  which  are  considered  by  users  to  br 
equivalent in  view of their ·characwrisUcs,  price  and 
intc nded  ute  account  for  in  all  such  proclucu  or 
tervice•  in  the common  market or a subJUndal pan 
of it: 
9.  tht  term  •expioitation'  rt'fcn  to  any  usc  of  the 
lirtnsed  ccchnoloJY  in  panicular in  the  production, 
active  or  paaaivt  salet  in  a ccrritory  even  if  not' 
coupled  wilh  manufacture  in  that  ccrritory,  or 
leasing of the licensed products; 
10.  'tht"  lictnsed ccrr;tory'  is the territory coverin& all or 
at  least  pan  of  the  common  market  where  the 
licenste is entitled to exploittht licensed ccchnoloey; 
11.  'ttrritory reserved  for the  licensor'  means ttrricorits 
in  which  the  litcntor has  noc  aranced  any  licences 
for r.ltenu he holds there or for his know-how; 
12.  •para lie I  patents'  means  parenu  for  the  same 
invtntioa • ..as the  ~nn has b«n ustd by the Coun of 
Justifc; 
U. •conntewd undcrtak.inas' means: 
(a)  unden.ak.inp  in  which  a pany to the  aa;remrn& 
dirmly or indirectly: 
- owns  more  than  half the capital  or business 
ISICU, or 
- ha• the power ;J exercise more than half the 
vocinc richu, or 
- hu the power to appoint  mo~  than half the 
membrn of the  supervisory board, board of 
direaon or bodies  lqally reprctendna  the 
undenakin1. or 
- has  tht'  right  to  manage  tht affairs  of  the 
undenaking; 
(b)  undenal\ings which directly or indirectly have  in 
or ove·  a pany  co  the  agreement  tht"  ri1hu  or 
powen listed in (a)  i 
(c)  undenakinss  in  which  an  undenaking  rcftrred 
co  in  (b)  dir«tly or indirectly  has  the  righu or 
powcn listed in (a); 
(d) undenakincs  in  which  the  panit-s  to  the 
11rcement or undtnakincs conntcted with chem 
jointly  have  the  richu or powen  liated  in  (a): 
such  jointly  connolled  underukin1s  are 
considered  to  bt  cetnnccccd  with  tach  of  tht 
panies to the a1reement. 
14.  'ancillary  provisions  relating  co  intellectual  propeny 
riahu othtr than  patenu' are  provisions  rrlatina  to 
ri&hU  which contributt tO  tht puttin&  into trftet of 
the  licensed  ttchmllogy,  where  there  are  no  obli· 
11tions  restrictive  of  competition  othtr than  thost 
also  attachrd  to  cht  lictn~d know-how  or  p.Jttnts 
and rxrmpttd undtr thr prtstnt Regulation. 
Articlt II 
This Regulation shall rnttr into forct" on  I January  199S. 
It shall  apply  until ll Dtum~r  2002. 
This  Rr1ulation  shall  bt  bindin1  in  iu  tncirt>ty  and 
direetl)' applic:ablt  in  all  MtmHr Statt-s. 
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GUIDELINES  ON THE  APPLICATION  OF  EEC  COMPETITION  RULES  IN  THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
(91/C 233/02) 
PREFACE 
These  guidelines  aim  at  clarifying  the  application  of Community competition  rules  to  the 
market participants in  the telecommunications sector. They ·must be viewed  in  the context of 
the special  conditions of the telecommunications sector, and the overall  Community telecom-
munications policy will  be  taken into account in  their application.  In  particular, account will 
have to be  taken of the actions the Commission will  be in a position to propose for the tele-
communications industry as a whole, actions deriving from the assessment of the state of play 
and issues at stake for this industry, as  has already been the case for the European electronics 
and  i-11formation  technology  industry  in  the  communication  of the  Commission  of 3  April 
1991  (1). 
'  A  major  political  aim,  as  emphasized  by  the  Commission,  the  Council,  and  the  European 
Parliament,  must be  the development of efficient Europe-wide networks and  services,  at the 
lowest cost and of the highest quality,  to provide the European user in  the single  market of 
1992  with a basic infrastructure for efficient operation. 
The Commission  has  made  it dear in  the past that in  this context it is  considered that liber-
alization  and  harmonization  in  the sector must go hand in  hand. 
Given  the  compeuuon  context  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  telecommunications 
operators  should  be  allowed,  and  encouraged,  to establish  the  necessary cooperation  mech-
anisms,  in  order to  create  - or ensure - Community-wide  full  interconnectivity  between 
public networks, and where required between services to enable European users to benefit from 
a wider range of better and  cheaper telecommunications services. 
This can  and  has  to  he  done  in  compliance  with,  and  respect  of,  EEC competition  rules  in 
order to avoid  the disc:conomics whil·h  otherwise could result. For the same reasons, operators 
and  other firms  that  may  be  in  a  dominant  market  position  should  be  made  aware  of the 
prohibition of abus(.'  of such  positions. 
The guidelines should be  read  in  the light of this objective. They set out to clarify,  inter alia, 
which forms of cooperation amount to undesirable collusion, and in  this sense they list what is 
not acceptable. They should  therefore be seen as  one aspect of an  overall  Community policy 
towards telecommunications,  and  notably of policies  and actions to encourage and  stimulate 
those  forms  of cooperation  which  promote  the  development  and  availability  of advanced 
communications for Europe. 
The  full  application  of competition  rules  forms  a  major  part  of the  Community's  overall 
approach  to telecommunications.  These  guidelines  should  help  market  participants  to  shape 
their strategies and arrangements for  Europe-wide networks and services  from  the outset in  a 
manner which  allows  them  to  be  fully  in  line  with  these  rules.  In  the  event  of significant 
changes in the conditions which prevailed when the guidelines were drawn up, the Commission 
may find  it appropriate to adapt the guidelines to the evolution of the situation in  the telecom-
munications sector. 
(') The  European  electronics  and  information  technology  industry:  state  of  play,  issues  at  stake  and 
proposals for action, SEC(91) 565, 3 April  1991. 
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I. SUMMARY 
1.  The Commission of the European Communities in 
its  Green  Paper  on  the  development  of  the  common 
market  for  telecommunications  services  and equipment 
(COM(87)290) dated 30 June  1987  proposed a  number 
of Community positions.  Amongst these,  positions  (H) 
and (I)  are as  follows: 
'(H)  strict  continuous  review  of  operational 
(commercial)  activities  of  telecommunications 
administrations according to Articles 85, 86 and 
90 of the EEC Treaty. This applies in particular 
to  practices  of cross-subsidization  of activities 
in  the  competitive  services  sector and  of acti-
vities in manufacturing; 
Q)  stric~ continuous review of all private providers 
in  the  newly  opened  sectors  according  to 
Articles  85  and 86, in  order to avoid the abuse 
of dominant positions;'. 
2.  These positions were restated  in  the Commission's 
document of 9  February  1988  'Implementing .the  Green 
Paper on  the  development  of the common  market  for 
telecommunications  services  and  equipment/state  of 
discussions  and  proposals  by  the  Commission' 
(COM(88)48). Among the areas where the development 
of  concrete  policy  actions  is  now  possible,  the 
Co.mmission  indicated the following: 
'Ensuring fair conditions of competition: 
Ensuring  an  open  compeuuve  market  makes 
continuous  review  of the  telecommunications  sector 
necessary. 
The  Commission  intends  to  issue  guidelines 
regarding the  application of competition rules to the 
telecommunications  sector  and on the  way that the 
review should be carried out.' 
This is  the objective of this  communication. 
The  telecommunications  sector  in  many  cases  requires 
coqperation  agreements,  inter  alia,  between  telecom-
munications  organizations  (TOs)  in  order  to  ensure 
network  and  services  interconnectivity,  one-stop 
shopping  and  one-stop  billing  which  are  necessary  to 
provide  for  Europe-wide services  and to offer optimum 
service  to users.  These objectives  can be  achieved,  inter 
alia,  by TOs cooperating - for example, in  those areas 
where  exclusive  or  special  rights  for  provision  may 
continue  in  accordance with  Community law,  including 
competition  law,  as  well  as  in  areas  where  optimum 
service  will  require  certain  features  of cooperation.  On 
the  other hand the  overriding  objective  to develop  the 
conditions  for  the  market  to  provide  European  users 
with a greater variety of telecommunications services, of 
better quality and at lower cost requires the introduction 
and  safeguarding  of  a  strong  competitive  structure. 
Competition  plays  a  central  role  for  the  Community, 
especially in view of the completion of the single market 
for  1992. This role  has  already been emphasized  in  the 
Green Paper. 
The single  market will  represent  a  new.  dimension  for 
telecoms operators and users. Competition will give them 
the opportunity to make full  use of technological devel-
opment and  to accelerate  it,  and ·encouraging  them  to 
restructure and reach the necessary economies of scale to 
become competitive not only on the Community market, 
but worldwide. 
With this in  mind, these guidelines recall the main prin-
ciples  which the Commission,  according to  its  mandate 
under the  Treaty's  competition  rules,  has  applied  and 
will  apply in  the sector without prejudging the outcome 
of any specific case which will  have to be considered on 
the facts. 
The  objective  is,  inter  alia,  to  contribute  to  more 
certainty of condititions for investment in the sector and 
the development of Europe-wide services. 
The  mechanisms  for  creating  certainty  for  individual 
cases  (apart  from  complaints  and  ex-officio  investi-
gations) are provided for by the notification and negative 
clearance procedures provided under Regulation  No 17, 
which give  a  formal  procedure for clearing  cooperation 
agreements  in  this  area whenever a  formal  clearance  is 
requested.  This  is  set  out  in  further  detail  in  this 
communication. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
3.  The  fundamental  technological  development 
worldwide  in  the  teleC0!11mUnications  sector e)  has 
caused  considerable  changes  in  the  competition 
conditions. The traditional  monopolistic  administrations 
cannot alone take up  the challenge of the technological 
revolution.  New  economic  forces  have  appeared  on 
(')  Telecommunications embraces any transmission, emission or 
reception  of signs,  signal.~,  writing,  images  and  sounds  or 
intelligence of any nature by  wire,  radio, optical  and  other 
electromagnetic systems (Article 2 of WATIC Regulation of 
9 December 1988). 
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the telecoms  scene which  are capable  of offering  users 
the  numerous  enhanced  services  generated  by  the  new 
technologies.  This  has. given  rise  to  and  stimulated  a 
wide deregulation process propagated in the Community 
with various degrees of intensity. 
This  move  is  progressively  changing  the  face  of  the 
European  market structure.  New private  suppliers  have 
penetrated the market with more and more transnational 
value-added services  and equipment. The telecommuni-
cations  administrations,  although  keeping a .  central role 
as public services providers, have acquired a business-like 
way  of  thinking.  They  have  started  competing 
dynamically  with  private  operators  in  services  and 
equipment.  Wide  restructuring,  through  mergers  and 
joint ventures, is  taking place in  order to compete more 
effectively on the deregulated market through economies 
of scale  and  rationalization.  All  these  events  have  a 
multiplier effect on technological progress. 
4.  In  the  light of this,  the cenu:al  role of competition 
for  the  Community  appears  clear,  especially  in  view  of 
the completion of the single  market for  1992. This  role 
has  already been emphasized in  the Green Paper. 
5.  In  the  application  of  competauon  rules  the 
Commission  endeavours  to avoid  the  adopiing of State 
measures  or undertakings  erecting or maintaining  arti-
ficial  barriers incompatible with the single market. But it 
also favours  all  forms  of cooperation which foster inno-
vation  and  economic  progress,  as  contemplated  by 
competition  law.  Pursuing  effective  competition  in 
telecoms  is  not a matter of political choice. The choice 
of a  free  market and  a  competition-oriented  economy 
was  already  envisaged  in  the  EEC  Treaty,  and  the 
competition  rules  of the  Treaty  are  directly  applicable 
within  the  Community.  The  abovementioned  funda-
mental  changes  make  necessary  the  full  application  of 
competition law. 
6.  There  is  a  need  for  more  cenainty  as  to  the 
application of competition rules.  The telecommunication 
administrations  together  with  keeping  their  duties  of 
public interest, are now confronted with the application 
of these  rules practically without transition from  a long 
tradition  of  legal  protection.  Their  scope  and  actual 
implications are often not easily perceivable. As the tech-
nology  is  fast-moving  and  huge  investments  are 
necessary,  in  order to benefit from  the  new  possibilities 
on the market-place, all the operators, public or private, 
have  to  take  quick  decisions,  taking  into  account  the 
competition regulatory framework. 
7.  This  need  for  more  certainty  regarding  the 
application  of  competition  rules  is  already  met  by 
assessments  made  in  several  individual  cases.  However, 
assessments  of individual  cases  so  far  have  enabled  a 
response  to  only  some  of  the  numerous  competition 
questions  which  arise  in  telecommunications.  Future 
cases  will  further develop  the  Commission's  practice  in 
this sector. 
Purpose of these guidelines 
8.  These guidelines are intended to advise public tele-
communications  operators,  other  telecommunications 
service  and  equipment  suppliers  and  users,  the  legal 
profession  and  the  interested  members  of  the  public 
about the  general  legal  and  economic  principles  which 
have been and are being followed  by the Commission in 
the  application  of competition  rules  to  undenakings  in 
the  telecommunications  sector,  based  on  experience 
gained in  indjvidual  Calles  in  compliance with  the  ruling~ 
of the  Coun of Justice  of the  European  Communities. 
9.  The Commission will  apply these  principles also to 
future  individual cases  in  a flexible  way,  and  taking  the 
panicular  context  of  each  case . into  account.  These 
guidelines  do  not  cover  all  the  general  principlc;s 
governing the application of competition rules,  but only 
those  which  are  of specific  relevance  to  telecommuni-
cation issues. The general principles of competition rules 
not specifically  connected  with  telecommunications  but 
entirely  applicable  to these  can  be  found,  inter  alia,  in 
the  regulatory  acts,  the  Court  judgments  and  the 
Commission  decisions  dealing with  the  individual  cases, 
the  Commission's yearly  reports  on  competition  policy, 
press  releases  and  other public  information  originating 
from  the Commission. 
10.  These guidelines do not create enforceable rights. 
Moreover,  th~y do not prejudice the application of EEC 
competition  rules  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Communities  and  by  national  authorities  (a~ 
these  rules  may  be  directly  applied  in  each  Member 
State,  by  the  national  authorities,  administrative  or 
judicial). 
11.  A change in the economic and legal  situation will 
not automatically bring about a simultaneous amendment 
to  the  guidelines.  The  Commission,  however,  reserves 
the  possibility  to  make  such  an  amendment  when  it 
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purpose,  because  of  fundamental  and/  or · repeated 
changes in  legal precedents, methods of applying compe· 
titian  rules,  and  the regulatory, economic and technical 
context. 
12.  These  guidelines  essentially  concern  the  direct 
application  of  competition  rules  to  undertakings,  i.e. 
Articles  85  and  86  of the  EEC  Treaty.  They  do  not 
concern  those  appli.cable  to  the  Member  States,  in 
particular Articles 5 and 90 (1)  and (3). Principles ruling 
the  application  of Article  90  in  telecommunications  are 
expressed  in  Commission  Directives  adopted  under 
Article  90  (3)  for  the  implementation  of  the  Green 
Paper (Z). 
Relationship  between  competition  rules  applicable  to 
undertakings and those applicable to Member States 
13.  The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities (')  has  ruled  that  while  tt  ts  true  that 
Articles  85  and  86  of the Treaty concern the conduct of 
undertakings  and  not  the  laws  or  regulations  of  the 
Member  States,  by  virtue  of Article  5  (2)  of the  EEC 
Treaty,  Member  States  must  not adopt or maintain  in 
force  any  measure which  could deprive those previsions 
of  their  effectiveness.  The  Court  has  stated  that  such 
would be  the case, in  particular, if a Member State were 
to  require  or favour  prohibited  cartels  or reinforce  the 
effects  thereof  or  to  encourage  abuses  by  dominant 
undertakings. 
If those  measures  are  adopted  or maintained  in  force 
vis-a-vis public undertakings or undertakings to which a 
Member State  grants  special  or exclusive  rights,  Article 
90  might  also  apply. 
14.  When the  conduct of a public  undertaking or an 
undertaking  to which  a  Member State grants special or 
cxdusive rights  arises  entirely as  a result of the exercise 
of tht·  undertaking's autonomous behaviour,  it can only 
be  caught by  Articles  85  and  86. 
(l)  Commission  Directive  88/301/EEC  of  16  May  1988  on 
competition  in  the  markets  in  telecommunications  terminal 
equipment (OJ No L 131, 27.  5.  1988, p. 73). 
Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1990  on 
competition  in  the  markets for  telecommunications services 
(OJ  No L 192, 24.  7.  1990, p.  10). 
'(')  Judgment of 10.  l.  1985  in  Case  229/83,  Leclerc/gasoline 
[ 19!15]  ECR  17; Judgment of 1  1.  7.  1985  in  Case  299/83, 
Leclerc/book~ (1985] ECR 2517; Judgment of 30.  4.  1986 in 
Cases  from  209  to 213/84, Ministere public v.  Asjes  [1986) 
ECR 1425; Judgment of 1.  10.  1987  in Case 311/85, Vere-
niging  van  Vlaamse  Reisbureaus  v.  Sociale  Dienst  van  de 
Plaatselijke  en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten (1987]  ECR 
3801. 
When  this  behaviour  is  imposed  by a  mandatory State 
measure  (regulative  or administrative),  leaving  no  dis-
cretionary choice to the undertakings concerned, Anicle 
90  may  apply  to the  State  involved  in  association  with 
Articles  85  and 86.  In this case Articles 85  and 86  apply 
to the  undertakings'  behaviour taking  into  account the 
constraints  to which the  undertakings  are  submitted  by 
the mandatory State measure. 
Ultimately,  when  the  behaviour  arises  from  the  free 
choice  of the  undertakings  involved,  but the  State  has 
taken  a  measure  which  encourages  the  behaviour  or 
strengthens its effects, Articles 85 and/or 86 apply to the 
undertakings' behaviour and Article 90 may apply to the 
State  measure.  This could be  the case,  inter alia,  when 
the State has approved and/  or legally endorsed the result 
of the undertakings' behaviour (for instance tariffs). 
These  guidelines  and  the  Article  90  Directives 
complement each other to a  certain extent in  that they 
cover  the  principles  governing  the  application  of  the 
competition  rules:  Articles  85  and  86  on the one  hand, 
Article  90  on the other. 
Application  of competition  rules  and  other Community 
law,  including open network provision (ONP) rules 
15.  Articles  85  and 86  and  Regulations  implementing 
those  Articles  in  application  of Article  87  of the  EEC 
Treaty  constitute  law  in  force  and  enforceable 
throughout  the  Community.  Conflicts  should  not  arise 
with  other  Community  rules  because  Community  law 
forms  a  coherent  ,regulatory  framework.  Other 
Community  rules,  and  in  particular  those  specifically 
governing  the  telecommunications  sector,  cannot  be 
considered as provisions implementing Articles 85  and 86 
in  this  sector.  However  it  is  obvious  that  Community 
acts  adopted in  the  telecommunications sector are to be 
interpreted in a way consistent with competition rules, so 
to ensure the best possible implementation of all  aspects 
of the Community telecommunications policy. 
16.  This applies,  inter alia, to the relationship between 
competition  rules  applicable  to  undertakings  and  the 
ONP rules.  According to the  Council  Resolution  of 30 
June  1988  on  the  development of the  common  market 
for  telecommunications  services  and  equipment  up  w 
1992 (
4
),  ONP  comprises  the  'rapid  definition,  by 
Council  Directives,  of  technical  conditions,  usage 
(")  OJ No C  257,  4.  10.  1988,  p.  1. 
ff/so ( 
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conditions,  and  tariff  principles  for  open  network 
provision,  starting  with  harmonized  conditions  for  the 
use  of leased lines'. The details of the ONP procedures 
have  ·been  fixed  by  Directive  90/387/EEC (I)  on  the 
establishment  of the  internal  market  for  telecommuni-
cations  services  through  the  implementation  of  open 
network provision, adopted by Council on 28 June 1990 
under Article  lOOa  of the EEC Treaty. 
17.  ONP  has  a  fundamental  role  in  providing 
European-wide  access  to  Community-wide  intercon-
nected  public  networks.  When  ONP harmonization  is 
implemented, a network user will  be offered harmonized 
access  conditions  throughout  the  EEC,  whichever 
country they address. Harmonized access will be ensured 
in  compliance  with  the  competition  rules  as  mentioned 
above,  as  the ONP rules specifically  provide. 
ONP  rules  cannot  be  considered  as  compeuuon  rules 
which apply to States and/  or to undertakings' behaviour. 
ONP  and  competition  rules  therefore  constitute  two 
different  but coherent sets  of rules.  Hence, the compe-
tition  rules  have  full  application,  even  when  all  ONP 
rules  have  been  adopted. 
18.  Competition  rules  are  and  will  be  applied  in  a 
coherent manner with  Community  trade  rules  in  force. 
}:iowever,  competition  rules  apply  in  a  non-discrimi-
natory  manner  to  EEC  undertakings  and  to  non-EEC 
ones  which  have  access  to the EEC market. 
III.  COMMON  PRINCIPLES  OF  APPLICATION  OF 
ARTICLES 85  AND 86 
Equal application of Articles 85  and 86 
19.  Articles  SS  and  86  apply directly  and  throughout 
the  Community  to  all  undertakings,  whether  public  or 
private,  on  equal  terms  and  to  the  same  extent,  apart 
from  the  exception  provided  in  Article  90  (2) ('). 
C>  OJ No L 192, 24. 7.  1990. p.  t. 
(")  Article  90  .(2)  states:  'Undertakings  entrusted  with  the 
operation of services of general economic interest or h.aving 
the  character  of  a  revenue-producing  monopoly  shall  be 
subject to the rules contained in  this Treaty, in  panicular to 
the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in  law or in fact, of 
the  panicular wks assigned  to them.  The development of 
trade must  not be affected to such  an  extent as  would  be 
contrary to the interests of the Community'. 
The Commission and national administrative and judicial 
authorities are competent to apply these rules  under the 
conditions set out in  Council Regulation No 17 (1). 
20.  Therefore,  Articles  85  and  86  apply  both  to 
private  enterprises  and  public  telecommunications 
operators embracing telecommunications administrations 
and  recognized  private  operating  agencies,  hereinafter 
called 'telecommunications organizations' (TOs). 
TOs are  undertakings within the meaning of Articles  85 
and 86 to the extent that they exert an economic activity, 
for the manufacturing and/or sale of telecommunications 
equipment  and/or  ior  the  provision  of  telecommuni-
cations  services,  regardless  of other  facts  such  as,  for 
example,  whether  their  nature  is  economic  or  no~ and 
whether they are legally distinct entities or form part of 
the  State  organization(').  Associations  of TOs  are  as-
sociations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 
85,  even  though  TOs  participate  as  undertakings  in 
organizations in which governmental authorities are also 
represented. 
Articles  85  and  86  apply  also  t9  undertakings  located 
outside  the  EEC  when  restrictive  agreements  are 
implemented  or intended  to be  implemented  or abuses 
are committed by those undertakings within the common 
market to  the  extent that trade between  Member States 
is  affected (
9
). 
Competition restrictions justified under Article 90  (2) or 
by essential requirements 
21.  The  exception  provided  in  Article  90 (2)  may 
apply both to State measures and to practices by  under-
takings.  The  Services  Directive  90/388/EEC,  in 
particular  in  Article  3,  makes  provision  for  a  Member 
State  to  impose  specified  restrictions  in  the  licences 
which  it can  grant for the provision  of certain  telecom-
munications services. These restrictions  may  be  imposed 
under Article 90 (2) or in order to ensure the compliance 
with  State  essential  requirements  specified  in  the 
Directive. 
C)  OJ No 13,  21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62 (Special  Edition  1959-62, 
p.  87). 
(')  See  Judgment  of the  Court  16.  6.  1987  in  Case  118/85, 
Commission v.  Italy- Transparen9' of Financial  Relations 
between  Member  States  and  Pubhc  Undertakings  [1987] 
ECR 2599. 
(')  See Judgment of the Court of 27.  9.  1988  in  Joined Cases 
89,  104,  114,  116,  117,  125,  126,  127,  129/85, Alstr<>m  & 
others''· Commission ('Woodpulp'), [1988] ECR 5193. 
U(st 6.9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  Nu C 233/7 
22.  As  far as Article 90 (2) is concerned, the benefit of 
the  exception  provided  by  this  provision  may  still  be 
!nvoked  for  a  TO's  behaviour  when  it  brings  about 
competition restrictions which its  Member State did  not 
impose in  application of the Services Directive. However, 
the fact should be taken into account that in this case the 
State  whose  function  is  to  protect  the  public  and  the 
general economic interest, did not deem it necessary to 
impose the said restrictions. This makes particularly hard 
the burden of proving that the Article 90  (2)  exception 
still  applies  to  an  undertakings's  behaviour  involving 
these  restrictions. 
23.  The Commission  infers  from  the  case  law  of the 
Court  of Justice (1°)  that  it  has  exclusive  competence, 
under  the  control  of  the  Court,  to  decide  that  the 
exception  of Article  90  (2)  applies.  The national  auth-
orities  including  judicial  authorities  can  assess  that this 
exception  does  not  apply,  when  they  find  that  the 
competition  rules  clearly  do  not  obstruct  the 
performance  of  the  task  of general  economic  interest 
assigned to undertakings. When those authorities cannot 
make  a  clear  assessment  in  this  sense  they  should 
suspend their decision in order to enable the Commission 
to  find  that the  conditions  for  the  application  of that 
provision  are  fulfilled. 
24.  As  to  measures  atmmg  at  the  compliance  with 
'essential  requirements'  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Services  Directive, under Article  1 of the  latter (11}, they 
can only be  taken by Member States and  not by  under-
takings. 
The relevant market 
25.  In  order to assess  the effects  of an  agreement on 
competition for the purposes  of Article  85  and whether 
there  is  a  dominant  position  on  the  market  for  the 
purposes  of  Article  86,  it  is  necessary  to  define  the 
relevant  market(s),  product  or  service  market(s)  and 
geographic market(s), within the domain of telecommu-
nications.  In  a  context  of fast-moving  technology  the 
relevant market definition is  dynamic and variable. 
('
0
)  Case  10/71,  Mueller-Hein  rt971]  ECR 723; Judgment of 
I 1.  4.  1989 in  Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed [ 1989] ECR 803. 
('
1
)  ' ••• the non-economic reasons in  the general interest which 
may cause  a  Member State to restrict access  to the  public 
telecommunications  network or public  telecommunications 
~crvie<·s.' 
(a)  The product market 
26.  A  product  market  comprises  the  totality  of the 
products which, with respect to their characteristics, are 
particularly suitable for satisfying constant needs and are 
only  to  a  limited  extent  interchangeable  with  other 
products  in  terms  of price,  usage  and  consumer  pref-
erence. An  examination limited to the objective charac-
teristics  only  of  the  relevant  products  cannot  be 
sufficient: the competitive conditions and the structure of 
supply and  demand  on the  market  must  also  be  taken 
into consideration (12). 
The Commission can precisely define these markets only 
within  the framework of individual  cases~  .. 
27.  For  the  guidelines'  purpose  it  can  only  be 
indicated that distinct service markets could exist at least 
for  terrestrial  network provision,  voice  communication, 
data  communication  and  satellites.  With  regard  to  the 
equipment market, the following areas could all  be  taken 
into  account  for  the  purposes  of  market  definition: 
public  switches,  private  switches,  transmission  systems 
and more,particularly, in the field of terminals, telephone 
sets,  modems,  telex  terminals,  data  transmission 
terminals  and  mobile  telephones.  The above  indications 
are  without  prejudice  to  the  definition  of  further 
narrower distinct markets. As to other services - such as 
value-added  ones  - as  well  as  terminal  and  network 
equipment, it cannot be specified here whether there is  a 
market for each of them or for an aggregate of them, or 
for both, depending upon  the interchangeability existing 
in  different  geographic  markets.  This  is  mainly 
determined  by  the supply  and the requirements  in  those 
markets. 
28.  Since  the  various  national  public  networks 
compete  for  the  installation  of the  telecommunication 
hubs  of large  users,  market definition  may  accordingly 
vary. Indeed, large telecommunications users, whether or 
not  they  are  service  providers,  locate  their  premises 
depending,  inter alia,  upon the features  of the telecom-
munications  services  supplied· by  each  TO.  Therefore, 
they compare national public networks and other services 
provided  by  the  TOs  in  terms  of  characteristics.  and 
prices. 
(1
1
)  Case 322/81,  Michelin  v.  Commission, 9  Novemhrr  1983 
[1983] ECR 3529, Ground 37.  • No C 233/8  Official Journal of the European Communities  6.9.91 
29.  As to satellite provision, the question is whether or 
not  it  is  substantially  interchangeable  with  terrestrial 
network provision: 
(a)  communication by  satellite can be  of various  kinds: 
fixed  service  (point  to  point  communication), 
multipoint  (point  to  multipoint  and  multipoint  to 
multipoint), one·way or two-way; 
(b)  satellites' main characteristics are: coverage of a wide 
geographic  area  not  limited  by  national  borders, 
insensitivity of costs  to distance,  flexibility  and  ease 
of  networks  deployment,  in  particular  in  the  very 
small aperture terminals (VSA  T) systems; 
(c)  satellites' uses can be broken down into the following 
categories:  public  switched  voice  and  data  trans-
mission,  business  value·added  services  and  broad-
casting; 
(d) a  satellite  prov1s1on  presents  a  broad  intt-n:hange-
ability  with  the  terrestrial  transmission  link  for  the 
basic  voice  and  data transmission  on  long  distance. 
Conversely,  because  of its  characteristics  it  is  not 
substantially  interchangeable  but  rather 
complementary  to  terrestrial  transmission  links  for 
several  specific  voice  and  data  transmission  uses. 
These  uses  are:  services  to  peripheral  or  less-
developed  regions,  links  between  non-contiguous 
countries,  reconfiguration  of capacity  and  provision 
of routing for traffic restoration. Moreover, satellites 
are  not  currently  substantially  interchangeable  for 
direct  broadcasting and  multipoint  private  networks 
for  value  .. added  business  services.  Therefore, for all 
those uses satellites should constitute distinct product 
markets.  Within  satellites,  there  may  be  distinct 
markets. 
30.  In  mobile  communications  distinct  services  seem 
to  exist  such  as  cellular  telephone,  paging,  telepoint, 
cordless  voice  and  cordless  data  communication. 
Technical  development permits  providing  each  of these 
systems with more and more enhanced features. A conse-
quence  of this  is  that the, differences  between  all  these 
systems ·are progressively blurring and their interchange-
ability  increasing. Therefore, it  cannot be  excluded  that 
in  future  for  certain  uses  several  of  those  systems  be 
embraced  by  a  single  product  market.  By  the  same 
token,  it  is  likely that, for certain  uses,  mobile  systems 
will  be comprised in a single market with certain services 
offered on the public switched  network. 
(b)  The geographic market 
31.  A geographic market is  an area: 
- where undertakings enter into competition with each 
other, and 
- where  the  objective  conditions  of  competition 
applying  to  the  product or service  10  question  are 
similar for all traders (',). 
32.  Without  prejudice  to  the  definition  of  the 
geographic  market  in  individual  cases,  each  national 
territory  within  the  EEC  seems  still  to  be  a  distinct 
geographic market as  regards  those  relevant services  or 
products, where: 
- the customer's  needs  cannot be  satisfied  by  using  a 
non-domestic service, 
- there are different regulatory conditions of access  to 
services, in particular special or exclusive rights which 
are apt to isolate national territories, 
- as  to  equipment  and  network,  therC'  are  no 
Community-common  standards,  whether  mandatory 
or voluntary,  whose  absence  could  also  isolate  the 
national  markets.  The  absence  of  voluntary 
Community-wide standards shows  different  national 
customers' requirements. 
However, it  is  expected that the geographic  market  will 
progressively extend to the EEC territory at the pace of 
the progressive  realization of a single  EEC market. 
33.  It has also to be ascertained whether each national 
market  or  a  part  thereof  is  a  substantial  part  of  the 
common  market. This  is  the case where  the  services  of 
the  product involved  represent  a  substantial  percentage 
of volume  within  the  EEC.  This  applies  to  all  services 
and products involved . 
. 34.  As to satellite uplinks, for cross-border communi-
cation by satellite the uplink could be provided from  any 
of several countries.  In this case, the geographic market 
is  wider  than  the  national  territory and  may  cover  the 
whole EEC. 
As  to  space  segment  capacity,  the  extension  of  the 
geographic  market  will  depend  on  the  power  of  thr 
satellite and its ability to compete with other satellites for 
(u) Judgment of 14.  2.  1978  in  Case  27/76, United  Brands  v. 
Commission [1978]  ECR 207, Ground 44.  In  the telecom-
munications  sector:  Judgment  of  5.  10.  1988  in  Case 
247/86, Alsatei-Novasam [1988] ECR 5987. 
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transmission to a given area, in other words on its range. 
This can be  assessed  only case  by  case. 
35.  As  to  services  in  general  as  well  as  terminal  and 
network equipment, the Commission assesses the market 
power of the undertakings concerned and the result for 
EEC  competition  of the  undeitakings'  conduct,  taking 
into  account their  interrelated  activities  and  interaction 
between the EEC and world markets. This is  even more 
necessary  to  the  extent  that  the  EEC  market  is 
progressively  being  opened.  This  could  have  a 
considerable effect on the structure of the markets in the 
EEC,  on  the  overall  competitivity  of the  undertakings 
operating in  those markets, and in the long run, on their 
capacity to remain  independent operators. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 
36.  The Commission recalls that a major policy target 
of the Council Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the devel-
opment of the  common  market for  telecommunications 
services  and equipment up to 1992  was  that of: 
' ..... stimulating European cooperation at all  levels, 
as  far  as  compatible  with  Community  competition 
rules,  and  particularly  in  the  field  of research  and 
development,  in  order to  secure  a  strong  European 
presence  on  the  telecommunications  markets  and to 
ensure the full participation of all  Member States'. 
In  many  cases  Europe-wide services  can  be  achieved  by 
TOs' cooperation - for example,  by  ensuring intercon-
nectivity  and  interoperability 
(i)  in  those  areas  where  exclusive  or special  rights  for 
provision  may  continue  in  accordance  with  Community 
law  and  in  particular  with  the  Services  Directive 
90/388/EEC; and 
(ii)  in  areas  where  optimum  service  will  require  certain 
features  of  cooperation,  such  as  so-called  'one-stop 
shopping'  arrangements,  i.e.  the  possibility  of acquiring 
Europe-wide services  at a single  sales  point. 
The Council is giving guidance, by Directives, Decisions, 
recommendations  and  resolutions  on  those  areas  where 
Europe-wide services  are most urgently needed: such  as 
by  recommendation  86/659/EEC  on  the  coordinated 
introduction  of the  integrated  services  digital  network 
(ISDN) in  the  European Community (1
4
)  and by  recom-
c•)  OJ No L 382,  31.  12.  1986,  p.  36. 
mendation 87 /371/EEC on the coordinated introduction 
of  public  pan-European  cellular  digital  land-based 
mobile communications in  the Community {
15
). 
The  Commission  welcomes  and  fully  suppons  the 
necessity of cooperation particularly in order to promote 
the  development  of  trans-European  services  and 
strengthen  the  competitivity  of  the  EEC  industry 
throughout the  Community and  in  the  world  markets. 
However, this cooperation can only attain that objective 
if it complies with Community competition rules.  Regu-
lation No 17  provides well-defined  clearing procedures 
for  such  cooperation  agreements.  The  procedures 
foreseen by Regulation No 17  are: 
(i)  the  application  for  negative  clearance,  by  which  the 
Commission certifies that the agreements  ...  are  not caught 
by Article  85,  because  they do not restrict competition 
and/  or do not affect trade between Member States; and 
(ii) the notification of agreements caught by Article 8'5  in 
order  to  obtain  an  exemption  under  Article  85  (3). 
Although  if  a particular agreement  is  caught by Article 
85,  an  exemption  can  be  granted  by  the  Commission 
under Article  85  (3), this  is  only so when the agreement 
brings about economic benefits - assessed  on the  basis 
of the criteria in the said paragraph 3 - which outweigh 
its  restrictions on competition.  In any event competition 
may  not  be  eliminated  for  a  substantial  pan  of  the 
products  in  question.  Notification  is  not an  obligation; 
but if, for reasons of legal certainty, the parties decide to 
request an exemption pursuant ·to Anicle 4 of Regulation 
No  17  the agreements  may  not be  exempted  until  they 
have  been notified to the Commission. 
37.  Cooperation  agreements  may  be  covered  by  one 
of  the  Commission  block  exemption  Regulations  or 
Notices C').  In  the  first  case  the  agreement  is  auto-
matically  exempted  under  Article  85  (3).  In  the  latter 
case,  in the Commission's view, the agreement does not 
appreciably  restrict  competition  and  trade  between 
Member  States  and  therefore  does  not  justify  a 
Commission  action.  In  either case,  the  agreement  doe~ 
not need to be  notified; but it may be notified in case of 
doubt. If the Commission receives  a multitude of notifi-
cations of similar cooperation agreements in the telecom-
munications  sector,  it  may  consider  whether  a  specific 
block exemption  regulation  for  such  agreements  would 
be  approp.riate. 
(Is)  OJ No L 196,  17.  7.  1987,  p.  81. 
(")  Reponed  in  'Competition  Law  in  the  European 
Communities'  Volume  I  (situation  at  3 t.  12.  1  989) 
published by the Commission. • 
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38.  The categories  of agreements C
7
)  which  seem  to 
be typical  in  telecommunications and  may be caught by 
Article  85  are  listed  below.  This  list  provides  examples 
only and  is,  therefore,  not exhaustive. The Commission 
is  thereby  indicating  possible  c<'mpetition  restrictions 
which  could  be  caught  by  Article  85  and  cases  where 
there may be  the possibility of an exemption. 
39.  These  agreements  may  affect  trade  between 
Member States for the following reasons: 
(i)  services  'other  than  services  reserved  to  TOs, 
equipment and spatial  segment  facilities  are  traded 
throughout the  EEC; agreements  on  these  services 
and  equipment  arr  then.·fore  likdy  to  affect  trade. 
Although  at present  cross-frontier  trade  is  limited, 
there  is  potentially  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
suppliers  of  such  facilities  will  in  future  confine 
themselves to their national market; 
(ii)  as  to  reserved  network  services,  one  can  consider 
that they also arc •traded throughout the Community. 
These  services  could  be  provided  by  an  operator 
located in one Member State to customers located in 
other  Member  States,  which  decide  to  move  their 
telecommunications hub into the first one because it 
is  economically  or  qualitatively  advantageous. 
Moreover, agreements on these matters are likely to 
affect EEC trade at least to the extent they influence 
the  conditions  under  which  the  other services  and 
equipment are supplied throughout the EEC. 
40.  finally, to the t•xtent that the TOs hold dominant 
positions  in  facilities,  servict>s  and  equipment  markets, 
their  behaviour  leading  to  - and  including  the 
conclusion of - the  agreements  in  question could also 
give  rise  to a violation of Article  86,  if agreements have 
or are likely to have  as  their effect hindering the main-
tenance of the degree of competition still  existing in  the 
market or the growth of that competition, or causing the 
TOs to reap trading benefits which they would not have 
reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective 
competition. 
(
17
)  For simplification's sake this term stands also for 'decisions 
by  associations'  and  'concerted  practices'  within  the 
meaning of Article 85. 
A.  Horizontal  agreements  concerning  tbt•  prc,visicm  o/ 
terrestrial facilities and reserved services 
41.  Agreements concerning terrestrial facilities  (public 
switched  network  or leased  circuits)· or services  (e. g. 
voice  telephony  for  the  general  public)  can  currently 
only be  concluded  between  TOs  because  of this  legal 
regime providing for exclusive or special rights. The fact 
that the Services Directive recognizes the possibility for a 
Member  State  to  reserve . this  provision  to  certain 
operators  does  . not  exempt  those  operators  from 
complying with the competition rules  in  providing these 
facilities  or  services.  These  agreements  may  restrict 
competition  within  a  Member  State  only  where  such 
exclusive  rights  are granted to more  than one provider. 
42.  These  agreements  may  restrict  the  compeuuon 
between  TOs for  retaining or attracting  large  telecom-
munications  users  for  their telecommunications  centre~. 
Such  'hub  competition'  is  substantially  based  upon 
favourable  rates  and  other  conditions,  as  well  as  the 
quality of the services. Member States are not allowed to 
prevent such competition since the Directive allows only 
the  granting  of  exclusive  and  special  rights  by  each 
Member State in  its  own  territory. 
43.  ,finally, these agreements may restrict competition 
in  non-reserved  services  from  third  pany undertakings, 
which  are  supported  by  the  facilities  in  question,  for 
example  if  they  impose  discriminatory  or  inequitable 
trading conditions on certain users. 
44.  (aa)  Price  agreements:  all  TOs'  agn•ements  on 
prices, discounting or <·ollection  charges for intt·rnational 
services,  are  apt  to  restrict  the  hub  competition  to  an 
appreciable  extent.  Coordination  on  or prohibition  of 
discounting could cause  particular!y  serious  restrictions. 
In  situations  of  public  knowledge  such  as  exists  in 
respect of the tariff level,  discounting  could  remain  the 
only possibility of effective price competition. 
45.  In  several  cases  the  .Court  of  Justice  and  the 
Commission  have  considered  price  agreements  among 
the  most  serious  infringements  of  Artidt~  HS  ('~). 
(
11
)  PVC, Commission Decision 89/190/EEC, OJ No L 74,  17. 
3.  1989, p.  I; Case 123/85, BNIC v.  Clair [1985) ECR 391; 
Case  8/72, Cementhandelaren v.  Commission  (1972)  ECR 
977;  Polypropylene,  Commission  Decision  86/398/EEC 
(OJ No L 230/1, 18.  8.  1986, p.  I) on appeal Casel79/86. 
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W!1ilc  harmonization of tariff SlnH'tun.·s  may  be a  major 
dcnu·m  for  th,·  provision  of Community-wide servi<·cs, 
this  goal  should  be  pursued  as  far  as  compatible  with 
Community competition  rules  and  should  include  defi-
nition  of  efficient  pricing  principles  throughout  the 
Community.  Price  competition  is  a  crucial,  if  not  the 
principal,  element  of  customer  choice  and  is  apt  to 
stimulate  technical  progress.  Without  prejudice  to  any 
application  for individual exemption that may be made, 
the  justification  of  any  price  agreement  in  terms  of 
Article  85  (3)  would  be  the  subject  of very  rigorous 
examination by the Commission. 
46.  Conversely,  where  the  agreements  concern  only 
the setting up of common tariff structures or principles, 
the  Commission  may  consider whether this  would  not 
constitute one of the economic benefits under Article 85 
(3)  which  outweigh the competition  restriction.  Indeed, 
this  could  provide  the  necessary  transparency on  tariff 
calculations  and  facilitate  users'  decisions  about  traffic 
flow  or the location  of headquarters or premises.  Such 
agreements could also contribute to achieving one of the 
Green  Paper's  economic  objectives  - more  cost-
orientated tariffs. 
In  this  connection,  following  the  intervention  of  the 
Commission,  the  CEPT  has  decided  to  abolish  re-
rommcndation PGT  /I  0 on the general principles for the 
lease of international telecommunications circuits and the 
establishment  of  private  international  networks.  This 
recommendation recommended, inter alia,  the imposition 
of  a  30 %  surcharge  or  an  access  charge  where 
third-party  traffic was  carried  on  an  international  tele-
communications  leased  circuit,  or if such  a  circuit  was 
interconnected  to  the  public  telecommunications 
IH'twork.  It  also  rcwmmcnded  tlw  application  of 
uniform  LJ.riff  cocffiri~nts  in  order  to  determine  the 
relative  price  level  of  international  telecommunications 
leased  circuits. Thanks to the CEPT's cooperation with 
the  Commission  leading  to  the  abolition  of  the  re-
commendation, competition between telecoms operators 
for  the  supply  of  international  leased  circuits  is 
re-established, to the benefit of users, especially suppliers 
of  non-reserved  services.  The  Commission  had  found 
that the recommendation amounted to a price agreement 
between  undertakings  under  Article  85  of  the  Treaty 
which  substantially  restricted  competition  within  the 
European Community (1'). 
c•>  Sec Commission press release IP(90)  188 of 6 March 1990. 
47.  (ah)  Agrt•t•meuts  rm  otba  wmlitwm  .fin  lhc 
provisiotr  of  focilitics 
These  agreements  may  limit  hub  competition  between 
the  partners.  Moreover,  they  may  limit  the  access  of 
users  to  the  network,  and  thus  restrict  third  under-
takings'  competition  as  to  non-reserved  services.  This 
applies  especially  to  the  use  of  leased  circuits.  The 
abolished CEPT recommendation PGT  /10 on tariffs had 
also  recommended . restrictions  on  conditions  of  sale 
which  the  Commission  objected  to.  These  restrictions 
were mainly: 
- making  the  use  of  leased  Circuits  between  the 
customer and  third  parties  subject  to  the  condition 
that  the  communication  concern  cxclusivdy  the 
activity for which the circuit has been granted, 
a ban on subleasing, 
- authorization of private networks only for customers 
tied to each other by economic links and which carry 
out the same activity, 
prior consultation between the TOs for any approval 
of a  private network and of any modification of the 
use  of the  network,  and  for any interconnection of 
private networks. 
For the purpose of an  exemption  under Article  85  (3), 
the granting of special conditions for a particular facility 
in order to promote its development could be taken into 
account among other elements. This could foster techno-
logies  which reduce the costs of services  and contribute 
to  increasing  competitiveness  of  European  industry 
strunures.  Naturally,  the  other  Article  H5  (3) 
requircnwnts should  al~o be  nwt. 
48.  (ac)  Agreements on  the choice of  telecommunication 
routes. 
These may have the following restrictive effects: 
(i)  to the extent that they coordinate the TOs' choice of 
the routes to be set up in  international services, they 
mav  limit  competition between TOs as  suppliers to 
use.rs'  communication.~ hubs, in  terms of invntmcm~ 
and  produnion,  with  a  possible  effect  on  tariffs.  It 
should  be  determined  whether  this  restriction  of 
their business autonomy is  sufficiently appreciable to 
be caught by  Article  85.  In  any event, an argument 
for an exemption under Article 85  (3) could be more 
easily  sustained  if common  routes designation  were 
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necessary to enable interconnections and, therefore, 
the use of a Europe-wide network; 
(ii)  to the extent that they reserve  the choice of routes 
already set up to the TOs, and this choice concerns 
one determined facility,  they could  limit the  use  of 
other facilities and thus services provision possibly to 
the detriment of technological progress. By contrast, 
the  choice  of  routes  does  not  seem  restrictive  in 
principle to the extent that it  constitutes a technical 
requirement. 
49.  (ad)  Agreements on  the  imposition of  technical and 
quality  st4ndards  on  the  services  provided  on  the  public 
network 
Standardization  brings  substantial  economic  benefits 
which can be relevant under Anicle 85  (3).  It facilitates 
inter alia  the  provision  of pan-European  telecommuni-
cations  services.  As  set  out  in  the  framework  of the 
Community's approach to standardization, products and 
services  complying  with  standards  may  be  used 
Community-wide.  In  the  context  of  this  approach, 
European  standards  institutions  have  developed  in  this 
field  (ETSI and CEN-Cenelec). National markets in  the 
EC would be opened up and form a Community market. 
Service and equipment markets would be enlarged, hence 
favouring  economies  of  scale.  Cheaper  products  and 
services  are thus available  to users.  Standardization may 
also  offer an  alternative  to  specifications  controlled  by 
un<l<·rtakings  dominant  in  tht•  n<•twork  an~hitc.·t·ture and 
in  non-reserved  scrvit·rs.  Standardization  agreements 
may, therefore, lessen  the risk of abuses by these under-
takings which could  block the access  to the  markets for 
non-reserved  services  and  for  equipment.  However, 
certain  standardization  agreements  can  have  restrictive 
· effecu on competition:  hindering innovation, freezing  a 
panicular stage  of technical  development,  blocking  the 
network  access  of  some  users/  service  providers.  This 
restriction  could  be  appreciable,  for  example  when 
deciding  to  what  extent  intelligence  will  in  future  be 
located  in  the  network or continue  to  be  permitted  in 
customers'  equipment.  The  imposition  of specifications 
other than those provided for by Community law could 
have  restrictive  effects  on  competition.  Agreements 
having these effects are, therefore, caught by Anicle 85. 
The balance between economic benefits and competition 
restrictions is  complex.  In  principle, an exemption could 
be  granted  if an  agreement  brings  more  openness  and 
facilitates  access  to  the  market,  and  these  benefits 
outweigh the restrictions caused by  it. 
SO.  Standards  jointly  developed  and/  or  published  in 
accordance with  the  ONP procedures  carry  with  them 
the presumption that the cooperating TOs which comply 
with those standards fulfil  the requirement of open and 
efficient  access  (see  the  ONP Directive  mentioned  in 
paragraph  16). This presumption  can  be  rebutted,  inter 
alia, if the agreement contains restrictions which are not 
foreseen  by Community law  and  are  not indispensable 
for the standardization sought. 
51.  One important Article  85  (3)  requirement  is  that 
users  must also  be  allowed  a  fair  share of the  resulting 
benefit.  This  is  more  likely  to  happen  when  users  are 
directly involved  in  the standardization process  in  order 
to contribute to deciding  what products or st"rviccs  will 
meet their needs. Also, the involvement of manufacturers 
or service  providers  other than  TOs  seems  a  positivt' 
element for Anicle 85  (3) purposes. However, this invol-
vement must be  open and widely representative in  order 
to  avoid  competition  restrictions  to  the  detriment  of 
excluded  manufacturers  or service  providers.  Licensing 
other manufacturers  may be  deemed  necessary,  for  the 
purpose of granting  an  exemption  to these  agreements 
under Article 85  (3). 
52.  (ae)  Agreements  foreseeing  special  treatment  /or 
TOs' terminal equipment or other companies' equipment/or 
'the interconnection or interoperation of  terminal equipment 
· with reserved services and facilities 
53.  (af)  Agreements  on  the exchange of  information 
A  general  exchange  of  information  could  indeed  br 
necessary for the good functioning of international tele-
communications  services,  and  for cooperation  aimed  at 
ensuring  interconnectivity  or  one-stop  shopping  and 
billing.  ·It  should  not  be  exte~ded  to  competition-
sensitive  information,  such  as  certain  tariff information 
which constitutes business secrets, discounting, customers 
and commercial strategy, including that concerning  ne1,1.· 
products. The exchange of this information would affect 
the autonomy of each TO's commercial policy and  it  is 
not necessary to atta.in  the said objectives. 
B.  Agreements  concerning  the  pruvision  of non-reserved 
services and terminal equipment 
54.  Unlike facilities  markets, where only the TOs are 
the  providers,  in  the  services  markets  the  actual  or 
!li
t.?· 
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potential competitors are numerous and include, besides 
the  TOs,  international  private  companies,  computer 
companies, publishers and others. Agreements on services 
and  terminal  equipment  could  therefore  be  concluded 
between TOs, between TOs and private companies, and 
between private companies. 
55.  The liberalizing process has led mostly to strategic 
agreements  between  (i)  TOs,  and  (ii)  TOs  and  other 
companies.  These  agreements  usually  take  the  form  of 
joint ventures. 
56.  (ba)  Agreements  between  TOs 
The  scope  of  these  agreements,  in  general,  IS  the 
provision  by  each  partner  of  a  value-added  service 
incluging  the  management  of  the  service.  Those 
agreements are mostly based on the 'one-stop shopping' 
principle,  i.e.  each  partner  offers  to  the  customer  the 
entire  package  of  services  which  he  needs.  These 
managed  services  are  called  managed  data  network 
services  (MONS).  An  MONS  essentially  consists  of a 
broad  package  of  services  including  facilities, 
value~added services  and  management. The agreements 
may  also  concern such  basic  services  as  satellite  uplink. 
57.  These agreements "could restrict competition in the 
MONS market and also in the markets for a service or a 
group of services  included in  the MONS: 
(t)  IH'tw,·en  tltt' participating TOs themselves; and 
(ii)  vis-d~vis  other  actual  or  potential  third~party 
providers. 
58.  (i)  Restrictions of  competition  between  TOs 
Cooperation  between  TOs  could  limit  the  number  of 
potential individual MDNS offered by each participating 
TO. 
The agreements may affect competition at least in certain 
aspects  which  are  contemplated  as  specific  examples  of 
prohibited practices under Article 85 (I) (a) to (c), in  the 
event that:  · 
- they fix  or recommend, or at least lead (through the 
exchange  of  price  information)  to  coordination  of 
prices charged by each participant to customers, 
- they  provide  for  joint  specification  of  MONS 
products,  quotas,  joint  delivery,  specification  of 
customers'  systems;  all  this  would  amount  to 
controlling  production,  markets,  technical  devel-
opment and investments, 
- they contemplate joint purchase of MONS hardware 
and/  or  software,  which  would  amount  to  sharing 
markets or sources of supply. 
59.  (ii)  Restrictive  effects  on  thir4  party  undertakings 
Third  parties'  market  entry  could  be  precluded  or 
hampered if the participating TOs: 
- refuse  to provide facilities  to third party suppliers of 
services, 
- apply usage restrictions only to third parties and not 
to  themselves  (e.g.  a  private  provider  is  precluded 
from  placing  multiple  customers  on  a  leased  line 
facility to obtain lower unit costs), 
- favour  their MONS  offerings  over those of private 
suppliers  with  respect  to  access,  availability,  quality 
and  price  of leased  circuits,  maintenance  and other 
servtces, 
- apply especially low rates to their MONS offerings, 
cross-subsidizing  them  with  higher  rates  for 
monopoly services. 
Examplt·~ of thi~ coulc.l  lw  the restrictions imposed by  Lhe 
TOs  on  private  network  operators  as  to  the  qualifi-
cations  of the  users,  the  nature  of the  messages  to be 
exchanged over the  network or the use  of international 
private  leased  circuits. 
60.  Finally, as  the participating TOs hold, individually 
or collectively, a dominant position for the creation and 
the exploitation of the network in each national market, 
any restrictive behaviour described in paragraph 59 could 
amount to an abuse of a dominant position under Article 
86  (see V  below).  · 
61.  On the other hand, agreements between TOs may 
bring  economic  benefits  which  could  be  taken  into 
account for the possible granting of an exemption under 
Anicle 85  (3).  Inter alia,  the possible benefits could be  :1s 
follows: 
a  European-wide  service  and  'one-stop  shopping' 
could favour business in Europe. Large multination:ll 
undertakings  are  provided  with  a  European 
communication  service  using  only  a  single  point  of 
contact, 
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- the  cooperation  could  lead  to a  certain  amount of 
European-wide  standardization  even  before  further 
EEC legislation on this matter is adopted, 
- the  cooperation  could  bring  a  cost  reduction  and 
consequently cheaper offerings  to the  advantage  of 
consumers, 
- a general improvement of public infrastructure could 
arise from a joint service provision. 
62.  Only by  notification  of the  cases  in  question,  in 
accordance with the appropriate procedures under Regu-
lation  No  17,  will  the  Commission  be  able,  where 
requested,  to  ascertain,  on . the  merits,  whether  these 
benefits outweigh the competition restrictions. But in any 
event, restrictions on access for third parties seem likely 
to be considered as  not indispensable and to lead to th~ 
elimination  of competition  for  a  substantial part of the 
products  and  services  concerned  within  the  meaning of 
Anicle  85  (3),  thus  excluding  the  possibilit}'  of  an 
exemption.  Moreover,  if  an  MDNS  agreement 
strengthens  appreciably  a  dominant  position  which  a 
participating  TO  holds  in  the  market  for  a  service 
included  in  the MONS, this  is  also  likely  to lead  to a 
rejection of the exemption. 
63.  The Commission  has  outlined  the  conditions  for 
exempting  suc.·h  forms  of  coopf.·ration  in  a  case 
concerning a proposed joint venture b<.·tween  22 TOs for 
the provision of a Europe-wide MONS, later abandoned 
for commercial reasons {'
0
), The Commission considered 
that the MONS project presented the risks of restriction 
of competition  between  the  operators  themselves  and 
private service  suppliers  but it accepted  that the  project 
also  offered  economic  benefits  to  telecommunications 
users  such  as  access  to Europe-wide services  through a 
single operator. Such cooperation could also have accel-
erated  European  standardization,  reduced  costs  and 
increased  the  quality  of the  services.  The  Commission 
had  informed  the  participants  that  approval  of  the 
project would have to be subject to guarantees designed 
to prevent undue restriction  of competition  in  the tele-
communications services markets, such as  discrimination 
against private services suppliers and cross-subsidization. 
Such  guarantees  would  be  essential  conditions  for  the 
granting of an exemption under the competition rules  to 
cooperation agreements involving TOs. The requirement 
for an  appropriate guarantee of non-discrimination and 
(2°)  Commission press release IP(89) 948 of 14.  12.  1989. 
non-cross-subsidization  will  be  specified  in  individual 
cases.  according  to  the  examples  of  discrimination 
indicated in  Section V  below concerning the application 
of Article 86. 
64.  (bb)  Agreements  between  TOs  and  other  service 
pro'Diders 
Cooperation  between  TOs  and  other  operators  is 
increasing  in  telecommunications  services.  It frequently 
takes  the  form  of  a  joint  venture.  The  Commission 
recognizes that it may have  beneficial effects.  However, 
this  cooperation  may  also  adversely  affect  competition 
and the opening  up  of services  markets.  Beneficial  and 
harmful effects  must therefore be  carefully weighed. 
65.  Such  agreements  may restrict competition for  the 
provision of telecommunications services: 
(i)  between the partners; and 
(ii)  from  third parties. 
66.  (i)  Competition  between  the  partners  may · be 
restricted "·hen these are actual or potential competitors 
for  the·  relevant  telecommunications  service.  This  is 
generally  the  case,  even  when  only  the  other  partners 
and  not  the  TOs  are  already  providing  the  service. 
Indeed; TOs may  have  the  required  financial  capacity, 
technical  and  commercial  skills  to enter the  market for 
non-reser\'ed  services  and  could  reasonably  bear  the 
technical  and  financial  risk  of  doing  it.  This  is  also 
generally  the  case  as  far  as  private  operators  are 
concerned, when·  they do not  yet provide the service  in 
the geographi{·al.markC't  rovered by  the cooperation, hut 
do provide this service dsewhere. They may therefore he 
potential competitors  in  this  geographic market. 
67.  (ii)  The  cooperation  may  restrict  competition 
from  third panies because: 
- there  is  an  appreciable risk that the  participant TO, 
i.e.  the  dominant  network provider,  will  give  more 
favourable network access to its cooperation partners 
than  to other service  providers  in  competition  with 
the partners, 
- potential  competitors  may  refrain  from  entering  the 
market because of this objective risk or, in  any event, 
because  of the  presence  on  the  market-place  of  a 
cooperation involving the monopolist for the network 
provision.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  market 
entry barriers  are  high:  the  market structure  allows 
only few suppliers and the size and the market power 
of the partners are considerable. 
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68.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cooperation  may  bring 
economic benefits which outweigh its  harmful effect and 
therefore  justify  the  granting  of  an  exemption  under 
Article  85 (3). The economic benefits  can consist,  inter 
alia,  of the rationalization of the production and distri-
bution  of telecommunication  services,  in  improvements 
in  existing  services  or development of new services,  or 
transfer of technology which improves the efficiency and 
the competitiveness of the European industrial structures. 
69.  In  the  absence  of  such  economic  benefits  a 
complementarity  between  panners,  i.e.  between  the 
provision  of  a  reserved  activity  and  that  of  a  service 
under competition, is  not a benefit as  such. Considering 
it  as  a  benefit  would  be  equal  to  justifying  an  invol-
vement  through  restrictive  agreements  of TOs  in  any 
non-reserved service provision. This would be to hinder 
a  competitive structure in  this  market. 
In  cenain  cases,  the  cooperation  could  consolidate  or 
extend the dominant position of the TOs concerned to a 
non-reserved services  market, in  violation of Anicle 86. 
70.  The  imposition  or  the  proposal  of  cooperation 
with the service provider as  a condition for the provision 
of the  network may  be  deemed  abusive  (see  paragraph 
98  (vi)). 
71.  (be)  Agreements  between  service  providers  other 
than  TOs 
The Commission will  apply the same principles indicated 
in  (ba)  and  (bb)  above  also  to  agreements  between 
private service providers, inter alia,  agreements providing 
quotas,  price fixing,  market and/or customer allocation. 
In  principle,  they  are  unlikely  to  qualify  for  an 
exemption. The Commission will  be  particularly vigilant 
in  order to  avoid  cooperation  on  services  leading  to a 
strengthening  of dominant  positions  of the  panners or 
restricting  competition  from  third  parties.  There  is  a 
danger of this  occurring  for  example  when  an  under-
taking  is  dominant with  regard  to  the  network  archi-
tecture and its proprietary standard is  adopted to suppon 
the service contemplated by the cooperation. This archi-
tecture  enabling  interconnection  between  computer 
systems of the panners could attract some panners to the 
dominant  panner.  The  dominant  position  for  the 
network architecture will  be strengthened and Article 86 
may apply. 
72.  In any exemption of agreements between TOs and 
other services  and/or equipment providers,  or between 
these  providers,  the  Commission  will  require  from  the 
partners  appropriate  guarantees  of  non-cross-subsidi-
zation and non·discrimination. The risk of cross·subsidi· 
ution and discrimination is  higher when the TOs or the 
other  partners  provide  both  services  and  equipment, 
whether within or outside the Community. 
C.  Agreements on  research  and development  (R&D) 
73.  As  in  other high 'technology based  sectors, R&D 
in  telecommunications is  essential for keeping pace with 
technological  progress  and  being  competitive  on  the 
market-place to the benefit of users. R&D requires more 
and  more  important  financial,  technical  and'  human 
resources  which  only  few  undertakings  can  generate 
individually.  Cooperation  is  therefore  crucial  for 
attaining the above objectives. 
74.  The Commission has adopted a Regulation for the 
block  exemption  under  Anicle  85 (3)  of  R&D 
agreements  in  all  sectors,  including  telecommuni-
cations (2'). 
75.  Agreements which  are not covered by this  Regu· 
lation (or the other Commission block exemption Regu-
lations)  could still  obtain  an  individual  exemption  from 
the  Commission  if  Article  85 (3)  requirements  ·are  met 
individually.  However, not in  all  cases  do the economic 
benefits of an R&D agreement outweigh its  competition 
restrictions.  In  telecommunications,  one  major  asset, 
enabling  access  to  new  markets,  is  the  launch  of new 
products or services.  Competition  is  based  not only on 
price,  but  also  on  technology.  R&D  agreements  could 
constitute  the  means  for  powerful  undertakings  with 
high  market shares  to  avoid  or limit  competition  from 
more  innovative  rivals.  The risk of excessive  restrictions 
of  competition  increases  when  the  cooperation  is 
extended from R&D to manufacturing and even more to 
distribution. 
76.  . The imponance which the Commission  att~ches to 
R&D and innovation is  demonstrated by the fact that it 
has  launched several programmes for this  purpose. The 
joint companies'  activities  which  may result  from  these 
programmes  are  not automatically cleared  or exempted 
as  such in  all  aspects from  the  application of the compe-
tition  rules.  However, most of tho!le  joint activities  may 
be  covered  by  the  Commission's  block  exemption 
(2
1
)  Rt:gulation  (EEC)  No 418/85,  OJ No  L 53,  22.  2.  1985, 
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Regulations. If  not, the joint activities in question may be 
exempted,  where  required,  in  accordance  with  the 
appropriate criteria and procedures. 
77.  In the Commission's experience joint distribution 
linked to joint R&D which is  not covered by ~he Regu-
lation  on  R&D  does  not play  the  crucial  role  in  the 
exploitation of the results of R&D. Nevertheless, in indi-
vidual cases, provided that a competitive environment is 
maintained,  the  Commission  is  prepared  to  consider 
full-range  cooperation  even  between  large  firms.  This 
should  lead  to  improving  the  structure  of  European 
industry and thus enable it to meet strong competition in 
the world market place. 
V.  APPUCATION OF ARTICLE ·86 
78.  Anicle 86 applies when: 
(i)  the undertaking concerned holds an individual or a 
joint dominant position; 
(ii)  it  commits  an  abuse  of that  dominant  position; 
and 
(iii)  the  abuse  may  affect  trade  between  Member 
States. 
Dominant position 
79.  In each national market the TOs hold individually 
or collectively  a dominant position  for the creation and 
the exploitation of the network, since they are protected 
by  exclusive  or  special  rights  granted  by  the  State. 
Moreover, the TOs hold  a  dominant position  for some 
telecommunications  services,  in  so  far  as  they  hold 
exclusive  or  special  rights  with  respect  to  those 
services (
22
). 
80.  The TOs may also hold dominant positions on the 
markets for certain equipment or services,  even  though 
they  no  longer  hold  any  exclusive  rights  on  those 
markets. After the elimination of these rights, they may 
have  kept very  important  market shares  in  this  sector. 
When the market share in  itself does not suffice  to give 
the TOs a  dominant position,  it  could  do it  in  combi-
nation with  the  othc;r  factors  such  as  tlw  monopoly  for 
the network or other relatt•d scrvin·s and a powc.·rful  and 
wide  distribution  network.  As  to  the  equipment,  for 
(") Commission Decision 82/861/EEC in the 'British Telecom-
munications' case, point 26, OJ No L 360,  21.  12.  1982,  p. 
36,  confirmed  in  the  Judgment  of  20.  3.  1985  in  Case 
41/83,  Italian  Republic  v.  Commission  (1985]  ECR  873, 
generally known as 'British Telecom'. 
example  terminal  equipment,  even  if  the  TOs  are  not 
involved  in  the  equipment  manufacturing  or  in  the 
services provision, they may hold a dominant position in 
the market as  distributors. 
81.  Also, firms other than TOs may hold individual·or 
collective dominant positions in markets where there are 
no exclusive  rights. This may be  the case especially for 
certain  non-reserved  services  because  of  either  the 
market shares alone of those undertakings, or because of 
a combination of several factors. Among these factors, in 
addition  to  the  market  shares,  two  of  particular 
importance  are  the  technological  advance  and  the 
holding of the  information  concerning  access  protocols 
or  interfaces  necessary  to  ensure  interoperability  of 
software  and  hardware.  When  this  information  is 
covered  by  intellectual  property rights  this  is  a  further 
factor of dominance. 
82.  Finally, the TOs hold, individually or collectively, 
dominant positions in the demand for some telecommu-
nication  equipment,  works  or software  services.  Being 
dominant for the network and other services  provisions 
they may account for a purchaser's share high enough to 
give  them  dominance  as  to  the  demand,  i.e.  making 
suppliers  dependent  on  them.  Dependence  could  exist 
when  the  supplier  cannot  sell  to  other  customers  a 
substantial part of its production or change a production. 
In  certain  national  markets,  for  example  in  large 
switching  equipment,  big 1  purchasers  such  as  the  TOs 
fac:c  big  supplic.·rs.  In  this situation, it should h'·  weighed 
up  case  by  case  whether  the  supplier  or the  rustomcr 
position will  prevail on the other to sut·h  an ext<'nt  as  to 
b,.  considered dominant under Article  86. 
With  the  liberalization  of services  and  the  expansion of 
new  forces  on the services  markets, dominant positions 
of undertakings  other than  the TOs may  arise  for  the 
purchasing of equipment. 
Abuse 
83.  Commission's  actiVIty  may  concern  mainly  the 
following broad areas of abuses: 
A.  TOs' abuses:  in  panit·ular,  they  may  take  a<lvantage 
of tlwir  monopoly  or at.  lc.·ast  dominant  posititl'n  10 
acquire  a  foothold  or  to  extend  their  power  in 
non-reserved  neighbouring markets, to the detriment 
of competitors and customers. 
B.  Abuses by undertaking other than  70s: these may take 
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whether  or  not  covered  by  intellectual  propeny 
rights,  with  the  object  and/  or  effect  of restricting 
competition. 
C.  Abuses of  a dominant purchasing position: for the time 
being this concerns mainly the TOs, especially to the 
extent  that  they  hold  a  dominant  position  for 
reserved activities in the natipnal market. However, it 
may  also  increasingly  concern  other  undertakings 
which have entered the market. 
A.  TOs' Abuses 
84.  The  Commission  has  recognized  in  the  Green 
Paper the  central  role  of  the  TOs, which  justifies  the 
maintenance  of cenain  monopolies  to  enable  them  to 
. perform their public task. This public task consists in the 
provision  and  exploitation  of  a  universal  network  or, 
where  appropriate,  universal  service,  i.e.  ohe  having 
general  coverage  and  available  to  all  users  (including 
service providers and the TOs themselves)  upon request 
on reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. 
This fundamental  obligation  could  justify  the  benefit of 
the. exception  provided  in  Article  90 (2)  under  certain 
circumstances, as  laid  down  in  the  Services  Directive. 
85.  In  most cases,  however, the competition rules, far 
from  obstructing  the  fulfilment  of  this  obligation, 
contribute  to  ensuring  it.  In  .Particular,  Article  86  can 
apply to behaviour of dominant undertakings resulting in 
a  refusal  to  supply,  discrimination,  restrictive  tying 
clauses,  unfair prices  or other inequitable conditions. 
If one of these types of behaviour occurs in the provision 
of one of the  monopoly services,  the  fundamental  obli-
gation  indicated  above  is  not performed. This could be 
the  case  when  a  TO  tries  to  take  advantage  of  its 
monopoly  for  certain  services  (for  instance:  network 
provision)  in  order to limit the competition they have to 
face  in  respect  of non-reserved  services,  which  in  turn 
are supported by  those  monopoly services. 
It is  not necessary for the  purpose of the application  of 
Article  86  that competition  be  restricted  as  to a  service 
which  is  supported  by  the  monopoly  provision  in 
question. It would suffice that the behaviour results in  an 
appreciable  restriction  of competition  in  whatever  way. 
This means that an  abuse  may occur when the company 
affected by the behaviour is  not a service provider but an 
end user who could  himself be  disadvantaged in  compe-
tition in  the course of his  own business. 
86.  The Coun of Justice has  set out this  fundamental 
principle of competition in telecommunications in one of 
its judgments (
23
). An abuse within the meaning of Article 
86  is  committed where, without any objective  necessity, 
an  undenaking  holding  a  dominant  position  on  a 
particular market reserves to itself or to an undertaking 
belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which 
might be  carried out by  another undenaking as  pan of 
its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with 
the  possibility  of eliminating  all  competition  from  such 
undertaking. 
The Commission believes  that this  principle applies,  not 
o~ly when  a  dominant undertaking  monopolizes  other 
markets,  but  also  when  by  anti-competitive  means  it 
extends its  activity to other markets. 
Hampering the provision of non-reserved services  could 
limit  production,  markets  and  above  all · the  technical 
progress  which  is  a  key  factor  of telecommunications. 
The Commission has already shown these adverse effects 
of  usage  restrictions  on  monopoly  provision  in  its 
decision  in  the  'British  Telecom'  case C~).  In  this 
Decision  it  was  found  that the  restrictions  imposed  by 
British Telecom on telex and telephone networks usage, 
namely on the transmission of international messages on 
behalf of third parties: 
(i)  limited  the  activity  of economic  operators  to  the 
detriment of technological  progress; 
(ii)  discriminated  against  these  operators,  thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis TOs 
not bound by these restrictions; and 
(iii)  made  the  conclusion  of  the  contracts  for  the 
supply of telex circuits subject to acceptance by the other 
parties  of  supplement.ary  obligations  which  had  no 
connection with  such  contracts.  These  were  considered 
abuses  of a  dominant  position  ideiuified  respectively  in 
Article  86 (b),  (c)  and  (d). 
This could be  done: 
.(a)  as  above,  by  refusing  or restricting  the  usage  of 
the service  provided  under monopoly so  as  to limit  the 
provision  of non-reserved  services  by  third  panies;  or 
(b)  by  predatory  behaviour,  as  a  result  of  cross-
subsidization. 
87.  The separation of the TOs' regulatory power from 
their business activity is a crucial matter in the contt"Xt of 
the  application  of  Article  86.  This  separation  is 
(2')  Case  311/84,  Centre  beige  d'etudes  de  marche  Telemar-
keting  (CBEM) SA  v.  Compagnie luxembourgoise  de.- tete-
diffusion  SA  and  Information  Publicite  Benelux  SA,  3 
October 1985 [1985) ECR 3261, Grounds 26  and 27. 
(
24
)  See  Note (2
1
). 
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provided in the Article 90 Directives on terminals and on 
services mentioned in Note 2 above. 
(a)  Usage restrictions 
88.  Usage  restncuons  on  prov1s1ons  of  reserved 
services are likely to correspond to the specific examples 
of abuses indicated in Article 86.  In particular: 
- they may limit  the provision of telecommunications 
services in free competition, the investmenu and the 
technical progress, to the prejudice of telecommuni-
cations consumers (Anicle 86 (b)), 
- to  the  extent  that  these  usage  restrictions  are  not 
applied to all  users, including the TOs themselves as 
users,  they  may  result  in  discrimination  against 
certain  users,  placing  them  at a  competitive  disad-
vantage (Anicle 86 (c)), 
- they  may  make  the  usage  of the  reserved  services 
subject to the  acceptance of obligations  which  have 
no connection with this usage (Article 86 (d)). 
89.  The usage restrictions in  question  mainly concern 
public  networks  (public  switched  telephone  network 
(PSTN) or public switched data networks (PSDN)) and 
especially  leased  circuiu. They may  also  concern other 
provisions such as satellite uplink, and mobile communi-
cation networks. The most frequent types  of behaviour 
are as follows: 
(i)  Prohibition imposed by TOs on third parties: 
(a)  to  connect  private  leased  circuits  by  means  of 
concentrator,  mulliplexer  or  other  equipment  to  the 
public switched network; and/or 
(b)  to  JUt  private  leased  circuits  for  profJiding 
strvices,  to  the  extent  that  these  services  are  not 
reserved. but under competition. 
90.  To the eXtent that the user is  granted a licence by 
State  regulatory  authorities  under  national  law  in 
compliance  with  EEC  law,  these  prohibitions  limit  the 
user's  freedom  of  access  to  the  leased  circuits,  the 
provision  of  which  is  a  public  service.  Moreover,  it 
discriminates  between  users,  depending  upon  the usage 
(Anicle  86 (c)).  This  is  one  of  the  most  serious 
restrictions  and  could  substantially  hinder  the  devel-
opment  of  international  telecommunications  services 
(Anicle 86  (b)). 
91.  When the usage  restriction limits  the provision of 
non-reserved  service  in  competition  with  that provided 
by the TO iuelf the abuse is  even  more serious and the 
principles  of  the  abovementioned  'Tel~marketing' 
judgment (Note 23  supra)  apply. 
92.  In  individual  cases,  the  Commission  will  assess 
whether  the  service  provided  on  the ·leased  circuit  is 
reserved or not,  on the basis  of the  Community regu-
latory  acts  interpreted  in  the  technical  and  economic 
context. of each  case.  Even  ~ough a  service  could  be 
considered reserved according to the law, the fact that a 
TO actuallY. prohibits the usage of the leased circuit only 
to  some  users  and  not  to  others  could  constitute  a 
discrimination under Article 86 (c). 
93.  The Commission has taken action in  respect of the 
. Belgian  R~gie  des  t~l~graphes  et  t~lephones  after 
receiving  a  complaint  concerning  an  alleged  abuse  of 
dominant position from a private supplier of value-added 
telecommunications  services  relating  to  the  conditions 
under  which  telecommunications  circuits  were  being 
leased.  Following discussions  with  the  Commission,  the 
RIT authorized  the  private  supplier  concerned  to  use 
the  leased  telecommunications  circuits  subject  to  no 
restrictions other than that they should  not be  used.  for 
the simple transpon of,  data. 
Moreover, pending the possible adoption of new rules in 
Belgium,  and without prejudice  to any  such  rules,  the 
RTI undertook that all iu existing and potential clients 
for  leased  telecommunications  circuits  to  which  third 
parties  may have  access  shall  be  governed  by  the same 
conditions as  those which were agreed  with  the  private 
sector supplier mentioned above (2
5
). 
(ii)  Refusal  by  10s  to  protJide  reserved  services  (in 
particular  the  networlt  and  leased  circuits)  to  third 
parties 
94.  Refusal to supply has been considered an abuse by 
, the  Commission  and  the  Coun  of  Justice (2
6
).  This 
behaviour  would  make  it  impossible  or  at  least 
appreciably  difficult  for  third  parties  to  provide 
non-reserved services. This, in turn, would lead to a limi-
tation of services  and of technical development (Anicle 
86 (b))  and,  if  applied  only  to  some  users,  result  in 
discrimination (Article 86 (c)). 
(,) Commission Press release IP(90) 67 of 29.  1. 1990 
e•)  Cases  6  and  7/73  Commercial  Solvenu  v.  Commission 
[1974)  ECR 223; United Brands v.  Commission  (Note  13, 
above). 
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(iii)  Imposition of  extra  charges or other special conditions 
·  for certain usages of  reserved services 
95.  An  example  would  be  the  imposition  of access 
charges to leased circuits when they are connected to the 
public  switched  network  or  other  special  prices  and 
charges for service provision to third panics. Such access 
charges  may  discriminate  between  users  of  the  same 
service  (leased  circuits  provision)  depending  upon  the 
usage  and  result  in  imposing  unfair  trading conditions. 
This  will  limit  the  usage  of leased  circuits  and  finally 
non-reserved  service  provision.  Conversely,  it  does  not 
constitute  an  abuse  provided  that  it  is  shown,  in  each 
specific case, that the access charges correspond to costs 
which are entailed directly for the TOs for the access  in 
question.  In  this  case,  access  charges  can  be  imposed 
only on an equal basis to all  users, including TOs them-
selves. 
96.  Apart from  these  possible  additional  costs  which 
should  be  covered  by  an  extra  charge,  the  intercon-
nection of a leased circuit to the public switched network 
is  already remunerated by the price related to the use of 
this  network.  Certainly, a  leased  circuit can  represent  a 
subjective value for a user depending on the profitability 
of the  enhanced  service  to  be  provided  on  that  leased 
circuit.  However, this  cannot be  a criterion on which  a 
dominant  undertaking,  and  above  all  a  public  service 
provider, can base. the price of this public service. 
97.  The  Commission  appreciates  that  the  substantial 
difference  between  leased  circuits  and  the  public 
switched  network  causes  a ·problem  of  obtaining  the 
necessary  revenues  to  cover  the  costs  of the  switched 
network.  However,  the  remedy  chosen  must  not  be 
contrary to  law,  i.e.  the  EEC  Treaty, as  discriminatory 
pricing  between customers· would  be. 
(iv)  Discriminatory price or quality of  the service provided 
98.  This behaviour may relate,  inter alia,  to tariffs or 
to  restrictions  or  delays  in  connection  to  the  public 
switched  network or leased  circuits  provision,  in  instal-
lation,  maintenance  and  repair,  in  effecting  intercon-
nection  of  systems  or  in  providing  information 
concerning  network  planning,  signalling  protocols, 
technical  standards  and  all  other information  necessary 
for  an  appropriate  interconnection  and  interoperation 
with the reserved service and which may  affec~ the inter-
working  of competitive  services  or terminal  equipment 
· offerings. 
(v)  Tying  the  provision  of the  reserved  service  to  the 
supply by the  TOs or others of  terminal equipment to 
be  interconnected  or  interoperated,  in  partiadar 
through imposition,  pressure,  offer of  special prices or 
other  trading  conditions  for  the  reserved  service 
linked to the equipment. 
(vi)  Tying  the  provision  of the  reserved  service  to  the 
agreement of  the  user to  enter into  cooperation  with 
the  reserved  service  provider  himself  as  to  the 
non-reserved service to be carried on the network 
(vii)  Reserving  to  itself for  the  purpose  of non-reserved 
service provision  or  to  other service providers  infor-
mation  obtained in  the exercise of  a reserved service 
in  particular  information  concerning  users  of a 
reserved  services  providers  mere  favourable 
conditions for the supply of  this in/ormation 
This  latter  information  could  be  important  for  the 
provision of services under competition to the extent that 
it  permits  the  targeting  of customers  of those  services 
and  the  definition  of business  strategy.  The  behaviour 
indicated  above  could  result  in  a  dif'crimination  against 
undertakings  to  which  the  use  of  this  information  is 
denied  in  violation of Article  86 (c).  The information in 
question can only be disclosed with the agreement of the 
users  concerned  and  in  accordance  with  relevant  data 
protection  legislation  (see  the  proposal  for  a  Council 
Directive concerning the protection of personal data and 
privacy  in  the  context  of  public  digital  telecommuni-
cations  networks,  in  particular  the  integrated  services 
digital  network  (ISDN)  and  public  digital  mobile 
networks) (2
7
). 
(viii)  Imposition of  unneeded reserved services by supplying 
reserved  and/or  non-reserved  services  when  the 
former reserved services are reasonably separable /rom 
the others 
99.  The practices under (v)  (vi)  (vii)  and (viii) result in 
applying conditions which  have  no connection with the 
reserved service, contravening Article  86 (d). 
100.  Most of these practices were in fact  identified in 
the Services Directive  as  restrictions on the provision of 
services  within the meaning of Article 59  and Article 86 
of the Treaty brought about by State measures. They are 
therefore covered by the broader concept of 'restrictions' 
(Z
7
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which  under  Article  6  of  the  Directive  have  to  be 
removed  by Member States. 
101.  The Commission  believes  that the  Directives  on 
terminals  and  on services also  clarify some principles  of 
application of Anicles 85  and  86  in  the sector. 
The  Services  Directive  does  not  apply  to  imponant 
sectors  such  as  mobile  communications  and  satellites; 
however,  competition rules  apply fully  to these  sectors. 
Moreover, as  to the services covered by the Directive it 
will  depend very much on the degree of precision of the 
licences  given  by the  regulatory body whether the TOs 
still have a discretionary margin for imposing conditions 
which  should  be  scrutinized  under  competition  rules. 
Not  all  the  conditions  can  be  regulated  in  licences: 
consequently,  there  could  be  room  for  discretionary 
action.  The  application  ·  of  competition  rules  to 
companies  will  therefore  depend  very  much  on  a case-
by-case examination of the licences.  Nothing more than 
a class  licence can be  required for terminals. 
(b)  Cross-subsidization 
102.  Cross-subsidization  means  that  an  undenaking 
allocates  all  or pan of the  costs  of its  activity  in  one 
product or geographic market to its  activity  in  another 
product  or geographic  market.  Under  certain  circum-
stances, cross-subsidization in telecommunications could 
diston competition, i.e. lead to beating other competitors 
with  offers  which  are  made  possible  not  by  efficiency 
and  performance  but  by  artificial  means  such  as 
subsidies.  Avoiding cross-subsidization  leading to  unfair 
competition  is  crucial  for  the  development  of service 
provision  and equipment supply. 
103.  Cross-subsidization  does  not  lead  to  predatory 
pricing  and does  not restrict competition when it is  the 
costs  of reserved  activities  which  are  subsidized  by  the 
revenue generated by other reserved activities since there 
is no competition possible as to these activities. This form 
of subsidization is  even  necessary,  as  it enables the TOs 
holders of exclusive rights to perform their obligation to 
provide  a  public  service  universally  and  on  the  same 
conditions  to  everybody.  For  instance,  telephone 
provision  in  unprofitable  rural  areas  is  subsidized 
through revenues from  telephone provision  in  profitable 
urban  areas  or long-distance  calls.  The same  could  be 
said  of subsidizing  the  provision  of  reserved  services 
through  revenues  generated  by  activities  under compe-
tition.  The application  of the general principle  of cost-
orientation  should  be  the  ultimate  goal,  in  order,  inter 
alia,  to ensure that prices are not inequitable as between 
users. 
104.  Subsidizing activities under competition, whether 
concerning  services  or equipment,  by  allocating  their 
costs to monopoly activities, however,  is  likely to diston 
competition in violation of Anicle 86. It could amount to 
an abuse by an undertaking holding a dominant position 
within  the  Community.  Moreover,  users  of  activities 
under  monopoly  have  to  bear  unrelated  costs  for  the 
provision of these activities. Cross-subsidization can also 
exist between monopoly provision and  equipment manu-
facturing and sale. Cross-subsidization can be carried out 
through: 
- funding  the  operation  of the  acuvmes  in  question 
with  capitai  remunerated  substantially  below  the 
market rate; 
- providing  for  those  actlVltaes  premises,  equipment, 
experts and/or services with a remuneration substan-
tially lower than the market price. 
105.  As' to  funding  through  monopoly  revenues  or 
making  available  monopoly  material  and  intellectual 
means for the starting up of new activities under compe-
tition, this  constitutes :m  investment whose  costs  should 
be  allocated  to  the  new  activity.  Offering  the  new 
product or service  should  normally include  a reasonable 
remuneration  of such  investment  in  the  long  run.  If it 
does  not,  the  Commission  will  assess  the  case  on  the 
basis  of  the  remuneration  plans  of  the  undertaking 
concerned and of the economic context. 
106.  Transparency  in  the  TOs'  accounting  should 
enable  the  Commission  to  ascertain  whether  there  is 
cross-subsidization  in  the  cases  in  which  this  question 
arises.  The ONP Directive  provides  in  this  respect  for 
the  definition  of  harmonized  tariff  principles  which 
should  lessen  the number of these cases. 
This  transparency  can  be  provided  by  an  accounting 
system which ensures the fully proportionate distribution 
of all  costs between  reserved and non-reserved activities. 
Proper allocation of costs is  more easily ensured  in  cases 
of structural  separation, i.e.  creating distinct entities  for 
running each of these  two categories of activities. 
An  appropriate  accounting  system  approach  shou!d 
permit  the  identification  and  aUocation  of  all  costs 
between  the activities which they suppon. In  this system 
all  products  and  services  should  bear proponionally all 
the relevant costs, including costs of research and devel-
opment,  facilities  and  overheads.  It  should  enable  the 
production of recorded figures which can  be verified by 
accountants. 
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107.  As  indicated  above  (paragraph  59),  in  cases  of 
cooperation agreements involving TOs a guarantee of no 
cross-subsidization  is  one of the  conditions required  by 
the  Commission  for  exemption  under Article  85 (3).  In 
order  to  monitor  properly  compliance  with  that 
guarantee, the Commission now envisages requesting the 
parties  to  ensure  an  appropriate  accounting  system  as 
described above, the accounts being regularly submitted 
to  the  Commission.  Where  the  accounting  method  is 
chosen,  the  Commission  will  reserve  the  possibility  of 
submitting the accounts to independent audit, especially 
if any doubt arises  as  to the capability of the system to 
ensure the necessary transparency or to detect any cross-
subsidization.  If  the  guarantee  cannot  be  properly 
monitored,  the  Commission  may  withdraw  the 
exemption. 
108.  In  all  other  cases,  the  Commission  does  not 
envisage  requiring  such  transparency  of  the  TOs. 
However,  if  in  a  specific  case  there  are  substantial 
elements  converging  in  indicating  the  existence  of an 
abusive cross-subsidization and/  or predatory pricing, the 
Commission could establish a presumption of such cross-
subsidization  and  predatory  pricing.  An  appropriate 
separate accounting system  could  be  important in  order 
to counter this  presumption. 
109.  Cross-subsidization  of a  reserved  acuv1ty  by  a 
non-reserved  one  does  not  in  principle  restrict  compe-
tition.  However,  the  application  of  the  exception 
provided  in  Article  90 (2)  to  this  non-reserved  activity 
could  not  as  a  rule  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  the 
financial  viability  of the  TO  in  question  rests  on  the 
non-reserved  activity.  Its  financial  viability  and  the 
performance of its  task of general economic interest can 
only  be  ensured  by  the  State  where  appropriate  by  the 
granting of an exclusive or special right and by imposing 
restrictions  on  activities  competing  with  the  reserved 
ones. 
II  0.  Also  cross-subsidization  by  a  public  or  private 
operator  outside  the  EEC  may  be  deemed  abusive  in 
terms  of Article  86  if  that  operator  holds  a  dominant 
position  for  equipment or non-reserved  services  within 
the EEC. The existence of this  dominant position, which 
allows  the  holder  to  behave  to  an  appreciable  extent 
independently of its  competitors and customers and ulti-
mately of consumers, will  be  assessed  in  the  light of all 
elements  in  the EEC and  outside. 
B.  Abuses by undertakings  other than  the  TOs 
·111.  Further to the  liberalization  of  servic~s, under-
takings other than the TOs may increasingly extend their 
power  to  acquire  dominant  positions  in  non-reserved 
markets. They may already hold such a position in  some 
services  markets  which  had  not  been  reserved.  When 
they take advantage of their dominant position to restrict 
competition and to extend their power,  Article  86  may 
· also  apply  to  them.  The  abuses  ·in  which  they  might 
indulge are broadly similar to most of those  previously 
described in  relation to the TOs. 
112.  Infringements of Article 86 may be committed by 
the  abusive  exercise  of  industrial  pro~erty  rights  in 
relation with standards, which are of crucial importance 
for  telecommunications.  Standards  may  be  either  the 
results  of  international  standardization,  or  de  /acto 
standards and the property.. of undertakings. 
113.  Producers  of equipment or suppliers  of services 
are  dependent  on  proprietary  standards  to  ensure  the 
interconnectivity of their computer resources. An  under-
taking which owns a dominant network architecture may 
abuse  its  dominant  position  by  refusing  to  provide  the 
necessary  information  for  the  interconnection  of  other 
architecture resources to its  architecture products. Other 
possible  abuses  - similar  to  those  indicated  as  to  the 
TOs - are,  inter  alia,  delays  in  providing  the  infor-
mation, discrimination in  the quality of the information, 
discriminatory  pricing  or other trading  conditions,  and 
making  the  information  provision  subject  tu  the 
acceptance  by  the  producer,  supplier  or user  of unfair 
trading conditions. 
114.  On 1 August  1984,  the  Commission  accepted  a 
unilateral undertaking from IBM to provide other manu-
facturers with the technical interface information needed 
to  permit  competitive  products  to be  used  with  IBM's 
then most powerful range of computers, the System/370. 
The  Commission  thereupon  suspended  the  proceedings 
under Article  86  which  it  had  initiated  against  IBM  in 
December 1980. The IBM Undertaking (2
1
)  also contains 
a  commitment  relating  to  SNA  formats  and  protocols. 
C')  Reproduced in full  in EC Bulletin  10-1984 (point 3.4.1). As 
to its  continued  application,  see  Commission  press  release 
No IP(88) 814 of 15 December 1988. 
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115.  The  question  how  to  reconcile  copyrights  on 
standards  with  the  competition  requirements  is 
panicularly difficult.  In  any event,  copyright cannot be 
used  unduly to restrict competition. 
C.  Abuses of  dominant purchasing position 
116.  Anicle  86  also  applies  to  behaviour  of under-
takings  holding  a  dominant  purchasing  position.  The 
examples  of  abuses  indicated  in  that  Anicle  may 
therefore also 'concern that behaviour. 
117.  The Council Directive 90/531/EEC (")based on 
Articles 57 (2), 66,  100a  and  113  of the EEC Treaty on 
the procurement procedures of entities operating in  inter 
alia  the telecommunications sector regulates essentially: 
(i)  procure'ment  p~dures in  order  to  ensure  on  a 
reciprocal  basis  non-discrimination  on  the  basis  of 
nationality; and 
(ii)  for products or services for use  in  reserved  markets, 
not in  competitive markets. That Directive, which  is 
addressed to States, does not exclude the application 
of Anicle  86  to the  purchasing  of products  within 
the  scope  of the  Directive.  The  Commission  will 
decide  case  by  case  how  to  ensure  that  these 
different  sets  of  rules  are  applied  in  a  coherent 
manner. 
118.  Furthermore,  both  in  reserved  and  compeuuve 
markets,  practices  other  than  those  covered  by  the 
Directive  may  be  established  in  violation  of Article  86. 
One  example  is  taking  advantage  of  a  dominant 
purchasing  position  for  imposing  excessively  favourable 
prices  or other trading  conditions,  in  comparison  with 
other  purchasers  and  suppliers  (Article  86 (a)).  This 
could result in  discrimination  under Article  86 (c).  Also 
obtaining,  whether  or  not  through  imposition,  an 
exclusive  distributorship  for  the  purchased  product  by 
the  dominant  purchaser  may  constitute  an  abusive 
extension  of its  economic power to other markets  (see 
'Telemarketing' Coun judgment (Note 23  supra)). 
119.  Another abusive practice could be that of making 
the  purchase  subject  to  licensing  by  the  supplier  of 
standards for the product to be  purchased  or for  other 
products,  to  the  purchaser  itself,  or to  other suppliers 
(Article  86 (d)). 
('1 OJ No L 297,
1
129.  10.  1990, p.  1. 
120.  Moreover, even  in  competitive markets, discrimi-
natory procedures on the basis of nationality may  exist, 
because  national  pressures  and  traditional  links  of  a 
non-economic  nature  do  not  always  disappear  quickly 
after  the  liberalization  of the  markets.  In  this  case,  a 
systematic  exclusion  or  considerably  unfavourable 
treatment  of  a  supplier,  without  economic  necessity, 
could  be  examined  under  Anicle  86,  especially  (b) 
(limitation  of  outlets)  and  (c)  (discrimination).  In 
assessing  the  case,  the  Commission  will  substantially 
examine  whether  the  same  criteria  for  awarding  the 
contract  have  been  followed  by  the  dominant  under-
taking  for  all  suppliers.  The Commission  will  normally 
take  into  account criteria  similar  to those  indicated  in 
Anicle  27  (1)  of the  Directive  CS
0
).  The  purchases  in 
question  being  outside  the  scope  of the  Directive,  the 
Commission will  not require that transparent purchasing 
procedures be  pursued. 
D.  Effect on trade between Member States 
121.  The same principle outlined ·regarding Article  85 
applies here. Moreover, in certain circumstances, such  as 
the case of the elimination of a competitor by an  under-
taking  holding  a  dominant  position,  although  trade 
between  Member States  is  not directly affected,  for  the 
purposes of Article  86  it  is  sufficient to show that there 
will  be  repercussions on the competitive structure of the 
common  market. 
VI.  APPLICATION  OF ARTICLES  85  AND  86  IN  THE 
.  FIELD OF SATELLITES 
122.  The  development  of  this  sector  is  addrc.·sscd 
globally  by  the  Commission  in  the  'Green  Paper  on  a 
common  approach  in  the  field  of  satellite  communi-
cations  in  the  European  Community'  of 20  November 
1990  (Doc.  COM(90)  490  final).  Due to the  increasing 
importance  of satellites  and  the  particular  uncertainty 
among undertakings as  to the application of competition 
rules to individual cases in this sector, it is  appropriate to 
address the sector in a distinct section in these guidelines. 
('
0
)  (See  Note 26)  Anicle  27  (1)  (a)  and  (b).  The criteria  on 
which  the  contracting  entities shall  base  the  award  of the 
contracts shall  be: (a)  the most economically advantageous 
tender  involving  various  criteria  such  as  delivery  date, 
period  for  completion,  running  costs,  cost-effectiveness, 
quality,  aesthetic  and  functional  characteristics,  technical 
merit,  after-sales  services  and  technical  assistance, 
commitments with regard to spare parts, security of supplies 
and price; qr (b) .the lowest price only. 
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123.  State regulations on satellites are not covered by 
the Commission Directives under Anicle 90  of the EEC 
Treaty respectively on terminals  and  services  mentioned 
above  except  in  the  Directive  on  terminals  which 
contemplates receive-only satellite stations not connected 
to a public  network. The Commission's  position  on the 
regulatory  framework  compatible  with  the  Treaty 
competition  rules  is  stated  in  the  Commission  Green 
Paper on satellites mentioned above. 
124.  In  any event the  Treaty  competition  rules  fully· 
apply to the satellites domain,  inter alia,  Articles 85  and 
86 to undertakings. Below is  indicated how the principles 
set out above,  in  particular in  Sections IV and V, apply 
to satellites. 
125.  Agreements between European TOs in particular 
within  international  conventions  may  play  an  important 
role  in  providing  European  satellites  systems  and  a 
harmonious deve!opment of satellite  services  throughout 
the  Community.  These  benefits  are  taken  into 
consideration under competition rules, provided that the 
agreements  do  not  contain  restrictions  which  are  not 
indispensable for the  attainment of these objectives. 
126.  Agr('ements  between  TOs  concerning  the 
operation  of satellite  systems  in  the  broadest sense  may 
he  caught  by  Article  85.  As  to space  segment capacity, 
the TOs are each other's competitors, whether actual or 
potential.  In  pooling  together  totally  or partially  their 
supplies  of  space  segment  capacity  they  may  restrict 
competition  between  themselves.  Moreover,  they  are 
likely to restrict competition vis-a-vis third parties to the 
extent that their agreements contain provisions with this 
object  or  effect:  for  instance  provisions  limiting  their 
supplies  in  quality  and/or quantity,  or restricting  their 
business  autonomy  by  imposing  directly  or indirectly  a 
coordination between  these  third parties and the parties 
to the  agreements.  It should be  examined whether such 
agreements could qualify for an exemption under Article 
85  (3)  provided  that  they  are  notified.  However, 
restrictions on third parties' ability  to compete are likely 
to  preclude  such  an  exemption.  It  should  also  be 
examined whether such agreements strengthen any indi-
vidual  or  collective  dominant  position  of  the  parties, 
which  also would exclude the granting of an exemption. 
This  could  be  the  case  in  particular  if  the  agreement 
provides that the parties are exclusive distributors of the 
space  segment capacity provided  by  the  agreement. 
127.  Such agreements between TOs could also restrict 
competition as  to the uplink with respect to which TOs 
are  competitors.  In  certain  cases  the  customer  for 
satellite communication has the choice between providers 
in  several  countries, and his  choice will  be  substantially 
determined  by  the  quality,  price  and  other  sales 
.conditions  of each  provider.  This  choice  will  be  even 
ampler since uplink is being progressively liberalized and 
to the extent that the application of EEC rules  to State 
legislations  will  open  up  the  uplink  markets. 
Community-wide agreements providing directly or indi-
rectly for coordination as  to the parties' uplink provision 
are therefore caught by Article  85. 
128.  Agreements  between TOs and private  operators 
on space segment capacity may be  also caught by Article 
85,  as  that provision  applies,  inter alia,  to cooperation, 
and  in  particular  joint  venture  agreements.  These 
agreements  could  be  exempted  if  they  bring  specific 
benefits such as technology transfer, improvement of the 
quality  of  the  service  or  enabling  better  marketing, 
especially  for  a  new  capacity,  outweighing  the 
restrictions.  In  any  event,  imposing  on  customers  the 
bundled  uplink and  space  segment capacity provision  is 
likely to exclude an exemption since it limits compe\ition 
in  uplink  provision  to  the  detriment  of the  customer's 
choice,  and  in  the  current market situation  will  almost 
certainly  strengthen  the  TOs'  dominant  position  in 
violation  of Anicle  86.  An  exemption  is  unlikely  to be 
granted  also  when  the  agreement  has  the  effect  of 
reducing  substantially  the  supply  in  an  oligopolistic 
market,  and  even  more  clearly  when  an  effect  of the 
agreement is  to prevent the only potential competitor of 
a dominant provider in  a given  market from  offering its 
services independently. This could amount to a violation 
of Article  86.  Direct or indirect imposition of any  kind 
of  agreement  by  a  TO,  for  instance  by  making  the 
uplink subject to the  conclusion of an agreement with a 
third  party, would  constitute  an  infringement of Article 
86. 
VII.  RESTRUCTURING IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
129.  Deregulation, the objective of a single market for 
1992  and  the fundamental  changes  in  the telecommuni-
cations  technology  have  caused  wide  strategic  restruc-
turing in  Europe and throughout the world as well. They No C 233/24  Official Journal of th~ European Communities  6.9.91 
have  mosdy  taken  the  form  of  mergers  and  joint 
ventures. 
(a)  Mergers 
130.  In assessing telecom mergers .in the framework of 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 on the control 
of  concentrations  between  undertakings (I')  the 
Commission  will  take  into  account,  inter  ali.,  the 
following elements. 
131.  Restructuring moves  are in  general·beneficial to 
the  European  telecommunications  industry.  They  may 
enable  the  companies  to  rationalize  and  ·to  reach  the 
critical  mass  necessary to  ~btain the economies of scale 
needed  to  make  the  important  investments  in  research 
and  development.  These  are  necessary  to develop  new 
technologies  and  to  remain  competitive  in  the  world 
market. 
However, in cenain cases they may also lead to the anti-
competitive  creation  or  strengthening  of  dominant 
positions. 
132.  The  economic  benefits  resulting  from  critical 
mass must be demonstrated. The concentration operation 
could  result  in  a  mere  aggregation  of  market  shares, 
unaccompanied by  restructuring measures or plans. This 
operation  may  create  or  strengthen  Community  or 
national  dominant  positions  in  a  way  which  impedes 
competition. 
133.  When  concentration  operations  have  this  sole 
effect,  they  can  hardly  be  justified  by  the  objective  of 
increasing  the  competitivity  of Community  industry  in 
the world market. This objective, strongly pursued by the 
Commission,  rather  requires  competition  in  EEC 
domestic  markets  in  order that  the  EEC  undenakings 
acquire the competitive structure and attitude needed  to 
operate in  the world  market. 
134.  In  assessing concentration cases in  telecommuni-
cations,  the  Commission  will  be  particularly  vigil~t to 
avoid  the  strengthening of dominant positions  through 
integration. If dominant service providers are allowed to 
integrate into the equipment market by way of mergers, 
access  to this  market by  other equipment suppliers  may 
be  seriously  hindered.  A  dominant  service  provider  is 
likely to give preferential treatment to its own equipll)ent 
subsidiary. 
{'1)  OJ No  L  395,  30.  12.  1989,  p.  1;  Corrigendum  OJ No 
L 257, 21. 9.  1990, p.  13. 
Moreover,  the  possibility  of disclosure  by  the  service 
provider  to  its  subsidiary  of  sensitive  information 
obtained  from  competing  equipment  manufacturers  can 
·put the latter at a competitive disadvantage. 
The  Commission  will  examine  case  by  case  whether 
vertical integration has such effects or rather is  likely to 
reinforce  the  competitive  structure  in  the  Community. 
135.  The  Commission  has  enforced  principles  on 
restructuring in a case concerning the GEC and Siemens 
joint bid for Ples:;ey  (u). 
136.  Article  85  ( 1)  applies  to  the  acquiSition  by  an 
undenaking of a minority shareholding  in  a competitor 
where,  inter alia,  the  arrangements  involve  the  creation 
of a structure  of cooperation  between  the  investor  and 
the other undenakings, which will  influence these under-
takings' competitive conduct ('J). 
(b)  Joint ventures 
137.  A  joint  venture  can  be.  of  a  cooperative  or  a 
concentrative nature. It is  of a cooperative nature when 
it  has  as  its  object  or  effect  the  coordination  of  the 
competitive  behaviour  of  undenakings  which  remain 
independent. The principles  governing  cooperative joint 
ventures  are  to be  set out in  Commission  guidelines  to 
that effect. Concentrative joint ventures fall  under Regu-
lation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 ('
4
). 
138.  In  some  of  the  latest  joint  venture  cases  the: 
Commission  granted  an  exemption  under Article  85  (3) 
on  grounds  which  arc  particularly  relevant  to  telecom-
munications.  Precisely in  a decision concerning telecom-
munications,  the  'Optical  Fibres'  case  C~),  the 
Commission  considered  that  the  joint  venture  enabled 
European  companies  to  produce  a  high  technology 
product,  promoted  technical  progress,  and  facilitated 
technology transfer. Therefore, the joint venture permits 
European  companies  to  withstand  competition  from 
npn-Community  producers,  especially  in  the  USA  and 
Japan,  in  an  area  of  fast-moving  technology 
e 2)  Commission  Decision  rejecting Plt-ssey's  complaint against 
the  GEC-Siemens  bid  (Case  IV  /33.018  GEC-Siemens/ 
Plessey), OJ No C 239, 25. 9.  1990, p. 2. 
(,) British American Tobacco  Compa~y Ltd  and  RJ  Reynolds 
Industries  Inc.  v.  Commission  Uoined  Cases  142  and 
156/84) of 17. 1  t. 1987 (1987) ECR 4487.  , 
(u)  OJ No C 203,  14. 8.  1990, p.  10. 
(")  Decision 86/405/EEC, OJ No L 236, 22.  8.  86, p.  30. 
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characterized by international markets. The Commission 
confirmed this approach in the 'Canon-Olivetti• case("). 
Vlll.  IMPACT  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CON-
VENTIONS  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  EEC  COM-
PETITION RULES TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
139.  International  conventions  (such  as  the 
Convention  of International Telecommunication  Union 
(I111)  or Conventions on Satellites)  play a fundamental 
role in ensuring worldwide cooperation for the provision 
of international  services.  However,  application  of such 
international  conventions  on  telecommunications  by 
EEC Member States must not affect compliance with the 
EEC law,  in  particular with competition rules. 
140.  Article  234  of  the  EEC  Treaty  regulates  this 
matter C').  The  relevant  obligations  provided  in  the 
various  conventions or related Acts  do not pre-date the 
entry into force of the Treaty. As  to the 111J and World 
Administrative  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Conference 
(W  A  TIC), whenever a revision or a new adoption of the 
ITU Convention or of the WA TIC Regulations 'occurs, 
the  1111  or W A  TIC members  recover their freedom  of 
action.  The Satellites  Conventions  were  adopted  much 
later. 
Moreover,  as  to all  conventions, the application of EEC 
rules does not seem to affect the fulfilment of obligations 
of  Member  States  vis-a-vis  third  countries.  Article  234 
does  not  protect  obligations  between  EEC  Member 
States entered into in  international treaties. The purpose 
of Article  234  is  to  protect the  right of third  countries 
.  only  and  it  is  not inr,ended  to  crystallize  the  acquired 
international  treaty  rights  of  Member  States  to  the 
detriment  of  the  EEC  Treaty's  objectives  or  of  the 
Community interest.  Finally,  even  if Article  234  (1)  did 
apply,  the Member States concerned would  nevertheless 
be  obliged  to  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate 
incompatibility  between  their  obligations  vis-a-vis 
(")  Decision 81!/88/EEC, OJ No L 52, 26.  2.  198S, p.  51. 
('') 'The  rights  and  obligations  arising  from  a~reements 
concluded  before  the  entry  into  force  of  thas  Treaty 
between one or more  Member States on the one hand and 
one  or  more  third  countries  on  the  other,  shall  not  be 
affected by the provisions of this Treaty. To the extent that 
such  agreements  are  not compatible  with  this  Treaty,  the 
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate 
steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established.  Member 
States  shall,  where  necessary,  assist  each  other  to  this 
end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude  , 
third  countries  and  the  EEC  rules.  This  applies  in 
particular where Member States acting collectively  h~ve 
the  statutory  possibility  to  modify  the  international 
convention in question as required, e.g. in the case of the 
Eutelsat Convention. 
141.  As  to  the  WATIC  Regulations,  the  relevant 
provisions of the Regulations in force from  9 December 
1988  are flexible  enough  to give  the parties  the choice 
whether or not to implement them or how  to implement 
them. 
In any event, EEC Member States, by signing the Regu-
lations,  have  made  a  joint  declaration  that  they  will 
apply  them  in  accordance  with  their  o6ligations  under 
the  EEC Treaty. 
142.  As to the International Telegraph and Telephone 
Consultative  Committee  (CCI11)  recommendations, 
competition rules  apply  to them. 
143.  Members of the CCITI are, pursuant to Article 
11  (2)  of the  International  Telecommunications  Con-
vention,  'administrations'  . of  the  Members  of  the 
I111  and  recognized  private  operating  agencies 
('RPOAs')  which  so  request  with  the  approval  of  the 
I11J members  which  have  recognized them.  Unlike  the 
members  of the ITU or the Administrative Conferences 
which  are  States,  the  members  of the  CCITI are  tele-
communications  administrations  and  RPOAs.  Telecom-
munications  administrations  are ·defined  in  Annex  2 to 
the  International  Telecommunications  Conventions  as 
'tout service ou departement gouvernemental responsable 
des mesures i -prendre pour executer les obligations de Ia 
Convention lnternationale des telecommunications et des 
reglements"  [any  government  service  or  department 
responsible  for  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  fulfil  the 
obligations laid down in the International Convention on 
Telecommunications  and  Regulations].  The  CCITI 
meetings  are in  fact  attended by TOs. Article  11  (2)  of 
the  International  Telecommunications  Convention 
clearly provides  that telecommunications administrations 
and  RPOAs  are  members  of the CCI1T by  themselves. 
The fact  that,  because  of the  ongoing process  of sepa-
ration  of  the  regulatory  functions  from  the  business 
activity,  some  national  authorities  participate  in  the 
CCITI is  not in contradiction with the nature of under-
takings of other members.  Moreover, even if the CCITI 
Il)embership  became  governmental  as  a  result  of  the 
separation of regulatory and operational activities of the 
telecommunications  administrations,  Article  90  in  asso-
ff /7 'J • 
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ciation with Anicle BS  could still apply either against the 
State  measures  implementing  the  CCITf  recommen-
dations and the recommendations themselves on the basis 
of  Article  90  ( 1  ),  or  if  there  is  no  such  ~ational 
implementing measure, directly against the telecommuni-
cations  organizations  which  followed  the  recommen-
dation(,.). 
144.  In  the  Commission's  view,  the  CCITf recom-
mendations · are  adopted,  inter  alia,  by  undertakings. 
Such  CCfiT recommendations,  although  they are  not 
legally binding, are agreements between undertakings or 
decisions  by  an  association  of  undertakings.  In  any 
event, according to the case law of the Commission and 
the  European  Court  of  Justice (")  a  statutory  body 
entrusted  with  certain  public  functions  arid  including 
some  members  appointed  by  the  government  of  a 
Member State may be an 'association of undertakings' if 
it represents the trading interests of other members  and 
takes  decisions  or makes  agreements  in  pursuance  of 
thpse interests. 
The  Commission  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that the 
application of certain provisions in  the context of inter-
national conventions could result in infringements of the 
EEC competition rules: 
(") See Commission Decision 8713/EEC ENI/Montedison, OJ 
No L 5, 7.  1. 1987, p.  13. 
(l'')  See  Pabst  &  Richarz/BNIA,  OJ No L 231,  21.  8.  1976, 
p. 24, AROW/BNIC, OJ No L 379, 31.  12.  1982, p.  1, and 
Case 123/83 BNIC v. Clair (1985)  ~CR  391. 
- As  to the W  A  TIC Regulations,  this  is  the rase  for 
the  respective  provisions  for  mutual  agreement 
between TOs on the supply of international telecom-
. munications  services  (Article  1  (5)),  reserving  the 
choice  of  telecommunications  routes  to  the  TOs 
(Article  3  (3)  (3)),  recommending  practices  equi-
valent to price  agreements  (Articles  6  (6)  (1)  (2)), 
and limiting the possibility of special arrangements to 
activities  meeting  needs  within  and/  or between  the 
territories of the Members concerned (Article 9) and 
only  where  existing  arrangements  cannot  satisfac-
torily  meet  the  relevant  telecommunications  needs 
(Opinion PL A).  · 
- CCITf recommendations Dl and  D2  as  they stand 
at the date of the adoption of these guidelines could 
amount  to  a  collective  horizontal  agreement  on 
prices  and other supply  conditions  of international 
leased lines to the extent that they  l~ad to a coordi-
nation of sales  policies  between TOs and  ther.efore 
limit competition between them. This  was  indicated 
by the Commission in  a CCITT meeting on 23  May 
1990. The Commission reserves the right to examine 
the  compatibility  of  other  recommendations  with 
Article 85. 
- The  agreements  between  TOs  concluded  in  the 
context of the Conventions on Satellites are likely to 
limit competition contrary to Article 85 and/  or 86 on 
the grounds set out in paragraphs 126 to US above. 
JL/71 . 
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COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 10  Dece~ber 1982 
relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV /29877 - British 
Telecommunications) 
(Only  the  English  text  is  authentic) 
(8U861/EEC). 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic  Community, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of  6 
February  1962, first  Regulation implementing Articles 
85  and 86 of the Treaty('), as last amended by the Act 
of  Accession  of  Greece,  and  in  particular  Article  3 
thereof, 
Having regard to an application lodged under Article 3 
of  Council  Regulation  No  17  on  22 June  1979  by 
Telespeed  Services  Limited  against  the  United 
Kingdom  Post  Office, 
Having  regard  to  the  decision  of  18  April  1980  to 
open  proceedings  in  this  case, 
Having  given  the  United  Kingdom  Post  Office  the 
opportunity  to  make  known  its  views  on  the  objec-
tions  raised  by  the  Commission,  in  accordance  with 
Article  19  of  Council  Regulation  No  17,  and  with 
Commission  Regulation  No  99/63/EEC  of  25  July 
1963 (2)  on the hearings  provided  for  in Article  19  (1) 
and  (2)  of  Council  Regulation  No  17, 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant  Positions, 
Whereas: 
I. THE  FACTS 
A.  British Telecommunications 
(  1)  British Telecommunications is  a public corpora-
tion  established under the Telecommunications 
Act  1981, an enactment of the United Kingdom 
Parliament. 
(2)  British  Telecommunications  has,  under  the 
Telecommunications Act  1981, a statutory duty 
to  provide  telecommunication  services  and  a 
statutory monopoly for  the running of telecom-
(')  OJ  No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
el  OJ  No  127,  20.  8.  1963,  p.  226~/63. 
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munication  systems  throughout  the  United 
Kingdom. 
(3)  During most of the time in which the activities 
later  described  to,-k  place  the  telecommunica-
tion services  now provided by  British Telecom-
munications  were  provided  by  the  United 
Kingdom Post Office under the Post Office Act 
1969,  also  an  enactment  of  the  United 
Kingdom  Parliament.  British  Telecommunica-
tions assumed the responsibilities of the United 
Kingdom  Post  Office  for  telecommunication 
services  from  1 October  1981  under the Tele-
communications  Act  1981. 
(4)  The enactment of the Telecommunications Act 
1981  formed  part of the  measures  taken  by  the 
United  Kingdom  Government  with  the  inten-
tion of encouraging competition in the telecom-
munication  field. 
(5)  Both  British  ielecommunications  and  the 
United  Kingdom  Post  Office  are  hereinafter 
referred  to  as  '~T'. 
B.  The  International  Telecommunication 
Convention  and Union 
(6)  All  EEC  Member States are  among the signato-
ries  of  the  International  Telecommunication 
Convention (ITC) which lays down the purposes 
and structure  of  the  International Telecommu-
nication  Union  (ITU).  The  International  Tele-
graph  and  Telephone  Consultative  Committee 
(CCITI) is  one of  the  permanent organs of  the 
ITU. 
(7)  Und.er  Article  11.1  (2)  lTC  the  duties  of  the 
CCITT  shall  be  to  study  technical,  operating 
and  tariff  questions  relating  to  telegraphy  and 
telephony  and  to  issue  recommendations  on 
them. Members of the  CCITT are  the telecom-
munication administrations of  all  ITU  member 
countries, as of  right, and any recognized private 
operating  agency  which,  with  the  approval  of 
the  member  country  which 'has  recognized  it, 
expresses  a  desire  to  participate in the work  of 
the Con;tmittee. BT  is  such a recognized private 
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(9) 
Under Article  44  lTC  the  Members  are  bound 
to  abide  by  the  provisions  of  the  Convention 
and  the  Administrative  Regulations  and  to  take 
the  necessary steps  to  impose the observance of 
these provisions upon private operating agencies 
authorized  by  them  to  establish  and  operate 
telecommunications and which engage in  inter-
national  services.  Article  1.1  (2)  of  both  Tele-
graph  Regulations  and  Telephone  Regulations 
provides that 'In implementing the principles of 
the  Regulations, Administrations (or  recognized 
private  operating agencies) should  comply with 
the  CCIIT  Recommendations,  including  any 
Instructions  forming  part  of  those  Recommen-
dations,  on  any  matters  not  covered  by  the 
Regulations.' 
C.  Retransmission  of  telephone  and  telex 
messages  in  the  UK 
Charges,  terms  and  conditions  relating  to  tele-
communication services in the United Kingdom 
were  and  are  laid  down  by  BT  in  'Schemes', 
made  under  Section  28  of  the  Post  Office  Act 
1969  and  Section  21  of  the  Telecommunica-
tions  Act  1981  respectively. 
(a)  Telex  Scheme  1971 
{10)  The  Post  Office  Telex  Scheme  1971  contained 
the  following  provision  which,  in  effect,  prohi-
bited  the  operation  of  commercial  message-
forwarding  agencies : 
'21. (2)  Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  any 
licence  granted  by  the  Post  Office  to 
the  (telex)  subscriber  or  with  the 
consent  in  writing  of  the  Post  Office, 
neither  the  subscriber  nor  any  other 
person  shall  receive  any  consideration 
either directly or indirectly in  return  for 
or  otherwise  hows.oever  on  account  of 
the  use  of  the  subscriber's  installation 
by  or  on  behalf  of  any  person  other 
than  the  subscriber  (  ...  )'. 
(b)  Schemes  T7/1975  and  TJ/1976 
(11)  In  recognition  of  the  fact  that  message-
forwarding agencies can  perform a useful service 
for  United·  Kingdom  customers,  the  above 
provision  was  replaced  in  the  Post  Office Telex 
Scheme  197 5 (Scheme  T?/197  5)  by  paragraph 
43  (2)  which  provided  inter  alia  that  'A 
subscriber may use his (telex) installation for the 
purpose  of  sending  and  receiving  messages  on 
behalf  of  other  persons  and  may  allow  other 
persons to  use  his installation for the purpose of 
sending  and  receiving  messages  on  their  own 
behalr. One  condition  laid  down  at  paragraph 
43 (2) (b) (iii) was that 'any amount charged by a 
subscriber in  respect  of  the  receipt and  delivery 
of  a message  which  both  originates  and  is  for 
delivery outside the United Kingdom or the  Isle 
of  Man  shall  not  be  such  that  it  enables  the 
originator  of  the  message  to  send  it  more 
cheaply  than  if  he  had  sent  it  by  means· of  a 
telex call made by him directly to the person for 
whom  the  message  was  ultimately  intended'. 
(12)  The above  provisions  were  reiterated  under  the 
heading  •Restriction  on  assignment  of  telex 
service  and  use  of  telex  installation', ·in  Para-
graph  70 (2) of the Post Office Telecommunica-
tion Scheme  1976 (Scheme Tl/1976), which  was 
in  operation  from  I  June  1976  to  20  January 
1978. 
{13)  Concerning paragraph  43  (2)  (b)  (iii)  of Scheme 
T?/1975,  subsequently  renumbered  70  (2)  (b) 
(iii)  in  Scheme  Tt/1976,  BT  found  it  adminis-
tratively  impossible  to  monitor  the  situation  to 
ensure  that,  for  any  telex  traffic  between  third 
coun.tries,  message-forwarding  agencies  did  not 
undercut the·charges of other Administrations. 
(c)  Message-forwarding  agencies 
(14)  Taking  advantage  of  telecommunication  tariffs 
. which  are  lower,  especially  in  relations  with 
North  America,  from  the  UK  than  from  some 
countries  in  mainland  Europe  (e·.g.  because  of 
differences  in  tariff  policies,  such  as  lower 
rentals  and  higher call  charges,  and  in  the  real 
costs),  and  of  currency  fluctuations  which  at 
some  times  made  these  UK  tariffs  still  more 
attractive, a number of communications bureaux 
operating  in  the  UK  have  in  the  last  decade 
entered the  business  of  retransmitting  messages 
originating  and  for  delivery  ou~side  the  UK. 
There  are  approximately  100  message-
forwarding  agencies  in  the  UK,  11  of  which 
were  believed  to  be  engaged  in  the  business  of 
relaying  traffic  between  third  countries  at  .the 
time of  publishing Scheme Tl/1978 (16  below). 
These  message-forwarding  agencies 
(i)  offer  to  receive  messages  by  telex  from 
persons or other telex forwarding agencies in 
one  foreign  country and  send  the  messages 
on  by telex  to  persons or other telex forwar-
ding  agencies  in  other  countries.  This 
service  may  be  particularly  useful  when  the 
same  message  (such  as  a detailed  specifica- . 
tion  of goods  for  which  tenders  are  invited) 
is  required  to  be  sent  to  a large  number  of 
foreign  destinations ; or 
·J/76 
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(ii)  receive  their  customers'  messages  in  data 
form  by  means  of  the  public  telephone 
system from  computers abroad (mainly from 
the United States) and send them onwards to 
other countries as data to be received at their  . 
destination  in  visual  form,  either as  printed 
out  messages  or  as  pictures  on  a  visual 
display  unit. 
(d)  CCI1T Recommendation  F 60,  Section  3.5 
(1 S)  In October 1976 the CCilT passed Recommen-
dation F 60 on Telex Operating Methods, whose 
Section  3.5  entitled •Restriction  on  the use  of a 
telex  station'  contains  the  following: 
'Administrations  and  recognized  private  opera-
ting  agencies  should  refuse  to  make  the  telex 
service  available  to  a  telegraph  forwarding 
agency which  is  known  to  be  organized for  the 
purpose  of  sending  or  receiving  telegrams  for 
retransmission  by  telegraphy  with  a  view  to 
evading  the  full  charges  due  for  the  complete 
. route'.  •Administrations  shall  refuse  to  provide 
international  telex  service  to  a customer whose 
activity would be regarded as an  infringement of 
the functions of an  Administration in  providing 
a  public::  telecommunication  service'. 
(e)  Scheme  Tl/1978 
(16)  In  direct or indirect implementation of  CCITT 
Recommendation  F 60,  Section  3.5,  BT  in  Post 
Office  Telecommunication  Scheme  (Scheme 
Tl/1978)  which  came  into  operation  on  21 
January  1978,  amended  Scheme  Tl/1976  as 
follows  (excerpts) : 
'44 (2)  (a)  unless  the  Post  Office  otherwise 
consents  in  wntang,  a  (telepho11e) 
subscriber  who  is  engaged  in  the  busi-
ness  of  sending  and  receiving  messages 
on  behalf of  other persons  by  means  of 
his  telephone  installation  and/or  allo-
wing other persons  to  use  his  telephone 
installation  for  the  purpose  of  sending 
and  receiving  messages  on  their  own 
behalf shall  not so  use  or allow  his  tele-
phone  installation  to  be  so  used  for  the 
purpose of sending to  or  receiving from 
a place outside the United Kingdom and 
the  Isle  of  Man  any  message  intended 
for  ultimate  reception  in  visual  form'. 
'70 (2)  (b)  any  (telex)  message  which  originates 
outside  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
(sle of Man  shall  not be sent onwards to 
a  destination  outside  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  Isle  of  Man ; 
(c) any message which originates outside 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Isle  of 
Man  shall  not  be  s~nt  onwards  to  a 
destination  within  the  United  Kingdom 
and the Isle of  Man  unless  it  is  received 
as  a  telex  call  made  directly  to  the 
subscriber's installation by the originator 
of  the  message.  (  ...  ) ; 
(d)  any  message  which originates  in  the 
United  Kingdom  or  th~  Isle  of  Man 
shall  not  be  sent onwards  to  a destina-
tion  out5ide  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  Isle  of  Man  unless  it  is  sent  as  a 
telex  call  made  from  the  subscriber's 
installation  directly  to  the  person  for 
whom  ttie  message  is  ultimately 
intended  by  the  originator  of  the 
message'. 
(17)  In  August  1978  BT sent a standard  letter to  all 
communications bureau operators in  the United 
Kingdom  calling  their  attention  to  the  above 
amendments and explaining that they  mean,  in 
effect,  that  private  agency  operators  are  prohi-
bited  from  providing  international  services  for 
their  customers  whereby : 
- messages  in  data  form  are  sent  or  received 
internationally  by  telephone  and  then 
converted  into telecommunication  messages 
for  reception  in  telex,  facsimile,  written  or 
other visual  form,  · 
- telex  messages  are  forwarded  in  transit 
between places outside  the United Kingdom 
and  the  Isle  of  Man, 
- telex  mtssages are  sent or received  via  other 
message-forwarding  agencies. 
{18)  BT  also  explained  in  this  standard  letter  that 
'Indeed, it  is  because  we  have  managed  to  keep 
our international  telex  charges  so  low - much 
lower than in other countries - that it  is attrac-
tive  for  oth~r  countries  to  send  their  telex 
messages  thrc,ugh agencies  in  this country. (  ...  ). 
The  activities  of  agencies  which  attract  telex 
messages  from  other countries to  transmit them 
from  the  United  Kingdom  to  a  third  country, 
cause a serious loss  of  revenue to other countries 
and  break  the  international  agreements  on 
which world cooperation in  telecommunications 
is  founded.  They  thus  put  at  risk  the  arrange-
ments we  have been able  to negotiate with other 
countries, and so. ~ndanger the  low  tariffs  we  at 
present  charge  to  our  own  customers  in  the 
United  Kingdom'. 
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(19)  BT has written a further  letter to  those agencies 
believed  to  be  forwarding  traffic  between  telex 
subscribers  in  third  countries.  A written  assur-
ance was  requested, stating that they understood 
and  would  comply· with  the. new  provisions. 
Nine  of  the  12  recipients  gave  such  an  assur-
ance. 
(20)  BT  has  stated  to  the  Commission  that  it  had 
been under pressure from  certain other national 
telecommunication  authorities  to  prevent 
retransmission  of  telex  messages  between  third 
countries  by  the  UK  message-forwarding  agen-
cies  and  that  it  had  irttroduced  the  restrictions 
in  order  to,  in  its  view,  meet  its  international 
obligations  to  other  administrations. 
(21)  Paragraph  11  (1}  of  Scheme  T.1/1976  provides 
that  if  a subscriber •fails  to  observe  or  perform 
any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Scheme,  or  any 
obligation  on  his  part  arising  thereunder,  the 
Post· Office  may (without prejudice  to any other 
right  or  remedy) : 
(a)  without  notice,  temporarily  disconnect  any 
installation  or  any  part  of  an  installation ; 
(b)  summarily cease  to  provide  telecommunica-
.  tion  service  after  giving  notice  of  its  inten-
tion  to  terminate service  provided  under the 
Scheme.' 
BT maintains that it has the  right to disconnect 
the  facilities  of  those  agencies  which  persist  in 
ignoring  the  Scheme  restrictions  but  it  has  not 
sought to  enforce  the  restrictions  by  taking any 
such  action. 
(22)  On  22  June  1979,  Telespeed  Services  Limited, 
one  of  the  UK  message-forwarding  agencies 
concerned  by  the  restrictions  introduced  by  BT 
on  21  January· 1978,  lodged  an  application 
under Article 3 of Regulation  No  17 requesting 
the  Co~mission to  find  that Articles  85  (1)  or 
86 of the  EEC Treaty had been infringed and to 
require  BT  to  bring  such  infringement  to  ~n 
end.  The  complainant  submits  that  the  actual 
effect of the  BT restriction is to prohibit retrans-
mission  by  a  UK  telex  operator  of  messages 
originating  outside  the  UK  to  destinations 
·outside the UK even where there is  no question 
of lower rates being charged or available. To the 
best of the complainant's knowledge  its  charges 
are  the  same  as  or higher  than  those  ruling  in 
the countries of its customers within the EEC. 
(23)  In  November 1981, BT revoked and  replaced all 
previous  schemes  by  the  Telecommunication 
Scheme  1981. The  provisions  of  paragraphs  44 
(2)  (a)  and  70  (2)  (b)  of  Scheme  Tl/1978  were 
carried  into the  1981  Scheme and  re-numbered 
paragraphs  51  (2) (a) and 82 (2) (a)  respectively. 
(24)  On  22 October 1982, BT wrote  to  the Commis-
sion  as  follows:  'it is  now  accepted  that,  in  the 
context of  this  case,  the  CCITT  Recommenda-
tion directly-conflicts with Articles 85 (1) and 86 
of  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  Consequently,  British 
Telecommunications has  unilaterally decided  to 
withdraw  the  particular  restrictions  at  issue  and 
will  amend  the  Telecommunication  Scheme 
accordingly  and  advise  other  administrations 
and  UK  message-forwarding  agencies  of  this 
decision'.  · 
11.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
A.  Applicability  of  Article  86  of  the  EEC 
Treaty 
Article  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  prohibits  as 
incompatible  with  the  common  market  any 
abuse  by  one  or  more  undertakings  of  a domi-
nant position within  the common  market, or  in 
a substantial  part  of  it,  in  so  far  as  such  abuse 
may  affect  trade  between  Member  States . 
(a)  Undertaking  in  a  dominant position 
(25)  The  United  Kingdom  Post  Office  and  British 
Telecommunications  are  public  corporations 
and  economic  entities  carrying  on  activities  of 
an  economic  nature.  As  such  they  are  under-
takings  within  the  meaning of Article  86  of the 
EEC  Treaty. 
(26)  British  Telecommunications  has  a  statutory 
monopoly,  under  the  Telecommunications  Act 
1981,  for  the  running  of  .  telecommunication 
systems  throughout  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  Isle  of  Man.  British  Telecommunications 
therefore  holds  a  dominant  position  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  which  constitutes  a substan-
tial  part of  the  common  market,  for  the  provi-
sion  of  telex  and  telephone  systems. 
(27)  Under  the  Telecommunications  Act  1981 
British  Telecommunications  became  the  legal 
successor of the United Kingdom Post Office  in 
respect  of  the  statutory  monopoly  for  the 
running  of  telecommunication  systems 
throughout  the  United  Kingdom  and  of  all 
rights  and  liabilities  thereunder.  British  Tele-
communications  is  therefore  the  successor  to 
the  United  Kingdom  Post  Office  for  the 
purposes  of  this  proceeding. 
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(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
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(b)  Abuse 
Restrictions  imposed  by  an  undertaking  in  a 
dominant  position,  even  under  a  power 
conferred  on  it  by  authority,  may  constitute an 
abuse  of  such  a dominant  position. 
Restrictions on  the  provision on  behalf of third 
parties  of  telephone  and  telex  service·s  and  on 
the  use  of  telephone  and  telex  installations  in 
the  United  Kingdom  are  laid  down  by  BT  in 
'Schemes'  made  under  Section  28  of  the  Post 
Office Act  1969 and Section  21  of the Telecom-
munications  Act  1981  respectively.  Under 
Schemes  T7/t975  and  Tl/1976,  subscribers 
were  free  to  use  their  installations  for  the 
purpose  of  sending  or  receiving  messages  on 
behalf  of  third  parties. 
Until  20  January  1978,  however,  paragraph  43 
(2) (b) (iii) of Scheme Tl/197  5 and  paragraph  70 
(2)  (b)  (iii)  of  Scheme  Tl/1976  provided  that 
where  a subscriber relayed  a telex  message  both 
originating  and  for  delivery  outside  the  United 
Kingdom, the amount he charged should not be 
such  as  to  enable  the originator of  the  message 
to  send  it  more  cheaply  than  if he  had  sent  it 
directly.  In  so  far as it applied to  the  retransmis-
sion  of  telex  messages  originating  in  another 
EEC  Member State  for  delivery.  to  any  country 
outside  the  United  Kingdom,  or  originating  in 
any  country  outside  the  United  Kingdom  for 
delivery  to  another  EEC  Member  State,·  this 
provision  was  an  abuse  under Article 86  EEC  as 
it ; 
(i)  limited message-forwarding agencies' activi-
ties  to  the prejudice of customers located  in 
other  EEC  Member  States ; 
(ii)  applied  dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent 
transactions  with  message-forwarding agen-
cies  by  imposing a condition  for  the conti-
nuation  of  services  that,  of  all  telex 
messages submitted to  BT, those for onward 
transmission  outside  the  United  Kingdom 
must  either  originate  in  the  United 
Kingdom or be charged for  by the agencies 
at  a price  that  ensured  that  they  were. not 
cheaper for  the  sender than  if he  had  sent 
them directly. This placed the agencies  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the 
national  telecommunication authorities and 
agen,cies in other Member States not subject 
to  such  restrictions ; and 
(iii)  made  the use of telephone and telex  instal-
lations  subject  to  the  acceptance  by  mes-
sage-forwarding agencies of an obligation to 
charge  prices  that  had  no' connectiqn  with 
the  type  and quality of the telecommunica-
tion  services  provided  by  them  but  rather 
arose  out of  BTs desire to  protect the  reve-
nues  of  other  national  telecommunication 
authorities. 
It may  be  noted, however,  that the above  provi-
sion  of  Schemes  T7/1975  and  Tl/1976  were 
never  enforced  \:3  above)  and  were  finally 
deleted  on  11  January  1978  with  effect  on  20 
January  1978. 
(31)  Scheme  Tl/1978,  amending  the  · principal 
Scheme  Tl/1976,  came  into  operation  on  21 
January 1978. The new  provisions of paragraphs 
44 (2) (a) and  70  (2) (b), which were  later carried 
into  the  1981  Scheme  as  paragraphs  51  (2)  (a) 
and  82  (2)  (a)  respectively,  in  effect  prohibit 
message-forwarding  agencies  in  the  United 
Kingdom  from  retransmitting  to  destinations 
outs1de  the  United  Kingdom 
(i)  messages  intended  for  ultimate  reception  in 
visual  form  (such  as  telex, facsimile,  printout 
or  picture  on  a  visual  display  unit)  and 
received  in  data  form  via  the  telephone 
system  from  computers  abroad;  and 
(ii)  telex  messages  originating  outside  the 
United  Kingdom. 
(32)  In  so  far  as  they  apply  to  telephone  and  telex 
messages  originating  in  another  EEC  Member 
State  for  delivery  to  any  country  outside  the 
United· Kingdom  or  originating in  any  country 
outside  the  United  Kingdom  for  delivery  to 
another  EEC  Member  State,  such  prohibitions 
are an abuse :mder Article 86 of the  EEC Treaty 
as  they: 
(i)  limit the activities of  United  Kingdom  tele-
phone  and  telex  subscribers  acting  as  mes-
sage-forwarding agencies  to  the  prejudice  of 
customers in other EEC Member States ; and 
(ii)  make  the  use  of  telephone  an.d  telex  instal-
lations subject to  obligations which  have  no 
connection  with  the  assignment  of  tele-
phone  or  telex  serv~ces. 
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(33)  1;3T  contends  that  it  would  not  be  an  infringe-
ment of Article 86 of the  EEC Treaty if BT were 
to  prohibit  telex  forwarding  agencies  altogether 
in  order to  reserve  to  itself,  in  accordance  with 
its  monopoly,  the  sole  right  of  providing  inter-
national  services.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no 
justification  for  holding  that  the  lesser  restric-
tions  which  it  has  imposed  on  the  act~vities of 
such  agencies  is  an  abuse  of  a dominant  posi-
tion. The Commission  doubts  that this conten-
tion is correct since the scope of BT's monopoly 
in  the  relevant  legislation  is  the  exclusive  privi-
lege  of  running telecommunication systems  not 
the  offering  of  services  making  use  of  such 
systems.  However,  even  assuming  that  the 
contention is  correct then  BT must exercise the 
powers granted  to  it  under  the  statutory  mono-
poly  in  accordance  with  the  EEC  rules  on 
competition  (see  paragraph  41  et  seq.) 
(34)  With  regard  to  paragraph  32  (i)  above,  the  new 
restriction  laid  down  in  paragraph  44  (2)  (a)  of 
Scheme  Tl/1978,  which  prohibits  UK  mes-
sage-forwarding  agencies  from  using  their tele-
phone  lines  for·  relaying  telex  and  other visual 
messages  between  countries  outside  the  United 
Kingdom, is  an abuse under Article 86 (b) of the 
EEC Treaty as it both limits the development of 
a new  market  and  the use  of new technology to 
tbe  prejudice of  relay  operators and their custo-
mers who are thus prevented from  making more 
efficient  use  of  existing  telecommunication 
systems. The  fact  that in  so  doing the  message-
forwarding  agencies  are  simply  exploiting  the 
tariff  differentials  existing  between  telex  and 
telephone services  provided  by  the  telecommu-
nication  authorities  is  irrelevant.  Even  if this 
were  to  result  in  fewer  telex  messages,  thereby 
providing  savings  in  costs  to  the  users,  this 
would  not  put  the  entire  international  telex 
system  at  risk.  The  maintenance  of  obsolete 
systems  through. measures  taken  by  an  under-
taking in  a dominant position  is  an  abuse under 
Article 86 (b) of the EEC Treaty in  that it limits 
technical  development  to  the  prejudice  of 
consumers. 
(35)  With  regard  to  paragraph  32 (ii)  above,  the  new 
restriction .laid  down  in  paragraph  70  (2)  (b)  of 
Scheme Tl/1978 is an  abuse under Article 86 of 
the  EEC  Treaty  as  it  makes  the  provision  and 
continued  provision  of  telecommunication 
services  subject  to  the  acceptance  of  an  obliga-
tion  not  to  deal  with  certain  equivalent  telex 
traffic  according  to  its  origin.  It is  in  no  way 
technically  necessary  nor  in  commercial  usage 
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to  treat such traffic differently and  as such  it  has 
no  connection  with  the  provision  of  telecom-
munication services. Rather, the obligation again 
arose  out of  BT's  desire  to  protect  the  revenues 
of other national telecommunication authorities. 
(36)  BT's contention that the  logical  consequence of 
such  a view  would  be  that  it  would  not  be  free 
to  restrict  the  use  which  customers could  make 
of its telecommunication systems can  be seen  to 
be unfounded. Any such  restrictions imposed  by 
BT  in  the  form  of  supplementary  obligations 
should  fall  outside  the  terms  of  Article  86  and 
in  this case  they  have  been shown  not  to  do  so. 
As  to  BT's  contention that  they do  not  have  to 
tolerate competition in services which  its  mono-
poly  was  intended  to  cover,  see  paragraph  33 
above. 
(c)  Effect  on  interstate  trade 
(37)  The  prohibitions  imposed  by  BT  on  message-
forwarding  agencies  in  the  United  Kingdom 
against  the  forwarding  of  messages  originating 
from  or  for  delivery  outside  the  United 
Kingdom  may  affect  trade  between  Member 
States in so  far  as  the countries of destination or 
origin  of  such  messages  are  Member  States  of 
the  European  Community. 
(38)  Although  the  prohibitions  relate  to  the  use  of 
telecommunication  installations  within  the 
United  Kingdom, they directly affect  the  provi-
sion  of services by  message-forwarding agencies 
in  the  United  Kingdom  to  third  parties  located 
in  other Member States, as such services  may  be 
provided  only  in  direct  relations  (i.e.  not  those 
in  transit)  between  the  United  Kingdom  and 
other Member States  and  no  longer  in  relations 
between  Member  States  other  than  the  United 
Kingdom  or between  those  Member  States  and 
countries  outside  the  European  Community. 
(39)  Thus,  there  is  a  clear  restnctton  on  trade 
between  Member  States  as  the  prohibition 
restricts  message-forwarding  agencies,  in 
carrying  on  their  business,  from  providing 
certain  services  for  customers  situated  in  other 
Member  States. The Commission  was  informed 
by the complainant that of the  13 000  to  14 000 
messages  it  received  from  abroad  annually 
between  1976 and  1979 for onward transmission 
to  destinations  abroad  85 %  originated  from 
EEC countries and  85 % were destined  for  EEC 
countries. 
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(40)  BT considers  that it  has  the right to disconnect 
those  agencies  who  persist  in  ignoring  the 
prohibition  and  this  would,  of  course.  have  the 
effect of preventing services of all  kinds between 
Member  States  being  offered  by  message-
forwarding  agencies.  The  complainant  has 
further  informed  the  Commission  that  it  has 
not  sought  to  develop  the  provision  of  these 
services,  for  which  it  saw  a considerable  poten-
tial, as  a result of the threat of disconnection by 
BT.  The  prohibition  has  thus  also  affected  the 
development  of  such  trade  between  Member 
States. 
a:  Applicability of Article 90 (2) of the EEC 
Treaty 
Article  90  (2)  of  the  EEC  Treaty  provides  that 
'Undertakings  entrusted  with  the  operation  of 
services  of  general  economic  interest or  having 
the  character of a revenue-producing monopoly 
shall  be  subject  to  the  rules  contained  in  this 
Treaty, in  particular to the rules on competition. 
in  so  far  as  the  application  of  such  rules  does 
not  obstruct the  performance, in  law  or  in  fact, 
of  the  particular  tasks  assigned  to  them.  The 
development  of  trade  must  not  be  affected  to 
such  an  extent as  would  be contrary to  the inte-
rests  of  the  Community'. 
(41)  Under  the  Post  Office  Act  1969  a·nd  the  Tele-
communications  Act  1981,  BT  has  been 
entrusted  with  the  operation  of  services  of 
general economic interest, namely the  provision 
of  telecommunication  systems  throughout  the 
United  Kingdom. The application of the Treaty 
rules on  competition to  BT would  not and  does 
not  obstruct the  performance of  its  duties  in  an 
efficient  and  economic  way.  Fgr  BT  to  be 
exempted  from  compliance  with  the  r:ules  on 
competition  it  is  not  sufficient  that  such 
compliance  would  make  performance  of  its 
duties  more  complicated. 
(42)  BT  has  claimed,  but  not  explained  how,  it 
would  be  obstructed  in  the  performance  of  its 
duties.  Indeed  it  would  be  in  BT's  interests  to 
allow such  traffic. Even  if  BT were  to experience 
difficulties  with  other  national  telecommunica-
tion  authorities  for  not  preventing  message-
forwarding  agencies  in  the  United  Kingdom 
from  undercutting  telex  tariffs  applied  in  other 
countries,  such  a situation  would  not  'obstruct' 
the  performance  of  BT's  particular  task. 
(43)  The  Commission  accepts,  in  its  broadest sense, 
the  view  held  by  BT that international coopera-
tion  and  the  honouring  of  international 
commitments  are  essential  features  in  the 
provision of international communications in an 
efficient  and  economic  way.  However.  this 
cooperation  should  not  go  so  far  as  to  violate 
the  Treaty  rules  of  competition. 
(44)  For the reasons set out above  the restrictions on 
the  use  of  telex  and  telephone  facilities  and 
s~rvices  by  .ST  constitute  infringements  of 
Article 86  of the  EEC Treaty.  BT should  there-
fore  be  required to  terminate any of the restric-
tions  that  are  still  in  operation. 
(45)  Notwithstanding  these  infringements,  the 
Commission  does  not  consider  that  a  fine 
should be  imposed on  BT in  view of the special 
circumstances  of  the  case  and  of  the  matters 
referred  to  in  paragraph. 20  above,  and  because 
BT  did  not  enfcrce  the  restrictions  by  discon-
necting  the  faciliti(·s  of  the  message-forwarding 
agencies. 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Article  1 
The following  provisions  of  the  relevant Telecommu-
nication Schemes of  the United  Kingdom  Post Office 
and  British  Telecommunications  constitute  infringe-
ments  of  Article  86  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Economic  Community : · 
1.  Scheme  T7/1975,  paragraph  43  (2)  (b)  (iii) 
2.  Scheme  Tt/1976,  paragraph  70  (2)  (b)  (iii) 
3.  Scheme Tl/1978. paragraphs 44 (2) (a) and 70 (2) (b) 
4.  Scheme/1981, paragraphs 51  (2) (a) and 82 (2) (a). 
Article  2 
British  Telecommunications shall  within  two  months 
of  the  d~te of  notification  of  this  Decision  bring  the 
infringements found  in Article  1 to an  end in so  far  as 
those  infringements  have  not  already been  brought to 
an  end. 
Article  3 
This Decision  is  addressed  to  British Telecommunica-
tions, 2-12 Gresham Street, UK-London  EC2V 7  AG. 
Done  at  Brussels,  I 0  December  1982. 
For  the  Commission 
Frans  ANDRIESSEN 
Member  of the  Commission 
230  i/81 .,  I 
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COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECI4JION 
of  12  January  1990 
relating to a  proceeding under Article  IS of the  EEC  Treacy 
(IV/32.006  - Alcatel  !apace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik) 
(Only  lhe  French and German texts· are authentic) 
(90/46/EEC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OP  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
H11ving  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation  No  17 of 6 february 
1962 Pint Regulation implementing Anicles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty ('~ 11 last amended by the Act of Acceuion of 
Spain  and  Portupl, and  in  particular  Articles  6 and  8 
tht reof, 
Hrving  regard  to  the  application· for  negative  clearance 
anri  the notification for exemption, submitted punuant to 
Articles  2. and 4 of Rcgultttion No 17 on  2.8 July 1986 by 
Akatel  Espace  SA.  Courbcvoic:,  and  ANT  Nachrichten· 
te< hnik  GmbH,  Backnang,  concerning  the  agreement  . 
be:: ween  them  signed  on  I t  february  1986, 
H:~ving regard  to  the  summary  of  the  application  and 
.no·ification  published"  pursuant  to  Article  19  (3)  of 
Rt- :~ulation  No  17, 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant  Positions. 
Whereas: 
(I) 
I.  THE  PACTS 
A.  IntrOduction 
On  28 July  1986 Alcatel  Espace SA.  Prance (here· 
inafter  ATES)  and  ANT  N~chrichtentechnik 
(')  OJ  No  13,  21.  2.  1962.  p.  204/62. 
(')  OJ  No  C  179,  IS.  7.  1989,  p.  9. 
(1) 
(l) 
(4) 
(.~) 
l/83 
GmbH,  Germany  (hereinafter  ANT)  notified  an 
agreement  to  the  Commission. 
The  purpose  of  the  agreement  is  to  promote 
research  and  development  (R&D)  of  certain  space 
electronic  equipment  in  the  field  of  civil  radio 
communications  and  broadcasting  satellites  and 
data  transmiuion  co,  from  and  between  satellite' 
and/or space vehicles throushout the world, as well 
11 to promote joint exploitation of the results and a 
degree  of  joint  marketing. 
The  object  of  the  notification  was  to  apply  for 
negative  clearance  or  alternatively  to  qualify  for 
exemption under Article IS (3) of the  EEC Treaty, 
punuant to Articles 2 and.4 of Regulation  No. 17. 
B.  The parties 
ATES  is directly controlled by  Alcatel  .:it (France), 
a subsidiary of Alcatel  NV  the  world  No  2 manu· 
facturer of communication equipment and systems. 
ATES  is  th~ principal  manufacturer,  in  the  Akatel 
Group,  of  space  electronic  equipment  carried  on 
board  satellites  and/or  spa~e vehicles.  The  1986 
turnover  of  ATES  was  FF Ill million  (ECU  120 
million).  During the  same  period  ATES's  turnover 
in the field covered by the agreement was  FF 481,5 
million  (ECU  71  million~ 
ANT is one of the leading companies  in  Germany 
in the  field  of telecommunication  technology. The: 
shareholders  of  ANT  are  Robert  Bosch  GmbH 
(83 %) and  Atlianz  Versicherungs  AG  (I 7 %).  In 
1986,  ANT  achieved  an  overall  turnover  of  OM 
t  2..~6  million  (ECU  590  million),  and  during  the r. 
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same  period  the  tumover  in  the  field  covered  by 
the  apment wu  DM  124  million  (ECU  58 
million~ 
C.  The aareement 
(6)  The  main  provisions  of  the  apment  are  as 
follows: 
(a)  The /i1/d covered by the •Jfftment is the space 
seamen& of communication systems usina satel-
lites and/or space  vehicles and/or communica· 
tion  subsystems  opcratina  on  board  satellites 
and/or space vehicles for civilian use in the am 
of: 
- civil  satellite  ndio communication services. 
and  direct  broadcut  television  services. 
- data  tnnsmission  to,  from  and  between 
satellites  and/or  space  vehicles  for  the 
purpose  of  telemer.ry,.  trackina  and 
command,  observation  or othen. 
(b)  The  panics  will  cooperate  in  research  and 
development  activities  in  the  field,  in  order to 
avoid  duplication  of  RlcD  effort.  and  will 
combine their  resources  for .the exploitttion of 
the  results  throuah  ntionaliution of manufac· 
curina. servicina and tatina of such systems, u 
well u chrouah coopencion in the biddina and 
neaotiations for contncts in  the field. This will 
normally be achieved by allocation of the deve· 
lopment and production of each item of equip-
ment  to  one  or  other  party.  'the  apement 
contains  suidelines  for  the  allocation  of  :he 
various it:ms of equipment between the  p:-•'i·~. 
However,  aiven  the  larac  variations  in  the 
equipment  carried  on  each  individual  satellite 
(or  small  set  of  satellites~ these  guidelines  are 
supplemented by a procedure  for allocatina the 
work  in  any  panic:ular  satellite  project. 
Nothins in the  asr~~ment prohibits either party 
from enpsins in any activity outside the scope 
of  the  asreement  which  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  panics'  obliptions. 
(c)  Prottdurts for  tht rooptration 
(i)  Each  party  will  nonnally  make  its  beSI 
effon  to  specify  satellite  payloads  and 
subsystems  for  which  it  is  responsible  in 
such  a way  that  ,.quipment  developed  by 
the  other  party  can  be  used  in  the  best 
possible  conditions. 
(ii)  BOth  parties  will  rcsularly  inform  each 
ocher  of  their  RacD  proaramme  R"~rdina 
equip,ment  in  :he  field. 
(iii)  After final allocation, by  m~·~ual aarcement, 
to  one  party  of  nnain  equipment,  the 
procedure  will  be  as  follows : 
- before  commencins  development  of 
such  equipment  each  party  shall 
consult the other about the objectives co 
be  achieved,  in  particular  performanc,.. 
cost  and  delivery  schedules, 
- the dcvelopina party wm be responsible 
for  R&D  fundins. 
- the developins party will be responsible 
for RicO activities and production of its 
allocated  equipment,  but  will  fully 
inform  the other pany of  the  results of 
its  R&D,  . 
- if  the  developing  party  subcontracts 
pans  of  the  RicO  or  production  of  its 
allocated equipment, it will give priority 
to  the  other  party, 
-- the  other  party  will  not  independently 
develop  the  same  equipment, 
- the other party  wi;l  procure equipment 
from  the developina party. If the devel-
oping  party's  proposal  docs  not  meet 
the  requirements  in  terms  of  perfor-
mance,  price  and  delivery  schedule, 
competina  proposals  may  be  requested 
from  other  suppliers  subject  to  prior 
consultation  and  close  cooperation. 
~~i Relevant  patents  owned  by  either  party,  and 
patents which  a party  is  entitled  to sublicense, 
will  be  communicated  to  the  other  party  and 
the  latter  will  have  a royalty-free  and  non-ex· 
clusive  licence  to  perform  its  acti\'ities  in  the 
field. 
In  the  case  of  inventions  conceived  jointly  by 
employees  of  both  panics,  patent  applications 
for such Inventions will  be  filed  In  the name of 
both  panics. 
(e)  Each party asrees to keep secret the confidential 
information  it  receives  from  the  other  party, 
and to use and disclose it only for the purposes 
intended  under  the  agreement.  On  expiry  of 
the agreement, each  party will  return  its copies 
of all  confidential  information  it  received  from 
the other party. The  confidentiality obligations 
will end five years after expiry of the agreement. 
(f)  Meetings  between  appropriate  personnel  of 
both  parties  will  take  place  to  discuss  matters 
such u  technical aspects, marketing and sales. 
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In addition, the parties will  inform each other 
regularly of outside developments of a technical 
or commercial nature  that have  come to  their 
attention and which  may be pertinent to their 
R&D activities in the field or the exploitation of 
the  results. 
(g)  (i)  Executive  committee 
Each  of  the  parties  will  appoint  three 
members  to  an  executive · committee. The 
decisions ofthe executive committee will be 
taken  unanimously  and  will  bind  both 
parties.  The  executive  committee  will  be 
responsible  for  establishing general  policies 
and  guidelines  relative  to  performance  of 
the  agreement  and  its  future  evolution. 
(ii)  Steering  committee 
The steering committee will  also  consist of 
three  members representing each  party.  Its 
decisions  must  be  taken  unanimously  and 
will  be  binding. If no unanimous decision 
can be reached, the matter will be submitted 
to  the  executive  committee. 
The  role  of  the  steering  committee  is  to 
take  - in  compliance  with  execution 
committee  guidelines  - main  decisions 
relating  to  the  marketing,  technical  and 
industrial  policies.  Such  decisions  will 
include  determination  of  projects  and  rel-
evant  strategies,  cooperation  in  marketing 
activities, execution  of cooperation in R&D 
and  production  activities,  and decisions  on 
sharing  of  equipment. 
(h)  Exploitation  of results 
The exploitation of results can be carried out in 
three  ways: 
(i)  jointly marketed projects - which are acti-
vities  where  both  parties  manufacture  and 
supply  as  the  result  of  a  successful  bid 
submitted  to  a  customer  by  both  parties 
acting  as  co-contractors ; 
(ii)  individually marketed projects - which are 
activities where only one party acts as  main 
contractor/supplier; 
(iii)  independently marketed  projects - which 
are  activities  where  only one party  manu-
factures and supplies equipment of  its  own 
manufacture. 
In each case of jointly or individually marketed 
projects, including calls for .tenders, the strategy 
and the  determination  of  which  party  will  be 
the  main  contractor  will  be  decided  by  the 
steering committee. 
The  party  acting  as  main  contractor  in  any 
individually marketed projects will ensure as  far 
as  possible  that  the  other  party  will  be  the 
subcontractor/supplier  for  all  equipment 
concerned  by  the  agreement,  which  the  main 
contractor  does  not  manufacture. 
Either  party  remains  free  to  pursue  indepen-
dently  markete<.:  projects. 
Each  party agrees  to  supply to  the other party 
any  equipment and  spare  parts  thereof  whirh 
the  other  party  may  request. 
(i)  The agreement has  an  initial term of  five  years. 
It will be  automatically extended for  three-year 
periods, unless  terminated by  one  party giving 
at  least  one year's  written  notice. 
After  the  notice  of  termination  of  the  agree-
ment,  licence  rights  under  patents  may  be 
extended  by  request  of  the  licensed  party, 
subject to  the parties agreeing upon  reasonable 
and  non-discriminatory  conditions. 
G)  Should  negotiation  fail  to  resolve  any  dispute 
which  may  arise,  the  parties  agree  that  it  be 
finally  settled  by  arbitration. 
(k)  Appendix  1 to  the  agreement lists  and  recom-
mends  a  division  of  the  following  equipment 
between  the  parties : 
- receiver  (RCVR), 
- input  multiplexer  (IMUX), 
- channel  amplifier  (CAMP), 
- _high  power  amplifier  (HPA), 
- output  multiplexer  (OMUX), 
- TIC transponder. 
This equipment covers  only a relatively  small  part 
of  the  quipment  covered  by  the  agreement,  and 
none  of  it  can  be  considered  as  a  final  product, 
which are complete satellites. The listed devices arc 
incorporated in  subsystems such as  repeater subsys-
tems,  tracking,  telemetry  and  command  subsys-
tems.  None of  the equipment listed above  can  be 
used  in  areas  outside  space  . 
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D.  The product and the market 
Nature  of demand 
(7)  The markets for satellites and their components are 
unusual  in that each satellite (or small set of satel-
lites) is a unique project requiring newly developed: 
or at  least  highly adapted, components assembled 
to an individual design dependent on the particular 
require~r.ents  of  the  customer.  This,  when 
combined  with  the  high  technology · involved, 
normally  implies  that. each  new  satellite  project 
requires  a  substantial  input  of  R&D,  which  is 
closely integrated with  the production of the satel-
lite and  its  components, each of which is  close  to 
being  a  prototype.  Moreover  satellites  obviously 
need to be robust and reliable, but as lightweight as 
possible.  These  factors,  taken .together,  imply that 
satellite  customers  and  their  prime  contractors 
insist on a very high degree of cooperation with all 
the  parties  involved  in  the  development  of  any 
particular  satellite. 
Market  shares  and competitive position 
(8)  There are a large number of competitors for manu-
. facturing  and  sales  of  the  equipment covered  by 
the  agreement :  about  18  in  the  EEC,  three  in 
Sweden,  six  in  the  United  States,  two  in  Canada 
and  three  in  Japan. 
The  table  gives  estimates  of  the worldwide  space 
related turnover of  the principal satellite producers 
in  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world : 
(million  tcus) 
Non  European 
Hughes  [ ... ](') 
General  Electric  [ ... ) 
European 
British  Aerospace  [ ... ) 
Matra  [ ... ] 
Aerospatiale  ( ... ] 
MBB  [ ... ) 
Selenia  Spazio  [ ... ) 
Alcatel  Espace  [ ... ] 
Marconi  [ ... ) 
Aeritalia  ( ... ] 
ANT  ( ... ] 
As  ~an be  seen  from  these  .figures,  Alcatel  and 
ANT's combined turnover in this area  is  less  than 
( 1)  In  the  published version  of the  Decision, some information 
has  hereinafter  been  omitted,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
Article 21  of Regulation  No 17 concerning non-disclosure of 
business  secrets. 
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several other European  manufacturers and  is  many 
times less  than that of some non-European manu-
facturers. 
Even  if  the  relevant  market is  narrowly  defined as 
the items covered by the field  of cooperation, and 
is  geographically restricted  to  EC-based  customers 
the parties' combined market share  is  under 20 oi 
If account is  taken of the worldwide  market, or of 
the overall  satellite market, their combined market 
share  is  much  lower. 
Moreover,  ther~  is  thought  to  be  a  substantial 
'learning curve'  for  all  aspects  of  satellite  produe-
tion, so that the more similar space projets a firm  is 
involved  with  (both  civil  and  military),  the  more 
effectively it can develop and produce new satellites 
or their components. This effect particularly bene-
fits  the  United  States  space  industry,  where  the 
number of space projects is  higher than in  Europe, 
the overall  budgets  allocated  to  space  activities  in 
the  United  States  and  Europe  in  1986  being  as 
follows: 
USA 
- Department of Defense 
-NASA 
Europe 
- National  budgets 
- European  Space  Agency  (ESA) 
(Sourt~: Euroconsult.) 
Total 
Total 
(billion  US  S) 
14 
7 
21 
0,84 
1,36 
2,20 
Thus,  taking  advantage  of  their  strong  worldwide 
positions and of  the size of their domestic market. 
certain  non-European  space  manufacturers  can 
afford  R&D  budgets and/or financial  and commer-
cial resources far exceeding those of their European 
competitors and can therefore cover a much wider 
range  of  activities  i~ space  electronic  equipment. 
subsystems  and  systems. 
This  may  explain  why  European  manufacturers 
only  compete· at  the  subsytem  level  and  at  the 
equipment  level,  whilst  other  manufacturers 
. compete at the full  final  product level, which nat-
urally  influences  the  structure  of  competition .. 
The share of the parties of the total  cost of  a sate!· 
lite (launch excluded) may vary significantly from.' 
very  low  percentage  when  their  procurement  ., 
limited  to  a  single  device  to,  exceptionally,  about 
half,  if they are  responsible  for  the  whole  payload 
of  a  telecommunications  satellite. 
For all  these  reasons,  Community companies wi.th 
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(9) 
technology find  it difficult  to compete with other 
larger  non-European  competitors. 
These factors have allowed non-European competi-
tors to win the contracts for a number of recent EC 
projects such as the Astra/SES and British Satellite 
Broadcasting direct  broadcasting  satellites. 
The  geographical  market 
In  view  of  the  high  prices  of  the  final  products, 
transport costs to the launch site are  unimportant. 
So,  except  where  legal  restrictions  or  national 
purchasing  preferences  exist,  Community  (and 
other) satellite customerS have  no particular reason 
to  buy  from  locally-based  manufacturers. 
The turnover of the parties in the field  covered by 
the  agreement  is  principally  within  the  common 
market. 
Legal  restrictions 
(1 0)  The main legal  restrictions existing on the market 
are  as  follows: 
(11) 
Cocom export control  rules  impose severe  restric-
tions  on  space  activities. 
Further  ~estrictions result  from  the 'Buy American 
Act'  and  similar  regulations. 
In  Europe, the ESA  'geographical return' principle 
requires a  balance between the financial  contribu- · 
tion  of each  member country  to  the Agency  and 
industrial  share  of  business  awarded  under  space 
programmes  to  manufacturers  of  those  countries. 
Main  customers 
The  main  customers  for  the  final  products  arc : 
- national  telecommunications  administrations 
worldwide  (P1Ts), 
- space  agencies  an  organizations  such  as : 
Intelsat, 
Inmarsat, 
Eutelsat, 
NASA, 
DLR,  DARA, 
ESA, 
CNES, 
- ISRO  (India), 
- Nasda  Uapan), 
- CAST (China), 
- Eumetsat, 
- direct  broadcast  satellite  consortia  such  as : 
- Astra/SES, 
- British  Satellite  Broadcasting. 
E.  Observations  from  third parties 
The Commission did  not receive  any  observations 
from  third parties following  the publication of  the 
notice required by Article  19  (3)  of Regulation  No 
17. 
II.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
A.  Article  85  (1)  of the  EEC  Treaty 
(12)  The  agreement  signed  on  11  February  1986 
between  Alcatel  Espace  and  ANT  Nachrichten-
technik  is  an  agreement  between  undertakings 
within the meaning of Article 85 (I) of the Treaty. 
The  object  of  tl-te  agreement  is  cooperation  in 
research and development activities and the combi-
nation of the parties' resources  for  the exploitation 
of these results through rationalization of manufac-
turing, servicing and  testing of such equipment as 
well  as  through  cooperation  in  the  bidding  and 
negotiation  for  contracts. 
(13)  Both parties  have  their own  researeh  and develop-
ment divisions which carry out research in the field 
covered  by the agreement and, except for  projects 
that  are  subject  to  special  legal  restrictions,  the 
parties  are  competitors. 
(14)  The following provisions of the agreement have the 
object  and/or  effect  of  restricting  competition 
within  the  common  market. 
1.  The allocation of devices between the parties for 
research  and  Cievelopment  and  production 
purposes, introduces a measure of specialization 
in  that those devices  will  be developed  by  one 
partner  only,  the  other  being  bound  not  to 
develop  its  own.  Although  the  agreement 
provides for  royalty-free and non-exclusive cross 
licensing of patent rights and for joint patents in 
some  cases,  the  consequence  is  nonetheless  a 
restriction  of  competition  in  R&D  as  now  only 
one  of  the  two  parties  will  undcttakc  any 
specific  R&D  project,  where  previously  both 
might have  done  this.  This  is  of  some  signifi-
cance  in  an  industry  in  which  virtually  every 
new order calls for  significant new  R&D  invest-
ment. 
2.  The  procedure  under  the  agreement  for · the 
procurement  by  one  party  of  the  equipment 
manufactued  by  the  other  party,  although 
leaving -the  former  the  possibility  of  using 
another supplier, tends to  eliminate the compe-
tition  of  third  party  suppliers. 
3.  The provisions of the agreement concerning the 
exchange of information between  the  parties on 
all  the marketing possibilities and those assign-
ing  to  common  committees  the  decision-
making process  relating  to  marketing, technical 
and  industrial  policies,  are  also  restrictive  of 
competition. 
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Although  provision  is  made  for  independently 
marketed  . projects,  a  jointly  agreed  R&D 
programme  and  common  committees  respon-
sible  for  marketing  decisions  will  certainly 
result  in  the  choice  of  one  of  the  two  joint 
marketing  methods  whenever  possible,  hence 
eliminating one supplier from the market in all 
these  cases. 
Consequently, the effect  of  the agreement is  to 
alter the previously autonomous position of the 
parties  relating  to  planning, financing,  research 
and development, production and marketing of 
the  equipment covered  by  the  agreement,  the 
parties  no  longer  being  able  to  act  indepen-
dently. 
(15)  The  parties  are  incorporated  in  different  Member 
States  and  aim  under  the  agreement  to  market 
jointly worldwide, hence obviously also at Commu-
nity level, so the agreement will necessarily have an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member States. 
(16)  The agreement  therefore  falls  within  the scope  of 
Article  85  (1)  of  the  Treaty. 
B.  Regulation (EEC)  No  418/85 
(17)  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No·  418/85 (3) 
provides  that the categories of research  and devel-
opment agreements  the  contents of which  are  in 
accordance  with  its  conditions,  are  exempted  by 
category  from  the  prohibition  of Article  85  (1)  of 
the  Treaty.  Moreover,  the  exemption  may  be 
extended  to  certain  agreements  containing  other 
restrictions by means of an 'opposition' procedure. 
The  agreement establishes  a  cooperation structure 
between  the  parties  that .goes  beyond  the  object 
and scope of Regulation (EEC)  No 418/85 and the 
parties  have  not  asked  the  Commission  to  apply 
the 'opposition' procedure. In  fact,  the cooperation 
between  the  parties  is  not  limited  to  R&D  and 
exploitation  of  the  results,  but  extends  to  the 
marketing  of  the  products.  So,  when  they  have 
agreed to bid jointly for  the contract for a satellite, 
they obviously must agree on the bid price and so 
are  restricted in their determination of prices. This 
implies,  inter alia, that the agreement falls  within 
the scope of Article 6 (d) of that Regulation. There-
fore,  even  though  the  parties'  Community market 
share is  below 20 %, Regulation (EEC)  No 418/85 
is  not applicable to the present case, nor could it be 
extended to cover this case by means of the opposi-
tion  procedure. 
( 1)  0 J No  L  53,  22.  2.  1985,  p.  5. 
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C.  Article  85  (3)  of the  EEC Treaty 
(18)  The  jointly  agreed  programme  of  research  and 
development by  the contracting  parties  is  such  as 
to  promote  technical  and  economic  progress. 
(19) 
The equipment covered  by  the agreement is  tech-
nically very sophisticated. Its development is  extre-
mely costly and requires a high degree of skill. The 
efforts  and  risks  involved,  if  they  could  be 
supported  independently  by  the  parties,  would 
most certainly not lead  to  results as  rapid, efficient 
and  economic  as  those  envisaged. 
The  level  of  individual  R&D  investment  is 
intended to remain the same for  each party, which 
will lead to a more efficient use of this expenditure. 
The degree of specialization for certain equipment 
achieved by both parties by means of this optimiza-
tion of  R&D  investment will  enable the  parties to 
develop a wider product range of  equipment to  be 
offered  to  customers. 
Under every space programme each piece of equip-
ment is  developed as  a prototype and the  ration'al-
ization expected will  lead  to  the supply of  higher-
quality equipment at  lower costs. Moreover,  repeti-
tive  development experience, on equipment proto-
types belonging to the same class, may result in the 
parties  reaching  a  level  of  production  comparable 
to  that already achieved  by other manufacturers of 
satellites.  Given  the  number  and  importance  of 
other competitors  in  this  field  it  is  most  unlikely 
that  the  reduction  of  competition  between  these 
two  competitors will .allow  them  to  increase  their 
prices  in  any  significant  way. 
The  cooperation  deriving  from  the  agreement  is 
excepted  to  lead  not  only  to  improved  and  more 
rapid technical solutions, but also to avoid duplica-
tion  of  R&D  effort,  hence  allowing  the  achieve-
ment of  cost  savings. 
The agreement thus contributes to promoting tech-
nical  progress. This benefit can  be  excepted  to  be 
passed  on  to  customers  in  terms  of  improved 
products. 
The  agreement  only  imposes  restrictions  on  the 
parties  which  are  indispensable  to  the  attainment 
of  these  objectives. 
The field  covered by  the agreement and the  o~jec· 
tives  of  the  R&D  programme  are  well  defl_ned. 
Nothing  under  the  agreement  prohibits  eather 
party  from  engaging  in  any  activity  outside  t~e 
scope  of  the  agreement  or constitutes  a  cornrnat· 
ment to  a  final  apportionment  of  the  equipment 
covered  by  the  agreement. 
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The slight  preference given  to  the  other party  in 
terms of subcontracting is merely an element of the 
somewhat complex arrangement for  specialization 
of  R&D  and production. 
The fact that each party is bound not do to develop 
certain  equipment  entrusted  to  the  other  flows 
from  that very  rationalization  which  is  the reason 
for  their expected improved  results  and  increased 
competitiveness. 
(20)  The nature of demand in  this case implies that the 
option of joint R&D, joint manufacturing, but sepa-
rate  ·marketing  is  not  practical.  This  results  from 
the close cooperation that is  necessary between the 
customer, prime stallite contractor and subcontrac-
tors  (such  as  the  parties).  Customers  and  their 
prime contractors insist on knowing, in great detail, 
who  has  manufactured  which  items,  and  all  the 
relevant  technical  detail  as  there  is  normally  no 
way  of repairing a satellite once in orbit. Competi-
tion  normally takes place  by  customers' calling for 
tenders  which  are  then  submitted  by  consortia 
formed on a case-by-case basis.  If separate market-
ing were  attempted, then in  any project for which 
both  pa~ies wished  to  bid, each  party would have, 
at the same time, to  promote its own  package, and 
to  assist  the  other in  promoting  that  party's  rival 
package  to  the  final  customer,  either  within  one 
consortium  or as  part  of  rival  consortia. Thus the 
same  technical  experts  would  have,  twice  over,  to 
describe  and  promote  an  identical  technical 
package to  the same customer.  In  this context the 
customer may  have  doubts  as  to  whether the  two 
parties, having failed  to cooperate commercially on 
a  joint  bid,  could  in  fact  successfully  cooperate · 
technically. This might lead them to buy elsewhere. 
This implies that, in  this  particular case,  the bene-
fits  of  joint R&D  and  joint  manufacture  can only 
be achieved  if  they are  combined with  a degree of 
joint  marketing. 
Moreover,  the  agreement  allows  for  independent 
actions  (independently  marketed  projects)  and/or 
usual  contractual  schemes  of  relatiops,  e.g. 
co-contracting Gointly  marketed  projects),  subcon-
tracting  and/or  purchasing  (individually  marketed 
projects).  Competitive  conditions  in  terms  of 
performance,  price  and  delivery  schedules  are 
required  for  procurement  by  and  between  the 
parties  who  are  allowed  to  consider  competing 
proposals from  third  parties  and  to  purchase  from 
them. 
In  the  case  of  independently  marketed  projects, 
which  either  party  is  free  to  pursue,  the  party 
which  did  not develop  an  item  of equipment can 
obtain  it  either by  buying  it  from  the  developing 
party,  or  by  procuring  it  from  third  parties  who 
offer  better  conditions  in  terms  of  performance, 
price  and delivery  schedules. 
The above  implies  that where,  exceptionally,  sep-
arate  marketing is  a viable option, the parties  may 
choose  it. 
(21)  The parties' market share, however defined,  is  not 
high, and there are  many other large manufacturers 
both within  the Community and  elsewhere  in  the 
world  who  are  active  or  potential  competitors  in 
the common market. Some  of  these  have  a  larger 
range  of  products  and  far  larger  sales  than  the 
parties. Thus the agreement, on its  own,  could  not 
allow  the  panies  to  eliminate  competition  in  the 
common  market  for  these  products. 
(22)  Accordingly, all the conditions set out in Article 85 
(3)  ·of  the  EEC  Treaty  are  fulfilled. 
D.  Article 8  of Regulation  No  17 
(23)  Pursuant  to  Article  8  (1)  of  Regulation  No  17,  a 
decision  in  application  of .Article  8.5  (3)  of  the 
Treaty  is  to  be  issued  for  a  specified  period  and 
conditions and obligations may be attached thereto. 
(24)  The agreement can be  authorized under Article  8.5 
(3)  from  the  da~ of  notification,  namely  28  July 
1986, and until  termination of the agreement, but 
in  any  case  not  later  than  31  December  1996. 
(25)  The conditions for  exemption  are  fulfilled  for  the 
stated  period,  in  the  light  of  the  special  circum-
stances  in  this  case. 
(26)  The exemption relates solely to  the notified agree-
ment,  and  does  not  cover  any  extensions  in  the 
scope of the  agreement.  In  this case,  the  structure 
necessary  to  obtain  the  benefits  of  R&D  coopera-
tion  and  manufacturing  specialization  requires  a 
much  higher degree  of  coordination  between  the 
parties  than  would  be  acceptable  in  more  usual 
specialization  or R&D  cooperation  agreement, and 
in this respect may be closer to the degree of coor-
dination  achieved  in  a  joint  venture. 
This  makes  it  necessary  for  the  Commission  to 
monitor  whether  this  agreement,  in  combination 
with other joint actions by  the parties,  may  lead  to 
a  substantial  reduction  of  competition,  a!>  suc.:h  a 
reduction  might imply  that  the  conditions  neces-
sary  for  an  exemption  would  no  longer  be  valid. 
Accordingly  this  Decision  must be  conditional  on 
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the parties promptly informing the Commission of 
the conclusion of any agreement or contract which 
modifies,  replaces,  or  cancels  the  notified  agree-
ment ; or any important joint activity by the parties 
relating to space electronic equipment outside the 
terms  of  the  notified  agreement, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Article  I 
Pursuant to  Article  85  (3)  of the  BBC  Treaty, the  provi-
sions of Article 85 (I) are  hereby declared inapplicable to 
the  agreement  signed  on  11  February  1986  between 
Alcatel  Espace SA and ANT Nachrichtentechnik GmbH, 
an.d  notified  on  28  July  1986. 
Article  2 
The following obligation is  attached to  the declaration in 
Article  1 : 
- the  parties  shall  inform  the  Commission  without 
delay  of  contracts  or agreements  concluded  between 
themselves by which the notified Agreement is  modi-
fied,  replaced  or  cancelled, 
- each  party  shall  further  inform  the  Commission  of 
any other contracts or agreements it concludes, either 
with third parties or with the other party, which relate 
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to  joint  activities  in  the  field  of  electronic  space 
equipment,  provided  such  contracts  or  agreements 
relate  to· major  business  issues  (in  volume  or in  stra-
tegic  importance) and cannot be considered coopera. 
tion  in  respect  of  single  projects. 
Article J 
This Decision shall apply with effect  from· 28  July 1986 
and shall  apply  until  31  December  1996. 
Article  4 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to : 
1.  Alcatel  Bspace  SA,  11  avenue  Dubonnet,  F-92107 
Courbevoie. 
2.  ANT  Nachrichtentechnik  GmbH,  GerberstraBe  33, 
D-7150  Backnang. 
Done  at  Brussels,  12  January  1990. 
For  the  Commission 
Leon  BRITIAN 
Vice-President • 
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COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 27  July 1990 
relating to a  proceeding under Article  85  of the EEC  Treaty 
(IV /32.688  - Konsortium ECR 900) 
(Only  the English,  Outc:b  and German texts are authentic:) 
(90/446/EEq 
THE COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 
1962,  First Regulation  implementing Articles  85  and  86 
of the Treaty (1), as last amended by  the Act of Accession 
of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Article 2 thereof, 
Having ·regard to the notification of a cooperation agree-
ment on  1·, April  1988  by  the  firms  AEG  Aktiengesell-
schaft,  Alcatel  NV  and Oy  Nokia  AB, 
Having  published  a  summary  of  the  notification (~ 
pursuant to  Article  19  (3)  of  Regulation  No  17, 
Having consulted the Advisory  Committee on Restrictive 
Practices  and  Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
(1) 
I. THE FACTS 
A.  Subject of the  notification 
On 7  April  1988,  AEG  Aktiengesellschaft,  Alcatel 
NV  and  Oy  Nokia  notified  a  cooperation  agree-
ment concluded by them. The cooperation between 
the  undertakings  relates  to  the  formation  of  a 
consortium,  ECR  900,  for  the  joint  development 
and  manufacture  and  the  joint  distribution  of  a 
pan-European  digital  cellular  mobile  telephone 
system. The cooperation does  not include the end 
products (mobile  telephones)  through  which  users 
are  connected  to  the  system. 
B.  The undertakings concerned 
AEG  Aktiengesellschaft ('AEG), whose  head office 
is  in  Frankfurt, Federal  Republic of Germany,  is  a 
group  owned  on  a  majority  holding  basis  by  the 
Daimler-B~nz AG  group,  whose  head  office  is  in 
Stuttgart-Untertiirkheim,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.  AEG's  activities  include  automation 
{1)  OJ  No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(Z)  OJ  No  C  308,  7.  12.  1989,  p.  5. 
systems, electrical tools, energy distribution, house-
hold  equipment  and  high-frequency,  industrial, 
information  and  communications  technology. 
(2)  Alcatel  NV  r  Alcatel),  whose  head  office  is  in 
Amsterdam,  Netherlands,  is  owned  on  a  majority 
holding basis by ti" '! CGE group, whose head office 
is  in  Paris,  France.  Alcatel's  activities  comprise 
communications systems  and  information  techno-
logy. 
(3)  Oy  Nokia  AB  (Nokia), whose  head  office  is  in 
Helsinki,  Finland,  does  not  belong  to  any  other 
group,  but  is  an  independent  group  of  underta-
kings.  Its  activities  include  information  systems, 
telecommunications,  mobile  telephones  and 
consumer electronics. 
(1) 
(2) 
C.  Description of the telephone system· 
In  the  'CEPT-Memorandum  of  Understanding'  of 
7  September  1987 (~.  the  signatories  agreed  · to 
introduce  a  pan-European  public  digital  cellular 
mobile  telecommunications service  in  their coun-
tries  in  1991.  The  planned  telephone  system, 
known  as  the  GSM  rGroupe  special  mobile') 
system,  is  a  new  communications  system  which 
doe~ not yet  exist. 
The system  uses  a  new,  digital,  cellular  technique 
to  improve communication between the users of  a 
mobile  telephone  network  in  numerous  respects : 
there  is  a  substantial  improvement  in  speech 
quality  end  an  increase  in  the  total  number  of 
users. The system allows additional data and infor-
mation  technology  services  to  be  linked  up  and 
new  protective  arrangements  to  be  included 
(authentication  to  prevent  misuse  of  users' 
appliances  and  encoding  to  prevent  unauthorized 
interception of communications). The agreement of 
virtually all the network operators in  Europe on the 
hardware  and  software  interfaces  of  the  system 
removes  all  the  communication  obstacles  created 
by  differences in  systems across  geographical  fron-
tiers  and opens  up  the way  for  a single  European 
communication network which would, for example, 
allow  a  user  to  be  contacted  anywhere  in  Europe 
('roaming'). 
(l)  CEPT  - Conference  Europeenne  des  Administrations  des 
Postes  et des  Telecommunications 
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Through predefinition of  the  GSM  system  on  the 
basis of a uniform standard with two to three speci-
fied  interfaces,  it  is  ensured  that  the development 
work will  result in a uniform system. However, the 
system  does  not  require  uniform  technology,  but 
allows  room  for  the  development  of  different 
system  components. The differing  specified  inter-
faces  allow the compatibility of all  system compo-
nents, which means that they provide the opportu-
nity of combining parts from  different manufactu-
rers. 
D.  Demand and supply in respect of the GSM 
system 
The  only  potential  buyers  in  the  network  area 
covered  by  the  GSM  system  are  at  present  the 
national  network operators  in  the  CEPT countries 
and the undertakings acting on  their behalf (in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  for  example, 
Detecon, a telecommunications consultancy firm). 
Demand for  all  and/or part of the system  is  chan-
neled  through  invitations  to  tender. Thus, a series 
of  invitations  to  tender  was  published  in  the 
Supplement  to  the  Official Journal of the  Euro· 
pean  Communities  of  5 January  1988  (No  2/  59). 
The invitations to  tender involve  orders  for  supply 
and  installation  and  not  development orders.  The 
objective  is  the delivery,  installation and operation 
of the equipment by the first  quarter of  1991. The 
mobile  telephones  themselves  are  not covered  by 
the  invitations  to  tender. 
In addition to  the undertakings making the notifi-
cation, the following consortia and individual firms 
have  emerged  as  suppliers : 
- Philips/Siemens  respectively  Philips/Bosch/ 
Siemens, 
- Bosch/Philips, 
- Matra-Ericsson, 
- Ericsson/Orbitel, 
- Ericsson/Matra/  Ascom  Hasler, 
--Orbitel/Matra/Ericsson, 
- Orbitel  (Racal/Plesse~'), 
- Motorola  (employing  system  components 
acquired  from  third  parties). 
E.  Content of the cooperation agreement 
The parties to the agreement have agreed to coope-
rate  in  the  development  and  manufacture  of  the 
GSM  system and parts thereof,  in  the further defi-
nition  and  adjustment  of  technical  specifications 
and  in  the  joint and  exclusive  distribution  of  the 
J/92 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
system  and  parts  thereof  in  CEPT  countries ·an 
accor~ance with  the  cooperation  agreement. 
The parties  are  setting up a consortium  known  as 
ECR  900  for  the  purpose  of  the  submission  of 
tenders for the GSM system in invitations to  tender. 
Commitments.  in  respect  of  CEPT  countries 
require  the  prior  written  agreement  of  all  the 
parties. However, if one of the parties does not wish 
to  participate  in  a  tender  or  contract.  the  other 
parties  are  free  to  do  so. 
During the term of the agreement, the  panies are 
prohibited  from  submitting  other  tenders  or 
concluding  contracts  in  the  CEPT  countries  in 
respect  of  the  GSM  system. 
Outside  of  the  CEPT  countries,  each  party  is 
entitled to pursue business in  respect oi  those  parts 
of  the GSM  system  in  whose  development  it was 
involved. 
(a)  In the case  of development activities  in  which 
several  parties  were  involved,  all  the  technical 
documentation is  to be exchanged on  a perma-
nent  and  cost-free  basis  between  the  oarties 
concerned  until  such  time  as  the  tec.hnical 
documentation  for  series  procuct:  .:-:1  is 
completed. 
(b)  In the case  of development  activitie~ in  _;,.hich 
only  one  party  is  involved,  there  will  :-e  no 
exchange  of  technical  documentaticn. 
(a)  Up  until  eight  months  before  exp1ry  cf  the 
agreement,  the  parties  are  prohirited  from 
using  technical  documentation  ob:ained 
pursuant to point 5 (a)  in order to  manu:~cture 
the  GSM  system  or  parts  thereof  ior  sale  in 
CEPT countries. 
(b)  After expiry  of  the  agreement,  ead:  pal.\  has 
the  non-exclusive  right  to  use  the  te..::-.nical 
documentation obtained pursuant to  poin: 5 (a) 
in  order  to  manufacture  the  GSM  svstem  or 
parts  thereof  for  sale  in  any  country.' 
(c)  Within a period of five years following exFiry of 
the  agreement,  however,  the  gran:  to  third 
parties of a sublicence in  respect of  :he .:.':>ove· 
mentioned right requires the prior ag:eem~nt of 
the  party  concerned,  with  any  li..:ence  fees 
being divided  equally  between  them. 
After the end of such period, the parties are  free 
to  grant sublicences  without  sharing  the  fees. 
(d)  Where a  party  is  excluded  on  the  grounds  of 
breach of contract, the party excluded loses  the 
right  to  use  the  technical  documen:ation 
acquired. 
.. 
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The agreement may  be  terminated  by  each  party 
for  the  first  time  on  31  December  1993  and 
thereafter at the end of each year. In such an event, 
the other parties may decide to continue the agree-
ment. 
The agreement ends automatically on 31  December 
1992 if the French or German or any other impor-
tant  postal  authority  of  a  CEPT country  has  not 
selected  the  GSM  system  for  its  market. 
F.  The Commission did  not receive  any  observa-
tions  from  interested  third  parties  following 
publication of the notice required by Article  19 
(3)  of  Regulation  No  17. 
II.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
Article  85  (1) 
The  cooperation  agreement  notified  is  not  under 
the present circumstances caught by Article 85 (1). 
The parties to the agreement are undertakings, and 
the  notified  agreement  is  an  agreement  between 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 85 (1). 
The agreement does not have as  its object or effect 
the restriction of competition within  the common 
market,  for  the  following  reasons : 
(a)  joint  development  and  manufacture  of the 
GSM  system 
The  parties  to  the  agreement  have  agreed  to 
cooperate on the development and manufacture 
of  the  GSM  system.  Such  an  agreement  does 
not constitute a restriction of competition. The 
facts  show  that development  and  manufacture 
by  individual  companies would  not take  place 
because  of the  high  cost  involved. The invita-
tions  to  tender  by  the  telecommunications 
administrations  published  on  5  January  1988 
lay  down  tight  deadlines.  The  invitation  to 
tender  for  Denmark  provides  for  the  pilot 
system  to  be  supplied  by  the  end  of  October 
1988,  and  the  invitation  to  tender  for  the 
United  Kingdom  provides  for  the  complete 
testing of the development system  by  30  June 
(989.  By  mid-1990, an initial pilot system is  to 
have been set up for  test purposes in the coun-
tries  involved  in  the  invitations  to  tender,  and 
the  supply,  installation  and  operation  of  the 
equipment is  scheduled for  the first  quarter of 
1991.  The  parties  to  the  agreement  would 
therefore  hardly  be  able  to  comply  with  the 
timetable  laid  down  if  they  were  to  proceed 
individually. 
Fyrthermore, the financial  expenditure and the 
staff required in the development and manufac-
ture of the GSM system is  so great that realisti-
cally  there  is  no  scope  for  companies  to  act 
individually. 
The  development  costs  are  estimated  by  the 
parties  to  the  agreement at  some  DM  300  to 
500 million. Because of the time schedule laid 
down, ·this  amount  cannot  be  spread  over  a 
longer period, but must be raised in the period 
up  to  the  installation  of  the  pilot  system  in 
1990, while the amortization of the investment 
in the event of a bid award will  be  long term. 
In  the  event  of  a  bid  award  to  one  of  the 
competitors, amortization  may indeed  be  enti-
rely  open  to  question.  As  far  as  the  staffing 
requirements  are  concerned,  only  a  limited 
number  of  sufficiently  qualified  engineers  are 
available  for  the  development  of  the  GSM 
system,  and  this  limited  number  cannot  be 
increased  in  the  short  term. 
Lastly,  for  objective  economic  reasons,  the 
parties to the agreement cannot be  expected to 
bear the financial  risk involved in the develop-
ment  and  manufacture  of  the  GSM  system 
alone. 
The  relevant  market  is  characterized  by 
narrowly limited demand. At present,  the  only 
potential  customers  are  15  national  network 
operators in the CEPT countries, or the under-
takings acting for  them, with the result that the 
suppliers' prospects of achieving a bid award  are 
only limited. Only if  they achieve  a bid  award 
will the suppliers be able to amortize the extre-
mely high development costs, since  the  results 
of the development work will have only limited 
use  outside the field  cevered by  the  invitations 
to  tender. This real  and serious  economic  risk 
can  be  borne only  if  the  parties  to  the  agree-
ment  bear  the  costs  jointly. 
It  is  noteworthy  in  this  context  that,  in  their 
invitations to tender, the national telecommuni-
cations  administrations  expressly  refer  to 
consortia  and  bidding  syndicates., 
No  single  member  of  the  consortium  would 
therefore  be  able  to  use  its  own  production 
improved  by  individual  development  in  order 
to  achieve  a  competitive  advantage  over  the 
other  members. 
The obligation  to  engage in joint development 
and manufacture  of the GSM  system  therefore 
does  not  restrict  competition  within  the 
common  market. 
(b)  joint distribution  of the  GSM  system 
ff/93 
As a result of the joint distribution requirement 
in the CEPT countries, the  p::~rties to  the agree--
ment  are  prevented  during  the  term  of  the 
agreement from competing with one another in 
the  sale  of  the  products  in  such  countries, 
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this requirement does  not amount to  a restric-
tion  of competition.  For  the  reasons  specified 
above,  the  parties  to  the  agreement  acting  on 
their own would not be in a position to provide 
a viable source of supply for individual distribu-
tion  of  the  GSM  system. 
(c)  Ban  on  tht ust of ttchnicaJ  documtntation 
Where a party is  excluded because  of infringe-
ment  of  the  agreement,  such  party  loses  the 
right  to  use  the  technical  documentation 
supplied  to  him  and  hence  the  possibility  of 
manufacturing  and  distributing  competing 
products with the help of such documentation. 
However,  this ban  does  not create  any  restric-
tion  of  competition  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 85 (1 ). The party in breach of the agree-
ment, having failed  to fulfil  his obligations  vis-
a-vis  the  other  parties  and  to  perform  his 
contribution to achieving the joint task, would,· 
if  allowed  to  use  the  technical documentation, 
receive unjustified benefits which would lead to 
an  undeserved  competitive  advantage  vis-a-vis 
the  other parties.  Such  competition  not based 
on performance is not protected by Article 85. 
This legal assessment is based on the circumstances 
set  out above.  Should  there  be  any  change  in  the 
actual  circumstances,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
the  Commission  from  re-examining  the  case, 
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HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Article  I 
On the basis  of  the  facts  known  to  it,  the  Commission 
sees  no reason  to  take any action under Article  85 (1) of 
the  BBC  Treaty  against  the  cooperation  agreement 
concluded  by  the  firms  ABG  Aktiengesellschaft,  Alcatel 
NV and Oy  Nokia  AB  on  21  December  1987. 
ArticLe  2 
This Decision is addressed to the following undertakings : 
1.  AEG  Aktiengesellschaft 
Theodor-Stem-Kai  1 
D-6000  Frankfurt/Main  70, 
2.  Alcatel  NV 
Strawinskylaan  537 
NL-1 077  XX  Amsterdam, 
3.  Oy  Nokia  AB 
Mikonkatu  15  A 
Helsinki,  Finland. 
Done  at  Brussels,  27  July  1990. 
For  the  Commission 
Leon  BRIIT  AN 
Vice·.Presiden t 
.  .:. ..  ' 
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(.Aas  wbos1 publitalion  is  not obligatory) . 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 18  October 1991 
relating to a  proceeding pursuant to Article 85  of the EEC Treaty 
(IV  /32.737  - Eirpage) 
(Only  the English  text is authentic) 
(91/562/EEq 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  Whereas: 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 
1962,  First  Regulation  implementing Articles  85  and 86 
of the Treaty  (
1 ~ as  last amended by the Act  of Accession 
of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Articles 4, 6 and 
8  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption,  submitted  under 
Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 17 on 17 May  1988 by 
Bord  Telecom  Eireann  and  Motorola  Ireland  Ltd  of  a 
joint venture agreement and related agreements and docu-
ments, concerning the setting up,  promotion  and opera-
tion  of  a  nationwide  interconnected  paging  sel'Vice, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of  the  application  and 
notification published pursuant to  Article  19  (3)  of  Regu-
lation  No  17 (2), 
After  consulting the  Advisory  Committee  on  Restrictive 
Practices  and  Dominant  Positions, 
(')  0 J  No  13,  21.  2.  1%2,  p.  204/62 
( 1)  OJ  No  C  294,  24.  II.  19'.111,  p.  1. 
(1) 
(2) 
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1.  THE FACTS 
On  17  May  1988,  Bord  Telecom  Eireann 
('Telecom)  and  Motorola  Ireland  Ltd  ('Motorola') 
submitted  for  negative  clearance  or  alternatively 
exemption, joint venture and accompanying agree-
ments  relating  to  the  setting  up,  promotion  and 
operation of a nationwide paging system  intercon-
nected  to the public telecommunications network. 
In the company set up for this purpose in  April of 
1988, •Eirpage  Ltd', the parties pool  their comple-
mentary  skills,  namely  Telecom's  technological 
expertise in the provision of telecom  infrastructure 
and services and Motc:;.rola's  marketing and product 
expertise  in  radio-paging  services. 
A.  The parties and the service concerned 
Telecom  was  corporatized  in  1984.  Pursuant  to 
Section  87 of the  Postal  and Telecommunications 
Services Act 1983 (the Act), in conjunction with the 
Telegraph  Act  of  1869,  it  continues  to  enjoy  a 
statutory  exclusive  privilege  with  respect  to  tele-
communications. infrastructures  and  the  provision 
of  certain  telecommunications  services,  subject  to 
the powers of Telecom itself (Section 89) and of tht 
Minister for Communications (Section  III) to grant 
licences to third parties to provide telecommunica-
tions  services  within  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
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Since  becoming corporatized, Telecom  has  intro-
duced  a  number  of  new  telecommunications 
sefvices  such as  Eirpac  (data  network)  and  Eircell 
(cellular  radio/mobile  telephones~  The  joint 
venture with Moto~la to provide paging seni~  is 
the  first  time that Telecom  has  coopera~ with 
another company  to enter a  new field. 
Motorola is  a wholly-owned subsidiary of Motorola 
Inc.  of  Illinois,  USA,  which,  with  a  worldwide 
turnover of  US  $ 9  billion  in  1989, is  one of the 
world  leaders  in  mobile  communications  equip-
ment  and  services.  Before  embarking  on  the 
Eirpage  joint  venture,  Motorola,  which ;"had  a 
turnover of £ Irl 10,7 million and 120 employees in 
1989,  offered  merely  telecommunications  equip-
ment,  including  paging  receiver  units,  and  not 
paging services (1). 
The paging service  offered  by  Eirpage  falls  within 
the  broader  category  of  mobile  communication 
services  .in  general,· which  includes  mobile  tele-
phones  and  mobile  radios.  f aging  is  a  one-way 
means  of  communicating  with  sor.teone  on  the 
move  who  carries  a  pocket-sized  receiving  unit, 
which  receives varying signals, such as  tone (beep), 
voice,  numerical  or  computerized  messages, 
depending  on  the  sophistication  of  the  receiver. 
The  person  carrying  the  pager  can  only  receive 
messages,  not  reply  to  calls. 
Interconnected  paging  is  a  particular  kind  of 
paging whereby a telephone, telex or ~ata message 
can  be  transmitted  via  the  public  network  to  the 
receiving  unit.  In  other words,  one  can  dial  the 
numer of a paging receiver on a normal telephone 
to  have  access  to  the wearer.  Where paging is  not 
interconnected, it is operator-assisted, which means 
that  an  operator  will  intervene  to  receive  the 
message to be paged from the caller and transmit it 
to  the  paging  unit of  the  customer. 
(5)  In  Ireland, the mobile communications sector is  at 
present  composed  of  traffic  via  mobile  radios 
(35 %),  mobile  telephones  (40 %)  and  pagers 
(25 % ).  Eirpage  at  present covers  13 %  of  mobile 
(')  As  of 1 August 1991, an  independent company, Sigma Wire-
less  Communications  Ltd,  has  taken  over  Motorola's  role  as 
importer  of  Motorola  products  in  Ireland  and  as  Eirpage 
agent.  · 
communications,  and  with  7 400  subscribers, 
approximately  60 %  of  the  overall  paging  s~ctor. 
Aside from Birpase, there are at least eight oompn-
nies  providing  operator-assisted  paging  service·~ 
mainly  in  the  Dublin  area  or  other  populatio:;. 
centres such u  Cork and Limerick. The number of 
·subscribers of these compapies ranges  from  under 
100 to approximately 2 000. Eirpage plans to cover 
virtually  all  regions  of  the  country  and  aims  at 
achieving  10 000  customers,  nationwide,  by  1992. 
By July of 1991, 87% of the geographical surface 
of the Republic  of  Ireland,  representing  90 %  of 
the  population,  was  covered  with  more  than  30 
transmitters  in operation. 
B.  The agreements as originally notified 
(6)  The notification  involves  six  docments : 
1.  The  joint venture  agreement: 
In  order to  establish  and  promote a nationwide 
paging  service,  Telecom  and  Motorola  agree  "to 
set up a joint venture company,  Eirpage  Ltd,  to 
be  owned  51  %  by  Telecom  and  49%  by 
Motorola.  In  view  of  these  shareholdings, 
Eirpage  is  a  subsidiary  of  Telecom  for  the 
purpose of the Act and thus enjoys the exclusive 
privilege  of  engaging  in  telecommunications 
services bestowed  on Telecom  by  Section  87  of 
the  Act  without  the  need  for  a  licence. 
As  far  as  the  management  of  the  company  is 
concerned,  Telecom  and . Motorola  have  equal 
powers :  three  directors  are  appointed  by 
Telecom, three by Motorola, and all decisions by 
the Board· require a majority vote, while most of 
the  business  decisions  of  any  consequence 
require  unanimity. 
The  joint  venture  agreement  provides  that 
neither party will engage in a competing paging 
service,  either  independently  or  in  association 
with others, during the term of the joint venture 
agreement and three years  fqllowing termination 
thereof. 
2.  The  business pla11  annexed  to  the  joint venture 
agreement sets out Eirpage's basic objectives and 
the  forecast  agreed  by  the  parties  as  to  the 
projected  financial  outcome  of  Eirpage's  first 
five  years  of  operation. 
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3.  The  marketing  service  and  business  develop- · 
ment  agreement  between  Telecom,  Motorola 
and Eirpage relates to the provision of expertise 
by  Motorola  to  Eirpage  and  by  the  latter  to 
Telecom  personnel. 
4.  The operating agrtement between Telecom and 
Eirpage  fixes  the tenns under which Telecom 
will  provide  access, to  the  public  network  to 
Eirpage. Telecom agrees to install and maintain 
the  physical attributes necessary  to operate  the 
paging  system,  namely ·antennas,  transmitters 
and the paging exchange needed to intercon~ect 
to  the public network, cumulatively referred to 
as  the  'Facilities'.  These  Faciliti~  belong  to 
Telecom  and  form  part of  the  public telecom-
munications  network.  Although  the  cost  was 
initially  estimated  at less  than £ lrl  1  million, 
the  actual  expenditure  has  risen  to  twice  that 
amount due,  inter alia, to a wider geographical 
coverage  than  originally  planned.  Telecom 
received  approxi.mately  £ Irl  500 000  for  the 
project  under  the  Community's  'STAR' 
programme  which  aims  at · developing  less 
forward  regions  by  improving  access  to 
advanced  telecommunications  services. 
In  order to cover this capital expenditure, and in 
return  for  the  use  of  these  Facilities,  Eirpage 
agrees  to  pay Telecom an annual operating fee 
which is calculated to fully amortize this paging 
network investment by Telecom  over a  1  0-year 
period,  together  with  a  return  of  5 %  over 
investment The annual fee,  furthermore, covers 
other  services  provided  by  Telecom,  namely, 
rental of a space for the antennas on a Telecom 
tower,  use  of  leased  lines,  rental  of  space  on 
Telecom's  premises  for  the  paging  exchange, 
maintenance  of  the  paging  network  and  the 
interconnect charge ; these  services  are  charged 
at the normal, publicly-known commercial rates. 
The  operating  agreement  provides  a  propor-
tionate  reduction  in  the  charges  payable  by 
Eirpage for  the use of the Facilities in the event 
other paging operators share the use of the same 
Facilities. 
5.  The  sta11dard  agency  agt·etment: 
Eirpage  does  not  itself  sell  the  paging  service 
directly  to  customers, but does  so via  a network 
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of independent, non-exclusive agents.  Once an 
agent  has  found  a  new  customer,  the  actual 
subscriber  agreement  is  signed  between  the 
customer  and  Eirpage.  The  subscription  rates 
and  other  con~tions . are . fixed  by  Birpage. . 
Agents  ~eeeive an  on·ao~g monthly commis-
sion ranJil.lg from  10 % to 30 %, depending on 
the number of subscribers  they  have  found for 
Eirpage,  and provided those subscribers  remain 
'live'. Agency agreements can be tenninated by 
either party on an annual basis. 
At  the  time  Eirpage  was  launched,  selleiS  of 
paging equipment, existing paging service provi-
deiS and other interested parties were invited to 
become Eirpage agents. At present, there are 20 
agents  including three  service  providers  which 
continue  to  offer  their  own  operator-assisted, 
local  rather  than  nationwide,  paging  services 
alongside  finding  subscribers  for  Eirpage. 
Among the sellers  of paging equipment which 
act as  Birpage agents are TBIS, a Telecom subsi-
diary  involved  in  the  provision  of  terminal 
equipment,  and  Sigma  Wireless  Communica-
tions  Ltd,  which  in August of 1991  took  over 
Motrola's  role  as  Birpage  agent. 
Eirpage  is  obliged by  the agency agreement not 
to  discriminate amongst the agents.  Sales  leads 
which come to  Eirpage are  passed on  to  agents 
in  a  rotating  alphabetical  order. 
Competition  exists  between  the  agents  on 
various  levels.  As  far  as  the  Eirpage  service  is 
concerned,  the  fact  that  the  subscription  rates 
are  necessarily  fixed  does  not  exclude  price 
competition amongst the agents, who in practice 
are willing to  discount on their commission  in 
order to secure business, thereby offering advan-
tageous  subscription  rates.  Secondly,  there  is 
competition amongst agents  with  regard  to  the 
marketing  and  presentation  of  the  Eirpage 
service.  Finally,  agents  who  are  paging  service 
providers  in  their  own  right  continue  t~  offer 
their  own  services  alongside  those  of  E1rpage. 
\ 
Eirpage  agents  are  free  to  sell  whatever  equip-
ment  they  want,  and  with  or  without  th<" 
Eirpage  name  or logo  attached.  In  view  of  the 
fact that many agents are also paging equipment 
manufacturers and/or distributors, finding custo-
mers  for  Eirpage  can  have  a  direct  beneficial 
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6.  The  standard subscriber agreement: 
the subscriber agreements are concluded directly 
between Birpase and the customer found by an 
Birpase asenL In order to cover the administra-
tive  costs  of  putting a  new  subscriber on  the 
system,  a  minimum  period  of  nonnally  12 
months applies, after which notice can be ~ven 
on a  monthly basis. Subscribers pay a  monthly 
charge to Eirpage which varies according to the 
sophistication of the pager being used and the 
geographical extent of the coverage  desired by 
each  individual  subscriber, . ranging  from  the 
home  zone  only  up  to  full  national  coverage. 
Subscribers  are  free  to  use  whatever  type  and 
brand of paging  receive  equipment they want, 
and may choose to rent or buy the pager,-dep~n­
ding on the  terms  offered  by  the  equipment 
provider,.  normally  the  agent  through  whom 
they wte brought into contact with  Eirpage. 
~-The agreements  as  amended or clarified 
following  the  Commission's  intervention 
The arrangements as  notified  presented a  number 
of problems from  the  point of view  of competition 
policy which stood  in  the way  of a favourable  atti-
tude  on  the  part  of  the  Commission.  During  the 
course  of  the notification  procedure, the following 
issues  were  resolved  in  a  satisfactory  manner : 
l. Market  mtry  by  tbird parties 
The  Commission  has  sought  assurances  from 
Telecom  and  the  relevant  licensing  authorities 
that companies interested in competing directly 
with  Eirpage  in  the  wide-area  interconnected 
paging sector will be treated on exactly the same 
footing  as  Eirpage.  Successful  market  entry 
depends on : (a)  the availability of facilities such 
as  those used by  Eirpage to operate the service ; 
and (b)  the  procurement of  licences,  including 
the  necessary  frequency  allocation. 
(a)  Telecom has  given  a written  undertaking to 
make available to persons satisfying the rele-
vant  licensing  and  financial  requirements 
the facilities  necessary  for  operating a wide-
area  interconnected  paging  service,  under 
the same conditions as  those which apply to 
Eirpage. These include the obligation on  the 
paging  operator  to  use  such  equipment for 
not  less  than  a  specified  period  mutu~lly 
agreed  upon  by  the  parties  on  the  basis  of 
the  total  investment  made  by  Telecom  and 
the payment to Telecom of an annual charge 
calculated  to  remunerate  the · cumulative 
capital cost fully  amortized over that period 
together with  a  reasonable  ·return  over  the 
capit;al  cost ; in res~  of the provision  by 
Telecom of interconnection, space and other 
services,  such as  maintenance,  the standard 
commercial charges shall apply,  as  they do 
'to Birpage. 
Telecom has agreed to make the full  text of 
the  undertaking  available  to  interested 
parties  and  to  inform  the  Commission  of 
any requests made pursuant thereto and the 
outcome of such  applications. 
The facilities referred to in Telecom's under-
taking form part of Telecom's telecommuni-
cations  network  and  are  owned  exclusively 
by Telecom.  The. undertaking  does  not  of 
course  in  any way  prejudice  other options 
which market entrants  may  prefer,  such  as 
the choice to buy the necessary equipment 
themselves, whereby the services required of 
Telecom  such  as  the  use  of  leased  lines 
would be. made available at the normal rates. 
Interconnection to the public switched tele-
phone  network  (PSTN},  telex  and  public 
switched  data  network  (PSDN-Eirpac)  is 
universally available on a non-discriminatory 
basis to those operators meeting the relevant 
licensing  requirements. 
Finally,  the  Commission  has  noted  that 
pursuant to  an  order  from  the  Minister  for 
Communications  under Section  110  of  the 
Act,  Eirpage  could  be  obliged  to  share  the 
Facilities  established  for  its  use  with  other 
service  providers. To reflect more accurately 
the  Minister's  power  in  this  respect,  the 
parties ·have  agreed  to  redraft  the  provision 
in  the  operating  agreement  between 
Telecom  and  Eirpage  which  limited  Tele-
com's  right  to  expand  the  Facilities; 
(b)  licensing  and  frequency  allocation : 
U/9B 
,..,.  !ill  • 
the administrative procedure which an  appli-
cant  paging  service  provider  must  success-
fully  complete  consists  of  one or  alternati· 
vely two elements, depending on the type of 
service  envisaged : 
(i)  All paging service operators, regardless of 
whether  the  service  offered  is  intercon-
nected,  operator-assisted,  regional  or • 
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national, must receive a frequency alloca-
tion in the fonn of a licence under the 
Wireless  Telegraphy  Act  1926.  Fre-
quency/spectrum management is carried 
out under  the  sole  competence  of the 
Minister  for  Communications.  Thus. 
Birpage  itself  is  dependent  on  the 
Minister for  frequency allocation on the 
same  footing  as  other  paging  seivice 
providers,  and  has  received  licences  to 
that effect. 
(ii)  Companies  interested  in  providing  a 
paging  service  interconnected  to  the 
public  telecommunication~.  network 
require in addition to the frequ~ncy allo-
cation  licence, a licence under the Tele-
communications Act  1983. This  licence 
can be  granted at the applicant's choice 
either by  the M,inister  for  Comm  unica-
tions, after consultation of Irish Telecom, 
whose  opinion is,  however,  not binding, 
or  by  Telecom  itself ;  refusals  by  the 
latter are  stibject  to  appeal.  Contrary  to 
the licence under the 1926 Act,  Eirpage 
did not require a licence under the 1983 
Act because it is a subsidiary of Telecom 
and  thus  enjoys  the  exclusive  privilege 
bestowed on the latter under Section 87. 
At  present,  the  frequency  allocation  and 
licensing  requirements  do  not  appear  to 
constitute  a  barrier  to  entry  to  the  paging 
sector  for  interested  companies.  On  the 
spectrum management side, the Department 
for Communications has reserved the 153 to 
154  MHz  band  solely  for  paging  services. 
According  to  the  Department,  the  approxi-
mately  40  channels  consequently  available 
for  paging  service  providers  should  be 
adequate  to  meet  any  foreseeable  needs  in 
this sector. If necessary, a new band could be 
opened  to  meet  channel  requirements. 
As  far  as  the  licence  under the  1983 Act is 
concerned,  the  relevant  authorities  have 
confirmed  that  licences  would  be  available 
for  national  interconnected  paging  services 
on the basis of objective  cri~eria, such as  the 
technical capacity and  financial  resources of 
the applicant and the' likelihood of a contin-
uous  service.  Normal  judicial  review  would 
apply  in  case  of a refusal. To date,  Eirpage, 
which·  as  noted  above  did  not  require  a 
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licence  under  the  1983  Act,  is  the  only 
co~pany providing  interconnected  paging 
semces, so that an actual application of the 
licensing procedure has not yet taken place. 
2.  C~s-114bsidizalion and pf'lj1rm1ial tariffs 
Written  assurances  have  been  provided  by  a 
chartered accountant that Eirpage pays full cost 
and expenses  to Telecom  and to  Motorola  for 
staff,  facilities  and services.  Telecom  does  not 
cross-subsidize Eirpage's activities through reve-
nues  from  services  reserved  to Telecom  as  the 
nati~nal  telecommunications  organization,  nor 
does Eirpage enjoy any preferential tariffs for the 
use  of  facilities  provided  by  Telecom,  such  as 
leased  lines.  Eirpage  operates  at  ann's  length 
from  both parent companies with  its  own  sep-
arate  offices  and  all  expenditure  is  funded 
through a bank overdraft facility which is  enti-
r~ly  separate  from  either  parent  company. 
E1rpage  establishes its own financial statementS 
independent of Telecom's annual  accounts.  ' 
3.  Tbe  paging equipment  market 
Eirpage only provides a paging service and does 
not  sell  paging  equipment.  The  parties  have 
stated  that the  Eirpage  system  has  been  confi-
gured specifically to offer maximum compatibi-
lity with  the products  of  all  manufacturers.  As 
stated  above,  Eirpage  agents  are  free  to  sell 
whatever equipment they want, with  or without 
the  Eirpage  name  or  logo  attached.  In  case  of 
enquiries to  Eirpage  concerning manufacturers' 
equipment,  information  is  provided.  regarding 
all  manufacturers  or  their  representatives  in 
Ireland. Only average prices are quoted to custo-
mers,  not  the  prices  of  a  particular  brand  of 
equipment. 
In  order  to  further  reassure  paging  equipment 
manufacturers  that  the  joint  venture  will  not 
give  an  unfair  advantage  to  sales  of  Motorola 
equipment, the  parties  have  confirmed  that : 
(a)  Eirpage will  cooperate with all  paging equip-
ment manufacturers or dealers  to  the extent 
technically  possible  that  their  products  can 
be  used  on  the  Eirpage  system ; 
(b)  Motorola  pagers  will  be  sold  with  the  same 
discounts to all  Eirpage agents subject to the 
normal commercial criteria based on volume 
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Furthermore,  c;larifications  regarding .the  type-
approval  procedure for  paging equipment have 
provided the necessary reassurances that manu-
facturers  competing with  Motorola  cannot  be 
discriminated against in any way. Contrary to a 
mistaken  belief,  it  is  not  Telecom,  but  the 
Minisuy for Communications which establishes 
the criteria for type-approval. Although Telecom 
does provide some type-approval services, this is 
done on an agency basis only, which means that 
the testing carried out by Telecom is an applica-
tion of the standards established by the Ministry. 
Furthermore,  a .  second  testing  agency,  Eolas, 
exists,  so  that  equipment  manufacturers  and 
importers have a choice. Finally, the Ministry for 
Communications  has  confirmed  that  although 
type-approval  is  strictly speaking  still =required 
for  paging equipment, in  practice such  receive-
only equipment which is  not liable to  harm the 
network in any way  is  not subjected  to testing 
by  either test  house. 
4.  The·  standard agenc;·  agreement 
Certain  amendments  were  required  to  ensure 
that the agency agreements do not have  resuic-
tive  effects,  notably  vis-a-fJis  paging  service 
providers  who  continue  to  provide  their  own 
complementary  services  next  to  those  of 
Eirpage. To this end, the parties  have  agreed  to 
the  following  changes  in  the  standard  agency 
agreement (references are to the November 1988 
version): 
(a)  clause  4  (a)  has  been  redrafted  in  order  to 
clarify that only sales leads which have  been 
passed on to a given agent by  Eirpage  must 
first  be  used  by  that agent  to  promote  the 
Eirpage  service ; if the  latter  is  not suitable 
for  the customer,  the agent  is  subsequently 
free  to promote his own service. In all  other 
contacts with  potential customers, the agent 
is  free  to promote his own service  first or in 
any  case  on  the  same  basis .  as  the  Eirpage 
service; 
'  (b)  clause 4 (c) which  imposed an  absolute obli-
gation on agents of loyalty  to  Eirpage 'in all 
matters',  was  too  broad  and  has  been 
redrafted  to  reflect  the  agent's  fr~edom  to 
continue  pursuing  · his  own  interests ; 
Eirpage's instructions need only be  followed 
in  respect  of  specific  Eirpage  matters; 
(8) 
(c)  clause 4 (f)  obliged an agent to bring to the 
attention  of  Eirpage  any  information  it 
received which was likely to be of benefit to 
Bi.rpaae in marketing the services. This obli-
ption ·could  not  be  reconciled  with  an 
agf!nt's  legitimate wish to continue or start 
competing  with  Birpage  and  has  been 
deleted; 
.(d)  in clause 4  (1),.  it  ~has been  darified that the 
designation  •Eil'{lage  Authorized  Agent'  is 
subsidiary to the agent's own denomination; 
(e)  the  post-term  non-compete  obligation  of 
Clause 9.7 (i), whereby agents were prevented 
for  a  period  of  three  years  following  the 
termination  of  the  agency  agreement  from 
soliciting persons who at the time of termi-
nation  were  Eirpage  subscribers,  has  been 
deleted; 
(f)  direct  competitors  of  Eirpage,  i. e.  paging 
compani~ providing interconnected paging 
services, should not be permitted as  agents. 
This also means tha:t existing agents who do 
not yet provide  such services  but decide  to 
enter that specific sub-market at a later date, 
must  at  that Roint  relinquish  their position 
as an Eirpage agent. Furthermore, an  Eirpage 
agent may not at  the same time be the agent 
for  other  paging  service  providers  offering 
interconnected  paging  services.  Provisions 
reflecting the above  have been added  to  the 
agency  agreement. 
5.  The· parties' position  after termination  of the 
joint venture 
In  the  event  the  joint  venture  agreement  is 
terminated, Telecom and Motorola must be  free 
to  compete  with  each  other  immediately.  To 
that end, the post-term non-compete obligation 
provided for in Article  18.2 of the joint venture 
agreement has been deleted at the request of the 
Commission. 
D.  Third parties' observations 
The Commission did  not receive  any  observations 
following  publication  of  the  notice  required  by 
Article  19  (3)  of  Regulation  No  17. 
1  100 . No L 306/28  Official  Journal of the European  Communities  7.  H. !It 
IL  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  Article 85  (t) 
(9)  Although Motorola owns 49 % of the joint venture 
company and is  thus, strictly speaking, a minority 
shareholder, the Board of Directors which actually 
runs Eirpage consists of an equal nurftber of direc-
tors representing each parent company, whereby all 
decisions of the Board require a majority vote and 
most busipess decisions of any consequence unani-
mity.  Consequently, the two  parties  to  the  agree-
ment,  both  of  which  are  economic  operators 
involved  in commercial  activities.  in  reality  share 
joint control of the joint venture, so that the arran-
gements involve agreements between two  indepen-
dent  undertakings  and  must  thus  be  considered 
under Article 85 (1).  In this context, it is  not only 
the  joint venture  agreement  itself which  must be 
assessed,  but the accompanying  agreements which 
implement  certain  aspects  of  the  cooperation, 
namely the operating agreement between Telecom 
and the joint venture company, the standard agency 
agreement  which  establishes  the  system  whereby 
the service is offered to consumers and the standard 
subscriber agreement. 
(1 0)  The market directly concerned by the joint venture 
agreement is the provision of paging services, i. e. a 
one-way  means  of  contacting  someone  on  the 
move.  Paging  offers  the.  advantage  above  other 
forms  of mobile  communications  of  being  relati-
vely  - up to  50 %  - cheaper  in  terms  of  the 
price of equipment and running costs. Also, mobile 
telephones are larger in size and  thus more unwiel-
dy  than  paging receive  units.  In  this  sense  paging 
at  present  represents  a  distinct  market.  These 
factors  could be expected to  fade  in  the future,  so 
that the choice between a mobile  telephone and a 
pager  would  no  longer  depend  on  size  or  cost. 
Paging would, however, continue to exist as a sepa-
rate  option  in  the  mobile  communications  sector 
because  if  offers  one-way  communications,  a 
distinct  advantage  in  keeping  down  the  billing 
costs. 
(It)  Telecom and Motorola are  potential competitors for 
the  provision  of  paging services.  Telecom's  exper-
tise  in  the  provision  of  infrastructure  has  in  the 
past  facilitated  its  entry  into  markets  for  various 
value-added  services,  such  as  Eirpac  and  Eircell. 
Given  Telecom's  general  know-how  and  more 
specifically  and technological  similarities  between 
communicating by  mobile  telephone  and  paging, 
and in view  of its  financial  position,  this  ease  of 
entry would also llpp.y with respect to  ~e paging 
sector.  · 
Although the Motorola company in Ireland did not 
provide  paging services  prior to  Eirpage,  but was 
solely a manufacturer of telecommunications hard-
ware,  including  paging  equipment,  the  Motorola 
group worldwide  has  extensive  experience  in  this 
sector which is  in fact  available  for  the  benefit of 
Eirpage  pursuant  to  the  Marketing  Services  and 
Business  Development  Agreement.  Motorola  is 
therefore a potential competitor for the provision of 
the service. 
(12)  Through  the  Eirpage  joint venture,  Telecom  and 
Motorola  have  joined  together  to  set  up  and 
provide a service which they could potentially have 
pursued  individually; the  joint venture  agreement 
prohibits either party  from  engaging in  a compet-
ing wide-area  interconnected  paging  service  either 
independently  or in  association  with  others.  The 
consequence of these  arrangements  is  that  instead 
of two competing companies offering the service in 
question  there is  only one, which  must  be  consi-
dered  to be a  restriction of competition. Also,  the 
fact  that potential competitors are  faced  bv  a joint 
venture  between  the  national  telecommunications 
company  and  a  subsidiary  of  one  of  the  world 
leaders  in  mobile  telecommunications  which  will 
initially  and  indefinitely - until  further  licences 
are  granted - be  the  only  provider  of  intercon-
nected paging services, may have a deterrent effect 
on  potential  market  entrants  and  thus  further 
restrict  competition. 
In view of the foregoing  considerations, the  agree· 
ments  which  form  the  basis  for  the  creation  and 
operation of the joint venture are deemed to consti-
tute  restrictions  of  competition  falling  within 
Article  85 (1 ).  The same  is  true with  regard  to  the 
system whereby intermediaries arc  used  w offer  tht· 
service  to  end-users,  as  laid  down  tin  ~landard 
agency  agreement.  These  arrangemt•nl<,  torm  an 
integral  part  of  the  operation  of  the  joim  v(·ntult' 
Moreover,  the restrictions  flowir.~ from  the  ag<'m y 
system  are  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  LOmpanJc~ 
offering  paging  services  in  competition  with  the 
Eirpage  service  have  been  appointed  as  Eirpage 
agents. 
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(13)  The notified arrangements relate to a service exten-
ding oyer the entire  territory  of  the  Republic · of 
Ireland and as  sU.ch  are capable of affecting trade 
between Member States. The fact that an agreement 
has as its object only the marketing of products (or 
services) in a  single Member State does  not mean 
that  trade  between  Member  States  cannot  be 
affected.  In the case  at  hand, both a  detrimental 
and  a  beneficial  impact  on  trade  from  other 
Member  States  can  be  envisaged  as  regards  the 
paging  service  market.  The  fact  that  the  joint 
venture company will  initially be the only provider 
of  interconnected  wide-area  paging  services  in 
Ireland  may  have  a  dissuasive  effect  on  market 
entry  by  competitors  from  other  Member  States. 
Conversely,  the  promotion  of  the  coniept  of 
paging as such which the joint venture company is 
committed  to  accomplishing,  may  be  expected  to 
attract  other providers  of (complementary)  paging 
services also  from  other. Member States, which  are 
free  to apply  fQr · the  necessary  licences  ~nd start 
operating once these  have  been  obtained. 
In  the  closely  linked  paging  equipment  market, 
which  was,  even  before  the  inception  of  Eirpage, 
characterized by an overriding presence of distribu-
tors  and  subsidiaries  of  equipment  ma.1ufacturers 
from  other  Member  and  non-Member  States,  the 
stimulation  of  sales  brought  about  by  the  joint 
venture is  likely to attract further imports or invest-
ments. 
Furthermore, Motorola  forms  part  of  a group oper-
ating  throughout  Europe  (and  worldwide)  in  the 
mobile  communication:,  services  and  equipment 
markets;  Motorola's  activities  in  Ireland  must  be 
seen  as  part  of  the  European  operations  of  the 
group as  such, which  necessarily  implies repercus-
sions  also  outside  Ireland. 
In  view  of  the  foregoing  circumstances,  the  joint 
venture arrangements can  be expected  to  have  an 
appreciable  effect  on  intra-Community  trade,  and 
Article  85  (1)  applies. 
B.  Article  85  (3) 
(14)  Subject to  the changes implemented by the parties 
in  the  agreements  as  notified  and  in  view  of  the 
undcrtakin~~ provided  with  rnpet t  ro  a numher of 
issues which originally stood in the way of a favou-
rable decision, the Commission has concluded that 
the· .. cooperation  between  Telecom  and  Motorola 
contributes to the development of telecommunica-
tions services in Ireland, thereby directly benefiting 
consum~rs of such services as  well as  undertakings 
involved  in  the telecommunications  sector.  These 
benefits could. not have  been . achieved  as  rapidly 
and to. the same extent in the absence of the joint 
venture  and therefore  outweigh  the  restriction  of 
competition bro!Jght about by the joining together 
of two  potential competitors. 
(15}  In  a  country  where  two-thirds  of  the  population 
lives  in sparsely populated rural  areas,  Eirpage  has 
undertaken  to  provide  a  service  beyond  the  more 
profitable  urban  areas  in  which  existing  paging 
service  providers  had  hitherto  concentrated  their 
activities.  By  the  end  of  1991,  34  transmitters 
should be installed  at  strategic  points  throughout 
the national territory, thereby covering virtually all 
of Ireland. These truly nationwide communications 
links can be expected to contribute to business effi-
ciency  and  especially  enable  small  and  medium-
sized business to  expand their activities geographi-
. cally, thereby contributing to  economic progress in 
Ireland. 
Although  the  joint  venture  arrangements  relate 
only to the provision of paging service~. the directly 
connected  paging  equipment  market  cnn  be-
expected  to  benefit from  the  increased  number of 
paging service subscribers  requiring paging  receive 
units,  thus  stimulating  production  in  this  sector. 
(16)  A  fair  share  of  the  benefits  resulting  from  the 
cooperation  accrue  directly  to  consumers. 
End-users,  that  is  subscribers  to  the  service,  can 
benefit  from  an  enhanced  paging  service  which 
offers  several  features  not  available  from  existing 
paging  companies,  tn  particular  nationwide 
coverage  and  interconnection  to  the  public 
network.  Furthermore,  Eirpage  offers  a  wider 
choice  of  services  than  previously  available  from 
one single  source,  ranging from  the  simplest  tone 
only  communication  to  the  more  sophisticated 
alphanum<:ri'  and  voin:  messages.  \'X'irhin  thi~ 
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range  of  possibilities  the  individual  needs  and 
budgets of each user will allow him to opt for full 
nationwide  or  regional  coverage,  and  for  the 
simpler or· the more sophisticated type of service. 
These options offer advantages for all users, namely 
those  using the service  primarily· for private, e. g. 
family or sociat purposes, and business user$ who 
can thus ensure varying degrees of communication 
to increase  their operating efficiency. 
The Eirpage service is  offered to customers not by 
the joint venture company itself, but via a network 
of agents  who  have  a  direct  finanCial  interest  in 
finding new clients and k~eping existing ones, and 
therefore  compete  with  each  oth~r. This  agency 
system ensures that there is  a choice· 'for consumers 
as  regards  the agent with whom  he wants  to deal 
and  the  conditions  he  can  enjoy  for  using  the 
Eirpage  service.  Furthermore,  the  standard  form 
agency agreement between  Eirpage and  its  agents 
obliges  the latter to ensure adequate maintenance 
and after-sales service, and perform guarantees with 
respect  to  the  paging  equ~pment  supplied  to 
subscribers:  The  maximum  one-year  duration  of 
the standard subscriber agreement leaves  consum-
ers ·free  to  change  to  another service  provider  at 
reasonable  notice. 
Finally, the paging equipment market will  automa-
tically expand along with  an  increasing number of 
subscribers  to  paging  services.  This  increased 
demand for  paging receive  units and the freedom 
of agents and subscribers to choose whatever brand 
they  wish,  can  be  expected  to  lead  to  a  wider 
choice  of  products,  and  at  lower  prices. 
(17)  The arrangements  between  the  parties  contain  no 
restrictions  which  are  not  indispensable  to  the 
attainment of the ensuing benefits for  the duration 
of  the  exemption. 
(18)  The  joint  venture  agreement  itself  was  indispen-
sable  in  enabling the parties  to offer as  rapidly as 
possible  a  service  which  in  terms  of  technical 
features  and geographic coverage  represents a  new 
option  in  this  seCtor.  Neither  party  acting on  its 
own  could  have  offered  the  service  as  rapidly  and 
effectively as  their cooperation has enabled them to 
do. 
Having  been corporatized  relatively  recently, Tele-
com's  transition  from  a  governmental  department 
to  a  commercial  operator  has  been  ~radual,  :~nd 
initially its activities centred on traditional telecom-
munications  services.  Although  Telecom  was 
admittedly  able  to  set  up  a  mobile  telephone 
service (Eircell) by itself, selling telephones, which 
are  familiar to everyone, is  easier than selling the 
new and unknown concept of paging, especially in 
rural  areas  ·where  the  population  may  be  less 
susceptible to new technologies. By way of compar-
ison,  Telecom's  experience  in  launching  Eirpac 
(data  .  network)  has  been  less  favourable.  Acting 
alone, Telecom could have set up a paging system 
in  the  Dublin  area  only,  whiCh  would  have 
deprived  the general  population  of the  enhanced . 
services  now of(ered  by Eirpage  nationwide.  • 
Unlike Telecom, Motorola is a purely commerciaJiy 
driven  company  and  does  not  have  Telecom's 
determination to provide nationwide telecommuni-
cations  services.  Thus,  even  if  Motorola  had 
obtained a licence to provide a paging service inter-
connected to the public network, it would not have 
been interested in extending the service to margin-
ally  profitable  rural  areas ;  the  same  would  have 
applied  to  any other purely  commercial  operator. 
Given  the  fact  that  two-thirds  of  the  population 
lives  in  rural  areas,  this  solution  would  have 
resulted in a much less  extensive coverage.  In  fact, 
existing paging companies have unril  now confined 
their services  to  Dublin  and the four  or five  other 
larger  towns  in  Ireland  where  investment  per 
customer is  minimized. 
Lesser geographic coverage of a service provided by 
Motorola alone would also  have resulted  in  a more 
limited development of the paging concept as  such, 
to  the  detriment of  other  service  and  equipment 
providers. 
Finally, Motorola could not have  been expected to 
bring  to  an  independent  venture  Telecom's 
commitment to ensure  maximum compatibility of 
all  brands  of  paging  equipment  with  its  system. 
The  foregoing  considerations  have  brought  the 
Commission to  the conclusion that  in  the  ah!>erKc 
of the combined efforts by the parties in  serting up 
the Eirpagc system, no nationwide enhanced inter-
connected paging service would have been available 
on the rapid timescale achieved as  a result  of  their 
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Furthermore,  the  Commission  considers  that  ttl~ 
Eirpage system could not be set up or at least could 
not function  satisfactorily,  if the  parties were  not 
obliged for a  limited period to refrain from ensa-
ging in directly competing projects. ~so, it would 
be  unreasonable to expect either party to invest its 
funds and expertise in the joint project, if there was 
a risk that the ·other would use those contributions 
either independendy or in association  with  third 
parties who have not made the same commitment. 
In  this· context  the  Commission  considers  the 
non-competition  obligation  imposed  by the  joint 
venture  agreement on the  parties to  be  indispen-
sable.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  restriction  is 
limited  to  the  life  of  the  agreement and  applies 
only to one-way wide-area paging services intercon-
nected  to  a  fixed  telecommunications:- network, 
which  means  that  the  parties  remain  free  also 
during  the  term  of  the  agreement  to  engage  in 
other  types  of  paging  services,  ·such  as  those 
referred  to  under recitals  4  and  5 above. 
(19)  Certain  aspects  of  the  notified  agreements  which 
were  not indispensable  for  achieving  the benefits 
thereof  were  eliminated  by  the  parties  at  the 
Commission's request in order to  bring the arran-
gements in line with the requirements of Article 85 
(3). 
In the joint venture agreement itself, the three-year 
post-term  non-competition  obligation  has  been 
deleted,  so  that in  case  of dissolution  of  the joint 
venture, the two  parties would immediately be free 
to  compete with  each  other and with third parties 
on  the  market. 
A  number  of  clauses  in  the  original  standard 
agency agreement likewise required amendment or 
suppression ; these  changes are  listed  above  under 
point  4  of  recital  7. 
(20)  The  arrangements  as  they  stand  following  the 
Commission's intervention during the course of the 
notification procedure do not afford the parties the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a  substantial  part  of  the  services  and  products  in 
question. 
· In  the  first  place,  Eirpage  is  subject  to  actual 
competition from  existing paging service  providers, 
which  account  for  40 %  of  the  paging sector and 
which in  many cases offer a service complementary 
to  that of Eirpage. Certain customers will  prefer to 
opt  for  operator-assisted  paging  services,  such  as 
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notably medical paging, and these services are thus 
unaffected by  Eirpage. The same applies to  purely 
local  paging systems. 
Secondly, nothing prevents licensed operators from 
competing directly with Eirpage in the provision of 
inten;onnected (nationwide) paging. In view of the 
undertaking which Telecom  has given during the 
course of the notification procedure to make facili-
ties similar to  those  used  by  Eirpage  available  to 
other  operators  (see  above  under  point  1  (a)  of 
recital 7), competitors can either use that possibility 
or invest directly in the necessary  facilities,  which 
would  in  that  case  belong  to  them  and  not  to 
Telecom. 
In the light of the assurances given by  the Depart-
ment for  Communications, the  licensing  require-
ments involved  in  offering  paging services  which 
were  examined  during  the  course  of  notification 
procedure  were  found  not  to  form  barriers  to 
market  entry.  Although  the  licensing  procedures 
are not within the power of the parties who  have 
sought clearance or exemption from  the Commis-
sion, the latter would be obliged to consider with-
drawing the exemption granted  under the  present 
L>ecision  if  in  the  future  it  appears  that  those 
procedures act  as  a barrier to entry or deterrent to 
competition  in  the  paging  sector. 
The  one-year  duration  of  the  Eirpage  subscriber 
agreement allows customers to switch upon a reaso-
nable period of notice to an  Eirpage competitor, 'if 
they so  wish. 
Thirdly, the paging market is directly influenced by 
developments  in  the  mobile  telephone  and  radio 
markets,  as  well  as  new  technologies which  are  at 
present developing, such  as  Personal Communica-
tion Networks (PCN}. At present, paging represents 
25%  of  the  mobile  communications  sector  in 
general. 
Finally,  Eirpage  cannot merely  be expected  not to 
eliminate  c;:ompetition  in  the  paging  sector,  but 
may  in  fact  stimulate  development  also  for  the 
benefit  of  other  paging  service  providers.  This 
circumstance  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Eirpage's 
marketing  and  advertising  efforts  promote  the 
concept  of · paging  as  such,  and  not  nwrely 
Eirpagc's  own  st'rvicc. 
Also,  although  the  Eirpage  service  does  nO£  tie  in 
the sale  of paging equipment, the increased  use  of 
paging services which is  expected to  develop,  both 
with  regard  to  Eirpage  subscribers  and  those  of 
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other  paging  service  providerS,  will  stimulate 
competition  in  the  paging  receive  equipment 
market. 
(21)  One issue which requires individual attention is the 
position  of  paging  service  providers  who  at  the 
same  time  act  as  Eirpage  agents.  Of  the  eight 
paging  service  providers  established  in  Ireland 
before Eirpage came on the market, three took the 
opportun~ty offered  of  becoming  Eirpage  agents. 
The services  these companies offer can  be  distin-
guished  from  the  Eirpage  service  in  that  they 
consist of operator-assisted as  opposed to intercon-
nected paging. One advantage of operated-assisted 
paging  is  that calls  are  screened  by  an  operator ; 
direct  contact  between  the  caller  and  the  person 
carrying the paging unit is  thus excluded.  Certain 
categories of subscribers - such as  doctors who do 
not want to be contacted directly by  their patients 
- prefer this service above the direct communica-
tion  made  possible  by interconnection.  Also,  the 
services  of  these  companies  are  geographically 
limited to Dublin alone or a small number of other 
urban  areas.  Given  the  fact  that  the  services · 
provided by these companies fulfil  different needs 
from  those  to  which  Eirpage  caters,  it  can  be 
expected t:tat these three companies will  continue 
to sell  their own services next to  those of  Eirpage, 
whereby their independence has been improved by 
the  various  amendments  in  the  standard  agency 
agreement  made  at  the  Commission's  request. 
Furthermore,  by  acting  as  Eirpage  agents,  these 
companies  may  be expected  to  acquire  first-hand 
experience  relating  to  interconnected  paging 
services, thereby enhancing their competitive posi-
tion  if  one day  they decide  to  offer such services 
themselves  in direct competition with  Eirpage; in 
that  case  they  could  of  course  no  longer  act  as 
Eirpage  agents.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  is 
aware  of  the  potential  conflict  which  may  exist 
with  respect  to  agents  which  offer  their  own 
services  next  to  those  of  Eirpage,  and  will  review 
the  situation  of  these  companies  and  any  other 
paging  service  providers  who  become  Eirpage 
agents within a short time-frame to  assess  whether 
this arrangement continues to  fulfil  the  conditions 
of  Article  85  (3). 
C.  Duration of the exemption and obligations 
(22)  Pursuant to  Article  6 (1)  of  Regulation  No  17,  the 
Commission  is  required  to  ~pecify the  date  from 
which an exemption is  granted~ The arrangements 
as  notified  on  17  May. 1988  presented  several 
aspects which prevented the granting of an exemp-
tion  in  this  case.  Following  discussions  with  the 
Commission,  the  notifying  parties  made  several 
firm  proposals  to  meet the  Commission's  objec-
tions. These proposals concerned in particular the 
necessary amendments to the joint venture  agree-
ment itself, the operating agreement and the stand-
ard agency agreement. ·Furthermore, Telecom esta-
blished  the  undertaking  referred  to  above  under 
point (1) (a) of recital 7 with regard to making avai-
• lable facilities similar to the Eirpage facilities,  thus 
ensuring  fair  market  entry to  third  parties  inter-
ested  in  interconnected  paging.  Accordingly,  the 
date on which the exemption takes effect will  not 
be the date of notification, but 26 March  1990, the 
date  by which  all  the  required  amendments  and 
the undertaking by Telecom had been presented to 
the  Commission. 
(23)  Article  8  (1)  of  Regulation  No  17  provides  that 
exemptions  under Article  85 (3)  may  be  granted 
only for a  specific  period and that conditions and 
obligations  may be  attached  to  them. 
In  view  of  the  characteristics  of  the  Irish  market 
which  is  characterized,  inter alia, by  slow  growth, 
the novelty of the service  being established  by  the 
parties, and the emergence of competing new  tech-
nologies, the development of the joint venture  can 
be expected to require a substantial period of time. 
Also,  a  joint venture  involving  the  provision  of  a 
service, as  opposed to, for  example, the production 
of goods, requires a certain continuity in  the  rela-
tionship  between  the  joint  venture  parents  and 
third  parties. 
The final capital investments involved in setting up 
the infrastructure of the nationwide paging network 
were  made  by  July  1991,  whereupon  the  10-year 
formula according to which Telecom will  be  reim· 
bursed  by  Eirpage  for  its  expenditures  went  into 
effect. 
In  view  of  the  foregoing  considerations.  the 
Commission  has  concluded  that  a  period  of 
exemption ending on 31  July 2001  is  appropriate 
in  this  case. 
.  (24)  In order for  the Commission to  perform  its  super-
visory functions pursuant to Article 8 (3) of  Regula-
tion No 17, the parties must comply with the follo-
wing  reporting  requirements  during  the  ptnod of 
exemption : 
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I. Telecom  must  inform  the  Commission  forth-
with  and on a continuing basis  of any requests 
for  paging facilities  made to  it by third parties 
pursuant  to  its  undertaking  referred  to  above 
under point 1 (a) of recital  7, and the outcome 
of such  requests. 
2.  Eirpage  must submit its  annual  financial  state-
ments to the Commission each year upon their 
issuance to allow for verification regarding cross-
subsidization  and  preferential  tariffs. 
3.  At  the  same  time  as  the  submission  of  the 
annual  financial  statements,  Eirpage  shall 
provide the Commission with an updated list of 
all  agents  selling the Eirpage  service  and indi-
cate  which agents are at the same time paging 
service  operators  in  their own  right.:-
4.  In January 1995, the parties shall make available 
to  the  Commission  information  enabling it  to 
review :  (i)  the  development  of  the  paging 
service  market in Ireland ; and (ii)  the develop-
ment of sales of Motorola paging receive equip-
ment  in  Ireland  compared  to  that  of  other 
brands. 
5.  All  three  parties  are  required  to  inform  the 
Commission  forthwith  of  any  amendments  or 
additions  to  the  joint venture  agreement  itself, 
the  operating  agreement,  the  standard  Eirpage 
agency  agreement,  the  standard  Eirpage 
subscriber  agreement,  and  likewise  any  change 
in  the scope, nature or extent of the cooperation 
between  them, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Article  1 
Pursuant to  Article  85  (3)  of the  EEC  Treaty,  the provi-· 
sions of Article 85 (1) are  hereby declared inapplicable for 
the  period  26  March  1990  to  31  July  2001  to  the  joint 
venture agreement dated 23  February 1988  between Bord 
Telecom  Eireann  (felecom)  and  Motorola  Ireland  Ltd 
(Motorola) and the relevant notified a'ccompanying agree-
ments :  the  operating  agreement  between  Telecom  and 
the  joint  venture  company,  the standard  Eirpage  agency 
agreement and the standard Eirpage subscriber agreement. 
Article  2 
The declaration of exemption contained in  Article  1 shall 
be  subject  to  the  following  obligations : 
(a)  Bord Telecom  Eireann  shall  inform the  Commission 
forthwith  and on a  continuing basis  of  any  requests 
made  under  the  undertaking  it  has  given  to  make 
paging facilities  available  to  third  parties ; 
(b)  Eirpage  Limited  shall  submit  its  annual  financial 
statements to  the Commission  each  year  upon  their 
issuance; 
(c)  Eirpage Umited shall at the same time as  the submis-
sion  of  its  annual  financial  statements  provide  the 
Commission with a list of all Eirpage agents and iden-
tify which agents are at the same time paging service 
operators  in  their own  right ; 
(d)  in January 1995, the parties shall submit a report to 
the Commission setting out (i) the development of the 
paging service market in Ireland, and (iQ  the develop-
ment of sales  of Motorola  paging receive  equipment 
in  Ireland  compared  to  that  of  other  brands; 
(e)  all  three parties are  required  to  inform  the  Commis-
sion forthwith of any amendments or additions to the 
agreements referred to in Arti~le 1, and of any change 
in  the  scope,  nature  or  extent  of  the  cooperation 
between  them. 
Article 3 
This Decision is addressed to the following undertakings: 
1.  Bord  Telecom  Eireann, 
Merrion  House, 
Merrion  Road, 
IRL-Dublin  4. 
2.  Motorola  Ireland  Limited, 
Unit  t2C, 
Santry  Industrial  Estate, 
IRL-Dublin  9. 
3.  Eirpage  Limited, 
Anglesea  House, 
Donnybrook, 
IRL-Dublin  2. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  October  1991. 
For  tbe  Commission 
leon  BRITI  AN 
Vice-Presidm t 
• 
., .. 
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COMMISSION  DECISION 
of l3 October 1.9.91 
making an initial allocation to the Netherlands of part of the resources to be 
charged to the 1.992 budget year for ·the supply of food from interveatioa ltocb 
to designated organizadoas ~  clistn"budoa to the moit deprived penoaa in  'the 
Community 
(91/5,3/EBC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUR~PEAN CONNUNmBS,  . 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing the  European 
Economic  Community, 
Having regard  to Council  Regulation (EEC)_ No 3730/87 
of 1  0 December 1987 laying down  the general  rules for 
the supply of food  from  intervention stocks-to the most 
deprived  persons .  in  the  Community ('), 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Regulation  (BBC)  No 
3744/87 of 14  December 1987 laying down  the detailed 
rules  for  the supply of food  from  intervention stocks  to. 
the most deprived ,persons  in the Community (Z).  as  last 
amended by Regulation (BBC) No 583/91 (?,and in parti-
cular Article  2  (3)  thereof, 
Having regard  to  Council  Regulation (EEC)  No 1676/85 
of 11  June 1985 on the value of the unit of account and 
the conversion rates to be applied for the purposes of the 
common agricultural  policy e).  as  last amended by Regu-
lation (EEC) No 2205/90 (~. and in  particular Article 2 (4) 
thereof, 
Whereas  on  3 October  1991, the  Netherlands  requested 
Commission authorization  to  initiate already in  1991  the 
action  on  its  territory  to  be  financed  by  resources  char-
geable to  the  1992 budget and indicated the quantities of 
produce  that  it  wished  to  distribute ; whereas  it is  desi-
rable  to  initiate  the scheme  now  in  the  Netherlands  by 
making an allocation to that country ; whereas this alloca-
tion shall  not exceed  SO  %  of the resources allocated by 
Commission decision to the Netherlands in respect of the 
plan  for  1991  ; 
Whereas in order to  facilitate  the implementation of this 
scheme it is  necessary to specify the rate of exchange to 
be  employed  in  converting  the  ecu  into  the  national 
(')  OJ  No  L 352,  IS.  ll. 1987,  p.  1. 
(l)  OJ  No  L 352,  IS.  Jl. 1987,  p.  33. 
(l)  OJ  No  L 65,  ll. 3.  1991,  p.  32. 
( 4)  OJ  No  L 164,  24.  6.  1985,  p.  1. 
(, OJ  No  L 201,  31.  7.  1990,  p.  9  . 
currency and to  do so at a rate which reflects economic 
reality, 
HAS  AOOPTBD  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
1.  The allocation for the Netherlands of the appropria-
tions referred to in Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EEC)  No 
3744/87 to be charged to the 1992 budget shall be  ECU  ,.,. 
1 643 000. 
This sum shall be converted into national currency at the 
rate applicable on 2 January 1991 and published in the C 
series of the Official journal of  the Europ111.n Communi· 
ties. 
2.  Subject to the limit set out in paragraph 1, the follo-
wing quantities of produce may be withdrawn from  inter-
vention  for  distribution  in  the  Netherlands : 
- 50  tonnes  of  butter, 
- 200  tonnes  of beef. 
3.  The withdrawals referred  to  in paragraph  2 may  be 
made  from  1  November  1991. 
Article  2 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  23  October  1991. 
ll/1 07 
For  the  Commissio11 
Ray  MAC  SHARRY 
Member  of the  Commission · • 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 23  December 1992 
relatiq to a proceediaa punaaat to Article 85 of the  EEC Treaty 
(IV  /.J2.745 - Astra) 
(93/SO/~EC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNmES, 
Having regard  to the Treaty establishing the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of 
6 February 1962, fim Regulation implementing Articles 
85  and 86 of the Treaty (1),  as  last amended by the Act 
of Accession  of Spain  and  Ponugal,  and  in  particular 
Article 2 thereof,  · 
Having  regard  to  the  notification  for  exemption 
submitted pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation No 17 on 
3 June  1988  by  British  Telecommunications  pic  (here-
inafter  'BT'),  Soci~~  europ~enne  des  satellites  SA 
(hereinafter  'SES')  and  BT  Astra  SA,  of a  series  of 
agreements  and  related  documents  regarding  the 
marketing  and  provision  of  television  broadcasting 
services by satellite, which  notification was  subsequendy 
amended  by  BT  to  include  also  an  application  for 
negative clearance, 
Having decided on 3 April  1990 to open proceedings in 
the case, 
Having  given  the  undertakings  concerned·  the  oppor-
tunity  to  reply  to  the ·  objections  raised  by  the 
Commission pursuant to Article·19 (1) of Regulation No 
17  and  Commission  Regulation  No 99/63/EEC of 25 
July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article  19 (1) 
and (2)  of Council Regulation No 17 (1), 
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive 
Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
(I) 
I. FACTS 
On  3  June  1988,  BT,  SES  and  BT  Astra  SA 
notified  to  the  Commission  of . the  European 
Communities  for  exemption  only  a  series  of 
agreements  and  related  documents  regarding  the 
marketing and provision of television broadcasting 
(') OJ No 13,  21.  2.  1962, p.  204/92. 
(') OJ No 127, 20.  8.  1963, p.  2268/63. 
(2) 
(3) 
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services  by  satellite;  subsequently,  in  its  reply  to 
the  Commission's  statement  of  objections,  BT 
argued  that Anicle  85  (1)  did  not  apply  to  the 
arrangements  and  by  letter of 5  December  1990 
formally  requested  the  notification  to  be 
considered as amended in that respect. 
A. The parties 
SES  is  a  Luxembourg  corporation  established  in 
1985  for  the  purpose  of operating  satellites.  Its 
fust  satellite,  Astra  I A,  launched  in  December 
1988,  was  the fim medium-powered  satellite  not 
owned  by  telecommunications  organizations 
('fOs') oHering international television services  in 
Europe. At the  time  of notification,  SES  did  not 
yet have  a turnover. Capital  to cover the  costs of 
purchasing  the  satellite,  having  it  launched  and 
other expenses  such  as  marketing  and  insurance, 
were  covered  by  the  input  of  approximatdy 
twenty  shareholders  from  various  Member  States 
and others, and State-guaranteed bank loans. 
In  1991,  SES's  turnover  rose  to  Lfrs 
3 471 954 747.  A  second  medium-powered  SES 
satellite,  Astra  I B,  was  launched  in  February  of 
1991. 
BT has  a number of subsidiaries, none of which  is 
involved  in the satellite sector. BT's total turnover 
for  the  year  ended  March  1992  was 
±  £  13 337 000 000. 
BT  is  a  licensed  operator,  entitled  to  carry  out 
telecommunications  activities  in  the  United 
Kingdom,'  which  includes  uplinking  signals  to 
satellites. 
According  to  Condition  1.1  of  BT's  licence 
granted  under  Section  7  of  the  Telecommuni-
cations Act  1984, the 'Universal provision  of tele-
communications  services'  is  imposed  on  BT 
fJis-a-fJis every person who requests  such services; 
Condition  5 further requires  BT  to take  all  steps 
to provide  international connection services  to  its 
customers  to  the  extent  necessary  to  meet  all 
reasonable  demands  for  such  services.  Condition 
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these  obligations  in  cenain  cases,  i.e.  if  the 
demand  for  such  services  in  a  given  area  is,  or 
seems likely to be, insufficient to cover the costs of 
setting up that service there. 
TtlnJision distribution by sattUitt 
(4)  TV channels  are  transmitted  by  various  means, 
such as terrestrial broadcasting, cable and satellite. 
A combination  is  also  possible,  for example via a 
satellite to a cable operator who transmits it to the 
end-viewers. Transmission by satellite involves the 
following steps: 
1.  television  channels  are  prepared  by  a 
'programme provider'; 
2.  the  signals  are  transmitted  from  the television 
studio  to  an  eanh  station  from  where  the 
'uplink' to the satellite takes plaee; programme 
providers must contract for such uplink services 
with  a  licensed  operator,  which  in  most  EC 
countries is exclusively the TO; 
3.  on  the  satellite,  the  signals  are  received  and 
amplified by a 'transponder', and then beamed 
back to eanh. Satellites are covered by several 
such transponders,  16  in  the case of the Astra 
I A satellite; 
4.  when the signals are 'downlinked' to the earth, 
they are caught by  a satellite  receive  dish; the 
receiver can be: 
(a)  a  cable  operator  who  then  transmits  the 
signal by cable to the TV viewers; 
(b)  SMATV  (satellite  master  antenna  TV) 
systems  whic;:h  distribute  to residents  of a 
hotel or apartment building; or 
(c)  TV viewers who receive the signals directly 
by placing satellite dishes on their rooftop; 
the  latter  is  referred  to  as  direct-to-home 
(DTH) reception. 
The size  of the  receive  dish  depends  on  the 
strength  of  the  satellite  being  used. 
Low-powered  satellites  require  very  large 
receiving  dishes,  more  than  1  ,5  metres  in 
diameter, while  the signals  from  medium- and 
high-powered satellites can be caught by much 
smaller dishes, suitable for individual rooftops. 
As  to  geographical  coverage,  or  the  satellite 
'footprint', low- and medium-powered satellites 
can cover all of Europe, whereas high-powered 
satellites  are  generally  limited  to  reception  in 
individual countries. 
(S)  Until  the  launch  of  Astra  I A  all  satellites  in 
Europe  were  operated  by  TOs,  individually  or 
collectively. The various steps  in  the  transmission 
of TV channels  are  covered  by  exclusive  rights 
bestowed  on  TOs  by  international  treaties  and 
domeStic laws: 
1.  The uplink 
According  to  the  Radio  Regulations  of  the 
International  Telecommunications  Union  and 
domestic  telecommunication  laws  in  the 
Member  States,  only  'licensed  operators'  are 
allowed to uplink signals  to satellites.  In  most 
countries in  Europe, at the  time  of the notifi-
cation  there  was  only  one  licensed  operator: 
the TO. In the UK, the duopoly created by  the 
1984  Telecommunications Act  resulted  in  two 
licensed  uplink  providers,  BT  and  Mercury 
Communications  Ltd;  seven  other  licences  to 
provide uplink services were granted in  1988 to 
1989  and  a  class  licence  was  introduced 
subsequently.  At  the  time  the  joint  venture 
agreement  was  concluded,  however,  BT  was 
the  only licensed  operator in  the  UK actually 
providing uplink services for international tele-
vision  distribution.  SES  is  likewise  a  licensed 
uplink provider in Luxembourg. 
2.  The space segment (satellites) 
The  geostationary  satellites  in  orbit  for  tele-
communication purposes are  for the most pan 
owned and operated by  international  organiz-
ations, such  as  lntelsat (International Telecom-
munications  Satellite  Organization),  Eutelsat 
(European  Telecommunications  Satellite 
Organization),  lnmarsat (International  Marine 
Satellite Organization) or by domestic TOs. 
The lntelsat  and  Eutelsat  treaties,  which  have 
been  signed  by  inter  alia  all  Member  States, 
restrict other persons  from  operating  satellites 
alongside lntelsat and Eutelsat satellites without 
having  gone  through  an  approval  or 'coordi-
nation'  procedure.  In  the  notification  and 
subsequent  proceedings,  the  panies  referred 
primarily to the Eutelsat procedure. 
Eutelsat was established in  1982 by an intergov-
ernmental Convention, at present signed  by  32 
European  Governments  (called  the  'panics'). 
• • 
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Next to the  convention  there  is  an •operating 
Agreement'  signed  by  the  TOs  (called  the 
•signatories') from  the States who are parties to 
the  convention.  Each  member  country 
designates one 'signatory'; in the UK, BT is the 
Eutelsat signatory. 
TO signatories finance  the Eutelsat satellites in 
proportion to  their utilisation  thereof, in  other 
words  the  more  a  TO  uses  uansponder 
capacity  on  a  Eutelsat  satellite,  the  more  its 
contribution will  be; signatory TOs also  share 
in  the  revenue  in  the  same  proponion. At  the 
time the joint venture was  established, BT had 
the largest investment share. 
At  the  outset  Eutelsat  operated  four 
low-powered telecommunications satellites. The 
first  of  the  Eutelsat  II  series  of  medium-
powered  satellites  of the  same  kind  as  Astra 
(i.e.  enabling reception  by  a 60  to 90  em  dish) 
was launched in August 1990. 
Pursuant  to  the  Eutelsat  Convention,  when  a 
Party  or  TO  becomes  aware  that  an  entity 
wishes  to  operate  satellites  and/or  satellite 
uplinking and downlinking equipment indepen-
dendy  from  Eutelsat  within  the  Party's  juris-
diction,  that Party or TO is  obliged  to furnish 
all  relevant  information  to  Eutelsat.  The 
Eutelsat  authorities  must  then  determine 
whether  the  operation  of  that  non-Eutelsat 
satellite: 
will  be  technically  compatible  with  the 
Eutelsat satellites, 
will  not  cause  the  Eutelsat  system 
significant economic harm('). 
With respect to the Astra satellite, the Eutelsat 
Assembly  concluded  that  no  significant  harm 
would  be  caused  to  the  Eutelsat  system 
provided that, inter alia 
Astra would be used for one-way television 
transmission only, 
no  more  than  four  Eutelsat  channels 
switched from Eutelsat's satellites to Astra. 
(')  Anicle XVI (a) of the Eutelsat Convention. 
In 1992, Eutelsat's Assembly of Panies adopted a Resolution 
according to which onlr those non-Eutelsat satellite systems 
providing 'reserved serv1ces' will be subject to the full Article 
XVI (a) consultation procedure. 
The SAO 
Following  scrutiny  of  BT's  role  as  Eutelsat 
signatory,  the  Office  of Telecommunications, 
Oftel, announced in  November of 1989 that a 
Signatory  Affairs  Office  (SAO)  would  carry 
out BT's  functions  as. signatory  independently 
from BT's commercial ann; this means that UK 
licensed  operators now have  access  to Eutelsat 
(and  lntelsat)  space  segment  capacity  on  the 
same footing as BT. 
3.  The downlink 
The laws of most Community countries require 
a satellite operator to obtain the consent of the 
local  TO  for  the  reception  in  that  TO's 
territory  of  downlink  signals  from  satellites. 
Furthermore,  in  the  case  of  Astra,  Eutelsat 
required coordination not only in  respect of the 
uplink to and operation of the satellite, but also 
with regard to the downlink into any counuies 
party to Eutelsat. 
The joint venture 
(6)  SES's Astra I A satellite has  a total number of 16 
transponders  for  which  customers  had  to  be 
found.  As  the  satellite  television  market  was 
characterized  by  a  predominance  of  English-
language channels, SES concluded that a majority 
of the channel providers (potentially) interested in 
broadcasting  via  Astra  would  be  located  in  the 
UK.  Consequently,  before  the  satellite  was 
launched,  the  decision  was  taken  to  allocate  a 
minimum of nine and a maximum  of 11  .of the  16 
transponders to a joint-venture established  by  BT 
and SES, whose stated aim would be to: 
- offer  operators  of  UK·originated  1V 
programmes a packaged service consisting of a 
BT uplink in the UK and transponder space on 
SES•s satellite, 
- stimulate  the  development  of  the  satellite 
market by: 
(a)  encouraging  manufacturers  of  satellite 
dishes_  suitable  for  so-called  'direct-
to-home'  (DTH)  reception  to  increase 
production; 
(b)  encouraging  retailers  to  promote  and  sell 
this equipment; and  . 
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(c)  encouraging  home-viewers  tO  buy  such 
dishes  so  that  they  can  receive  Astra's 
.  s~gnals directly on their roof-tops. 
(7)  The  following  agreements  and  other  documents 
were examined during the notification procedure: 
- the  main  or JOmt-ventures  agreement  of  17 
December 1987 between SES and BT, in which 
they agreed  to set up  the  50/50 joint-venture 
company  BT  Astra  SA,  and  whereby  SES 
undertook  to  lease  transponders  to  the  joint 
venture company for further disposal via a UK 
licensed operator (thus  not necessarily BT)  to 
final  customers  as  a  packaged  ~ontract 
including the uplink, 
- four  side-letters  dated  17  December  1987 
relating to: 
- the  allocation  of options  to  BT  of trans-
ponders on the Astra satellite, 
- SES's  undertaking  in  relation  to Clause  6 
(4)  of the  agreement  concerning  its  obli-
gation not to divert satellite business. from 
the UK, 
- the  formation  of  a  JOint  marketing 
company (Satellite Promotions SA), 
- SES's  franchise  from  the  Luxembourg 
Government  as  to  the  use  of  the  Astra 
satellite, 
- the  BT  /SES  joint-venture  marketing  plan, 
which  detailed  the  marketing  activities  to  be 
undertaken  by  the  .parties:  BT  would 
concentrate on facilities  marketing, i.e.  finding 
customers  for  the  service,  and  SES  would 
concentrate  on  retail  marketing,  i.e.  the 
receiver equipment industry and end-users, 
- the  main  services  and  separate  services 
agreements, likewise  relating to the marketing 
activities, 
- the  agreements  between  BT  and  television 
programme  providers.  These  agreements  are 
not uniform. Most are for a period of 1  0 years, 
with a lump sum  being paid in  advance by the 
customer  for  the  full  period  covering  both 
(8) 
uplink  and  transponder  lease;  the  price  paid 
decreases  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
transponders  leased.  One  agreement  is  for 
three years, with the possibility of extending to 
10  years;  in  the  first  three  year  period,  the 
customer is charged monthly, thereafter a lump 
sum  is  paid.  Only  in  one  agreement  is  a 
distinction made in the amounts being paid for 
the uplink and the transponder lease. 
The joint venture arrangements  were  to  continue 
for  as  long  as  the  Astra  satellite  would  remain 
technically 'alive', i.e. normally 10 years. 
Individual  provisions  which  were  of relevance  111 
the Commission's examination were: 
1.  Clause  3.  The  transponders  covered  by  the 
joint-venture agreement between SES  and  BT 
were  leased  to  BT  Astra  SA,  which  in  turn 
would lease them to a 'licensed UK operator'. 
Pursuant to a side-letter of 17 December 1987 
between the parties, SES agreed that the Joint 
Venture would grant BT options over 9 trans-
ponders,  to  be  disposed  of  within  a  stated 
period.  BT  in  its  turn  would  offer  a  single 
contract  to  programme  providers  comprising 
both  the  uplink  by  BT  and  a  space  on  the 
Astra satellite. 
2.  Clause  5 covered  BT's  rights  and  obligations 
'where it is the licensed UK operator'. Sub  (  1) 
provided  that  although  BT  had  the  right  to 
determine  the  component  for  the  uplink 
service to be included in  the total price  to the 
customer, it would consult with SES  in setting 
this price. 
3.  Clause 6 covered SES's rights and obligations. 
Clause 6 (1)  provided  that although  SES  had 
the  right  to  determine  the  price  which  '\\'as 
charged to UK custo'mers for the use  of trans-
ponder space  on  the  Astra  satellite,  it  would 
consult  with  BT  in  setting  that  price  e"en 
where BT was not the 'licensed operator'. 
4.  Clause  5  (2)  obliged  BT  to  make  the  Astra 
satellite  the  satellite  of  first  choice  in 
marketing TV services,  and  not to discourage 
use  of Astra  in  its  pricing and  marketing,  for 
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example by charging customers using the new 
medium-powered Eutelsat II series of satellites 
(at  the  time  of  the  joint  venture  not  yet 
launched)  lower margins  or uplink fees  than 
those using Astra. 
5.  Similarly, Clause 6 (5)  obliged  SES  to use  its 
best efforts  to ensure the  use  of BT's uplink 
services  to  the  transponders,  which  was 
consistent with  the  17  December  1987  side-
letter  whereby  SES  granted  options  with 
respect to nine transponders to BT. 
6.  Clause 6 (  4) obliged SES  not to seek to diven 
UK-originated  programmes,  i.e.  programmes 
physically prepared primarily in  a UK studio, 
to uplink outside  the  UK.  According  t-o  the 
side-leuer of 17  December  1987  with  regard 
to Clause 6 (4), SES also had to refrain from 
encouraging programme providers  to prepare 
their English-language programmes in studios 
outside the UK. Specifically, SES was obliged 
not  to  induce  programme  providers  to  use 
studios  in  and  uplink  from  Luxembourg  by 
providing  commercially  preferential  terms 
'either  for  the  satellite  capacity  or  for  the 
uplink services' (SES being licensed to provide 
uplink services in Luxembourg). 
7.  Clauses 5 (3), 6 (2) and 7 contained provisions 
aimed  at  facilitating  transfer  to  the  Astra 
satellite  of customers  hitheno  using  satellite 
services on other satellites. In this context, BT 
could  provide  its  existing  customers  (trans-
mitting  via  the  Intelsat  I  or  Eutelsat  I 
satellites) the facility of 'double-illumination', 
i.e.  simultaneous  transmission  to  both 
satellites.  As  customers  would  be  hesitant  to 
'double-illuminate'  if  that  meant  paying  for 
two  full  leases,  these  arrangements  provided 
for  BT and  SES  to  bear  pan of the  costs. 
Furthermore,  BT  undenook  under  cenain 
conditions  to  facilitate  early  termination  by 
customers of existing contracts. 
8.  Although  SES  was  contractually  free  to 
market the  transponders  not covered  by  the 
joint venture  arrangements  as  it  saw  fit,  its 
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freedom  was  limited  by  Clause  6  (  4)  which 
provided  that all  UK originated  programmes 
(i.e.  prepared in studios in  the UK)  uplinked 
to  the  Astra  satellite · had  to  be  marketed 
through the joint-venture and by Clause 6 (5) 
which  determined  that  where  a  customer 
planned  to  uplink  from  the  UK,  the  terms 
offered to that third party could not be  more 
favourable  than  those  offered  to  the  JV. 
Furthermore, SES would endeavour to ensure 
that the service offered by BT Astra in the UK 
was  not  'mutually  inconsistent'  with  the 
service offered by SES in other countries. 
9.  Clause  6  (6)  provided  that  unless  otherwise 
agreed between BT and SES, SES would  not 
utilize  transponders  on  satellites  other  than 
Astra  I A  for  programmes  prepared  in  or 
uplinked from the UK while any of the trans-
ponders covered by this Agreemen( remained 
available for use. 
10.  Pursuant  to  Clause  9  of  the  joint-venture 
agreement  and  the  terms  of  the  customer 
contracts,  the  channel  provider  paid  BT  a 
lump sum covering the uplink service and the 
transponder  lease.  The  latter  amount  was 
passed  on in  its  entirety by  BT  to  BT  Astra 
SA, which in the turn passed on 90 % to SES; 
10% went  back  to  BT  as  the  'BT  Service 
Charge'. In other words, for its involvement in 
the joint venture BT received; 
- the uplink fee, 
- the 10% BT service charge on the trans-
ponder lease. 
Clause 9 also referred to a 'Eutelsat payment' 
to  be  made  per  transponder  by  SES  to 
\  Eutelsat; in  reply to a request for information 
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of Eutelsat stated that 'there are no payments 
to Eutelsat whatsoever,  nor indeed any other 
arrangement of payment  in  kind  rather than 
cash, nor any. exchange or transaction of any 
kind possessing any value, as  between Eutelsat 
and  SES  or any other party which  could be 
deemed  as  related  to utilization  of the  GDL 
(Astra) satellite. We have not seen and are not 
aware  of the  contents  of  the  joint-venture 
agreement of 17 December 1987 referred to in 
your letter'. 
As the joint-venture agreement did not bestow 
any absolute  exclusivity on BT,  in  theory any 
other  'licensed  UK  operator•  could  have 
leased the transponder capacity from BT Astra 
and  conclude  the  customer  contracts 
comprising uplink and transponder space with 
the  programme  providers.  However,  in  that 
event  the  10 %  'BT  service  charge•  would 
continue  to be  paid  by  BT  Astra to BT;  the 
'licensed  operator"  in  fact  carrying  out  the 
coordinating function  would only receive  the 
fees  for  its  uplinking  activities,  while  BT 
would still  receive  10 %  for  an  operation  in 
which  it played  no  apparent role,  except that 
of  being  part  owner  of  the  joint-venture 
company. 
Termination of  the joint-venture 
(9)  On  3  April  1990,  the  Commission  initiated 
proceedings  under  Regulation  No  17,  having 
come  to  the  preliminary  conclusion  that  the 
notified  arrangements  fell  under Article  85  (1)  of 
the  EEC  Treaty  and  could  not benefit  from  an 
exemption under Article  85  (3).  Subsequently, the 
parties  presented  a  proposal  whereby  the  joint-
venture  agreement  and  related  side  letters  and 
service  agreements  would  be  terminated,  but the 
customer  agreements  concluded  under  the  joint-
venture  arrangements  would  remain  in  place 
pursuant  to  a  novation  resulting  in  direct  trans-
ponder leases  from  SES  to BT  instead  of via  the 
joint-venture  company.  As  the  removal  of  the 
joint-venture  company  from  the  chain  of trans-
ponder  leases  from  SES  to,  ultimately,  the 
programme  providers,  did  not  in  reality  change 
the  status  quo,  the  Commission,  on 26  July  1990, 
sent a statement of objections  to the  parties, who 
presented  their  views  in  writing  and  orally  at  a 
hearing  held  for  that  purpose  on  13  and  14 
November 1990. 
(10)  On  30. January  1991,  the  parties  signed  an 
agreement  terminating  their  joint-venture 
arrangements,  subject  to  the  same  conditions  as 
contained  in  the  proposal  referred  to  above  in 
recital9. 
II. LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A. Article 85 (1) 
(1 1)  The  arrangements  between  the  parties  restricted 
competition in  the marketS  both for the  provision 
of  satellite  transponder  capacity  for  the  distri-
bution  of  television  channels  and  for  uplink 
services.  The effects  of the  cooperation  between 
the parties were  felt  both in  the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere in the Community. 
1.  Restriction  in  the  market  /or  space  segment 
capacity 
(12)  SES  and  BET  are  direct  competitors  m  the 
European  market  for  the  provision  of  space 
segment capacity for the transmission of television 
channels. 
(13)  As  the owner of the Astra I A satellite,  SES could 
offer  16  transponders  to  programme  providers 
seeking satellite transmission. 
(14)  BT  has  since  1983  been  offering  space  segment 
capacity  on  Eutelsat  (and  lntelsat)  satellites  to 
programme  providers.  Pursuant  to  Article  16  of 
the Eutelsat operating agreement,  all  applications 
for  the  allotment  of  Eutelsat  space  segment 
capacity  to  programme  providers  passes  through 
the  signatories,  in  the  UK BT.  BT  arranged  for 
the  ultimate  disposal  of  the  transponders  and 
concluded the  customer contracts, direct contacts 
between the latter and Eutelsat being excluded by 
the  terms  of the  operating  agreement.  Although 
the  final  allotment  of space  segment  capacity  is 
determined not by the individual signatory but by 
the  Board  of signatories,  BT was  at the  time  the 
joint-venture was concluded the signatory with the 
largest investment share.  According  to  the  notifi-
cation,  BT  was  providing  more  TV  distribution 
services by  satellite than any other European tele-
communications organization; the fact that BT did 
not  actually  own  the  space  segment  capacity 
offered  to  customers  does  not  mean,  as  it  has 
argued,  that it was  not in  competition  with  SES, 
given the context of the Eutelsat arrangements. 
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(15) 
It is  illustrative to note that the Eutelsat Assembly 
stated as  a condition for Astra's coordination that 
there  is  an  increased  joint  effort  and  aggress-
iveness  by  signatories  . . . in  a  drive  to find  new 
business  . . . in  order particularly to make· up  for 
the  loss  of  revenues  originating  from  the 
implementation of the  GDL (Astra)  satellite.  BT, 
as  the  UK  signatory,  had  to  reconcile  this 
commitment  with  iu  obligation  under  the 
agreement with SES  to make Astra the satellite of 
first choice. 
BT has furthermore stated that BT and SES could 
not be  regarded as  competitors because BT could 
not,  in  1986  to  1987,  offer  customers  medium-
powered  capacity,  but only  low-powered  lntelsat 
and  Eutelsat capacity; it was  not until  the middle 
of 1990 that the first medium-powered Eutclsat II 
series  satellite  was  launched. This  argument must 
be  rejected  in  that  it  presupposes  that there  are 
distinct  separate  markets  for  low-powered  and 
medium-powered  capacity.  In  fact,  low-powered 
and medium-powered satellites offer customers the 
same  possibilities  as  far as  geographic cQverage  is 
concerned  and  as  regards  transmission  to  cable 
head-ends; medium-powered satellites simply offer 
the  added  featur~ of enabling DTH reception by 
relatively  small  receive  dishes.  DTH transmission 
and  transmission by cable can however take place 
simultaneously.  In  countries  with  well-developed 
cable  systems  where  there  is  thus  less  need  for 
individual  reception,  cable  subscribers  will  not 
know  whether  the  programmes  they  receive  are 
being  transmitted  via  low- or  medium-powered 
satellites - or in fact by other means. 
Recent  statistics(')  indicate  that  73%  of  all 
European  homes  receiving  Astra  channels  do  so 
via  cable  (and  smatv),  the  percentage  in  highly-
cablized  countries  such  as  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands going up to nearly 100 %. 
BT  itself  stated  ir:t  its  reply  to  the  statement  of 
objections:  it  is  clear  that  ·medium-powered 
satellites  ; were  . competing .  with  .  low-powered 
capacity,  referring  in ·that context to the  Eutelsat 
coordination procedure aimed  at determining the 
competitive  impact  of medium-powered  capacity . 
on low-powered capacity. 
(16)  Pursuant  to  the  joint  venture  agreement  and  in 
particular Clause 6 (  4) which provided that all UK 
(')  Cable &  Satellite Express,  10.  7.  1992. 
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originated  programme  channels  uplinked  to  the 
Astra  satellite  would  be  marketed  through  the 
joint venture, SES agreed not to enter the  market 
in  question independently but in  cooperation with 
a direct competitor, BT. The restriction of compe-
tition flowing from Clause 6 (4) was reinforced by 
specific clauses in the main agreement between the 
parties,  which  also  constituted  restrictions  of 
competition in the sense of Article 85 (1), viz: 
- Clause  6  (1),  which  obliged  SES  to  consult 
with  BT  in  setting  the  price  charged  to  UK 
customers for the  use  of transponder space on 
the Astra satellite, 
- Clause  5  (2)  which  obliged  BT not  to  offer 
more favourable  terms with  respect to the use 
of other satellites for TV services than Astra. 
Through these  two provisions,  the  conditions  for 
the  use  o( transponder capacity  on Astra  and  all 
satellites  on which  BT  leased  capacity  could  be 
aligned: Clause 6 ( 1) achieved such alignment with 
respect  to  other  existing  satellite  capacity  and 
Clause 5 (2)  for future satellite capacity. Although 
Clause  5  (2)  referred to  the  Eutelsat  II  satellites, 
this  was  by way of example  only,  and  BT's  obli-
gation  not  to  discriminate  against  the  Astra 
satellite  by  its  pricing  policy  or  other  policies 
extended  to  all  other  satellites  for  TV  st·rviccs. 
These  arrangements  involved  an  all-over  and 
far-reaching  price  coordination  between  the  two 
parties  and  deprived  customers  of a  new,  alter-
native source of supply for transponder capacity in 
the UK. 
The gravity  of this  alignment  was  reinforced  by j 
the  consideration  that  aside  from  its  role  in 
Eutelsat,  BT  was  also  in  its  own  right  a  direct 
potential competitor of SES:  given  BT's  financial 
position  as ·well  as  iu technical  and  commercial 
know-how  in  the  satellite  sector,  BT  would  not 
experience any barriers to entering the  market for 
the  operation  of  satellites  independently;  its 
unwillingness  until  now  to  do  so,  which  BT 
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entrant,  is  a  purely  subjective  consideration  and 
cannot  be  relied  upon  in  determining  potential 
competition. 
Furthermore, the restrictions regarding the  supply 
of transponder capacity extended beyond: 
1.  the  transponders  covered  by  the  agreement 
between BT and SES, 
2.  the UK and 
3.  the Astra satellite itself: 
re  1.  and  2.:  Clause  6  (4)  provided  that  all 
UK-originated  programmes  must  be  marketed 
through the  joint venture with  BT  and  that SES 
would  not  seek  to  divert  UK-originated 
programmes to uplink outside the UK. 
As  clarified  by  one  of the  side  letters,  SES  had 
also  to  refrain  from  encouraging  programme 
providers  to  prepare  their  English  language 
programmes  in  studios  outside  the  UK.  Even  if 
customers  were  to  do  so,  Clause  6  (5),  which 
determined that customers uplinking from the UK 
outside  the  joint  venture  could  not  enjoy  more 
favourable  terms  than  joint-venture  customers, 
ensured that there would be  no benefit in  circum-
venting the joint venture. 
re 3.: Clause 6 (6) obliged SES not to utilize trans-
ponders  on  satellites  other  than  the  Astra  lA 
satellite  for  programmes  prepared  in  or uplinked 
from  the  UK  while  any  of  the  transponders 
covered by the  joint venture  agreement remained 
available. 
2.  Restrictions in the uplink market 
(17)  UK  programme  providers  who  wished  to  lease 
transponder  capacity  on  the  Astra  satellite  were 
obliged  do  so  via  the  joint  venture.  Although 
theoretically  a  licensed  operator  other  than  BT 
could have  been  used,  SES's  obligation  to ensure 
the use of BT's uplink to the transponders (Clause 
6  (5)),  and  the  fact  that  the  10%  BT  service 
charge would go to BT regardless  of the  licensed 
operator to whom BT Astra  SA  ultimately  leased 
the transponder for further disposal  to customers, 
meant  that  in  reality  the  contract  partner  with 
whom programme providers were faced  for access 
to Astra  was  BT.  Pursuant  to  Clause  3  (1),  the 
service  offered  to  customers  by  the  licensed 
operator  comprised  the  transponder  (s)  and  the 
uplink.  Induced by more favourable  conditions  in 
the  event  they  opted  for  long  term  leases,  most 
customers  (i.e.  representing  eight  out  of  nine 
transponders  leased  at  1  December  1989) 
concluded  10  year  customer  contracts  with  BT. 
The  arrangements  involved  the  following 
restrictions: 
Restrictions between the parties 
- competition  for  uplink  services  between  the 
parties:  BT and SES  are direct competitors  in 
the  uplink  market,  as  both  are  licensed  to 
provide  uplinking  services.  Although  the 
licences  of BT  and  SES  related  only  to  their 
respective  national  territories,  p~ogramme 
providers  are  not  bound  by  national 
boundaries  and  could  either  transmit  their 
programmes by conventional or other means to 
another  territory  for  uplinking  or  establish 
studios in  the locality where the conditions are 
the most favourable.  At the oral  hearing,  SES 
has  confirmed  that  four  German  television 
programmes  were  uplinked  to  satellites  other 
than  Astra  in  Germany,  downlinked  in 
!
Luxembourg  and  then  uplinked  again  to  the 
Astra  lA  satellite  by  SES.  RTL-4,  previously 
RTL-Vtronique, a channel aimed  primarily  at 
l 
Dutch-speaking  audiences,  set  up  a  studio  in 
Luxembourg to allow direct uplinking  by  SES 
to Astra IA. 
However,  various  clauses  m  the  main 
agreement  between  BT  and  SES  eliminated 
any  real  competition  between  them  as  far  as 
the uplink service was concerned: Clause  5 (1) 
obliged  BT to consult with  SES  in  setting  the 
price  for  the  uplink  component,  Clause  5  (2) 
obliged BT not to charge lower uplink fees  in 
the event of uplink services  to other satellites, 
e.g.  Eutelsat II satellites, and Clause  6 (  4)  and 
6  (5)  sought  to  restrain  SES  from  inducing 
programme providers to use  its  uplink facilities 
• 
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in  Luxembourg  by  providing  commercially 
preferential  terms  either  for  the  satellite 
capacity or for the uplink services. 
Both parties have  argued that these provisions 
did  not  have  any  practical  consequences,  as 
UK programme providers would not have been 
interested in  an  uplink by SES  in  Luxembourg 
anyway, either following transmission from the 
UK or directly in the case of relocation of TV 
studios. Transfrontier movement  in  the uplink 
market is,  however,  possible,  as  illustrated  by 
the  case  of the  German  and  Dutch  television 
channels  refe-rred  to above.  The  provisions  of 
the  joint vrmurc and  notably the side-letter to 
Clause  6  (4)  were  indeed  precisely  aimed  at 
preventing this  type  of movement and cannot, 
as  the parties  suggest,  have  been  without any 
practical significance.  In  fact,  BT subsequently 
confirmed  that  the  restrictions  on  SES  as 
regards  its  uplinking  activities  in  Luxembourg 
were inserted becauscHthere was a concern that 
there could be dumping of uplink prices which 
would then distort what would be the decision 
of an economically rational TV company ... It 
might  have  been  in  Luxepibourg's  interest 
given  that most of the  customers  were distant 
to  have  priced  that  {uplink)  capacity  at  an 
unrealistically low rate,\\ 
Restriction~ vis-:l-vis third parties 
- foreclosure  of  other  (potential)  uplink 
providers: the fact· that under the joint venture, 
most programme providers who signed the BT 
customer contracts  are  bound  to  BT  for  the 
uplink  services  during  a  period  of  10  years 
represents  an·, absolute  1  0-year foreclosure  for 
other  licensed  UK  operators  from  providing 
this service as  regards the Astra satellite, which 
until  three  years  after the  arrangements  were 
concluded  was  the  only  medium-powered 
European  satellite.  Furthermore,  pursuant  to · 
Clause 6 (6),  SES  could  not use  transponders 
on  other  satellites  (e.g.  Astra  IB)  for 
programmes originated or uplinked  in  the UK 
as  long  as  any of the transponders covered by 
the joint venture agreement remained available. 
Also,  until  the  SAO  arrangements  referred  to 
above  under  recital  5  (2)  were  introduced, 
. other uplink  providers  did  not  have  access  to 
Eutelsat or lntelsat space segment capacity, 
- limitation  of customer choice:  UK customers 
interested  in  broadcasting  via  Astra  were 
obliged  to accept  the  uplink  service  provide<i 
by- BT, whereas they may  have  found  or may 
find  more  favourable  terms  elsewhere.  The 
tying  of BT's  uplink  service  to  the  satellite 
capacity on Astra was  aggravated  by  the  fact 
that  under  the  customer  contracts,  most 
· customers were obliged to pay one  lump  sum 
covering  both  elements  of  the  contract; 
unaware  of the  price  being  charged  for  the 
uplink,  respectively  transponder  capacity, 
customers  were  thus  not  in  a  position  to 
negotiate the conditions imposed on them. 
3.  Appreciability  and  effect  on  trade  between 
Member States 
(18)  For the above reasons, the agreements resulted  in 
serious restrictions of competition which given the 
size  of  all  parties  concerned,  including  the 
customers involved, were appreciable.  By  the very 
nature of the service  in  question and also  in  view 
of the individual clauses  aimed at discouraging or 
preventing  cross-border  activities  in  both  the 
transponder  and  uplink  markets,  trade  between 
Member States was affected and Anicle 85  (1)  of 
the EEC Treaty was therefore applicable. 
B. Article SS (3) 
(19)  In  order  for  the  Commission  to  declare  the 
prohibition of Anicle 85  (1)  inapplicable  pursuant 
to Article 85  (3},  the requirements provided for  in 
Article  85  (3)  must all  be  met.  In the  first  place, 
the  restrictive  agreement  must  result  in  cenain 
benefits  in  terms  of  improving  production  or 
diStribution,  or  pro~~ting technical  or economic 
progress,  which  oureigh the  disadvantages  for 
competition.  · 
As a general argument, the panies have stated that 
any restrictions of competition resulting from  their 
cooperation  were  outweighed  by  the  benefits 
which ensued in  terms of economic progress in  the 
provision  of  satellite  television  services  and 
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improved  distribution  thereof.  Admittedly,  Astra, 
as  the  first  privately-owned  satellite  for  interna-
tional  television  services  to  compete  with  the 
lntelsat  and  Eutelsat  satellites,  and  funherrnore 
the  first  medium-powered satellite,  contributed to 
increasing competition on the market for television 
transmission  by  satellite.  However,  in  the 
Commission's view these benefits were a result of 
the existence of the Astra satellite as  such and not 
of the  arrangements  concluded  between  BT  and 
SES  for  the  purpose  of marketing and  operating 
the  satellite.  The  question  is  thus  whether  SES 
could have  entered the  market with the Astra  lA 
satellite  independently  of the  arrangements  with 
BT  or,  rather,  as  the  parties  have  argued,  that  --~­
those arrangements were indispensable to enable a 
new  competitor  to  the  existing  Eutelsat  and 
lntelsat systems to emerge successfully. 
(20)  The  parties  did  not  argue  that  SES  needed  to 
cooperate with  BT  in  order to ov-ercome  the first 
hurdles facing  new market entrants in  this sector, 
namely the  heavy  costs  involved  in  acquiring  the 
satellite  itself :md  the costs of launching it.  These 
costs  SES  was  able  to  bear  by  itself  and  it  has 
indeed  stated  that  it  had  no  wish  to  enter  the 
market  for  the  provision  of satellite  capacity  for 
the  transmission  of television  channels  with  any 
partner.  However,  the  particular  features  of this 
market  represented  obstacles  to  market  entry 
which  SES  concluded  could  only  be  overcome 
through the arrangements with BT. 
(21)  Specifically,  the  parties  have  argued that in  order 
for  SES  to  exploit  UK  demand,  it  had  no  alter-
native  but  to  conclude  a  joint  venture  with  BT, 
because: 
- BT's  position  as  the  UK  Eutelsat  signatory 
enabled  SES  ultimately  to  obtain  Eutelsat 
approval  for  the  operation  of  the  satellite; 
Eutelsat requires two signatories to embark on 
the  coordination  procedure,  so  that  SES 
needed  another  signatory  aside  from  the 
Luxembourg  PTT,  which  supported  the 
Luxembourg-based  company.  In  view  of the 
considerations  regardiqg  English  language 
programmes  (see  recital  6  above)  and  BT's 
apparent  interest  in  providing  uplink  services, 
BT was chosen,  ' 
- BT's  poslUon  at  the  time  the  arrangements 
werde  made  as  the  sole  effective  uplink 
provider  in  the  UK  ensured  potential 
customers  that there would be  no problem  in 
obtaining  the  necessary  uplink  to  the  Astra 
satellite. 
Although  these  considerations  may  well  have 
resulted in SES's point of view at the time, they do 
not  constitute  valid  objective  reasons  for  the 
restrictive arrangements between the parties. 
(22)  The parties have submitted that although there are 
no  provisions  to  this  effect  in  the  Eutelsat 
Convention,  SES  required  a  second  signatory  in 
order to embark successfully on the Eutelsat coor-
dination  procedure.  It has  also  been  established 
that more than a year before the  main  agreement 
was  concluded,  BT  offered  to  contribute  to  the 
commercial success of the then-planned SES Astra 
satellite system by inter alia serving as the required 
second  Signatory.  BT  clearly  stated  that  this 
assistance  would  be  given  in  the  context  of  an 
agreement  between  BT  and  SES.  It is  therefore 
understandable  that SES,  as  it has  stated  in  reply 
to  the  Commission's  statement of objections,  did 
not expect BT to provide its  services  as  signatory 
without some form of compensation. 
There  were,  however,  no  objective  reasons  to 
justify the imposition of a pannership on  SES :ts  a 
quid  pro  quo  for  BT's  assistance  in  the  coordi-
nation  procedure.  Article  XVI  of  the  Eutelsat 
Convention  merely  states  that a  Signatory  which 
becomes  aware  of any  person  within  its  territory 
intending  to  utilize  non-Eutelsat  space  segment 
equipment, must furnish all relevant information in 
order  to  allow  the  Parties  to  establish  whether 
there  is  likely  to  be  any  significant  harm  to 
Eutelsat.  This  provision  does  not  in  any  way 
require the Signatory engaged in  the coordination 
procedure to enter into some form of cooperation 
agreement with the applicant market entrants, nor 
are  there  any other provisions  in  the  Convention 
or  Operating  Agreement  which  do  so.  In  fact, 
as  noted  above  under  recital·  8  1  ,  t  e 
irector- enera  o  ute sat  stated  not  to  ave 
an  knowledge  of the  arrangements  betw.een  B I 
an  .  n ot er wor  s,  w  en  ecame aware 
oT  customer  interest  in  the  Astra  satellite  in  the 
UK, that fact alone gave rise to BT's obligation to 
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coordinate  under Article XVI; BT has  submitted 
correspondence with programme providers dating 
back  to  well  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
agreement  with  SES  in  which  such  interest  was 
clearly expressed.  One programme  provider  in  a 
letter dated 9  October 1986  formally  advised  BT 
as  the  UK Signatory  to  Eutelsat of its  very  real 
interest in  using  Astra  and  expressed  its  ooncern 
that  BT  had  not  regis~red  that  interest  at  a 
previous Eutelsat meeting. 
SES  has  noted  that  according  to  the  OFfEL 
statement on the setting up of the SAO (see above 
recital  5 (2))  BT is  entitled  to a fee  equivalent to 
7 % of the space segment charge to cover its costs 
•n  providing  its  services.  as  signatory;  SEs· 
compared this  fee  to the  10 %  BT service  charge 
due  under the  notified  arrangements.  The Oftel 
statement cannot, however,  be  used  as  a point of 
reference in  this case in  that it refers to situations 
in which BT acts as  an intermediary for applicants 
seeking  s.pace  segment  capacity  on Eutelsat (and 
lntelsat) satellites and involves a far broader range 
of Signatory activities  than its  involvement· in  the 
coordination  procedure  alone.  Furthermore,  the 
arrangements  between  BT  and  SES  went  much 
further than  the mere  payment of the  BT service 
charge  and  resulted  in  the  serious  restrictions  of 
competition referred to in recitals 12  et seq. 
In  any  event,  an  agreement  concluded  for  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  or  complying  with  a 
procedure  in  which  the entry of new competitors 
is  subject  to  the  approval  of existing  competing 
market  participants  cannot  benefit  from  an 
exemption  under Article  85  (3),  the requirements 
of which  relate  to  objective  advantages  such  as 
improvements  in  production,  distribution  or 
technical and economic advances. 
(23)  The  Commission  cannot  accept  that  the 
arrangements  between  BT  and  SES  were  indis-
pensable  in  order to  ensure  that UK programme 
providers  would  be  provided  with  the  necessary 
uplinking services by BT,  at that time  the only de 
facto  provider of such services for television distri-
bution via satellite in the UK. 
In the Commission's view, BT was obliged both by 
Conditions  1 and  5 of its  licence  under the Tele-
communications Act  1984,  and  by  the  provisions 
of Community  law,  in  particular  Article  86,  to 
provide the uplinking services without requiring to 
participa~ in the leasing of transponders on SES's 
satellite to customers, thereby collecting the  1  0 % 
BT  service  charge  to  be  deducted  from  SES's 
revenues for the lease of the satellite capacity. 
In  reply  to  the  Commission's  statement  of 
objections,  SES  argued  that  at  the  time  the 
arrangements  were  concluded,  it  was  far  from 
clear that it  could  count on  an  obligation  on  rhe 
part of BT  under its  licence to provide  uplinking 
services.  It  noted  that  Oftel's  decision  in  the 
PanAmSat  case,  whereby  it  was  established  that 
BT's  obligations  arise  as  soon  as  it  receives  a 
request  from  a  person  in  the  UK  for  a  given 
service,  provided  the customer is  willing  to  pay  a 
reasonable price, was not issued until March 1988. 
Furthermore,  SES  argued  that  even  if  Oftel's 
position on this point had been clear in  the period 
preceding  the  conclusion  of  the  joint  venture 
agreement in  December 1987, BT would probably 
not have  been obliged to build  an earth station  if 
customers  had  not already entered  into  contracts 
for the supply of the service. 
SES's  arguments  cannot  be  accepted.  In  the  first 
place,  if  BT's  obligations  under  its  licence  were 
not  clear  at  the  time  SES  needed  to  reassure 
customers  that  uplinking  to  the  Astra  satellite 
would be provided for, it was  not by entering into 
restrictive arrangements with BT that the situation 
would  be  clarified.  PanAmSat,  which  actually 
experienced difficulty  in  obtaining  uplink  services 
by BT, did not enter into a joint venture with  the 
latter,  but  made  representations  to  Oftel.  SES, 
however,  never  put  the  issue  to  the  test.  Well 
before the arrangements between the parties were 
concluded,  BT  engaged  in  correspondence  with 
programme · providers  who  expressed  a  clear 
interest in  the Astra lA satellite; in  October 19 8  6, 
one potential Astra client formally advised BT that 
it had a very real interest in using Astra (see above 
rectical  22)  even  on  the  basis  of  restricted 
downlink  reception  possibilities  in  northern 
European countries. In the absence of other uplink 
providers for television distribution at that time, all 
uplinking services to the Astra IA satellite from  the 
UK  would/6ecessarily  accrue  to  BT.  However, 
before  those  customers  could  translate  their 
interest into commitments firm  enought to actuate 
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53.6  of  BT's  licence  it  is  not  necessary  that  a 
contract actually be  concluded), the arrangements 
between  BT  and  S~S were -finalized.  Again,  the 
issue was not put to the test. Furthermore, it is not 
clear  why  simply  by  vinue  of the  joint venture 
agreement  with  SES,  BT  did  decide  that  the 
building of a dedicated earth station was justified; 
BT  itself  has  stated  that  it  installed  a  new 
dedicated  uplink  terminal  to  access  the Astra  lA 
satellite ... prior to BT securing any customers for 
service on the Astra lA satellite. 
Finally,  BT's  capital  investment  in  these  instal-
lations  represented  ±  3% of SES's  total  expen-
diture in satellite construction and launching costs. 
Some arrangement far less restrictive than the joint 
venture  agreement  must  have  been  possible  to 
ensure BT that it would recoup this investment. 
As  far  as  Community  law  is  concerned  in  this 
connection,  as  a  matter  of  general  principle,  it 
should  be  clear  that  in  the  telecommunications 
sector,  characterized  by  activities  which  can only 
be  carried out by operators such as  BT licensed to 
do  so,  the  provision  of services  under licence  to 
market  participants  must  be  freely  available  and 
cannot  be  made  subject  to  market  entrants 
concluding restrictive agreements with the licensed 
operator. The fact that SES  was  not satisfied that 
Community  law  was  sufficient  to  compel  BT  to 
provide  uplink  services  does  not  justify  the 
solution  it  finally  opted  for.  Again,  SES  did  not 
put the issue to the test. 
(24)  From the outset, the parties were informed that on 
the  basis  of  the  above  arguments  relating  to 
Eutelsat  coordination  and  uplinking  services,  the 
requirements of Article  85  (3) did  not seem  to be 
met. A further line of argumentation in support of 
the  arrangements  was  subsequently  developed, 
relating to: 
- the  benefits  of  a  single  packaged  customer 
contract covering both uplink and transponder 
capacity, 
- the  need  for  BT's  involvement  m  finding 
customers in the UK for Astra I A. 
(25)  According  to  the  parties,  a  single  customer 
contract comprising  uplink  facilities  and  satellite 
capacity  placed  the  sole  responsibility  for  the 
entire service on one entity, BT. For the customer, 
this  was  not only  convenient but could  lead  to  a 
quicker  resolution  of  technical  problems;  under 
the  packaged  arrangement,  BT  would  be  most 
likely to take measures to restore  degradations in 
signal  quality,  regardless  of  their  origin,  for 
example  by  strengthening  the  uplink  signal  in 
order  to  compensate  for  a  weaker  downlink 
signal,  the  latter deficiency  otherwise  not falling 
under  BT's  responsibility.  If  there  were  two 
separate  contracts,  the  uplinker  (BT)  and  the 
satellite  provider (SES)  would  only monitor their 
own responsibilities and there would be no control 
of the service as a whole. Neither would be willing 
to take corrective  action  until  it  had  been  estab-
lished  on which  pan of the  transmission  path  the 
fault lay. 
(26)  In  the  Commission's  view,  however,  no  reasons 
have  appeared  why  a  bundled  contract  offers 
technical  advantages  not available  in  the  case  of 
two  separate  contracts.  In  fact  the  following 
considerations run counter to this argument: 
(a)  in  order  to  provide  uplink  services,  an 
operator such as BT must have the benefit of a 
licence.  In  return  for  the  privilege  of being 
allowed to provide such  services,  the  licensed 
operator  must  ensure,  to  the  extent  he  is 
capable  of.  doing so,  that  the  service  actually 
reaches  the  viewer  in  the  form ·  of clear  and 
continuous  reception  of  the  television 
programmes  on  his  screen.  If  the  uplink 
provider  is  capable  of influencing  the  quality 
of the  end product ultimately  received  by the 
viewer,  he  is,  in  the  Commission's  opinion, 
obliged  to  do  whatever  is  necessary  in  that 
respect.  If it  subsequently  appears  that  extra 
efforts  by  the  uplink  provider  were 
necessitated  by  defects  in  parts  of the  trans-
mission  path  for  which  he  is  not  directly 
responsible,  the  uplink  provider  is  of  course 
entitled  to  compensation  from  the  entity 
responsible for the deficiency; 
(b)  the  parties•  contention that separate contracts 
would  tend  to  slow  down  the  remedying  of 
signal  problems  ignores  the  fact  that  even 
under  a  packaged  contract,  whatever  party 
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turns  out to  be  responsible  for  the  deficiency 
will  be  liable  vis-a-vis the other party for any 
loss  of  revenue.  It  is  thus  directly  in  the 
interest of each  party that faults  are detected 
and  remedied  immediately,  in  order to  limit 
their potential ultimate liability. This interest is 
not  in  any  way  linked  to  the  presence  of a 
bundled contract; 
(c)  in  the  statement  by  the  Director-General  of 
Oftel  regarding  the  independent  PanAmSat 
satellite  (see  above  recital  23),  reference  is 
made  to Condition  35  of BT's licence, which 
contains a general prohibition of linked sales. 
The  Director-General  notes  that although  in 
the  case  of lntelsat  satellites  (an~ the  same 
reasoning  would  apply  with  respect  to 
Eutelsat),  users  have  no  direct  access  to  the 
satellite  sector  and  BT  as  signatory  is 
permitted  to  provide  both  the  uplink and the 
satellite sector, this argument would no longer 
hold  with  the  advent  of independent satellite 
systems ... and unbundling would be required. 
If there was  an  alternative satellite system, ... 
customers  would  be  free  to  make  their own 
arrangements  with  the  independent  satellite 
operator.  Nowhere  in  the  Director-General's 
remarks  is  there  any  mention  of a  technical 
reason  why uplink and  satellite  sector should 
be provided by the same entity. 
The  Commission's  position  was  confirmed  by 
programme providers  using  the Astra  lA  satellite. 
Users together leasing the largest number of trans-
ponders  denied  that  there  were  any  technical 
advantages to a bundled contract. To illustrate the 
fallacy  of  the  argument  that  BT  would  be  the 
single  point  of contact  for  customers  in  case  of 
problems, programme providers cited the case of a 
technical incident which  occurred in  the spring of 
1989. Having contacted BT as  directly responsible 
under  the  customer  contracts,  one  programme 
provider was  subsequendly advises  to contact SES 
to  solve  the  problem,  while  another  programme 
provider  stated  that  at  a  later  stage  it  also 
discussed  the  problem  directly  with  SES  because 
BT had been tardy in dealing with the matter. 
(27)  Also in support of the bundled customer contracts, 
the parties argued  that it  is  contractually efficient 
to negotiate only one contract covering  an  entire 
service  rather than  engaging  in  separate  contract 
negotiations  for  each  element.  Furthermore,  a 
customer with  a  single  contract  for  both  uplink 
and transponder capacity is better placed to secure 
compensation for faults. Fpr example, if the uplink 
service  fails  due  to  B'Ps  fault,  the  customer will 
·receive a rebate for the satellite part of the service 
as  well  as  for  the  uplink.  In  the  case  of  two 
separate contracts,  one  party would  not be  likely 
to  make  a  rebate  for  the  failure  of  the  other 
(28) 
party's service.  '  lflli 
In  the  Commission's  view,  the  efficiency  which 
may  result  from  negotiating  only  one  contract 
does  not  ou~eigh the  disadvantages  which  such 
tying arrangements entail, both for customers who 
are faced  by bundled services and for competitors 
in  the  services  concerned  who  are  thereby fore-
closed.  With  regard  to  the  compensation  for 
faults,  the  contractual  arrangements  involved  in 
the  case  of separate  contracts  would  admittedly 
have  to  contain  provisions  which  ensure  that 
customers  are  not obliged  to pay  for  a service  A 
they have not been able to enjoy not through any 
fault  of  their  own  but  because  a  third  entity 
providing  a  service  B on  which  the  execution  of 
service A depends has not performed that service B 
satisfactorily or at all. 
In conclusion,  the  Commission  considers that the 
bundled contract does not bring about any benefits 
which  justify  the  arrangements  between  the 
parties.  In  reaching  this  conclusion,  the 
Commission  took  into  consideration  the  views 
expressed by the  four programme providers  using 
the Astra lA  satellite via  customer contracts  with 
BT: 
1.  programme  provider  X  which  leased  several 
transponders  on  Astra  lA  stated  The  principal 
issue  raised  in  the  meeting  'with  Commission 
officials'  is  X's  dissatisfaction  with  the 
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'bundling' of services  in  its  agreement with ... 
BT ... The lack of transparency in  packaging 
the  uplinking  and  the transponders  is  a  major 
objection; X  came to agreement with  BT  only 
because it had no alternative ... The reason for 
this  is  that  BT  obtained  exclusive  rights  to 
market a number of transponders on the Astra 
satellite to UK customers; As a buyer, X would 
have preferred dealing with SES; 
2.  programme  provider  Y  stated  that  it  would 
have  preferred  two  contracts,  because  then 
there  would  have  been  room  for  negotiating 
different  prices.  Several  months  before  finally 
signing  a  contract  with  BT  for  two  trans-
ponders  on  Astra  lA,  Y  wrote  to  Oftel 
concerning the  severe  problems  we  are  having 
in  obtaining  competitive  quotations  for  the 
provision  of  medium  power  satellite  capacity 
...  ;  we  at  Y,  along  with  other satellite  tele-
vision companies, have invited Eutelsat and SES 
Astra to submit bids  for the  provision  of such 
capacity.  Both  organisations  have  informed  us 
that  we  must  deal  through  British  Telecom 
International; What makes matters worse for us 
is  that BTl require  as  part of the contract for 
satellite capacity that we  use their earth station 
uplink  site  at  Woolwich.  We  believe  this  is 
using their monopoly to make a linked sale; 
3.  programme provider Z stated that the view was 
taken that it was  better to deal with one person 
for the overall contract and service. In assessing 
this  statement,  the  Commission  took  into 
consideration 
- the fact that no reasons were given why this 
view was taken; with regard to the technical 
advantage  of dealing  with  one  entity,  Z's 
first  reaction  as  to whom it would contact 
in case of problem was SES, 
- Z  was  25 %  owned  by  BT  at the  time  the 
customer  contract  was  concluded;  all 
important  decisions,  such  as  transponder 
leases, were taken unanimously by the three 
shareholders; 
4.  programme provider Q  is  a  non-UK company 
which already prior to the emergence of Astra 
lA was obliged to locate its  studios  in  London 
because it was  not clear whether the TO in  its 
own territory would  provide  uplink  services  t'' 
lntelsat space segment capacity, a sen·icc which 
BT was willing  to provide. Q stated  that as  it 
had  already  located  its  transmissions  to 
London, British Telecom was the only one who 
could provide Astra capacity. Although Q does 
cite  certain  "advantages  in  having  a  bundled 
contract  its startin  oint a  ears to have been 
that capactty on  tra cou  on y  e  ac~u1re 
tHrough  B  I  ,i. also,  the  advantages  1t  me  had 
hi!!!Vcr been put to the test in practice. 
The  parties  have  argued  that  there  was  no 
customer interest  in  an  unbundled  ser\'ice  at  the 
time  and  that  statements  made  by  programme 
providers  now  when  market . conditions  haYe 
changed  do  not  necessarily  reflect  what  they 
requested  at  the  time  the  agreements  were 
concluded. It is  true that the Commission  has  not 
found  any  evidence  of  written  requests  by 
customers to BT and SES for separate, unbundled 
services.  As  BT  noted  during  the  course  of  the 
procedure,  however,  BT  was  engaged  in  oral 
discussions  concerning· Astra  IA  with  programme 
providers before the arrangements with  SES  were 
conc;:luded,  which  were  not,  however,  e,·idenced 
by any 'correspondence in  the  file'.  In  a letter  to 
Oftel,  however,  quoted  above  under  2.,  one 
programme provider stated that it  and  others  had 
applied  to  SES  directly  for  the  pre\\ i'ion  of 
satellite  capacity,  but had  been  rdnrt·d  to  BT  as 
the entity to deal through. In  any l'vt.·nt, nJston1cn 
would  necessarily  have  been  denied  unbundled 
services  in  view  of  Clause  3  ( 1)  of  the  main 
agreement which  stated  that 'The service  offered 
to  customers  will  comprise  the  transponders 
covered by this  agreement and the addition of the 
~plink'. 
SES  has  stated  that  by  choosing  for  long-ttrm 
contracts, customers have indicated that they  \\ere 
not  injured  by  the  bundled  service.  In  the 
Commission's  view,  however,  it  was  more  likt'ly 
the  up  to  50 %  savings  programme  providers .. 
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enjoyed by opting for a long-term contract which 
prompted their choice . 
(29)  On the marketing side, the parties argued that the 
pooling  of their  respective  skills,  resources  and 
experience was  required  in  order to promote the 
use of the Astra satellite. BT with several years of 
experience  in  marketing  and  providing  satellite 
services  to  UK  television  programme  providers 
was responsible for finding customers, while SES's 
marketing responsibilities related to promoting the 
retail  side,  including  both  equipment  manufac-
turers and viewers. 
The Commission  does  not  agree  that SES  could 
not  have  found  customers  itself  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  independendy  of  Brs  marketing 
effQrts. The total number of television programme 
providers  interested  in  satellite  television  in  the 
UK was less  than  10 at the time  the joint venture 
was  concluded,  and  there  is  no  apparent  reason 
why  SES's  commercial  team  could  not  have  · 
approached  these  potential  customers  itself.  In 
fact,  one  programme  provider  has  stated  that 
SES's  commercial  director  was  very  actively 
promoting  the  Astra  satellite  in  the  UK himself, 
several years before it was launched and before the 
joint venture was established. SES  has  argued that 
its  initial  contacts  with  customers  were  only 
translated  into  binding  contracts  with  BT's 
assistance. Given  the fact that potential customers 
were already at an early stage  informed  that they 
must  deal  through  BT,  well  before  the  first 
customer contracts were  signed,  it  is  not possible 
to  establish  in  retrospect  whether  customers  felt 
BT's involvement was  indispensable in  this respect. 
It should be noted, however, that SES has sold the 
transponders  not  covered  by  the  joint  venture 
arrangements directly to programme providers in a 
number of countries, without the need  for a joint 
venture with  the  local  telecommunications organ-
ization. 
Finally,  BT's  involvement  in  the  sale  of  trans-
ponders on the Astra satellite admittedly facilitated 
the  transfer  of  BT's  Eutelsat  and  Intelsat 
customers  to  Astra  thanks  to  the  joint  venture 
agreement  provisions  on  double-illumination  and 
early  termination  of existing  customer  contracts. 
· However, several  customers  have  noted  that they 
believe  the  reduction  in  the  satellite  price  which 
could  have  been  achieved  in  the  absence  of BT's 
involvement  in  the  Astra  satellite  would  have 
amply offset the extra costs they would  have  had 
to bear in  the absence  of free  of charge 'double-
illumination'. 
(30)  The 'retail' marketing being carried out by  SES  is 
a  continuation  of an  area  of activity  in  which, 
according  to  the  parties,  it  'had  already  been 
active on a pan-European basis including the UK', 
and  which  in  any  event  it  would  have  pursued, 
also in the absence of the arrangements with  BT. 
Concbuion 
(31)  In  view  of  the  foregoing,  the  Commission  has  ..,...•• 
concluded  that  as  the  arrangements  between  BT 
and SES: 
- did  not  bring  about ·any  improvements  and 
benefits on the market in question, and 
- were  not  indispensable  in  order  to  ensure 
SES's  entry into the  market for  the provision 
of space segment capacity, 
the  notified  arrangements  were  not  eligible  for 
exemption. 
Under these  circumstances,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
examine whether the other requirements of Article 
85 (3) are met. 
C. Article l  of Regulation  17 
(32)  Pursuant  to  Article  3  of  Regulation  17,  the 
Commission may, by decision, find  that there is  an 
infringement of Article  85  of the EEC Treaty and 
require the undenakings concerned to bring  such 
infringement to an end. This implies  not only  the 
termination of restrictive  agreements  between  the 
panies,  but  also  the  elimination  of  restrictiYe 
effects  residing  in  contracts  which  have  been 
concluded with third undertakings under the terms 
of the aforesaid restrictive ·agreements. 
In  the  case  at  hand,  after  the  parties  had  been 
heard in accordance with Article  19  (1)  and  (2)  of 
Regulation No 17, they infoqned the Commission 
that  the  joint-venture  agreement  betv.•een  them-
selves,  and  various  ancillary agreements  and  side 
letters,  were  terminated  on  30  January  1991 ; 
under the provisions of the termination agreement, 
existing  customer contracts  will  remain  in  force, 
whereby the transponder lease takes place directly 
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{33) 
JOmt-venture  company;  upon  expiry  of  such 
contracts,  BT  shall  have  no  further  rights  with 
respect  to  the  transponders  concerned  nor  any 
others on Astra I A or Astra I B. 
The  termination  of  the  joint-venture  agreement 
ensures  the  commercial  autonomy of the  parties 
for  the  future.  However,  the  customer contracts 
which  were  concluded  by  BT  under  the  joint-
venture  arrangements  continue  to  be  in  force 
pursuant  to  Clause  5.1  (1)  of  the  termination 
agreement without any modification. 
These  contracts  perpetuate  the  restracuve  effects 
resulting from the joint-venture agreement because 
customers  who  wished  to  transmit  their 
programmes  via  the  Astra  lA  satellite  were  not 
given  the choice .of concluding separate contracts 
for,  on the one hand, uplink services and, on the 
other  hand,  the  lease  of  transponder  capacity. 
Furthermore,  the  terms  of  those  customer 
contracts were determined by BT and SES  in the 
context  of  the  joint-venture  arrangements,  i.e. 
under  conditions  of  distorted  competition.  This 
does  not mean that the customer contracts, simply 
because  of  their  links  with  the  restrictive  hori-
zontal  agreements,  are  also  caught by  Article  85 
( 1  ).  However,  the  restrictive  effects  which  these 
contracts  perpetuate can only be  eliminated when 
the  customers  have  been  given  the right of read-
justment. Therefore, they must have  the option to 
remain  committed  to  the  customer  contracts  as 
signed  with  BT,  to  terminate  those  contracts  or 
renegotiate  the  terms  thereof.  To  this  end,  and 
within  one  month  of  the  notification  of  this 
Decision  to  them,  BT  and  SES  shall  inform 
programme  providers  who  signed  contracts  with 
BT  for  international  TV distribution  services  via 
the  Astra  lA  satellite  prior  to  30  January  1991, 
that during the  four months after having been so 
informed, they may, if they so wish, 
- renegotiate the terms of the contract, or 
- terminate  the  contract,  taking  into  account  a 
reasonable period of notice. 
Customers who choose to renegotiate or terminate 
must  in  any  event  be  ensured  that  the  uplink 
services  and  the  use  of the  transponder  capacity 
will  continue  to  be  provided  to  them  without 
interruption during the transitional period. 
Customer  contracts  which  at  the  choice  of  the 
customer continue to run under the original terms 
would  only  be  restrictive  of competition  if  they 
result in the foreclosure of uplink providers other 
than BT.  However, in  the light of current market 
conditions,  in  particular  the  accessibility  of UK 
uplink  providers  to  Eutelsat  and  Intelsat  space 
segment capacity through the SAO and additional 
new  space  segment  capacity,  such  as  Astra  IB, 
which  has  in the meantime become available, such 
a  foreclosure  would  seem  unlikely.  If  new 
elements were to appear, proceedings independent 
of those which  have  led  to this  Decision could be 
called for, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article  1 
The  main  agreement  of  17  December  1987  between 
Societe  Europeenne  des  Satellites  SA  and  British  Tele-
communications  pic,  and  all  related  side  letters  and 
agreements regarding the arrangements whereby the two 
parties  cooperated  in  the  joint provision  of a television 
distribution service by satellite (collectively referred to as 
the. agreements),  constituted  an  infringement  of Article 
85  (1) of the EEC Treaty until 30 January 1991, the date 
on which  those  agreements were terminated. 
Article  2 
An  exemption  pursuant  to  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EEC 
Treaty  for  the  agreements  referred  to  in  Article  1  is 
hereby refused for the period during which they were  in 
force. 
Article 3 
Within one  month  from  the  date of notification  of  thi~ 
Decision,  British  Telecommunications  plc  (BT)  and 
Societe Europeenne des  Satellites SA  (SES)  shall  inform 
television programme providers who concluded contracts 
with  BT for television  distribution services  via  the Astra 
I A satellite prior to 30  January  1991  in  writing of the 
Commission's Decision and in particular Articles  1 and  2 
.. • 
• 
28.  1. ~3  Official Journal of the European Communities  No L 20/39 
thereof,  and  advise  them  that  during  a  period  of four 
months  after  having  been  so  informed,  such  television 
programme providers are entitled, if they so wish, to 
- renegotiate the terms of those contracts, or 
- terminate  those  contracts,  subject  to  a ·reasonable 
period of notice  given  by the.m  to BT, which in  its 
turn shall  forthwith  inform SES  that such notice has 
been given. 
When the letter pursuant to this Anide is  sent to tele· 
vision  programme  providers  within  the  one-month 
time-limit referred to above, a copy of such letter shall at 
the same  time  be submitted to the Commission. 
Article 4 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  following  under-
takings: 
(a)  British Telecommunications pic, 
British Telecom Centre, 
81  Newgate Street, 
GB-London ECtA 7  AJ; 
(b)  Soci~  europeenne des satellites SA, 
ChAteau de Betzdod, 
L-6815 Luxembourg. 
Done at Brussels,  23  December 1992. 
For the  Commission 
Leon BRITT  AN 
Vice-President ***  *-A-* 
* VP *  ....... 
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COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 27  July  1.9.94 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of 
the EEA  Agreement 
(Case  IV/34.857  - BT-MCI) 
(O~ly the English  text is  authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(94/  579 /EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic  Area, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 
1962,  First  Regulation  implementing Articles  85  and  86 
of the Treaty ('),  as  last amended by the Act of Accession 
of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Articles 2, 6, and 
8  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and the notification for exemption submitted, pursuant to 
Articles  2 and  4  of  Regulation  17,  as  converted  on  18 
September 19.93 from the original notification pursuant to 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21  December 
1989  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between  under-
takings (2), 
Having regard  to the request  made by the parties on 1  0 
February 1994, to extend the application and notification 
to  Article  53  of  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic  Area, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of  the  application  and 
notification published pursuant to Article  19 (3) of Regu-
lation  17  and  to  Article  3  of  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA 
Agreement (l), 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant  Positions, 
(1)  OJ No  13,  21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(l) OJ No L 395, 30. 12.  1989, p.  1 (corrected version OJ No L 
257,  21.  9.  1990,  p.  13). 
(')  OJ No  C  93,  30.  3.  1994,  p.  3. 
Whereas: 
I.  THE PACfS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
(I)  The  present  case  was  oiriginally  notified  as  a 
concentration  pursuant  to  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89. However, the Commission concluded that 
none  of  the  transactions  notified  constituted  a 
concentration. The parties were so  informed by the 
decision  of  13  September 1993. Consequently, and 
at  the  request  of  the  parties,  the  notification  was 
converted into a notification for  negative clearance 
and/or exemption  pursuant  to  Regulation  17. 
Following the· entering into force of the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement~ 
the parties requested the Commission to extend the 
notification  to  cover  also  Article  53  of  the  EEA 
Agreement. Given that the notified agreements will 
have  a relevant impact on the EFTA countries and 
that such  impact is  expected  to be very  similar to 
that  the  notified  agreements  will  have  on  the 
Community,  the  Commission  will  also  apply 
Article  53  of  the  EEA  Agreement  in  the  present 
case. 
(2)  The notified operation actually comprises two  main 
transactions : 
(i)  British Telecommunications pic (Bl) is  to  take 
a 20 %  stake  in MCI  Communications Corpo-
ration  (MCI~ worth  US$  4,3  billion.  BT  will 
acquire new equity and will become the largest 
single  shareholder  in  MCI,  with  proportionate 
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(3) 
(4) 
board representation and investor protection. As 
will  be further detailed later,  several  provisions 
have  been  included  in  the  relevant  agreement 
to  impede BT from  controlling or influencing 
MCI; 
(ii)  the  creation  of  a  joint-venture  company, 
Newco, for the provision of enhanced and valu-
e-added global  telecommunications  services  to 
multinational (or large regional) companies. The 
parties will contribute their existing non-corres-
pondent international  network  facilities,  inclu-
ding Syncordia,  BT"s  existing outsourcing busi-
ness,  to  Newco. 
In  the framework of the operation, the parties will 
rationalize  their respective  holdings  in  other tele-
communications operators (fOs) and groupings in 
the world. In this respect, MCI has already acquired 
most of BTs existing business in North America. 
B.  THE  PARTIES 
BT,  the  former  UK  monopolist  telecommunica-
tions  operator,  and  now  a  publicly  quoted 
l:Ompany,  supplies  telephone  exchange  lines  to 
homes  and  businesses ;  local,  trunk  and  interna-
tional  (to  and  from  the  United  Kingdom)  tele-
phone  calls;  other  telecommunications  services 
and  telecommunications equipment for  customers' 
premises. 
Worldwide  turnover  for  BT  in  1993  was  ECU 
17 952 million, a figure that shows a slight decrease 
in  respect  of  1992  (ECU  18 080  million).  Over 
95% of  BTs turnover was  obtained  in  the  EEA, 
mainly  (over  94 %)  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Outside  the  United  Kingdom,  BT  has  an 
established  presence  in  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Germany  and  Spain,  where  it  has  recently 
announced  a  joint-venture  agreement  with  Banco 
de  Santander to  provide  data  transmission  services 
in  Spain, where it  has  recently  announced a joint-
venture  agreement  with  Banco  de  Santander  to 
provide  data  transmission  services  in  Spain  in 
competition  with  the  local  TO. 
BT is the world's fourth largest telecommunications 
company  in  terms  of  traffic  (minutes  of  telecom 
traffic). 
MCI  is  a  telecommunications  common  carrier  in 
the  United  States  of  America  providing  a  broad 
range  of  US  and  international  voice  and  data 
communications  services  including  long-distance 
telephone,  record  communications  and  electronic 
mail  services· to  and  from  the  US. 
Worldwide  turnover  for  MCI  in  1992  was  ECU 
8 137  million.  MCI's  turnover  in  the  Community 
(5) 
(6) 
for  the  same  year  was  said  by  MCI  to  be  ECU 
326,27  million. 
MCI is the second largest long-distance operator in 
the United States  of  America after AT&T  and  the 
world's  fifth  largest  in  terms  of  traffic. 
C.  THE RELEVANT  MARKET 
1.  Newco 
The  market  Newco  will  address  is  the  emerging 
market  for  value-added  and  enhanced  services  to 
large  multinational  corporations,  extended  enter-
prises and other intensive users of telecommunica-
tions  services  provided  over  international  intelli-
gent networks. This market will cover a wide range 
of  existing global  trans-border  services,  including 
virtual  network  services,  high-speed  data  services 
and  outsourced  global  telecommunications  solu-
tions  specially  designed  for  individual  customer 
requirements.  Initially,  however  Ne~co will  focus 
its development efforts on the biggest [  ...  ] (') multi-
nationals. 
In  this  market,  Newco  is  expected to  offer  a port-
folio  of global  products  included in  six  categories 
of  service  offerings.  Those  global  products  will 
originally be based on a blend of existing products 
of  the  parent  companies. 
The six  categories  are  the  following : 
- data  services :  low-speed  packet,  high-speed 
packet  and  frame  relay  servtces,  pre-
provisioned,  mananged  and  circuit  switched 
bandwidth, 
- value-added  application  services :  value-added 
messaging  and  video  conferencing services, 
- traveller  services : global  calling  card  services, 
- intelligent  network  services, 
- other  services :  Integrated  VSAT  network 
services, 
- global outsourcing that will allow the distibutor 
to  offer  its  customers  the  ability  to  transfer 
responsibility  and  ownership  of  their  global 
networks  to either the distibutor or Newco.  In 
this  respect,  Newco  will  be  able  to  integrate 
within  its  own  offerings  third-party  products 
already  owned  by  customers that  they  want  to 
keep. 
(1)  Blanks  between  square  brackets  indicate  buisiness  secrets 
deleted  pursuant  to  Article  21  (2)  of  Regulation  No  17. .. 
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Given the needs of big companies to link locations 
geographically dispersed over the world (that means 
also  providing broad  coverage  of delivery  capacity 
and  in-country  support),  those  products  must  be 
global in nature and respond to a very particular set 
of  requirements. 
For a product to be global, it must have a number 
of special characteristics that make it different from 
similar  products. Those  characteristics  are : 
- to  provide  ubiquitous  service  across  multiple 
borders, 
- to provide consistent service  levels  and flexible 
delivery  schedules, 
- to  make  time-zones,  languages  and  currencies 
irrelevant, 
- to  overcome  inadequacies  of  local  infrastruc-
tures, 
- to make customers assume service is local when 
it is actually being provided from  the other side 
of the  world. 
The requirements of big ccmpanies that a provider 
of services must meet, and that refer to all  products 
or services  being  provided  are : 
- a  single  point  of  contact  accountable  for  as-
suring service  levels, 
- seamless,  uniform,  flexible  features/ 
functionality  across  geography, 
- end-to-end  provisioning,  installation,  fault 
management  and  service  support, 
- reliable  service, 
- customized  billing,  management  information, 
reporting with language and currency flexibility, 
- speed,  ease  of  implementation, 
- products that meet existing and evolving needs. 
Generally  speaking,  those  requirements  have  not 
been  adequately  satisfied  under  the  still  existing 
structure of the global  telecommunications market 
based on national monopolies. A national TO does 
not  provide  real  one-stop-shop,  end-to-end  or 
seamless  services  to  customers'  premises  located 
outside the national borders. What a TO was doing 
up to now was  to cooperate with other TOsto link 
their  respective  networks.  Doing  so  meant  that 
customers  were  billed  separately  and  in  different 
currencies  by the TO of each  country where  they 
had facilities,  that services and features available in 
each  country were  different (or  at  least  that some 
features  available  at  home  were  not  available 
(8) 
(9) 
_____  , _____  , ______ _ 
abroad),  and  that  they  had  to  face  many  other 
problems  linked  to  the  differences  in  culture  or 
language. 
This  situation  began  to  change  because  of  two 
elements. The starting up, first in the United States 
of America, then in the United Kingdom and now 
in the rest of the Community, of the gradual libera-
lization  process  of  the global  telecommunications 
market,  and,  secondly  the  rapid  convergence  of 
telecommunications  and  information  technology. 
Both  elements  enabled  the  introduction  of  new 
services  and  products  which  vastly  improved 
quality  and  range.  One  result  was  that  multina-
tionals and other big companies began to construct 
their own  private  networks. However,  those private 
networks were costly because they eliminated scale 
economies  of  service  and  personnel,  and  because 
telecommunications  was  not the  core  business  of 
those  companies.  For  those  reasons,  now  that  the 
continued evolution  of  the  said  two  elements  has 
substantially  changed  the  overall  situation,  those 
companies may consider turning to  telecommuni-
cation  service  providers  such  as  Newco. 
In  addition,  as  regulation  eases  and  technology 
advances,  the  border  between  services  still  under 
monopoly and liberalized services fades  away.  This 
fact  adds  further  uncertainty  to  the  market. 
(10)  In  this context, what  BT and  MCI  intend to  offer 
through  Newco  is  what  the  existing  technology 
allows  them  to  offer  within  the current regulatory 
limits. New products within existing categories and 
new  categories  of  products  could  be  offered  by 
Newco  in  the  years  to  come,  that  could  include 
public  basic  telecommunications  services. 
(II}  However,  this  Decision  relates  only  to  Newco's 
range  of  products  and  business  scope  as  notified. 
Any  substantial  change  thereof  in  the  years  to 
come, and  in  particular the offering by  Newco of 
public basic telecommunications services will  then 
require  a  new  notification. 
Structure  of the  market 
(12)  It is  particularly difficult to give a precise picture of 
the  existing  structure  of  this  emerging  market 
because its  principal feature  is  that it is  in  constant 
evolution.  What  is  certain  is  that  there  is  a  very 
significant growth  potential  in  the segment  to  be 
addressed  by  Newco,  due  to  the continuing emer-
gence of  new technologies, improvements in  basic 
infrastructure,  the  increasing  standardization  of 
services  across  borders,  the  increasing  sophistica-
tion of customers and their reliance on telecommu-27.  8.  94  Official  Journal of  the  European  Communities  No  L  223/39 
nications as  a transport vehicle for information. All 
this is in the framework of a rapidly changing tele-
communications regulatory environment, which, in 
the Community, will  mean full  liberalization· tele-
phony in  1998  (2003  for  some  Member States). 
2.  BT's  investment in  MCI 
(13)  The acquisition by BT of new equity equivalent to 
a  20 %  stake  in  MCI  is  intended  to  serve  a 
common  interest  expressed  by  the  parties  to  go 
global  to  better  serve  (and  keep)  their  existing 
customers  and  to  better address  new areas  of the 
market. 
(14)  The telecommunications market is  developing fast 
and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how 
it will  look  in a  few  years'  time : the  prospect of 
full  liberalization is  pushing TOs to take positions, 
in  order to  be in the best possible situation when 
full  liberalization comes. Many  alliances are being 
announced, and most of them include provisions to 
enter  the value-added  segment,  as  a  first  step (in  · 
the  EEA,  value-added  and enhanced services  have 
already been liberalized), in particular as  regards the 
provision  of  advanced  value-added  services  to  big 
multinationals.  In  this  respect,  the  creation  of 
Newco and the investment of BT in MCI are steps 
taken  by the two  parent companies to  pre-position 
themselves  for  when  full  liberalization  is  in place, 
steps that are being followed by many TOs who are 
creating  sets  of  products  comparable  to  those  of 
Newco. 
3.  Geographic scope 
(15)  The geographic market to  be addressed by  Newco, 
and to  be considered  iR  respect of  the investment 
of BT in MCI,  is  global. Such conclusion is  based 
on  the  two  following  arguments. 
Although  national  borders  are  still  in  place  as 
regards  the provisions of most telecommunications 
services, strategic alliances like the present one are 
being created now in anticipation of a market situa-
tion where national boundaries will  have substanti-
ally  disappeared. 
In addition, both the services that Newco is  going 
to  offer,  as  indicated in definition of the business 
scope of Newco (see  recital 23), and the customers 
.it  intends  to  serve  are  by  nature  international; 
consequently  Newco  will  not  be  involved  in  the 
provision  of  services  within  one country  only. 
4.  Market shares of Newco 
(16)  Newco's addressable market has  been estimated by 
the parent companies at ECU [  ...  ] billion in  1994 
and is projected to achieve over[  ...  ] annual growth 
over its first  five  years  to achieve ECU [  ...  ] billion 
in  1999.  It  is  also  estimated  that the  Community 
will  account  for  [  ... ]  of  the  market  in  1994/95 
rising  to  [  ...  ]  in  1998/99. 
According  to  Newco's  business  plan  ~ts  market 
share, considering all categories of services together, 
will  be  [ ...  ]  in  1994  and  grow  to  over  [  ....  ]  by 
1999 (assuming no dramatic change in the catego-
ries  of products  offered). 
5.  ¥:ain competitors of  Newco 
(17)  Many  companies, on  their own  or in  cooperation 
with  other  partners,  have  entered  or  are  entering 
the  market  for  international  value-added  services 
(the  precise  set  of  services  being offered  is  never 
exactly  the same).  Among them, the  most impor-
tant are:  AT&T  Worldsource,  AT&T  lstel,  GElS, 
International  Private  Satellite  Partners  (limited  to 
North America and Europe), Eunetcom, Unisource, · 
Infonet,  Sprint  International,  FNA  (limited  to 
financial  services),  and  IBM  (through  IBM's 
connect  programme).  Some  of  those  projects  are 
the  current  expression  of  strategic  alliances 
between TOs, the  real  scope  of which  is  not well 
determined  yet,  but  which  are  similar  to  the· 
present one between  BT and MCI  in that they are 
actions  intended to  position  their partners  with  a 
view  to the full  liberalization  to come and are  not 
limited  to  the  provision  of  value-added  services. 
In  addition,  almost  every  TO  in  Europe  and  in 
North. America  is  trying  to  offer  to  its  existing 
customers, at a  national  or a  limited  international 
level, an improved set of value-added and enhanced 
services. 
For  many of  them, the  range  of specific  products 
they want to  offer and  the kind of customers they 
want to serve are  not clear yet. However, a substan-
tial  number  intends  to  address  the  needs  of  the 
same  companies  Newco  sees  as  potential  custo-
mers, so that it is  anticipated that there is going to 
be  substantial  competition  at  least  at  that  level. 
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(18} 
It should also be noted that a substantial number of 
major  companies  whose  needs  Newco  intends  to 
address  have  installed  or  are  in  the  process  of 
installing  their  own  internal  networks  built  on 
circuits  leased  from  10s. Those  networks  will  be 
close  substitutes of the  Newco's services, in so  far 
as  they  are  to  be  offered  to  third  parties. 
6.  Position of buyers 
The  customers  that  Newco  intends  to  serve  are 
multinational  corporations.  extended  enterprises, 
and  other  intensive  users  of  telecommunications 
and  in  particular the  biggest ( ...  ] of  them.  Many 
of  them  have  huge  telecommunication  needs.  In 
addition  many  have  developed  experience  in  the 
management of  their own  internal networks. They 
will  only switch  to providers such as  Newco,  if  so 
doing  proves  to  be  cost-effective.  Finally,  given 
their knowledge of  the market they are  in  a posi-
tion  to  request  offers  from  different  competitors. 
All  those factors give them considerable bargaining 
power which  will  give  rise  to  pressure on margins 
and an expected high level  of competition between 
suppliers. 
D.  THE  TRANSACTION : THE  NOTIFIED  AGREE-
MENTS 
(19)  The  complexity  of  the  operation  concluded 
between BT and MCI is reflected by the substantial 
number of agreements notified to the Commission. 
Those  agreements  are  summarized  below : 
1.  Agreements regarding  Newco 
(i)  The  joint-venture  agreement UVA) 
This  is  the  principal  document  creating 
Newco.  Under  it,  the  parent companies  indi-
cate  their intention to  achieve joint success in 
the  global  telecommunications  market  and  to 
offer  a  seamless  set  of  global  enhanced  and 
value-added  products to  the customers of MCI 
and  BT. 
(ii)  The  intellectual  property  agreement  (IPA) 
concluded by  BT, MCI and Newco concerning 
(20) 
:J[,  {'1  31 
the  licensing to  Newco  of  the  parent compa-
nies'  technical  information  and  intellectual 
property rights  needed  by  Newco  to  carry out 
the  business,  and  the  licensing  of  Newco's 
technical information to the parent companies. 
(iii)  The  BTIMCI services  agreements (SA),  under 
which  Newco  and  each  parent  company 
(acting  as  supplier)  agree  on  the  terms  and 
conditions of supply of support services  to  be 
provided  by  each  parent  company  to  Newco, 
related  to  the establishment by  Newco  of  the 
global  platform  and  on  the  provision  by 
Newco  of  the  global  products  and  services. 
(iv)  The  BT/MCJ,  distribution  agreement.'  (DA) 
under  which  Newco  appoints  each  parent 
company (acting as  distributor) as  its  exclusive 
distributor for global  products in  the Americas, 
in  the  case  of  MCI,  and  in  the  rest  of  the 
world,  in the  case  of  BT. 
(v)  The agreement for the sale and purchase of  the 
business of  Syncordia (with a disclosure letter) 
concluded between  Newco and  BT setting the 
terms  and  conditions of  the  sale  of  the  assets. 
and business included  in  Syncordia, which  up 
to  now  was  Brs outsourcing  unit. 
(vi)  The  lnfonet  indemnity  agreement  concluded 
between BT and MCI under which MCI under-
takes to indemnify and hold BT harmless from 
and against any legal  action  by  lnfonet against 
MCI, arising from  MCJ's ownership in  lnfonet. 
2.  Agreements regarding  BT's  investment in 
MCI 
(i)  The  investment  agreement (IA)  under  which 
BT  has  agreed  to  purchase  20 %  of  the  out-
standing shares  of  common  stock  of  MCI. 
(ii)  The  registration  rights  agreement  concluded 
between  BT  and  MCI,  required  in  order  for 
each  party  to  effect  the  transactions  contem-
plated  by  the  lA. 
(iii)  The  McCaw  indemnity  agreement  under 
which  BT  undertakes  or  indemnify  MCI  and 
hold it harmless in  respect of any legal  action 
by the cellular phone company McCaw against 
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(iv)  Finally,  the  transaction  also  includes  three 
agreements relating to  the  sale  by  BT to MCI 
of most of its existing activities  in  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Canada. 
3.  Contractual provisions 
(21)  Relevant  provisions  of  the  agreements  from  a 
competition  point  of  view  are  further  detailed 
below. 
A.  Concerning  Newco 
(i)  Structure  of  Newco 
(22)  Newco  is  an  international  JOint-venture  company, 
and  according  to  the  parties,  the  central  focus  of 
their  alliance.  Following  the  incorporation  of 
Newco,  75,1  %  of its  share  capital  will  be  owned 
by BT and  24,9 %  by  MCI.  Each  party  will  have 
the  right  to  appoint  Newco  board  directors  in 
accordance with its  shareholding. Thus BT will  be 
entitled to  nominate six  out of eight directors (the 
A directors) and MCI  two out of eight (the B direc-
tors). 
Most  decisions  of  the  board  arc  to  be  adopted  by 
simple  majority  of  the  directors  present  at  any 
board  meeting.  However,  a  number  of  important 
decisions  cannot  be  adopted  without  the  prior 
consent  of  both  shareholders.  Most  important  of 
those  decisions  are  changes  in  business  direction, 
management appointments (including the appoint-
ment of the chief executive officer) and approval of 
the  five-year  business  plan  and  annual  operating 
plan  and budget, so  that  MCI  has  joint control of 
the  company  (this  was  the  conclusion  of  the 
Commission in its decision of  13  September 1993). 
The  day-to-day  management  and  operations  of 
Newco will be delegated to a chief executive officer 
who will be responsible to  the board for  all  matters 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business. 
Newco  will  be  incorporated  in  the  United 
Kingdom with day-to-day management vested in a 
US-based  service  company.  It  is  expected  to 
employ around [ ... ] people.  It  is  anticipated  that 
over the five  initial years, the parent companies will 
invest  US$  [ ...  ]  billion  (ECU  [ ...  ]  billion)  in 
Newco  including  the  assets  which  will  be  trans-
ferred  to  it  prior  to  closing.  BT  will  invest  US$ 
[ ...  ]  million  and  MCI  US$  [ ... ] million. 
(ii)  Purpose  and  activities  of  Newco 
(23)  Newco  has  been  created  for  the  provision  of 
enhanced  and  value-added  telt-communications 
services  and  outsourcing  to  big  companies.  By 
enhanced  and  value-added  telecommunication 
services  the  parties  mean  any  international  tele-
communication  service  (collectively  referred  to  as 
global  products)  which  the  regulatory  framework 
permits to  be  offered  between  two  or more coun-
tries by members of a single group and which  the 
regulatory framework permits to be managed on an 
end-to-end  basis ('). 
To achieve that goal, Newco's precise activities can 
be split into planning and management on the one 
hand,  and , support  and  marketing  on  the  other 
hand. 
1.  Provisions  concerning  planning  and  manage-
ment 
In respect of planning and management activi-
ties,  Newco will  be  responsible  for : 
(a)  the  planning  and  development  of  global 
products.  As  part  of  this  function,  Newco 
will  review  the  current  products  of  the 
parent  companies  and  the  regulatory 
constraints  still  existing  at  any  given 
moment; 
(b)  the establishment of a global platform (i.e.  a 
software  package)  over  which  the  global 
products  will  be  provided.  Newco  will 
provide a 'best-of-breed' platform comprised 
of a  combination of any or all  of  transmis-
sion,  switching,  signalling,  network  intelli-
gence and service management services. The 
architecture, design and continuing develop-
ment  shall  be  at  the  discretion  of  Newco, 
although  it shall  ensure  that  those  parts  of 
the  distributor  domestic  system  used  are 
compatible  with  the  overall  design.  Such 
platform will  be based  initially on the  exis-
ting systems of the parent companies. Thus 
interworking those systems will consume the 
most  important  part  of  Newco's  time  and 
efforts  in  its  early  years  of  ope~ation ; 
(c)  the provision of telecommunications services 
management  to  customers,  including  the 
acquisition  and  management  of  assets  and 
staff from customers (global outsourcing) (2). 
(')  The  following  services  are  excluded  from  the  definitton : (i) 
voice  international  simple  resale  (ii)  international  direct  dis-
tance dialling provided on a correspondent basis (iii)  the pro-
vision of international private leased circuits and (iv) any servi-
ces which for regulatory reasons must be offered on a corres-
pondent basis. 
f)  In this respect, Syncordia, BT's existing outsourcing unit, will 
continue to exist, either as  a division  or as  a separate  branch 
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In  order to  carry out the  foregoing,  Newco will 
have  a  buc:fget  for  R&D  activities.  However,  as 
Newco will  not have its own in-house facilities, 
the R&D  activities  will  actually  be  undertaken 
mainly by the parent companies, under contract 
with  Newco. The former will  keep  the owner-
ship  of  their  laboratories  and  of  the  existing 
technology  being  licensed  to  Newco. 
2.  Support  and  marketing 
Newco  will  derive  its  revenue  from  selling  its 
services to its parent companies who will  be the 
exclusive distributors of the Newco  products. In 
this respect, it will  not have direct contact with 
customers  except  as  regards  the  provision  and 
sale  of global  outsourcing services.  Newco  will 
nevertheless  have  a  number of  responsibilities 
and  obligations  towards  the  distributors : 
(a)  it will decide, according to principles set out 
in the business plan, who is going to be the 
main or 'lead' distributor in each contract for 
global  products  ~ 
(b)  it  will  provide  technical  and  commercial 
support  to  each  distributor  in  sales  and 
marketing  activities  including  assisting  in 
identifying potential  customers,  advising  on 
the  most  suitable  means  of  meeting  the 
requirements  of  a  customer,  supporting 
account  management  and  assisting  in  the 
preparation  of  proposals  to  customers ~ 
(c)  it will  provide billing services to distributors ; 
(d)  it will  provide second-level  customer service 
in  support of the first-level support provided 
by  the  distributors ; 
(e)  it  will  carry  out global  ~arket analysis  and 
an  annual  products  development  plan. 
(iii)  Provisions concerning dealings 
with/by  Newco 
(24)  Pursuant to Article  17 (1)  of the JV  A,  transactions 
between  Newco  and  a  shareholder  are  to  be  on 
terms and conditions substantially as  favourable  to 
Newco as if such transaction had been entered into 
with  a  third  party  on  an  arm's-length  basis  (cost 
plus  a  reasonable  market  rate  of  return)  but  no 
more  than  that. 
Pursuant to Article  17 (3) of the JVA,  Newco is  to 
purchase  all  products,  services  and  facilities  from 
the parent companies only if in each case  the rele-
vant  parent  company  can  provide  the  same  on 
terms at least as  favourable  as  regards  price, quality 
and service to  Newco as would be obtainable in  an 
arm's-length transaction from a supplier not related 
to  Newco  or the  parent  companies. 
(iv)  Non-compete  provisions 
(25)  Pursuant to Article  18 (1) (a) of the JV  A, and except 
in accordance with  the  DA,  each  shareholder and 
its  ultimate parent company undertakes  to  Newco 
and  the other shareholder and  its  ultimate  parent 
company that it will  not carry on  or be engaged or 
interested in the provision  of enhanced and value-
added telecommunication services anywhere in the 
world  or  international  outsourcing  services  or 
appoint any person  to  be  a director of  a business 
which provides such services other than as  director 
of  Newco  or its  subsidiary  undertakings.  In  addi-
tion, and except in accordance with the distribution 
agreement,  they  also  undertake  not  to  solicit  the 
custom of any person for the purpose of offering to 
it  enhanced  and  value-added  telecc mmunication 
services  or  international  outsourcing  services. 
However, neither BT nor MCI will  be  in breach of 
the  non-compete  provision  as  a  consequence  of 
any  actions  undertaken  by  either  of  them  in 
compliance with  the  licence granted  to  BT by  the 
Secretary  of  State,  or  any  applicable  regulatory 
certificate, licence or any obligation  imposed upon 
MCI  by  any  authority  in  the  United  States  of 
America (Articles  18  (3)  and  18  (4)  of  the JVA).  It 
has  to be  noted, however,  that  in  such  a case, and 
provided that the  parent company involved cannot 
find  an  alternative  means  of  complying  with  the 
non-compete  provision,  it shall  pay  to  Newco  an 
amount  equal  to  any  profits  made  as  a  result  of 
such  action  (Article  18  (5)  of  the  JVA). 
Finally,  Articles  18  (9)  and  18  (1 0)  of  the  JVA 
ensure  that  in  the  case  of  deregulation  of  the 
US/UK (and  vice  versa)  route  for  the  provision  of 
international  voice  services,  BT  and  MCI  will 
receive  from  each  other  the  necessary  support  to 
compete;  however,  if  the  two  parent  companies 
cannot agree  on  a  method  to  effectively  compete 
with third parties except by  means of international 
voice  resale, then Newco will be authorized to offer 
basic  international  voice  services  on  that  deregu-
lat~ route.  As  indicated  in  recital  II should  this 
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(v)  Licences  granted  to  Newco  and  by 
N ewco  to  the  distributors 
(26)  Pursuant  to  Article  3  (3)  of  the  ITA,  each  parent 
company  grants  to  Newco  irrevocable,  perpetual, 
non-exclusive,  non-transferable  licences to use  the 
technical information solely for  the purposes of the 
business. However, it has to be noted that the term 
'technical information' excludes confidential infor-
mation (the sharing of which between  and among 
the parties is substantially restricted by the terms of 
a Data Segregation Schedule of the JVA) and trade 
secrets  of  a  commercial  nature. 
Newco  has  the  right  to  grant  the  following  sub-
licences  to  its  parent companies : 
(a)  to BT solely for its territory (i.e. the world exclu-
ding the Americas)  and  to  MCI  solely  for  the 
Americas,  to  use  the  technical  information 
licensed  from  the  parent  companies  in  the 
distribution  of  Newco's  products (Article  3  (4) 
(a)  (i)  of the  IPA).  In  addition, each  distributor 
has  the right to grant similar suh-sublicences to 
customers  and  an  outside  party  for  the  sole 
purpose of discharging, in  whole or in  part, the 
licensed distributor's obligations under the rele-
vant  distribution  agreement  (but  in  any  event 
restricted  to  the  territory  of  that  distributor) ; 
(b)  to  the  so-called  non-owning  parent  company 
(i.e.  the  parent  company  that  does  not own  a 
specific technical intellectual  property right), to 
use  the  licensed  technical  information  in 
respect  of  products other than  global  products 
provided  by  Newco  to  customers  connected 
to/or  served  by  such  parent  company  but 
limited  to  that  parent  company's  territory  as 
distributor (Article  3  (4)  (c)  of  the  IPA). 
Newco  itself  cannot  sublicence  an  ou~side  party 
with  two  exceptions : 
(a)  where  the  distribution  agreement  has  become 
non-exclusive  (Article  3  (5)  (a)  of  the  IPA); 
(h)  where  Newco  is  providing  directly  to  any 
custonH:r  global  out!>ourciog  directly  to  any 
customer. 
Furthermore,  Newco  grants  to  each  parent 
company, upon request, similar licences to use  the 
technical  intellectual  property  rights  (Article  6  of 
the  IPA)  of  Newco. 
Finally,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  sublicences 
granted  to  BT  or  to  MCI  under  their  respective 
technical  intellectual  property  rights  will  survive 
termination of the agreement as  irrevocable, perpe-
tual  and worldwide  licences  unrestricted as  to use 
and licensing (Article 13 (1) (b) and 13 (2) (b) of the 
IPA),  subject only  to  the  payment by  each  parent 
company to the other of a given royalty during four 
years. In addition, they also receive similar licences 
for  Newco's  own  intellectual  property  rights. 
(vi)  Ownership  by  Newco  of  new  techno-
logy 
(27)  Pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the IPA, Newco may be 
the  owner  of  the  technical  intellectual  property 
rights  in  new  developments.  In  such  a  case,  and 
assuming  that  a  given  development  was  actually 
made  by  one  parent  company  under  contract  by 
Newco,  such  parent  company  (Newco  does  not 
have  its  own  R&D  activities)  will  receive  from 
Newco  a  non-exclusive,  irrevocable,  perpetual 
licence  to  use  that  development  for  any  purpose 
(Article  7  (2)  of  the  IPA).  Conversely,  where  the 
new development is owned by the parent company 
that  effected  it,  that  parent  company will  grant a 
similar licence to  Ncwco (Article 7 (3) of the IPA). 
(vii)  Trade  mark  provisions 
(28)  Pursuant  to  Article  12  (3)  (a)  and  (b)  of  the  IPA 
each  parent  company grants  the  other (this  time 
without any  intervention  by  Newco)  a  non-exclu-
sive  licence  to  use  and  license  the trade  marks of 
the one in the territory of the other in connection 
with  the  sale,  distribution,  provision  or  perfor-
mance  of global  products  only. 
(viii)  Provisions  regarding  the  distribution 
of  Newco  products 
(21J)  Pursuant  to  Article  2  (I)  of  each  DA,  Ncwco 
appoints the distributor as  its  exclusive  dt~tributor 
in  the territory. Such  appointment means  that  the 
distributor has  the exclusive  right to  promote, sell 
and distribute services in the territory (Article 3 (1) 
of  the  DA)  and  the  corresponding  obligation  to 
promote the sale of the global products in the terri-
tory  (Article  8  (1)).  In  addition,  the  distributor 
agrees  to  obtain  from  Newco,  with  some  excep-
tions, all requirements for global products (Article 5 
(1 )).  Finally, in consideration of the provision of the 
services, the distributor pays to Newco (i)  a variable 
annual  charge  based  on  the  forecast  that  each 
distributor  is  obliged  to  provide  to  Newco  each 
1. • 
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year of the aggregate requirements of its own custo-
mers  for  the  following  12  months  (I~  and  (ii)  a 
usage charge. Also, in consideration of the licences 
granted by Newco to the distributor pursuant to the 
intellectual  property  agreement,  the  distrlbutor 
shall pay Newco an annual charge that for the first 
financial  year  will  amount  to  US$  6,5  million 
(Article  16). 
Newco  undertakes  not  to  sell  global  products 
directly or indirectly in the territory other than to 
the distributor (Article 4  (1 )).  However, Newco can 
sell  global  outsourcing  services  directly  to  custo-
mers when it is  desirable to do so for tax or other 
reasons and assuming that in such a case the distri-
butor  releases  Newco  from  its  undertaking  in 
Article  4  (1)  (Article  4  (2)).  The  provision  of  the 
global  products  to  the  distributor  includes  the 
provision by Newco of all necessary use of remote 
networks on the most competitive terms available, 
where  the  products  are  to  be  provided  at one or 
more  sites  of  one  customer  located  outside  the 
territory (Article 6 (5)),  and the provision by Newco 
of reasonable technical and commercial support to 
the  distributor  in  sales  and  marketing  activities 
(Article  9). 
B.  Concerning  BTs inve.rtment  in  MCI 
(i)  Restriction  on  transfer of shares  by  BT 
and  limits  to  the  ability  of  BT  to 
increase  its  shareholding  in  MCI 
(30)  Pursuant to Article  5 (I) of the lA,  BT undertakes 
not to dispose of its shares in any manner whatso-
ever for four years from the closing date. After that 
date,  BT can  sel~  but  must  give  a  right  of  first 
refusal  to  MCI  (Article  5  (3)  of  the  lA). 
Pursuant to Article  6  (1)  of the lA, BT is  granted 
the right to acquire any new shares issued by MCI 
necessary to maintain the percentage it has in MCI 
at  that time or to  increase  it assuming  that such 
purchase  does  not  breach  any  foreign  ownership 
restrictions under US  law applicable at the relevant 
time (Articles  6  (2)  (d)  and  6  (4)  of the  lA). 
However, pursuant to under Article 7 (I) of the lA, 
BT has agreed not to acquire, directly or indirectly, 
the ownership of any additional equity of MCI  to 
exceed  20%  theteof until  the  1Oth  anniversary of 
the  closing  date.  Furthermore,  during  the  same 
(!)  It has to be noted that if the actual requirements of the distri-
butor are  less  than those stated in the forecast, no part of the 
charge  will  be  refunded  by  Newco. 
period, BT has expressly undertaken not to seek to 
control or influence the company (Article  7 (3)  of 
the  lA)  . 
Once the 10-year 'standstill' period has expired, BT 
can increase  its shareholding up to  the  level  thc11 
fixed  by  the  US  Communications  Act  as  regards 
foreign  ownership.  However,  even  if  those  restric-
tions  were  completely  eliminated,  BT  would 
generally  only be  allowed  to  exceed  a  35 %  stake 
in  MCI  by  a  tender offer or  business combination 
that has  been approved  by a  majority of the inde-
pendent directors  and  by a  majority of the share-
holders  (other than  BT)  (Article  7  (4)  of  the  lA). 
(ii)  BT's consent rights and board represen-
tation 
(31)  The MCI  board is  to be composed of 15  directors. 
BTs representation on the MCI  board will remain 
in  proportion  to its  shareholding.  BT is  currently 
entitled  to  three  directors.  Four  directors  can  be 
executive officers of MCI. There is  a similar repre-
sentation on most MCI  board committt•es. At least 
eight  members  of  the  MCI  board  must  be  fully 
independent of MCI  and  BT (Articles  9 (7)  and  9 
(9)  of  the  lA). 
BT,  as  the sole  holder of MCI's  dass A  common 
stock,  has  been granted  substantial  consent  right!> 
with  respect  to  certain  corporate  actions  of  MCI 
concerning  equity  issuances,  acquisition  of  core 
and of  non...core  business, sak·s  of  assd~ and  hor· 
rowing  above  certain  specified  limits. 
(iii)  Loss  of  rights  provisions 
(32)  Pun;uant to Article  9  (12)  of the  lA,  in  the event 
that  either  BT or MCI  engages,  directly  or  indi-
rectly,  in the core  business (2)  of the other (in  the 
Americas  in  the  case  of  BT  and  outside  the 
Americas  in  the  case  of  MCI)  or  transfers  or 
provides  sales  and  marketing  in  connection  with 
any  person  or acquires  an  interest  in  any  person 
who is  engaged in the core business of the other, 
then  the  engaging  party  will  lose  certain  rights. 
(~ Defined as  all  telecommunications and other dcctroni<.·  infor 
mation  s<.·rvices  and equipment for  the provision  of  MKh scr· 
vices,  as  they exist  on  the date of  this agreement or hereafter 
exist, iocluding (but not limited to) all  forms of telecommuni-
cation access aRd egress; and value-added consumer and busi-
ness  services  generated  through  or as  a  result  of  underlying 
telecommunications services  using all  technology (voice,  data 
and  image) and physical  transport,  network  intelligence, and 
software  applications,  and  including  (i)  information  procl.'s-
sing, (ii)  systems integration and outsourcing, (iii)  transa.:tton 
processing  and  (iv)  cable  television. 
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In  the  case  of  BT,  its  shares  in  MCI  will  be 
converted  into  common  stock  and  it  will  lose  its 
voting and consent rights and its board representa-
tion  in  MCI. 
In  the case  of MCI,  BT will  n·asc to he  bound by 
various  obligations  concerning  future  share  trans-
fers,  voting or the standstill  provisions  mentioned 
above. 
In any event, the loss  of rights provisions will  not 
be  automatically triggered ; there are  a number of 
exceptions (listed in Article 9 (12) (b) and (d) which 
include without limitation  correspondent relation-
ships  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  and any 
activities  in  connection  with  the  ownership  of 
Newco) and a  procedure to  be  followed  (including 
arbitration in case of disagreement) before a loss of 
rights  is  deemed  to  exist. 
E.  THIRD  PAiriY  OBSERVATIONS 
(33)  Following  the  publication  of  a  notice  pursuant to 
Article  19  (3)  of Regulation  17 and to  Article 3 of 
Protocol  21  of  the  EEA  Agreement,  comments 
were  received  from  two  interested  third  parties. 
One of  them requested its  comments and identity 
to  remain confidential. The other set of comments 
received  focused  on  the  ability  of  BT  to  distort 
competition in the provision of enhanced and valu-
e-added  services  throughout  Europe,  given  its 
control  of  local  access  facilities  in  the  United 
Kin~dom and on the necessity for  the Commission 
to  impose undertakings on the parties with respect 
to non-discriminatory treatment of competitors and 
cross-subsidization  of  competitive  services  with 
revenues derived  from  non-competitive operations, 
to  facilitate  the  development of effective  competi-
tion  in  the  telecommunications  market. 
The  Commission  studied  carefully  the  comments 
received and concluded that concerns expressed by 
those  third  parties  had already  been  raised  by the 
Commission  and discussed  in  detail  with  BT and 
MCI, who had provided adequate answers and safe-
guards.  Consequently,  those  comments  have  not 
caused  the  Commission  to  modify  its  substantive 
position  indicated in  the Article  19  (3)  notice and 
expressed below, as  regards the notified agreements. 
II.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
A.  APPLICATION  OF  ARTICLES  8S  (I)  OF  TilE  EC 
TREAlY AND  5J  (I)  OF THE  EEA  AGREEMENT 
TO THE CREATION  OF  NEWCO  AND  TO DT's 
INVESTMENT  IN  MCI 
1.  The creation of Newco 
(a)  Competition  between  the  parent  companiu 
and/or Newco 
(34)  The parent companies  must be  considered  poten-
tial  competitors  of  Newco  and  of  each  other  in 
respect  of  the  global  products  to  be  offered  by 
Newco and actual  competitors in  the  overall  tele-
communications  market. 
The inherent evolving nature of the business scope 
of Ncwco will  have  an  effect on  the issue of pott:n-
rial/actual  competition ;  it  is  therdon.'  comidercd 
that  when  (and  i~  Newco  begins  to  offer  some 
basic services (recital  11 ),  the parent companies will 
become  actual  competitors  of  Newco. 
(35)  The abovementioned conclusions are  based on the 
following  arguments : 
(a.a)  potential compet1t1on in  international 
value-added  and  enhanced  services 
(36)  Newco's  offering will  consist  of  a  mixture  of  the 
parent companies' existing  products  and  networks. 
Prior  to  the  incorporation  of  Newco,  the  pan•nt 
companies were  competitors, at  least  to  a  limited 
extent,  for  obtaining  contracts  for  similar  sets  of 
products  and  services.  Thus,  BT  won  a  contract 
with Hewlett Packard North America for  the deve-
lopment  of  a  global  communications  strategy 
focused  mainly  on  Europe  and  Asia  Pacific.  In 
addition, customers of MCI for value-added services 
in  the  United  States  of  America  with  branches 
abroad  could  obtain  basically  the  same  features 
(with  some  limitations depending on  the  number 
of locations abroad) in respect of these value-added 
services when entering into contact with  their faci-
lities abroad as when doing the same in the United 
States of America. Although many of those services 
are  provided  on  a  correspondent  basis  - i.e.  by 
means of connecting MCI to another TO's network 
- some of them - MCI  mail, for  instance - are 
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(37)  The  parties  have  indicated  that  they  have  with-
drawn  from  the  market  that  Newco  will  address. 
However,  Newco  has  in  fact  received  a  licence 
from  the parent companies to use  the technologies 
and the latter retain the ownership of their respec-
tive  know-how and intellectual property rights and 
also keep intact their respective R&D capabilities. 
Newco  will  not do  any  research  and development 
on  its  own  but will  award  contracts  mainly to  i~ 
parent  companies  to  do  so.  It is  therefore  consi-
dered that the parent companies will certainly keep 
and  increase  their  proficiency  and  know-how  in 
respect of the technologies required to stay in (or to 
re-enter)  the  market. 
In  addition,  although  the  ownership  of  any  new 
development  could  be  awarded  to  Newco,  it  is 
possible  (depending  on,  the specific  arrangements 
made  in  each  case)  that  the  developing  parent 
company obtains the ownership, and, in any event, 
the  parent  companies  will  receive  licences  from 
Newco  for  using  any  such  developed  technology 
for  any  non-global  product. 
(38)  llle parties  have  declared that they intend to offer 
to their intranational customers (that will usually be 
the  national  facilities  of  Newco's  international 
customers) a set of services  that for  the customers 
will  have  an  identical look and feel  to  the services 
offered by Newco in the international arena. For so 
doing  they  will  receive  from  the  other  parent 
company through  Newco the appropriate licences. 
Neither  BT  nor  MCI  are  prevented,  within  their 
own territories, from  setting up local subsidiaries in 
any  given  country  to  serve  the  local  needs  of 
companies  in  those  countries.  As  a  result  a 
customer  could  be  contracting  at  the  same  time 
with  BT  (or  MCI),  outside  Newco,  for  its  local 
needs and with BT (or MCI) as exclusive distributor 
of  Newco  for  the  customer's  international  needs. 
(39)  Furthermore,  customers  may  be  international,  but 
have  such  a concentration  of  traffic  in  either the 
United  Kingdom or the  United  States  of America 
that  the  relevant  parent company's offering could 
be in  direct competition with  that of Newco were 
the customer to  decide  to  forego  Newco's interna-
tional  spread  in  order  to  get  a  good  deal  on 
domestic  telecommunications  which  formed  the 
bulk  of  its  needs. 
(40)  Finally,  the  parent  companies will  maintain  their 
commercial  presence  and  reputation  intact.  They 
will also keep, in part1cular because they will  be tht· 
exclusive distributors of  Newco, and increase  their 
knowledge of the market in terms, for  instance, of 
customers'  needs. 
AU  the  above  elements  make  the  probability  of 
such  a  (re)entry  more  credible. 
(a.b)  Actual  or  at  least  potential  competi-
tion in the overall market for telecom-
munications services 
(41)  BT and MCI  are  the  fourth  and  fifth  largest  tele-
communications companies  in  the world  in  terms 
of  traffic.  BT,  as  the  former  monopolist  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  still  keeps  a  very  substantial 
amount of market  power in  that  Member State  as 
reflected  by  BT' s  overall  market  share  (around 
90 % of the UK market). MCI  is  the second largest 
long-distance  carrier  in  the  United  States  of 
America,  although  significantly  behind  AT&T. 
Under a traditional approach  based on the state of 
international  telecommunications  prior  to  liberali-
zation,  TOs  were  limited  to  activities  on  their 
respective  domestic  markets  and  thus  did  not 
compete. However, this view  cannot be  maintained 
any longer, at least as  far  as  large  users of telecom-
munications are  concerned. The different networks 
compete on  features  and  prices for  the installation 
of the telecommunication hubs of those large users. 
The  intensity  of  this  competition  is  bound  to 
increase in the coming years as long as  the liberali-
zation  process  continues. 
(42)  Both  MCI  and  BT develop direct activities outside 
their  home  markets  by  means  of  subsidiaries 
and/or  their  activities  in  international  organiza-
tions. 
MCI employs 150 people in Europe and has several 
subsidiaries  in  different  Member States  (Germany, 
Belgium,  France,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom). 
Those  subsidiaries  provide  the  liaison  office  with 
the  local  TO  involved,  and  also  provide  mainte-
nance  and  repair  of  customer-based  equipment, 
and coordination of billing information with  multi-
national  customers.  They  also  support  the  sale  of 
several  of MCI's  services (i.e.  MCI  Call  USA,  Vnet) 
which  are  available  to  European  users  and  in 
competition  with  international  direct  dial  services 
offered  by BT or by  other TOs in  their respective 
home markets. Apart from  the subsidiaries already 
mentioned, MCI  has a branch office in  the  Unitt>d 
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another in the  Netherlands, MCI  Global  Ventures 
BV,  intended  to  be  'the  holding  company  of  a 
project  that  did  not  materialize.  In  addition,  in 
Greece,  Ireland,  Spain  and  the  Netherlands,  MCI 
conducts  liaison  activities  and  sales  support  for 
services  through  independent  contractors. 
MCI  currently  provides  enhanced  private  line 
services  between  the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom pursuant to a telecommunica-
tions  services  licence  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In 
addition,  MCI  also  provides  data-only  services  for 
one customer's worldwide  reservation system  using 
VSAT  licences  issued  in  Germany  and  France  to 
Overseas Telecommunications Inc., an  MCI  subsi-
diary. 
Finally,  MCI  has  a  8,5%  participation  in  the 
Financial  Network  Association  (FNA),  an  associa-
tion  formed  for  the purpose of helping the supply, 
on  a  correspondent  basis,  of  specialized  telecom-
munication services to the global financial commu-
nity. In addition, MCI  had a 25% stake in Infonet, 
but  has  divested  itself  thereof. 
BT  has  substantial  activities  in  some  Member 
States,  in  particular,  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Germany and Spain (where  it  has  recently created, 
together  with  the  Spanish  Banco  de  Santander,  a 
joint  venture  to  offer  data  services  in  Spain). 
However, the bulk of  BT'  s activities abroad prior to 
the  transaction  with  MCI  was  in  the United States 
of  America.  As  a  result  of  the  operation,  most  of 
British  Telecom  North  America  (BTNA)  activities 
will  be  sold  to  MCI,  and Syncordia  will  be  trans-
ferred  to  Ncwco.  Nonetheless, BT will  keep a resi-
dual staff presence in  the United States of America 
and  BT  USA  Holdings,  the  US  holding company. 
Apart  from  these,  BT  will  retain  BT  US  Capital 
Corporation  (which  is  used  by  BT  for  obtaining 
funds  in  the  US  market),  BT  US  Paging  Inc.,  BT 
US  Ventures  Inc.  and  BT  US  Cableships.  Finally, 
BT  has  held  a  25 %  shareholding in  McCaw  but 
this  has  now  been sold  to  AT&T  in  exchange  for 
2%  of  the  outstanding  voting  power  of  AT&T, 
worth  in  the  region  of  US$  2  billion, which  does 
not give BT any influence over AT&T's commercial 
strategy  and  which  BT  has  declared  it  expects  to 
sell  at  the  appropriate  time. 
(b)  Al'Plicability  of Article  85  of the  EC  Treaty 
and Article  53  of the  EEA  Agreement to  the 
creation  of Newco 
(43)  Having  concluded  that  BT and MCI  are,  and  for 
the  foreseeable  future  will  continue to  be, at  least 
potential  competitors  in  the  two  markets 
concerned,  it  is  necessary  to  assess  whether  the 
creation  by  them of  Newco  falls  under Article  8S 
(1). 
It has  not been demonstrated conclusively that the 
creation of Newco  is  the only objective  means for 
the  parent  companies  to  enter  and  stay  in  the 
market for international and enhanced value-added 
services,  because  both  parent  companies  are 
companies that currently have substantial activities 
in similar fields, including the provision of services 
to  customers  abroad,  sometimes on  a  non-corres-
pondent basis, and that have the financial and tech-
nological  capacities  required  to  enter the  relevant 
market  on  their  own.  In  doing  so,  they  will  be 
facing  substantially the same constraints, in terms, 
for  instance,  of  regulation,  that  Newco  will  be 
facing, when trying to enter the relevant market. In 
addition,  the  creation  of  Newco  means  that each 
parent  company  is  unlikely  itself  to  develop  a 
similar  set  of  products  for  use  in  the  relevant 
market on its  own.  For these  reasons,  the creation 
of  Newco falls  within the scope of Article 85 (1)  of 
the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agree- . 
ment. 
In addition, under its  present structure, Newco can 
be considered as a vehicle for the parent companies 
to  pool  their respective  intellectual property rights 
and  to  cross-license  each other and  Newco on  an 
exclusive basis as  far as  the services to be offered by 
Newco are  concerned, given in particular the non-
compete  provision,  but also  given  the  intellectual 
property agreements, the geographical scope of  the 
licences granted to Newco by the parent companies 
and by Newco to them, and the terms of the exclu-
sive  distribution agreements. The Commission has 
indicated, in respect of reciprocal licences between 
competitors on an  exclusive basis, that the benefits 
of  the block  exemption  regulations on  patent and 
know-how  licence  agreements to  such  licences are 
conferred only if  the parties are  not subject to any 
territorial restriction within the Community, inclu-
ding  restrictions  that  isolate  the  Community 
against  imports  from  non-member  countries  and 
thereby adversely affect  the conditions of competi-
tion  within  the  Community. 
For  the  abovementioned  reasons  it  is  concluded 
that Newco  falls  within  the scope of Article 8S  (1) 
of the EC  Treaty and of Article  53  (1)  of the  EEA 
Agreement. 
• No  L  223/48  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  27.  8.  94 
2.  BT's  investment in  MCI 
(44)  As  a  general  rule,  both  the  Commission  and  the 
Court  of Justice  have  taken  the  view  in  the  past 
that Article 85 (1) does not apply to agreements for 
the sale or purchase of shares (I)  as  such. However, 
it  might do so, given  the specific  contractual  and 
market  contexts  of  each  case,  if  the  competitive 
behaviour  of  the  parties  is  to  be  coordinated  or 
influenced. 
The  Commission  consequently  assessed  whether 
the presence of BT's nominees to the board of MCI 
could give  rise  to coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the two companies, in particular given 
the access  that BT will  have  to MCI's confidential 
information.  In  this  respect,  the  lA  has  been 
drafted  in  such  a  way  that  BT does  not have  the 
possibility  to  seek  to  control  or  influence  the 
company. This is  particularly so in  the case of the 
obligations found  in Articles 7 (1)  (not to increase 
share  holding for  1  0 years) and 7 (3)  (not to seek to 
control  or  influence  the  company). 
In  addition  both American  corporate and antitrust 
laws  would  impede  any  misuse  of  (or  even  the 
access  to)  any piece of confidential  information of 
MCI  by  BT. 
For  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  it  is  concluded 
that  the  investment  by  BT  in  MCI  does  not  fall 
within the scope of Article 85 (1)  of the EC Treaty 
or  Article  53  (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
B.  APPLICATION  OF  ARTICLE  85  (1)  OF  THE  EC 
TREA1Y  AND  ARTICLE  53  (!)  OF  THE  EEA 
AGREEMENT TO  CONTRACfUAL  PROVISIONS 
(45)  The  following  provisions  restrict  competition : 
(a)  the  appointment of BT as  exclusive  distributor 
of Newco (Article  2 (1)  of BT's DA) within the 
EEA; 
(b)  the  obligation  on  the  parties  to  obtain  from 
Newco  all  requirements  for  global  products 
(Article  3  (1)  of  each  DA); 
(c)  the non-compete provision as  regards the activi-
ties  of  N ewco  (Article  18  (  1)  of  the  JV  A) ; 
(d)  the 'loss of rights' provisions pursuant to Article 
9  (1 2)  (c)  of the  lA,  as  regards  the activities of 
MCI  in  the  territory  of  the  EEA. 
(')  See  the  Decision  in  Philip Morris/Rembrandt/Rothmans re-
ferred  to  the  14th Report on Competition, points 98  to  l 00 
and Joined Cases  142/84 and  156/84, BAT and Reynolds v. 
Commission,  [1987]  ECR  4487. 
(46)  Of  these  restnctwns,  the  non-compete  prov1s1on 
and  the  obligation  to  buy  all  requirements  for 
global  products  from  Newco  are  ancillary  ro  the 
qeation and successful  initial operation ot  Newco. 
In this respect, they are considered to be subsumed 
under the joint venture and, consequently, they will 
not be assessed pursuant to Article 85 (I) of the EC 
Treaty and  Article  53  (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement 
separately  from  the  joint  venture  itself. 
Newco is  the way chosen by BT and MCI to 'enter 
the relevant market. In this respect, both restraints 
are different expressions of the same firm  commit-
ment made by the  two  parent companies towards. 
each  other and  towards  Newco,  and  required  for 
Newco  to  successfully  enter the  market, 'conside-
ring the characteristics of the emerging market for 
.global  value-added  and  enhanced  service~  (and 
those  of  the  overall  market  for  telecommunica-
tions), in terms of uncertainty and associated  risks, 
substantial  investments  required,  and  level  of 
competition from similar ventures. Those characte-
ristics  are  reflected  in  the  fact  that  Newco  is 
expected  to incur substantial losses at  least  during 
its  early  years  of  operation. 
The non-compete clause  is  aimed at ensuring that 
BT  and  MCI  will  concentrate  their  efforts  on 
Newco, as  regards the services to be offered  by the 
joint venture ; thus  parallel  activities  by  them  (for 
instance  in  cooperation  with  other  TOs)  do  not 
frustrate  Newco's  success  in  entering the  relevant 
market. 
The obligation  on  BT  and  MCI,  as  the  exclusive 
distributors of  Newco, to  buy all  requirements for 
global products from  Newco, is  aimed at ensuring a 
steady stream of funds for  Newco and at increasing 
the credibility and market reputation of  Newco ; if 
the  parent  companies  were  free  to  obtain  global 
products from other sources, in particular in  cases 
where  Newco could  adequately satisfy  a  particular 
requirement, that might severely affect the credibi-
lity of Newco and its  financial  position. It has also 
to  be  noted  that  Newco  itself  is  not  obliged  to 
obtain from its parent companies all  of its  require-
ments for  telecommunications and other products 
and  services. 
Ancillary  prov1s10ns  are  usually  accepted  for  a 
limited  period  of  time.  In  the  present  case, 
however, in view of the particular circumstances of 
the  market  in  which  Newco  will  be  operating, 
including the substantial investements involved and 
the  associated  risks,  those  provisions  will  be 
accepted as  ancillary for  the entire duration of the 
exemption  granted  by  this  Decision  to  the  joint 
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(47)  The appointment of  BT  as  exclusive  distributor of 
Newco within the EEA falls under Article 85 (1) of 
the  Treaty  and  under  Article  53  (1)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement because it has  as  its object or produces 
os  its  effect  the  isolation  of  the  EEA  against 
imports  of  the  relevant  services,  as  offered  by 
Newco, from outside the EEA. Such fact will adver-
sely affect the conditions of competition within the 
EEA.  In addition, it cannot be considered ancillary 
to the creation of the joint venture taking in parti-
cular into account that the agreements  foresee  the 
possibility of the distribution becoming non-exclu-
sive  (Article  3  (5)  (a)  of  the  IPA). 
As  to  the  appointment  of  BT  as  exclusive  distri-
butor  of  Newco  in  the  BT  territory  outside  the 
EEA  territory  and  the  corresponding  provision 
under MCI's distribution agreement concerning the 
Americas,  these  provisions  do  not  produce  any 
appreciable effect in the EEA.  For that reason they 
do  not  fall  under either Article  85  (1)  of the  EC 
Treaty  or  Article  53  (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
(48)  In  view  of  the current state  of  development of the 
overall  market for  telecommunications, the 'loss of 
rights'  provision  affecting  BT  (Article  9 (12)  (a)  of 
the  lA)  and,  in  so  far  as  the territory of the EEA  is 
not concerned, the 'loss  of rights'  provision  affec-
ting  MCI  (Article  9  (12)  (c)  of  the  lA),  will  not 
produce any appreciable effect in the EEA. For that 
reason  these  provisions  do  not  fall  under  either 
Article 85  (1)  of the Treaty or Article  53  (1)  of the 
EEA  Agreement. 
On  the  contrary,  in  so  far  a1.  the  territory  of  the 
EEA  is  concerned,  the  'loss  of  rights'  provision 
pursuant to  Article 9 (12)  (c~ already  has an appre-
ciable effect in  the EEA  and cannot be  considered 
ancillary either to  the investment of  BT in MCI or 
the  incorporation of Newco.  It has  as  its object or 
produces  the  effect  of  significantly  impeding any 
entry by MCI  into the territory of the EEA using its 
existing technologies, in segments of  the  telecom-
munications market, that are  currently outside  the 
business  scope  of  Newco  but  within  the  widely 
defined 'core  business'  of  BT.  In  this  respect,  this 
provision, although it is  not a non-compete provi-
sion as  such, because MCI  is  not actually prevented 
from  competing on  its  own  in  BT's  territory  (the 
effect of  the provision  is  to  make MCI  pay a high 
price  in  case  it  decides  to  compete  with  BT  in 
fields  different from  those covered by Newco), will 
nevertheless produce a practical effect very close to 
a  non-compete  obligation. 
As a result, MCI  might for  instance in practice feel 
dissuaded from  setting up a local  company in  any 
country within BT's territory to  provide non-inter-
national  value-added  services,  eve  though  only 
using  its  existing  range  of  products  and  services 
(that is, without infringing any intcllecutal property 
right  belonging  to  BT  or to  Newco),  within  that 
country. 
Any  agreement  which  presents  undertakings  in 
third countries from becoming suppliers or compe-
titors within the Community falls within the scope 
of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty (and under Article 53 
(1)  of the EEA Agreement). The assessment of the 
case has not shown the existence of any reason that 
would justify departing from  that established prac-
tice. 
In addition, a non-compete provision  that extends 
beyond  the  field  of  activity  of  a  joint  venture 
cannot be  accepted  as  such ('). 
For those reasons,  the 'loss of  rights'  provision  for 
MCI  pursuant to  Article  9 (12)  (c)  of  the  lA  falls 
under Article 85 (1) of the Treaty (and Article 53 (1) 
of the EEA  Agreement) in  so for as  the territory of 
the  EEA  is  concerned. 
C.  EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 
AND  BETWEEN  MEMBER  STATES  AND  EFTA 
COUNTRIES 
(49)  In  point 39  (i)  of the Guidelines on the  appli~..:ation 
of  EEC  competition  rules  in  the  telecommunica-
tions  sector (2)  issued  by  the  Commission,  it  is 
stated  that  as  in  the  entire  Community  non-re-
served  services,  equipment  and  space  segment 
infrastructure are traded, any agreement concerning 
them may affect trade between Member States. This 
is  the situation in  the  present case  as  Newco  will 
cover the provision of value-added services not only 
between the EEA and abroad, but also between any 
two  EEA  countries.  Such  effect  on  trade  between 
Member  States,  and  between  Member  States  and 
the EFTA  countries,  is  going to  be  substantial  in 
view of the growing size  of the market, and of the 
further  expansion  expected  for  the  coming years. 
( 1)  See  Article 3 (3)  of Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  2349/ 
84, Article 6 (a)  of Commission Regulation (EEC)  No 418/85 
and Article 3 (5) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 556/89. 
(2)  OJ  No C  233,  6.  9.  1991,  p.  2. 
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As  regards non-ancillary provisions, they also affect 
trade  between  Member  States,  and  between 
Member  States  and  the  EFT  A  countries,  because 
they tend to insulate the entire  EEA by impeding 
the  development  of  existing  or  new  activities  by 
MCI  within it, not only in  respect of the products 
and the geographic areas within the business scope 
of  Newco (as  a  result  of  the exclusive  distribution 
arrangements)  but  also  in  respect  of  products  or 
geographic areas that are outside the business scope 
of Newco (as a result of the 'loss of rights' for MCI). 
obtain the financial means to finance the improve-
ment of  its  infrastructure  in  the  United  States  of 
America. 
(52)  The agreements notified, in so far as  they fall  under 
Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (I) of 
the  EEA  Agreement,  satisfy  the  conditions  for 
exemption laid down in Article 85 (J) of the Treaty 
and Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
As  the provision of services between any two  EEA 
countries  is  included  in  the  business  scope  of  (a)  Improvements 
Newco,  such  effect  on  trade  is  substantial. 
D.  CONCLUSION  IN  RESPEC'T  OF ARTICLE  85  (I) 
OF THE EC TREA1Y AND OF ARTICLE 53 (1) OF 
THE  EEA  AGREEMENT 
(50)  In  conclusion it  is  considered that the creation of 
Newco falls  under Article  85 (1)  of the Treaty and 
Article  53 (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement, and that this 
is  also  the  case  of  the  non-ancillary  provisions 
mentioned above. The restrictive effect on competi-
tion and on trade between Member States is  consi-
dered  to  be  substantial. 
E.  APPLICATION  OF  ARTICLE  85  (3)  OF  THE  EC 
TREA1Y  AND  ARTICLE  53 (3)  OF  THE  EEA 
AGREEMENT 
. (51)  The objectives of  the parent companies in entering 
this  set of  transactions are  somewhat different.  BT 
wants to become a leading global provider of inter-
national  value-added  and  enhanced  telecommuni-
cations services  in  the world,  but with  a  particular 
emphasis  in  Europe  and  in  the  United  States  of 
America.  Collaboration  with  a  major  American 
player was  particulary important for  BT to achieve 
those  goals,  and  in  particular  to  enter  the  US 
market,  where  40 %  of  multinational  companies 
are  located. 
MCI's main interest was to maintain its competitive 
position  in  the  Americas,  in  particular  against 
AT & T.  In  order  to  do  ~o.  a~ customers'  demand 
for  global  services  was  increasing, MCI  concidered 
it  necessary  to  add  a  global  dimension  to  its 
services  but  without  having  to  establish  itself 
abroad ; it therefore chose the joint venture alterna-
tive.  MCI  first  entered  into  Infonet,  but  finally 
opted  for  an  alliance  with  another  TO.  In  this 
respect,  after  negotiating  with  different  TO's  it 
turned to  BT. As  a result of the transactions it will 
(53)  It is  considered that  Ncwco will  improve telecom-
munications  services  and  technical/economic 
progress in the Community in  the following ways : 
- The combination of  BT and MCI technologies 
will  allow  Newco  to  offer  new services,  based 
on -the  existing  services  of the  parent compa-
nies,  more  quickly,  cheaply  and  of  a  more 
advanced  nature than either BT or MCI would 
have  been  capable  of  providing  alone  under 
their  existing  technologies.  Such  combination 
will  nevertheless require a very  costly and time 
consuming effort  as  demonstrated  by  the  fact 
that  the  set  of  services  that  Newco  will  offer 
will  not  be  fully  operational  within  five  years. 
In  addition,  a:;  a  related  consequence,  MCI 
technology, which  is  said to be one of the most 
credible and  user  fricJHIIy  in  the world,  wdl  lw 
made  available  to  European  customers  of 
Newco (within  the limits imposed by  the non-
ancillary  provisions  to  be  discussed  below). 
- The strategy of  Ncwco  for  entering the market 
is  to  add  value  to  basic  transmission  capacity 
(international  private  leased  lines)  obtained 
from  local  TOs.  However,  Newco  will  not use 
the  features  of each  national  network  involved 
but will  instead add  its own switching systems, 
call  prosessing/routing, signalling and databases 
as  well  as  software  to  provide  the international 
services on a truly seamless basis. This is  consi-
dered to be a real advantage over existing inter-
national  services  that  are  provided  (this  is  the 
case  of  BT  and  MCI)  by  interconnecting 
national networks that are  usually incompatible 
in  terms  of  structure,  software,  hardware  and 
management systems. The result of a combined 
network  so  creative,  is  as  strong as  its  weakest 
link  and  so  the  number  of  services  and  the 
features  thereof are  those supported by  the less 
performant  national  network  involved. 
In addition, if succesful, Newco could allow the 
Community's  most  important  companies  to 
achieve  levels  of  telecommunications  perfor-
mance on an  international  level  currently only 
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could  enable  them  to  better. withstand  global 
competition  from  other corporations  operating 
from  parts  of  the  world  where  technological 
advance  in  telecommul!ications  is  becoming 
common-place. 
- Finally, Newco will  allow cost savings resulting 
from  its operation of a single network architec-
ture reflecting economies of scale at a technolo-
gical  and operational  level,  and  possibly  from 
cheaper  interconnections  obtained  from  TOs 
given  Newco's  expected  size.  In  this  respect, 
Newco  will  no  doubt  generate  competition 
between  the  providers  of  international  basic 
transmission  capacity  in  order  to  obtain  the 
lowest  costs  for  its  business,  and  will  try  to 
direct traffic  over alternative  routes  in order to 
achieve  the  lowest  cost  routing  available. 
(54)  Both  the  exclusive  distribution  arrangements  in 
respect  of  BT  and  the  'loss  of  rights'  for  MCI  as 
regards  the  EEA,  are  aimed  at  ensuring that each 
parent company concentrates its  marketing efforts, 
in terms of prospecting for  customers, investments 
on  regional  and/or  national  networks  and  other 
facilities,  within its  respective  territory, as  required 
by  a  successful  market  entry  by  Newco.  At  the 
same time, Newco will  benefit from  the reputation 
and  track-record of  its  parent companies,  vis-a-t.:is 
its  potential  customers. 
(b)  Consumers 
(H)  The incorporation of  Newco will  mean that consu-
mers in general will benefit more rapidly from a set 
of  new  advanced  services  than  Newco's  parent 
companies  would  have  been  capable  of  providing 
separately. 
In  addition, consumers, big companies in  this case, 
will  benefit  directly  through  the  provision  of : 
- a  greater  product  portfolio  of  developed  and 
new  services  allowing  them  to  operate  more 
effectively  on  a  global  scale  and  to  better 
compete with  their global  as  well  as  with their 
Community and  EEA  competitors,  and 
lower pricing resulting from  the cost savings to 
be  made  by  Newco  as  a  result  of  operational 
effiencies  or  pressure  on  local  TOs. 
Such advantages will  improve the competitive posi-
tion  of  those  company  users  in  their  respective 
markets, in particular against competitors that have 
at  their  disposal  more  advanced  telecommunica-
tions. 
In  this  respect,  the  exclusive  distribution  arrange-
ments for BT will ensure in respect of its customers 
that there  is  a single  person  to  contact in  case  of 
any  kind  of  difficultes  related  to  the  continuous 
provision of the services anywhere in the world.  In 
addition,  the  'loss  of  rights'  for  MCI,  seen  as  a 
means of permitting confidence between the parent 
companies to grow (see  recital 62) would guarantee 
the  necessary  stability  of  the  underlying  relation-
ship between  BT  and MCI  necessary  for  it  to  be 
succesful. A succesful entry by Newco will increase 
the level of competition in the relevant market, and 
hence the possibilities of choice available for  custo-
mers.  Such  stability  is  also.  a  very  important 
element for  customers  when  considering giving  a 
potential  supplier  responsability  over  a  strategic 
element as  to  their  telecommunications  needs. 
(c)  Remaining competition 
(56)  The creation  of  Newco  will  not afford  the  parties 
the  possibility  of  eliminating  competition  in 
respect of the categories of services to be offered by 
Newco.  Such  conclusion  is  also  applicable  to  the 
non-ancillary  restrictions  identified  above,  and  is 
based  on  the  following  arguments : 
- At Newco's level  there will be significant third-
party  competition  coming  first  of  all  from 
AT & T's Worldsource  and  from  Eunectom  (or 
from  any  enhancement  of  Eunectom  if  plans 
for  a  closer  cooperation  between  Deutsche 
Bundespost  Telekom  and  France  Telecom  go 
ahead).  There  will  also  be  competition  from 
other  existing  alliances,  such  as  Unisource  or 
IPSP,  or  from  alliances  to  be  concluded 
between  TOs  that  have  not  taken  a  position 
until  now (like  Sprint,  and the  'Baby  Bells'  in 
the  United  States  of  America,  NIT in  Japan 
and some significant European TOs like Tclc£6-
nica,  Belgacom, Mercury or STE1).  Finally, the 
parties  also  expect  competition,  at  least  for 
components of  global value-added telecommu-
nications  services,  coming  from  other  players 
including  computer  and  data  processing 
companies (like IBM,  DEC and EDS) and infor-
mation  service  companies  (like  Geis  and 
Compuserve). 
- Multinational  or  other  big  companies  are 
sophisticated  purchasers  with  the  ability  to 
build their own  private  network solutions or to 
attract offers  from  competitors of  Newco.  This 
gives  the  multinationals  considerable  bargain-
ing  power  reflected  in  intense  pressure  on 
. margins, and competition between the suppliers 
for  customers. 
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(57)  In  this  context, the  Commission  has  examined  in 
detail  and discussed  with  the pnrtit·s,  the extent to 
which  access  to  MCI  and  BT  networks  by  third 
parties  is  possible.  This  is  an  Important  question 
that can become of particular relevance in the near 
future,  as  is  also  the  issue  of  possible  cross-
subsidization  of  Newco  by  BT,  an  issue  that  the 
Commission  has  also  examined  in  detail. 
In  this  respect,  ex1stmg  regulation  to  which  BT 
and/or MCI are subjected in  their respective coun-
tries  prevents  such  cross-subsidization  and/or 
discrimination  from  taking  place. 
As  regards  MCI,  under  the  requirements  of  the 
Communications Act  of  1934,  as  enforced  by  the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC), MCI's 
network arrangements and services are described in 
publicly  available  tariff  schedules  or contracts. 
The  Communications  Act  and  the  FCC's  policies 
prohibit MCI  from  making any  unjust or  unreaso-
nable discrimination in the provision of its services 
including access to  these services by MCI's compe-
titors  and  foreign  correspondents.  In  addition  the 
FCC has a complaint process, should any party feel 
aggrieved by MCI's actions or inactions (or by those 
of any other TO in  the United States of America). 
The  situation  is  similar  as  regards  BT  because 
under the terms of the Public Telecommunications 
Operator Licence that BT received  under the Tele-
communication Act  1984, which is  enforced by the 
Office  of  Telecommunications  (Oftcl),  BT  cannot 
show  undue  preference  or  discrimination  in  the 
provision of certain services towards other persons, 
nor  unfairly  favour  any  part  of  its  own  business 
against  competitors.  In addition,  a  prohibition  on 
exclusive  dealing  in  the provision  of international 
telecommunications  services  prevents  BT  from 
making arrangements with overseas correspondents, 
including  MCI,  which  would  exclude  them  from 
dealing  with  other  operators  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Finally,  condition  18  of  BTs  licence 
(together with  condition 38,  in  so  far  as  the confi-
dentiality of customer information is  concerned(!)), 
empowers  Oftel  to  act  against  any  unfair  cross-
subsidy by  BT and imposes upon BT an obligation 
(1)  The use of such information is  also restricted by the Data Se-
gregation Schedule of the JVA, to  which reference is  made in 
recital  26. 
to  keep  records  of  any  material  transfer  lwtwt·en 
any  parts  of  its  husi1wss. 
Those  regulatory  constraints  are  reflected  in  the 
agreements, so that actions  undertaken  by  MCI  or 
BT in  complying with  their respective  obligations 
are  excluded  from  the  non-compete  provision  in 
the JJVA (Articles  18 (3)  and  18 (4))  and  from  the 
'loss  of  rights'  provisions  in  the  lA  (Articles 
9 (12) (b) (iii)  and  9 (12) (c) (iiii)). 
The  abovementioned  regulatory  constraint<>,  toge-
ther with  the additional  explanations  provid~d by 
the  parties,  have  permitted  the  Commission  to 
conclude that it  is  not necessary for  it to take  any 
further action  as  of  now,  including requesting the 
parties  to  make  appropriate  undertakings  to  the 
effect that they will  neither discriminate nor cross-
subsidize. However, should this conclusion prove to 
be  wrong  in  the  future,  the  Commission  will 
immediately apply the competition rules of the EC 
Treaty (and if applicable those of EEA Agreement) 
as  required. 
(d)  Indispensability 
(i)  Newco 
(58)  The formation  of  Newco itself is  indispensable for 
the parent companies to successfully enter the rele-
vant  market: 
- Newco will allow the time required for the rele-
vant services to  be  marketed to  be substantially 
shortened.  As  many  other  companies  (mainly 
alliances) are  entering the relevant  market, the 
time  required  for  being  in  the  market  with  a 
comprehensive set  of  services  is  a  competitive 
factor  of  the  utmost  importance. 
In  addition,  Newco  will  allow  each  parent 
company to  substantially  reduce  the costs  and 
risks  inherently  associated  with  the  complex 
organization  required  to  offer  such  services  at 
the scale  and  with  the  other features  required 
by  multinationals  and  other  big  international 
users. 
Finally,  as  indicated  in  recital  7,  Newco  is  a 
means  to  quickly  overcome  the  inadequacies 
associated with the provision of the services and 
features  (one-stop-shop,  end-to-end  and  seam-
less  basis,  etc.)  required  by  multinationals  and 
other big international users, under the existing 
framework  of  cooperative  relationships  esta-
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(ii)  ExduJit'f  diJtribution 
(59)  Under  BT's  distribution  agreement,  BT  is 
appointed by Newco as  the exclusive distributor for 
Newco's  products  in  a wide  territory, covering the 
entire  world  excluding  the  Americas. 
Such  exclusivity  is  reinforced  by  the  licensing 
provisions  in  the  IPA. Thus, pursuant to Article  3 
(4) (a) (i),  Newco sublicenses BT solely for the 'terri-
tory'  and  MCI  solely  for  the  Americas  to  use  the 
combined  technology  it  has  received  from  its 
parent  companies  in  the  distribution  of  Newco's 
products.  In  addition,  each  parent  company  (or 
distributor) receives directly from  the other a non-
exclusive licence to use and license the trademarks 
of  the  latter  within  its  own  territory.  Thus,  BT 
grants MCI such a licence for the trademarks of BT 
but limited to the Americas (Article  12 (3)  (a)  and 
(b))  and  vice  versa. 
The parties haw provided the Commission with an 
array  of  arguments supporting the indispensability 
of  the  exclusive  distribution  arrangements  for  BT 
in  the  transaction.  Both  have  particularly  stressed 
the protection of the valuable  intellectual  property 
rights  they  have  contributed  to  the  joint venture 
against  outsiders  but,  in  particular,  against  each 
other.  In  this  context,  both  parties  have  stressed 
that  they  have  not found  a  more efficient manner 
of  organizing the distribution  of  the products in a 
balanced  way. 
Taking those facts  into consideration, together with 
the  high  level  of  competition  that  the  parent 
companies will  be  facing (as  distributors of Newco) 
and the substantial bargaining power of customers, 
the  exclusive  distributioQ  arrangement  for  BT 
(including  here  those  provisions  in  the  IPA  that 
reinforce it) can be accepted as  being indispensable 
to  the positive effects (in  particular the distribution 
of  the  products  in  an  efficient  manner)  resulting 
from  the restrictive clauses, provided that at least a 
possibility  for  passive  sales  is  available  for  EEA 
customers. By passive sales is understood, as  regards 
MCI,  the possibility offered  to  a  EEA  customer of 
addressing  himself  to  MCI  for  the  provision  of 
Newco  products  in  the  EEA  with  the  support of 
Newco  (as  regards,  for  instance,  the  availability of 
leased  lines  or the  required  customer service)  but 
without the  intervention  of  BT or with  the  inter-
vention  of  BT  only  as  support  distributor. 
(60)  The  Commission  has  therefore  examined  the 
extent to which such passive  sales are  possible  for 
all  kinds of customers. The parties have confirmed 
that passive  sales(') will  he  possibte  irrespective of 
the actual  size  and  location  of customers, and  the 
Commission considers (and the parties have  recog-
nized)  that  passive  sales  by  each  distributor  to 
customers in the exclusive territory of the other are 
indeed a genuine possibility (2).  Thus, any potential 
European  customer,  with  activities  in  at least  two 
Member  States,  but  no  presence  in  the  United 
States of  America,  can  contract with  MCI (instead 
of  BT,  the  exclusive  distributor  for  the  EEA)  the 
provision of Newco services in the EEA only. MCI 
will  conclude the sale  in America (without infrin-
ging  any  licence  granted  to  it  by  Newco  or any 
trademark licence granted by B1) and will  then ask 
Newco  to  procure  all  necessary  use  of  remote 
networks  (third-party  networks)  on  the  most 
competitive  terms  available.  For so  doing,  Newco 
could, in some cases, engage BTs services (in parti-
cular as  regards  regulated services still  provided by 
BT),  but will  always  be obliged to  obtain supplies 
on  a  competitive  basis.  In  addition,  MCI  will  be 
responsible  for  that  customer. 
In  conclusion,  the  exclusivity  is  considered  indis-
pensable  within  the  meaning of  Article  85  (3)  of 
the EC Treaty (and pursuant to Article 53 (3) of the 
EEA  Agreement). 
(iii)  MCI's 
1loss of rightJ' pursuant to Article 9 (12) 
(c)  of the  lA 
(61)  As  explained  above,  Article  9  (12)  (c)  of  the  IA 
provides for MCI to  lose certain rights in  the event 
that MCI becomes engaged in the core business of 
BT in a territory defined as  'the rest of the world', 
which  includes  the  entire  EEA. 
(I)  The latest available version of the business plan  even  makes a 
distinction between  'remote sales' (where a customer requests 
a bid  from  one  distributor  for  services  in  the  other distribu-
tor's  territory)  and  'passive  sales'  (where  a customer  requests 
bids  from  a distributor which  is  not responsible  for that terri-
tory or customer). Both sales can  be effected. The relevant dis-
tributor will  independently  prepare  a bid  without  consulting 
the  other,  and  Newco,  to  the  extent  that  it  will  be  involved 
will  not disclose  to  one distributor the  prices or conditions it 
has  provided  to  the other or any  confidential  information  re-
garding  the  customer. 
(2)  In  addition, differences in  MCI  and  BT prices  for  Newco ser-
vices will occur in so far as each will  be related to  local condi-
tions  and  supply  costs. 
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(62)  This  provision  has  to  be  considered  against  the 
imbalance  between  the  very  high  value  for  each 
parent company of its  proprietary software licensed 
to Newco (and to each other within their respective 
territory) and the low level  of protection  to  which 
the  software  is  entitled  under  most  intellectual 
property laws  in  force.  Basically, the same software 
is going to be used  by  Ncwco to serve the needs of 
its  international  customers  and  by  each  parent 
company to serve  the intra-national needs of their 
customers  within  their  respective  territories.  In 
addition,  it  has  to  be  taken  into  account  that 
through  Newco (and  the licences that  Newco will 
grant to its parent companies in respect of any new 
development) the technologies of both parties will 
be  increasingly  interlinked  and,  'hence,  will  be 
increasingly  difficult  to  separate. 
For  these  reasons,  the  parties  decided  not  to 
include a  termination  provision  in the IPA in case 
of infringement, and instead to  include the 'loss of 
rights'  provisions  in  the  lA.  In  this  respect,  the 
latter  can  be  seen  as  analogous  to  the  territorial 
licensor protection permitted under both the patent 
licensing  block  exemption  regulation  (Regulation 
(EEC)  No  2349/84)  and  the  know-how  licensing 
block  exemption  regulation  (Regulation  (EEC)  No 
556/89). 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  'loss  of  rights' 
pursuant to Article 9 (12) (<.)  of the lA are indispen-
sable  in  particular as  a  means of permitting confi-
dence between the parent companies to  grow and, 
consequently,  to  permit  the  necessary  transfer  of 
technology  so  as  to  allow  Newco  to  succeed. 
(63)  However,  as  indicated  above,  such  provtston  will 
also  produce  the  effect  of substantially  preventing 
MCI  from  entering  the  EEA  using  only  its  own 
proprietary  technology.  The  Commission  sees  no 
justification  for  accepting  this  restrictive  effect  for 
as  long  as  the  agreements  are  in  force. 
For that reason, and following discussions with  the 
Commission, the  parties  have  modified  the agree-
ments so that the 'Joss of rights' provision pursuant 
to  Article 9 (12) (c)  of the lA, in  so far  as  the EEA 
is  concerned, will  apply only for  a  period  of five 
years. Once the five-year  period in  respect of those 
rights  has  expired,  MCI's  'loss  of  rights'  will  be 
terminated  in  relation  to  the  EEA. 
This  five-year  period  is  adequate  taking  into 
account  that the existin.g  business  plan  for  Newco 
commits  the  parent  companies  for  five  years  and 
that, in addition, five  years is  the time required for 
the set of services to  be marketed by  Newco to  be 
fully  operational. 
In  view  of  this  modification,  the  Commission 
considers that Article 9 (12) (c) of the IA now fulfils 
the  conditions  for  the  granting  of  an  exemption 
pursuant to  both  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC  Treaty 
and  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
(e)  Conclusion 
(64)  It is  concluded that all  the four conditions for  the 
granting  of an  individual  exemption  pursuant  to 
Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  pursuant  to 
Article 53 (3)  of the  EEA Agreement in respect of 
the creation of Newco and in respect of the indis-
pensable restrictions indentified above are satisfied. 
F.  DURATION  OF  THE  EXEMJYfiONS 
(65)  Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation  No 17, a deci-
sion  in  application  of  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC 
Treaty  (and  pursuant  to  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA 
Agreement in  so  far  as  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  is  concerned)  shall  be  issued  for  a 
specified period. Pursuant to Article 6 of that Regu-
htion, the date  from  which  such  a  decision  takes 
effect  cannot  be  earlier  than  the  date  of  notifica-
tion.  In  that respect,  in  the  present case  the  Deci-
sion,  in  so  far  as  it  grants exemption, should take 
effect: 
- from  the  date  the  notification  was  complete, 
that  is  from  16  November  1993  to  15 
November  2000  as  regards  the  joint  venture 
created between  13T and MCI, and the appoint-
ment of BT as  exclusive distributor of Nc'wco in 
the  EEA, 
as  regards  the 'loss  of  rights'  for  MCJ  pursuant 
to  Article 9 (12)  (c)  of  the  IA,  until  the  end of 
the fifth  year  from  the date  of the adoption of 
this  Decision, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Article  1 
On the basis  of the facts  in  its  possession,  the  Commis-
sion has  no grounds for action  pursuant to  Article  8S  (1) 
of the EC Treaty and Article 53 (I) of the EEA Agreement 
in  respect  of  the  agreements  as  notified,  relating  to  the 
acquisition  by  BT of a 20 %  stake  in  the sharccapital of 
MCI,  to  the appointment of MCI  as  exclusive distributor 
of  Newco  in  the  Americas  pursuant  to  Article  2  (1)  of 
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as  exclusive .distributor of Newco in the rest of the world 
excluding  the  EEA  territory,  to  MCI's  'loss  of  rights' 
pursuant to Article 9 (12) (c) of the Investment Agreement 
in so far as the territory of the EEA is  not concerned, and 
to BT'  s 'loss of rights' pursuant to Article 9 (12) (a)  of the 
Investment Agreement. 
Article  2 
On the basis  of the facts  in  its  possession, the Commis-
sion  has  no grounds for  action  pursuant to Article 85  (1) 
of the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agreement 
for  the  duration  of  the  exemption  granted  to  the  joint 
venture in respect of the obligation on BT and on MCI to 
obtain from  Newco all  requirements  for  global  products 
pursuant to  Article  3 (1)  of each  Distribution Agreement 
and  in  respect  of  the  non-compete  provision  as  regards 
the activities  of  Newco  pursuant to  Article  18  (1)  of the 
Joint-Venture  Agreement. 
Article  3 
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
(3) of the EEA Agreement, the provisions of Article 85 (1) 
of the EC  Tre~ty and of Article 53 (1)  of the EEA Agree-
ment are hereby declared inapplicable for the period from 
16  November  1993  to  15  November  2000  to  the  joint 
venture, Newco, created between BT and MCI, as  notified 
to  the Commission, and to the appointment of BT as the 
exclusive  distributor of  Ncwco within  the territory of the 
EEA pursuant to Article 2 (1)  of BT's Distribution Agree-
ment. 
Article  4 
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
(3) of the EEA Agreement, the provisions of Article 85  (1) 
of the EC Treaty and of Article 53 (1)  of the EEA Agree-
ment are hereby declared inapplicable for a period of five 
years  from  the date of the  adoption  of  this  Decision  to 
Article  9  (12)  (c)  of  the  Investment  Agreement. 
Article  5 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to : 
British  Telecommunications  plc, 
81  Newgate  Street, 
UK-London  EC1A  7  AJ. 
MCI  Communications  Corporation, 
1801  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  NW, 
Washington,  DC  20006, 
USA. 
Done  at  Brussels,  27 July  1994. 
For  the  Commi.uion 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Ml'mbcr  of tht·  Commi.rrion 
• 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 15  December 1994 
relating to a  proceeding pursuant to Article 85  of the EC Treaty and Article  53 of the 
EEA  Agreement 
(IV/34.768 - International Private Satellite Partners) 
(Only the English and Italian texts are authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(94/895/EC) 
TIIF COMMISSION  OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of 
6  february  1962,  First  Regulation  implementing 
Articles  85  and  86  of the Treaty (I),  as  last amended  by 
the  Act  of  Accession  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  in 
particular Articles 2, 6 and 8 thereof, 
Having regard  to  the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption,  submirted  pursuant 
to Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 17 on 28 June 1993 
by  the  parties concerned below, 
Having  regard  to  the  request  made  by  the  parties  on 
14  February  1994,  to  extend  the  application  and 
notification to Article 53 of the EEA  Agreement, 
Having  regard  to the summaries  of the application  and 
notification  published (Z)  pursuant  to  Article  19  (3)  of 
Regulation No 17, 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory.  Committee  on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
(1) 
I.  THE FACTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
On  28  june  1993,  20  agreements  relating· to the 
creation  of  a  company  were  notified  ro  the 
Commission.  The  company,  International  Private 
Satellite  Partners  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  IPSP) 
has  been  created  under  the  form  of  a  limited 
partnership organized under United States law, and 
( 
1
)  ()  J No  13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
e)  OJ  No C 305,11. 11.1993, p,  U  and OJ No C 159,10. 6. 
1994, p.  2. 
(2) 
(3) 
has  been  formed  to  provide  (a)  international 
business  telecommunications services  to  busincs~es 
in  Europe  and  North  America  using  its  own 
satellite system on a  one-stop shop basis;  and  (h) 
to offer bulk transmission capacity to third  p:uuc~. 
to the extent that the  capacity of the  satellites  is 
not fully  utilized  by  IPSP  or its  partners. 
Following  the  entering  into  force  of  the  EEA 
Agreement,  the  parties  requested  the  Commission 
on 14 February 1994 to extend the notification to 
cover  also  Article  53  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
Following such request the Commission started the 
relevant  cooperation  procedure  with  the  EFTA 
Surveillance Authority. 
B.  THE PARTIES 
(a.a)  The  partners 
Orion Satellite Corporation (hereinafter referred  to 
as  'OrionSat'),  which  is  a  company  or~anizcd 
under the laws of the State of Delaware, neatcd by 
its  ultimate  parent  company,  Orion  Network 
Systems, to serve as the general partner in  IPSP.  It 
holds  the  United  States  Federal  Communi(ation~ 
Commission  (hereinafter referred  to as  'the  FCC') 
licence to construct, launch and operate IPSP's two 
satellites  and  has  broad  authority  to  manage  and 
control JPSP's  development and operations. 
Orion  Network  Systems,  which  is  also  a  limited 
partner  in  IPSP,  provides  telecommunications 
facilities  and  services,  in  particular  point-to-point 
transmission services  using subleased capacity. 
OrionSat, as general partner, has a f  ...  ] eJ  interest 
in  the  partnership  that  has  to  be  added  to  an 
additional [ ...  ] held by  Orion Network Systems. 
British  Aerospace  Communications,  which  is  a 
limited  partner  of  IPSJ>  belonging  to  the  Briti~h 
Aerospace group (hereinafter referred  to as  'BAe') 
of companies, and formed  by  the latter specifically 
for  the purpose of investing in  IPSP. 
( 
1
)  1- ..  J  Blanks  between  square  hrackets  indicate  hmmc~' 
secrets deleted pursuant to Article 21  (2) ot Rcgui.Hion 
No 17. 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
It  holds  a  [ ...  ]  interest  in  IPSP.  The  British 
Aerospace  Group is  mainly engaged  in  the design 
and  manufacture  of  civil  and  military  aircraft, 
guided weapon systems, satellites and sub-systems, 
payloads and launch vehicle cquipmcnts and motor 
vchidcs. In  particular, it is  the prime contractor for 
the IPSP  satellites. 
The total turnover of the BAe  group in 1992 was 
£  9 977 million (ECU  13 000 million). 
COM DEV Satellite Communications Ltd, which is 
a  limited partner of IPSP  in which it holds a  [ ...  ] 
interest.  It  was  incorporated  specifically  by  its 
ultimate parent company, COM DEV Ltd, for  the 
purpose of investing in IPSP. 
The COM DEV  group is  an important supplier of 
satellite  payloads subsystems  for  communications, 
space science and remote sensing applications. 
General  Dynamics  Commercial  Launch  Services, 
which is a limited partner of IPSP in which it holds 
a  1  •..  ]  interest.  It  provides  spacecraft  launch 
services and will  also provide such services for the 
IPSP  satellites .. 
It belongs  to the  General  Dynamics  Co.  which  is 
engaged  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of weapon 
systems  and  platforms,  space  transportation,  and 
building  materials.  The  consolidated  turnover  of 
General  Dynamics  Co.,  in  1991  was  US  $  8 751 
million  (ECU  7 250 million). 
Kingston  Communications  International  Ltd 
(hereinafter  referred  to as  'Kingston'), which  is  a 
limited  partner of IPSP  in  which  it  holds  a  [ ...  ] 
interest.  It  was  incorporated  specifically  by  its 
parent company, Kingston Communications (Hull) 
pk, for  the purpose of investing in  IPSP. 
Kingston  Communications  (Hull)  plc  is  a  United 
Kingdom company, being the licensed  operator of 
the  public  switched  telephone  network in  the city 
of Hull and its surrounding area. 
Kingston Communications (Hull) plc and BAe have 
incorporated  a  jointly  controlled  joint  venture, 
Kingston  Satellite  Services  Ltd,  intended to act as 
the agent of both parent companies in discussions 
with  IPSP  concerning  the  offering  of  IPSP 
services. 
The  1991  total  turnover  of the  Kingston  group 
was£ 59 million (ECU  77 million). 
MCN Sat. US,  which is a United States corporation 
formed  with  the  primary  purpose  of holding  the 
investment of the  French group Matra-Hachette in 
IPSP  where it holds a  [ ...  ] interest. 
The  Matra-Hachette group is  active  in aerospace, 
in  particular in  the manufacture of various types of 
(8) 
(9) 
satellites (through Matra Marconi Space), defence, 
telecommunication  and  CAD-CAM  equipment, 
automobile  transportation,  publishing, 
broadcasting, movie production and advertising. Its 
overall  turnover  in  1992  was  H  .S S 000  million 
(ECU  S 350 million). 
STET - Societa Finanziaria T  elefonica per Azioni, 
which  is  an  Italian  company  whose  majority 
shareholder  is  the  lstituto  per  la  Ricostruzione 
Industriale  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'IRI'),  the 
largest Italian State company. STET's institutional 
function,  as  IRI's  holding  company  for  the 
telecommunications  sector,  is  to  guarantee  the 
coordination  of financial  and  commercial  aspects 
in  the  provision  of  telecommunications  services, 
manufacturing  products  and  network  in~t<libtion. 
STET as  limited  partner  holds  a  1 ...  J interest  in 
IPSP. 
As  will  be  described ·later,  STET  will  have  the 
exclusive  responsibility  for  promoting  the  sale  of 
IPSP  satellite  capacity  and  international  business 
telecommunications  services  in  Italy  and  'Eastern 
Europe'. 
Trans-Atlantic Satellite,  Inc., which  i~  a suhsidiary 
of the japanese company Nissho Iwai  Co., formed 
mainly for  the purpose of investing in  IPSP  where 
it  holds  a  [  ...  ]  interest.  In  addition  it  wtll  also 
work  as  a  subcontractor  to  BAe  for  certain 
components of the IPSP  satellites. In this respect it 
obtained  a  turnover of US  $  3  million  (ECU  2,5 
million)  for the year ending 31  March 1992. 
Nissho  Iwai  Co.  is  a  general  trading  company 
active  in  trade  in,  and  import  and  export  of all 
types  of  domestic  Japanese  and  foreign 
merchandise.  Its  turnover  in  the  year  ending 
31  March  1992  was  ECU  86 700  million.  The 
Nissho Iwai  Group has  a  substantial  intncsr in  a 
number  of companies  in  the  tciel.:onHuumcttions 
business. In particular, it  participates in  the capital 
of Satellite Japan Corporation, a Japanese satellite 
operator, the main business of which is  to sell  hulk 
transponder capacity in Japan only. This company 
was  merged  with  the  japanese  company  JC-Sat. 
The  merger  was  cleared  by  the  Commission  last 
year. 
(b.b)  The  limited partnership 
'(10)  IPSP  has  been  organized  first  to  provide 
international  business  telecommunications  services 
(e.g.  internal  corporate  networks,  bulk  data 
transfer,  data  collection  and  transport,  fax  and 
electronic  document  distribution,  and  network 
services  by  satellite  and  using  very  small  aperture 
terminals  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'VSATs')  to 
multinational  companies  on  a  'one-stop  shop', 
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(11) 
(12) 
'end-to-end'  basis  covering  North  America  and 
Europe;  and  secondly,  to  offer  transmission 
capacity on  its  satellites  to the extent capacity is 
no't  fully  utilized  by IPSP  and its  partners. 
The  closing  of IPSP  under  the  notified  structure 
started in  1982 when OrionSat filed an application 
with  the  FCC  for  a  licence  to  operate  an 
international  satellite  system.  Following  the 
granting of the licence, OrionSat initiated, in 1988, 
the  process  of  consultation  with  Intelsat.  The 
consultation lasted one year and, once finished  in 
1989, OrionSat entered  into  a  contract with BAe 
as  prime  contractor  for  the  construction  and 
launch of the satellite system. At the same time and 
through the closing of the  partnership, at the end 
of  1991,  OrionSat  held  discussions  and 
negotiations  with  prospective  partners  and 
negotiated  a  loan  financing  package  from  an 
international consortium of banks. 
l Jndcr  the  terms  of the  FCC's  licence,  IPSP  or its 
wstonwrs  were  not  allowed  to  interconnect  the 
IPSP  satellite  facilities  with  a  switched  telephone 
network  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
telecommunications  services.  However,  in 
December  1993,  the  FCC  adopted  a  new  policy 
pursuant to which  it  is  now possible  for  separate 
satellite systems (like IPSP)  to apply to carry up to 
1 250  64-kbps  equivalent  circuits  of  public 
~witched traffic. 
I.  Service and facilities 
(13)  IPSP  intends  to  build,  launch  and  operate 
high-power  Ku-band  telecommunication  satellites 
to  he  positioned  in  orbital  positions  3]05 W  and 
47°  W longitude. The first satellite, built using the 
Eurostar platform - developed jointly by BAe  and 
Matra  Marconi  Space  through  a  joint  venture 
called  Satcom  International  - will  contain  28 
transponders  of  54  MHz  handwidth  and  six 
rranspondt·rs  of  ]()  MHz  bandwidth,  that  will 
make  1 728  MHz  of  usJ.ble  communications 
capacity  per  satellite.  The  geographical  reach 
('footprint')  of  the  satellites  will  cover  much  of 
North America, much of the  EEA  and portions of 
central and eastern Europe. 
(14)  It  is  expected  that  the  first  satellite  will  be 
operational  by  December  1994  and  the  second 
sometime  thereafter.  Their  design  life  will  be  12 
years. 
(15)  Prior  to  the  launchmg  and  operation  of its  own 
satellites,  IPSP  will  provide the services  by relying 
on leased facilities. 
(16)  In  addition,  IPSP  will  operate  its  own  tracking, 
telemetry and command facilities  being built in  the 
US  to control the satellites, that will  be  backed up 
by  additional facilities  to  be  huilt in  Italy. 
(  17)  Customer§  of  IPSP  will  have  to  install  two· W<lY 
VSATs  on  their  premises  in  order  to  .tecc~s  tlw 
services. 
2.  Finanqal contribution 
(18)  The  complex  financial  arrangements  supporting 
IPSP are as follows: 
(a)  the  partners have  invested a  total of US  $  90 
million in  equity distributed according to their 
respective  interests  in  IPSP.  OrionSat's 
contribution as general partner amounts to US 
$  30  million  made  up  of  the  FCC  licence, 
certain contract rights and other tangible  and 
intangible assets; 
(b)  in  addition they  have  obtained  a  senior  debt 
facility of up to US  $ 251  million  for  the first 
satellite  from  a  syndicate  of  internationa I 
banks;  · 
(c)  certain  of  IPSP's  partners  have  committed 
additional  funds  for  an  amount  of  US  $  9 
millio_.; 
(d)  furthermore, with a view to guaranteeing lPSP 
a  sufficient level  of utilization of the satellites' 
capacity, the limited partners have also  a~rt.•cd 
to  lea~ capacity on the satellites up to a total 
amount of j ..•  ],  .11ul  of 1  ...  j transponders. As 
will  he  described  later  that capacity could  he 
re-leased  by  the limited  partners to customers 
of IPSP; 
(e)  finally,  the limited  partners have entered  into 
additional  contingent lease  capacity  contracts 
with  IPSP  that  will  require  them  to  make 
additional  contributions  to  IPSP  in  exchange 
for  additional  transmission  capacity  up  to 
r  ...  ]  transponders,  in  case  of  negative  cash 
flow,  to  allow  IPSP  ro  service  the  senior 
debt. 
3.  Central management and integrated operations 
(19)  As  IPSP  has  been  created  to  provide  services  to 
customers  on  the  basis  of a  fully  interconnected 
network enabling the provision of uniform services 
at  uniform  prices,  the  general  partner  is  ~iven 
exclusive  responsibility  for  management  and 
control  of  IPSP  and,  subject  to  certain  limited 
rights  of  review  and  approval  by  the  limited 
partners,  has  broad  authority  to  carry  our  the 
development,  operation  and  marketing  and 
promotion of IPSP"s  business. 
(20)  This control  by  OrionSat is  also a  requirement of 
the  fCC  in  order  that  the  licence  that  OrionSat 
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4.  Marketing and distribution 
(21)  IPSP will market and distribute its services with the 
assistance  of  a  number  of  local  marketing  and 
operating  companies  that  will  be  nominated  by 
IPSP as representative agents or distributors. Apart 
from  STET, which is  the exclusive distributor for 
Italy and  the exclusive  representative  agent  for  a 
group  of countries  collectively  referred  to  in  the 
agreements as 'eastern Europe' (Austria, Hungary, 
Poland,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Malta,  the  former 
USSR,  the  former  Czechoslovakia and the  former 
Yugoslavia), such agents or distributors will work 
on a  non-exclusive basis. They may, but need not, 
be  limited  partners.  As  in  some  Member  States 
licences to provide uplink services are not available 
yet,  IPSP  will  have  to  work  with  the  national 
telecommunications operators (hereinafter referred 
to as 'TOs') which will act as agents. This situation 
is  expected  to  last  until  the  Community's 
liberalization  of  satellite  services  is  effective  and 
implemented. 
C.  THE RELEVANT MARKET 
(a.a)  Product market(s) 
(22)  IPSP  will compete in two markets: 
- that  of  international  private  business 
telecommunications services, 
- that of the  offer  of bulk satellite transmission 
capacity. 
1.  International business private 
telecommunications services 
(23)  Services  of  the  kind  that  IPSP  will  offer  to  its 
customers  are  intended  to  address  the  growing 
need  of  multinational  companies  for  advanced 
end-to-end  communic1t1on\  between  their 
geographically  dispn~cJ  loc11ions  around  the 
world  and/or  between  them  and  their  customers 
and  suppliers  of  raw  materials  and  intermediate 
products. The services include, among others, voice 
calling, high-speed fax, data storage and transport 
and video confercncing. 
(24)  Such  services  can  be  included  in  the  emerging 
market  for  international  (or  even  global) 
value-added  services  to  large  corporations  and 
other  intensive  users  of  advanced 
telecommunications services. 
(25)  This  is  one  of  the  segments  of  the  overall 
telecommunications  market  with  the  biggest 
potential  for  growth in  the  years  to come, taking 
full  advantage  of the  current  ongoing  process  of 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  and  of  the 
growing  convergence  of  telecommunications  and 
electronics, in particular software. 
It  is  significant  that  most  of  the  ,dh.JiltT\  111  the 
telecommunications  field  being  ;nmounced 
nowadays  include  prov1s1ons  to  enter  the 
value-added segment (sometimes as a first step of a 
broader alliance), and in particular the provision of 
advanced  value-added  services  to  the  world's 
biggest corporations. 
(26)  The services  can  be  provided  to  customers either 
using terrestrial  facilities  and establishing  physical 
links by means of coaxial or optical-fibre cables, or 
using  satellite  facilities  and  VSATs.  It  is  widely 
accepted  that  satellites  are  particularly 
recommended  as  regards  customers'  locations  in 
remote territories and in  areas having a  very poor 
terrestrial infrastructure. 
(27)  Although  some  of  the  other  alliances  being 
announced include also the provision of ~crvices by 
satellite  - as  parr  of a  basket  of sen·iccs  to  ht• 
provided mainly through cables - IPSP  is  tht' first 
venture  that  will  offer  services  only  through 
satellites. 
(28)  Another  particularity  of  IPSP  is  that  contrary  to 
most of the alliances being announced - that are 
formed  by incumbent TOs - IPSP's  partners are 
(apart from STET and Kingston) private companies 
not  previously  active  in  the  telecommunications 
field. 
(29)  According  to  the  parties,  this  b..:k  of  private 
initiative is due to the fact that such companies still 
face  significant barriers to entry arising from: 
- the remaining regulation of telecommunication 
services in  many countries notwithstanding the 
substantial changes that are takmg place.  That 
means that IPSP  will  not be able to operate on 
its  own  where  exclusive  rights  still  exist  and 
that it will  have to apply for licences to provide 
uplink/downlink  services  where  total 
liberalization  of the  satellites'  carrh  segment  is 
not  achieved.  In  addition,  IPSP  will  have  to 
coordinate  with  the  internauon.tl  ~atcllitc 
organizations  to  providt'  serv~re.,  v1a  c,l'paratl' 
satellite system\, 
the size of the investment necessary to enter rhc 
market, in particular if the entrant is  acquiring 
its  own transmission  facilities.  I11  this  n·spect, 
the cost of the construction, testing and bunch 
of the two IPSP satellites alone is  budgeted at a 
minimum cost of US  $ 425 million, 
- the difficulty, cost and length of rime  necessary 
to  establish  a  business  of  suffiCient  size  and 
reputation,  including  building  up  hrand 
familiarity and a customer base, in  thi~ market 
in particular. 
2.  Offering of bulk satellite transmission capacity 
(30)  This is a  market of secondary importance for  IPSP. 
The parties have declared  that they  will  he  active 
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011  It ouly  111  t.:aS(' Jcmand for IP\1'\ S('l van.·s  is  lcs., 
than expected. 
(31)  Up to now, the supply of space segment ~apacity is 
mainly in the hands of three international satellite 
organizations  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'ISOs'): 
lntelsat,  Eutelsat  and  Inmarsat.  They  are  the 
ultimate  owners  of  a  considerable  number  of 
telecommunication  satellites  in  orbit  (lntelsat  for 
instance  currently  operates  13  geostationary 
satellites).  All  three  have  a  very  similar structure, 
e.g.  they  are  organizations  implemented  by  a 
number of agreements signed  by  sovereign  States, 
represented  by  their  governments  or  by  their 
Jcsignarcd  public  or  ptivatc  telecommunications 
operators  (known  as  'signatories'),  to  provide 
space  ~egment required (a)  for  international public 
telecommunication  services  either  to  all  areas  of 
the  world  (lntelsat)  or  to  Europe  (Eutelsat) 
or  (h)  for  improved  maritime  and  aeronautical 
communications (lnmarsat). 
(ll)  lJn<kr  JS(h'  rcspecuvc:  t.:OIIV<'Illions,  Jirc~:t  au.:e~s 
to  satellite  scgment  <.:apacity  and  earth  station 
terminal  facilities  are  reserved  to  the  signatories 
(who  also  own  the  terrestrial  networks),  so  that 
private satellite operators, who are in competition 
with  signatories,  are  compelled  to  ask  them  for 
obtaining  the  capacity.  This  situation  places 
signatories  in  a  very  strong  position  that  further 
reinforces  their  already  strong  position  in  the 
telecommunications market  a<>  a  whole. 
(33)  In  addition,  owners  c;>f  separate  satellite  systems, 
such  as  IPSP,  have  to  undergo  (i)  a  consultation 
process with lntelsat (and/or Eutelsat)  designed to 
ensure  that  such  separate  satellite  systems  will 
cause  no  significant  economic  harm  to  ISOs' 
systl·m  and  (ii)  a  technical  roordination  process, 
also with the relevant ISOs,  to ensure the technical 
compatibility  of  tht'  new  facilitics  and  their 
operation with  the  usc  of the  frequency  spectrum 
JnJ orbital spat.e ust·d  hy  th<'  existing clnd  planned 
JSOs'  span· segnlt'nl. 
To  date,  and  following  the  consultation  process 
carried  out  by  IPSP  with  Intelsat,  Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Italy, 
Ireland, Austria, the United  States and the United 
Kingdom have currently granted landing rights  to 
IPSP  or  its  representative.  In  addition,  IPSP  has 
also initiated the consultation process with Eutelsat 
with the support of the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Ireland. 
(b.b)  Geographic market 
(H)  IPSP  will  be active primarily  111  the area covered by 
the geographic reach of the satellites, i.e.  much of 
North America, much of the  EEA,  and portions of 
Central and Fast<'lll  Furop1:.  It  is  ro11~1tkrnl tla.ll 
this woulJ  be·  the  geographic  m<trket  l"Ovcrcd  hy 
the  agreements.  This  area  would  however  be 
further  extended  by  using  terrestrial  links  and 
networks  to  cover  customers'  premises  located 
outside the footprints of the  satellites. 
(c.c)  Position of IPSP  in the market 
(35)  IPSP  estimates  that  the  total  private  line  service 
market represented approximately ECU  8,4 billion 
in  1990,  of  which  private  corporate 
communications  for  transatlantiC  and 
intra-European  services  accounted  for  ECU  1 4 
billion.  IPSP's  pro}ections  for  1995  anticipate  the 
latter figure  to grow to ECU  3,5  billion  of which 
IPSP  will  account  for  some  ECU  [ ...  } or a  {  ...  J 
market share. 
D.  THE NOTIFIED AGREEMENTS 
(a.a)  List of  agreements 
(36)  IPSP in its present form is  a result of a lengthy and 
complex  negotiation  by  and  between  its  current 
partners. This complexity is clearly reflected hy  the 
number of agreements included in  the  notification 
intended to cover the organization and financing of 
IPSP, the satellites, arrangements for IPSP  to obtain 
the  assistance  of  its  partners  and  others  m 
marketing and so on. They are the following: 
- Second  Amended  and  Restated  Agreement  of 
Limited  Partnership  (and  related  turthcr 
amendments),  which  sets  forth  the  ha~ic 
principles under which IPSP has  been  or~.mitcd 
and will  he  operating.  .  , 
Communications Satellitl' Capacity  Agrcl'llll'lll'o 
and  Contingent  Communications  Satellite 
Capacity  Agreements  concluded  between  IPSP 
and  each  of  the  limited  partners  (or  the 
affiliates thereof) through which the latter ha\·e 
entered  into  seven-year  commitments  for 
substantial capacity on the IPSP satellite system 
for their own internal needs but also for  resale 
to third  parties  through IPSP  and  inrendeJ  to 
ensure a  minimal use of the satellites' capacity, 
and  have  also  undertaken to  use  anJ  pay  for 
either  additional  contingent  capacity  or  make 
capital contributions in case a cash flow  deficit 
occurs.  The  letter  agreements  have  been 
concluded to respoml to requirements made for 
IPSP's  senior deht lenders. 
Agreement  of  Principles  settin!!,  forth  dw 
general  principles  under  which  IPSP  wall  offer 
J/151 No L 354/80  Official Journal of the  European Communities  31.  12.  94 
its  srrvires  to  cuslonwr'>,  im ludin~  also  the 
general  terms  upon  wluch  H  may  ohtain  the 
assistance  of  local  marketing  and  operating 
companies  as  representative  agents  or 
distributors of IPSP. 
- Amended  and  Restated  Preferred  Bidder 
Agreement  under  which  IPSP  will  give 
preference  to  partners  in  procuring  various 
products  and  services  to  the  extent  that such 
partners'  bids  for  the  products  are  at least  as 
favourable to IPSP  as  those of other bidders. 
- Service  Provision  and  Distribution  Agreement 
for  Italy  between  IPSP  and STET under which 
STET,  for  as  long  as  the  provision in  Italy  of 
international  business  tdcnmununications  is 
regulated so !hat, under Italian law, only STFT 
can  provide  them,  is  designated  the  exclusive 
distributor for  IPSP  in  Italy.  Once deregulation 
has occurred, and provided that STET complies 
with  certain  performance  criteria,  STET  will 
keep the exclusive  right to promote the sale of 
IPSP's services in  Italy. 
- First Refusal Agreement for Italy between IPSP 
and STET under which IPSP  will  give  STET a 
right of first  refusal  for  the  provision of bulk 
satellite  capacity  to  customers  in  Italy  for 
services  in  Italy.  This  agreement  will  become 
effective  if and when  the  provision  of satellite 
capacity in  Italy  becomes  liberalized. 
- Representative Agent Agreement for the Sale of 
Satellite  Capacity  in  eastern  Europe  between 
IPSP  and STET which sets  forth the terms and 
conditions  (induding  targets  to  lw  met  hy 
STET)  under  which  STET  i~  designated  the 
exclusive  agent  of  IPSP  for  the  sale  of  bulk 
satellite capacity in  'eastern Europe'. 
- Service  Provision  and  Representative  Agent 
Agreement  for  eastern  Europe  between  IPSP 
and STET under which  STET is  appointed the 
exclusive  and  representative  agent  of  IPSP  in 
'eastern  Europe'  for  the  provision  of services 
provided that STET complies with a number of 
performance  criteria  set  forth  in  the 
agreement. 
(b.b)  Details of the specific arrangements 
1  .  Provisions  concerning  the  management  and 
structure of IPSP 
(37)  The  agreements  contain,  in  particular,  the 
following provisions: 
(38)  - Under  Article  7.01 (a)  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement,  the  general  partner of 
IPSP  is  given  full,  exclusive  and  complete 
discretion  in  the  management,  operation  and 
(.'Ontrol  of  tlw  hu  .... iness  ami  afLurs  of  IPSP. 
Convcr:.dy,  linutnl  partnn~  .lll'  prol11hitcd 
from taking part in the day-to-day management 
of  IPSP  except  as  expressly  provided  in  the 
agreements  (Article  7.10  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement,  and  Article  2  of  the 
Agreement of Principles). This discretion of the 
general partner extends also to the setting up of 
IPSP  prices and other commercial conditions. 
(39)  - Notwithstanding  the  above,  limited  partners 
can  exert  a  certain  influence  on  the 
management  of  IPSP  through  a  permanent 
structure that is  created  and  composed  of the 
following committees: 
(a)  Parttwrs  Pl:tnntrlg  and  l'ol.cy  R(·vicw 
<:ommitret: 
Created  under  Article  7.11 (a)  of  the 
Limited  Partnership  Agreement,  this 
Committee  consists  of  one  member 
nominated  by  each  partner.  The  general 
partner is  to submit a number of actions to 
the  Committee,  which  has  the  right  to 
approve or disapprove them by a  majority 
vote.  Most important of those actions are: 
- the establishment of any  pricing policy 
with  respect  to  IPSP's  sale  of services 
which  is  intended  to  result  in  the  sale 
of  satellite  transmission  capacity  to 
customers generally at prices which are 
lower  than  those  charged  to  limited 
partners  or  the  sale  of  satellite 
transmissi;m  capacity  to  certain  IPSP 
partners  at  prires  or  terms  m.llcrially 
different  from  the  pri<.:es  and  terms 
offered  or  available  to  IPSP  partners 
generally, 
- the  decision  by  the  general  partner  to 
increase  the  budget  above  a  given 
percentage, 
- the approval of business  plans for  IPSP 
services  concerning  (  i)  I  PSP  resources, 
(ii)  additional  funding,  and  (iii)  the 
initiation  of IPSP  services  prior  to  the 
launch of the satellites. 
(b)  Technical  Committee  (Article  7.15  (b)  of 
the Limited Partnership Agreement). 
This  is  an  advisory  committee  on  all 
matters  relating  to  the  technology  and 
operation of the  IPSP  satellite  system  and 
transmission  networks.  In  particular,  and 
with  regard  to  IPSP  services,  it 
recommends  technical  standards  for  the 
equipment and operations. 
(c)  Under  Article  7.04  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement,  certain  major 
decisions by the general partner that would 
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have  a  significant  impact  on  the  limited 
partners'  investmants,  are  subject  to  a 
majority  vote  by  them.  They  include 
dissolution  of  IPSP,  its  merger  or 
consolidation with another entity, and the 
sale of a  material portion of IPSP's assets. 
(40)  - In  order  to  ensure  that  OrionSat  devotes  its 
full-time  efforts  to  the  management  of  IPSP, 
under Article  7.06  of the  Limited  Partnership 
Ag~eement,  the  general  partner  is  prevented 
from  engaging  in  any  business  other than the 
management  of  the  partnership  without  the 
prior written unanimous consent of the limited 
partners.  In  addition,  neither  OrionSat  nor 
Orion  Network Systems,  Inc  may  have  other 
business  interests  or  may  engage  in  other 
business  ventures  that  compete  directly  or 
indirectly with IPSP. 
Conversely, limited partners are free to compete 
with  IPSP  in  the  provision  of  services  to 
customers.  They  also  remain  free  to  acquire 
business  interests  or engage  in  other  business 
ventures  with  competitors  of IPSP  or  limited 
partners  thereof  (Article  7.06  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement  and  Article  7  of  the 
Agreement of Principles. 
2.  Most favoured provisions 
(41)  The  agreements  contain  a  number  of prov1s1ons 
referred  to as 'most favoured  nation' under which 
IPSP  warrants  that  limited  partners  will  get  the 
best prices, terms and other conditions that lPSP  is 
offering  to  each  of  its  customers  for  similar 
capacity  and/or  ~crvices.  Such  provisions  arc 
included  in  Article  16.02  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement  and  also  in  Articles  16.01 
of the  various  Capacity Agreements,  21.01  of the 
various  Contingent  Capacity  Agreements,  and  in 
Articles 4.5  and  15.1  of the  Service  Provision and 
Distribution  Agreement  for  Italy,  3.5  of  the 
Capacity  Sale  Agreement  for  eastern  Europe  and 
4.4 and 15.11  of the Service  Provision Agreement 
for eastern Europe. 
These  provisions  in  turn  give  IPSP  comparable 
protection as  to services  and equipment it obtains 
from partners in order to enable it to function at a 
competitive  cost  level.  This  protection,  however, 
does  not apply in  the case  of contracts between a 
limited partner and lntelsat, Eutelsat, Inmarsat and 
domestic satellite systems. 
3.  Sales of satellite capacity at prices below those 
paid by limited partners 
(42)  Under  Articles  16.01  (h)  of  the  Capacity 
Agreements  and  21.01  (b)  of  the  Contingent 
Capacity Agreements, if IPSP  wants to sell or lease 
satellite capacity to third party customers at a  pro 
rata  price  per MHz per  month that is  below the 
one  that  limited  partners  have  agreed  to  pay  to 
IPSP  under  the  abovementined  agreements,  then 
IPSP  must  offer  them  the  same  amount  of 
additional  transponder  capacity  being  offered  to 
customers  at  the  same  price  but  with  a  10 % 
discount  and  on  the  saine  other  terms  and 
conditions. 
4.  Use  by IPSP of satellite capacity contracted by 
limited partners 
(43)  Under Article 8 of the Agreement of Principles, and 
as long as IPSP is generating sufficient positive c..:ash 
flow  to cover senior debt service,  IPSP  undertakes 
to make usc first of capacity which limited partners 
have contracted on a firm  c..:ommitml'llt basis- i.e. 
under their  respective c..:apacity  agreements - and 
which  they  are  unable  to  use  for  their  internal 
needs. 
5.  Calls  for tenders by  IPSP 
(44)  Under  Article  2  of  the  Preferred  Bidders 
Agreement,  when  IPSP  calls  for  tenders  worth 
more than US  $  1 million, if one or more limited 
partners supplies a  bid which is  no less  favourable 
to IPSP  than third party proposals with  regard  to 
price,  design,  performance,  payment,  delivery 
schedule  and  other  terms  and  conditions,  then, 
subject to a  possible 'best and final'  round of bids, 
IPSP  is  to  award  the  contract  to  the  limited 
partner(s) whose bid(s) achieve those criteria, terms 
and conditions. 
6.  Marketing and distribution conditions 
(a)  General 
(45)  The  marketing  and  distribution  of  IPSP  services 
will  be  centrally  planned  and  managed  but 
'implemented  in  a  decentralized  manner.  In 
addition, services will be offered at a uniform price 
and quality level. 
(46)  These  principles  are  implemented  through  the 
following specific arrangements: 
- IPSP  has  sole  and  exclusive  control  and 
operation of the  satellite  system  (Articles  7.01 
and 7.10 of the Limited Partnership Agreement, 
8.01  of the Capacity Agreements and  13.01 of 
the Contingent Capacity Agreements), 
- the marketing and .distribution of international 
business  telecommunications  servic..:cs  arc  the 
responsibility  of the  general  partner  (Arttdc  2 
of the  Agreement of Principles),  who will  also 
establish  all  prices  for  IPSP  services  (except 
where prohibited by  law, given exclusive  rights 
granted  to the TO  in  certain  countries  to  do 
so).  In  addition  sale<;  of  scrviL·es  will  be 
centrally  managed  by  the  general  partner  hut 
primarily  undertaken  by  representative  agent~ 
chosen  by  the  general  partner (and that could 
include  limited  partners).  In  contracting  with 
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agents or distributors, the general partner is  to 
obtain competitive prices, terms and conditions 
and provide performance criteria and goals for 
such  agents.  Finally, contracts will  he  made in 
the name of IPSP, 
- Attachment  A  of the  Agreement  of Principles 
provides  that  where  IPSP  services  are  to  be 
provided  in  a  territory  where  exclusive  or 
special  rights exist relating to the provision of 
such services, the IPSP services will be provided 
to  the  customer  under  a  separate  contract, 
drawn  up  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
applicable  in  that  territory  and  concluded 
between the customer and IPSP's  agent, that in 
such cases will  normally  he  the  national TO. 
(b)  Specific  arrangements with  regard to STET 
(b.l) Regarding  the  Ita I ian. terri tory 
(  4  7)  Under  Article  2  of  the  Service  Provision  and 
Distribution  Agreement  for  Italy,  STET  is 
appointed  as  IPSP's  exclusive  distributor  in  Italy 
for  as  long  as  the  Italian  telecommunications 
market is  regulated (1). 
If the  Italian  territory  becomes  deregulated,  the 
exclusive  right of STET  will  be  converted  into an 
exclusive  right  to  promote  the  sale  of  IPSP's 
services in  Italy. This right will  be  dependent upon 
STET's  compliance  with  certain  performance 
criteria  expressed  in  terms  of revenue  targets.  In 
case  STET  fails  and  docs  not take  all  reasonably 
necessary  steps  to  remedy  such  failure  within  a 
period of  18  months, then  IPSP  is  to be  permitted 
to appoint other distributors in  the Italian territory 
on a  non-exclusive basis.  However, STET will  still 
be  a  non-exclusive distributor. 
Conversely, STET undertakes not to promote IPSP 
services  outside  the  Italian  territory  with  the 
exception  of  the  'eastern  European'  territory (2) 
(Article 2.3. of the Service  Provisions Agreement). 
In  spite  of such  exclusivity,  if  IPSP  or one of its 
agents,  distributors  or  partners  after  the  Italian 
territory  has  been  deregulated,  is  requested  to 
provide services in Italy, they can do so. 
Once deregulation is  in  place, if a customer located 
in  Italy  wants  to  purchase  from  IPSP  a 
comprehensive  package  of  international  business 
telecommunications services, also including ground 
operations services with respect to its Italian sitc(s), 
( 1)  For  the  meaning  in  the  text  of  the  words  'regulated'  or 
'deregulated' as regards Italy,  see  recital  (36), fifth  indent. 
(1)  However,  this  provision  does  not  prevent  STET  from 
engaging in  passive sales  outside Italy. 
then IPSP  will  in  principle subcontract with STET 
for  the  purpose  of  providing  ground  operations 
services  in  Italy.  However, the final  decision  as  to 
the usc  of STET's r,round opnario11  scrvil  e~ lies  in 
the hands of customl'rs; so that, 1t  lor  co~t or other 
reasons,  customers  prefer  to  obtain  tlw  ground 
operations  services  elsewhere,  then  IPSP  would 
provide the package of services without the ground 
operations services. 
(48)  In addition, under the First Refusal  Agreement for 
Italy,  when  the  provision  of satellite  capacity  in 
Italy becomes liberalized, IPSP  is  to give  STET the 
opportunity,  during  a  60-day  period,  to  provide 
the bulk satellite capacity requested  hy  a customer 
located  only  in  the  Italian  territory  or,  if  the 
customer prefers to acquire the capacity from  IPSP, 
to provide such capacity to IPSP on the same terms 
and conditions  agreed  with  the  customer.  In  ;my 
case,  the  capacity  referred  to  1s  1  he  c1 p;Kity 
committed  by  STET  and  the  lPSP's  satellites.  The 
purpose of this provision is  to give  STET a certain 
priority in  discharging the  risks  it  has assumed  in 
undertaking such commitment. However, the price 
and terms of the lease  or sale  of satellite capacity 
to  customers,  and  also  to  Italian  customers,  arc 
determined by  IPSP. 
(49)  Finally,  under  Article  .1.3  of the  Service  Provision 
and  Distribution  Agreement  for  Italy,  IPSP 
undertakes  to  forward  to  STET  inquiries  from 
prospective  customers  who  wish  to  receive 
telecommunications  services  within  the  Italian 
territory and not extending beyond  it. 
(b.2)  Regarding  the  countries  collectively 
referred  to  as  'eastern  Europe' 
(50)  The  two  relevant  agreements  arc  very  similar  to 
those regarding Italy except that in  the present case 
STET  is  being  appointed  IPSP's  exclusive 
representative  agent  for  the  purpose  of  offering 
IPSP's bulk satellite capacity and services. 
(51)  According  to that exclusivity,  and  for  as  long  as 
the countries concerned are  regulated  (and  during 
the  first  year  following  their  deregulation),  IPSP 
and the limited partners undertake not to promote 
the sale of either bulk satellite capacity (1)  obtained 
from  IPSP  or satellite telecommunications services 
offered  on  other  satellite  systems  and  satelite 
telecommunication  services  provided  by  IPSP  or 
that are reasonably equivalent to the  IPSP  scrvi,es 
promoted by  STET. 
( 1)  This  agreement  applies  only  to  customer~  loc.lft·J  111  the 
eastern  European  territory,  and  not  to  customer~  located 
elsewhere  who  require  capacity  for  a  number  of sitl's,  also 
including  one  or  more  sites  in  the  ea~tern  European 
territory. 
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('7)  However,  IPSP  l·an  ~ell  hulk  capacity  111  tht· 
countries  uukpcndl·ntly  from  STFT  and  linutcJ 
partners  are  free  at  any  time  to  market  satellite 
capacity  obtained  from  other  satellite  systems, 
international business  telecommunications services 
provided  using  capacity  on  the  IPSP's  satellites, 
provided  that  the  services  ·are  not  reasonably 
equivalent  to  the  IPSP's  services  marketed  by 
STET.  Furthermore,  following  one  year  after 
deregulation  in  the  countries  concerned,  limited 
partners  will  be  allowed  to  offer  additional  bulk 
satellite  capacity  obtained  from  IPSP  and/or 
services  that are equivalent  to  those  marketed  by 
STET, provided  nonetheless  that no logo or trade 
name belonging to IPSP  i'i  used. 
Finally,  any  third  pcr'><>ll  or  entity  having 
purchased  satellite  cap.wty  from  IPSP  would  be 
free  at any time to sell  the capacity or any satellite 
telecommunication sernces, provided that no logo 
or trade name belonging to IPSP  is  used. 
(53)  STET's exclusive  nghts  under the two agreements 
will  continue  for  as  long  as  it  meets  certain 
performance criteria defined in  the agreements. 
7.  No third-party observations 
(54)  Following the two publications pursuant to Article 
19  (3)  of  Regulation  :--Jo  17  made  to  cover 
Article  85  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  of the 
EEA  Agreement  respectively,  no  comments  were 
received  frmn  third  parrie'>. 
(55) 
II.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
A.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLES  85  (1)  OF THE EC 
TREATY AND 53  (1) OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
TO II'SP 
On  the  basis  of  arguments  developed  below, 
partners of IPSP  are not to be considered as actual 
or potential competitors in  the relevant markets to 
be addressed by IPSP. 
(a)  In  order  for  IPSP  to  enter  the  market  as  a 
facilities-based  pro,·ider, it has been necessary 
to  obtain  a  number  of  authorizations  and 
licences,  and  to  arrange  for  the  financing, 
construction,  launch  and  operation  of  two 
satellites.  In  this  re<;pect,  it  is  considered  that 
none of the  partners  is  in  a  position  to  meet 
all  of  those  requirements  alone  but  only 
through  cooperation  in  a  venture  like  the 
present one. In  this  respect, 
- only  IPSP's  general  partner,  OrionSat, has 
the  necessary  authorizations  and  licences 
from  the  FCC and  lntrlsat  to  latu11·h  and 
operate the  sat<•llltt'!..  Moii'OVI'I,  th<"  lt"l'lll'> 
of  the  fCC  licence  prevent  the  general 
partner  from  releasing  control  over  it 
without  prior  FCC  approval  and  define 
very clearly the  kind  of services  that IPSP 
would  be  allowed  to  provide  (sec 
recital (12)), 
- none  of  the  IPSP  partners  holds  the 
necessary  authorizations  and  licences  to 
provide  international  telecommunications 
services  in  all  the  countries  inside  the 
footprint of the satellites.  Only STET and 
Kingston  (apart from OrionSat  itself)  hold 
any  licence  to  offer  telecommunication~ 
services  but  STET  is  limited  to  Italy,  and 
Kingston  to  the  town  of  Hull  and  the 
surrounding  area.  As  regards  the  other 
limited  partners,  th~y  (or  their  ultimate 
parent companies) are industrial companies 
active  in  different  segments  of  the 
aerospace  market  and  have  neither  the 
licences  nor  the  experience  required  in 
providing communication services to other 
companies  on  a  competitive  basis 
(although  some  of  them  have  gathered 
some  experience  by  managing  their  own 
internal networks). 
(b)  None of the IPSP partners could reasonably be 
expected to make the investment, and assume 
the substantial risk associated with it,  reqtmed 
to enter the market. The very  high  harriers to 
entry, the substantial amount of market power 
in  the  hands  of  the  incumbent  TOs  in  the 
overall  telecommunications  market  and  of 
ISOs  in  the  satellite  transmi~~ion market,  the 
advanced  technologies  involved,  the 
substantial  inherent  risk  of failure  associated 
with  space  operations  and  the  broad 
geographic  area  covered,  together  with  the 
amounts required and the bargaining power of 
customers  (in  particuhu the  big  multinational 
corporations), make this venture very  risky.  In 
view  of  the  above,  it  is  not  realistic  to 
consider,  from  an  economic  point  of  view, 
that  any  of  the  partners  would  enter  the 
market alone. 
(c)  In  addition,  as  regards  marketing  and 
distribution,  the  principle  of  uniform  prices 
and  other  conditions  in  different  tcrritorrcs, 
together  with  the  Implementation  of  such 
marketing  in  a  decentralized  manner,  seems 
appropriate to fulfil  the needs  for world-wide 
telecommunications  services,  on  a  one-stop-
shopping  and  billing  basis,  of  customers 
having  branches  or  subsidiaries  dispersed  in 
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The  proviSion  of  such  services  is  not 
adequately guaranteed by the existing bilateral 
arrangements between TOs, under which each 
one provides its  own facilities  within  its  own 
country.  This  means  that  each  national  TO 
prices  its  portion  of the  network  separately, 
contracts  with  the  customer  sepcrately,  and 
hills  it  separately, for  a  set  of services  that is 
often  not  uniform  in  all  territories  involved 
given  the  different  technical  features  of each 
network involved.  In  this respect, the result of 
a combined network so created is  as strong as 
its weakest link and so, the number of services 
and  the  features  thereof  arc  those  supported 
by  the  less  performam  national  network 
involved. In addition, operational matters such 
as  monitoring  quality,  correcting  faults  and 
providing customer service are also  performed 
separately. 
National TOs are becoming increasingly aware 
of  the  importance  of  the  market  for 
international business telecommunications and 
of  the  inconveniences  resulting  from  the 
situation  described.  As  indicated,  they  are 
trying to overcome them by  forming consortia 
with other TOs to offer such services  (and, in 
most cases, to do other things).  Some of them 
have  already  been  notified  to  the 
Commission. 
(56)  The  creation  and  implementation  of  IPSP,  by 
introducing a new competitor, may  be  expected to 
increase  the  level  of competition in  a  fast-growing 
segment of the overall telecommunications market, 
until  very  recently  reversed  to  companies  holding 
exclusive  rights. This would  help  to accelerate the 
pace at which new and uniform services are offered 
to  customers  and  to  improve  their  price  and 
performance. 
(57)  The  impact  in  the  market  for  bulk  satellite 
transmission capacity is  expected  to be  positive as 
well  as  quite  imporant,  in  particular,  because  the 
creation of IPSP  means creating an alternative, and 
private,  supplier of space  segment capacity  to the 
incumbent  and  very  strong  ISOs  and  to  national 
systems  controlled  by  national  TOs.  Thus,  IPSP 
would  mean  increasing  the  choice  available  to 
service  providers  demanding  space  segment 
capacity. 
(58)  In  conclusion, the implementation of IPSP,  one of 
the  first  private  ventures  to  enter  the  evolving 
telecommunications market, falls  outside the scope 
of  both  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and 
Article 53  (  1) of the  EEA  Agreement. 
B.  APPLICATION  OF  ARTICLE  85  OF  TilE  EC 
TREATY AND  ARTICLE  53  OF THE EEA 
AGREEMENT TO CONTRAC11JAL 
PROVISIONS 
(59)  The  following  prov1s1ons  fall  outside  both 
Article  85  (1) of the  EC Treaty and  53  (1)  of the 
EEA  Agreement: 
- the  fact.  that  STET  is  nominated  exclusive 
distributor of IPSP's  services  in  Italy  while  the 
Italian  market  is  regulated.  This  provision 
merely  reflects  the  fact  that  under  italian  law 
STET still enjoys exclusive rights m some ot the 
areas  to  be  addressed  by  IPSP.  Even  in  the 
absence  of  the  agreement,  no  other  company 
would  have  been  able  to  distribute  IPSP's 
services in Italy, 
- provisions concerning the nomination of STET 
as  exclusive  representative  agent  in  'eastern 
Europe'  apart  from  Austria.  As  the  countries 
concerned  are  outside  the  EC  and  the  EEA, 
these  prov1s1ons  do  not  produce  any 
appreciable effect in  the EEA. 
(60)  The  following  prov1s1ons  are  to  be  con~idcrcd  a~ 
non-appreciable restrictions of competition: 
- As  regards the agreements relating to the Italian 
territory, the exclusive right to promote the sale 
of IPSP's services in Italy granted to STET after 
deregulation has occurred is  not an appreciable 
restriction of competition because: 
(a)  IPSP's  services  are  bv  definition 
international, so that Italian ~ustomers can 
sign  a  contract for  the  same  services  with 
agents  or distributors  not  located  in  Italy 
through  their  subsidiaries  or  facilities 
outside Italy, 
(b)  potential  customers  of  IPSP  will  be  big 
corporations  often  having  facilities  in 
several countries, 
(c)  as  the  only  exclusivity  remammg  after 
liberalization  will  be  the  exclu~ivity  to 
promote the  sale  of the  IPSP's  services  in 
Italy,  IPSP's  agents  and  distributors  other 
than STET  will  be  free  to  sell  the  IPSP's 
services  in  Italy, 
(d)  STET  is  not  prevented  from  dealing  w_ith 
competitors of IPSP,  and 
(c)  most importantly, IPSP  is  expected  ro  have 
a  market  share  below  5%  of  the  two 
markets concerned. 
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(61) 
- As  regards  the  agreements  relating  to  the 
Austrian  territory,  the  above  reasoning 
concerning the Italian territory is  also valid.  In 
a~dition, the exclusive rights that STET has, as 
agent  for  IPSP,  are  more  limited  than  those 
STET has as  regards  Italy  (see  recitals  51,  52 
and  53),  given  that  IPSP  can  address  itself 
directly to customers and that limited  partners 
can  market capacity  and/or  services  obtained 
from  other· satellite  systems  and  even  services 
'making use  of satellite capacity obtained from 
IPSP. 
For  the  following  reasons,  the  provisions  detailed 
below,  while  putting  restraints  on  the  partners' 
freedom  of action,  are  concluded  to  be  directly 
related  and  necessary  to IPSP,  and do not exceed 
what the creation and operation of IPSP  requires. 
Consequently  they  are  to  be  treated,  under  the 
competition rules of the EC Treaty and of the EEA 
Agreement, as ancillary restraints. 
(a)  The  non-competition  provision  is  ancillary 
because  it  refers  only  to  the  general  partner 
and  is  a  locigal  consequence  of  the  sole 
responsibility  granted  to  it.  The  provision  is 
aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  general  partner 
devotes  itself  to  the  management  of  IPSP's 
business  on  a  full-time  basis.  As  for  limited 
partners, as  indicated  above,  they  are  free  to 
compete with IPSP. 
(b)  The  'most  favoured  nation'  prov1s1ons  are 
ancillary  because  they  are  intended  to  ensure 
that  IPSP  treats  each  limited  partner,  which 
will  normally also  be  a  customer of IPSP,  on 
an equal basis - but not on more favourable 
terms - as regards the other limited  partners 
and, in particular, third party customers, with 
no investment made in IPSP. 
(c)  The preference to be  given  to limited  partners 
in  respect of certain calls for tenders issued by 
IPSP,  under  the  Preferred  Bidder  Agreement, 
can  also  be  considered  ancillary  on  the  basis 
that  a  certain.  preference  towards  limited 
partners  seems  natural,  in  exchange  for  the 
substantial  amounts  of  money  they  have 
invested  in  the  venture,  and considering  that 
most of them are themselves active in different 
segments of the aerospace market, and so are 
manufacturers of equipment of the same kind 
as  that  required  by  IPSP.  It  has  also  to  be 
noted that the provision, as  it reads,  does  not 
give  limited  partners  any  advantages  as  to 
price or other ·terms  and so it is  not expected 
to produce any  appreciable  foreclosure  effect 
affecting  the  competitive  position  of  third 
parties.  In  any  event,  and  given  both  the 
structure  of  the  relevant  markets  and  in 
particular the presence of powerful incumbent 
companies,  any  abusive  interpretation  of this 
provision seems  to  be  excluded  if  the  venture 
is  to  succeed  in  gammg  a  presence  in  the 
markets it will address. 
(62)  Ancillary restraints are to be assessed together with 
the company created.  In this  respect,  as  IPSP  has 
been  concluded  not  to  fall  within  the  scope  of 
Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  of 
Article 53  (1) of the EEA  Agreement,  then neither 
, do the provisions detailed above, 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS  DEC.:::ISION: 
Article  1 
On  th~  basis  of  the  facts  in  its  possession,  the 
Commission  has  no  grounds  for  action  under 
Article 85  (1)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  in  respect  of  the  notified  agreements 
relating  to  the  creation  of  the  International  Private 
Satellite Partners company (IPSP). 
Article 2 
On  the  basis  of  the  facts  in  its  possession,  the 
Commission  has  no  grounds  for  action  under 
Article 85  (  1)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53 J  I)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  in  respect  of  the  non-competition 
obligation  on  the  general  partner  under  Artide i06 of 
the  Limited  Partnership  Agreement,  the  'most  favoured 
nation'  provisions  under  Article  16.02  of  the  Limited 
Partnership  Agreement,  under  Article  16.01  of  each 
Capacity  Agreement,  under  Article  21.01  of  each 
Contingent Capacity Agreement,  under  Articles  4.S  ,1nd 
15.1 of the Service Provision and Distribution Agreement 
for  ftaly,  under  Article  3.5  of  the  Capacity  Sale 
Agreement for Eastern Europe and under Articles 4.4 and 
15.11  of  the  Service  Provision  Agreement  for  Eastern 
Europe, and in  respect of the  preference  to  be  given  to 
limited  partners  under Article  2  of the  Preferred  Bidder 
Agreement,  the  appointment  of  STET  as  exdu~iYc 
distributor of IPSP  in Italy under Article  2 of the  Service 
Provision  and  Distribution  Agreement  for  Italy  and  the 
appointment of STET as exclusive representative agent of 
IPSP  urider  Articles  2  of  the  Representative  Agent 
Agreement  for  the  Sale  of Satellite  Capacity  in  Eastern 
Europe  and of the  Service  Provision and  Representative 
Agent Agreement for Eastern Europe. 
Article 3 
This Decision  is  addressed to: 
International Private Satellite  Partners, L.P., 
2440 Research Boulevard, Suite 400 
Rockville, Maryland 20850 
USA 
Orion Satellite Corporation 
2440 Research Boulevard, Suite 400 
Rockville, Maryland 20850 
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British  Aerospace Communications Inc., 
Suite 500, 13873 Park Center Road 
Herndon, Virginia 22071 
USA 
COM DEV  Satellite Communications Ltd 
155  Sheldon Drive 
Cambridge, Ontario NlR 7H6 
Canada 
Kingston  Commti~ications International Limited 
Telephone House, 
Carr Lane 
GB-Hull HUt 3RE 
MCN SAT  U.S.,  Inc., 
c/o Matra Aerospace, Inc., 
1735 Jefferson Davis  Highway 
Suite  810 
Arlington, Virginia 
USA 
Orion Network Systems 
2440  Resea~ch Boulevard, Suite 400 
Rockville, Maryland 20850 
USA 
STET- Societa  Finanziaria Telefonica per Azioni 
Corso d'Italia 41 
I-00198  Rome 
Trans-Atlantic Satellite, Inc., 
do Nissho Iwai American Corporation 
1211 A  venue of the Americas 
New York, N.Y.  10036 
USA 
General Dynamics Commercial Launch Services,  Inc., 
9444 Balboa Avenue 
San Diego, California 92123 
USA. 
Done at Brussels,  15 December 1994 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the Commission 
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Notice  punaaat  10  Article  tt  (J)  of  Council  Rcplaboa  No  17 (')  coaccraiaa  Cue 
No IV  /.U.J61 - lafoaet 
(92/C 7/03) 
lat.roduc:tioa 
1.  On 20  Aupst 1990,  lnfonet Services  Corporation 
('lnfont-t')  submitted  for  negative  clearance  or  alter-
natively  c xempcion,  asreemenu  relating  to  the  orsan-
ization of lnfonet and  the  relationship between lnfonet 
and iu sh areholden in  relation to the supply by lnfonet 
of telecommunications services in many countries around 
the world including all Member States. lnfonet is owned 
by fwe  telecommunications organizations (70s') (') of 
the Community (the 'Community TOs') as well as public 
and  priv:ne  telecommunications  operators  from  ouuide 
the Community. 
A.  The  Parties 
2.  From  1969, lnfonet operated as  a  business unit of 
Computer  Sciences  Corporation  ('CSC'),  a  US 
corporation  primarily engaged in  the computer services 
business. In  1988 it was incorporated as  a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of esc. esc subsequendy and gradually sold 
all iu shares in lnfonet which specializes in telecommuni-
cations  ~rvices. The current shareholders of lnfonet and 
their respc'-"tive  shareholdings are as follows: 
(I) The following Community TOs: 
- Tr;>nspac,  a  wholly-owned  subsidiary  of France 
Telecom, the public telecommunications operator 
in  France, with 16,17 %, 
- Deuuche  Bundespon Telekom,  the  public  tele-
communications  operator  in  Germany,  with 
16,17%, 
- Teldonica  International  Holding  BV,  a 
subsidiary of Telefonica, the public telecommuni-
cation, operator in Spain with 5,38 %, 
- R~gie des Ttltgraphes et Ttltphones, the public 
tdc..:ommunications  operator  in  Belgium,  with 
5,3!1 %, 
(') OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(')  As  defined Article  I of Commission  Directive 90/388/EEC 
of 28 June  1990 on competition in  the markeu for  telecom~ 
muniatjons servius (OJ No L 192,24. 7.  1990, p.  10). 
- P1T Telecom  BV,  a  subsidiary  of Koninklijke 
PIT Nederland  NV,  the  public  telecommuni-
cations operator in the Netherlands with 5,38 %, 
(2)  The following non-Community TOs: 
- MCI  Telecommunications  Corporation,  a  US 
corporation  ('MCI'); with  25% of the  shares, 
MCI  is  the largest shareholder of InfoneL  MCI 
is  a  recognized  private  operating  agency 
('RPOA') (')  and  is  the  second  largest  long-
distance telecommunications company in the US, 
- Telecom Australia, the Australian public telecom-
munications operator, wiih 5,38 %, 
- Singapore  Telecom  International  PTE,  the 
Singapore  public  telecommunications  operator, 
with 5,38 %, 
- Swedish  Telecom  International,  a  company 
under the control of the Swedish public  telecom~ 
'  munications operator, with 5,38 %, 
- Swiss  Pli,  the  public  telecommunications 
operator in Switzerland, with 5,38 %, 
- Kokusai  Denshin  Denwa Co. Ltd,  an  RPOA  in 
Japan, with S %. 
3.  Infonet  has  operations  located  in  42  countries 
including  subsidiaries  in  Belgium,  in  charge  of  coordi~ 
nating  European  activities,  Germany  and  the  UK. 
Infonet also has a 20 % shareholding in  lnterpac SA,  a 
subsidiary  of  Transpac  and  France  Cable  and  Radio 
(iuelf a  subsidiary of France Telecom)  set  up  with  the 
purpose of marketing  ~nd supporting Jnfonet services  in 
France  and  a  S%  shareholding  in  lnterpac  Belgium 
SA/NV, a  subsidiary  of the  R~gie des  T~ltgraphes et 
T~l~phones set  up  to accomplish  the  same  functions  in 
Belgium.  In  its  fiscal  year  1990  (I  April  1989  to 
31  March  1990),  Infonet  had  a  worldwide  turnover of 
US  $ ... million and a Community turnover of US  S ... 
million. 
(')  As  defined  in  Annex  I  to  the  Constitution  of the  Inter-
national  Telecommunicatit'ns  Union,  final  acts  of  the 
Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice 1989. 
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B.  The  scnim 
4.  lnfonet offers global  value-added  network  services 
(commonly  known  u  'VANS') on  a one-stop shopping 
basis (which means that a customer has  1  single point of 
contact  with  a  supplier  of  an  international  service 
notably  for  ordering  and  billing  reasons,  instead  of 
contactS  with  multiple  suppliers  in  the  various countries 
involved).  Those  services  include  data  communications 
services  such  u  netWork  services  based  on  X-2S  and 
other  protocols,  X.400  services,  electronic  mail,  elec-
tronic  data  interchange  ('EDI], store  and  forward  fax 
and  telex services  and videotex  services.  It also  includes 
voice  communications  services  such  as  in  private 
netWorks.  lnfonet also  provides  computer services  such 
u  computer timesharing. 
S.  lnfonet operates  iu data  communications  services, 
which  :ue the largest pan of its business, on the basis of 
an  international  packet-switched  network,  constructed 
with  lines  leased  from  the  TOs  and  other  operators 
throughout the  world  and  nodes  belonging  to  lnfonct. 
Amongst  such  TOs  and  operators  are  iu shareholders 
listed  in  paragraph  3  above  which  have  exclusive  or 
special  righu  for  the  leasing  of lines  to  telecommuni-
cations  services suppliers  like  lnfonet. 
6.  The major suppliers of global value-added network 
services  having  1  significant presence  in  the Community 
include  AT & T, which  acquired  lstel  in  1989,  a  UK 
systems  integrator and  network services  provider;  EDS; 
Genera I Electric lnfonnation Services which has alliances 
with  British  International  Computers  of  the  UK  and 
STET of Italy; IBM; Sprint; and Tymnct now owned by 
British  T  clecommunications.  AJ  demonstrated  by  the 
presence of those suppliers in the Community, the VANS 
markets  :.re  becoming  more  and  more  competitive,  in 
large part as a result of the Community policy of liberali-
zation  and  hannonization  of  the  telecommunications 
markcu.  Although  no  reliable  statistics  for  the  market 
share of Infonet or its compct;tors have been provided by 
the  parties,  it  seems  that  with  its  US  $  . . .  million 
turnover in, the EC in  1990, lnfonet currently has a small 
market  share  in  the  Community. 
C.  The  Apeemcats as  orisioaUy aotifaed 
7.  The  notification  included  six  documents  (herein 
described  as  the •Agreements'); 
( 1)  the  By-laws  of lnfonet amended  and  restated  as  of 
17 January 1990; 
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(2)  a Stockholders Agreement of 6 September  1988  and 
five  amendmenu  thereto.  The  Stockholders 
Aareement  notably  deals  with  the  panicipation  of 
the shareholders  in  the  management  of lnfonet  and 
the  distribution  of  Infonet  services  by  the  share-
holden. Concerning the management of lnfonet, it is 
provided  that  Infonet  is  managed  by  and  under  a 
Board  of  Directors  consisting  of  12  directors. 
Concerning the distribution  of Infonet  services,  it  is 
provided  that each  shareholder will  establish  a local 
Organization  for  the  marketing  and  suppon  of 
lnfonet  data  transmission  services  in  its  home 
country. Shareholders  remain  free  to commercialize 
other  competing  services.  It  is  also  provided  that 
each  shareholder  will  utilize  lnfonet  on  a 
non-exclusive  basis  in  order  to  supply  end-to-end 
international  data  transmission  services  to  iu 
customers.  Distribution  arranr.cments  in  other 
countries are described in paragraph  8 below.  Finally 
the  Stockholders  Agreement  gives  a  right  of  first 
refusal  to  each  shareholder  in  case  of  any  sale, 
pledge,  transfer  or  assignment  by  another  shut-
holder of any of the outstanding capit:al  in  lnfonet; 
(3)  the  Intercompany  Agreement  of  I  April  1988 
between CSC and Infonct, had the purpose of f:acili-
tating  CSCs  sale  of  the  shares  in  Infonu  in 
connection  with  CSC's  exit  from  the  public  data 
transmission  market.  In  this  context,  the  Inter-
company  Agreement  contains  a  covenant  not  to 
compete whereby esc undertakes not to develop or 
offer anywhere in  the world, without Infonct's prior 
consent, public data transmission  services  in  compe-
tition with  lnfonet during  five  years  and, during  the 
following two yean, ,not offer anywhere in the world 
any such  network that utilizes protocols and  services 
whi.:"  are  the  same  as  those  utilized  by  Infonct's 
network; 
(4)  under  the  Master  Marketing  and  Te:aming 
Agreement  of 6 September  1988  between  CSC  and 
lnfonct,  the  Parties  agree  to  cooper:ate  for  the 
marketing  and  the  provision  of  complement:ary 
services  which  each  provides,  prim:uily  in  the  US. 
The  Parties  agreed  that CSC  shall  consider  lnfonet 
as  iu preferred  provider  so  long  as  its  prices  and 
services  are  competitive  and  th:at  e:ach  Party  shall 
attempt  to  include  the  other  Party,  so  long  as  its 
prices  and  services  arc  competitive,  as  a  subcon-
tr~ctor on  all  new  business  opportunitir.s  involving 
services  of  the  type  offered  by  such  other  P:arty. 
Finally,  it  is  provided  that  wherever  :and  whenever 
possible,  the  Panics  shall  conduct  joint  m:arketing 
activities. This Agreement is now largdy in disuse; 
(S)  the  Services  Agreement  of  6  September  1988 
between  Infonet  and  CSC  is  a  tr:ansition:al 
agreement,  whereby esc agreed  to  provide  cenain 
services  (such  :u  the  provision  of  warehousing 
facilities  and  administrative  assistance)  in  order  to 
assist  Infonet  to  1\ct  as  a  scp:aratc  independent 
company. The Agreement is  now l:argely in d:suse; • 
'  .. , 
'~ 
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(6)  the  Marketing Agreement between lnfonet and  MCI 
was  entered  into  on  16  January  1990  when  MCI 
~came  ll •hareholder of lnfonet. The purpose of the 
Agreement is cooperation between  lnfonet and MCI 
for the markctins of the provision of complementary 
services  which each  provides.  Under the Agreement, 
MCr  agrees  to  endeavour  to  usc  lnfonet  as  the 
primary underlying  carrier of packet switch  services 
for  its  customen  and  as  a  preferred  third  pany 
provider of end-user solutions  which  can be offered 
by  Infonet.  MCI  also  agrees  generally  to  promote 
lnfonct services. The panics undertake to determine 
what  MCI  services  may  best  be  licensed  to &nfonet 
for  sale  to iu cuStomen.  lnfonet agrees  to consider 
MCI as iu preferred third pany provider of tclccom· 
munications solutions of which  MCI has capabilities. 
However,  each  Party  will  continue  to  market  its 
services  itself.  Finally MCI  agrees  to refrain  while  it 
is  a  shareholder  of  lnfonct  from  offering  to 
end-uscn  public  packet  switch  services  competing 
with those offered by lnfonct. 
D.  Funher iaformatioa oa lnfonet 
8.  The  notification contains  funhcr information  more 
panicularly  on  (I)  the  usc  by  lnfonct  of  facilities 
provided by the Community TOs and (2) the distribution 
of lnfonet services. 
(I) The usc of Community TOs' facilities 
lnf0net's data  transmission  services  arc  provided  on 
a  network  composed  of  nodes  installed  in  the 
countries  where  lnfonet  services  are  offered,  which 
connect lines  leased  from  the TOs around  the world 
including  the  TOs  and  operators  which  are  share-
holders of lnfonet. In the Community, Infonet leases 
line'  from Transpac, Deuuchc Bundespost Telekom, 
Tdrfonica, the  R~gie des Ttltgraphes et Ttltphoncs 
and  JYIT Telecom.  Infonet  also  uses  satellite  trans-
mis~ion provided by the TOs. 
(2)  Distribution of lnfonct services 
lnfonet  has  non-exclusive  distribution  arrangerr.ents 
in  many  countries  including  the  12  Member  States 
under which distributors arc granted the  right to sell 
lnfonet  services  within  their  territory  (and  arc  not 
prevented  from  selling  the  services  outside  their 
territory)  and  have  the  primary  responsibility  to do 
so  in  relation  to  multinational  customers  based  in 
their  territory.  As  indicated  under  paragraph  7,  the 
shareholders  act  as  distributor  in  their  home 
countries.  In  other  countries,  similar  distribution 
arrangements have been made with third parties. 
E.  ~~~~  pea ~  the  Commissioa  foUowias  its 
JDte"caaoa 
9.  The  Agreements  as  notified  presented  some 
pro_blcms  fro~ the  point  of view  of competition  policy 
wh1ch  stood  m the  way of a favourable  attitude on  the 
pan of the  Commission.  Those  problems  related  essen-
tially  to  the  risks  of  cross-subsidization  by  the 
Community TOs in favour of lnfonct and discrimination 
by·  the  Community  TOs  in -favour  of  Info net  against 
other ·services supplien. During the course of the  notifi-
cation  procedure. those  issues  were  resolved  in  a satis-
factory  manner  by  way  of  undcnakings  given  to  the 
Commission. 
(I)  Discrimination 
In  order  to  provide  services  of tht'  type  described 
under  paragraph  4,  Infonct  or  any  other  supplier 
must  rely  on  the  usc  of  the  public  telecommuni-
cations  network  and  possibly  other  reserved 
~rviccs e>  (hereafter "reserved services') provided by 
the Community TOs since  the  latter  have  exclusive 
or  special  rights  in  this  respect  in  their  respective 
countries. Because those Community TOs arc share· 
holders of lnfonct it  is essential for the  s~feguarding 
of  fair  competition  between  Infonct  and  other 
existing  or  potential  telccommunictions  services 
supplien,  to  eliminate  the  risk  that  the  former  is 
granted  more  favourable  treatment  in  relation  to 
access  and  usc  of  the  public  telecommunications 
network or reserved  services.  In  order to ensure the 
absence of discrimination,  the  Community TOs and 
lnfonet itself have agreed that: 
(a)  Ttmu «nd conditions.  The  terms  and  conditions 
applied  by  the  Community  TOs  to  Infonet  for 
the  provision  of  reserved  service:~  (e.g.  the 
provision  of  leased  lines)  in  ordr:·  to  supply 
services  as  described  under  paragraph  4 shall  be 
similar  to  the  terms  and  condition'  applied  to 
othtr suppliers  of  similar  services.  ·  rhis  relates, 
for  instance,  to  price,  q:Jality  of  service,  'Jsagc 
conditions,  timing  of  installation  of  faci:ities, 
repairs and maintenance. 
(b)  Scopt of  stroicts to bt offirtd. Infonet  will  not  be 
granted  terms  and  conditions,  more  particularly 
in  rdation  to  usage  restrictions,  for  reserved 
services  which  would  allow  it  to  offer  services 
which  other  suppliers  uc  prevented  from 
offering. 
(c)  Ttchnic«l in/orm«tion. The Community TOs  will 
not discriminate  between  Infonet  or its  distribu-
(')  ReKrved  services  are  services  which  are  provided  pursuant 
to  ·~cial or exclusive  righu  ~ranted  ~y the  c.ommun!ty 
Member States  to the  Commun1ty TOs  '" compla1ncc  with 
EEC law . 
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tors and any other supplier of services competing 
with  Infonet services  in  relation to th( release of 
any  decision  to  make  substantial  changes  to 
technical  interfaces  providing  the  means  of 
access  to  reserved  services  or in  the  release  of 
other  technical  information  relating  to  the 
operation  of  the  public  telecommunications 
network. 
(d)  Comm~m•/ infomu~tion. The· Community  TOs 
will  not  discriminate  between  lnfonet  or  its 
distributors and any other supplier of services of 
the  type described  under paragraph  4 in  relation 
to  the . provision  of  certain  categories ·  of 
commercial  information.  This  means  th:u  the 
Community TOs will  not provide  to lnfonet or 
its  distributors  systematic  and  organized 
customer  information  derived  exclusively  from 
the exploitation of the public telecommunications 
infrastructure  or  the  operation  of  reserved 
services  if such  information confers a substantial 
competitive  advantage  and  is  not  readily  and 
equally obuinable elsewhtre hy Infonet's compe-
titors. 
(2)  Cross-subsidization 
In  0rder  to  avoid  that  lnfonet  or  its  distributors 
benefit from cross-subsidies deriving from the exploi-
utio;'l  of  the  public  telecommunications  infra-
strut ture  and  the  operation  of reserved  services  by 
the  Community  TOs,  the  Community  TOs  have 
agreed  with  Infonet  that  the  latter  will  operate  at 
arm's  length  from  the  former.  In  particular,  Infonet 
and  its  distributors  will  be  charged  on  an  arm's 
length  basis the costs relating to services provided by 
the  Community  TOs  including  the  provision  of 
facilities,  personnel  and  loans.  Conversely,  any 
services  supplied  by  Infonet  or  its  distributors  to 
Community TOs would  also be charged on an arm's 
length basis. 
(3)  Rewrding and reporting obligations 
In  order  to  allow  the  Commission  to  monitor 
compliance  with  the  ~,greements  of  non-discrimi-
nation  and  non-cross-subsidization,  the  following 
has been agreed by the parties: 
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(a}  RtcurJing  obligatio-:.•.  Each  Community TO has 
agreed to ketp its  records of each application by 
Infonet or its distributors for reserved servicts by 
such  Community  TO  readily  avail:tble  for 
inspection  by  the  Commission  for  a  period  of 
three  years  following  such  application.  Such 
records  will  include  the  following  items:  when 
the  application  has  been  made,  what  has  been 
applied  for,  e.g.  t'"PC:  of leased  line  or reserved 
service,  when  i·  ~tas  been  satisfied  and  under 
what  terms  and  conditions  including  price  and 
usage condition. 
(b)  R~porting  obligations.  Infonet  gave  an  under-
taking  to  the  Commission  to  supply  yearly  a 
report  containing  the  following  information:  a 
summary of the  records  kept by the Community 
TOs pursuant to paragraph 9 (3) (a); a summary 
of  any  financial  transactions  exceeding  an 
aggregate  of  ECU  2  million  in  value  between 
Infonet and  any  Community TO and  any  other 
facilities  provided  by  a  Community  TO  to 
Infonet;  details  of  any  new  agreement  entered 
into  by  Infonet  with  any  Community  TO a:td 
relating directly to the notified agreements. 
The Commission's intentions 
I 0.  On  the  basis  of  the  foregoing,  the  Commission 
intends  to  take  a favourable  position  pursuant to Article 
85.(3)  of the  EEC  Trtaty and  to  close  the  procedure 
with  the  sending  by  the  Commission's  Directorate-
General  for  Competition  of  an  administrative  letter 
('comfort  letter').  Before  doing  so,  the  Commission 
invites  interested  third  parties  to  send  their observations 
within  one month  from  the  publication  of this  notice  to 
the  following  address,  1uoting  the  reference  IV /33.361 
- Infonet: 
Commission  of the  European Communities, 
Directorate-General for  Competition  (lV), 
Directorate for  Restrictive Practices, Abuse of Dominant 
Positions  and  other Distortions of Corllpetit!on  I, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi  200, 
B-1 0-49  Brussels. 
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Notice  pursuant to Article  19  (3)  of Council  Regulation  No 17 (') concemi.og  a  request for 
negative  clearance or ;m  exemption pursuant to  Article  85  (3)  of the  EEC Treaty (Case  No 
~\  IV  /34.282 - lntrax) 
(93/C 117/04) 
1.  On 10 April  1992, PTT Telecom BV  (The Hague, 
the  Netherlands),  hereinafter  'PTf  Telecom'  and 
Nederlands  Omroepproduktie  Bedr_ijf  NV  {Hilversum, 
the  Netherlands),  hereinafter  'NOB',  submitted  to  the 
European Commission for negative clearance or alterna-
tively exemption, a cooperation agreement in the field of 
Satellite News Gathering services. In the company set up 
for  this  purpose, lntrax BV,  the  parent companies pool 
their complementary skills,  namely NOB's experience as 
a  provider  of  television  facilities  services  ind  PTT 
Telecom's  experience  with  respect  to  the  uplinking  of 
(television)  signals  to satellites. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
2.  ·JYfT Telecom is  100% owned by Koninklijke PTT 
Nederland  NV (the  Netherlands), which  with  activities 
in  both  the  postal  and  telecommunications  domains, 
achieved  a  turnover  of  Fl  13,6  billion  in  1990.  PTT 
Telecom  is  the  public  telecommunications  organization 
(TO)  in  the  Netherlands. 
PTT  Telecom  has  two  other  subsidiaries  involved  in 
satellite  services,  Satellite  Business  Television  BV  and 
Unisource  Satellite  Services  (formerly  Vesatel)  BV:  the 
first  company  is  involved  in  providing  internal  business 
communications  and  information  via  satellite  to groups 
of  companies  and  organizations,  while  the  second 
operates  in  the  area  of  fixed,  not  mobile,  satellite 
communications. 
3.  NOB  and  its  subsidiaries  provide  the  technical 
facilities required for the preparation and transmission of 
radio- and  television  programmes.  In  '1990,  NOB 
achieved  a turnover of Fl  402  million. 
4.  Intrax BV (lntrax) of Hoofddorp, the Netherlands, 
was  set up  by PTT Telecom and NOB to provide inter-
national  satellite  news  gathering  services.  For financial 
reasons, the initial shareholding reflects an 80 % partici-
pation  by  JYIT  Telecom  and  20% by  NOB,  with  the 
agreed  intention  of  achieving  a  50 :50  relationship  by 
1994.  Intrax  is  run  by  a  board  of directors  under the 
supervision of a supervisory board (raad van  commissa-
rissen)  consisting  of  an  equal  number  of  members 
appointed  by  PTT  Telec;;om  and  NOB  respectively.  At 
present,  the  board of directors consists  of one member, 
appointed  by  the  annual shareholders'  meeting;  as  long 
as  the  director  is  appointed  by  PTf  Telecom,  the 
president  of the  supervisory  board,  currently consisting 
of  two  members,  shall  be  the  member  appointed  by 
(')  OJ No  13,  21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
NOB. Business decisions of any importance to be .taken 
by the {board of)  director(s)  require  the  prior approval 
of the supervisory board. 
II. THE SERVICES INVOLVED 
5.  Satellite news gathering is  a relatively new form  of 
communication  which  is  built  on  two  existing, 
complementary  services,  (i)  those  provided  by  facilities 
houses such as  NOB and (ii)  the  uplinking  of signals  to 
satellites  from  groundstations,  traditionally  a  telecom-
munications  activity. 
Television (and  ra~io) facilities 
6.  Services  relating  to  television  and  radio  facilities 
involve  the  provision of the  technical  attributes  and  ac-
tivities  required  to  prepare  and  emit  television  (and 
radio) programmes. Physical attributes used for television 
facilities  include  studios,  cameras,  editing  equipment, 
music  libraries,  audiovisual  archives,  orchestras  and 
fhoirs;  the  services  include  the  maintenance  of  these 
attributes and the provision of manpower - for example 
cameramen  and editors - for the operation thereof. 
7.  Until  1988,  the  provision of technical  facilities  for 
the  preparation  and  emission  of  television  programmes 
was  carried out by the  'facilities  branch'  of the  Neder-
landse  Omroep  Scichting.  (NOS),  the  association  of 
public broadcasting organizations in the Netherlands. To 
carry out its tasks, including those of its facilities branch, 
the  NOS  used  general  broadcasting  revenues,  namely 
income  from  advertisements  and contributions  made  to 
the  broadcasting  organizations.  According  to  the  then 
existing  Omroepwet  (Broadcasting  Act),  the  public 
broadcasting organizations were  obliged  to  acquire  the 
technical facilities they needed to prepare and emit their 
programmes exclusively from  the facilities  branch of the 
NOS. In other words, the facilities  branch of the  NOS 
enjoyed a legal monopoly for the provision of television 
facilities  to the public broadcasting organizations. 
On 1 January 1988, the facilities branch of the NOS was 
converted  into  an  autonomous  company,  Nederlands 
Omroepproduktie Bedrijf NV (NOB), which is  of course 
one of the parties involved in the notified arrangements. 
During  a  transitional  period,  the  public  broadcasting 
organizations continued to be  obliged to  use  the services 
of NOB for  a  certain  percentage of their  requirements. 
As of 1 January 1991  as  regards television and  I January 
1992 as  regards radio, the provision of technical facilities 
is  wholly  open  to  competition.  NOB's  position  on  the 
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market. for television facilities has, however, continued to 
be very strong in  the two years  fol~owing liberalization. 
Up linking 
8.  Uplinking  is  the  transmiSSion  of  signals  from  a 
satellite  groundstation  to  a  satellite,.  from  which  the 
signal  is  subsequently  downlinked  to  receive  dishes. 
Uplinking is  a telecommunications activity which in most 
Member  St:~:tes  is  exclusively  reserved  to  the  national 
telecommunications organization (fO). 
Satellite news  gathering 
9.  Satellite  news  gathering  (SNG)  represents- an  inte-
gration  of  the  provision  of  technical  audio-visual 
facilities and uplinking services. SNG facilities  have  been 
developed  to allow the  rapid on the spot collection and 
transmission  of  audiovisual  news  and  data  at  remote 
locations  normally  not  or  not  regularly  served  by  the 
terrestrial network, for  example:  the  scenes of disasters, 
sports  events  and  other newsworthy  happenings  which 
require  or warrant immediate coverage  and  conveyance 
to the general public or a specific audience. 
10.  Successful news  gathering of this  type depends on 
the speed and efficiency with which the event in question 
can  be  audio-visually recorded,  if  necessary  edited  and 
then communicated to  the  customers,  for example  press 
bureaus  and  broadcasting  organizations,  for  further 
incorporation  into  their  news  programmes.  For  this 
purpose,  the  integrated  use  of  transportable  audio  and 
video  production  facilities  and  small,  transportable 
uplinking facilities  allow for the  on-the-spot preparation 
and  editing  of  news  shots  which  can  subsequently  be 
uplinked immediately and transmitted via satellite to one 
or several  points. 
11.  SNG  services  are  a  recent  phenomenon  on  the 
European market, the value of which the parties roughly 
estimate  to  be  a  few  million  Dutch  guilders  in  the 
Netherlands  and  Fl  10  to  30  million  in  Europe. 
SNG-service providers from the United States and Japan 
enjoy a headstart from  which they will  benefit once the 
European  market  is  liberalized.  In  the  Netherlands,  as 
explained  below,  there  are  no  longer  any  barriers  to 
entering  the  market  for  SNG services,  and  lntr~ can 
expect  to  face  competition  from  experienced  American 
and  Japanese  SNG-service  providers  as  well  as  from 
European  organizations  such  as  press  bureaus,  broad-
casting  organizations  and  TOs  who  are  actually 
providing  such  services  elsewhere  or  are  in  a  position 
easily  to do so. 
III. THE SNG SERVICES  PROVIDED BY  INTRAX 
12.  To  carry  out  its  basic  SNG  activities,  lntrax 
reqUires 
(i)  transportable  registration- and  editing  equipment 
and personnel; 
(ii)  a transportable satellite groundstation for  uplinking 
purposes  and  uplinking  personnel;  the  uplinking 
equipment  is  located  in  a  so-called  SNG-unit,  a 
small  truck with the groundstation on its  rc;>of  and 
the  necessary  hardware  and  software  inside;  the 
market vafue of a SNG-unit is  approximately ;cu 
430 000; 
(iii)  transponder  capacity  on  a- satellite  to  relay  the 
uplinked signals to their point of destination, e.g.  a 
broadcasting studio. 
13.  NOB  agrees  to  provide  lntrax,  at  the  latter's 
request,  with  the  transportable  registration- and  editing 
equipment,  personnel  and  expertise  during  the  term  of 
the  agreement,  for  which  Intrax  will  be  charged  the 
normal commercial rates, in other words at arm's length. 
lntrax is  thus contractually free  to· acquire these facilities 
from  sources  other than  NOB,  and  NOB  in  its  turn  is 
not obliged  to reserve  such  facilities  for  use  by  lmrax. 
14.  As  far  as  the  SNG-unit  is  concerned,  the 
agreement provides for an  arm's  length sale  of one unit 
by  PTf Telecom  to  lntrax,  while  a  second  unit  will 
remain  available  for  lntrax's use  at  the  latter's  request, 
also  at  the  normal  commercial  rates.  Aside  from  the 
initial  SNG-unit  to  be  acquired  from  PTf Telecom, 
· lntrax  is  thus  contractually free  to  acquire  further units 
from  sources other than P1T Telecom. 
15.  In order to provide SNG services,  lntrax requires 
the  occasional  use  of  capacity  on  satellites.  Imrax  is 
contractually free  to  acquire such  capacity from  any  of 
the available sources, which include international satellite 
consonia such  as  Eutelsat and  lntelsat,  individual  tele-
communications  organizations  and  private  satellite 
operators. 
16.  The  cooperation  agreement  between  PTf 
Telecom  and  NOB  is  non-exclusive,  which  means  that 
(i)  PTT Telecom is  free  to provide up linking services  to 
parties  other than  lntrax,  (ii)  NOB  is  free  to  provide 
technical  facilities  to parties  other than  Intrax  and  (iii) 
both  PIT  Telecom  and  NOB  are  free  to  compete 
directly with lntrax in the provision of SNG services. 
17.  It is the parties' intention that lntrax will carry out 
its  activities both within and outside of the Netherlands. 
18.  The cooperation agreement which forms  the  basis 
of lntrax'  s activities was concluded on 21  October 1991 
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IV.  THE  REGtJI.;ATORY  SI11JATION  WITH  RESPECf 
TO SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 
t 9.  The various steps involved  in  the transmission of 
signals  to  satellites  are  generally  covered  by  exclusive 
rights  bestowed  by  international  conventions  and 
domestic  laws  on  the  TOs.  In  most  Member  States, 
uplinking is  a service reserved exclusively for the national 
TO,  while  access  to  the  satellites  of  international 
consortia such  as  Eutelsat is  only possible  via  the TO 
signatories.  In  order · to  determine  whether  PIT 
Telecom's  position  as  the TO in  the  Netherlands  and 
signatory  in  the  context of the  international  fOnsortia 
would result in a  de facto  monopoly for lntrax because 
potential  competing  SNG-service  providers  would  not 
have  the  benefit  of PTf Telecom's  partnersnip,  it  is 
necessary to examine the existing regulatory situation in 
the  Netherlands and PTf Telecom's policy as  Eutelsat 
(and Intelsat) signatory. 
Uplink.jog 
20.  Of crucial  importance with  respect to the factual 
setting of the  notified arrangements  is  the liberalization 
of certain  uplinking  services  in  the  Netherlands.  On  14 
November  1991,  the  Dutch Minister  in  charge of tete-
communications  issued  a  communication  in  which  it is 
stated that Konink.lijke  P1T Nederland NV as  national 
concession-owner for satellite' groundstations has agreed 
vis-a-vis the Minister to refrain fr9m invoking itS  right of 
first  refusal  as  conferred  by  the  Dutch  T elecommuni-
cations Act (Wet op de Telecommunicatievoorzieningen) 
with respect to _the  operation of three types of ground-
stations,  which  are specified  as:  1.  VSATs  (Very Small 
Aperture Terminals) and 2. VSAT-hubstations providing 
a  maximum speed of data-transmission with a maximum 
diameter  of  4  to  10  metres  respectively,  and  3. 
SNG-groundstations  with  a  maximum  diameter  of  4 
metres.  With  respect  to these  categories,  the  Minister's 
communication  states  that  thir4  parties  other than  the 
national  concession-owner  are  eligible  for  licences  to· 
operate  such  groundstations,  subject  to  statutory 
provisions provided for in certain acts  such as  the T de-
communications Act and the Media Act. 
21.  Licences for the operation of SNG-groundstations 
are issued by the Direction for Telecommunications and 
Post  of  the  Ministry  for  Transport  on  the  basis  of 
objective criteria, and there is  no involvement whatsoever 
of PTT Telecom in the licensing procedure. Licences are 
granted  for  one  year,  and  a- licence  fee  of Fl  100  per 
licence,  which  means  per  groundstation,  is  charged. 
Intrax has  applied for and been granted a  licence on the 
same  basis  as  any  other  applicant  not  having  the 
corporate ties  with PTT Telecom which  Intrax has. 
22.  lntrax pla~s to offer SNG services also ouuide the 
Netherlands. To the extent the  up  linking of signals  to 
satellites  has  not yet been liberalized in  other countries 
where  it.  wishes  to  operate,  lntrax  will  be  obliged  to 
contract for uplinking services from the national TO and 
in  that  respect  will  be  in . the  same  situation  as  any 
{potential) competitors. 
Availability of transponder capacity. 
23.  Eutelsat  (European  Telecommunications  Satellite 
Organization)  is  an  international consortium  set up  by 
an  intergovernmental  convention  signed  by  32 
governmentS,  the  'parties',  and  effectively  operated  by 
the  'signatories',  normally the  national TOs, who have 
signed an operating agreement to that effect. Eutelsat is 
a  major operator of telecommunications satellites  in  the 
European  ·Community.  Under  the  terms  of  the 
Convention, space segment capacity on  itS  satellites  can 
be  rented only to  itS  signatories, who can  in  their turn 
rent  such  capacity  to  third  parties;  in  other  words, 
companies  wishing  space  segment capacity  on  Eutelsat 
satellites  are  not in  a  position  to  have  direct  contracts 
with  Eutelsat  to  that  effect,  but  must  acquire  such 
capacity via  a  signatory. PTf Telecom was  designated 
by  the  Dutch government to be  the  Eutelsat  signatory. 
24.  PTT  Telecom  has  given  assurances  to  the 
Commission  that  in  the  event  capacity  on  Eutelsat 
satellites  is  scarce,  for example when there  is  a  sudden 
momentary  increase  in  demand  due  to  an  exceptional 
occurrence, PTf Telecom will ensure that the allotment 
of such capacity will be carried out without any discrimi-
nation because applications will  be  dealt with strictly in 
the  order  in  which  they  come  in.  PTT  Telecom  has 
specifically  confirmed  that  lntrax  will  not  enjoy  any 
preferential treatment for rental of capacity on Eutelsat 
satellites.  PTT  Telecom's  position  in  this  respect  will 
apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  applications  for  capacity  on 
Intelsat  satellites,  a  consortium  similar  to  Eutelsat  but 
operating on a  world-wide basis. 
25.  Although  the  Eutelsat  Convention  does  not 
bestow  any  explicit  territorial  exclusivity  on  the  signa-
tories, in  practice until recently third parties transmitting 
signals to satellites from the national territory of a given 
signatory  would  also  lease  the  required  space  segment 
capacity from  Eutelsat via  that signatory.  In  September 
1992,  the panies and signatories  from  the  Netherlands, 
the  United  Kingdom,  France  and Germany,  agreed  to 
allow  telecommunications  service  providers  seeking 
access  to  Eutelsat  space  segment  capacity  to  choose 
freely  from  which  signatory  they  wish  to  lease  such 
capacity.  This  means  that  competitors  of  lntrax  who 
have  a  licence  to  provide  uplinking,  including  SNG 
services  in  the  Netherlands  are  not  bound  to  lease 
J  167 No C 117/6  Official Journal of the  European Communities  28.  4.  93 
Eutelsat capacity from  P'IT Telecom,  but can  likewise 
do so from  the three other signatories who have  agreed 
on  the  abolition  of  any  territOrial  restrictions  in  this 
respect.  Other Eutelsat  signatOri~s may -be  expected  to 
adhere to these  arrangements  in  the future. 
26.  Finally, as  noted before, space segment capacity is 
available from a number of sources other than the inter-
national  satellite  consortia.  Thus,  in  conclusion,  with 
respect to space segment capacity, companies competing 
with  Intrax  in  the  Netherlands  will  have  access  to 
Eutelsat (and Intelsat)  capacity via  PIT Telecom on  a 
non-discriminatory  basis,  they  will  have  access  to 
Eutelsat  capacity  via  at  least  three  Eutelsat  signatOries 
other than  P1T Telecom  and  they will  have  access  to 
satellites belonging to organizations other than Eutelsat. 
In  countries  other than  the  Netherlands,  Inirax will  be 
subject  to  the  same  operational  constraints  as  its 
(potential)  competitors. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
27.  In  conclusion,  the  Commission  is  of  the 
preliminary opinion that the notified arrangements allow 
for  a  rapid  introduction  of an  enhanced  telecommuni-
cations  service,  while  the  regulatory  situation  in  the 
Netherlands,  the  stated  policy  of . P1T Telecom  with 
respect  to its  allotment of Eutelsat· (and  lntelsat)  space 
segment capacity and the  non-exclusive character of the 
cooperation  should  ensure  that competing  SNG-service 
providers  are  not· faced  by  any barriers  to  entry an the 
Dutch market. Outside the Netherlands, lntrax will be  in 
the sahte  position as  other SNG-service providers. 
The Commission therefore proposes to take a favourabfe 
position  with  respect  to  the  coopt;ration  arrangements 
between  PTT  Telecom  and  NOB.  Before  doing  so,  it 
invites  all  interested  parties  to  send  their  observations 
within one month of the publication of this notice to the 
following  address,  quoting  the  reference  IV /34.282 -
Imrax:  · 
Commission of the  European  Communities, 
Directorate-General IV (Competition), 
Directorate for  Restrictive  Practices, 
Abuse  of ·Dominant  Positions  and  other  Distortions  of 
Competition, 
200, Rue  de  Ia  Loi, 
B-1 049  Brussels. 
Recapitulation of current tenders, published in  the  Supplement to the Official Journal of 
Europeao Communities, fmanced by the European Economic Community under the E 
Development Fund (ED  F)  or the European Communities budget 
· (week:  20  to  24  April  1993) 
(93/C  117 /05) 
Invitation tO  Number and date  Final date 
tender No  of 'S' Journal  Country  for submission 
of bids 
3653  s 76,. 20.  4.  1993  16.  6.  1993 
3654  s 78,  22.  4.  1993  BW-Selebi-Phikwe: slipring  30.  6.  1993 
induction motor with automatic 
liquid starter and cable 
3649  B-Brussels:  prequalification of  21.  5.  1993 
consultantS 
3616  Zimbabwe  ZW-Harue: vehicles  and  14.  7.  1993 
earthmoving equipment 
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Commission  noticc  pursuant  to  Article  19  (3)  of Council  Regulation  No  17  on  Case  No 
IV I 34.4 2  2 - Aero:.aJatialc:/ A  lea tel  Espacc 
(94/C 47 /06) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On  6  August  1992  Aerospatiale  and  Alcatel  Espace 
notified the Commission of an agreement concluded on 
1  March  1991  on  telecommunications  satellites  and 
satellites  having  related,  and  in  particular  military, 
applications. The cooperation between the parties might 
be extended to other areas such as earth observation. 
The  agreement  provides  for  business  cooperation 
coupled with technical and industrial specialization. The 
agreement,  aimed  at  rationalizing  the  activities  of  the 
parties,  does  not  provide  for  integration  of  their 
production  lines.  Consequently,  as  regards their 'space' 
anivitics, they  remain separate entities  having their own 
n·s«·arch  and  proJunion  faciliti<"~. 
The panics have in  the past been associated frequently in 
carrying  0ut  satellite  programmes,  either  as 
co-contr:~ctors or as prime contractor and subcontractor. 
The agreement establishes almost system:ltic cooperation 
hct"·ecn  the  parties  going  beyond  the  ad hoc  consoni:t 
which  they  have  hitherto  formed  (for  example,  for 
Eutelsat 2,  TDF I!Il, Turksat and  Arabsat  2). 
The  agreement  forms  part  of  a  strategy  of  alliances 
pur~ued by  the  parties  with  rt"gard  to  s:nel!it<.'S,  On  the 
one hand with Alenia and with DASA and, on the other, 
by  all  four with  the  American  company SS/Loral,  With 
the  aim  of establishing  a  vertically integrated  industrial 
facilit~' of sufficient size  to  meet the  requirements  of a 
rapidly developing world  markt•t. 
II.  THE PARTIES 
Aerospatiale is  a  French public undertaking operating in 
the  aerospace  industry.  It  produces  planes  (Airbus), 
rndit.1rv  and  civilian  helicopters,  missiles  and,  as  far  as 
~pace  ~~  ronrcrned, launchers (it  i~  the system integrator 
and  principal  stage  contractor  for  the  Ariane  launcher) 
and  satellites.  Aerospatiale's  total  turnover  in  1991 
amounted to FF 48 600  million, of which space activities 
represented  FF  4 755  million,  with  FF  1 528  million  of 
this latter figure being accounted for by civilian satellites. 
Alcatel  Espace  is  controlled  by  the  Alcatcl  Alsthom 
Group  through  Alcarel  NV.  Akatel  i~  actin·  in 
communication  systems,  energy and  transport, electrical 
eng1neering,  accumulators  :1nd  other  services.  The 
turno\'er of Alcatel NV in  1991  was ECU I 5 746  million. 
The turno\'er of Alcatel  Espace during  the  same  period 
was  FF  1 639  million.  Alcatel  NV's  space  activities 
extend beyond  those of Alcatel  Espace: six  other group 
companies or divisions  of companies  work  in  the  space 
<,ector,  onhoard  electronic,  and  ground  electronic 
equipment,  with  a  total  space  turnover  of  ECU  56 
million in  1990. 
As far as  the agreement is  concerned, Aerospatiale is  the 
prime contractor for satellites and the supplier of satellite 
platforms and optical  payloads.  Similarly,  it has a  large 
turno,·er  in  the  prime  contracting  of 'turnkey'  satellite 
systems.  Alcatel  Espace  is  the  prime  contractor  of 
satellite  telecommunications  systems  (onboard  and 
ground)  and  the supplier of payloads,  notably telecom-
munications payloads, and of sub-systems and associated 
equipment. 
III. THE MARKET 
A.  The product market 
The relevant produn market in  this case is  that for tele-
communications satellites,  both civilian and  military. 
- S;tpply 
Satellites  are  high!:  complex  spacecraft  it1Vl'h·ing  many 
different  technologies.  A  standard  satellite  consists  of 
two  b:tsic  pans:  the  platform  and  the  payload.  ,The 
platform is  the physical structure of the satellite and thus 
incorporates a numher of control and propulsion  system~ 
who~r ioh it  is  to  en~ure the stahility of the satellite and 
maintain the orbit in  which it was placed, to supply elec-
trical  energy and ensure thermal control of the satellite. 
The payload consists of specialized  systems designed  to 
perform  the  particular task  for  which  it  was  placed  in 
orbit. 
The spatial environment in  which satellites  must operate 
and  the  virtual  impossibility  of  repairing  a  malfunc-
tioning  satellite  once  it  is  in  orbit  impose  very  strict 
manufacturing  and  test  conditions which  require  manu-
facturers to invest \Cry large amounts both in  produnin11 
lines  and  in  assembly and  test facilities. 
In  addition, products used  in  space arc  largely  made to 
measure.  Consequently,  although  manufacturers 
ende:l.\'our to standardize their. products as far as  possible 
so as  to spread their R&D expenditure over the broadest 
possible  series  of products,  each  new  sateliite  entails  a 
subst:tntial  amount  of  new  R&D  expenditure,  which 
firms  arc  vinualh- un:tble  to  recover in  full,  whether I"· 
obtaining  a  con~r:lct  or  by  using  the  rc~ult\  111  ot11,.·, 
projects. 
Last!:·,  since  a  manufacturer  is  rarely  able  to  provide 
alone all  the systems which go to make up a s:ncllite, the 
suppliers  of different  systems  very  often  work  together 
under  the  wing  of  a  manufacturer  acting  a'  tlw. prim<· 
contractor, who de:1ls  with the custom<'r  . 
.  ,  '{[  1  6  9 
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"  -Demand 
Demand is  almost always channelled through invitations 
to tender published by customers. Customers are either 
governments/national  agencies  or  telecommunications 
operators,  international  satellite  organizations  (ISOs) 
such  as  Intelsat, organizations of a  military nature such 
as  NATO  and,  increasingly,  private  companies 
(sometimes consortia} set up for the purpose of operating 
satellites (such  as  SES and the Astra satellites}. 
In  general,  the customers are very well  informed of the 
state  of  the  required  technology  and  their  precise 
requirements  and  in  addition  have  very  considerable 
purchasing power. 
The  content of the  invitations  to tender varies  widely. 
While  some  include  only  ground-delivered  satellites, 
others ('turnkey' projects)  also include services allowing 
delivery  in  orbit  (launching),  ground  stations  and  even 
the operation of the satellite in  orbit. 
B.  Geographic market 
The scale of the market depends largely on the type of 
final  consumer  of  the  satcllite{s).  The  international 
satellite  organizations  (ISOs)  such  as  lntelsat  and 
lmmar~:n :tre  not  bound  by  any  nationality  criteria  in 
pur•hasmg  their  s:nelli!cs.  The  same  goes  for  private 
lllll~Lll))\.'1'~  and  for  nn.tnrin which  dt)  tll1t  h:we a  suffi-
Ciellll~  dC\ eloped  n:nional  aer0~p:1cT  Jndu~try  .  .A.s  f:u  a~ 
such  countries  and  such  organizations  ::tre  concerned, 
competition  between  manufacturers  has  always  been 
open  and  very  intense,  and,  since  transport  costs  are 
scarcely significant,  the  market is  worldwide. 
However,  certain  regional  satellite  organizations  or 
space  agencies  pursue  a  declared  or  tacit  policy  of 
buying  their satellites  only from  their  members.  This  is 
rhe  case  with  the  European Space Agency (ESA), which 
ope;:nes  on  the  basis  of the  principle  of a  fair  return, 
pronding the industries of each member state of the ESA 
organization  with  contracts  equivalent  in  amount to its 
fm:.ncial  contribution  to  the  organization.  Similarly, 
gin'n the strategic importance of the  aerospace industry 
for  certain  countries,  those  which  have  national  space 
programmes founded on a well developed industrial base 
allocate considerable proportions of their programmes to 
their  own  industries.  the  extent  to  which  they  do  so 
being  in  proportion  to  the  relevant  national  industry's 
rap:~.city.  The  United  States  (with  its  'Buy  American 
Act'), Japan and most of the Member States pursue such 
a  policy.  Consequently,  as  far  as  the  Community  is 
concerned, apart from  European participation within the 
ISOs  and  the  growing  activity  of  private  operators, 
national  markets  were  until  very  recently  llrgely 
compartmentalized  and  separate,  except  in  the  case  of 
components. 
However, the market situation  in  the western countries, 
and  in  the  Community  in  particular,  is  evolving  very 
rapidly  rowards  the  disappearance  of  barriers  between 
Member  States  and,  consequently,  towards  a  unified 
m:trket.  Three essential  bctors are at work here: 
certain satellite applications and, in  particular,  those 
relating  to  telecommunications  and  especially  rhe 
broadcasting  of  television  and  radio  signals,  have 
largely reached the commercial stage. In addition, the 
surface covered  by a  satellite  in  geostationary  orbit 
obviously exceeds the frontiers o( any one coumry, 
the  current  deregulation  of  telecommunications  in 
Europe  and  the  rapid  development  of  the  techno-
logical possibilities  of telecommunications in  general 
has  parallel  effects  on  satellites  and  also  makes  it 
easier for a range of new actors to gain access to the 
space  market,  both  as  service  suppliers  and  on  the 
demand side as customers for space capacity, 
lastly, the recent entry into force of the Directive on 
public  procurement  will  help  to  ensure  equality  of 
opportunities  for  the  various  suppliers  in  obtaining 
public  contracts,  to  the  detriment of national  pref-
erences. 
It  must  therefore  be  concluded  that  the  relevant 
geographic  market  is  at  least  the  Community,  except 
where  contracts  have  been  concluded  for  a  specific 
programme  with  certain  organizations  or  any  national 
agency  and  may  comprise  constraints  of various  kinds 
linkt•d  to na!ionality or to  :1.  fair  return 
C.  The  market position  of  European  satellite  manufac-
turers 
The gro\\'ing reliance of customers (particularly in  tele-
communications and  the  broadcasting of television  and 
radio signals) on purely commercial criteria in  their im·i-
tations to tender means,  firstly,  that manufacturers must 
make  Yery  considerable  efforts  in  terms  of  prices  and 
financing and insurance terms,  delivery  dates  :-~rHJ  ill\·ol-
vemem not only in  the manufacture of satellites, but aho 
in  placing  them  in  orbi!  and  operating them  once  the~· 
are in  space so as  to make their tenders more :utrani,·e. 
Secondly, it  also  means  that an  effort must  be  made  to 
reduce  production  costs  through  standardiz:ttion  :-~nd 
synergy. 
The  market  therefore  favours  large-scale  undertakings 
\\·ith  a  very  high  degree of vertical  integration. 
The supply  side  of the  satellite  market  in  Europe  is  at 
present  highly  fragmented  and  involves  a  wry  large 
number of firms  engaged  in  'space'  activities  either  :-.s 
prime  contractors  or  as  payload,  sub-system  or 
component manufacturers. This fact,  which  is  due to the 
historical  compartmentalization  of  national  markets  in 
Europe,  contrasts  with  the  situation  of  the  industry  in 
the  United  States,  which  is  at  present  dominated  by  a 
limited  number of companies  (notably  Hughes  and  GE No C 47/8  Official journal of the  European Communities  15. 2. 94'; 
/ 
Astro and TRW and  Lockheed  in  both the civilian  and 
the  military  sectors  which  arc  very  large  and vertically 
integrated (Hughes, for examplt',  through  its  subsidiary 
Hughes Communications, is  one of the  major suppliers 
of space capacity in  the United States). 
The  American  companies  have  the  benefit  of a  large, 
deregulated  and  unified  domestic  market  and  of 
government  space  programmes  - both  in  the  civilian 
sector  (notably  NASA),  and  in  the  military  sector  -
which are much larger than those available to European 
companies  both  at  national  level  and  through  the 
European Space Agency (ESA}. 
The  involvement  of  American  companies  outside  the 
United  States  has  been  very  great as  regards  the  ISOs 
and third countries, but more limited as  regards Europe. 
However,  with  barriers  to  entry  in  Europe  falling, 
competition from the United States will certainly grow in 
the near future. 
In  addition  to  American  companies,  it  may  also  be 
expected that manufacturers in  the former Soviet Union 
will  become  increasingly  active  on  both  the world  and 
European  markets.  The  recent  launcher  agreements 
concluded between Russia and  the United States on the 
one hand and Russia  ~md Europe on the other are a first 
step in  thi~ direction. 
The  European  comp:wies'  respon'-c  to  such  market 
developments  is  twofold,  namely w  increase in  size and 
to  pursue  vertical  integration,  through  mergers  or 
large-scale  strategic  alliances.  The  setting  up  of  the 
German  company  DASA,  the  Franco-British  company 
Matra-Marconi Space  NV and  rhe  series  of agreements 
concluded  between  Aerospatiale,  :\lea  tel,  Alenia  and 
DASA  and  with  the American  company  Space  Systems 
Loral  in  the  satellite  sector,  of  which  this  agreement 
forms  an  integral  part,  are  "cry clear examples  of this. 
IV.  THE NOTIFII:D AGREEMENT 
The  cooperation  agreement  concluded  between  the 
parties is  intended initially to cover civilian  and military 
telecommunications  satellites.  The  parties  also  envisage 
the possibility of broadening it later to cover observation, 
meteorological and scientific satellites. 
The  aims  of  the  agreement  are,  firstly,  to  impro,•e 
competitiveness  through optimum Yerticalization  and  to 
cover  satellite  activities  as  widely  as  possible  and, 
secondly,  to  improve  profitability  and  increase  market 
shares  through  close  business  collaboration  between  the 
parties. 
The agreement has  been concluded  for  an  initial  period. 
of  10  years.  However,  after  five  rca:·~, each  party  may 
termmate  the  agreement  subject  tO  n1inimum  norice  of 
one year. 
4"~ 
The main  fcatun.·s  of the  a~rcemcnt art·  :ts  follnwll: 
(a)  Technical and indusrrial specialization 
In  order to .exploit  to  the  full  the  high  degree  of 
complementarity  in  their activities,  the panies  have 
decided  to  allocate  their  technical  and  industrial 
activities  in  accordance  with  a  specialization  table. 
They will  thus not have to. stop any of their current 
activities. 
For  the  rest,  Aerospatiale  and  Alcatel  will  rem:un 
separate  entities  having  their  own  research  and 
production facilities. 
(b)  Industrial property 
Each  party  will  remain  the  owner  both  of  the 
industrial property owned by it prior to the signature 
of the  agreement and  of the  results  of its  research 
activities under the agreement. 
Nevenheless, licences may be granted by each of the 
parties to the other, the terms of which  ~·ill be estab-
lished on a case-by-case basis and must be acceptable 
to each of them. 
As  far  as  inventions  resulting  from  joint  work  are 
concerned, it  is  pro,·idcd that only one of the  partie~ 
will  file  an~  p:ucm  applications  and  will  ~r:un the 
other a  licence undt'r terms which "ill als  ...  "'  be  estab-
lished on a case-by-ctl.c basis. 
(c)  Management committee 
A  management  committee  cons1stmg  l'l  four 
members, two appointed by each party,  ha~ been set 
up.  It  will  be  responsible  for  exchange~  l)j  infor-
mation  and  for  taking  decisions  rl·garding 
cooperation,  111  particular  extending  the  field 
covered,  policy  coordination  on  produd  dcn:l-
opmcnt, the approval of joint tenders and tb·ir tenn' 
and, where appropri.nc, separate tenders. 
The committee has to take its decisions unanimouslv. 
However, if it  proves  impossible to reach  agreeme~t 
on a  decision,  the  committee in  the  first  place,  and 
subsequently  the  management  of  Aerosp:niale  and 
Alcatel,  will  decide on the desirability of each  party 
acting independently. 
In addition, a  number of working groups h:t,·e  been 
set  up  for the  exchange of relevant  information  on 
research and development and on product P'-"'licy. 
(d)  Cooperation procedure 
This is  the key  clause in  the agreement. It c'-uhlishc,, 
firstly,  a  general  principle  of  mutual  prtn·i~ion  of 
information and  consultation between the parties on 
all  measures  rclatin~  to  the  areas  covered  by  the 
agreement. 
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Secondly,  it  provides  for  joint  commercial  action, 
notably through the drawing up of a business action 
plan  that will  include  all  existing  or new  projected 
invitations to tender to which  a joint ·response  is  to 
be made. 
As  regards the first  aspect,  the committee will  coor-
dinate the parties' product development policies and 
will  examine  planned  industrial  alliances  with other 
companies. 
As  regards the second  aspect,  the parties undertake 
not  to  participate  in  any  other  response  to  the 
projected  invitations  to  tender  that  have  been 
included  in  the  business  action  plan  with  the 
agreement  of  the  two  parties.  It  should  also  be 
noted,  however,  that  there  is  nevertheless  a 
substantial  margin  for  independent  action  by  each 
party: 
1.  In the case of an invitation to tender for which a 
joint bid has been submitted, each party is  free to 
submit tenders for equipment and/or sub-systems 
to the customer or third parties provided that (i) 
the value of the tenders does not exceed 15% of 
the  selling  price  of  the  satellite,  (ii)  the 
management committee  is  informed  and  (iii)  the 
terms  of  the  tender  are  'compatible'  with  the 
legitimate  interest  of the  parties  under the  joint 
proposal. 
2.  The  management  committee  may  decide  for 
'strategic  reasons'  to  have  each  of  the  parties 
submit a tender separately. 
3.  In addition, the agreement provides that a number 
of contracts  will  be  excluded  from  the  business 
action plan. 
4.  Lastly, when one of the parties does not intend to 
include  a  projected  invitation  to  tender  in  the 
business action plan, the other party is  free to act 
separately. 
The Commission intends to take a favourable view of the 
agreement notified. Before doing so,  it  invites  interested 
third parties to send their comments on the case within 
one month of publication of this notice to the following 
address,  quoting  reference  IV  /34.422  Alcatel  - A~ro­
spatiale: 
Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate-General for CompeJition (DG IV), 
Directorate for Restrictive Practices, Abuse of Dominant 
Positions and Other Distortions of Competition I, 
200 Rue de Ia  Loi, 
B-1 049 Brussels. 
Commission communication pursuant to Article 9 (1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3832/90 
of  20  December  1990  applying  generalized  tariff preferences  for  1991  in  respect  of textile 
products  originating  in  developing  countries  (extended  for  1994  by  Regulation  (EC) 
No  3668/93) 
(94/C 47/07) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3832/90 ('), extended for 1994 by 
Regulation  (EC)  No  3668/93 C),  the  Commission  gives  notice  that  the  following  fixed 
duty-free amounts,  applicable  from  1 January to 30  June 1994,  have been exhausted: 
Order No  Category  Origin  Fixed  duty-free amount  Date of exhaustion 
40.0040  4  Philippines  941  500  pieces  12.  l. 1994 
40.0070  7  Pakistan  486 000  pieces  12.  l. 1994 
40.0220  22  Brazil  324,5  tonnes  10.  t.  1994 
40.0280  28  South Korea  11  000  pieces  10.  1.  1994 
40.0360  36  Belarus  14,5  tonnes  4.  1.  1994 
ImportS  beyond  these  amounts  are  liable  to  payment of the  normal  duties  of the  Common 
Customs Tariff. 
(')  OJ No L 370, 31.  12.  1990, p.  39. 
(')  OJ No L 338, 31  12.  1993, p.  22. 
--·--·-·----------
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Notification of a  technical cooperation agreement between telecommunications organization 
(Case No IV  /34.820 - GEN) 
(94/C 55/03) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
1.  On 9 August 1993, the telecommunications organ-
izations  of France,  Germany,  Italy  and  Spain (1),  and 
British  Telecommunications  pic.  submitted  to  the 
Commission  for  examination  under  the  competition 
rules, technical cooperation arrangements ·referred to as 
'GEN' (Global European Network), aimed at improving 
the quality and  availability  of international  leased  lines 
mainly  through  more efficient  operational  mechanisms. 
2.  The  GEN  operation  agreement  (OA)  which 
contains  the  terms  and  conditions  upon  which  this 
cooperation will  take place  has  been  concluded  for  five 
years and is  renewable. 
3.  Each  GEN operator agrees  to dedicate  a  cenain 
amount of its fibre optic capacity {the 'bearers•) to GEN 
and  to  install  on  its  network  at  least  one  'node'  (or 
network access system, NAS) and associated data packet 
transmission  links conforming to the X25 standard. 
The bearers  form  the  physical  links  between  the  nodes 
through which each GEN operator obtains access  to the 
overall  capacity  operated  under  the  framework  of the 
GEN OA. It is  also  the link  between  that capacity  and 
the GEN operator's local  network. 
The  nodes  are  interconnected  to  a  network  control 
syste-m  (NCS)  whose  computers  manage  and  supervise 
the  overall  capacity.  The  NCS  hard\"\·are  and  related 
software  comprise  the  network  management  system 
(NMS). 
Within  the  framework  of  the  GEN  OA,  each  GEN 
operator  is  able  to  operate  and  manage  its  own 
sub-network(s). In  this way, for example, DBP-T would 
be able  to gain  access  to  its  sub-network  in  France via 
france Telecom's node  in  Paris. 
4.  A  management  committee  conSISung  of  one 
representative  per  GEN  operator  has  been  created  to 
oversee the  implementation and operation of GEN. The 
overall  network  is  run  by  the  GEN  manager  and  a 
limited  number of dedicated personnel under the overall 
direction  of  the  GEN  management  committee.  The 
position  of  GEN  manager  rotates  between  the  GEN 
operators. 
The  common  operating  costs  of GEN  arc  apportioned 
between the  GEN operators according to the percentage 
('}  France  Telecom,  Deutsche  Bundespost  Telekom,  STET, 
lritcl und Telefonica. 
of the total GEN capacity under the operational control 
of a GEN operator. 
When a  new GEN operator joins,  the  above  costs  are 
reapponioned under the terms of the GEN OA. 
5.  GEN, not being  a  legal  entity, does not own  any 
equipment.  Therefore,  under  the  OA,  each  GEN 
operator  agrees  to  dedicate  an  initial  amount  of fibre 
optic capacity for use  on GEN. Any funher quantities, 
qualiues and routes of bearers to be dedicated under the 
GENOA are a matter for negotiation between the GEN 
operators. 
The terms and  conditions for providing the bearers are 
not determined  by the GEN OA but  are  a  matter  for 
bilateral agreement between the GEN operator providing 
the  bearer and the GEN operator using  it.  The panics 
have  agreed  that the charges shall  be  calculated on the 
basis of the cost of providing and maintaining the- bearer 
plus a  reasonable rate of return and  that charges will  be 
applied  in  a  non-discriminatory manner. 
6.  Admission  to  GEN  is  open  to  all  applicant~ who 
fulfil  cenain  criteria  and  will  take  place  in  order  of 
application. The criteria are: 
(a) the  applicant  must  be  a  telecommunications  organ-
IZation; 
(b) the  applicant  must  be  willing  and  able  to  procure. 
install and test a node and an appropriate pan of X25 
and  to  purchase  an  NMS  soft\vare  sub-licence  and 
test  overall  intcrcrJnnection  with  the  existing  GEl\" 
network; 
(c) the  applicant  must  have  the  appropriate  regulator: 
authorization under its own national law; 
(d) the  applicant  must  be  able  to establish  the  mlllunum 
level  of  interconnection  v1a  GEN  (to  emure 
re-routing if necessary); 
(c) the  applicant  must  be  abk  to  lll<'et  tcdJniol 
rcqurremcnts  neccs~ary  to  preH'IIt  dcterior .llitlll  nf 
quality, efficiency aud !>peed; and 
(f) the  applicant  mu~t  be  capable  of  fulfrllllls  tlw 
financial,  technical  and  legal  commitments  under the 
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As presently configured, there is a technical limitation on 
the number of GEN operators. From the technical point 
of view, GEN can accommodate up to 20 nodes. Beyond 
that  there  would  be  significant  deterioration  in  the 
quality, efficiency and speed of operation of GEN. It is, 
however,  possible  to  enhance  the  management  system 
capacity to increase the number of nodes with investment 
and the commitment of time and resources. 
7.  After  preliminary  scrutiny,  the  Commission 
considers  that the  application  must be  examined  under 
the provisions of Council Regulation No 17 C). 
(')  OJ No 13, 2l. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
8.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third parties  to 
send  any  observations  they  may  have  regarding  these 
arrangements.  In  accordance  with Article  20  of Regu-
lation  No  17,  such  observations  will  be  protected  by 
professional  secrecy.  Observations  must  reach  the 
Commission within  30  days of the date of this  notice, 
quoting the reference: IV  /34.820- GEN. 
Send observations  to~ 
Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG  IV}, 
Directorate  for  restrictive  practices,  abll!e  of dominant 
positions and other distortions of competition I, 
200  rue de Ia  Loi, 
B-1049 Brussels. 
Recapitulation of current tenders, published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the 
European  Communities,  financed  by  the  European  Community  under  the  European  Devel-
opment Fund (EDF) or the European Communities budget 
(week:  15  to 19 February 1994) 
(94/C 55/04} 
Invitation to  Number .and  date  Final date 
tender  No  of 'S' Journal 
Country  Subject  for submission 
of bids 
3812  s 35,  19.  l. 1994  Germany  O-Berlin: technical assistance· for  6.  4.  1994 
an  em•tronmental information 
programme 
3775  s 35,  19.  2.  1994  Sudan  SO-Khartoum: various supplies  19 .•. 1994 17.  5.  94 
.. 
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Official Journal of the  European Communities 
Notification (Case No IV/35.038 - Jetphonc) 
(94/C 134/04) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
1.  On 5 April  1994  the  Commission  received  an  application  for negative  clearance and  a 
notification  with  a  view  to  exemption,  pursuant  to Articles  2  and  4  respectively  of Council 
Regulation No 17 (') of a joint venture agreement between BT Jersey (a subsidiary of British 
Telecom)  and  France  Cables  et Radio  (a  subsidiary  of France  Telecom)  under  which  the 
parties  are  to  dev~lop,  through  a  joint  venture  Qetphone),  telecommunications  services 
operating on board aircraft and relayed by terrestrial means (TffS: terrestrial flight telephone 
system). 
2.  The notified arrangement consists mainly in: 
- a 50/50 joint venture agreement of unlimited duration, 
- ancillary agreementS setting out the framework within which the joint venture is  to operate. 
3.  The Commission invites interested third parties to submit to it any observations they may 
wish  tO  make  on the subject. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  ten we>rking  days  from  the  date  of 
publication  of  this  notice.  They  may  be  sent  either  by  fax  or  by  post,  quoting  reference 
No IV  135.038 - Jetphone, to the  following  address: 
Commission  of the  European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG  fV), 
Directorate IV  /B, 
Office  3/062, 
150  avenue de Coctenberg, 
B-1049  Brussels, 
(Fax  No {32 2)  296 98 09). 
(')  OJ No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
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Notice punuant to Article 19 (J) of Council Reculation 17 (') conceminc a request for nrcativc 
clearance or an exemption pursuant to Article 85  (J) of the EC Treaty 
Case  No IV/J4.792- CMC-Talklinr 
(94/C 221/06) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
I.  Introduction 
1:  On  I 5  July  1993,  Matra  Communications  SA 
(france)  and  Talkline  PS  PhoneService  GmbH 
(Germany)  notified  to  the  Commission  an  agreement 
wiJt•rehy  Communications  de  Mohile  Cellulaire  SA 
(franc<")  'CMC', the company jointly set  up  by  Matra 
Communications  SA  and  Cellcom  Ltd  (United 
Kingdom), was authorized to issue capital to two more 
shareholders,  Talkline  PS  PhoneService  GmbH  and 
Norauto SA (France). 
The  shareholders  of  CMC  are  now  therefore  Matra 
Communications,  Cellcom,  Talkline  and  Norauto. 
CMC, Cellcom and Talkline act as service  providers  in 
the fiei<J  of mobile telephony in their respective countries 
of  incorporation.  The  agreement  involves  important 
changes  in  the  capital  structure  of  CMC.  However, 
control of the joint \·enture company remains as before 
in the hands of Matra and Cellcom, and the activities of 
the  parent companies  are  not  affected  by  the  notified 
agreement  (following  modifications  madt>  at  the 
Commission's request). 
I  )uring  thf'  <·ourse  of  tilt  nmific:ttion  pmn·dur,., 
additional  information  was  provided  by  thr  parlics, 
notahly  relating  to  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
whereby the joint vr-nture and those of the parties which 
operate in  the field of mobile telrphony air-time reselling 
agree  to  c:ooperatc  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a 
pan-European distribution of mobile tdephony services. 
As  the- Memorandum of Understanding was not formally 
notified to the Commission, a  description of its  essential 
featurr-s  is  given  in  this  notice  purely by way of back-
ground information'. 
I I. The Parties 
2.  Four  Parties  have  signed  the  shareholders 
agr<"ement  relating to the capital increase of CMC: 
M:ura  Communications  SA  (Matra),  a  frend1 
comp:my  helonging  to  the  Matra-1 Jac:hcue  Group, 
involved  in  rhe  manufacture  of  telecommunit·ation 
equipment  (e.g.  telephone  handsets,  PBX,  rellular 
network infrastructure equipment, trunk systems), 
(')  OJ No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  104/62. 
- Cellcom  Ltd  (Cellcom),  a  British company,  licensed 
in  the  United  Kingdom  by  both  mohile  phone 
network operators (Cellnet and Vodafone) to act as a 
service provider, 
- Talkline  PS  PhoneSC"rvice  GmhH  (Talklinc),  a 
German  company bdonging to the  Preuso;ag  Group, 
licensed  in  Germany by  both  mohile  phone  network 
operators  (Mannesrnann  Mobilfunk  and  Deutsche 
Tdekom Mobil) to act as a service provider, 
- Norauto SA  (Norauto), a  frt>nch  company acting as 
a  retailer of automobile act·essories and sen·il·ing cars 
in  its  outlets throughout France. Norauto intends to 
act  as  a  non-exclusive  dealer  for  tht>  joint-,·enture 
company. 
3.  In  addition to those of the above companies which 
act as  service  providers in  the field  of mobile telephony 
services,  i.e.  Cellcom  and  Talklinc,  two  more  parties 
have signed the Mt>morandum of Understanding relating 
to pan-Europe  an  services : 
the joint venture company inelf, Communications de 
Mobile  Cellulaire  SA  (CMC),  a  h<"ndt  company 
which  is  licensed  by  both  frenc:h  mobile·  llt'twork 
op<·rators  (France  Telecom  Mobiles  and  Socil·te 
J=rans-aisc  du  Radiotelephone)  to  act  a~  a  service 
provider.  Although  CMC  is  licensed  for  bolh 
GSM (I) and analogue services, it· intend~ to focuc;  its 
marketing efforts on GSM, 
- Talkline  Nordic,  a  Danish  company,  acting  as  a 
retailer of telecommunication equipment. 
Ill. The:  r~levant market 
.f.  Certain operators of mobile  phone  networks  have 
elected  to  market  a  share  of  their  sen·iceo;  through 
service  providers  (also  known  as  'air-time  re!'ellers').  A 
service  provider  acts  as  a  relay  betwt"en  the  individual 
subscriber and the network operator. 
This  relationship  is  established  through  a  contr:u·t 
(usually  referred  to as  a  'licrnce') hctwren-the  nrtwork 
operator  and  the  servin·  prm;idrr,  whcrehy  cu~tomer( 
suhscrihing  tn  the  st•rvice  availablt"  on  thr  nprr:otor'c; 
network will  pay a  rixed  monthly  fee  and a  ':lriahlc fer 
(')  GSM, originally 'Groupe Special  Mohilc', and  ll(lW  c;tancling 
for 'Global System for  Mobilt" Communications', is  an  ETSI 
standard  for  digital  mobile  telrphony  in  the  900  Mh1 
frequtncy range. 
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for  the  communications  they  initiated  to  the  service 
provider who, in  turn, will  pay the largest part of these 
monies  to  the  operator.  In  otht"r  words,  a  S("rvice 
provider  assumes  the  liability  for  recovering  thf'  sums 
due by the customers in exchange for a percentage of tlie 
telecommunication turnover that his  customers generate. 
This  percentage  depends  on  the  terms  of the  contract 
binding the service provider to the operator, and usually 
increases  with  the  telecommunication  turnover  secured 
by the service provider.  . 
Amongst  the  duties  falling  to the  service  provider are: 
taking  subscriptions  from  individual  customers  to  the 
operator's  network,  promoting  the  st>rvice  available  on 
the  operator's  network,  customer  care  and  billing  of 
customers. 
5.  Whereas  in  the current regulatory context, mobile 
tt-lt>phony  networks  are  limited  to  national  borders, 
nothing  pn·vents  st-rvicc  providers  from  acting  for 
<lifferent  network  operators  in  different  countri<"'>.  This 
possibility  of  establishing  trans-European  billing  and 
distribution  organi?..ations  is  especially  relevant  in  the 
context  of  the  GSM  mobile  telephony  system.  Unlike 
analogue  telephony.  GSM  systems  ar<"  technically 
compatible throughout Europ<",  so  that a  customer who 
.'iuhsnibe1l  to  the  servicf's  offt'rcd  by  one  network  can 
usc  his  phone  on  any  other  GSM  network.  At  the 
moment,  this  possibility  of  u!iing  one's  phone  in  a 
country  <lifferent  from  the  country  of  subscription 
depends  on  the  existence  of  'ro:uning  agreemenr.s' 
lwtwcen  network  operators,  whcrchy  the  nctwork 
oprrator  who took the suhscription (the horne  network) 
payc;  the nel\vork operator for the calls pet formed on the 
l:ttter's  n<'twork,  i.e.  that in  which  the  cu~tomc."r 'roams' 
(the  vi~ited network). 
6.  Some  operators  of  'visited'  n<"tworks  add  a 
surcharge  to  the  price  they  would  otherwise chargc  to 
their  own  suhscribers,  and  thio;  surcharge  is  eventually 
passed  on  to  the  final  customer.  They  justify  this 
sun·har~<'  hy  the  fact  that  only  the  home- nt>twork 
rccei\·r~ a monthly pa)'lllcnt  for the sub  .. cription, whereas 
the visited network can only ch:ur,r calls performed. This 
su n:ha rge,  ah hough  it  varies  f  wm  0JH.'  operator  l<l 
:lllother,  can  t·onstitute  a  disincenti\'e  for  customers  tn 
use  tht'ir  phone on  a  network on  which  they  have  no 
subscription. 
7.  The  Parties to the agreement ha\·c  expressed  their 
intention, in  a  Memorandum of Understanding, to offc."r 
via  ead1  other  the  air-time  they  purchase  from  their 
r<"spenivc operators. This approach, if  proved su<.·cessful, 
would  change  the  structure  of  the  mobile  telephony 
services  market:  at  the  moment,  ser. icc  providers  bill 
their  customers  for  a  service  which  is  typically  one. 
provided  hy  a  single  operator,  oper:tting  within  one 
country.  Thcn•forc,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission, 
different  reference  markets  should  he  considered  with 
rcspen to th("  agreements which  have been  notified: 
- a  European-wide  markt·t  of GSM  mohile  telephony 
services,  in  which  service  providf'rs  purchase  high-
volumes  of  air-time  from  several  operators 
throughout  Europe,  effectively  bringing  a 
one-stop-shop  ~c.-rvice  at  affordable  prict-~  to  indi-
vidual customers, 
- a  series of national  markets defined by  th<"  scope of 
the  licence  granted  to  each  mobile  phone·  network 
operator  by  relevant  national  authorities;  in  these 
markets, national network operators provide access to 
their GSM telephony services on a wholesale basis to 
service pro\'iders. 
IV.  The shareholder agreement 
8.  Tht- shareholder agreement (SA)  is  concluded for a 
duration of 20 years, and  is  subject to tacit renewal. 
9.  The SA originally prohibited the parent <"Cltnpanies 
from  competing with  the  joint-venture company. These 
provisions have now been deleted from the SA. 
I 0.  'l11e  SA  originally  restricted  the  joint  Vf'nture 
company  CMC  to  operate  only  in  France  ac;  air-time 
rcseller.  At  the  Commission's  request,  these  provisions 
have  been deleted  from  the SA. 
V.  The Memoran<lum of Understanding 
11.  The Memorandum of Und<"rstanding  (MoU)  wac; 
signed  in  June  1993  by  Cellcom,  CMC, Talkline,  and 
Talkline  Nordic.  The- M.oU  aims  at  estahlishing  a 
one-stop sllopping and hilling sen·ice to any cu~tomer of 
the Parties: 
the  Parties  intend  to  jointly  procure  tt'rminal 
ec1uipment,  to establish  regional stocks, and  to apply 
common distribution methods allowing a  ru~tomer of 
any Pany to the  MoU  to receive  after-sake;  ser.rice 
for the equipment in  :tny  country in  which  another 
party to the MoU operates, 
a  customer  of  one  Party  will  have  ;IcC<''~  to 
SIM-cards (subscriptions  to  the  service)  and  mohilc 
phone  services  provided  by  any other Party  tlf  the 
MoU;  accordingly,  after-sales  service  for  a 
subscription  taken  frClm  one  Party  (~'.g.  the 
replacement of a SJM-card) will  he  performed hy any 
Party, 
the  Parties  intend  to  share  know-how  and  ~oftw:ue 
applications  for  subscriber  handling,  hilling  and 
customer service,  in  so  far  as  this  docs  not  infringe 
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the rights and title or th<"  l·onun("n·ial  imerf'st of any 
Party;  the  Parties  intend  to  jointly  develop  a 
European SIM-card enabling cooperative services, 
the  Panies  will  adopt  a  joint  training  programm~, 
recruit foreign  language-speaking staff and exchange 
trading conce-pts  and materials  in  so far as  this does 
not  infringe  the  rights  and  title  or the  commercial 
interest of any Pany. 
following  addrc.-ss,  quming  tla~  rdnenn·  'IV/.\4.797 
CMC-Talkline'. In  acc01·dance  with Article  20 of Regu-
lation No 17, such observations will  be protectrd by tlte 
provisions on professional secrecy. 
The  Commission  intends  to  take  a  favourable  view 
towards  the  notified  transaction  under  the  competition 
rules  of  the  EC  Treaty.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites 
interested third parties to send their observations within 
one  month  of  the  publi<"ation  of  this  notice,  to  the 
Observations should be sent to: 
European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), 
Directorate for  restrictive  practices,  abuse  of dominant 
positions and other distortions of competition I, 
Electrical  and  elt"ctronic  manufactured  products, 
information industries and  tdecommunic:uion~. 
200  rue de  Ia  Loi, 
B-1 049 Bru5scls. 
Fax:  (32 2)  296 98 09. 
Prior notifiCation of a  concentration 
(Case No IV  /M.492 - Klackner lie  Co./Computer 2000 AG) 
(94/C 221/07) 
(T~xt with  F.EA.  relcvancc) 
I.  On  I  Augmt  1994,  th<>  Commission rf'ct"ived  a  norifir:uion of a propmf'<l  t·onn•ntr:Hi<'ll 
pursuaru to Anidc 4 tlf a Cuunt·il Regulation (EEC) No 4064/H9 (') by v.•hid1  the umff'rtaking 
Kl<kkner  &  Co.  AG  belonging to the Viag/Bayernwerk-Group :u·quire5  within  thf'  meaning 
of Art ide 3 (I) (h) of that R<"gulation  control of the whol<"  of Computer 2000 AG. 
2.  The business acti\"itics  of the undertakings concerned arr: 
for Klockner & Co. AG: distribution of steel, chemicals, textil<'s and fuels, 
for Computer 2000 AG: distribution of computer hardware and softwar<'. 
3.  Upon  prdimin:u y  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that  th<'  notified  C(lllCt>ntration 
could fall  within  the scope of the abovementioned Regulation. However, thl'  final  decision on 
tf1is  point  is  reserved. 
4.  The Commission  inviu·s  interested  third  parties to submit their possible  ohst>rvations  on 
the proposed  operation to the Commission. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not later than  10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication.  Observations can  be  sent to tl1e  Commission by  fax  (fax  No 32-2-296 43 0 I) or 
by  post, under rderenc<'  numher rv  /M.492 - Klockner &  Co./Computrr 2000 AG,  to the 
following  address: 
Commission of the  Europe-an  Comrnunitie5, 
Directorate Gen<'ral  for Competi(ion (DG IV), 
Merger Task fnrct", 
I 50, Avenue de  Cortenh(·q~. 
B- I 049 Brussels. 
/ 
(')  OJ No L 395, 30.  12.  uiK("Currigendum: OJ No I. 257, 21. 9.  1990, p.  1.\. 
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Notice  pursuant  to  Article  19  (3)  of  Co~mcil Regulation  No  17 (')  concerning  case  No 
IV/35.006- ETSI interim IPR policy 
(95(C 76/05) 
(Tat with EE.A rdCYaDce) 
I. Inuoduction 
1.  On 22  February 1994, the European Telecommuni-
cations  Standards  Institute  ('ETSI')  submitled  to  the 
Commission  of the European Communities for negative 
clearance and or exemption pursuant to Article 85 of the 
EC  Treaty and Article  53  of the  EEA  Agreement,  the 
ETSI  interim  intellectual  property  rightS  ('IPR  ') policy 
('the  policy')  and  the  ETSI  intellectual  property rightS 
undertalting ('the undenaking') as  approved  ~y the 15th 
ETSI General Assembly  of 18  March 1993.  --
2.  Following  a  vote  by  mail  ballot  decided  on  by 
.  )"'fTSI's  20th  General  Assembly  on  22  July  1994,  the 
:required majority of ETSI's members voted in favour of 
abandoning  the  undertaking;  subsequendy,  ETSI 
amended  the  notification  so  as  tO  exclude  any 
consideration  of the  undenaking. As  far  as  the interim 
policy  is  concerned,  a  new  version  was  approved  by 
ETSI's members at ETSI's 21st General Assembly on 22 
and 23  November 1994; this revised version, which went 
into effect on 23  November 1994, takes into account and 
reflectS  the  abandonment  of  the  Undertaking.  The 
present notice thus relates only to the interim IPR policy 
as  revised. 
II.  The Parties 
3.  The  creation  of a  European  standardization body 
for the  telecommunications sector was  recommended  by 
the  Commission  in  its  1987  Green  Paper on the  devel-
opment  of the  common  market for  telecommunications 
,. · 1ervices  and  equipment  (Towards  a  dynamic  European 
\.Leconomy) (').  Such  a  body  was  established  in  1988  in 
Sophia-Aiuipolis  (France)  as  the  European  Telecom-
munications  Standards  Institute  ('ETSI'),  a  non-profit 
association  under  French  law.  ETSI  was  formally 
recognized  as  a  European  Standards  Institute  by  the 
Community in  1992 (l). 
ETSI's  task  is  to establish  common  European standards 
in  the  telecommunications  sector;  ETSI  standards  in 
many  instances  play  a  specific  role  under  Community 
law;  in  particular,  they  must  be  used  inter  alia  (i)  in 
connection with the mutual recognition for type approval 
(')  OJ No 13, 21.  12.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(2)  COM(87) 290, 30. 6.  1987. 
(')  Commission  Decision  92/400/EEC  of  15  July  1992, 
amending Directive 83/189/EEC OJ No L lll, 6. 8.  1992. 
of  tenninal  equipment  pursuant  tO  Directive 
91/263/EEC  on  the  mututal  recognition  of  terminal 
equipment e>,  and (ii)  in  relation to public procurement 
by telecommunications operatOrs (f). 
4.  According to ETSI's Statutes,. membership of ETSI 
is  open tO  entities falling within five  defined  categories, 
namely  (i)  Administrations,  administrative  bodies  and 
national  Standards  organizations,  (ii)  Public  network 
operators, (iii)  manufacturers,  (iv)  Users and (v)  Private 
services  providGrs,  research  bodies,  consultancy 
companies  and others.  All  members  must be  established 
on  the  territory  of  a  country  falling  within  the 
geographical  area of the  European Conference of PoStS 
and  Telecommunications  Administrations  (CEP'I).  At 
present, ETSI has  approximately 365  mem~ers; legal  or 
natural  persons  entitled  to  full  membership  may  alter-
natively· become  an  observer,  which  carries  with  it the 
right to attend and participate in  the meetings  of ETSI 
Assemblies (General and Technical), but not the right tO 
vote. 
5.  ETSI's  sovereign  body  is  the  General  Assembly, 
which  meetS  twice  a year and on  an  extraordinary basis 
at  the  convocation  of  the  chairman;  the  General 
Assembly  adopts the definitive standards and decides on 
more  genenl  issues  such  as  the  IPR  policy.  ETSI's 
Technical  Assembly  approves  the work programmes  on 
draft standards, which are prepared by ETSI's Technical 
Committees.  Voting  both  within  the  General  Assembly 
and  the Technical  Assembly  takes  place  on  a weighted 
basis  connected  tO the annual turnover in  telecommuni-
cations of the entity in question, or in the case of admin-
istrations, the  national GDP. 
Ill. The  background  to  the  present  interim  IPR policy 
6.  The  development  and  ultimate  application  of  a 
given standard can be held up or even made impossible if 
the standard incorporates proprietary technology and the 
owner  of  that  technology  is  not  willing  to  make  it 
(")  Council  Directive  91/263/EEC  of  29  April  1991  on  the 
approximation of the laws  of the Member States concerning 
telecommunications  terminal  equipment,  including  the 
mutual recognition of their conformity, OJ No L 128, 23.  5. 
1991. 
(')  Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June  1993  coordinating 
the  procurement  pro~edurcs  of  entities  o~crating  in  the 
water, energy,  transpo~ and telecommunicauons sectors, OJ 
No  L 199, 9.  8.  1993; Article  18  (2)  specifics  that 'technical 
specifications  shall  be  defined  by  reference  to  European 
specifications where these exist'. 
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available  for  third  panies  wishing  to  manufacture 
productS complying with the standard. This problem has 
been  addressed  in  a  general  context,  i.e.  not  relating 
exclusively  to  the  telecommunication$  field,  in  the 
Commission•s  communication  on  intellectUal  property 
rightS  and standardization (1),  which  setS  out a  number 
of relevant policy considerations. 
7.  In  order to  reduce  the  risk  of investment in  the 
preparation, adoption and application of standards being 
wasted because of the unavailability of an IPR and with 
a  view  to  finding  the  appropriate  balance  between  the 
needs  of standardization  for  public  use  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications on the one hand and the  legitimate 
interest of the  owners  of intellectUal  property rights  in 
deciding  whether  or  not  their  technology  will  be 
available for others or not on the other hand, ETSI soon 
after  iu creation  set  up  an  intellectual  property rights 
-Committee in  order to propose solutions. 
8.  The culmination of the discussions within ETSI on 
these  IPR issues  was  the  adoption  by  ETSI'  s  General 
Assembly  on  18  March  1993  of an  interim  IPR policy 
and  an  IPR undertaking.  In  very broad  lines,  the  IPR 
arrangementS  adopted  at that time  foresaw  a system  in 
which  members  would  agree  in  advance  to  allow  their 
IPRs  deemed  'essential'  (i.e.  equipment complying  with 
the  standard could  not be  made  without infringing  that 
IPR)  for  an  ETSI  standard,  to  be  included  in  that 
standard, unless the IPR-owner had identified any IPR it 
wished  to  withhold ·within a certain  period  (six  months) 
as  of the  date  on  which  the  Technical  Committee  had 
decided  to include the  draft standard in  the  ETSI work 
programme.  Aside  from  establishing  what  has  been 
referred to as  the 'licensing-by-default' obligation, which 
differs  (as  did  a  number of other aspects  of. the under-
taking)  from  the  practice  in  other  standard-making 
bodies  where IPR holders  must  explicitly agree to have 
their technology included  in  a  standard,  the  ETSI IPR 
undertaking  set  forth  certain  obligations  regarding  the 
terms  of the  licence  to  be  granted  to  other  members, 
inter  alia  (i)  that  the  licence  be  for  monetary 
consideration,  unless  agreed  otherwise  by  both  licensee 
and  licensor,  (ii)  the  obligation  for  the  IPR  holder  to 
notify to the Director of ETSI the maximum royalty rate 
it  would  apply  and  (iii)  the  obligation  to  grant 
non-exclusive licences covering the area of the CEPT, as 
well  as  of the  Associate  Members  (e.g.  Australia,  New 
Zealand  and  Israel;  other countries  would  be  included 
on  a standard-by-standard basis,  depending on whether 
an  officially  recognized  national  Standardization  body 
had  formally  adopted the  standard and  implemented  it, 
or  whether  a  major  telecommunications  network 
operator had  or was  about to  procure  on  a substantial 
scale equipment  to  a  specification  compliant  with  that 
standard). 
(')  COM(92) 445 final, 27.  10.  1992. 
9.  The  arrangementS  described  briefly  in  point  8 
above  gave  rise  to a complaint lodged on  22 June  1993 
by the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers 
Association (CBEMA}, moSt of whose members are also 
members of ETSI, alleging infringements of both Articles 
85  and 86  resulting from  ETSI's IPR arrangements, i.e. 
the obligation on members to sign the undertaking which 
in  CBEMA's view  amounted  to a  compulsory  licensing 
scheme,  and  the  other licensing  conditions  mentioned 
above  under point 8. 
The issues  raised  by this  complaint were  never decided 
on formally by the Commission, in view of the fact that 
the undertaking and any references thereto in the policy 
were abandoned by ETSI'  s General .Assembly of 22 and 
23 November 1994 in order to achieve greater consensus 
amongst ETSI members, and the complaint subsequently 
withdrawn. 
IV. The relevant market 
10.  Article  2  of  ETSI's  Statutes  states  that  ETSI's 
objective is  to produce the technical standards which are 
necessary to achieve  a large  unified  European  telecom-
munications  market;  according  to  Article  3,  ETSI's 
activities shall be technical pre-standardization and stan-
dardization  at the  European  level  in  the  telecommuni-
cations  and  related  areas.  On  this  basis,  two  directly 
affected  marketS  can  be  identified,  namely  the  market 
for  te-lecommunications  standards  and  the  downstream 
markets which use those standards, i.e.  the telecommuni-
cations equipment and services markets. For the purpose 
of an assessment under the competition rules  of the EC 
Treaty and the EEA Agreement, the geographic scope of 
the IPR arrangements can be  deemed to be  at least the 
entire  EEA,  although  ETSI  standards  may  in  fact  be 
adopted and applied also outSide  the  EEA. 
V.  ETSI'S interim IPR policy 
11.  The  interim  IPR policy  adopted  by  ETSI's  21st 
General .Assembly on 22 and 23 November 1994 conwns 
the  following  provisions  which  may be  relevant  for  an 
assessment pursuant to Article  85  of the EC Treaty and 
Article  53  of the EEA Agreement: 
"  Provisions  relating to  ETSI members 
(i)  Each  member shall  use  iu reasonable  endeavours 
to  infonn ETSI in  a  timely manner of essential  IPRs  it 
becomes.aware of; in  particular, a  member submitting a 
technical  proposal  for  a  standard  shall  on  a  bona fide 
basis  draw  ETSI's  attention  to  any  of its  IPRs  which 
might be essential if that proposal is  adopted. These obli-
gations  do  not  however  imply  any  obligation  on 
members to conduct IPR searches (clauses 4.1  and  4.2 of 
the  policy). 
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(ii)  Where  a  member  notifies  ETSI  that  tt  JS  not 
prepared to license  an IPR in  respect of a standard, the 
Technical Assembly shall review the requirement for t!lat 
standard and satisfy itself that a viable  alternative tech-
nology is available for the nandard which is  not blocked 
by that IPR and satisfies ETSI's requirements; where in 
the  opinion  of the  Technical Assembly  no  such  viable 
alternative technology exists, work on the standard shall 
cease,  and  the  Director  of  ETSI  shall  request  that 
member to reconsider its position. If it does not, it shall 
infonn the Director of ETSI of its  decision and provide 
a written explanation of its reasons for refusing to license 
that IPR; the  Director shall  send  the  member's  expla-
nation  to  the  ETSI  Counsellors  (this  includes  the 
European  Commission)  for  their  consideration  (clause 
8.1.1  and  8.1.2). 
(iii)  Any violation of the policy by  a  memb~r shall be 
deemed to be a breach by that member of its obligations 
to  ETSI.  The  ETSI  General  Assembly  shall  have  the 
authority to decide the action to be taken, if any, againSt 
the member in breach in accordance with ETSI's Statutes 
") (clause  14). 
Provisions  relating  to  members and non-members 
(i)  IPR  holders  whether  members  of  ETSI  or third 
parties, should be adequately and fairly rewarded for the 
use  of their  IPRs  in  the  implementation  of standards 
(clause  3.2). 
(ii)  When  an  essential  IPR  relating  to  a  panicular 
standard  is  brought  to  the  attention  of  ETSI,  ETSI's 
Director  shall  request  the  owner  to  give  within  three 
months  an  undertaking in  writing that it  is  prepared to 
grant  irrevocable  licenses  on  fair,  reasonable  and 
non-discriminatory terms and conditions to manufacture, 
sell  lease  or otherwise  dispose  of  equipment  so  manu-
factured  (clause  6.1). 
(iii)  Where  ETSI  becomes  aware  that  licences  in 
respect  of  a  standard  are  not  available  from  a  third 
party,  the  standard  shall  be  referred  to  the  Director of 
ETSI  for  funher  consideration  in  accordance  with  a 
.;,'  procedure  described  in  clause  8.2,  which  includes 
discussion  in  the Technical and  General Assemblies  and 
consultation  with  ETSI's  Counsellors,  and  may 
culminate  in  a  request to  the  European Commission  by 
the General Assembly to see what further action may  be 
appropriate, including non-recognition of the standard in · 
question. 
Provisions  relating  to  ETSI and general  issues 
(i)  ETSI shall take reasonable measures to ensure that 
its  activities  which  relate  to  the  preparation,  adoption 
and  application  of  standards,  enable  standards  to  be 
availzble  to  potential  users  in  accordance  with  the 
general principles of standardization (clause  3.3) . 
(ii)  At  the  request  of  the  European  Commission 
and/or the  EFTA-Secretariat  and  subject  to  the  latter 
two organizations meeting all reasonable expenses, ETSI 
shall  arrange  to  have  carried  out  an  investigation 
including  an  IPR  search,  with  the  objective  of  ascer-
taining  whether IPRs exist or are  likely  to exiSt  which 
may be or may become essential to a proposed standard· 
and  the  possible  terms  and  conditions  of  licences  for 
such  IPRs (clause 6.2). 
(iii)  Any published Standard shall include information 
pertaining  to  essential  IPRs  which  are  brought  to the 
attention of ETSI prior to such publication; ETSI shall 
establish  appropriate  procedures  to  allow  access  to 
information  at any  time  with  respect to  essential  IPRs 
which have  been  brought to its  attention (clause 7). 
(iv)  The  proceedings  of  ETSI  committees  shall  be 
regarded  as  non-confidential and information submitted 
to  a committee  shall  be  available  for public  inspection, 
unless  the  information  is  in  written  or other  tangible 
form,  it  is  identified  as  being  confidential  when  it  is 
submitted and it is  first submitted to and accepted by the 
chairman of the committee  as  being confidential (clause 
10). 
(v)  ETSI and its  members will endeavour to formulate 
a definitive  IPR policy, which will  include an evaluation 
of the  application  of the  interim  policy ·by  the  General 
Assembly  not  later  than ·four  years  from  the  date  of 
adoption  of the  interim  policy;  the  interim  policy  came 
into  effect  on  23  November  1994  for  a  minimum 
duration of two years and will remain in effect thereafter 
unless terminated by a 71  %  majority of a weighted indi-
vidual member vote confirmed by a 71  % majority of the 
weighted  national vote. 
Conclusion 
12.  The Commission intends to take a favourable view 
pursuant to Anicle  85  of the EC Agreement and Article 
53  of the EEA Agreement towards the ETSI interim IPR 
policy;  before  doing  so,  it  invites  all  interested  third 
parties to submit their observations within 30 days of the 
publication  of  this  notice  to  the  following  address 
quoting  the  reference  IV  /35.006  - ETSI  interim  IPR 
policy: 
Commission of the  European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), 
Directorate  for  restrictive  practices,  abuse  of dominant 
positions  and other distortions of competition I, 
· 200  Rue  de  Ia  Loi!Wetstraat 200, 
B-1049  Brussels. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 12 April  1991 
declaring the compatibility of a concentration 
.  (C~  No  ..  IV/M042 .:·A1Catelffeltmra) 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 
(Only the English text is authentic) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of  21  December 1989 on the control of  concentrations 
between undertakings(!),  and  in particular Article 8(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the Commission  Decisio~ of 21  January  1991  to initiate proceedings in this case, 
Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the obligations proposed 
by the Commission, 
After consulting the Advisory Committee on Concentrations, 
Whereas: 
I.  FACTS 
Nature of the proceeding 
I.  This proceeding concerns a proposed concentration which was notified on  I  0 December 1990 pursuant 
to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, consisting of the acquisition by Alcatel N.V. 
(Aicatel) from Fiat Spa (Fiat) of a controlling interest of  69.2% of  the shares ofTelettra Spa {Telettra). 
Telettra will in tum ~cquire I 00% of  Alcatel Face Spa, which is a subsidiary of  Alcatel.  Fiat will still 
own  25.4% of Telettra.  The  balance  of the  shares  in  Telettra are  currently owned  by  the  Spanish 
telecommunications operator, Telefonica de Espana {Telefonica). 
The parties 
2.  Alcatel  is  70%  owned  by  Alcatel  Alsthom  Compagnie  Generale  d'Electricite  (Aicatel  Alsthom), 
fonnerly  known  as  CGE.  Alcatel  is  principally  a  supplier  of telecommunications  systems  and 
equipment,  and  in  1989  had  a  worldwide  turnover  of 12.8  billion  Ecu.  Alcatel  Alsthom  had  a 
consolidated worldwide turnover of 20.7  billion  Ecu  in  1989,  the balance deriving mainly  from  the 
energy and transportation, nuclear, electrical engineering, and batteries sectors.  The Community-wide 
turnover of  Alcatel Alsthom in  1989 was  16.5 billion Ecu.  Not more than two-thirds was achieved in 
any one Member State. 
3.  Telettra is  principally a supplier of telecommunications  systems and  equipment.  In  1989,  it  had  a 
worldwide turnover of I. I billion Ecu, 0.95 billion Ecu of  which arising in the Community.  Not more 
than two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover was achieved  in  any one Member State. 
(I)  OJ  L 395, p 1,  rectified  version 
OJ  L 257, 21.9.1990 
Context of the agreement 4.  The agreement on the acquisition of  control in Telettra is one of the components of  the "Accord Cadre" 
entered into between Fiat and Alcatel Alsthom.  The other components of the "Accord Cadre" are: 
-the acquisition by Magneti Marelli, a subsidiary of Fiat, of a controlling interest in Alcatel 
.. Alsthom'  s  batteries subsidiary, CEAC.  This proposed .concentration,  which  is  subject to 
. :  completion" of" the  ~·~Vfelettta Sgteement;. h8s  beeri  notified and  is "being  dealt  with 
separately under case no. IV /M04JCl>; 
! 
the planned acquisition of a controlling interest in Fiat's railway equipment subsidiary, Fiat 
Ferroviaria, by GEC-Aisthom which is jointly controlled by GEC and Alcatel Alsthom; 
the creation of  a European holding company which will be jointly owned by Fiat and Alcatel 
Alsthom,  with  the  intention  of developing  initiatives  of mutual  interest  in  research  and 
development. 
The various components of  the.~'Accord Cadre" fall to be separately assessed under Regulation (EEC) 
No.  4064/89 or Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
The affected product markets 
5.  Four product markets within the telecommunications systems and equipment sector are affected by the 
concentration, these being public switching, line transmission systems, microwave systems, and private 
switching. 
These four markets represent 72% of  the total telecommunications equipment market which had a value 
of 16.7  billion ECU  in the EC  in  1989, including other telecommunications equipment areas such as 
radiotelephony, subsets, earth stations and telecommunications cables. 
In  terms of value, the most important telecommunications market is the market for public switching 
with  a  value  of 5.6  billion  Ecu  in  1989  which  represents  34% of the  total  telecommunications 
equipment market.  In the same year, the market for line transmission systems had a value of3.9 billion 
Ecu  (23%), private switching a value of 2 billion Ecu (12%), and microwave systems a value of 0.6 
billion Ecu (3%). 
6.  Market  shares  of the  parties  and  of their main  competitors  in  these  product markets  in  1989  are 
reproduced in  Annex(]). 
7. 
8. 
9. 
(2) 
(1) 
The public telecommunications eauipment markets 
The telecommunications equipment supply industry is characterised by a steadily increasing and very 
high level of R&D expenditure, due to the increasing software content of  telecommunications products 
and the shortening of product life cycles.  Technically,  Telettra  fits  in  well  with Alcatel's existing 
product base, and the acquisition gives Alcatel access to Telettra's  cross~connect technology. 
Public  switching,  line  transmission  equipment  and  microwave  equipment  are  largely  public 
telecommunications equipment markets where the telecommunications operators are the only or by far 
the most important customers.  The Spanish telecommunications operator, Telefonica for example, is 
the only buyer in  Spain of public switches,  and buys 90% of the line transmission equipment  and 
currently 60% of the microwave equipment in that Member State. 
Public telecommunications operators in principle operate diversified supplier policies which aim to strike 
OJ  C 315,  14.12.1990, p.l4 
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a  balance  between  creating  and  maintaining  competition  between  suppliers  on the  one hand,  and 
minimising costs arising from product differences on the other hand.  For public switching, for example, 
it is generally not considered feasible to have more than two or three suppliers because of  the high cost 
and technical complexity of this type of  equipment.  For transmission equipment, in general tenns, it 
is  u~ual to have more suppliers, say three to five,  but there would still be  a practical limit to the 
number which ·coul(l t>e: sti~tilined.  ·  .  "!  •  •  • •  •  •  ·  •  •  •  ·  •  •  ·  •  • 
Procurement  practices vary from  one operator to another,  and  from  one category of equipment to 
another, but are in  principle based on a combination of negotiated contracts and tenders. 
11.  Procurement  practices of the  EC  telecommunications  operators  are  evolving.  Traditionally,  in  all 
Member States public networks were operated by state-owned telecommunications authorities which 
gave their orders for telecommunications equipment to a small group of national suppliers.  This was 
often accompanied  by specific national technical standards, which created adaptation costs for non-
domestic suppliers. 
12.  The actual pace of change in  procurement policy varies quite significantly from  one Member State to 
another.  In this context, a process of liberalisation and deregulation of  the telecommunications sector 
has  been  initiated in  the  framework  of the achievement of the single  market.  The  Commission's 
Directives on liberalisation of  telecommunications services, for example, aim to create more competition 
by breaking up the monopolies of the network operators in  the provision of services.  On the supply 
side, Directives on public procurement and on mutual recognition of  terminal type approval aim to open 
markets  to  competitors  from  other  Member  States.  Furthermore,  there  are  efforts  to  achieve  a 
Community-wide  standardisation of telecommunications  equipment  in  the  framework  of European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
13.  It  is  anticipated that the application of the provisions of Council Directive 90/531/EEC<
4
)  on public 
procurement will contribute to further breaking down the traditional nationally-based buying policies 
of the telecommunications operators.  Member States have to implement this Directive by  1 January 
1993,  with  the exception  of Spain,  which  must  implement  it  by  1 January  1996,  and  Greece  and 
Portugal by  I January  1998. 
14.  As to standardisation of products in the markets under consideration, ETSI,  which was set up  in  1987, 
plans to issue 22 standards and  II technical reports in the transmission area in  its work programme for 
1990-1993.  Adoption of ETSI  standards by the telecommunications operators in this area is voluntary 
for the time being,  and  commitment  to this varies.  However,  from  the date of implementation  of 
Directive 90/531/EEC, use of European Telecommunications Standards (ETS) by telecommunications 
operators will  be mandatory in  the specification of their calls t9 tender. 
15.  The  extent  of national  specifications  which  exist  varies  from  one  Member  State  to another  and 
according to product.  National specifications for transmission equipment for example are low or non-
existent in Spain but quite significant in  Italy. 
< 4
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16. 
17. 
Transmission markets in Spain 
Because of the significance of Alcatel and Telettra as competitors for the supply of line transmission 
equipment in Spain, the Commission has carried out a detailed enquiry as to the structural impact of 
.  the. con~ntration in this··Member State  . 
•••  \,  #  .  ~  .. : '.  ·.  .•. 
Spain  is  at present the  fastest  growing telecommunications  market  in  the EC,  with overall growth 
expected to continue at around  5%  in  real  terms  per annum  for  the next  5 years  because  of the 
modernisation programme under way.  In 1989 the value of  the line transmission equipment market was 
531  million  ECU (13% of the total  EC  market) and that of the microwave equipment market  117 
million  ECU (20% of EC).  Against the  overall trend  in  the other telecommunications  equipment 
markets, the microwave equipment market is generally declining. 
Ability of Telefonica to react to the concentration 
18.  The  telecommunications  operator  most  concerned  by  the  concentration,  Telefonica,  has  raised  no 
objection.  Like other telecommunications operators, Telefonica has a diversified supplier policy so as 
not to be overly dependent on any one supplier.  In  its  initial reply to the Commission's enquiries, 
Telefonica stated that it considered that the concentration between Alcatel and Telettra would not affect 
this policy. 
19.  In  response  to  the  Commission's  subsequent  enquiries  Telefonica  has  specified  that  its  policy  of 
diversified transmission equipment purchasing is based,  inter alia, on the following principles: 
Orders are placed on the basis of annual or two-yearly programmes and product suppliers are 
aware of invitations  to  tender for  products.  The  factors  taken  into  account  in  awarding 
contracts are quality, the delivery period, reliability and price. 
Telefonica is willing both to arrange any contacts that suppliers wish to have and to provide 
them  with  the  information  they  deem  necessary  in  order to  be able  to tender on an  equal 
footing. 
New or potential suppliers may  freely request technical approval of their products.  Products 
which have successfully undergone technical testing are included in Telefonica's catalogue of 
suitable  products  which  can  be  purchased.  The  ultimate  choice  of products  is  made  in 
accordance with a combination of parameters, of which technical performance is one. 
An industrial presence in Spain will not henceforth be a decisive factor; it will, however, be 
necessary to maintain back-up in  the country. 
The company's strategic plan for  1991-95 provides among other things for the opening-up of 
the market to new suppliers. 
20.  Tdefonica has minority shareholdings in  some of its suppliers.  In  particular, it  has a shareholding of 
21%  in  Alcatel  Standard  Electrica S.A.  which  is  a subsidiary of Alcatel, a shareholding of 10%  in 
Telettra Espanola S.A.  which is a subsidiary of Telettra, and a shareholding of 5.4% in Telettra itself. 
21.  An  agreement which is conditional on the acquisition of Telettra by Alcatel- has already been entered 
into whereby Alcatel  will  acquire Telefonica's 5.4% shareholding in  Telettra.  The same agreement 
contains a provision whereby Alcatel has a call option to acquire Telefonica's shareholding in Telettra 
Espanola S.A. 
Furthermore,  Telefonica  has  stated  that  there  is  no  longer  a  strategic  reason  to  retain  minority 
shareholdings in  its suppliers, and that  it  is  willing to consider suitable offers. 
22.  Accordingly, on 6 February  1991, Alcatel  made the following commitments to the Commission: 
to acquire Telefonica's 5.4% shareholding in  Telettra when control in  Telettra is  acquired; 
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to exercise the call option to acquire the I  OOA. shareholding of  Telefonica in Telettra Espaftola 
S.A.; 
to enter immediately into good faith  negotiations with Telefonica so as to acquire at a fair 
price Telefonica's 21% shap-ebolding in Alcatel Standard Electrica S.A  .  .  ·  .  .  ~. .  .  "  . . . .  .  .  . .  .  .. 
Ability of  conioetitors to react to tile concentration 
23.  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  (AT&l)  is  the  world's  leading  line  transmission 
equipment supplier.  It conducts its business  in  Spain through  a joint venture company, AT&T-NS 
Espafta, which was set up in 1987.  This company is 51% owned by AT&T and 49% owned by Amper 
S.A.  The joint venture's first transmission sales were in 1988, with strong increases following in 1989 
and  1990.  AT&T-NS  Espafta today offers the full  range of line transmission products in Spain. 
AT&T  considers  that  it  is  possible  for  it  to  sell  a  higher  than  anticipated .level  of transmission 
equipment in Spain.  AT&T-NS Espafta has the ability and spare capacity to do this, and AT&T could 
supply products from  other subsidiaries into this market. 
Jl/'t 91 24. 
AT&T does not currently sell  microwave transmission  products in  Spain.  AT&T-NS  Espafta  is said 
to continue to pursue public tender opportunities for  microwave radio equipment. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Ericsson) is a Swedish company which, because of  its relatively small 
domestic market base, has always been an active international competitor.  Almost  SO% of its overall  .. 
tuniover.now aris.e8'in Eur6pe; exduding.Swederl.  Ericsson is al~y  established in Spain.  Although 
principally a supplier of  public switching equipment to Telefonica, it also supplies digital transmission 
equipment products.  Ericsson considers that it could strengthen the existing product offering, and easily 
expand local capacity if necessary,  or supply products from  other subsidiaries. 
Ericsson  currently has  limited  sales  of a small  capacity short distance radio  link  in  the  microwave 
equipment market in Spain.  It states that it is intended to develop its position in this Member State and 
that essentially there is no product adaptation requirement for further development. 
25.  Siemens has currently only a marginal position in the transmission markets in Spain, accounted for by 
sales  of around  lOrn  ECU,  of microwave  equipment  in  1989.  Siemens  is  the  third  largest 
telecommunications equipment supplier worldwide, just behind Alcatel and AT&T,  and  is therefore a 
significant potential competitpr for the transmission. markets  in  Spain. 
In  response to the Commission's enquiries,  Siemens  considers that  there arc currently two  important 
trade barriers to the Spanish markets.  These are the vertical  integration of Telefonica with suppliers, 
and the fact that on public procurement Directive 90/531/EEC does not have to be applied in Spain until 
1996. 
26.  Alcatel in its notification cites the possibility of  significant entry into the Community's markets by other 
large  companies,  notably  Northern  Telecom  of Canada,  and  Fujitsu  and  NEC  of Japan.  For these 
companies  however,  the  costs  of product  adaptation  are  substantial,  since  there  exist  currently 
substantial differences  in  technical specifications. 
II.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
Concentration 
27.  The  notified  operation  is  a concentration  within  the  meaning  of Article  3(l)(b) of Regulation  No. 
4064/89 since by acquiring 69.2% of the shares  in  Telettra,  Alcatel  will  acquire control of Tclcttra. 
Community dimension 
28.  The  thresholds  of Article  1(2)  of Regulation  No.  4064/89  arc  met  since  the  combined  aggregate 
worldwide  turnover of Alcatcl  Alsthom  and  Tclettra  is  more  than  5 billion  Ecu,  and  the  aggregate 
Community-wide turnover of each  is  more than  250  million  Ecu,  of which not more  than two-thirds 
is  achieved within  one and  the  same  Member  State.  The  concentration therefore has  a Community 
dimension. 
Compatibility with the common  market 
(i) Relevant  product  markets 
29.  The  concentration  leads  to  an  increase  in  market  shares  in  four  markets:  public  switching,  line 
transmission  equipment,  microwave  equipment  and  private  switching.  Each  of these  markets  is  a 
relevant product  market  for  the  purposes of assessment  under Regulation  No.  4064/89. 
(ii) Geographical  markets 
30.  It is considered that up to now the telecommunications markets in the EC have been largely  fragm~ntcd • 
' 
.  · 
in  national markets.  The main  reasons for this have been, inter alia: 
....  ·~·::. 
the operation of the public networks by national telecommunications authorities which have 
traditionally given their orders for telecommunications equipment to a small group of  national 
suppliers, and .  .  .  .  . .  .. .  .· \  ..  .  ·~··....  .  .... 
different national standards which created high rosts of  adaptation for non--domestic suppliers  . 
This situation is evolving as described in recitals 7 to 15  above. 
31.  In  very broad terms, standardisation is  progressing faster for transmission equipment than for public 
switching for example.  Furthermore, the replacement of analogue technology by digital  will  break 
down some of the existing technical barriers further in the medium to long term. 
32.  Although it is anticipated that in the medium term the technical barriers will become less significant, 
the actual pace of  change of  commercial policy of the network operators varies substantially from  one 
Member State to another. 
33.  The  combination  of Alcatel  and  Telettra  has  a  significant  impact  on  competition  only  on  the 
transmission markets in Spain. It is sufficient therefore to examine whether the Spanish markets have 
to be considered as relevant geographical markets. 
34.  The most significant structural characteristics up to now have been that: 
the  Spanish  telecommunications  operator,  Telefonica,  tradi~ionally purchased  from  locally 
established suppliers, although this has started to change; 
there  is  no  legal  obligation  in  Spain  for  the  next  five  years  to  apply  the  procurement 
procedures provided for  in  Council Directive 90/531/EEC; 
there are vertical links between Telefonica and its major equipment suppliers and in particular 
Alcatel  and  Telettra,  by  means  of  minority  shareholdings. ·  Vertical  links  between 
telecommunications operators and their suppliers can distort normal conditions of  competition 
by giving those suppliers a privileged position on the market.  This can be the case even where 
telecommunications  operators  only  have  minority  shareholdings,  since  such  links  would 
normally put other suppliers without such  links at a disadvantage. 
35.  Given the current structural characteristics of the transmission markets  in  Spain,  it  is concluded that 
Spain  has to  be  considered as  a separate relevant geographical  market,  for  the purpose of assessing 
whether the concentration could give rise to  a dominant position which would significantly impede 
effective competition within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89. 
(iii) Impact of the proposed concentration 
Overall impact 
36.  For public switching, there is only an  impact in  Italy, where Alcatel and Telettra together would have 
21% of the market based on  1989 figures.  Since ltaltel is by far the leading competitor on the Italian 
market,  having maintained a market share of 50% for the last  few  years,  the creation of a dominant 
position for the combined entity in this product market by the concentration is excluded, even  if Italy 
were to be considered the  relevant geographic market. 
For  private  switching,  Telettra  is  not  a significant  competitor  in  any  Member  State since  it  has  a 
marginal  presence only on  the Italian  market.  The  concentration  produces no  significant structural 
effect on either the Italian or wider EC  market. 
Accordingly, only the impact of the concentration on the markets for line transmission equipment and 
microwave equipment (the transmission  markets) in  Spain has to be considered. Transmission markets in  Spain 
37.  On the basis of  the actual market shares of  Alcatel and Telettra in 1989, the concentration leads to very 
. high combined market. shares Qn the transmission markets in Spain· for the ne~  entity, because the two 
. companies are the tWo current· principal suppliers to Tefefonica.  .  .  .  . ·  •  ·  ·.  ...  ~ ·  ·· · 
The figures .  are as follows: 
line transmission equipment: Alcatel 40%, Telettra 41% 
microwave equipment: Alcatel  18%, Telettra 65%. 
Contestability of the transmission markets 
38.  A very high share of any market could indicate that a dominant position exists. Such an indication in 
the  case  of a  supplier  may  n~vertheless be  countered,  for  example  by  the  buying  power  of a 
monopsonistic purchaser. 
In the present case, the high market shares of  Alcatel and Telettra in the transmission markets in Spain 
result from Telefonica's choice of these companies as its main suppliers.  This choice was however 
made on the basis of Alcatel and Telettra being active competitors in the past. 
39.  Since Telefonica has maintained a diversified purchasing policy up to now, it  is  not probable that the 
new  com~ined entity will sustain the same market shares as achieved by the parties as competitors. 
40.  It  is  possible for Telefonica to increase its purchases from  other suppliers of transmission equipment 
in  order to prevent any dependence on the new entity. 
AT&T  is  immediately capable of increasing its deliveries across the entire range of line transmission 
equipment products.  AT&T is not yet supplying microwave products in Spain, but AT&T-NS Espana 
is  continuing to pursue some public tender opportunities. 
. 
Although  Ericsson  does  not  cover the whole  range of line transmission  products,  it  is  capable of 
increasing deliveries of digital products, these products being the most  important segment for new 
installations.  Ericsson currently only has limited sales of microwave equipment in Spain.  It has stated 
however that it is  intended to develop its position in that Member State. 
The two principal actual competitors are therefore capable of increasing supply. 
41.  Furthermore, it would seem possible for some competitors not currently present to a significant extent 
in  Spain  to  become  suppliers  in  the  changed  environment.  Although  the  procedures envisaged  in 
Directive 90/531/EEC do not yet have to be introduced, Telefonica has stated that: 
it is willing both to arrange any contacts that suppliers wish to have and to provide them with 
the information they deem necessary in  order to be able to tender on an equal footing. 
new or potential suppliers may freely request technicaf approval of their products.  Products 
which have successfully undergone technical testing are included in Telefonica's catalogue of 
suitable  products  which  can  be  purchased.  The  ultimate  choice  of products  is  made  in 
accordance with a combination of parameters, of which technical performance is  one. 
an  industrial presence in  Spain will not henceforth be a decisive factor. 
42.  On  this basis, there would be no significant barrier from  the demand side for strong competitors such 
as Siemens to enter into Spain.  Siemens is already present to some extent in the microwave equipment 
market. 
The technical costs of adaptation do not today in  themselves  constitute an  appreciable barrier to entry 
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for  European-based  competitors.  There  is  no  indication  either for the  time  being that  proprietary 
intellectual  property  rights  could  be  exploited  in  such  a  way  as  to  amount  to  a  barrier to  such 
competitors. Within the framework of  standardisation in ETSI the Commission has a strong interest in 
preventing such a barrier emerging. 
43.  ·  Consequently, as to 'hitherto  ·non._g~ropein based ootnpetilors such as Nof.them ·Teteeom, Fujitsu arid 
NEC, it is not necessary to determine whether these are realistic potential competitors in Spain in  the 
foreseeable future in the line transmission equipment market.  It is likely that a technical barrier to entry 
will remain until the Community's standardisation programme comes into effect and Telefonica fully 
adopts the standards which will be defined by ETSI  in this area.  The North American and Japanese 
standards are currently significantly different from  those adopted  by the  various European  network 
operators.  Once common  European standards are defined and implemented, the necessary minimum 
volume to justify adaptation may become a more realistic possibility. 
Structural links between Telefonica and the 
. parties to the concentration 
44.  In the context of the present case, the participation of  Telefonica in the capital of Alcatel and Telettra, 
given their strong position on the transmission markets in Spain, is considered to amount to a barrier 
for other competitors. 
45.  Alcatel has entered into a commitment vis-a-vis the Commission  whereby Alcatel will acquire from 
Telefonica  the  minority  shareholdings  in  Telettra  and  Telettra  Espafta  S.A.  and  will  enter  into 
negotiations to acquire from  Telefonica the minority shareholding in  Alcatel Standard Electrica S.A. 
The  vertical  links between  Telefonica and  Telettra will  therefore disappear and  given  Telefonica's 
willingness to consider appropriate offers, there is a probability that the vertical link between Telefonica 
and Alcatel will also be removed, given Alcatel's commitment  in  this respect. 
46.  Alcatel's commitments  relate to the removal  of a significant  structural  barrier to the transmission 
markets  in  Spain,  and  it  is  considered  necessary therefore for  the Commission  to ensure that these 
commitments are complied with as soon as possible after completion of the concentration by attaching 
appropriate obligations to  its  Decision. 
(iv) Conclusion 
47.  For the reasons outlined above,  it appears that competitors of Alcatel and Telettra are capable in  the 
near  future  of increasing  their  supply  to  Telefonica  in  the  transmission  markets.  Because  of its 
diversified purchasing policy and removal of  vertical links with Alcatel and Telettra, it also appears that 
Telefonica is capable in the near future of increasing its purchases from  other suppliers. 
48.  In  these circumstances, it  is not considered that the current high market shares of Alcatel and Telettra 
on the transmission  markets  in  Spain  will enable the new entity to  behave to an  appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors and main  customer. 
49.  The concentration  does  not therefore create or strengthen  a dominant  position as  a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or a substantial part of it. 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article  I 
Subject  to the  obligations defined  in  Article 2,  the  proposed  concentration  between  Alcatel  and  Telettra  is 
declared compatible with the common  market. 
Article 2 
The following obligations are attached to this Decision: 
(a)  That Alcatcl acquires Telefonica's 5.4% shareholding in  Telettra Spa upon the acquisition of control in Telettra Spa,  and that Alcatel  informs the C0111mission  when this takes place; 
(b)  That Alcatel exercises its call option to acquire the 10% sharcholding ofTclcfonicn in Telcuru 
Espanola  S.A.  as  soon  as  this  is  possible,  and  at the  latest within  12  months  from  the 
acquisition of control in Telettra, and that Alcat~l informs- the Commission when this takes 
· · ··  place;  ·  ·  •  ·  ··· ·  ·• ·  ·  ··  ·  •·  · · 
(c)  That Alcatel enters immediately into good faith negotiations with Telefonica so as to acquire 
at a fair price Telefonica's 21.14% shareholding in Alcatel Standard Electrica SA, within one 
week of the closing of the agreement with Fiat to acquire Telettra, and that Alcatel informs 
the Commission when it has done so; 
That Alcatel  informs the Commission as soon as there is  a successful outcome; 
Where there  is  no  successful  outcome within  3  months,  that Alcatel  informs  the 
Commission of  the progress ofthe negotiations that are taking place, and updates this 
information  subsequently every 3 months, 
That Alcatel,  in  the event of no  successful outcome, or no successful outcome after 
12 months have elapsed, provides the Commission with full details ofthe offer being 
made (including price and conditions) so as to enable the Commission to verify that 
the negotiations as  defined above have been conducted in  good faith; 
(d)  So as to ensure that the effect of  the commitments is not neutralised, that Alcatel shall not sell 
to  Telefonica shares  in  any  company of the Alcatel  group which has  activities  in  the  EC 
without prior approval from  the Commission until such time as the Commission waives this 
obligation.  This obligation ceases to have effect at the latest the date of full implementation 
in  Spain of Directive 90/531/EEC, which must take place by  1 January 1996. 
This Decision is  addressed to: 
Alcatel N.V. 
Paris Headquarters S.A. 
3  3 rue  Emeriau 
F-750 15  Paris 
Telettra S.p.A 
19  Via E.  Cornalia 
1-20124  Milano 
Article 3 
Done at  Brussels,  12.4.1991 
For the Commission 
Sir Leon  Brittan 
Vice President 
t/19 6 
•  t •  • 
PUBLIC VERSION 
··  MERUER PROCEDURE - : 
ARTICLE 6(1 )b DECISION 
Registered with advice of delivery 
To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs, 
Re.:  Case No IV/M.I33  Ericsson I Kolbe 
1. 
2. 
Your notification pursuant to Article 4 of Council  Regulation No 4064/89 (Merger Regulation) 
The proposed operation, notified on the 12th December 1991, concerns a joint venture (JVC) between 
a Swedish company, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB  (Ericsson), and a German company, Hans 
Kolbe &  Co. (HK). 
After examination of the notification, the Commission  has concluded that the notified operation falls 
within  the  scope  of the  Merger  Regulation,  and  that  it  does  not  raise  serious  doubts  as  to  its 
compatibility with the common  market. 
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The  Parties and the Operation 
Ericsson and HK propose to form  a joint  venture (JVC),  Ericsson  Fuba Telekom  GmbH.  Ericsson  is 
a major manufacturer of telecommunications equipment,  producing mainly systems and  products for 
wired  and  mobile communications  in  priyate and  public networks.  HK  produces mainly  radio  and. 
television broadcast ·equipnicmf·and ··is also a wholesaler· of related electronic proclutts: The Jvc· will 
mainly be engaged  in  the field of public digital transmission, especially digital cross-connect (DXC) 
technology,  in the Federal  Republic of Germany. 
4.  HK  will  transfer  to  the  new  company  all  of its  fixed  assets  and  inventory  relating  to  its  digital 
transmission systems and equipment business. Additionally, all of its intangible assets associated with 
that  business,  such  as  trademarks,  trade  names,  patents,  human  resources  and  know-how,  will  be 
transferred to the JVC. 
5.  Ericsson will not transfer any assets to the JVC. Ericsson will acquire a 51  %stake in the new company 
and the balance will  be held  bY.. HK. 
I.  COMMUNITY  DIMENSION 
6.  The operation has a Community dimension. The worldwide turnover of  the two undertakings concerned, 
Ericsson and  HK, amounts  in their respective last financial year, to Ecu  6,145 million and to Ecu 294 
million. 
The aggregate Community-wide turnover of Ericsson and HK is Ecu 2,541  million and Ecu 264 million 
respectively.  They do not achieve more than two-thirds of their Community  turnover in one and  the 
same  Member State. 
II.  CONCENTRATION 
Joint control 
7.  The  joint  venture  agreement  between  the  parties  provides  for  joint control  in  the  sense  that  the 
agreement of both parents is required in  respect of fundamental  decisions,  regarding the structure and 
the management of the JVC. 
8.  The JVC agreement provides that unanimity  is required in the shareholder's meeting for the adoption 
of decisions, inter alia, relating to any budget (including investment and financial  plans and cashflow 
forecasting),  conclusion  of licence  agreements  with  major  third  competitors,  and  guidelines  for  the 
General  Manager(s). 
Full  function  JV 
9.  The JVC will continue HK's activities in the area of public digital transmission equipment. In addition, 
it will be engaged in the adaptation of Ericsson transmission equipment for the German market, and in 
R&D  on assignment from  Ericsson. 
HK  will  withdraw  permanently  from  the  production  of digital  transmission  equipment and  will  in 
essence  retain  a financial  interest  in  the  JVC.  Ericsson  will  remain  active  in  digital  transmission 
technology as  part of its worldwide telecommunication  activities. 
I  0.  The  newly formed  company  is a joint venture that will  perform  on a lasting basis all  the functions of 
an  autonomous  economic entity. 
This  follows  already  from  the fact  that the JVC  will  carry  on  HK's former  activities  in  the  field  of 
digital transmission equipment. The assets transferred to the JV enable it to carry on a viable economic 
activity  in  a maner functionally distinct from  its  parents. 
The  eventual  licensing  of the  JVC's  industrial  property  rights  to  Ericsson,  for  usc  for  any  purpose 
•  • II. 
including manufacturing outside of  Gennany, demonstrates the capability of  the JVC in generating its 
own  technologies  and  know-how.  The presence of HK  as  shareholder in  the NC guarantees  the 
transparency of  the pricing of  the JVC's products sold either to Ericsson or via Ericsson to third parties, 
which contributes to the financial  independence of the JVC. 
Absence of risk of cootdination  ·..  .  ~. 
HK will not retain any activities in the field of  digital transmission equipment systems after the transfer 
of this  business  to  the  NC. HK's divestiture  of its  know-how  and  experience  relating  to digital 
transmission  will preclude it from  re-entering this market.  Given the significant financial  resources 
necessary to undertake the relevant research and development to be an effective competitor in this area, 
it  would be commercially unreasonable for HK  to abandon the technological advantages that it now 
holds and to re-enter the market later when the technology is further developed. HK's primary area of 
expertise is broadcasting and receiving equipment and not digital transmission or telecommunications. 
12.  Ericsson  will  remain  a ·competitor of the JVC as  Ericsson  will  not withdraw from  the transmission 
markets  and  will continue to take part in  the Flexnode-project.  having overall responsibility for the 
consortium  (see paragraphs  17  and  18  where  DXC  systems and the  Flexnode-project are explained). 
Ericsson  and  the JVC  have developed digital  cross-connect systems which  differ in  technology and 
performance.  Since Ericsson  will  supply the German  Bundespost with  "the DXC 4/l Crossconnect 
System", whilst the JVC will supply the same customer with  its "DXC 4/4 System", the competitive 
relationship between Ericsson and the JVC is likely to remain unchanged. 
13.  Furthermore, it appears that Ericsson will assume the overall industrial responsibility for the JVC, since 
HK's interest in the JVC will in  fact become financial  rather than commercial  in nature over time. 
In  such cirsumstances  it  would  appear that there is  no  room  for  the coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of undertakings which remain independent in  the sense of Art.  3 (2) of the Regulation. 
14.  The  other  activities  of Ericsson  and  HK  do  n~t overlap  except  for  cellular  telephones.  Ericsson 
manufactures and distributes analog cellular telephone and terminal equipment, whereas HK only distri-
butes these products.  Their respective turnover is (*) and (**). HK,  however, markets its products in 
Germany where Ericsson  is not present. Since national standards for that kind of  equipment still exist, 
it can  be said that Ericsson and HK do not compete in  the same geographic area as a result. 
It is unlikely that the creation of this JVC will have any effect on Ericsson's decision whether or not 
to enter the German market  in  the future. 
15.  In  view of the above, there are no grounds to believe that the establishment and operation of the JVC 
will  result in  a coordination of competitive behaviour.  · 
Thus, the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of  the Merger 
Regulation. 
III.COMPATIBILITY  WITH  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
Relevant Product Market 
16.  The JVC  will develop and produce digital cross-connect (DXC) systems which are a new product in 
the area of telecommunications,  more specifically in  the line transmission sector. 
17.  Digital  cross-connect  transmisison  is  an  emerging  technology.  still  in  a development  stage,  which 
enables  network  operators to  optimize the  use  of the existing telecommunications  infrastructure  by 
looking for unused or under-used lines.  DXC technology permits, from  a remote central location, the 
engagement of those unused or underused lines in  the transmission of telecommunication signals. 
Optimization is especially important for the transmisison of significant amounts of data signals which 
occurs, for example, when data is transmitted for the remote printing of newspapers. 
1!/199 DXC technology also allows the automatic re-routing of signals if a communication is cut off due to 
failure. The current technology permits only re-routing via manual intervention by a network operator. 
18.  The Flexnode Consortium  is one of the three consortia commissioned by the Deutsche Bundespost 
Telekom, throug~ its project "NeUjrnoten 2000", to develop and supply  ~igital cross-connect technology 
·in Germany. It consists of  Erlcsso~. HK and Deutsche· Telefon Werk'e (DeTeWe).  .  ·  ·  · 
The other two consortia are : 
Siemens and PKI (Philips Kommunikations-Industrie) 
Alcatel/SEL and ANT 
(*)  Business secrets - greater than  Ecu  10 million 
(.,..) Business secrets - below  Ecu  10 million 
Ericsson  has  the overall  responsibility  for  the  Flexnodc  contract  under which  the  JVC  will  supply 
(replacing HK) the DXC 4/4 System, Ericsson the DXC 4/l System and DcTeWe the DXC  110 System. 
These systems undertake eventually the same function but with different speeds: the HK's system has 
the highest transmission rate,  DeTeWe's the lowest. 
19.  The notifying parties  state  that DXC  transmission  technology falls  into the product market of line 
transmission technology systems and equipment as defined in the Alcatei/Telettra case.<ll They say that 
the line transmission sector may be further split up into multiplexing/demultiplexing equipment, digital 
cross-connect systems, fiber-optic transmission product, SDHISONET broadband transmission products. 
20.  It can  be  left open  whether the suggestion  of the parties is  correct,  because even on the basis of a 
narrower product market definition, ie.  DXC systems, the operation does not raise serious doubts. 
Geographic Reference Market 
21.  Up to now, telecommunication markets in the EC  have been largely fragmented into national markets. 
A process of liberalisation and deregulation of the telecommunications sector has been  initiated in  the 
framework of the achievement of the single market. The Commission's Directives on liberalisation of 
telecommunication services, on public procurement and on mutual recognition of  terminal equipment, 
are examples of measures to open up national markets. 
Although it is anticipated that in the medium term technical barriers will become less significant, the 
actual pace of  change of the commercial policy of  the network operators varies substantially from  one 
Member State to anotherY> 
22.  The JVC has a significant impact on competition in the transmission markets in Germany, taking into 
account that the German  Bundespost is  the first telecommunications operator in  Europe to equip its 
telecommunications network with DXC systems. 
23. 
(I) 
It  can  be  left  open  whether  Germany  is  the  relevant  geographic  market,  or whether  the  relevant 
geographic market is  larger,  because the proposed operation does not raise serious doubts on the basis 
of even a narrower geographic market definition.  · 
Dominance 
THe  JVC will not create or strengthen a dominant position on  the DXC market  in  Germany. 
Commission  Decision of 12  April  1991,  OJ  L 122/48. 
Sec Alcatcl!Telcttra above. 24. 
IV. 
25. 
According to the figures supplied by the notifying parties the market for DXC in Germany is estinmted 
at  OM  2-3 billion over a five to six  year period. 
At present, market shares in the business of  digital cross-connect transmission technology can only be 
based on the first contract awarded by the Gentian Bundespost. The Flexnode Consortium received  1/3 
of that amount which was split .more or less evenly among the three participants. 
Thus, even the combination of  the market shares of Ericsson and the JVC would not lead to a market 
share that would indicate a dominant position  in the DXC market in Germany. 
In addition, the companies present in the other two consortia are strong players with the know-how and 
the  necessary  resources  to  guarantee  an  effective  competitive  environment  in  the  DXC  market  in 
Germany.  Potential  competition  from  telecommunication  equipment  manufacturers  such  as  AT&T, 
Northern Telecom/STC,  Fujitsu and NEC  is also very likely (the entry costs are estimated at between 
OM 200 and 300 million). 
ANCILLARY  RESTRAINTS 
The joint venture agreement contains a non-competition clause under which  HK  is  prohibited from 
conducting, directly or indirectly, operations in competition with the business of the JVC,  as long as 
HK  is bound by the joint venture. agreement,  but in any event during a period of at least five years. 
This non-competition clause is seen as a restriction directly related and necessary to the implementation 
of the concentration and therefore covered by this decision. 
V.  FINAL ASSESSMENT 
26.  Based on the above findings, the Commission  has come to the conclusion that the proposed operation 
does not raise serious doubts as to  its compatibility with the common  market. 
•  • 
• 
For the above reasons,  the Commission  has decided  not to  oppose the notified  concentration  and  to 
. declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is adopted in application of  Article 6( l )(b) 
of the Council Regulation  No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, Dear Sirs, 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(l)b DECISION 
PUBLIC VERSION 
Registered with advice of 
delivery 
1.  To the notifyng parties 
Subject:  Case No.  IV/M249- Northern Tclecom/Matra Telecommunication 
Notification of 9.7.1992 pursuant to Article 4 of 
Council Regulation No. 4064/89 
I.  The notification concerns principally the proposed acquisition by Northern Telecom Limited (NT) of 
joint control of Matra Communication S.A.  (MC), which is currently under the sole control of Matra 
S.A.  (Matra). 
2.  After examination of the notification the Commission has concluded that the proposed operation falls 
within  the  scope of Council  Regulation  No.  4064/89  and  does  not raise  serious  doubts  as  to  its 
compatibility with the common market. 
I.  THE TRANSACTION AND THE PARTIES 
J.  NT and Matra intend to establish a long-term partnership in the field of  telecommunications equipment. 
To  that  effect  NT  will  acquire  joint  control  of MC,  which  conducts  Matra's  telecommunication 
activities.  In  addition,  NT will set up with  MC two joint ventures with regard to mobile telephony 
worldwide and public networks in France. Furthermore, NT intends to acquire a minority interest in the 
parent company of Matra, MMB S.A. The proposed transaction will provide NT with the opportunity 
to enter new geographical markets in the Community, while MC will obtain access to the resources of 
a global telecommunications equipment supplier. 
4.  NT is  a Canadian manufacturer of telecommunications equipment which ranks amongst the top ten 
telecommunications suppliers worldwide. The Canadian BCE Inc. holds a majority interest in NT and 
in the Canadian telecommunications operator Bell Canada. 
5.  Matra is  a diversified  French holding company with activities  including defence,  transport systems, 
aerospace and, through MC, telecommunications. Matra is ultimately controlled by the Lagardere family. 
II.  CONCENTRATION 
6.  NT will acquire a multitude of  corporate and financial links with the Matra group. Most significant are 
equity participations in  MC and the two joint ventures to be set up with MC.  The equity participation 
in  MC will be 20% initially. This will he increased by another 20% approximately at the latest by  1997 
through shares exchanged in  return for a loan given by NT.  NT may even further increase its stake in 7. 
MC  bringing its  pm1icipation  to  [ f)  if it wishes to do so. ·n.c  equity participation  in  the two joint 
ventures will be 50%. All three companies will be governed mainly through two limited partnerships, 
the principal partners of which are NT and Matra. 
Joint control 
NT and Matra will control MC and the newly created companies jointly, since both, NT and Matra, will 
have to approve unanimously fundamental business decisions of  all three as well as their business plans 
and budgets. In addition, NT and MC have to agree on the chairmen of  the two joint ventures, which 
NT has the right to designate. 
Full-function joint venture 
8.  MC is engaged in the manufacture and supply of  telecommunications equipment, including public and 
private switching systems, telephone sets, mobile telephony and cellular telephones. The company will 
continue its activities as  a  full-function entity as  before.  In  addition,  it will take over NT's French 
private switching business (BCS business), which will be transferred to MC. 
9. 
10. 
I) 
:n 
i) 
The parties intend to allocate special responsibilities to MC and the two separate legal entities to be set 
up.  MC will he attributed global responsibility for product line planning and R&D for tem1inals. One 
of the proposed joint ventures (The GSM Company) will become responsible for the development and 
supply of mobile telephony worldwide for both, NT and MC.  The other joint venture (The Networks 
Company) will become responsible for the marketing, sales and customer service of  packet switching, 
transmission and public switching products in  France. 
It can be left open whether these two proposed joint ventures will become full-function entities. Their 
creation is  part of the acquisition of  joint-control by NT of Matra's telecommunication business, MC, 
which is a full-function entity. It should not make  ar.y difference whether the activities taken over by 
these joint ventures are carried out within  special  divisions of MC  itself,  or are carried out through 
separate legal entities. 
Absence of coordination of competitive behaviour 
The parties' intention is  that in  the long run  MC will be integrated into NT's European and in  some 
respects worldwide business. Thus, MC will  become the group's "center of excellence" in the field of 
telecomunications terminals and will have global  responsibility for  product line planning and R&D. 
They also intend to converge product lines in  private switching, to  consolidate their sales, marketing 
and service organisations in  France and to study the potential for consolidation in Belgium, Germany 
and Spain and eventually in all Member States. The GSM Company will be responsible for both parties' 
mobile telephony business worldwide, combining MC's cellular telephones and radio base stations with 
NT's switching equipment. 
In  principle  Malra  (and  in  fact  the  Lagardere  group)  will  no  longer  be  involved  in  the 
telecommunications  business as  an  independent player.  The only ,exception to  this is  a joint venture 
between  Matra and Ericsson, namely, MET,  which operates in  the field of public digital switching in 
France, with a turnover of  around [ f> (that is  [ ]
3>  of MC's total turnover). MET is France Telecom's 
second supplier of public digital switching equipment, with a limited share of the market compared to 
the  major supplier Alcatel.  Since it began  operations  in  1986  MET's activities have been  confined 
essentially to France and to certain public switching products, produced under licence from  Ericsson. 
There  is  no scope for coordination of competitive behaviour between  Matra!MET and the Networks 
[ ] deleted - business secret. 
[ ] deleted - business secret. 
( ] deleted - business secret - read "a small  proportion". Company (of MC and NT) because the Networks Company realistically can only seek to enter the 
French market through product lines other than those currently produced by Matra!MET, [ t>.  France 
Telecom's demand for public digital switching products will have been almost entirely realised through 
the operation of the current supply agreement. Under these circumstances coordination of  competi'tive 
behaviour is unlikely to occur. 
For the same reasons no coordination of competitive behaviour is likely between Matra!MET and the 
GSM Company (NT and MC) with regard to digital equipment for digital cellular radio systems. As 
in the case of  public switching MET is a supplier to France Telecom under a contract which will expire 
in  1995. 
II.  Matra owns a US  manufacturer of private switching systems,  lntecom, which is  mainly active in  the 
North American  market  where structures of competition are different from  Community markets.  Its 
annual European sales of around 4 million ECU can be regarded as insignificant in competition tenns. 
12.  In  conclusion  the  proposed  a~quisition  of joint  control  by  NT  in  MC  can  be  considered  as  a 
concentrative joint venture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation. 
III.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
13.  The aggregate worldwide turnover of the BCE group and the Lagardere family group of companies 
exceeded  5  billion  ECU  in  1991  (BCE  16,048  M  ECU,  Lagardere  7,703  M  ECU).  Both  have  a 
Community-wide turnover of  more than 250 million ECU (BCE around 900 M ECU, Lagardere 2,587 
M ECU), and they did not achieve more than two-thirds of  their Community-wide turnover in one and 
the same  Member  State.  Thus  the  proposed  operation  meets  the thresholds of Article  1  (2) of the 
Regulation. 
IV.  COMPATIBILITY  WITH  THE COMMON MARKET 
14.  NT and  MC are both manufacturers of telecommunications equipment. There are significant overlaps 
between their activities in  four areas, namely,  public switching, private switching, telephone sets and 
mobile telephony. 
Geographic Reference Market 
15.  It is not necessary to decide in the present case whether the geographic reference market is national or 
Community-wide since  even  on the narrower market  definition no dominant  position  is  created  or 
reinforced. 
Assessment 
16.  The principal activities of NT and  MC  are carried out in  different geographic areas - more than 70% 
ofNT's EC turnover is generated in the UK (through STC) while almost 90% of MC's operations are 
confined to France with virtually all the rest  in Gern1any (through AEG's former telecommunications 
subsidiaries). As a result of the minimal overlap between the parties, the proposed operation will  not 
lead to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position in the four identified affected markets  in 
the Community or within a substantial part of it. 
Public switching 
17.  Matra!MET is  only active  in  France where  it  holds a market  share of less than 25% [ ]51.  NT has  a 
4)  [ ] deleted - business secret. 
~)  deleted - business secret. 
t/204 
.. 
; .. 
18. 
m a r k c t  s h a r c  o f  I' c s s  t  h a n  I  0 %  ]''  >  i n  t h e  lJ  K •  1 h c 
only EEC country where it is currently supplies public switching systems. 'l11c combined market share 
of both parties on a Community-wide basis is significantly less than  10% (actually 2%). 
Private switching 
In  the  private switching systems  business both  parties are  in  principle active  in  most  or  all  of the 
Community  but their combined  market  share does  not exceed  25%  in  any  Member State,  with the 
exception of Ireland, where MC is not active and thus there is no overlap. On a Community level their 
combined market share is also below 25% [ ]'>. 
Telephone sets 
19.  An overlap between the parties' activities exists only in  Belgium and  Portugal, where their combined 
market shares will remain significantly below  I  0%. There is no overlap in the UK, NT's most important 
market  in  the EEC,  or in  Franc_e  and Germany,  MC's most  important  EEC  markets. 
20.  At the Community  level  the parties' combined  market  share remains  below 25% [ ]
8>. 
Mobile Telephony 
21_  MC  produces the full  range of mobile telephone equipment, with switching produced through  MET. 
whereas  NT  only  recently  introduced  switching equipment  into  the  EEC,  in  the  UK.  NT's  market 
position  in  the  EEC  is therefore currently insignificant while  MC  has a stronger position  in  France l 
]">where it is France Telecom's second supplier for this equipment. The parties' combined EEC market 
share is well  below  1  0%. 
22.  On the basis of  the above. it can  be concluded that the proposed acquisition will not lead to the creation 
or reinforcement of a dominant position  in  the common  market or a substantial part thereof. 
V.  ANCILLARY  RESTRAINTS 
23.  The non-competition obligations and the cross-licensing agreement entered into between the parties can 
be  regarded  as  directly  related  to  and  necessary  to  the  implementation  of the  concentration and  are 
therefore ancillary within  the  meaning of the  Regulation. 
v.  FINAL  ASSESSMENT 
24.  Based  on  the  above  findings,  the  Commission  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  proposed 
concentration does  not  raise serious doubts as  to  its compatibility with  the common  market. 
•  *  • 
* • 
For the above reasons, the Commission  has decided not to oppose the notified concentration and to declare  it 
compatible with  the common  market.  This  decision  is  adopted  in  application of Article 6(1)b of the  Council 
Regulation No.  4064/89. 
For the Commission, 
6>  deleted - business secret. 
7>  deleted - business secret. 
8>  deleted - business secret. 
'I)  deleted - business secret. 
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MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(l)b DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs, 
Re.  :  Case No IV  /M.346 - JCSAT/SAJAC 
Notification  of 1.6.1993  pursuant  to Article  4  of Council  Regulation  No.  4064/89  (Merger 
Regulation) 
I.  On  1.6.1993,  ltochu Corporation (Itochu),  Mitsui and Co,  Ltd (Mitsui), Sumitomo Corporation 
(Sumitomo)  and  Nissho  Jwai  Corporation  (Nissho  lwai)  will  merge  their  domestic  satellite 
communication business and acquire joint control of  the newly created company Kabushiki Kaisha 
Nihon Satellite Systems (Newco). 
2.  After examination of the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation 
falls  within  the  scope  of the  Merger  Regulation  and  does  not  raise  serious  doubts  as  to  its 
compatibility with the common market. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
3.  Each  notifying  party  is  a  large  Japanese  trading  company  dealing  with  a  wide  range  of 
commodities, industrial goods and consumer goods.  Besides trade and manufacture of  goods, each 
offers a wide range of services and invests in various activities.  Japan Communications Satellite 
Company  Inc  (JCSAT)  concentrates  ltochu  and  Mitsui's satellite  operation  business.  JCSAT 
operates two communications satellites which provide domestic telecommunications services within 
Japan.  Satellite Japan  Corporation (SAJAC) concentrate Sumitomo and Nissho Iwai's satellite 
operations business.  SAJAC is  licensed to operate domestic communications satellites in  Japan, 
but does not own or operate a satellite. 
II.  THE OPERATION 
4.  Following the acquisition by ltochu and Mitsui of 50% of  the shares ofSAJAC and by Sumitomo, 
Nissho lwai and possibly other minority SAJAC's shareholders of 50 % of the shares of JCSAT, 
SAJAC and JCSAT will merge.  l11e shares of the new created entity Newco will be held in  the 
following percentages : ltochu 27 % ; Mitsui 23 % ; Nissho lwai 22 % ; Sumitomo 22 % ; other 
SAJAC shareholders 6 %(1). 
{I)  In  case that other SAJAC shareholders do not invest in  JCSA  T, and consequently in Newco, the 
notifying parties will adjust the above percentages with the condition  i.a.  that the order of the 
ownership is  maintained. 
1l(206 
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III.  JOINT VENTURE 
5.  According to the terms of  a Shareholders Agreement, entered into by the notifying parties, Newco 
will have a board of ten directors, four of whom will be representative directors.  Itochu, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo  and  Nissho  Iwai  will  each  nominate  two directors  among  which  one  representative 
director.  The remaining two directors will be appointed by agreement ofltochu, Mitsui, Sumitomo 
and Nissho Iwai.  Newco will also have four statutory auditors with each party appointing one of 
them.  The filii-time auditor will rotate among the "four parties.  Finally, a number of matters will 
require the approval of ltochu, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Nissho lwai, including the annual settlement 
of  accounts, the establishment of  subsidiary or other major investment or withdrawal, any provision 
of  satellite  communication  service  by  Newco,  determination  of  medium- and  long-term 
management  plans and all  important matters  relating to the management  of the company. 
6.  As  a result  of the  above  mentioned  elements,  it  can  be  concluded  that  Newco  will  be jointly 
controlled by  ltochu, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Nissho lwai. 
IV.  CONCENTRATION 
7.  Newco will perform on a lasting basis all the functions ofan autonomous economic entity.  It has 
been created for an  indefinite period of time.  It will  have  its own  assets and  its own personnel. 
It will  use the trademark JCSAT and will have its own logo.  Marketing, accounting, finance and 
management support provided by the parties to Newco will  be regulated by specific contracts in 
order to guarantee the independence of Newco. 
8.  As regards possible coordination between the various undertakings concerned, the notifying parties 
will not retain any activity related to the satellite communication business.  Furthermore, there are 
no  identifiable spill-over effects arising from  linkages or means  by which  the enlarged group of 
undertakings could exploit the  increase in  the total  range of products. 
9.  The present operation therefore constitutes a concentration in the sense of Article 3 of  the Merger 
Regulation. 
V.  COMMUNITY  DIMENSION 
I  0.  The combined aggregate turnover of  the undertakings concerned in their last financial year exceeds 
5,000 million  ECU  (ltochu  127,135 million  ECU  ; Mitsui -109,795  million  ECU  ; Sumitomo 
122,838  million  ECU  ; Nissho  Iwai  69,734 million  ECU).  Their Community-wide  turnover  is 
more  than  250 million  ECU.  1'1 
The undertakings concerned do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-
wide turnover within one and the same Member State.  Therefore, the proposed concentration has 
a Community dimension. 
VI.  COMPATIBILITY  WITH  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
1  1.  Neither JCSAT  nor  SAJAC  is  licensed to  provide  telecommunications  service outside Japan  or 
between  Japan  and another location.  Therefore,  the concentration  has  presently  no effect  in  the 
Community. 
12.  This situation  is  not likely to change for the following  reasons  : 
the current equipment of JCSAT  is  unsuited to transmission  between Japan and  the  EC 
the  Japan  Minister  for  Post  and  Telecommunications  has  always  insisted  on  separate 
licenses for  domestic and  international carriers.  Up to  now,  it  has also never allowed  a 
company to obtain  both  a domestic and  an  internationaJ<
2
> common  carrier license.  . 
Finally,  it  can  be  added  that  European  and  international  satellite  operators  providing 
1'1  deleted  business secret 
(2) 
This applies for  Type  I common cal/
2 
Q 
7 telecommunications service within Europe or between Europe and Japan already exist and that the 
operation of  a new satellite communications service between Japan and the Community would also 
require European regulatory approvals. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
13.  Based  upon  the  above  considerations,  the  Commission  has  come  to the  conclusion  that  the 
proposed concentration does not create or strenghten a dominant position as  a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part 
of it. 
•  ----
For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified concentration and to 
declare it compatible with the common market.  This decision is adopted in  application of Article 
6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, .. • 
OFFENTLICHE  VERSION 
FUSIONSVERFAHREN 
ARTIKEL  6{1)b  ENTSCHEIDUNG 
Einschreiben mit EmpfangsbesUitigung 
An die Parteien 
Betr.:  Fall  Nr.  IV/M.394- MANNESMANN/RWEIDEUTSCHE  BANK 
Ihre Anmeldung gemaB  Artikel 4 der Ratsverordnung (EWG) Nr. 4064/89 (Fusionsverordnung) 
Sehr geehrte Damen  und  Herren, 
I. 
2. 
I. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Am  19.11.1993  hat  die  Kommission  eine  gemeinsame  Anmeldung  der  Deutsche  Bank  AG, 
Frankfurt am Main, dcr Manncsmann AG, DUsseldorf, und dcr  R  WE-Encrgic AG, Essen, crhaltcn, 
nach der die drei Unternehmen VermOgenswerte in ein Gemeinschaftsunternehmen im Bereich von 
Telekommunikationsnetzen ("corporat~ networks") und Mehrwertdiensten ("value-added services") 
fUr  Firmenkunden einbringen. 
Nach PrUfung der Anmeldung hat die Kommission  festgestellt, daB das angemeldete Vorhaben in 
den  Anwendungsbereich  der  Fusionsverordnung  flillt  und  daB  keine  emsthaften  Bedenken 
hinsichtlich seiner Vereinbarkeit mit dem  Gemeinsamen  Markt bestehen. 
DIE  PARTEIEN 
Die Deutsche Bank AG (nachfolgend "Deutsche Bank") betreibt als Universalbank Bankgeschafte 
aller Art und ist auBerdem  in den Bereichen Untemehmensberatung, Versicherungen und sonstige 
Finanzdienstleistungen tatig. Ihre Tochtergesellschaft Deutsche Gesellschaft flir Netzwerkbetriebe 
mbH  (DGN)  unterhalt  die  Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur  ftir  die  Deutsche  Bank  und  ist  in 
geringem  Umfang auch  fl.lr  Dritte tatig. 
Die Mannesmann AG (nachfolgend "Mannesmann") ist ein diversifiziertes deutsches Unternehmen 
mit  Produktions- und  Vertriebsaktivitaten  in  der ganzen  Welt.  Mannesmann  ist  vor allem  in  der 
Erzeugung  und  Verarbeitung  von  Eisen  und  Stahl,  in  der  Herstellung  von  Erzeugnissen  des 
Maschinenbaus, der Elektrotechnik  und der Elektronik sowie  im  Anlagenbau tatig.  Im  Bereich 
Telekommunikation  hat  das  Untemehmen  in  Deutschland  eine  Beteiligung  von  51  %  an  der 
Mannesmann  Mobil funk  GmbH,  die  das  Funktelefonnetz  D  2  unterhalt  (  ein  zweites 
Funktelefonnetz  wird  von  der  Deutsche  Bundespost  Telekom  betrieben)  sowie  eine  100 %-
Beteiligung an der Mannesmann Datenverarbeitung GmbH und eine indirekte Mehrheitsbeteiligung 
an  der  im  BUndelfunkbereich  tatigen  Quickfunk  GmbH.  In  Frankreich  und  Spanien  halt 
Mannesmann Minderheitsbeteiligungen an zwei Untemehmen flir Mobildatenkommunikation bZ\v. 
Paging-Netze. 
RWE-Energie  AG  (RWE-E),  ein  Tochteruntemehmen  der  RWE-AG,  ist  ein  im  wesentlichen  in 
den  westlichen  Bundeslandern  von  Deutschland  operierendes  Energieversorgungsunternehmen. 
RWE-E  bzw.  RWE-AG  halten Minderheitsbeteiligungen an einem  BUndelfunkuntemehmen bzw. Serviceuntemehmen  ftir  Mobilfunknetze  sowie  eine  70  %-Beteiligung  an  der  Lahmeyer 
lnformationstechnik GmbH, die lngenieurleistungen im Mobilfunkbereich erbringt.  Weitere 10% 
an  Lahmeyer werden von der Deutschen Bank gehalten. 
II.  DER ZUSAMMENSCHLUSS 
6.  Deutsche Bank, Mannesmann and RWE-E werden ihre gesamten Telekommunikationsanlagen mit 
Ausnahme  der  von  RWE-E  tllr  Energieversorgungszwecke  benOtigten  Anlagen  auf  DGN 
Ubertragen. Gleichzeitig wird Deutsche Bank SO % der DGN-Anteile an Mannesman.n und weitere 
25 % an  R  WE-E verluBem. 
7.  Das Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen (GU) wird-unter neuem Namen- im Bereich Corporate Networks 
ftir  die  Muttergesellschaften  und  tllr  sonstige  Firmenkunden  in  Deutschland  sowie  spater 
europaweit tiUig sein. Das Dienstleistungsangebot wird Sprach-, Daten- und Bildkommunikation, 
Basisdienste  wie  z.B.  elektronische  Post  ("Electronic  Mail")  sowie  branchenspezzifische 
Mehrwertdienste umfassen. .. 
Gemeinsame  Kontrolle 
8.  Wie bereits festgestellt, werden Mannesmann 50 %, Deutsche Bank und  R  WE jeweils 25 %  der 
Anteile  an  dem  GU  halten.  Gema.B  dem  "Partnervertrag"  zwischen  den  Beteiligten  bedUrfen 
wichtige Geschti.ftsentscheidungen des GU einer einstimmigen Beschlu8fassung der Gesellschafter 
im Gesellschafterausschu6. Dazu gehOren Entscheidungen Uber Ausbau und Betrieb des Corporate 
Network,  Umsatz-,  Investitions- und  Finanzplanung,  Anschaffung  und  Ventu6erung  von 
AnlagevennOgen,  Erwerb  und  Verttu6erung  von  Beteiligungen  u.a .. Dartlber  hinaus  ist jeder 
Geschaftstbhrcr des  GU  einstimmig  zu  bestellen.  Die  Beteiligtcn  Oben  somit die  gemeinsamc 
Kontrolle Ober das GU  aus. 
Selbstandige wirtschaftliche Einheit 
9.  Zu  Beginn  seiner  Geschiiftstatigkeit  wird  das  GU  ausschlie81ich 
Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen  fUr  die  Mtittergesellschaften  erbringen.  Es  ist jedoch  die 
erklarte Absicht der Beteiligten, da6 das GU  Iangerfristig vor aHem  fur  Dritte tiitig werden  soli. 
Der gegenwartigen  Planung  ~folge sollen nach 4 - 5 Jahren 50 % und nach  6 Jahren 60 - 80 % 
des  Umsatzes  mit  Drittkunden  erzielt  werden.  Ein  gewinntriichtiger  Betrieb  des  in  dem  GU 
zusammengetbhrten  Telekommunikationsanlagen  als  Corporate  Network  ist  auch  nur  bei 
Erreichung  einer  "kritischen  Masse"  von  Sprachverkehrsaufkommen  m6glich,  die  bei  einem 
Mehrfachem  des  Bedarfs der Muttergesellschaften  liegt. 
10.  Da  das  GU  selbst  nur  Corporate  Networks  und  einige  Basisdienste  wie  E-Mail  oder  EDI 
("Electronic-Data-Interchange")  entwickeln  und  anbieten  kann,  ist  es  fUr  branchenspezifische 
Anwendungen und Mehrwertdienste auf Dritte und auf die Muttergesellschaften angewiesen.  Im 
Bereich von Finanzdienstleistungen und von energieversorgungsspezifischen Anwendungen haben 
Deutsche Bank bzw. R  WE-E bereits entsprechende Mehrwertdienste entwickelt. Diese werden von 
dem GU als Handler oder Vertreter von  Deutsche Bank bzw.  R  WE-E vertrieben  in Kopplung mit 
eigenen Dienstleistungen. Das GU wird nichtsdestotrotz aile Funktionen einer selbstandigen wirt-
schaftlichen Einheit erflillen, da es in seinem Dienstleistungsangebot frei und kundenorientiert ist 
und die jeweils erforderliche branchenspezifische Software fUr  aile Ubrigen  Bereiche bei  Dritten 
bezieht. Die Softwareangebote der Muttergesellschaften Deutsche Bank und R  WE werden insoweit 
nur einen kleinen Ausschnitt der Geschiiftstiitigkeit des GU bilden. 
Koordinierung des  Wettbewerbsverhaltens 
II.  Deutsche  Bank,  Mannesmann  und,  mit  Einschrankungen,  R  WE  bring en  ihre  gesamten 
Festnetzanlagen  fur  Daten- und  SprachUbertragung  in  das  GU  ein.  R  WE  ist  aufgrund  deutscher 
energicrcchtlicher  Bcstimmungen  gehalten,  bestimmte  fur  die  Aufrechterhaltung  dcr 
Energieversorgung erfordcrliche Telekommunikationsanlagen wie z.B. Betriebsfunk und Systemc 
zur Steuerung des Energieverbrauchs zu betreiben. Mit der fUr  1998 vorgesehenen Liberalisierung 
der  Sprachvermittlung  fllr  die  Offentlichkeit  wUrde  R  WE  die  MOglichkeit  erhalten,  seine 
verbleibenden  Leitungen  Dritten  anzubieten.  Nach  dem  "Partnervertrag"  Uber das  GU  ist  R  WE 
jedoch verpflichtet, freie Kapazitiiten  in seinem Netz zuniichst dem GU anzubieten. AuBerdem  ist 
es  R  WE  aufgrund  eines  Wettbewerbsverbotes  verwehrt,  auBerhalb  des  GU  selbst  Corporate 
Networks anzubieten. 
I  2.  Da Mannesmann bereits im Bereich der mobilen SprachUbertragung tatig ist, erscheint es weiterhin 
nicht ausgeschlossen, daB Mannesmann versuchen konnte, den Absatz in diesem Bereich mit dem 
Absatz  des  GU  zu  koppeln.  Dies  entspricht  jedoch  nicht  den  Interessen  der  Ubrigen 
Muttergesellschaften des GU und birgt  auch die Gefahr in sich, Kunden an andere Dienstleistungs-
anbieter auf dem Markt des GU zu verlieren. SchlieBlich ware eine solche Koordinierung zwischen 
GU  und  D 2 - Mobilfunknetz nur fllr das sich  Uberschneidende Kundensegment denkbar. 
Ill. 
Das GU  wird demnach  eine selbstandige wirtschaftliche Einheit bilden  und keine Koordinierung 
des  Wettbewerbsverhaltens voneinander unabhangig bleibender Unternehmen  bewirken. 
GEMEINSCHAFTSWEITE  BEDEUTUNG 13.  Der  ZusammenschluB  hat  gemeinschaftsweite  Bedeutung  im  Sinne  des  Art.  1  Abs.  2.  Die 
weltweiten  Gesamtums~tze von  Mannesmann  (13,66  Mrd.  ECU)  und  RWE (25,21  Mrd.  ECU) 
sowie die nach Art. 5 (3) a zu berUcksichtigenden Ums~tze  der Deutschen Bank (49,66 Mrd. ECU) 
betrugen 1992 mehr als 5 Mrd. ECU. Aile Unternehmen erzielten im gleichen Geschaftsjahr mehr 
als  250  Mio ECU  in der  EG,  wovon nur  R  WE  und  Deutsche Bank mehr als  zwei  Drittel  in 
Deutschland umsetzten. 
IV.  VEREINBARKEIT MIT DEM GEMEINSAMEN MAR.KT 
A.  Die relevanten Produktmarkte 
Corporate  networks 
14.  Mit der Umsetzung der Richtlinie der Kommission vom 28.6.1990 Uber den Wettbewerb auf  dem 
Markt  fUr  Telekommunikationsdienste  (90/388/EWG)  ist  es  in  Deutschland  seit  Anfang  1993 
mt)glich,  Corporate Networks, d.h.  Festnetze zur Obertragung von  Daten und Sprache inncrhalb 
geschlossener  Benutzergrupp~n, anzubieten  ("Gcnchmigungskonzept  Corporate Networks"  des 
Bundesministeriums  fur  Post  und  Telekommunikation  =  BMPT).  Vor  1993  war  allein  die 
Telekommunikation  innerhalb  cines  Unternehmensstandortes  vom  Sprach- und 
DatenUbertragungsmonopol der DB Telekom ausgenommen. In einem ersten Liberalisierungsschritt 
wurde 1989 die Datenkommunikation zwischen verschiedenen Standorten freigegeben. 
15.  Corporate Networks kOnnen  Unternehmen und Institutionen, die geschlossene Benutzergruppen 
darstellen,  frei  angeboten  und  mit  dem  Offentlichen  Telefonnetz der  DB  Telekom  verbunden 
werden.  Vom  Offentlichen Telefondienst unterscheiden sich die Netze der privaten Anbieter vor 
allem  durch  den  anwendungsbezogenen  Zuschnitt  (z.B.  ein  Corporate  Network  fur  einen 
AutomobilhersteJier samt  Zulieferem  und  Handlern).  Betreibt ein  Anbieter mehrere  Corporate 
Networks, so dUrfen  diese nicht unmittelbar,  sondem nur tiber das Offentliche Netz miteinander 
verbunden  werden.  AndernfaJJs  besttinde  die  Gefahr  einer  Umgebung  der  noch  bestehenden 
Beschr~kung auf geschlossene Benutzergruppen.  Die  fur  ein Corporate Network erforderlichen 
Leitungen mtissen von der DB Telekom angemietct werden. AuBerdem bedarf der Betreiber einer 
Einzelgenehmigung durch das BMPT. 
16.  Das GU wird sich neben dem Corporate Network-Betrieb ftlr seine Muttergesellschaften zun~chst 
auf einen  Kundenkreis  von  Untemehmen  [  ... Jl  im  In- und  Ausland  [  ... ](1)  beschriinken  unter 
AusschluB [  ... ](1) der [  ... J(l) Unternehmen, die nach Einschatzung der Beteiligten eigene Corporate 
Networks aufbauen werden. 
17.  Die Frage, ob Corporate Networks in der von dem GU angebotenen Fonn einen eigenen sachlichen 
Markt darstellen, der von der allgemeinen  und Offentlich zugooglichen Sprach- und DatenUber-
tragung durch DB Telekom und andere nationale Telekombetreiber zu trennen ist, bedarf ebenso 
wie  die Frage nach der Unterscheidung separater Markte fur  Netze zur Sprachtibertragung und 
Netze zur Datentibertragung keiner Entscheidung, da selbst bei Annahme engerer Markte nicht von 
der  Entstehung  oder  Verstarkung  einer  marktbeherrschenden  Stellung  infolge  des 
Zusammenschlusses auszugehen ist. 
18.  Mit  Blick  auf die  sonstigen  AktiviUiten  der  Beteiligten  im  Btindelfunk  und  Mobilfunk  sind 
Corporate Networks allerdings als  eigensttindige Telekommunikationsdienstleistung  anzusehen. 
Btindelfunk erlaubt Sprachkommunikation innerhalb geschlossener Benutzergruppen nur in einer 
Richtung,  d.h.  nicht  in  Dialogform,  und  ist gegenwartig nur regional begrenzt mOglich.  Diese 
Obertragungsform ist daher nur fur wenige Zielgruppen einsetzbar (Betriebe mit Fahrzeugflotten 
oder AuBendienstmitarbeitern). Mobilfunk ist lizenzgebundene, mobile Sprachilbermittlung fur die 
Offentlichkeit,  d.h.  jederrnann  zug~glich.  Zudem  ist  die  Kommunikation  tiber  Mobilfunk 
wesentlich teurer als  tiber ein rein terrestrisches Netz.  FUr  mobile Datenilbertragungsnetze sind 
bislang vom  BMPT keine  Lizenzen vergeben worden. 
Das GU konzentriert sich auf einen Kundenkreis von grOBeren  Unternehmen; genauere Angaben 
werden aus GrUnden  der Wahrung von  Geschaftsgeheimnissen nicht verOffentlicht. 
• 19. 
Mehrwertdienste 
Das  Betreiben  cines  Corporate  Network  schlieBt,  wie  bereits  festgestellt,  eine  Reihe  von 
Basisdiensten  wie  E-mail,  Videokonferenzen  und  EDI  ein.  Daneben  soli  das  GU  branchen-
spezifische  Anwendungen,  sog.  Mehrwertdienste  ("value-added  services"),  anbieten.  Die 
Entwicklung  solcher  Dienste  befindet  sich  gegenwartig  erst  im  Anfangsstadium,  eine  exakte 
Definition  von  Mehrwertdiensten  ist  deshalb  noch  nicht  mOglich.  Beispiele  ftlr  derartige 
Dienstleistungen sind die von R  WE-E und Deutsche Bank angebotenen speziellen Anwendungen 
fUr  <len  Energie- bzw.  Finan~ektor oder auch die elektronische Verfolgbarkeit von Lieferungen 
und  die  entsprechende  Lieferbestatigung.  Allgemein  kann  festgestellt  werden,  daB  erst  die 
speziellen,  auf die  BedUrfnisse  des  Kunden  zugeschnittenen  Mehrwertdienste  dem  Corporate 
Network Funktionalitat verleihen. 
20.  lm  vorliegenden  Fall  ist  es  nicht  erforderlich  zu  entscheiden,  ob  cs  einen  eigenen  Markt  fiir 
einzelne, fUr einfache und fortgeschrittene oder fur die Gesamtheit von Mehrwertdiensten gibt, da 
die wettbewerbliche Beurteilung insoweit nicht unterschiedlich ausflillt. 
B.  Die relevanten  geographischen  Markte 
21.  Wenn  auch  das  GU  mit  Autbau  und  Entwicklung  eines  Corporate  Network  zunachst  nur  in 
Deutschland und fur dort ansassige Unternehmen Uitig sein wird, beabsichtigt es auf tangere Sicht, 
im  europaischen  Ausland  und  unter  UmsUinden  darOber  hinaus  tatig  zu  werden,  urn  den 
intcrnationalcn  Anforderungen  seiner Kunden  Rechnung  tragen  zu  konnen.  Letzteres  entspricht 
bereits jetzt den Planungen und Aktivitatcn von offentlich-rechtlichen und privaten Anbietem: Es 
ist  eine  wachsende  Zahl  von  transnationalen  Allianzen  im  Telekommunikationssektor  zu 
verzeichnen,  die  auf  das  Angebot  von  Corporate  Networks  flir  multinationale  Untemehmen 
abzielen und eine globale Ausrichtung haben (DB Telekom/France Telecom; Telefonica/Unisource 
N.V.~ British Telecom/MCJ  etc.). Die geographische Ausdehnung cines Corporate Network hangt 
demnach  von  der  Lage  der  Untemehmensstandorte  auf der  Kundenseite  ab  und  kann  lokal, 
national,  europaisch  oder global  sein.  Die  zunehmende  lnternationalisierung der Miirkte spricht 
daftir,  auch  die Kommunikationsmarkte  europaisch oder sogar global  zu  betrachten. 
22.  Auch  diese  Frage  bedarf jedoch  keiner  abschlieBenden  KUirung,  da  das  geplante GU  auch  bei 
Zugrundelegung eines deutschen  Marktes keine marktbeherrschende Stellung erlangen wOrde. 
23. 
24. 
C.  Wettbewerbliche Beurteilung 
Corporate  networks 
Rei Annahme eines Marktes flir Corporate Networks zur Sprach- und DatenObertragung ist in erster 
Linic zu  berllcksichtigen, daB cs sich  um  cincn sehr jungcn, in  Deutschland erst seit Anfang  1993 
cxistiercnden Markt handclt.  In diescm  Bereich ist gcgcnw:trtig und  fUr die absehbare Zukunn DB 
Telekom der flihrendc Anbieter in Deutschland. Das von den Beteiligten geplant GU gehOrt zu den 
ersten  privaten  Anbietem,  die  die  bisherige  Monopolstellung  der  DB  Telekom  angreifen.  DB 
Telekom  hat  angekOndigt,  auf dem  entstehenden  Markt  ab  Anfang  1994  ein  eigenes  "Virtual 
Private  Network"  (VPN)  anzubieten.  Die  Tatsache,  daB  das  Unternehmen  dabei  auf  sein 
bestehendes  Offentliches  Leitungsnetz  zurOckgreifen  kann  und  daB  VPN  nach  Aussagen  von 
Wettbewerbem  Jetztlich  nur  eine  neue  AbrechnungsmodaliUit  fiir  GroBkunden  unter  EinschluB 
besonderer Rabatte darstellt, offenbart die Oberragende  Marktstellung von  DB  Telekom. 
Nach  Schatzungen der Beteiligten  belauft sich  das Gesamtvolumen  der  fi.ir  Dritte mit  Corporate 
Network-Diensten  in  der Daten- und Sprachkompmnikation  erbrachten  Leistungen  im Jahr  1993 
auf  ca.  3,5  Mrd.  ECU.  Davon  entfallen  Ober  3 Mrd.  ECU  auf DB  Telekom,  die  auch  in  den 
kommenden Jahren der mit Abstand ftihrendc Anbieter sein wird. Das GU erwartet ftir  1994 einen 25. 
Umsatz von  ca.  [  ... ]2. 
Aktueller Wettbewerb geht fUr DatcnUbcrtragungsdienste und tei lwcise fUr Corporate Networks von 
spezialisierten Untemehmen  wie z.B.  MEGA NET,  GElS  (General  Electric  Co.),  INF AS,  einem 
Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen  zwischen  Stinnes  AG  (YEBA-Konzern)  und  Bank  fur 
Gemeinwirtschaft, und DEB IS, einer Tochtergesellschaft der Daimler Benz AG, aus. Daneben wird 
das  GU  dem  Wettbewerb  der  oben  genannten  transnationalen  "outsourcing"-Untemehmen  der 
groBen  Telekomanbieter  ausgesetzt  sein.  Als  potentielle  Wettbewerber  kommen  andere 
Energieversorgungsuntemehmen  (Bayemwerk,  Preussen  Elektra),  die  Uber  die  erforderlichen 
Telekommunikationsanlagen  verfilgen,  die  Deutsche  Bundesbahn  als  Inhaberin  des  groBten 
terrestrischen  Kommunikationsnetzes  in  Deutschland  sowie  GroBuntemehmen  mit  bislang 
ausschlieBiich  konzemintemen  Networks  sowie  Computer- und  Netzequipmenthersteller  in 
Betracht. 
26.  Wenn auch fUr einen Markteintritt Anfangsinvestitionen in betriichtlicher Hohe erforderlich sind, 
die  entgegen  der  Ansicht  der  Parteien  gewisse  Marktzutrittsschranken  bilden  und  nur  groBen 
Anbietern  ein  Tiitigwerden  ermoglichen,  handelt es sich  insgesamt  urn  einen  Markt  mit  groBen 
Wachstumschanccn, auf dcm  bereits vor der fiir  1998 erwartetcn Liberalisicrung der Offcntlichcn 
Sprachvcrmittlung cin kontinuierlichcr Ansticg des Sprachverkchrsaufkommcn crw:u1ct wird.  Die 
Wettbcwcrbsstruktur diescs Marktes ist bislang nur insoweit abzuschcn, als die DB Tclekom  noch 
auf mehrere Jahre dominicrender Anbieter sein wird.  Die GrUndung des GU  kann zur Entstehung 
eines bedeutenden Konkurrenten fuhren  und  hat  insoweit einen wettbewerbsbelebenden Effekt. 
Value-added services 
27.  Der gemeinschaftsweite Bedarf an Mehrwertdiensten wurde von der Kommission fUr das Jahr 1992 
auf  etwa  5  Mrd.  ECU  geschiitzt  (vgl.  die  Entscheidung  "Eucom/Digital"  vom  18.5.1992  -
IV /M.218).  Insgesamt  handelt  es  sich  eben falls  urn  einen  in  der  Entwicklungs- und 
Experimentierphase  befindlicher  Markt  mit  groBen  Wachstumschancen.  Umsatz- oder 
Marktanteilsangaben fur das GU oder flir die Muttergesellschaften sind nicht verftigbar, da diese 
bislang Mehrwertdienste nicht vermarktet haben. 
28.  Wettbewerber  des  GU  werden  andere  Anbieter  von ·Corporate  Network-Diensten  sein.  Als 
potentielle Anbieter kommen die  groBen Telekomanbieter,  Hersteller von Telekommunikations-
ausrUstungen  und  Softwarehersteller in  Betracht.  DB  Telekom  wird  auch  in  dicsem  Sektor der 
filhrcnde  Anbietcr  auf mittclfristige  Sicht  sein.  Mit  der  Entstehung  einer  marktbeherrschenden 
Stellung infolge  des Zusammenschlusses  ist  deshalb  nicht  zu  rechnen. 
Y.  GESAMTBEURTEILUNG 
29.  Aufgrund der oben getroffenen Feststellungen ist die Kommission  zu dem Ergebnis gelangt,  daB 
das  ZusammenschluBvorhaben  keinen  AnlaB  zu  ernsthaften  Bedenken  hinsichtlich  seiner 
Vereinbarkeit mit dem  Gemeinsamen  Markt gibt. 
30.  Aus diesen Grunden hat die Kommission entschieden, dem angemeldeten ZusammenschluB  nicht 
entgegenzutreten,  sondern  ihn  fUr  vereinbar  mit  dem  Gemeinsamen  Markt  zu  erkliiren.  Diese 
Entscheidung beruht auf Artikel 6 (I) b der Fusionsverordnung. 
FOr die Kommission 
2  Unter  100  Millioncn  ECU;  die  genaue  Angabc  ist  Geschiiftsgeheimnis  und  wird  deshalb  nicht 
veroffentlicht. 
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OFFENTLICHE VERSION 
FUSIONSVERFAHREN 
ARTIKEL 6(1){b) ENTSCHEIDUNG 
An die Parteien 
Betrifft :  Fall  Nr.  IV/M.408  - R  WE/Mannesmann 
1. 
2. 
I. 
3. 
4. 
II. 
5. 
6. 
Iluc Anmeldung gemaB  Art.  4 der Ratsverordnung (EG) Nr.  4064/89 
(Fusionsverordnung) 
Am 25.01.1994 hat die Kommission eine gemeinsame Anmeldung der RWE-Energie AG, Essen, und der 
Mannesmann  Eurokom  GmbH,  DUsseldorf,  erhalten,  nach  der  die  Untemehmen  beabsichtigen,  ein 
Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen  im  Bereich  der  mobilen  DatenUbertragung,  begrenzt  auf das  Gebiet  der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, zu  grUnden. 
Nach  PrUfung der  Anmeldung  hat  die  Kommission  festgestellt,  daB  das  angemeldete  Vorhaben  in  den 
Anwendungsbereich  der  Ratsverordnung  (EG)  Nr.  4064/89  fallt  und  daB  keine  emsthaften  Bedenken 
hinsichtlich seiner Vereinbarkeit mit dem  Gemeinsamen  Markt bestehen. 
DIE  PARTEIEN 
Die  R  WE-Energie  AG  (R WE),  ein  Tochteruntemehmen  der  R  WE  AG,  ist  vornehmlich  im  Bereich  der 
Energieversorgung in Deutschland Ultig. Sie ist zudem  bei Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen an einem 
Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen  beteiligt,  das  in  Deutschland  corporate  networks  und  Mehrwertdienste  fur 
Fimenkunden  anbietet  (vgl.  Entscheidung  der  Kommission  vom  22.12.1993,  Fall  Nr.  IV/M.  394  -
Mannesmann/ RWEIDeutsche  Bank). 
Die Mannesmann  Eurokom  GmbH  (Mannesmann},  ein  Untemehmen der Mannesmann AG,  halt Anteile 
an Gesellschaften, die BUndelfunk in Deutschland, Mobildaten-kommunikation in Frankreich und Paging 
in  Spanien anbieten.  Die  Mannesmann  AG  ist  im  Bereich der Telekommunikation  mehrheitlich  an  der 
Mannesmann  Mobilfunk  AG,  die  in  Deutschland das  Funktelefonnetz D 2 betreibt, sowie an dem  unter 
Ziff.  3.  genannten Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen zum  Betrieb von CORPORATE NETWORKS  beteiligt. 
DER  ZUSAMMENSCHLUB 
Die anmeldenden Parteien werden eine gemeinsame Gesellschaft in der Rechtsform einer GmbH errlchtcn, 
an  deren  Stammkapital  R  WE  mit  43%  und  Mannesmann  mit  21%  beteiligt  sein  werdcn.  Wcitcre 
Anteilseigner sind die Deutsche Bank, die Energieversorgung Schwaben AG u.nd die Compagnie Financiere 
pour  le  Radiotel<~phone S.A.  (COFIRA)  mit  jeweils  10%  und  die  RAM  Mobile  Data Network  GmbH 
(RAM),  ein  Tochterunternehmen  der  US-amerikanischen  BeiiSouth  Corporation,  mit  6%  dcr 
Geschaftsantei I  e. 
Gegenstand  des  Gemeinschaftsunternehmens  ist  zunachst  die  Bewerbung  urn  die  Erteilung  einer  vom 
Bundesminister  flir  Post  und  Telekommunikation  ausgeschriebenen  Datenfunklizenz und,  im  Faile  der 
Lizenzerteilung,  das  Errichten  und  Betreiben  eines  Datenfunknetzes  im  Gebiet  der  Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland  zwecks  Erbringung  von  mobilen  Datenfunkdiensten.  Soweit  die  Gesellschaft  die 
Datenfunklizenz  nicht  erhalt,  wird  sie  aufgelost.  Die  Erteilung  einer  sogenannten  "wettbewerblichen 
Unbedenklichke.itserkHirung" der zustandigen Wettbcwerbsbehorde ist Voraussetzung flir die Vergabc der 
Lizenz. 
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GEMEINSAME KONTROLLE 
7.  R  WE und Mannesmann werden das Gemeinschaftsunternehmen gemcinsam kontrollieren. Zwar wird R  WE 
nach  Errichtung der Gesellschaft  Ober  43% der  Stimmrechte,  Mannesmann  Uber  21% der  Stimmrechte 
verfligen. Die Anteileigner habenjedoch einen Konsortialvertrag geschlossen, nach dessen Inhalt eine Reihe 
von fllr die Geschltftspolitik des Untemehmens wesentlichen Entscheidungen einer Mehrheit von 83% der 
Stimmen  der  Gesellschaftcrvcrsammlung  bcdOrfen.  Hierzu  gehtircn  insbesondere  die  f'cstellung  des 
Jahrcsabschlusscs,  die  Ocstcllung  und  Abbcrufung  dcr  GcschUflsfUhrung  sowic  Andcrungcn  und 
Erg:tnzungen des Gescllschaftsvertrages. Die Gesellschaft wird daroberhinaus einen GesellschafterausschuB 
haben,  der  mit  einer  Mehrheit  von  83%  der  Stimmanteile  Ober  MaBnahmen  wie  die  Umsatz- und 
Ergebnisplanung, Investitions- und Finanzplanung, Personalplanung sowie Erwerb und VerauBerungen von 
Beteiligungen  etc.  beschlieBt.  Aufgrund  des  Zustimmungserfordemisses  von  83%  ktinnen  deshalb  die 
genannten,  fUr  die Geschltftspolitik der Gesellschaft strategisch wesentlichen  MaBnahmen  sowohl  in  der 
Gesellschafterversammlung  wie  im  GesellschafterausschuB  nur  unter  Mitwirkung  von  R  WE  und 
Mannesmann  getroffen  werden.  Die  Regelungen  gewahren  heiden  Untemehmen  daher die  gemeinsame 
Kontrolle Ober das Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen. 
SELBSTAND/GE  WIRTSCHAFTLICHE  EINHEIT:  KEINE  KOORDINIERUNG  DES 
WETTBEWERBSVERHALTENS 
8.  Die  Gesellschafter  werden  gemafi  den  Verpflichtungen  aus  dem  Konsortialvertrag  die  notwendigen 
finanziellen  und  sachlichen  Mittel  in  das  GU  einbringen,  damit  dicses als  selbsHindiger Teilnchmer am 
Markt  opcricrcn  kann.  Es  soli jcdcnfalls bis  zum  Jahre 20 II  seine TUtigkcit  ausUbcn. 
9.  Gcgenstand  der  Geschaftstatigkeit  des  GU  wird  die  Bereitstellung  cines  Netzes  zur  mobilen 
paketvermittelnden  Datenilbertragung  sowie  das  Angebot  von  entsprechenden  Datenfunkdiensten  sein. 
Mannesmann  als  auch  RWE  sind  in  Deutschland  bereits  auf benachbartcn  Marktcn  tatig.  Mannesmann 
bictet  in  Deutschland  Ubcr  das  D  2 Nctz  Dienstleistungen  dcr  mobilen  SprachUbertragung  an.  Eine 
Koordinierung des Wettbcwerbsverhaltens zwischen dem Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen und der Mannesmann 
Mobi I  funk  erscheint jedoch  unwahrscheinlich,  da  dies  zum  einen  nicht  den  lnteressen  der  R  WE,  des 
groBten  Gesellschafters, entsprechen wUrde, und zum anderen sich der Kundenkreis beider Untemehmen, 
wie  unter  Ziff.  12,  13  ausgefUhrt,  aufgrund  der  nur  geringen  Austauschbarkeit  der  Angebote  des 
Sprachmobilfunkes und des speziellen Datenmobilfunkes nur geringfUgig Uberschneiden wird. Gleiches gilt 
fllr  die  AktiviUiten  von  Mannesmann  und  R  WE  als  Anbieter  von  Dienstleistungen  fUr  CORPORATE 
NETWORKS, da diese Dienstleistungen nicht mobil, sondem auf den Festleitungsbereich und auf  gesetzlich 
definierte Benutzergruppen beschrHnkt sind, sodaB  im  Hinblick auf cine nur geringe Oberschneidung im 
Kundensegment eine Koordinierung als unwahrscheinlich angesehen  werden  kann. 
Ill.  GEMEINSCHAFTSWEITE  BEDEUTUNG 
10.  Der wcltweite Gesamtumsatz der RWE AG (29,5  Mrd. ECU)  und dcr Manncsmann AG {13,6 Mrd. ECU) 
betrug 1992 mehr als 5 Mrd.  ECU. Beide Untemehmen erreichten im gleichen Geschaftsjahr mehr als 250 
Mio  ECU  in  der  Gemeinschaft,  wobei  nur  RWE  mehr  als  zwei  Drittel  dieses  Umsatzes  allein  in 
Deutschland erzielte. 
IV.  VEREINBARKEIT  MIT OEM  GEMEINSAMEN  MARKT 
MOBILER  PAKETVERMITTELNDER  DATENFUNK 
II.  Das Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen soil im Rahmen der vom Bundesminister fur Post und Telekommunikation 
vergebenen Lizenz ein Datenfunknetz zur mobilen paket-vermittelnden Datcnubertragung bereitstellen und' 
betreiben.  Die  Lizenz  berechtigt  nicht  zum  Sprach-Telefondienst  fl.ir  die  Offentlichkeit  und  ist  auf das 
Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beschrankt. 
12.  Im  mobilen  Datenfunk  werden  "Pakete"  von  Dateninfonnationen  vom  Absender  zum  Empfanger 
Ubermittelt,  ohne  daB  eine  spezielle  Verbindung  aufgebaut  werden  und  ohne  daB  der  Empflinger  zum 
Zeitpunkt der Obertragung erreichbar sein muB.  Die Vermittlung erfolgt auf cincm Obertragungskanal, der 
glcichzcitig  fiir  mehrcre  Vcrbindungcn  genutzt  wcrdcn  kann.  llicraus  crgibt  sich  eine  hohe 
Frcqucnznkonomie, die cs crlaubt, bis zu  1000 Datenfunkgerate pro Funkkanalpaar zu nutzen. Der mobile 
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paketvermittelnde  Datenfunk dicnt  insoweit insbesondere zur  Obertragung geringerer, speicherbarer und 
damit jederzeit abrufbarer Datenmengen.  Einsetzbar  ist  mobile  Datenfunktechnik beispielsweise  tllr die 
Steuerung von Kraftfahrzeugflotten, tllr die UnterstUtzung von AuBendienstmitarbeitem mit notwendigem 
Datenmaterial (Preise, Lagerbestande,  u.a.) oder tllr die Telemetric, d.h.  die systematische Erfassung der 
~ustandsdaten von Maschinen wie Verbrauchszabler,  A~tomaten oder UmweltmeBstationen. 
13.  Aus Kundensicht unterscheidet sich der mobile Sprachfunk von der paketvermittelnden Kommunikatlon 
vor  allem  in  der Art  des  Angebotes,  der  Kundengruppen  sowie  in  den  Preisen.  Sprachmobilfunk  ist 
vomehmlich auf Vermittlung von  Sprachkommunikation  ausgerichtet.  Zwar  ist grundslitzlich auch  eine 
Obertragung von Daten im Sprachmobilfunknetz (wie dem GSM oder dem E-Pius-Netz) technisch mOglich. 
Diese  ist  jedoch  wesentlich  zeit- und  kostenintensiver,  da  die  Obertragung  speicherbarer  Daten  im 
leitungsvermittelnden  Netz  nur  tiber  den  Aufbau  einer  individuellen  Verbindung  zwischen  den 
Endtcilnehmcrn  crfolgen  kann.  Dies  fuhrt  zu  ciner  geringercn  Frequenmkonomic  (-25 
MobilfunkgcrUtc/Funkkanalpaar) und zu zeitlichcn  Vcrz~gerungen, da hci jedcr SWrung die Lcitung crncut 
aufgebaut  werden  mull.  Mobiler  Datenfunk  wird  zudcm  insbesondere  von  spezifischen 
Firmenkundengruppen wie Transp:<?rtuntemehmen, Versicherungen usw. genutzt werden, die tiber die reine 
Nutzung der Leitung hinaus eines auf ihre Bedtirfnisse zugeschnittenen Anwendungskonzeptes bedtirfen. 
Es  ist  deshalb  davon  auszugehen,  daB  aus  der  Sicht  der  Kunden  Datenkommunikation  im  mobilen 
Sprachfunknetzjedenfalls mittelfristig nur als Erganzung zur Sprachkommunikation (etwa im Rahmen von 
nicht speicherbaren  Short Message Services,  die  auf dem  Display  des Telefongerates erscheinen),  nicht 
jedoch als Alternative zur reinen Datentibertragung angesehen werden kann. 
14.  GleichermaBen  ist die mobile  DatenUbertragung auch im  Verhaltnis zu den  in einem Corporate Network 
angebotenen Diensten als eigenstandige Telekommunikations-dienstleistung anzusehen. Serviceleistungen 
in  einem  Corporate Network  sind  auf den  Festleitungsbereich beschrankt  und  sind nur einer gesetzlich 
festgelegten  Benutzergruppe zuganglich. 
Rf7U~VANT£R GEOCiRAP/1/SCI/ER  MARKT 
15.  Das Gemeinschaftsunternchmen wird mobilen Daten funk aufgrund der Lizenzbeschrankungen zunachst nur 
in  Deutschland  autbauen  und  betreiben.  Es  kann  hier  dahinstehen,  ob  aus  diesem  Grunde  von  einem 
national en oder unter dynamischer Betrachtungsweise von einem europaischen Markt  auszugehen ist. Denn 
auch  bci Zugrundelegung des deutschen Marktes kann die Entstehung ciner marktbeherrschenden Stellung 
des Gemeinschaftsuntemehmcns ausgeschlossen werden. 
WETT'/1EWERBLICI/E  REURTEILUNG 
J 6.  In Deutschland wird mobiler Daten funk fur die Offentlichkeit bisher lediglich von der DBP Telekom tiber 
ihre Tochter DeTe-Mobil  angeboten.  Die Erteilung einer Datenfunklizenz an einen  privaten Anbieter ist 
dam it ein erster Schritt zur Liberalisierung des Marktes. Sie ftlhrt zum Eintritt cines zweiten Netzbetreibers. 
der sein  Serviceangebot nach  Zulassung  in  Konkurrenz zu  dem  bisherigen  Monopolanbieter entwickeln 
muf3.  Der Zutritt des Gemeinschaftsuntemehmens filhrt daher zu einem zweiten Anbieter auf dem  Markt 
fur mobile  Datenfunkkommunikation und ist wettbewerblich positiv zu  beurteilen. 
V.  GESAMTBEURTEILUNG 
17.  Aufgrund  der  oben  getroffenen  Feststellungen  ist  die  Kommission  zu  dem  Ergebnis  gelangt,  daB  das 
ZusammenschluBvorhaben  keinen AnlaB zu emsthaften Bedenken mit dem  Gemeinsamen  Markt gibt. 
18.  Aus  diesen  GrUnden  hat  die  Kommission  entschieden,  den  ZusammenschluB  ftir  vereinbar  mit  dem 
Gemeinsamen  Markt  zu  erklaren.  Diese Entscheidung beruht auf Art.  6( I  )(b) der Fusionsverordnung. 
FUr die  Kommission 
JI/21 7 Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  Case No IV/M.425- BS/BT 
~~~  _P_u_s_u_c_v_E_Rs_t_o_N ________  ~I 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
Registered with advice of delivery 
To the notifying parties 
Notification of 25.02.1994 pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No 4064/89 
The  above  mentioned  operation  concerns  an  agreement between  Banco  Santander (BS)  and  British 
Telecommunications (BT) to form  a company to offer managed data network services (MDNS) in Spain. 
2  After examination of  the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation involves 
the acquisition  of sole control by  BT of a new joint venture company which incorporates MegaRed, a 
wholly owned Banco Santander subsidiary.  The operation does not fall within the scope of application 
of Council Regulation 4064/89. 
THE PARTIES 
3  BS is a leading company in the Spanish banking and financial services sector and has developed a private 
domestic network to support its financial services business.  This network is operated through its subsidiary 
MegaRed S.A (MegaRed). 
4  BT's  principal  activity  is  the· supply of telecommunications and  equipment principally  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Its  services  in  the  UK  market  include  the  provision  of managed  network  services  to  its 
corporate customers. 
II  THE OPERATION 
5  The operation consists of the purchase by  BT of a 50% interest in MegaRed which will be renamed BT 
Telecomunicaciones SA {BTSA).  BS will transfer the existing assets (ie the network) of MegaRed into 
BTSA.  BTSA will  be  the only vehicle by which the shareholders (BS and  BT) will market, sell  and 
service domestic and international managed network services (MNS) to customers in  Spain.  BTSA will 
use an upgraded version of MegaRed's existing network to provide domestic MDNS services in  Spain. 
BTSA's network will be connected to both BT's and other international networks.  BTSA will also ofter 
a limited range of BT products for those customers who wish to source all their telecoms needs from  a 
single supplier. 
.. . 
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6  The operation will be achieved through a complex set of agreements.  The main agreement is the joint 
venture agreement between BS and BT which sets out the formation, capitalisation, funding operation and 
management of BTSA;  the manner in which BS and BT act as shareholders; and the framework for the 
supporting agreements.  There are six supporting agreements: the supply agreement which commits BS to 
source all  its current MNS  requirements from  BTSA  for a  period of at  least 6  years; the  marketing 
agreement which commits BT to appoint BTSA as its marketing representative for its international MNS 
operations in Spain; the distributipn agreement which appoints BTSA as a distributor for a limited set of 
B"rs  telec'ommunlcations  products;  the  support  agreement  which· provides .  for  BTSA  io  act  as' a 
maintenance, technical support and customer service contractor for B"rs MNS customers in Spain; and a 
transport agreement which facilitates the interconnection between the BT international network and the 
BTSA network. 
7  The joint venture agreement sets out the rights and obligations of  both parties within BTSA.  The principal 
rights and obligations are: 
(1) 
BS and BT each have 50% of the share capital of DTSA, but voting rights arc split [  1<•>  in  BT's 
favour except for certain areas covered by consent rights which require both shareholders agreement; 
Business secret. 8 
BS and BT will each have three directors on the board but the BT appointed chainnan will have a 
casting vote except for certain key strategic issues for the first three years of the operation of the 
agreement where special protections for BS apply. 
The General Manager (GM) and Deputy General Manager (DGM) will be responsible for the day to 
day management of BTSA.  The GM will be initially appointed by both BS and BT and after that 
by the 'board by simple majority (including the Bf' c.asting .vote if required).  The DGM will be 
appointed by tile board oil BS's· pro~sa1.  ·  · 
The consent rights contained in Clause 20 of  the joint venture agreement provide that the consent of  both 
shareholders is required to take decisions on the following aspects of BTSA's business: 
changes in  scope (ie exploiting new markets other than MNS); 
mergers, acquisitions and asset sales; 
charges over assets (ie using assets as security for loans); 
admission of new shareholders; 
guarantees; 
changes in  dividend policy; 
delegated authority of the GM; 
increases in  the Funding and Development commitments; and 
shareholder related contracts. 
9  These consent rights will remain in force until the joint venture agreement is dissolved or the shareholding 
of either BS or BT falls below 20%. 
10  At board level, the BS special protections set out in Clause 18 of  the joint venture agreement cover areas 
where the Chainnan (appointed by BT) will not be able to exercise the casting vote provided for in the 
joint venture agreement.  These areas are: 
human resource policies; 
organisational structure; 
compulsory redundancies; 
distribution and agency agreements; 
changes in  network investments; 
major customer bids or advertising campaigns; and 
substantial domestic tariff restructuring. 
These special protections only operate for the first three years of the joint venture agreement. 
II  After three years has elapsed, BS has an annual right for six successive years to require BT to purchase 
its shareholding in  BTSA (the Put Option).  The amount which BT would be obliged to pay is set out in 
a  (  ]<
2
> formula [ ](3). 
12  Both BS and BT have agreed an initial amount of money which will be invested in  BTSA over the first 
5 years  of its  operation (the  Funding Commitment).  A  proportion of the  Funding Commitment (the 
Development Commitment) is designated for the funds required during the first 3 years of the operation 
of BTSA. 
13  During the first  3  years, funding will  be by  way of equity contributions only and any increase in  the 
Development Commitment (or any modification to the business plan which would lead to an increase in 
the Development Commitment) would require the agreement of both shareholders. 
14  In  Years 4 &  5 increases in  the Funding Commitment would be able to be approved  by simple majority 
of the  shareholders but should  BS  be outvoted, they would not  be  obliged to participate in  any such 
additional  capital  injection.  If BS  chose not to participate, then  its  sharcholding would be diluted. 
However, any change in the funding mix (eg through debt capital or operational leasing) would require the 
consent of both  shareholders.  From  Year 6  onwards,  the  Funding Commitment will  cease to exist. 
Increases in equity participation would continue to be decided by simple majority and decisions on changes 
to the funding mix would continue to require consensus. 
(2) 
(3) 
Business secret. 
Business secret.  J/220 
..  • • 
15  An  initial business plan will he agreed between the two shareholders.  The business plan will be  fix ten 
years and will  be  updated annually Gointly  in  the  first  three years  if this requires an  increase  in  the 
Development Commitment and solely by BT otherwise).  For the first three years, the approval of BS  is 
required where changes to the business plan impinge on areas which fall under the consent rights or the 
special protections. 
III  SOLE 'CONTROL 
16  For the first three years of  the joint venture agreement, the special protections will cover a wide range of 
management issues and, combined with the shareholder consent rights, will provide veto rights to BS in 
the running of  BTSA.  In addition, the Development Commitment and the requirement for the agreement 
of  both shareholders to any change in the amount of equity participation will preclude either shareholder 
from  increasing its shareholding at the expense ofthe other. 
17  From  Year 4  onwards,  however,  the  balance  of the joint venture  agreement changes  as  the  special 
protections no longer apply and the Development Commitment will be exhausted.  The opportunity for BS 
to influence the conduct of BTSA is contained in the consent rights and the possibility of BS exercising 
the Put Option. 
18  The consent rights, set out in  paragraph 8,  cover a range of major issues on  which the approval of both 
shareholders is required.  Protections for such major issues arc necessary to protect minority rights but 
are not sufficient in themselves to provide the possibility of  exercising a decisive influence on BTSA.  In 
particular, according to clause  13.3(b) of the joint venture agreement, after the  first three years of the 
operation of the agreement: "  .. any business case  or  update  to  the  business  plan  may  be approved  by  a  simple  majority of 
Shareholders but should it require funding in excess of  the Funding Commitment the Shareholders 
shall be free to decide whether or nor to participate in the provision of the additional funding ... ". 
The effect of  this clause is to give BT the possibility of  increasing its equity participation in BTSA without 
the agreement of  BS and, should BS decide not to increase its equity stake then its shareholding would be 
diluted and BT would have a permanent majority at shareholder level. Should BS's shareholding fall below 
45% then" they·  would Jose· one of their nominees on the BTSA board: 
19  The other major protection for BS within the joint venture agreement is the opportunity of  exercising its 
Put Option between Year 4 and Year 10.  The Put Option could be seen to provide a financial disincentive 
to BT to seek to control BTSA without reference to BS by requiring BT to purchase the whole of BS's 
stake at a price based on  [a formula]<
4>.  The minimum value for the stake in  Year 4 is  [ ]<
5>.  This [ ]<
6> 
value does not represent a large amount for BT whose worldwide turnover in  1993 was approximately 18 
billion  ECU.  If the  value  is  higher,  then  the  prospects  for  RTSA  arc  better which  RT,  as  a  major 
telecommunications operator, would be well placed to exploit.  The Put Option does not, therefore, provide 
a sufficient incentive for BT to allow BS to exercise a decisive influence over BTSA. 
20  In  the light of the above,  it  does not appear that BS  will have the opportunity to exercise a decisive 
influence over BTSA after three years of the joint venture agreement. 
21  At most BS wilJ be able to exercise a decisive influence over BTSA for only the first three years of the 
joint venture agreement.  The business plan covers a ten year period and [ ]<7>.  Given the long term nature 
of the investment, the three year period is insufficient to bring about a lasting change in the structure of 
the undertakings concerned.  BT will therefore have sole control over BTSA.  Consequently, the operation 
is  the  acquisition  of control  by  BT of a  new joint venture  company which  incorporates  MegaRed. 
Therefore, for the purposes of calculating turnover, Article 5(2) is  applicable. 
IV  ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
22  BT and Mega Red have a combined worldwide turnover of  over 5000 million EClJ. BT has a Community 
wide turnover of  over 250 million ECU.  Mega Red docs not have a Community wide turnover of over 250 
million ECU.  Therefore, the operation does not have a Community dimension. 
(4)  Business secret. 
(5)  Business secret. 
(6)  Business secret.  JJ/222 
{7)  Business secret. 
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• v  CONCLUSION 
Rased on the ahovc, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation dues not have at  'ommnnily 
dimension within the meaning of  Article 1 of  the Merger Regulation and therefore does not fall within the 
scope of the Merger Regulation.  This decision is  adopted in  application of Article 6(1)(a) of Council 
Regulation No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, >- I 
I 
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(Acts  whose publication is  not obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
of 9 November 1994 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 
(IV  /M.469 - MSG  Media Service) 
(Only the German text is  authentic) 
(  94/922/EC) 
THE COMMISSION OF TiiE EUROPE.;\N COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to the Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 
of 21  December  1989 on the  control of concentrations 
between  undertaking (1),  and  in  particular  Article  8  (3) 
thereof, 
Having regard  to the EEA  Agreement, and in  particular 
Article 57 (  1  ) thereof, 
Having  regard  to the  Commission  Decision  of 18  july 
1994 to initiate proceedings in this case, 
Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity 
to make  known  their views  on the  objections  raised  by 
the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Advisory Committee 
on Concentrations (2·), 
Whereas: 
(1)  The  procedure  under  consideration  concerns  the 
proposed  setting  up,  by  Bertelsmann  AG 
(I)  OJ  No L 395, 30.  12.  1989,  p.  1.  Corrigendum:  OJ  No L 
257, 21.  9.  1990, p.  13 . 
(Bertelsmann),  Deutsche  Bundespost  T elekom 
(Telekom)  and  Taurus  Beteiligungs  GmbH 
(Taurus),  of a  joint  venture  under  the  name  of 
MSG  Media  Service  Gesellschaft  fur  Abwicklung 
von  Pay-TV  und  verbundenen  Diensten  mbH 
(MSG). 
(2)  By  decision  dated 28  June  1994, the  Commission 
ordered  the  suspension  of the  concentration  as  a 
whole, pursuant to Article 7 (2)  and Article  18  (2) 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 (hereinafter  the 
'Merger  Regulation'),  until  it  takes  a  final 
decision. 
(3)  By  decision  of  18  july  1994,  the  Commission 
found that the notified concentration raises serious 
doubts  as  to  its  compatibility  with  the  common 
market.  The  Commission  accordingly  initiated 
proceedings in  this case,  pursuant to  Article  6  (  1) 
(c)  of the Merger Regulation. 
(4)  By  letter  dated  29 june 1994, Germany  informed 
the  Commission,  pursuant to  Article  9  (2)  of the 
Merger  Regulation,  that  the  concentration 
threatened  to create or to strengthen  a  dominant 
position as a result of which  effective competition 
would  be  significantly  impeded  on  three  markets 
within  Germany,  each  of which  was  a  separate 
geographic market within the meaning of Article 9 '31"  \\ 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7).  A referral of the case pursuant to Article 9 (3) 
of the Merger Regulation has  not taken place. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
Bertelsmann is the common parent company of the 
leading  German  media  group.  The  Bertelsmann 
group  has  activities  primarily  in  book  and 
magazine  publishing,  book  dubs,  printing,  music 
publishing and sound recording, and has  holdings 
in commercial· television.  Although Germany is  the 
most important market for  Bertelsmann, the  gro~:~p 
also  has  widespread  international  activities  (some 
6% of its turnover is  earned outside Germany). 
Taurus  is  a  holding  company  belonging  to  the 
Kirch  group (Kirch).  Kirch  is  the  leading  German 
supplier  of  feature  films  and  television 
programming  and  is  also  active  in  commercial 
television. The group operates mainly in Germany. 
Kirch  also - and to an  increasing extent - has 
holdings  in  pay-TV suppliers outside Germany. 
(7)  Telekom is the public telecommunications operator 
in  Germany.  Telekom  is  active,  either  directly  or 
through  subsidiaries,  in  all  areas  of 
telecommunications services.  It has a  monopoly of 
the  German  telephone  network  arid  is  the  owner 
and  · operator  of  nearly  all  the  German 
cable-television networks. 
II.  THE PROPOSED OPERATION 
(8)  Bertelsmann, Kirch and Telekom propose to set up 
a  joint  venture,  MSG,  which  will  have  a  share 
capital of DM 60 million. Each of the parents will 
hold  one-third  of  the  share  capital  and  voting 
rights in MSG. The object of MSG is the technical, 
business  and  administrative  handling  of  mainly 
payment-financed  television  and  other 
communication  services,  including  conditional 
access  and  subscriber  customer  management,  as 
well  as  the  provision  of the  necessary  technical 
infrastructure for  the  supply of such services  and 
all related business. 
(9) 
m. THE CONCENTRATION 
1.  Joint control 
MSG  will  be  jointly controlled  by  its  three  parent 
companies.  According  to  MSG's  articles  of 
association,  each  of the  parents  has  the  right  to 
supervisory board. A number of strategic decisions 
require the approval of the supervisory board by  a 
75%  majority  vote.  Such  decisions  include  the 
appointment  of  ·the  management,  the  annual 
budget,  entering  into  new  or  giving  up  existing 
activities,. basic questions as to the organization of 
legal  and economic  relations  with  the  authorities, 
network operators and service suppliers and  basic 
decisions  on  the  technology  and  systems  to  be 
applied.  The  agreement  of  all  three  parents  is, 
therefore,  required  in  basic  .decisions  concerning 
the  management,  commercial  policy  and  the 
competitive strategy of the joint venture. 
2.  Concentrative joint venture 
(10)  (a)  MSG will perform on a permanent basis all the 
functions  of an  autonomous  economic  entity. 
There is at present only one pay-TV channel in 
Germany,  Premiere,  which  is  operated  by  a 
joint venture  (Premiere  Medien  GmbH  &  Co. 
KG),  owned  by  Bertelsmann,  Kirch  and Canal 
Plus.  Premiere  at present  supplies  the  services 
required  for  the  operation  of  pay-TV  itself. 
There  is  therefore  currently  no  market  in 
Germany for  the services  which  arc  the  object 
of MSG.  Howeyer, as  outlined  below,  it  is  to 
be  expected  that,  as  a  consequence  of  the 
introduction of digital  television  over  the  next 
few  years,  the  joint  venture's  downstream 
market for pay-TV and other payment-financed 
television  services  will  grow  rapidly  and  new 
suppliers will enter the market. It may therefore 
be  assumed that a  market will  develop  for  the 
services  offered  by  MSG  which  will  reach  a 
substantial  size  in  the  foreseeable  future.  The 
MSG joint venture is intended to play an active 
role  in  this  growth  market and  participate  in 
the  value  chain.  MSG  will  therefore  be  a 
full-function  enterprise on the  market and not 
merely  take on auxiliary functions,  whether in 
whole  or  in  part,  for  its  parent  companies 
Bertelsmann and Kirch. 
(11) 
appoint  two  mcmbe:s  of  the  . six-mc1/ 
2  2  6 
With  regard  to the  investment  required  for  its 
busi11ess  activity~  the  parent  companies  are 
prepared to provide the  joint venture  with  the 
necessary  financial  resources  to  enable  it  to 
undertake  the  investment  itself.  According  to 
the MSG  business plan submitted by  Telekom, 
.  . .. 
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(12) 
MSG's  total  capital  requirement  will  be  DM 
( ••• )  ( 1)  million  up  to  the  year  2004,  provided 
that the decoders which are to  be  installed are 
rented-.  DM  [  ... ]  million  of  this  capital 
requirement  is  to  be  financed  from  the  joint 
venture's own capital.  Although,  according  to 
the business plan, the break-even point is  to be 
expected  only  after  [  ... )  years  (which  means 
that  the  cumulative  operating  result  will  be 
positive  in  [  ... )),  a  positive  operating  result  is 
expected  in  [  ... ] if the cumulative initial  losses 
are  disregarded.  Such  results  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  exceptional  in  the  case  of  a 
long-term  project  in  a  future-oriented  market 
with  a  high  investment  requirement.  Neither 
the  equity-capital  base  described  nor  the 
earnings  pattern  aimed  at  point  to  the 
conclusion  that  MSG  would  be  inadequately 
endowed  with  financial  resources  and  could 
not  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  full-function 
enterprise. 
Nor  is  this  assumption  precluded  by  the  fact 
that  MSG  will  possibly  rake  over  services 
relating  to  Premiere's  current  analog  pay-TV 
business.  Premiere  already  has  the  technical 
infrastructure for  analog pay-TV, on the  basis 
of  which  the  company  itself  administers  its 
subscriber  system.  MSG's  business  plan 
indicates  the  company  itself  administers  its 
subscriber  system.  MSG's  business  plan 
indicates for  1995 to 1997 a subscriber list for 
MSG  which  is  far  smaller  than  Premiere's 
current subscriber list  (Premiere subscriber list: 
800  000;  MSG  subscriber  1995:  [  ... );  1966: 
[  ... );  1997:  [  ... ].  This  suggests  that  MSG's 
services  are  not  aimed  at  Premiere's  current 
analog  pay-TV,  but  at  future  digital  pay-TV 
services.  If  over  the  next  few  years  MSG 
develops a digital pay-TV infrastructure, it may 
be  assumed  that  Premiere  will  use  that 
infrastructure  if  it  wishes  to  supply  digital 
pay-TV.  Digitalization  will,  however,  open  up 
the  possibility  of  further  pay-TV  suppliers 
entering the  market and making  use  of MSG's 
services. 
(13)  MSG will, as outlined below, supply a package 
of  services  that  constitute  an  autonomous 
market. One of MSG's essential tasks will  be to 
create the necessary technical  infrastructure for 
digital  pay-TV,  by  establishing a  decoder  base 
and  a system  of conditional access.  This  is  an 
essential prerequisite for pay-TV that calls for a 
(1)  In  the  published  version  of the  Decision,  some information 
has  hereinafter  been  omitted, pursuant to  rhe  provisions of 
Article  17 (2)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets . 
quite substantial  level  of investment.  In  so  far 
as the use of the technical infrastructure by  the 
services supplied  by  MSG  requires cooperation 
on the part of MSG with the parent companies, 
who are themselves pay-TV suppliers, the same 
need arises  for  cooperation with other pay-TV 
, suppliers who avail themselves of infrastructure 
and services . 
(1~)  (b) The setting-up  of MSG  has  neither  the  object 
nor the  effect  of coordinating  the  competitive 
behaviour  of  undertakings,  which  remain 
independent  of  one  another.  A  risk  of 
coordination between Bertelsmann and Kirch  is 
in  particular  not  to  be  expected  in  the 
introduction  of  new  pay-TV  services  or  the 
conversion  of  present  advertising-financed 
programmes  into  pay-TV  programmes.  The 
pay-TV activities of Bertelsmann and Kirch  are 
currently  combined  in  the  joint  venture 
Premiere.  Premiere's  three  parent  companies 
have  undertaken  'as  a  specific  measure 
embodying  their  company-law  obligations  in 
the  joint  venture'  not. to  participate  in  any 
other German-language pay-TV service  for  the 
duration  of  the  joint  pay-TV  service  without 
the  agreement  of  the  other  partners.  If 
therefore in  future Bertelsmann and Kirch were 
to  supply  pay-TV  programmes  independently 
of  each  other,  any  coordination  of  such 
independent  activities  would  be  the  result  of 
cooperation in  Premiere. It is  not apparent that 
any  additional  coordination  through  MSG  is 
necessary  in  that  connection  and  that  such 
additional  coordination  might  be  relevant  ro 
the  concentrative  or  cooperative  nature  of 
MSG. 
(15)  Nor  can  a  risk  of  coordination  within  the 
meaning of Article  3 of the Merger Regulation 
between  the  parent companies  be  assumed  in 
the installation of a digital infrastructure and in 
the use  of such systems.  The installation of an 
appropriate  digital  infrastructure  for  pay-TV 
and  its  use  is  precisely  the  business  object  of 
the  joint  venture.  Cooperation  within  a  joint 
venture  within  the  framework  of the  business 
object is  a characteristic of every  joint venture 
and  cannot  be  used  as  evidence  of  its 
cooperative nature. The Commission finally has 
no  evidence  that  Telekom  or  Kirch  or 
Bertelsmann  intend  to  supply  the 
abovementioned  services  beyond  MSG.  After 
the  establishment  of  MSG,  T  elekom,  in 
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potential competitor of the joint venture, since 
the  development  of  an  additional  alternative 
infrastructure  by  Telekom  would  be 
economically  unjustifiable  in  view  of  its 
investment in MSG and would run completely 
counter to the strategy pursued by T elekom in 
helping to set up MSG. 
(  16)  Lastly, it appears improbable that there will  be 
any  coordination  between  Kirch  and 
Bertelsmann  via  MSG  on  the  market  for 
advertising-financed  television.  Although 
Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  each  have  holdings  in 
advertising-financed  television  channels,  it  is 
not apparent why  cooperation  in  the  pay-TV 
area  and  in  services  for  pay-TV  should,  for 
example,  lead  to  a  restnction  of competition 
between RTL and SAT  I. The same applies to 
the relationship between Telekom and the  joint 
venture  as  regards  future  non-media-related 
communications  services  provided  by 
Telekom. 
(17)  It  must  accordingly  be  assumed  that  the 
setting-up  of MSG  represents  a  conceQ.tration 
within the meaning of Article 3  of the Merger 
Regulation in the form of a concentrative joint 
venture. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
(18)  The aggregate worldwide turnover of Bertelsmann, 
Kirch and Telekom is  more than ECU 5 billion. In 
the  financial  year  1992/93,  Bertelsmann  earned 
ECU  9  billion,  the  Kirch  group ECU  [  ...  ]  million 
and Telekom  ECU  29,3 billion.  Each of the three 
undertakings  achieves  an  aggregate 
Community-wide turnover of more than ECU  250 
million.  The  undertakings  concerned  do  not  all 
realize  more  than  two-thirds  of  their  aggregate 
·community-wide  turnover  within  one  and  the 
same  Member  State.  The  concentration  therefore 
has a Community dimension within the meaning of 
Article  1 of the Merger Regulation. 
(19) 
V.  ASSESSMENT  UNDER  ARTICLE  2  OF  1HE 
MERGER REGULATION 
A.  Relevant product markets 
The proposed concentration affects the market for 
administrative  and technical  services  for  suppliers 
of pay-TV  and  other  television  services  financed 
through  subscription  or  payment  by  viewers,  the 
market  for  pay-TV  and  other  television  services 
financed  through  subscription  or  payment  by 
J/228 
viewers  (pay-TV)  and  the  market  for 
cable-television networks. 
1.  Administrative  and  technical  services  for 
pay-~ 
(20)  The  operation  of  pay-TV  requires  a  special 
technical  infrastructure consisting essentially of an 
adaptor  for  decryption  (decoder), 
conditional-access  technology  and  a  subscriber 
management system.  A series  of services  required 
for  the  operation of pay-TV  are  provided  on  the 
basis of this infrastructure. 
(21)  (a)  Pay-TV programmes are generally hro.H.kast by 
cable  or  satellite.  Unlike  free  commercial 
television,  they  require  a  specific  system  to 
ensure  that  only  authorized  viewers,  that  is, 
subscribers  to  the  particular  pay-TV  supplier, 
can receive  the  programmes. This  requires  the 
installation of a decoder in  the  home  of every 
pay-lV  viewer  in  order  to  unscramble  the 
television picture, which is scrambled when  the 
television signal is  broadcast. Decoders may  be 
either  bought  or rented  from  shops  or  leased 
out  to  viewers.  Since,  at  least  in  the  initial 
phase,  the  price  of the  digital  decoders  which 
will  in  future  be  installed  will  amount  to 
between  OM  1 000 and  DM  1 500  and  as  a 
result  the  cost  to  the  individual  viewer  is 
relatively high, it  may be  assumed that, at least 
in  the  first  five  years,  digital  pay-TV  decoders 
will  normally  be  rented.  This  means  that  the 
installation of a decoder base  requires a  major 
investment  by  the  . operator  of  a  pay-TV 
infrastructure. 
(22)  Since  most  households  will,  following  the 
introduction of digital television, continue for a 
number of years to be equipped with an analog 
television  set,  there  will  also  be  a  need  for  a 
digital-analog  convertor  that  will  allow  the 
digital  signals  to be  received  in  analog  form. 
The  convertor  and  decoder  will  in  all 
probability  be  available  in  a  single  device 
('set-top  box')  and  in· the  longer  term  be 
incorporated  in  satellite  receivers  or  directly 
into television sets. 
(23)  (b)  In  addition  to  the  decoder  base,  pay-TV 
requires  a  system  of conditional  access.  This 
system comprises the transmission of encrypted 
data,  which  contain·  information  on  the 
programmes  or  packages  of  programmes 
subscribed  to  and  on  the  entitlement  of  the 
pay-TV subscribers to receive the  programmes, 
together with the television signal, and possibly 
•. 
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smart cards  which  are  made  available  to  the 
viewer  and  are able  to decipher  the encrypted 
authorization  data  and  transfer  them  to ·the 
decoder.  Control  of  c~nditional  access  takes 
place either within the decoder or by  means of 
one  or  more  smart  cards  inserted  in  the 
decoder  . 
(24)  In  Western  Europe, there are at present- for 
analog  pay-TV  - at  least  five  encryption 
systems  which  operate on  a  proprietary  basis: 
Videocrypt (used  by  BSkyB and Adult Channel 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  by  Filmnet  in  the 
Benelux  countries), Syster /Nagravision  (Canal 
Plus in  France and Spain, Premiere in  Germany 
and  Austria  and  Teleclub  in  Switzerland), 
Eurocrypt  (Filmnet  and  TV  1000  in 
Scandinavia),  Irdeto  (Telepiu  in  Italy)  and 
Luxcrypt  (RTL  4  and  RTL  5  in  the 
Netherlands).  Harmonization  throughout 
Europe  has  been  achieved  for 
scramblingldescrambling,  for  the  digital  signal 
broadcasting  standard  (MPEG  II)  and  for  the 
licensing  of  proprietary  conditional  access 
technologies  within  the  framework  of  the 
European  Project  for  Digital  Video 
Broadcasting  (DVB),  which  consists  of 
approximately 150 companies with interests in 
the  field  of digital  TV  in  Europe.  As  far  as 
encryption  technology  is  concerned,  the 
intentions of the individual enterprises vary.  In 
particular,  pay-TV  suppliers  such  as  BSkyB, 
Canal  Plus  and  Filmnet  are  convinced  of the 
need for proprietary encryption technology and 
see  the  SimulCrypt concept as  the  appropriate 
approach  to  conditional  access  in  digital 
television. On the other hand, potential pay-TV 
•  suppliers  and  network  operators  prefer  a 
common-interface  solution.  With  Simulcrypt, 
pay-TV  broadcasters  can  have  simultaneously 
access to bases of consumer decoders which use 
different  conditional  access  systems,  on  the 
basis  of  agreements  and  of  technical 
arrangements defined in the DVB. On the other 
hand,  in  a  'common  interface'  solution,  the 
decoders can be already technically designed so 
that they can 'understand' very  different access 
control  systems  thanks  to  modules  and/or 
smart  cards.  In  the  framework  of  DVB,  an 
agreement  was  recently  reached  on  the 
provision  of  both  concepts  'Simulcrypt'  and 
'Common  Interface'.  A  code  of  conduct  is 
added to Sirnulcrypt  for  governing commercial 
relations  between  parties  in  the  market.  Some 
of  the  DVB  members  have  signed  the  code, 
others have  not. 
(25)  (c)  In addition  to the  decoder  base and encrypted 
conditional  access,  there  is  also  a  subscriber 
datafile  in  which  all  the  relevant  information 
on  pay-TV  subscribers  is  'stored,  including 
invoicing  and  in  payments  (subscriber 
management system). 
(26)  The infrastructure described forms the basis for 
the  services  relating  to  the  operation  of 
pay-TV.  These  involve  primarily the  following 
administrative and technical services: 
- the making available of decoders, 
- the handling of conditional access, 
subscriber  management  in  respect  of 
pay-TV customers, 
settlement  of  accounts  with  programme 
suppliers. 
(27)  (d) The  technical  and  administrative  services  for 
pay-TV can  be  provided  by  a  pay-TV supplier 
itself.  This  is  currently the  case  with  Premiere. 
The  pay-TV  supplier  can  also  make  irs 
infrastructure  available  to  other  pay-TV 
suppliers.  This  is,  for  example,  the  case  with 
Canal  Plus  in  France  and  - for  satellite 
pay-TV- with BSkyB  in  the United Kingdom. 
Premiere,  too,  intends  to  offer  its  services  to 
other  enterprises.  The  infrastructure  may, 
however,  also  be  operated  by  undertakings 
which are not programme suppliers. This is  the 
case in particular with cable network operators. 
The provision of the  relevant services  by  cable 
network  operators  is  commonplace  in  the 
United States. 
(28)  MSG will  make the decoders available (at  least 
in  the short and  medium-term),  and  will  also 
carry  out  access  control  and  subscriber 
management for pay-TV providers. In  so doing, 
MSG  will  have  direct  contractual  relations 
mainly  with  the  programme  suppliers.  The 
pay-TV  subscription  agreement  will  be 
concluded  between  the  programme  supplier 
and the  final  consumer.  In  addition,  MSG  will 
lease the decoders to the end user - in  any case 
for  quite  a  few  years.  Finally,  the  programme 
supplier  must  conclude  user  agreements  with 
Telekom  and  other  network  or  satellite 
operators. 
(29)  Under  the  subscriber  management  system, 
MSG  will  also  monitor  in-payments  and  pass 
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on information on this  to any  pay-TV supplier 
cutting  off  the  conditional  access  signal  for 
subscribers who are late with payments.  MSG 
will,  according  to  the  parties  themselves, 
neither offer programmes or interactive services 
nor undertake  packaging  (the  putting together 
of  programme  packages).  The  packaging  and 
marketing  of  the  programmes  transmitted 
through  MSG  will  be  carried  out  by  the 
programme  organizers  themselves.  MSG 
intends  to  offer  its  services  as  from  199  5  to 
programme  suppliers  irrespective  of  whether 
they  broadcast their  programmes  using  digital 
or  analog  technology.  Since,  as  described 
below, the introduction of digital technology is 
imminent and since  Kirch  and Bertelsmann, as 
co-partners  in  the  only  analog  pay-TV 
broadcaster so  far  in  Germany,  do not intend 
to  put  together  any  further  pay-TV 
programmes on an  analog  basis  (apart from  a 
children's  channel  which  Premiere  intends  to. 
introduce),  it  is  not  to  he  expected  that  MSG 
will  to  any  s1gnificant  extent  be  further 
involved in  analog programmes. 
(30)  (e)  Even  if  there  is  at  present  no  market  in 
Germany  for  the  services  provided  by  MSG, 
such  a  market  is  expecte~  to  develop,  in 
particular following  the  introduction of digital 
television (see  paragraph 2). Since it is  unlikely 
that all  suppliers of television  communications 
services  will  have  their own infrastructure, the 
relevant  demand  should  develop  quickly, 
leading  to  the  supply-side  development  of the 
services offered by  MSG. 
(31)  (f)  According  to the conception  underlying  MSG, 
it  must be  assumed  that there  will  be  a  single 
market  for  services  relating  to  digital  pay-TV 
and  other  digital  interactive  television 
communications  serv1ces.  MSG  will  offer 
decoder,  conditional  access  and  subscriber 
management from one and the same body. The 
same  package  of  services  is  provided  on  an 
analog basis  by  Premiere  and Selco.  Selco  also 
markets  the  pay-TV  programmes  which  it 
handles.  After  the  agreement  within  DVB  on 
the  parallel  existence  of several  access  control 
solutions,  the  services,  in  particular  the 
subscriber  management  system,  could  also  be 
supplied  separately.  A  number  of  the 
undertakings  surveyed  by  the  Commission 
accordingly consider it  possible that a separate 
market  for  subscriber  management  by 
specialized  firms  may  develop.  In  connection 
with subscriber management or separately from 
it, a special market might possibly also develop 
for  programme  packaging,  which  means  the 
putting-together  of  packages  of  programmes 
from  different programme suppliers. 
2.  Pay-TV 
(32)  Pay-TV constitutes a  relevant product market that 
is  separate  from  commercial  advertising-financed 
television  and  from  public  television  financed 
through fees  and partly through advertising. While 
in  the case of advertising-financed television,  there 
is  a  trade  relationship  only  between  the 
programme  supplier  and  the  advertising  industry, 
in  the case of pay-TV there is  a  trade  relationship 
only  between  the  programme  supplier  and  the 
viewer  as  subscriber.  The  conditions  of 
competition  are  accordingly  different  for  the  two 
types of commercial television. Whereas in  the case 
of  advertising-financed  television  rhe  .tudil•ncc 
share  and  the  advertising  rates  .are  the  key 
parameters, in  the case  of pay-TV  the  key  factors 
are  the  shaping  of  programml'S  to  meet  the 
interests  of  the  target  groups  and  the  level  ol 
subscriber  prices  (see  also  the  Commission 
Decision  of  5  August  1994-IV/M.410 
Kirch!Richmontffelepiu). There is,  however,  some 
relationship between pay-TV and free-access TV in 
that the  growth  of the  pay-TV  market  is  slower 
where the programmes provided by  free-access  TV 
broadcasters  are  relatively  varied.  Thus,  the 
development of the  figures of Premiere subscribers 
was  different  in  Germany  as  compared  to  the 
development of subscribers in France or the United 
Kingdom  (see  point 48).  But this does  not change 
anything  about  the  original  character  of  the 
pay-TV  market.  The  distinction  between  the  two 
markets  could,  however,  become  blurred  in  the 
case of pay-TV programmes that are financed from 
a  mixture  of  sources.  Such  programmes  can  be 
expected  in  various  countries  in  future.  On  the 
German  market,  however,  there  is  as  yet  no 
evidence  of pay-TV  having  such  mixed-financing 
sources,  particularly  since  Premiere  is  financed 
solely from subscriptions and payments hy  viewers. 
According  to  various  market  particip.mts,  tht' 
absence of programme  hreaks for  aJvcrtrsing will, 
on  the  contrary,  be  an  important  argument  m 
winning customers over to digital pay-TV. 
(33)  Pay-TV  programmes  and  free-access, 
advertising-financed  programmes  also  differ  in 
terms of content.  Digitalization  allows  the  signals 
being transmitted to be  highly compressed and will 
therefore  lead  to  a  considerable  increase  in 
transmission  capacities.  At  present,  some  14 
million  households  on  cable  and  some  seven 
million  households  with  satellite  receivers  can 
receive  about 30 television  programmes in  analog 
form.  In  the  digital  age,  200  or  more  television 
programmes  are  considered  possible.  The  new 
programmes  would  probably  be  mainly  pay-TV 
J/2?/J . 
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programmes,  since  there  are  limits  to the  further 
growth in the volume of television advertising and 
since the market for advertising-financed television 
therefore  appears essentially  to  be  a  mature one. 
Against  this  background,  a  variety  of  new, 
payment-financed special-interest programmes may 
be  expected, meeting the demand of specific target 
groups  (e.g.  sport,  music,  news,  feature  films  or 
children's programmes).  Although a  similar trend 
towards special-interest channels may  be  observed 
in  the  case  of advertising-financed  television  too, 
this  is  not comparable  with  the  specialization  to 
be  expected  in  digital  pay-TV.  In  addition, 
digitalization  in  conjunction  with  the  use  of the 
telephone  or cable  network as  the  return channel 
allows  the  introduction  of  inter-active  television 
services  such  as  pay-per-view,  near-video-
on-demand,  video-on-demand,  home  banking, 
home shopping and teleteaching. 
(34)  According  to  the  information  provided  by  the 
parties, digitalization of Telekom's cable  network 
will  take  place  in  1995.  By  early  1995,  digital 
reception  should  be  available  to  80%  of 
households  on cable  (assuming,  that  they  have  a 
decoder).  This is  expected to rise  to 96% during 
the  course  of the  year.  Satellite  transmission  can 
already  be  carried  out in  either analog or digital 
form;  only  the  terrestrial·  broadcasting  and 
reception  facilities  require  adjustment.  In 
Telekom's broadband cable network, there will  in 
future,  in  the  hyperband  range  of  300  - 450 
MHz, be  15 channels available for the transmission 
of digital  programme signals. A total of four to 10 
digital  programmes  is  to  h('  available  on  each 
l:hannd.  In  a  first  sta~c,  Tclckom  intends  to 
provide  three  channels  for  di~ual pay-TV  by  the 
end of 1995. 
(35)  Whereas in  the United States a  directly  receivable 
digital satellite programme package comprising an 
initial  range  of  75  programmes  (DirectTV)  was 
started early  in  1994, Europe  is  at present at the 
stage  of  pilot  projects.  In  the  United  Kingdom 
BSkyB  is  offering  pay-per-channel  and 
pay-per-view via  satellite while  BT is  going to try 
out  video-on-demand  using  partly  digital 
technology.  In  France,  France  Telecom  has  just 
issued  an invitation to tender for  an  order for  the 
supply  of 300 000  decoders.  Canal  Plus  similarly 
intends  to  introduce  digital  decoders  in  1995. 
Bertelsmann  has  embarked  on  cooperation  with 
Canal  Plus  in  the  pay-TV  area,  involving 
investment of more than ECU  [  ... j (1)  million  over 
the next three years. 
(3(i)  In Germany, several pilot projects for digital and in 
some cases  interactive  television  are getting  under 
way  this  year,  for  example  in  Nuremberg, 
1 
Hamburg und Berlin.  Projects involving interactive 
services,  including  near-video-on-demand  and 
home-shopping,  will  start at the  end  of  1994  in 
4 000  households  in  Baden-Wiirttemberg  (Multi 
Media  Services  Pilot)  and  in  Hamburg  (DITB 
Gesellschaft  fi.ir  digitales  interaktives  Fernsehen 
mbH). In  the home-shopping area,  the  mail  order 
firm  QueUe  Schickedanz  AG  is  planning  to 
introduce home-shopping as  from  1995  and wants 
to develop  this  into its  own satellite channel  with 
an 'electronic catalogue' and a  range  of avaibhk 
services  and  entertainment.  Most  of  the 
undertakings  surveyed  hy  the  Commission  in  tfw, 
proceeding  accordingly  expect  there  to  be  an 
increase  in  digital  pay-TV  and  digital  interal:tive 
services  between  1995  and  1998.  Premiere,  the 
pay-TV  channel  operated  by  Bertelsmann,  Kirch 
and Canal Plus  has announced that it  hopes to he 
able  to  offer  near-video-on-demand  and 
pay-per-view as from 1995/96. 
(37)  According  to  a  survey  reported  in  the  specialist 
press,  at least  20 %  of television  viewers  over  14 
years  of age  in  Germany  would  be  prepared  to 
spend  money  for  pay-TV  in  addition  to  the 
television  licence  fees  and  the  fees  for  the 
broadband  cable  network.  This  would  give  a 
market  potential  of  over  10  million  viewers  for 
pay-TV. Telekom itself,  as  part of its  planning for 
MSG, anticipates 3,4 million connected houst·holds 
by  2005. 
(38)  It  is  doubtful  whether  all  forms  of 
payment-financed  communications  services  for 
picture-receiving  appliances  are  to  be  included  in 
one and the same market. Interactive services such 
as  home shopping or home  banking in  particular 
might have  to  be  regarded as  separate.  However, 
according to what is  known at present, pay-TV in 
the  form  of  pay-per-channel,  pay-per-view  and 
near-video-on-demand constitutes a  single  market, 
since,  in  such  forms  of viewing,  the  broadcaster 
alone  determines  the  programme  sequence  and 
timing  and  the  viewer  has  only  limited  choice 
avai.lable (in the case of near-video-on-demand, for 
example,  a  specific  number  of  feature  films  is 
available for selection, with each  being repeated at 
specific times of the day). Things might he different 
(')  Business  secret;  according  ro  press  art1dcs  approximately 
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in  the  case  of video-on-demand  proper,  with  the 
customer selecting a programme of his choice from 
an  electronic  video  library.  However,  since  this 
form  of  broadcasting  will,  according  to  the 
information  provided  by  various  potential  market 
participants,  probably  not  ·be  achievable  for 
technical  reasons  over  the  next  few  years,  if need 
not  be  assigned  specifically  to  any  particular 
market. 
3.  Cable television  networks 
(39)  In  the  Commission's  view,  a  separate market can 
be  considered  to  exist  for  cable  television 
networks. 
(40)  The  parties  have  submitted  that,  following  the 
introduction of digitalization,  there will  no  longer 
be  a  separate  relevant  market  for  cable  television 
networks.  They  argue  that  there  would  then  no 
longer  be  any  shortage  of transmission  capacity. 
They  also  consider  that  cable,  satellite  and 
terrestrial  frequencies  are  now  regarded  by  the 
consumer as interchangeable and entail comparable 
financial  charges  for  viewers  and  for  programme 
suppliers. 
(41)  This  view  cannot  be  accepted  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  Regardless  of  whether  the  form  of 
transmission  is  analog or digital, television  can  be 
broadcast  via  terrestrial  frequencies,  satellite  or 
cable  networks.  There are considerable differences 
between the three means of transmission, as far  as 
the  technical  conditions  and  financing  are 
concerned.  While  terrestrial  transmission  and 
satellite television only require the viewer to install 
an  aerial  or  a  satellite  dish  at  his  own  expense, 
cable  television  presupposes  the  maintenance  of a 
cable  network  financed  by  the  viewer  through 
cable  fees.  It  makes  a  difference  to  the  final 
consumer whether he  has  to incur a large amount 
of expenditure on a one-off basis for  one form  of 
transmission (for example, for the satellite receiver) 
or whether  he  prefers  to  incur  low-level,  regular 
payments  in  the  form  of cable  fees.  Although  in 
Germany  market  penetration  through  cable 
connections (some  14  million)  is  particularly  high 
compared  wirh  other  Member  States,  the  choice 
between  different  means  of transmission  is ·not a 
straightforward  matter  for  a  large  number  of 
households,  even  in  Germany.  Of  the  total  of 
around  33  million  households  with  television, 
some  8 million are not yet  on cable, and there are 
at  present  no  plans  at  all  to  link  a  further  9 
million households up to cable. The fact that some 
8  million  of households  could  still  have  a  choice 
and  that  the  differences  in  financing  referred  to 
above could  be  reduced  by  similar  paymem terms 
(instalments)  may  result  in  a  certain  degree  of 
substitutability. This does  not,  however,  have  any 
particular  importance  in  Germany  because  of the 
very advanced degree of cable link-up as comp.ued 
to  other  Member  States  and  because  of  various 
other  circumstances  set  out  below.  Households 
with television  are quite  frequently  faced  with  the 
difficulty  that the  acquisition  of satellite  dishes  is 
prohibited on aesthetic grounds by  the  landlord or 
by  the owners' association  in  the case  of multiple 
dwellings.  Lastly,  a household already on cable or 
having a satellite receiver  is  normally not ready  to 
make  a  further  investment  in  the  other  form  of 
transmission  (lock-in  effect).  Multiple  dwellings 
may  increasingly  be  switching  from  cable  to 
satellite in  order to receive  foreign  broadcasters, as 
the parties report,  but this does  not mean  that the 
two means of reception are interchangeable, since 
the programmes supplied differ. 
(42)  From  the  programme  suppliers'  point  of  view  as 
well,  contrary  to  the  view  put  forward  by  the 
parties, cable  and  satellite  are  not interchangeable 
in terms of costs. Taking the  cost comparison  put 
forward by  the parties, it is true that a programme 
supplier broadcasting via  satellite and also  feeding 
the satellite programme into the cable network has 
comparable  costs  to a  supplier  broadcasting  only 
via  the  cable  network.  However,  if  a  programme 
supplier  broadcasts  solely  via  satellite 
(direct-to-home),  this  entails  significantly  higher 
costs per household and per year. 
(43)  Lastly,  it is  not the case, as  the parties argue,  that 
there  is  no  longer  a  separate  relevant  market  for 
cable networks  because digitalization has  removed 
the  shortage  in  the  means  of  transmission  of 
television  signals.  Whether  an  economic  item  is 
available  to  customers  in  limited  or  sufficient 
numbers  does  not  determine  the  existence  of  a 
relevant  market  for  such  an  item.  The  decisive 
factor  is  whether  trade  relationships  based  on 
payment  exist  in  respect  of a  good  or  a  service. 
This  is  at present  and  will  in  future  be  the  case 
with  the  transmission  capacity  for  television 
signals, whether in  analog or digital form. 
(44)  For the reasons, the Commission considers that 
there  is  a  separate  relevant  market  for  cable 
television  networks. 
B.  Relevant geographic market. 
(45)  On  the  basis  of the  results  of  the  Commission's 
investigations,  the  relevant  geographic  market  for 
1(232 
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all  of the  three  product markets defined  is  restricted  to 
Germany.  However, as far  as  the market  for  services  is 
concerned,  it  cannot  be  ruled  out that MSG  will  over 
time - possibly with local partners - extend its service 
activities to other countries as  well. 
(46)  1.  In  the case of pay-TV,  this is  due in particular 
to  the  fact  that  the  programmes  offered  in 
Germany  are  to  a  large  extent  not 
interchangeable  with  programmes  offered  in 
other countries. The conditions of competition 
for pay-lV suppliers are, at present and for the 
foreseeable  future  even  after  digitalization  of 
the  means  of  transmass10n,  considerably 
different  in  the  individual  Member  States  for 
the following  reasons: 
(47) 
(4H) 
lV programmes arc  very  largely  nationally 
restricted and broadcast only in  the relevant 
national  language.  Broadcasting  rights  are 
granted for one or more specified countries 
or  language  regions.  Such  granting  of 
broadcasting  rights  and  the  timing  of 
so-called  'windows' for  feature  films,  video 
and pay-lV are subject to various statutory 
provisions  and  provisions  agreed  between 
the  suppliers  respectively.  Furthermore, 
foreign  language films or other programmes 
are  almost  never  broadcast  in  the  original 
la~guage.  Whereas,  for  example,  English 
language  films  are  frequently  broadcast  in 
the  Benelux  countries  and  in  Scandinavia 
with  subtitles  in  the  relevant  national 
language,  dubbing  is  the  usual  practice  in 
Germany,  France,  Italy  and  Spain.  This 
entails differing costs for  the  broadcasters. 
It  is  true  that,  in  certain  niche  markets, 
there  are  already  programmes  broadcast 
beyond  linguistic  borders,  such  as  for 
example  the  franw-Gcrman  channel  Arte 
or  the  music  channel  MTV.  Generally, 
however,  the  range  of  programmes 
available  and  the  programme  mix  are 
clearly  determined  by  cultural  differences 
and specific  preferences  on  the  part of the 
relevant audience. 
The  language  barriers  and  regulatory 
differences  in  particular  will  continue  to exist 
even  in  the  digital  pay-TV  age.  It  is  to  be 
assumed that pay-TV programmes in  Germany 
will  continue  in  future  to  be  predominantly 
German  language  programmes.  This  factor 
alone means that the conditions of competition 
will  be  different  from  other  non-German 
speaking countries. 
However, the market for  pay-TV demonstrates 
further  differences  in  the  conditions  of 
(49) 
(50) 
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competition  between  Member  States.  The 
supplier  structure  in  analog  pay-TV  is 
characterized by the fact that. in virtually every 
Member  State,  one  particular  supplier  has  a 
dominant  market  position  or  indeed  a 
monopoly. This is  the  case  with  BSkyB  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  Canal  Plus  in  France  and 
Spain, Filmnet in the Benelux countries, Telepiu 
in  Italy  and  Premiere  in  Germany.  Only  in 
Scandinavia  are  several  suppliers  operating 
(Filmnet, 1V 1000, Tele lV). Similarly,  prices, 
the  number  of programmes  and  combination 
possibilities differ.  Even the encryption systems 
described  above  can  be  differentiated,  albeit 
more  at  regional  level,  as  between  the  large 
suppliers.  Premiere  is  at  present  the  only 
supplier  with  only  one  programme.  The 
German  market  accordingly  has  a 
conspicuously  lower  level  of  penetration  by 
pay-TV.  Only  around  800 000  (;crman 
households  having  television  - 2 <X,  ot  the 
total  - subscribe  to  Premiere.  In  France  and 
the  United  Kingdom,  the  corresponding  rates 
are  16% and  15% respectively.  A difference 
in  market penetration may not as  such indicate 
a market access barrier. However, according to 
a  number of television  market competitors  of 
the  enterprises  involved  in  the  concentration, 
the  discrepancy for  example between  Germany 
and  France  is  due  to  differences  in  how 
attractive  is  the  range  of feature  films  shown 
on  free-access  advertising-financed  television. 
The  broad  range  of  feature  films  in  German 
television  will  probably  make  market  access 
more difficult for  third parties in  the future as 
well. 
From a technical pomt of view, finally,  account 
must  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  in  the  case  of 
pay-TV  the  viewer  can  receive  programmes 
only via  a  decoder. This in  principle opens up 
the  technical  possibility  of  operating  price 
differentiation  for  identical  programmes  as 
between different Member States. 
Although  following  the  introduction  of 
digitalization it is  to be expected that there will 
be  an  increase  in  supply  and  the  development 
of  various  interactive  services,  the  structural 
imbalances  on  the  supply  side  will  not  be 
evened  out  in  the  short-term.  It  is  already 
foreseeable  that  today's  leading  pay-TV 
suppliers will  also  play a leading role  in  digital 
television.  The  Commission's  investigations 
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(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
largest potential market in  Europe for  pay-TV 
services. 
This  would also be  true for  German suppliers 
wishing to operate in Austria. Here, bearing in 
mind the lack of any language barrier, a market 
could be assumed to exist for German language 
pay-TV.  Currently,  the  pay-TV  channel 
Premiere,  which  is  operated  by  Kirch, 
Bertelsmann  and  Canal  Plus,  has  the  great 
majority of its  subscribers  in  Germany;  it  has 
less  than  [  ... )% of  its  subscribers  in  Austria. 
There are currently no  other pay-TV suppliers 
in  these  two  countries.  For  this  reason  and 
because of the conditions of competition at the 
beginning  of  the  digital  pay-TV  era  set  out 
below,  the  competitton  assessment  of  the 
concentration  would  be  the  same  even  on the 
assumption  of  a  geographic  market 
encompassing both countries. 
2.  Since  the  services  being  offered  by  MSG  are 
closely connected with the supply of pay-TV, it 
must  be  assumed  that  the  market  for  these 
services  too  will  in  the  foreseeable  future 
remain  confined  to  Germany.  Although  MSG 
is,  according  to  the  parties,  geared  to  (54) 
Europe-wide activity and there are no obstacles 
to the supply of decoders and smart cards and 
the  acquisition  of subscribers  abroad  and  the 
linguistic  and regulatory differences, which are 
of some  relevance  in  the  pay-TV  sector,  have 
no  direct  effect  on  the  service  sector,  the 
pay-TV  suppliers  handled  by  MSG  would,  as 
already  noted,  have  to  have  transmission 
capacities with the respeqive national network 
owners.  This  may  be  of  little  relevance  in 
countries  where  television  programmes  are 
received  mainly  by  satellite,  but it  is  of crucial 
importance to the  German  market where  over 
14 million households are on cable. MSG will 
accordingly  initially  operate only in  Germany. 
Even  Premiere,  which  provides  the  necessary 
services  itself  and,  according  to  its  own 
statement,  could  also  provide  them  for  other 
pay-TV  suppliers,  has,  as  stated  above,  the 
great  majority  of its  subscribers  in  Germany. 
To  the  extent  that  German  providers  of  (55) 
pay-TV  also  acquire  subscribers  in  other 
German-speaking  regions,  MSG's  service 
market  will  probably  also  spread  to  such 
areas. 
Even  though  it  may  be  true  that  supply  by 
foreign  programme  suppliers  does  not 
necessarily  require  them  to  have  their  own 
technical  infrastructure  in  Germany,  such  an 
infrastructure  appears  to  be  an  advantage. 
Hitherto the relevant services have always been 
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provided by  the national pay-TV supplier. The 
recent establishment of the  German  marketing 
and  services  undertaking  Selco  for  BSkyB 
pay-TV  programmes  and  other  English 
language  programmes  further  illustrates  this. 
MSG's  market  chances  also  rest  to  a  not 
insignificant  extent  on  the  existence  of  a 
well-developed cable network in Germany. This 
network will  in  itself and in  conjunction  with 
the  telephone  network  also  be  of  particular 
importance for  future  interactive services.  This 
applies  particularly  in  view  of  the  imminent 
introduction  of ISDN  technology  on  the  basis 
of  the  glass  fibre  broadband  cable  network, 
allowing  the  development  of a  two-way  data 
transmission  network  with  almost  unlimited 
capacity.  Against  the  background  of  the 
significantly  smaller  degree  of  connection  to 
cable  in  most  of  the  other  Memhcr  States, 
particularly in  France and the  United  Kingdom, 
there will  for  the  foreseeable  future  not he  any 
homogeneous  conditions  of  compeuuon 
between  Germany  and  the  other  Member 
States.  With  regard  to  Austria  and  its  cable 
networks, developments could, for  the  reasons 
set  out  above  (point  52),  result  in  the 
emergence  of a  German  language  market  for 
services. 
3.  As  regards  the  operation  of cable  television 
networks,  there  is  already  a  national  German 
market  resulting  from  T elekom 's  statutory 
monopoly  on  laying  and  operating  cable 
networks in  public  roads. This  means  that  the 
conditions  of  competition  in  Germany  are 
substantially  different  from  those  in  other 
countries in  which  the  network monopoly  bps 
already  been  abolished  and  in  some  cases  a 
large  number  of  private  network  operators 
exist. 
C.  Effects of the concentration 
1.  Technical and administrative services 
MSG  will  be  the  first  supplier  of  technical  and 
administrative  services  for  pay-TV  and  other 
payment-financed  communication  services  in 
Germany.  Apart  from  Selco,  an  undertaking 
established in  a special  market segment,  MSG  will 
probably be  the  only supplier  of such  services  on 
the German market in the near future and will thus 
have  a  monopoly.  Although  a  monopoly  in  a 
future  market  that  is  only  just  beginning  to 
develop  should  not  necessarily  be  regarded  as  a 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 2 
(3)  of the  Merger Regulation, the  assumption that 
no market dominance exists presupposes in such a 
case  that  the  future  market  in  question  remains 
. 
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open to future competition and that the monopoly 
is  consequently  only  temporary.  However,  this 
condition is  n·ot  met  in  the  present case.  One can 
expect that the  market for  the  services  offered  by 
MSG is being sealed off already in the development 
phase by the establishment of the joint venture and 
that MSG will acquire a long-term monopoly  . 
(a) Elimination of potential competition 
(56)  As  already  stated,  experience  in  other  countries 
shows  that  pay-TV  suppliers  or  cable  network 
operators are the most likely suppliers of technical 
and  administrative  services  for  pay-TV.  In 
Germany,  the  only  pay-TV ·supplier  at  present  is 
Premiere,  which  is  jointly  controlled  by  its  three 
shareholders,  Bertelsmann,  Kirch  and Canal  Plus. 
Premiere  at  present  provides  the  necessary 
technical and administrative services for its pay-TV 
operation  itself.  On  the  other  side  there  is 
T elekom,  which  holds  a  monopoly  under  public 
law on the broadband cable network, and which is 
virtually  the  sole  cable  network  operator  in 
Germany.  Over  90%  of  cable  networks  in 
Germany  are  operated  by  T elekom.  With  the 
setting  up  of  MSG  there  is  therefore  a 
concentration  of  those  enterprises  which  would 
each otherwise have had to install an irrfrastructure 
for  digital  pay-TV and  provide  the  corresponding 
services.  The  most  likely  potential  competition  is 
thus excluded already in  the development phase of 
the  market. 
(57)  The parties argue in  response  to this that none of 
the undertakings setting up MSG would, in view of 
the substantial investment required, be prepared on 
its  own  to  open  up  the  market  for  the  services 
being  offered  by  MSG.  According  to  the 
submission of the parties, none of the shareholders 
in  MSG would accept the  risk  associated with the 
investment on its  own and  without the  combined 
know-how  required  for  the  project.  It  must  be 
granted to the parties that the investment required, 
which  according  to  the  documents  available  is 
estimated  at  OM  [  ... ]  million  over  the  next  10 
years,  is  of  a  considerable  order  of  magnitude. 
However, Bertelsmann/Kirch on the one hand and 
Telekom  on the other have  the  resources  to carry 
out a  project  such  as  MSG on  their  own as  well. 
Each  also  has  a  strong  interest  in  setting  up  a 
technical  infrastructure  for  digatal  pay-TV.  In  tht· 
case  of Bertelsmann/Kirch,  this  is  because  of the 
additional  programme  possibilities  that  digital 
television makes available  precisely for  pay-TV. In 
the  case  of  T elekom,  it  is  of  considerable 
importance that in introducing digital television the 
preconditions  be  created for  digital  pay-TV.  Since 
the  additional  programmes  made  possible  by 
digitalization  would  probably,  as  already 
described, mostly be  payment-financed, the success 
of  digital  television  and  hence  better  IISL'  of 
Telekom's cable network depends on the  necessary 
infrastructure for  pay-TV being ensured. 
(58)  The argument put forward by the parties that they 
could  assume  the  risk  of  investing  in  digital 
infrastructure  only  jointly  also  appears  rather 
unconvincing if one bears in  mind experience with 
the  introduction  of the  mobile  telephone  system 
GSM  in  Germany.  Here  too,  an  infrastructure 
covering as much of the country as possible had to 
be set up for  a new communications system. Yet  it 
proved  possible  for  two  competing  mobile 
telephony  operators to  undertake the  task. It was 
thus  ensured  that  mobile  telephony  users  can 
choose between two competing systems, system D 1 
operated by Telekom and system 02 operated by  a 
private consortium.  Whereas  MSG's  investment  is 
to amount to some OM (  .. ) million over  lO  years, 
each of the 01 and 02 operators invested OM 2,5 
to 3 billion over a period of five  years. 
(59)  It  is  apparent  from  Telekom's  documentation  on 
the  MSG  project  that  Telekom  has  a  strategic 
interest,  through  the  development  of  a  service 
undertaking,  in  entering  the  pay-TV  market  and 
the  future  market  for  interactive  higher-value 
services.  With  the  promotion  of  the  spread  of 
pay-TV  as  an  entry  into  interactive  !-.erviccs,  the 
possibility opens up for  Tclekom to pursue a more 
strongly use-oriented policy in the broadband cable 
service area rather than a purely connection-related 
payments  and  charges  policy.  Against  this 
background,  it  appears  likely  that,  if  it  were  not 
involved  in  MSG,  T elekom  would  independently 
enter  the  market  for  technical  and  administrative 
services  and  would  hence  operate  a  pay-TV 
infrastructure  that  would  not  be  controlled  by 
Bertelsmann/Kirch.  If  necessary,  Telekom  could 
also  undertake  this  task  together  with  other 
partners not active  in  the field  of pay-TV. 
(b) Partitioning of the market 
(60)  It appears scarcely  conceivable  that competing 
suppliers  in  Germany  could  enter  the  market 
for  technical  and  administrative  services  for 
pay-TV  once  MSG  had  established  it~elf  on 
that  market.  The  installation  of an  alternative 
infrastructure would require  a  large  amount of 
investment that would be  undertaken  by  other 
suppliers  or  groups  of suppliers  only  if  there 
was a chance of market penetration. However, No L 364/12  Official Journal of the European Communities  31.  12.  94 
such a chance would scarcely exist if MSG had 
already  occupied  the  market.  An  alternative 
supply of services would have to impose  itself 
against  the  combined  competitive  advantages 
and  specific  strengths  of T elekom  on the  one 
hand and Bertelsmann/Kirch on the other. This 
appears hardly possible. 
(aa)  Strengths  of Telekom 
(61)  The  following  specific  strengths  of  Telekom  are 
particularly relevant to the joint venture MSG and 
the  market for  the services offered  by  MSG: 
Telekom  has  a  broadband cable  network with 
at  present  over  13  million  connected 
households,  which  represents  more  than 90 % 
of all cabled households in Germany (a total of 
14 million cable connections). Of the two basic 
means  of  transmitting  pay-TV,  the  cable 
network  plays  a  far  greater  role  in  Germany 
than  satellite  TV,  which  at  present  can  be 
received  by  seven  million  households.  In 
addition,  regional  or  local  markets  can  be 
reached most cheaply via  direct, locally limited 
inputs  into  the  cable  network.  Because  of the 
importance of the cable network in Germany, it 
makes sense  for  services  relating to pay-TV to 
be  provided  only  if  they  relate  to  pay-TV 
programmes that are also transmitted by cable. 
Restricting  services  to  satellite  programmes  is 
conceivable  only  in  special  market  segments, 
such  as  the  area of activity  covered  by  Selco, 
described  below.  Apart  from  such  segments, 
any pay-TV provider is  therefore dependent on 
the use  of the cable network of Telekom. 
As  the  owner of the  cable  network,  Telekom 
will  be  in  charge  of  digitalization  in  the 
hyperband  area.  It  will  determine  the  gradual 
expansion  of  the  transmission  channels  for 
digital  television  and  can  thus  control  the 
development  of the  transmission  capacity  for 
digital television. 
With  its  recently  acquired  16,6%  holding  in 
SES,  T elekom  has  become  the  second  largest 
shareholder,  after  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg,  in  the  main  European  satellite 
operator,  which  reaches  6  million  households 
in  Germany via  the Astra satellites. Telekom is 
represented  on  the  board  of directors  of SES 
and  collaborates  with  SES  in  order to  ensure 
compatibilitiy  between  the  satellite  network 
and the cable  network in  the  digital  television 
area.  Even  if Telekom does not control SES,  it 
can,  through  its  stake  in  SES,  influence  the 
allocation  of satellite channels  using  the  Astra 
(62) 
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satellites,  which  play  a  dominant  role  in  the 
Community. 
As  the owner of the  broadband cable network 
and  at  the  same  time  the  holder  of  the 
monopoly  for  the  fixed  telephone  network, 
Telekom  controls  the  two  main  means  of 
transmission  that  can  provide  the  return 
channel  required  for  interactive  digital 
television. The use  of the  mobile phone system 
as  a  return  channel,  though  technically 
possible, does not appear to be an appropriate 
alternative  in  economic  terms  at  least  for 
private  households.  According  to  the 
Commission's  information,  the  broadband 
cable network in Germany cannot for  technical 
reasons be  used at present as  a  return channel. 
This  would  require  further  invc-;tmcnt.  This 
makes Telekom's telephone network or its glass 
fibre  network  all  the  more  important  as  the 
only channel currently available  for  interactive 
television. 
- With  the  cable  network,  Telekom  has  a 
customer  base  that  may  be  of  consi"derable 
importance  for  the  operation  of  pay-TV. 
Telekom has direct access to about four million 
individual customers. It is  in addition indirectly 
involved  in  the cable service companies, which 
look after a  further  900 000 cable  users  in  the 
network  level  4  area  (house  distribution 
equipment).  Furthermore,  with  its  Telekom 
shops  represented  throughout  the  country, 
Telekom also has a national distribution base. 
As  a  cable  and  telephone  network  operator, 
Telekom  has  experience  in  network 
management and  the  technological  know-how 
for communications services. 
The specific  strengths of Telekom outlined  above 
confer substantial competitive advantages on MSG 
as compared with potential competitors. 
(bb) Strengths  of Bertelsmann/Kirch 
As  the  only  supplier  of  pay-TV  so  far, 
Bertelsmann/Kirch already have, through Premiere, 
a subscriber base which they can also use  in  future 
digital  pay-TV.  The  parties  object  in  this  respect 
that  Premiere's  subscriber  base  would  not  be 
sufficient to ensure  a  pay-back on the  investment 
in  MSG.  This  may  be  true.  However,  the  risk  of 
investment in a digital infrastructure is significantly 
reduced  if  the  service  provider  can  build  on  a 
subscriber base of analog pay-TV customers.  Each 
competitor  of  MSG  would  have  to  build  on  a 
subscriber  base  which  the  pay-TV  suppliers 
handled  by  them  would  have  to  first  acquire. 
• 
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Competitors of Bertelsmann/Kirch  on the  market 
for  pay-TV  would,  in  contrast  to  the  parent 
companies of Premiere, have to start from scratch. 
The same applies to potential competitors of MS9 
in  the  area  of  technical  and  administrative 
services. 
(63)  As  explained  in  detail  below,  Bertelsmann  and in 
particular  Kirch  have  preferential  access  to 
programme software. Bertelsmann/Kirch have .to  a 
far greater extent than their potential competitors 
in  the  pay-TV  market  the  possibility,  after  the 
introduction  of  digital  television,  of  offering 
additional  attractive  pay-TV  programmes.  Any 
potential  competitor of MSG  would consequently 
have to create a customer base without having the 
programmes of the future leading pay-TV supplier 
available  for  its  technical  infrastructure.  This 
increases  substantially  the  economic  risk  for  an 
alternative service supplier. 
(  64)  Lastly,  Bertelsmann,  which  has  experience  in  the 
customer  management  of  22  million  book  club 
members  worldwide and is  the leading book club 
operator in  Germany,  with  six  million  book club 
members,  has an  important  potential  distribution 
channel  for  pay-TV.  This  too  strengthens  the 
chancrs  of  market  succt·ss  for  futurt" 
lkrtdsmann/Kirch  digital  pay-TV  programmes, 
which  at the  same  time  means  for  MSG  that  its 
customer  base  is  secured.  In  this  respect, 
Bertelsmann  argues  that a  substantial  part of the 
book  club  customer  base  is  only  leased  to 
Bertelsmann by [  ... J independent selling agents, and 
that  Bertelsmann  is  not  interested  in  steering  the 
buying power of book club clients from the current 
club  products  towards  other  products.  However, 
on  the  one  hand,  it  is  unlikely  that  a  selling 
method,  which  consists  of  recruiting  clients 
through  independent  selling  agents,  would 
seriously  prevent  the  extension  of  the  club's 
product range. On the other hand, the argument of 
a  transfer of club clients from  books and discs  to 
pay-TV  products  is  not  very  convincing.  Any 
successful  pay-TV  product  presents  a  risk  of 
transfer  within  the  culture  budget  of consumers, 
whatever way is  used for selling, and the successful 
introduction  of  digital  pay-TV  is  precisely  the 
declared objective of MSG and its parents. 
(cc)  Other serv  1ce  sup  pi ie rs 
(65)  The  only  currently  known  company  wishing  to 
offer  in  Germany  similar  services  to  those  to  be 
provided  by  MSG  is  Selco  Servicegesellschaft  fUr 
elektronische  Kommunikation  mbH  (Selco).  Selco 
is  a  joint  venture  between  the  private  television 
broadcaster  PRO  7  (50,1  %)  and  News 
Corporation  Ltd  (49,9 %),  which  belongs  to  the 
Murdoch  group.  According  to  the  information 
available  to  the  Commission,  Selco's  business 
object  is  confined  to  the  marketing  of 
foreign-language  programmes  in  Germany.  This 
probably involves  primarily programmes from  tht· 
..  pay-TV  supplier  BSkyB,  which  belongs  to  the 
Murdoch group.  Selco  will  therefore  operate  in  ;t 
niche  market  with  a  limited  subscriber  base.  It 
should further be  noted that 47,7% of the shares 
in PRO 7  are held  by Mr Thomas Kirch,  the son 
of  the  owner  of  the  Kirch  group.  It  appears 
furthermore  that  PRO  7  to  a  large  extent 
purchases  Kirch-group  programme  software  for 
use  in  its  programmes.  PRO  7  therefore  should 
probably  be  included  at  least  in  the  sphere  of 
influence  of  the  Kirch  group.  Against  this 
background it is  hardly to be  expected  that Sdco 
will enter into active competition against MSG. 
(66)  The  Luxembourg  company  Europa  Online  SA, 
which is  mentioned  by  the parties and which  is  in 
the process of being set up, is,  according to press 
reports, confined to interactive information services 
that  are  computer-supported.  The  share  capital 
reported in the press of an equivalent of DM 1,25 
million suggests  that it is  improbable that Europa 
Online  will  establish  an  infrastructure  for  digital 
pay-TV. 
(67)  Contrary to the submission of the parties, it cannot 
realistically be expected that other competitors will 
enter  MSG's  market  in  view  of  its  competitivt' 
advantages as described above.  In  this conneaion, 
a contradiction in  the parties'submission should be 
pointed out. On the  one hand, MSG's  investment 
risk  is  said  to  be  so  high  that  Bertelsmann/Kird1 
and Telekom would each be  unable to take on  the 
risk  on their own. On the other, according to  the 
parties,  other  competitors  will  enter  the  market 
once MSG has successfully established itself on it. 
(68)  The assumption that in the long term MSG is  to be 
expected to have a monopoly position is  confirmed 
both by the results of the oral hearing, in which a 
number of third parties took part, and  by  a  large 
number of responses from other firms surveyed  by 
the  Commission,  firms  which  operate  in  the 
television  area·  or  other  areas  of  relevance  to 
MSG's activity. It is  accordingly not to be expected 
that an alternative service  provider could  cstahli~h 
itself as a competitor of MSG. 
(69)  A dominant position on the part of MSG  is  also to 
be  expected  even  if  MSG  with  irs  present 
shareholder  structure  were  to  decide  to  install  a 
decoder base using a so-called 'common interface'. 
'Common  interface'  means  here  an  encryption 
technology  design  that  allows  any  other 
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pay-TV or service  provider  to operate conditional 
access  and  subscriber  management  using  an 
available decoder  base without requiring a  licence 
for  the use  of the conditional access  system of the 
firm  that  installed  the  decoder  base.  This  can  be 
achieved  because  modules of different  programme 
or service providers can be  plugged into a decoder 
equipped  with  a  common  interface,  and  each 
module  contains  the  proprietary  encryption 
elements.  It  is  true  that,  under  such  a  system, 
potential  competitors  would  no  longer  require 
investment in  their own decoder base. However, it 
cannot be excluded that, where decoders are leased 
to  viewers,  MSG  might  impose  on  them  in  the 
lease  contracts  the  requirement  that  they  should 
not use  the decoder with modules of other pay-TV 
or service  providers  without the  consent of MSG. 
Such a contractual restriction would be  possible at 
the  present stage of understanding within the DVB 
project.  As  a  consequence  of  the  restriction, 
competitors  of  Bertelsmann/Kirch  or  of  MSG 
would not have free  and uncontrolled access to the 
installed  decoder  base  in  spite  of  the  common 
interface, as long as decoders are mainly or at least 
to  a  substantial  extent- leased  by  MSG  and  not 
bought  by  pay-TV  subscribers.  According  to  the 
business  plan of MSG, this- will  be  the case during 
the first five  years, during which the  proportion of 
leasing of new equipment should fall  progressively 
from  approximately 70% to approximately 20 %. 
This  means  that  free  access  will  not  be  possible 
during  a  fairly  lengthy  period  in  which  digital 
television  is  being  introduced.  But  this  period  is 
decisive  in  determining  market  conditions  on 
MSG's  market.  Moreover,  even  after  this  period, 
free  access  will  be  possible  only  for  decoders sold 
to subscribers  and  not  for  lease  decoders  already 
installed. 
Even  if  MSG  does  not  limit  the  access  of  other 
service  providers  in  the  leasing  contracts  on 
decoders, it can be expected that MSG would have 
a  dominant  position  on  the  separate 
conditional-access  and  subscriber-management 
market  that could then  in  theory exist. Thanks to 
the  business  potential of Bertelsmann!Kirch  in  the 
pay-TV  area,  MSG  will  on  its  market  probably 
benefit  from  economies  of scale  (subscriber  base, 
number of programmes handled) that would make 
competition  from  other  service  providers  much 
more  difficult.  On  the  other  hand,· Telekom's 
participation  in  the  joint  venture  allows  MSG  to 
provide  pay-TV  suppliers  with  the  necessary  user 
contracts for Telekom's broad band cable network, 
even  if  these  contracts  are  legally  made  between 
Telekom  and  the  users.  MSG  can  therefore,  in 
contrast to other  potential  service  suppliers,  offer 
programme  suppliers  a  comprehensive  service 
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covering  all  the  technical  prerequisites  for 
pay-TV. 
(71)  Furthermore, if MSG  occupies the  market with  its 
present  shareholder  structure,  any  new  pay-TV 
suppliers  will  probably  be  largely  dependent  on 
MSG's supply of services, even  if,  with a common 
interface  and  unlimited  access  to  decoders, 
conditional access and subscriber management can 
be  provided  by  other  service  suppliers  using  the 
decoder  base  installed  by  MSG.  It  is  not  to  be 
expected that the average pay-TV subscriber would 
wish  to  have  dealings  with  several  subscriber 
management operators. It is  in  the viewer's interest 
to have as  far  as  possible a single body dealing on 
his  behalf with  all questions  relating  to  the  taking 
of  pay~TV (e. g.  extension  of the  subscription  to 
additional  programmes,  reduction  of  programmes 
subscribed  to,  settlement  of  the  subscription). 
Whichever service  supplier can provide the  largest 
number  of  programmes  and  the  most  attractive 
programmes will  thus occupy  a  favoured  position 
against which the other service suppliers  will  have 
difficulty  in  asserting  themselves.  It  is  to  be 
expected  that  MSG  will  acquire  such  a  favoured 
position  since,  in  view  of  their  programme 
resources, Bertelsmann and Kirch will be able most 
rapidly and most extensively to provide the  digital 
pay-TV  market  with  attractive  programmes.  Any 
new  pay-TV  suppliers  would  therefore 
substantially reduce their sales prospects if they did 
not make  use  of MSG's  services  and  offered  the 
customer their own subscriber management or that 
of another service  supplier. 
(72)  The  'suction  effect'  of  a  service  undertaking 
controlled  by  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  could  be 
countered most easily by  a cable network operator 
that  took ·over  pay-1V  subscriber  management 
itself  and  possibly  offered  cable  customers 
programme  packages  which  it  had  itself  put 
together.  Because  of the  structural  conditions  in 
Germany, such a function could be  performed only 
by Telekom, which dominates the market for cable 
networks.  The cable  islands  of  the•private  cable 
network operators are mostly  too small  to  justify 
the  expenditure  involved  in  the  investment  that 
would  be  required  for  them  to  have  their  own 
conditional  access  and  their  own  subscriber 
management for  pay-TV.  In  contrast to Telekom's 
broad  band cable  network,  the  private  operators' 
cable networks are moreover not such .m  essential 
means  of  transmtsston  for  pay-TV  that 
Bertelsmann/Kirch's programmes would be  obliged 
to use  them. As  a  result of Telekom's involvement 
in  MSG,  therefore,  a  market  structure  is  created 
.. 
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which  suggests  that  MSG  will  have  a  dominant 
position even where a common interface is  used. 
(c)  Summary 
(73)  for the  reasons set out above  it  IS  to be  expected 
that the  proposed concentration  will  give  MSG  a 
durable  dominant  position  on  the  market  for 
technical and administrative services in Germany. 
' 
2.  Pay-TV 
(74)  If MSG  held  a  dominant position  on the  market 
for  technical  and  administrative  services,  this 
would  considerably  strengthen  the  position  of 
Bertelsmann/Kirch  on the downstream market for 
pay-TV.  It  would  have  to  be  expected  that  the 
setting-up  of  MSG  would  give  Bertelsmann  and 
Kirch  a  durable dominant position on the  market 
for pay-TV. 
(a)  Present  posztwn  of Bertelsmann/Kirch  on  the 
market for pay-TV 
(75)  At present, Premiere, which is  jointly controlled by 
Bertelsmann,  Kirch  and  Canal  Plus,  is  the  only 
pay-TV supplier in Germany. Even if, as a result of 
increased  capacity  following  the  digitalization  of 
television,  a  large  number  of  new  pay-TV 
programmes  are  possible  and  hence  competitors 
may be expected to enter the pay-TV market, there 
is  significant  evidence  that  Bertelsmann/Kirch, 
irrespective  of  the  establishment  of  MSG,  will 
retain a leading position on that market. 
(76)  Bertelsmann and Kirch  have  preferential access  to 
the software that is  attractive for pay-TV. Kirch is 
the  leading  German  suppiier of feature  films  and 
entertainment programmes for television. Kirch has 
at its  disposal a  stock of about 15  000  movies of 
all  types  and  50  000  hours  of  television 
programmes  and  also  has  extensive  production 
activities  in  the  area  of  movies  and  television. 
Together  with  Axel-Springer-Verlag,  Kirch  also 
controls ISPR.  ISPR  has become the leading agency 
for  sports  broadcast  rights  and,  for  example, 
markets  the  Bundesliga  football  games  centrally. 
Bertelsmann  also  has  acc'ess  to  attractive  sports 
rights and film  production activities through Ufa. 
(77)  Both  undertakings  have  widespread  actiVIties  in 
free-access  commercial  television.  The commercial 
television  broadcasters  in  which  Bertelsmann  and 
Kirch  have  holdings or which have  to be  included 
within  the  sphere of influence  of the  Kirch  group 
achieve  a  share  of  some  80 %  of  television 
advertising  revenue  in  Germany  (RTL,  SAT  1, 
PRO  7,  RTL  2,  VOX,  Deut!ches  Sportfernsehen 
and  Kabelkanal).  Kirch  in  particular,  with  its 
associated  companies  or  the  companies  ro  he 
included  in  its  sphere  of influence  (SAT  I,  DSF, 
PRO  7  and  Kahclkanal),  has  the  possihilitv  of 
making  multiple  use  of  film  ri~hrs  or  ~porting 
rights. This cnahks tlll'  Kin.:h  j;roup lo Jl.IY  h1!~hn 
prices  than  other  competitors  in  acquirin~  su~h 
rights. Their preferential access  to software means 
that  Bertelsmann/Kirch  can,  following  the 
digitalization  of  television,  offer  additional 
attractive  pay-TV  programmes  and  programme 
packages more easily than potential competitors. 
(78)  In  this  connection,  it  is  of particular  importance 
that  Bertelsmann/Kirch's  programme  resources 
allow  different  programme  packages  to  be  put 
together  that are  tailored  to  the  requirements  of 
specific  target  groups  and  can  be  offered  at  an 
attractive  subscription  price.  Experience  in 
countries  where  pay-TV  is  already  at  a  more 
advanced  stage  of  development  shows  that  the 
bringing  together  of  individual  programmes  ro 
form  programme  packages  is  a  key  factor  in 
achieving  success  on  the  pay-TV  market.  Pay-TV 
suppliers  occupying  a  less  important  position  on 
the  market  may  moreover  be  forced  to  induJc 
their programmes in  the  leading pay-TV supplier's 
packages,  thus  giving  it  control  over  its 
competitors. 
(79)  Account  must  also  be  taken  of  the  fact  that,  as 
already  noted,  Bertelsmann  is  the  leading  book 
club  operator  in  Germany  and  thus  has  at  its 
disposal  an  important  potential  distribution 
channel  for  pay-TV  programmes.  In  the  case  of 
Kirch,  a  further  competitive  advantage  derives 
from  its  35%  holding  in  Axel-Springer-Verlag, 
which  for  its  part  has  a  20 %  stake  in  SAT  1. 
Axel-Springer-Verlag  is  the  largest  newspaper 
publisher  in  Germany  and  at the  same  time  also 
the  leading  publisher  of  television  programme 
magazines.  Obviously,  the  media  association  of 
Kirch  and  Axel-Springer-Verlag  is  likely  to 
promote the acceptance of pay-TV programmes in 
which Kirch  is  involved. 
(80)  With regard to the position which Bertelsmann and 
Kirch  hold  on  the  pay-TV  market,  another 
important  point  is  the  fact  that  the  competition 
ban  imposed  on  Premiere's  shareholders,  as 
described  above,  removes  any  chance  of 
competition  between  both  undertakings  on  the 
pay-TV market. This fact is  perhaps less  important 
in  the  case  of analog  television,  since,  given  the 
shortage  of  available  transmission  channels,  the 
possibility  of new  pay-TV  programmes  is  in  any 
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event  limited.  However,  with  the  increase  in 
transmission  capacities  following  digitalization, 
both  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  will  have  the 
possibility  of  supplying  a  much  larger  range  of 
programmes  on  the  market.  Against ·  this 
background,  the  competition  ban  acts  as  a 
restriction of competition to a much greater extent 
than previously. 
(81)  Thus, Bertelsmann/Kirch already at present has an 
extraordinarily  strong  position  on  the  pay-TV 
market. 
(b) Strengthening ol the position ol 
Bertelsmann/Kirch through  MSG 
(82)  If, for the reasons set out above, MSG achieves on 
a lasting basis a monopoly position as an operator 
of a  digital  infrastructure  for  pay-TV,  all  pay-TV 
suppliers  that  may  enter  the  pay-TV  market 
following  digitalization  will  be  forced  to take  the 
services  underlying  pay-TV  from  an  enterprise 
controlled by the pay-TV suppliers that are already 
in  a  leading  position.  Future  pay-TV  competitors 
of  Bertelsmann/Kirch  would  have  the  choice  of 
either accepting MSG' conditions or staying out of 
the  market.  This  assessment  is  supported  by  the 
results  of the  hearing  and  by  a  large  number  of 
responses  from  enterprises surveyed. 
(83)  The  parties  argue  in  response  to  this  that  each 
pay-TV  programme supplier has  the  alternative of 
providing  this  service  themselves,  as  is  currently 
generally  usual.  This  is  incorrect.  A  look  at  the 
present  situation shows  that any new  programme 
supplier entering the market is obliged to make use 
of the  services  of that  pay-TV  supplier  which  is 
already  established  on  the  market  with  technical 
infrastructure. This  follows  from  the  fact  that the 
economic  risk  is  normally  too  great  for  a 
programme  supplier  to  install  its  own  new 
infrastructure  for  a  new  programme.  Experience 
has  shown  that,  for  example,  a  new  programme 
supplier  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  dependent  on 
BskyB's  infrastructure  and  a  new  supplier  in 
France on that of Canal Plus.  With the setting up 
of MSG  under its current shareholder structure, a 
comparable  situation  would  also  arise  for  digital 
pay-TV in Germany. 
(84)  Via  MSG,  therefore,  Bertelsmann/Kirch  could 
significantly  influence  competition  from  future 
pay-TV suppliers and to a  large extent shape it as 
they wished. Through their controlling influence in 
MSG,  they  can  ensure  that  MSG's  terms  and 
conditions and in  particular the price structure are 
arranged  in  a  way  that  is  advantageous  to  their 
own programmes and disadvantageous to  those of 
their  competitors.  Bertelsmann/Kirch  could  also 
derive  benefit  from  artificially  high  prices,  since 
unlike  their  competitors  they  have  a  share  in 
MSG's earnings. 
(85)  There would furthermore  be  the  possibility,  citing 
technical  constraints.  that  could  be  verified  only 
with difficulty, of supplying MSG's services in  such 
a  way that the  market access  of programmes  that 
ran counter  to  the  interests  of Bertelsmann/Kirch 
was  at  least  delayed.  The  same  also  applies  to 
Telekom's  input  of  programmes  into  rhe  cable 
network.  It  cannot  be  ruled  out  that,  if  it  is 
concentrated  with  Bertelsmann/Kirch  in  MSG, 
Telekom  will  also  take  its  partners'  interests  into 
account. The difficulties  previously encountered in 
feeding  programmes  broadcast  via  Astra  into 
Telekom's  cable  network  suggest  that,  citing 
technical constraints, it can influence access  ro  the 
cable  network  without  in  any  provable  way 
infringing the  neutrality requirement. 
(86)  As  already  stated, Telekom  has  it  in  its  power  to 
control  the  digital  development  of the  hyperband 
in  its  broadband cable  network.  T elekom  intends 
to  make  three  channels  available  for  digital 
television  by  the  end  of 1995,  with  each  channel 
being able to broadcast digitally between  four and 
10 television programmes. This means that initially 
an  additional  transm1sston  capacity  will  be 
available for only 30 new  pro~rammcs at the most. 
A  large  proportion  of this  capacity  can  easily  be. 
taken  up  by  Bertelsmann/Kirch,  particularly  since 
Premiere  will  be  able  to  introduce 
near-video-on-demand,  which  would  use  up  a 
considerable  proportion  of  the  transmtsston 
capacity. Telekom has stated that the digitalization 
of the other 12 channels  available  will  take  place 
in  the  light  of  general  economic  conditions  in 
accordance with the  principle of development  that 
will  achieve optimum coverage tailored to suit the 
needs  of  the  marker.  Having  set  itself  these 
relatively  vague  criteria,  Telekom  has  it  in  its 
power  to  base  the  further  development  of  the 
hyperband on the  pay-TV interests of its  partners 
in  MSG.  Account should also be  taken of the fact 
that development can in  any case take  place  only 
gradually,  since  digitalization  of  a  new  channel 
takes about six months and involves investment of 
around DM 50 million. 
(87)  Bertelsmann/Kirch  also  have  the  possibility  of 
influencing  via  MSG  the  location  of  their 
competitors'  programmes.  The  large  number  of 
possible  programmes in  digital  television  makes  it 
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necessary to establish a system of user guidance to 
help  the  viewer  locate  individual  programmes  in 
the  'programme  jungle'.  Since  the  necessary 
on-screen  modulator  is  contained  in  the  decoder 
box, such user guidance will  probably be  operated 
by  whoever installs  the  decoder base.  The control 
of  user  guidance  enables  the  operator  to  place 
programmes  of  competing  pay-TV  suppliers  on 
positions  in  the  programme  menu  which  make 
them less attractive. In this context, it is important, 
for  example,  how  many  operating  steps  are 
required to get access to a certain programme. 
(88)  Bertelsmann/Kirch similarly have the possibility via 
MSG  of  influencing  the  marketing  of  competing 
programmes  as  regards  the  placing  of  such 
programmes  on the  smart cards  issued  by  MSG. 
MSG, as the operator of conditiona.l access,  places 
on the  smart cards  the  pay-TV  programmes  and 
programme  packages  offered,  which  are  then 
released  by  the  authorization  signals  transmitted 
with the television signal.  It is  to be  expected that 
the  average· pay-TV  subscriber  will  not  wish  to 
have to use a variety of different smart cards. MSG 
can  therefore  impede  any  competitors  of 
Bertelsmann!Kirch by placing them not on the first 
smart card with the atttractive programmes, but on 
additional new smart cards. 
(89)  Lastly, Bertelsmann!Kirch could acquire substantial 
informational  advantages  through  MSG.  This 
applies in  respect of planned new programmes, but 
in  particular  also  in  relation  to  the  customer 
structure  and  viewer  behaviour of the  subscribers 
handled  by  its  subscriber  management  system. 
Bertelsmann!Kirch  do  not  even  have  to  acquire 
access  to individual  customer data.  It is  sufficient 
for  them  to  obtain  access  to  non-personal  data 
giving,  for  example,  information  on  the  age 
structure  of  the  viewers  of  the  relevant 
programmes.  In  the  case  of  interactive  pay-TV 
services  such  as  pay-per-view, moreover, it can be 
ascertained  from  non-individualized  data  which 
specific  group  prefers  what  specific  programme 
contents  and  to  what  extent.  Such  information 
confers substantial competitive advantages since  it 
makes  it  much  easier  to  develop 
target-group-oriented  programmes  or  programme 
packages. 
(90)  The  parties  counter  this  by  arguing  that  it  could 
not be in the interest of MSG's shareholders to act 
to the  prejudice of other pay-TV suppliers  as  this 
would  endanger  the  economic  success  of  MSG. 
This argument appears questionable, since MSG is, 
as  was  stated  above,  expected  to  achieve  a 
; 
monopoly position. Other pay-TV suppliers will  be 
dependent on the services supplied by MSG even if 
the  conditions  are  unfavourable  and  there  are . 
possibilities of prejudice. Furthermore, Bertelsm~mn 
and Kirch  have  a  particular interest  in  controlling 
the pay-TV market and in  influencing the chances 
of  their  competitors  notwithstanding  a  possible 
negative  impact  of  such  behaviour  on  MSG's 
profits. Any counter-argument. by  the  patties  that 
the  participation  of Telekom  ensures  that MSG's 
actiVIty  will  be  non-discriminatory  and 
supplier-neutral is not convincing. Bertelsmann and 
Kirch  hold  two-thirds  of the  shares  in  the  joint 
venture.  Even  if  Telekom  exercises  joint  control 
with Bertelsmann and Kirch over the joint venture. 
it cannot be  expected  that MSG  will  behave  in  a 
neutral  manner  where  the  imerests  of  hoth 
Bertelsmann  and  Kirch·  coincide.  This  is  of 
particular  relevance,  since  Kirch  and  Bertelsmann 
possess  know-how for  pay-TV  technology,  and. in 
addition  will  be  the  most  important customers of 
MSG's services, so that they will be  able to restrict 
Telekom's scope for decision-making in  MSG. 
(c)  Summary 
(91)  In  view of the considerable competitive advantages 
that  are  involved  for  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  in 
MSG  and  the  possible  adverse  effect  on  future 
competitors, it is  to be expected that the proposed 
concentration  will  create  a  durable  dominant 
position for  Bertelsmann and Kirch on the  pay-TV 
market in  Germany. 
3.  Cable networks 
(92)  It can be expected that the proposed concentration 
will  in  the  long-term  also  adversely  affect  to  a 
considerable  extent  effective  competition  on  the 
market  for  cable  networks  in  Germany.  In  the 
immediate  future,  the  Telekom  monopoly  under 
public  law  in  the  broadband  cable  network  will 
continue.  It  is  however  to  be  expected  that, 
following  the  liberalization  of  basic  telephone 
services  in  1998,  the  cable  network  market  will 
also be deregulated and opened up to competition. 
There  is  a  danger  that,  by  jointly  operating  the 
pay-TV structure together with the leading pay-TV 
suppliers, Telekom will strengthen its position as  a 
cable  network  operator  in  such  a  way  that, 
following  liberalization,  competition  in  the  cable 
network market will  be  substantially  impeded  and 
thus Telekom's dominant position  safeguarded.  In 
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T elekom  as  a  potential  competitor  in  the  market 
for  technical  and  administrative  pay·  TV  services, 
Telekom,  through  the  proposed  joint  venture, 
prevents  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  from  being 
available  as  potential  partners  for  other  future 
cable network operators. 
(93)  For  the  time  being,  cable  operators  operating  ar 
network  level  4,  i.e.  in  the  area  of  private 
home-distribution  facilities,  can  only  to  a  very 
limited  extent  install  cable  networks  which  are 
independent  of  Telekom's  broadband  cable 
network.  Establishing  the  required  satellite 
reception equipment  (head  ends)  is  subject  to the 
Federal  monopoly  on  radio  plants  and  needs  an 
authorization  from  the  Ministry  for  Post  and 
Telecommunications  (BMPT).  According  to  the 
administrative  practice  of  the  BMPT,  a  general 
authorization is  given only  for  head ends of cable 
networks which do not go beyond the frontiers of 
a  piece  of  land  or  which  cover  linked  pieces  of 
land with  not more  than 25  supplied households. 
Otherwise,  a  special  authorization  is  required.  As 
to  cable  networks  between  pieces  of land  which 
are not linked, the BMPT does not in principle give 
authorization  for  head  ends.  The  only  exception 
from  this prohibition is  made for  private operators 
outside  existing  or  projcocJ  areas  of  T elckom. 
This  administrative  practice  largely  protects 
T  elekom  from  competition  by  private  cable 
network  operators.  Should  this  practice  be 
abandoned  in  liberalizing  the  market  for  cable 
networks,  cable  companies  operating  at  network 
level 4 will have the opportunity to link their cable 
islands  which  at  present  are  limited  to  single 
estates  and  thus  to  enter  into  competition  with 
Telekom.  This  competition  can,  however,  be 
rendered  much  more  difficult  for  the  private 
network  operators  if  T elekom  together  with 
Bertelsmann  and  Kirch  controls  MSG  as  the 
dominant  service  company.  There  would  in 
particular be  the  risk  that private  operators could 
not obtain the  programmes of the leading pay-TV 
suppliers  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch,  which  are 
required  for  attractive  programme  packages,  or 
could  obtain  them  only  on  unfavourable 
conditions. The creation of MSG  with the current 
shareholding  structure  is  therefore  liable  to 
strengthen the dominant position of Telekom as a 
cable network operator. 
VI.  UNDERTAKINGS  WHICH  THE  PARTIES 
PROPOSE TO GIVE 
(94)  By  letter of 20 October 1994 the  parties proposed 
giving  various  undertakings  so  as  to  remove  the 
doubts  against  the  proposed  concentration.  The 
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proposed  undertakings  comprise  the  following 
points: 
MSG  will choose a decoder base that works on 
the  basis  of a  common interface  provided  that 
a common interface is  developed in  accordance 
with  the  standards  defined  by  DVB  and 
minimizes  the  risk  of  piracy,  so  that  this 
technology  can  be  accepted  by  pay-TV 
providers. 
MSG  will  promote the free  sale  of detoders in 
the  market and,  in  the case  of renting,  it  will 
not impose any clause forbidding the use of the 
decoder for  receiving  programmes not handled 
by MSG. 
- MSG  undertakes  not  to  disclose  to  its  parent 
companies any  information on programmes or 
subscriber data of other pay-TV suppliers (even 
in  non-individualized form). 
- MSG  will  choose  a  neutral  and 
non-discriminatory style  of presentation within 
the framework governing the technical features 
for  the  presentation  of  an  Electronic  · 
Programming Guide  (EPG)  and  will,  as  far  as 
technically  possible,  provide  inform.1tion  on 
programmes not handled hy  MSC. 
MSG  will  establish an advisory  body that will 
control  the  non-discriminatory  manner  of 
display  within  EPG.  On  the  board,  the 
customers  (service  providers)  of  MSG  will  be 
represented,  and  proposals  made  by  the 
·advisory  body  will  be  taken  into  account  by 
MSG in its decisions. 
- MSG will charge reasonable market prices and 
will  operate  a  transparent  price  policy,  in 
particular with  regard to equivalent  prices  for 
equivalent services. 
- Telekom  undertakes  that,  in  addition  to  the 
currently installed 30 channels, it will  open  up 
its  networks for  further digital transmission of 
programmes in  order to have sufficient reserves 
of technically usable transmission capacity and 
to avoid any shortage of channels. 
(95)  These  proposed  undertakings  must  be  deemed 
insufficient  to avoid  the  abovementioned  creation 
or strengthening of dominant positions.  It is  true 
that they  relate to certain aspects which, generally, 
can be of particular importance for the competitive 
structure  of  future  digital  pay-TV.  In  particular, 
the  introduction  of a  common  interface  appears 
from a competition point of view to be a solution 
to the  problem  of conditional  access  that  would 
have  a  positive  effect  on the  de~elopment of free 
and unfettered competition. This is  true at least  if 
t 
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there are no contractual restraints on access to the 
decoder base  for  other pay-TV suppliets. Equally, 
a  transparent  price  policy  with  respect  to 
administrative  and technical  services  is  a  positive 
factor  for  the  competitive  development  of digital 
pay-TV.  Given  the  current  structure  of 
shareholders  of  MSG,  however,  the  proposed 
undertakings  do  not  suffice  to  remove  the 
competttton  problems  in  the  present  case. 
Moreover,  they  are  partly  subject  to  conditions 
and reservations which put their enforceability into 
question.  Furthermore,  apart  from  the 
undertakings  concerning  the  introduction  of  a 
common  interface  and  the  creation  of  sufficient 
digital channel reserves by T  elekom, they basically 
comprise  only  the  commitment  not  to  abuse  in 
certain respects a dominant position held  by  MSG 
on  the  market  for  administrative  and  technical 
services  to  the  detriment  of  competitors  in ·the 
market for  pay-TV. 
(96)  The  undertaking concerning the  introduction of a 
common interface is subject to the condition that it 
minimize the risk of piracy and that the technology 
can  be  accepted  by  pay-TV  providers.  It  is  thus 
merely  a  declaration of intent which  leaves  scope 
for MSG to choose a decoder infrastructure on the 
basis  of  a  proprietary  system,  claiming  that  the 
common interface is  not sufficiently secure or that 
there  is  a  lack  of  acceptance  by  potential 
customers.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that the  most  important potential  customer 
of MSG is  Premiere, which is  jointly controlled by 
Bertelsmann,  Kirch  and  Canal  Plus.  It  is  well 
known that Canal Plus  is  resolutely  opposed to a 
common  interface  and  vigorously  supports 
proprietary encryption systems  in  digital television 
as well  as elsewhere.  Besides,  Bertelsmann recently 
entered  a  strategic  alliance  with  Canal  Plus.  One 
practical  project  to  come  out  of  this  strategic 
alliance  is  the· agreement to set  up  a  joint venture 
to develop a digital encryption system. 
(97)  Even  if  the  undertaking  were  given  in  a  form 
which  ensured  the  introduction  of  a  common 
interface,  the  incompatibility  of the  concentration 
with  the  common  market would  not  be  removed. 
As  set  out above  (points  70  to  72),  MSG  in  its 
current structure of shareholders  would  achieve  a 
dominant position in  the market for  technical and 
administrative  services  even  on  the  basis  of  a 
common  interface  with  unlimited  access.  Against 
this  background,  a  common  interface  is  not 
capable to remove the serious harm to competition 
resulting from the combination of the leading cable 
network operator and the leading pay-TV suppliers 
in the MSG  joint venture. 
(98)  The  proposed  undertakings  relating  to  the 
behaviour of MSG  towards its customers and  the 
further  digitalization  of  the  cable  network  by 
T elekom are not such  OlS  to avoid  the  creation or 
strengthening of a  pre-existing  dominant  position 
held  by  Bertelsmann  anp Kirch  in  the  market for 
pay-TV.  As  to  MSG's  assurance  of 
non-discriminatory  treatment  of  customers,  this 
merely  complies  with  the  legal  obligations 
incumbent on undertakings in a position of market 
dominance.  In  view  of the  various  possibilities  of 
hidden  discrimination  that  exist  in  practice,  it 
would furthermore  be  difficult to prove that MSG 
was  not  be~aving neutrally  vis-a-vis  programme 
providers. The proposed advisory board would not 
alter  this  assessment  since  it  would  have  only 
advisory  functions and its  proposals would  nor  be 
binding on MSG.  In  addition, the  undertaking not 
to pass programme information or subscriber data 
to the parent companies of MSG could not prevent 
the parent companies from obtaining informational 
advantages  in  non-verifiable  ways  because  of the 
particular  relationship  and  information  links 
between them and MSG. Nor does the undertaking 
by Telekom  that  it  will  provide  sufficient  digital 
channel  reserves. afford any guarantee that further 
digitalization  will  not,  citing  technical  and 
economic needs, be  tailored to suit the  interests of 
Bertelsmann and Kirch.  In  any case,  it  is  rather a 
general  declaration  of  intent  and  not  a  firmly 
defined undertaking. 
(99)  All  in  all,  it can be  said  that only the  undertaking 
on  the  introduction  of  a  common  interface 
contains  a  structural  aspect.  The  undertaking, 
however,  is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  market 
dominance by  MSG,  and it  is  moreover  suhje<.:t  to 
reservations  which  make  it  amount  to  a 
non-binding  declaration  of  intent.  The  other 
proposed  undertakings  have  to  be  described  as 
mere  pledges of conduct which have  no structural 
dimension and whose fulfilment cannot in any case 
be  checked.  They  are  as  a  matter  of  principle 
inappropriate  to  solving  the  st~tural problem, 
namely  that  the  creation  of  MSG  creates  or 
strengthens dominant positions on the  markers 'for 
administrative  and  technical  services,  pay-TV  and 
cable networks. 
VII.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TECHNICAL  AND 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
(100)  The parties point out that the  rapid acceptance of 
digital  television  will  be  promoted  by  the  services 
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offered  by  MSG.  It  is  true  that  the  successful 
spread  of  digital  television  presupposes  a  digital 
infrastructure and hence that an enterprise with the 
business object of MSG can contribute to technical 
and economic progress.  However, the  reference  to 
this  criterion  in  Article  2  (1)  (b)  of  the  Merger 
Regulation  is  subject  to  the  reservation  that  no 
obstacle  is  formed  to  competition.  As  outlined 
above,  however,  the  foreseeable  effects  of  the 
proposed concentration suggest that it will  lead to 
a  sealing-off of and early  creation of a  dominant 
position  on  the  future  market  for  technical  and 
administrative  services  and  to  a  substantial 
hindering  of  effective  competition  on  the  future 
market for  pay-TV. 
(101)  This hindering of effective competition does in  fact 
make  even  the  achievement  of  technical  and 
economic  progress  questionable.  It  is  extremely 
doubtful  whether,  under the  conditions given,  the 
establishment of a digital infrastructure for pay-TV 
by  MSG  will  actually  contribute  in  a  positive 
manner  to  the  development  of  technical  and 
economic progress. It  is  to be  feared  that, in_ view 
of the effects of the concentration described above, 
potential  suppliers  of  digital  pay-.TV  will  not 
decide  to  enter the  market  to the  same extent as 
would  be  the  case  with  a  service  supplier  whose 
shareholder  structure  would  ensure  strict 
neutrality.  The  successful  spread  of  digital 
television  would,  in  such  a  situation,  be  hindered 
rather  than  promoted.  This  assumption  is 
underpinned  by  a  series  of  opinions  from  the 
enterprises surveyed, which have stated that, in the 
event  of the  concentration being carried out, they 
would  have  to  review  and  possibly  abandon 
existing plans or thoughts on future pay-TV supply 
in  the digital television area. 
VID.  SUMMARY 
(102)  For the reasons outlined above, it is to be expected 
that the proposed concentration would lead to the 
development  or  strengthening  of  dominant 
positions  and  that  effective  competition  in  a 
substantial  part  of  the  Community  would  as  a 
result be  significantly  hindered.  The concentration 
must  therefore- be  declared  incompatible  with  the 
common market,  in  accordance with  Artidc 2 (3) 
of the Merger Regulation, and with the functioning 
of the EEA  Agreement, in  accordance with Article 
57 of that Agreement. 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article 2 
The  concentration  by  way  of  the  creation  of  a  joint 
venture  as  notified  by  Bertelsmann  AG,  Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom  and Taurus Beteiligungs  GmbH  & 
Co.  KG  is  hereby  declared  incompatible  with  the 
common  market  and  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
Agreement. 
Article 2 
This Decision  is  adressed  to: 
1.  Bertelsmann AG, 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Strage 2  70, 
D-33311  Giitersloh. 
2.  Deutsche Bundespost T  elekom, 
Godesberger Allee  87-93, 
D-40474 Dusseldorf. 
3.  Taurus Beteiligungs GmbH &  Co. KG, 
Robert-Biirkle-StraSe 2, 
D-85737 Ismaning. 
Done at Brussels,  9 November  1994. 
For  the Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the Commission 
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f Dear Sirs, 
PUBLIC VERSION 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
Subject:  Case No.  IV/M.561- SECU.RICOR DATATRAK 
Your notification of 17.2.1995 pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No 4064/89. 
I.  On 17 February 1995 two British undertakings Securicor International Limited and Securicor Datatrak 
Limited and the Dutch undertakings, Centraal Beheer Pensioenverzekering NV (Centraal Beheer) and 
Parcom  Services BV notified to the Commission the creation of a joint venture which will provide 
vehicle tracking services within the territory of the Netherlands. 
2.  After examination of the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation falls 
within the scope of  application of  Council Regulation No 4064/89 and does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the common market and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
3.  Securicor International  Limited  and Securicor Datatrak  Limited  are  both  subsidiaries of the British 
undertaking  Securicor Group pic whose main  activities,  carried out in  the UK and  internationally, 
include express parcels, freight haulage, document delivery and mail services; the transportation and care 
of  cash and valuables; security guards and patrol; custodial services; the manufacture, sale, installation 
and maintenance of communication products, electronic surveillance and alarm systems. 
4.  Central Beheer is part of the Achmea Group created as a result of  a recent merger between two Dutch 
insurance undertakings the A  VCB Group and the Zilveren Kruis Group.  The Achmea Group is active 
in  both life and non-life insurance. 
5.  Parcom Services BV is an  investment company belonging to the Banking and Insurance Dutch Group 
lNG. 
II.  THE AGREEMENTS 
6.  Securicor  International,  Central  Beheer and  Parcom  Services  will  first  create  a  holding  company 
Security Datatrak Europe BV (SDE) which will hold all the share capital of an operating subsidiary to 
be created,  Security Datatrak Netherland BV (SDN).  SDN will carry out in  the Netherlands a  new 
telecommunication service, namely, a vehicle tracking system which will provide fleet operators with 
real  time information on the position and status of all  vehicles under their control. 
7.  SDN and Securicor Datatrak Limited will enter into an exclusive supply and licence agreement for the 
Netherlands by which Securicor Datatrak Limited will supply the infrastructure equipment (the base 
stations), the vehicle equipment (the locators) and will license the know how,  including the software, 
necessary to run the system. 
Ill.  CONCENTRATION 
t/245 8.  SDN  will be jointly controlled, through SOE,  by  Securicor International, Central Beheer and Parcom 
Services as  each  of the  parent companies  will  hold  33.33%  of the share capital  of SOE  and  major 
decisions concerning the activity of  SDN such as the approval of  the business plan, the appointment of 
senior staff will require the consent of all  parents. 
9.  SDN  will  be  an  autonomous  full  function  undertaking which will  provide specific tclecom services, 
namely a vehicle tracking services within a national geographic market (the Netherlands).  To perfonn 
these services SON has to build a terrestrial infrastructure of LF and VHF radio stations and to benefit 
from the service the customers must have the appropriate vehicle equipment.  These infrastructure and 
vehicle equipments are manufactured in the UK by another subsidiary of  the Securicor Group, Securicor 
Datatrak Limited,  which  will  supply them on  an  exclusive basis for the Netherlands.  SON  will then 
sell and  install the vehicle equipment to the customers either directly or through a network of agreed 
service providers established by  SDN throughout the Netherlands.  The primary objective of SDN  is 
not to  be  a sales agency  to distribute Securicor Datatrak equipment but to  provide a specific service 
requiring a specific technology and equipment which is currently only marketed by Securicor Datatrak 
Limited. 
to.  SDN  will therefore be an autonomous full  function  undertaking with its own assets and personnel and 
it will not give rise to the coordination of  the competitive behaviour of its parents since only one parent, 
the Securicor Group, will be active in the JV services market although in a different geographic market. 
11.  Thus the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
12.  The operation has a Community  dimension.  The  worldwide turnover of all  undertakings concerned 
amounts to more than 5,000 million ECU.  The Community wide turnover of each parent exceeds 250 
million  ECU  and  the undertakings concerned do  not achieve more than two thirds of their aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and  the same  Member State. 
V.  COMPATIBILITY 
13.  The  vehicle  tracking  services  which  will  be  provided  by  the  JV  in  the  Netherlands  will  use  the 
automatic vehicle location (A VL) technology developed by Securicor Datatrak Limited.  The Datatrak 
system consists of  a new technology which combines the accurate position determination of  the vehicles 
with  the  reliable transmission  of the position  information. 
14.  The  infrastructure  of the  Datatrak  system  in  the  Netherlands  will  comprise  three  main  integrated 
elements:  a network of 5 low frequency (LF) transmitters allowing position detennination, a two way 
data transmission network which will comprise 21  UHF base stations connected to a central computer 
by  means of land lines and a network control centre which will  inter alia monitor and control the  LF 
stations and  operate a customer service desk  for answering customer queries. 
In order to operate the base stations a licence attributing the radio frequencies has to be obtained from 
the Dutch Authorities. 
15.  The  service  will  be  marketed  to  fleet  operators.  Potential  customers  include  inter  alia distribution 
companies,  emergency  services  (police,  ambulance,  fire  brigades),  national  courier services,  public 
transport and taxi services.  The standard customer vehicle equipment includes the locator, an electronic 
device combining the positioning and the data communications equipment in a single compact unit and 
a single whip antenna.  In addition to the basic standard equipment, customers will be offered additional 
equipment to  perform  more specific functions.  Customers will  also  need a display system  located at 
their premises to present the vehicle location and status data in  a form  understandable to the user. 
16.  According to  the  parties,  this  is  a new  service and  there are currently no  competitive systems  in  the 
market.  However the parties indicated that ot~er systems developed by competitors, which will combine 
both elements, may be offered in the future in the Netherlands subject to prior authorization for the use 
of radio frequencies by the Dutch authorities.  Both positioning systems and mobile data transmission systems arc available but there is  at  present no other system which offers the integration of both. 
17.  The service to be provided will  be quite a new one in  the Dutch  market  and therefore there are no 
affected markets in the sense of  the Merger Regulation.  Besides, both the Achmea Group and the lNG 
Group are not active at all neither in the operation of vehicle tracking services nor in the up stream 
market of development, manufacture and sale of  vehicle tracking systems and equipment.  Therefore, 
there  is  neither  any  addition  of market  shares  outside the jv geographic  market  nor any  risk  of 
foreclosure of the up-stream  market  for systems and equipment since there will be any pooling of 
technological know-how or manufacturing capacities. 
VI.  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
18.  Securicor Datatrak Limited,  a company belonging to the Securicor Group will enter in an  exclusive 
supply and licence agreement for the Netherlands to supply SON with all the infrastructure equipment 
and  the vehicle equipment.  However,  SON  may  purchase equipment  from  a  third  party if better 
conditions are offered providing that such equipment meets the technical criteria of Security Datatrak 
and no know-how of Securicor.Datatrak is  used on the manufacture of such equipment. 
19.  'rl1e  supply and  licence agreement  also deals  with  the exclusive  licence f(lr  SON  to  usc,  within  the 
geographic area covered by the agreement, the trade names, trade marks, know-how, software and other 
rights owned by Securicor Datatrak in  connection with the vehicle tracking system. 
20.  The supply and licence agreement is directly related to the concentration.  However, the exclusive nature 
of  these agreements goes beyond what is strictly necessary for the implementation of  the concentration 
and  therefore the supply and  licence agreement  cannot be considered as  ancillary to the  proposed 
concentration and should be assessed under the provisions of Article 85 of the Treaty. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
21.  Based on the above, the proposed concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with 
the common market and the functioning of the EEA  Agreement. 
* 
*  * 
For the  above  reasons,  the  Commission  has  decided  not  to  oppose  the  notified  operation  and  to  declare  it 
compatible with the common market and with the functioning of  the EEA Agreement.  This decision is adopted 
in  application of Article 6( I )b of Council Regulation No 4064/89. 
For the Commission 
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1 DOCUMENTS ON THE APPLICATION 
OF THE COMPETITION RULES 
TO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
Ill  Judgments of the Court of Justice 
relating to Telecommunications 
A  Judgments relating to Articles 85 and 86  EC 
If/ !1 ..  I 
•  I 
I 
#  I 
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~  I Case 41/83 
..... 
ltalia~ Republic 
v 
Commission of the European Communities 
'Abuse of a dominant position. {Article 86)  - Public undertakings (Article 90)  -
International agreements (Article 234)- Article 222- Article 190 of the Treaty' 
Summary 
1.  Competition  - Dominant position  - Activities of  a national telecommunications  under-
taking - Exercise  by that undertaking of  rule-making powers - Application of  Article 86 
of  the  Treaty 
(EEC Treaty,  Art. 86) 
2.  Competition  - Dominant position  - Abuse - Prohibition  by an  undertaking  holding  a 
statutory monopoly on  telecommunications of  certain activities of  private message-forwarding 
agencies - Criteria for appraisal 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 86) 
J.  Application for annulment - Submissions  - Infringement of  Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty 
pleaded by a Member State  other than  the Member  State  which  controls  the  undertaking  in 
question - Whether admissible  -
(EEC Treaty,  Art. 90 (2) and first paragraph of  Art.  173) 
4.  Measures adopted by institutions - Statement of  reasons - Duty - Scope 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 190) 
1.  The  management,  by  an  undertaking 
having  the  status  of  a  nationalized 
industry,  of  public  telecommunication 
equipment  and  its  placing  of  such 
equipment  at  the  disposal  of  users  on 
payment of a  fee  amounts to  a  business 
activity  which  as  such  is  subject  to  the 
obligations imposed by Article  86  of the 
Treaty.  Comprised  within  that  activity, 
and  therefore  subject  to  review  in  the 
light of Article  86  of the Treaty,  is  the 
autonomous  exercise  of  rule-making 
powers  strictly  limited  to  the  fixing  of 
tariffs  and  the  conditions  under  which 
services are provided for users. 
2.  An  undertaking  holding  a  statutory 
monopoly  on  the  management  of 
H\\3 
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telecommunications  networks  infringes 
Article 86 of the Treaty when it prohibits 
the  activities  of  private  message-
forwarding  agencies  , handling  inter-
national  telecommunication  traffic, 
unless i" .~s .shoWJ;l  tha.t .such:-agencies ~ 
abusing  the  .public  networkS:  The · 
employment  of  new  technology  con-
stituting technical progress in conformity 
with  the  public  interest  cannot  be 
regarded as  an abuse. 
3.  Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 
17 3  of the Treaty,  Member States  may, 
by  means  of  an  application ·- for 
annulment,  challenge  any  measure 
adopted  by the  Commission  in  the  form 
of a  regulation or an individual decision 
and  may,  in  so  doing,  plead ·  the 
infringement  of  any  stipulation  in  the 
Treaty  in  support  of  their  claims.  It 
follows  that  a  Member  State  may,  in 
support of such an application,  plead an 
infringement  by  the  Commission  of 
Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty,  the 
observance  of which  the  Commission  is 
required  to  ensure,  even  if  the  under-
taking affected by the application of that 
provision  comes  under  the  authority  of 
ano~~r  .Membe~  Stat~. 
4.  The statement of the reasons on which a 
decision  having  adverse  effect  is  based 
must  enable  the  Court  to  review  the 
legality  of the  decision  and  to  provide 
the  party  concerned  with  details 
sufficient to allow that party to ascertain 
whether  or  not  the  decision  is  well-
founded. The requirement of a statement 
of reasons must be viewed in the context 
of the circumstances  of the case,  and  in 
particular the  content of the  measure  in 
question, the nature of the reasons relied 
on and the interest which addressees, or 
other persons to whom the measure is  of 
direct and individual  concern, within the 
meaning  of  the  second  paragraph  of 
Article  173  of the  Treaty,  may  have  in 
obtaining explanations. 
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON 
delivered on 16 January 1985 * 
Mr President, 
Members  of  the  Court, 
The  case  which  this  Court has  before  lt  IS 
unusual  on  more  than  one  count. It is,  as 
has been observed, the first of its kind. 
The Italian Government, acting on the basis 
of Article 17 3 of the EEC Treaty, has asked 
the  Court to declare void  a  decision of 1  0 
December 1982, 
1  in  which the Commission 
declared  certa1n  provtslohs,  adopted 
"  Translated from  the French. 
1  - Commission  Decision  No  82/861/EEC  (Official  Journal 
1982, L 360, p.  36). 
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successively  by  the  United  Kingdom  Post 
Office  and  by  British  Telecommunications 
(hereinafter jointly referred to as  'BT') and 
designed to curtail the activities of message-
forwarding  agencies,  to  be  contrary  to 
Article 86 of the Treaty. 
Thus  the  applicant State  is  not the  one .in 
which  the  undertaking  in  question  has  1ts 
seat.  On the  contrary,  the  Govern~ent of 
the  United  Kingdom  intervened  1n  the 
proceedings in  support of the Commission. 
Furthermore,  BT,  which  had  not 
implemented  the  provisions  complained  of, 
did not incur any fine,  and indeed refrained 
from  seeking  the  Court's  censure  of  a 
.m 14  • ...........  ·· .·  .  . 
·In Case 41/83 
~ •  '  .....  •  '  ., ·~  •  "  •••••• 0  •  •  • ••••  '  ,·  '.... •  • ••  '  • • ·• ••  •  •  '  ' 
jUDGMENT OF 2.0.  3.  19.85.  __,  C{\SE  41/83'  . 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
20 March 1985 * 
..... 
., ...  •'•  . ... 
••••  I>  .....  ·'7· .. 
. ... 
.· .. 
Italian  Republic,  represented by Arnalda Squillante, Head of the Depanment of 
Diplomatic Legal Affairs,  acting as  Agent, assisted by  Giorgio Azzariti, Avvocato 
della Stato, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Italian Embassy, 
applicant, 
v 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  represented  by  its  Legal  Adviser, 
Giuliano Marenco, acting as  Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at 
the office of Georgios K.remlis,  a member of its  Legal  Department, Jean Monnet 
Building, Kirchberg, 
defendant, 
supported in its submissions by 
the  United  Kingdom,  represented  by  G.  Dagtoglou,  of the  Treasury  Solicitor's 
Department, Queen· Anne's Gate Chambers, London, with an  address for  service 
in  Luxembourg at the office  of J.D. Howes, acting as  Agent for the Government 
of the United Kingdom, c/o British Embassy, 28  Boulevard Royal, 
1ntervener, 
APPLICATION for a declaration that Commission Decision No 82/861/EEC of 
! 0 December 1982 (Official JournaL L 36C,  p. 36\ relating\to a proceeding lg~inst 
British Telecommunications· under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, is void, 
...  Language of the Case: halian. 
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THE COURT 
composed  of:  Lord  Mackenzie  Stuart,  President,  G.  Bosco,  0.  Due  and 
C. Kakouris  (Presiden~ of Chambers), T. Koopinans, U. Everling, K.  Bahlm.ann2 
· Y.  Gali:not and R~ Jolie.i,. Judges,  ·  ·  ·  .  ·  ·  ·  · .  ·  . · · ·  · 
Advocate General: M.  Darmon 
Registrar: H. A.  Rtihl, Principal Administrator 
gives the following 
JUDGMENT 
(The account of the facts  and issues which is  contained in the complete text of the 
judgment is  not reproduced) 
Decision 
By  application  lodged  at  the  Court  Registry  on  15  March  1983,  the  Italian 
Republic  brought an  action  under the  first  paragraph of Article  173  of the  EEC 
Treaty  for  a  declaration  that  Commission  Decision  No  82/861/EEC  of  10 
December 1982  (Official Journal, L  360,  p.  36),  relating to a proceeding against 
British Telecommunications under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, was void. 
On  1  October  1981  British  Telecommunications,  a  statutory  corporation 
established  under  the  British  Telecommunications  Act  1981,  took  over  the 
functions  of the United Kingdom  Post Office,  set up  under the  Post Office Act 
1969.  Both of these nationalized undertakings are hereinafter referred to as  'BT'. 
As  holder  of  the  statutory  monopoly  on  the  running  of  telecommunications 
systems  in  the  United  Kingdom,  BT has  a  duty to  provide  inter alia  telex  and 
telephone  services.  Pursuant  to  both  the  Post  Office  Act  and  the  British 
Telecommunications  Act,  BT  exercises  rule-making  powers  in  respect  of 
telecommunications  services  in  the  United  Kingdom  for  which  it  lays  down 
charges  and conditions by  means  of schemes; these are published  in  the  London, 
Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes. 
"'  after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General delivered at the sitting on 16 January 1985, 
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Furthermore,  BT has  the  international  status  of a  recognized  private  operating 
agency having  a  seat on one of the permanent bodies of the ITU (International 
Telecommunications  Union},  set  up  by  the  ITC  (International  Telecommuni-
cations Convention, United  Natic;>ns  Treaty Series, No 2616, p.  188}, which was 
· · signed· on· 2 ·October 1947 at ·Atlantic City and last revised on 25  October 1973 ·at 
Malaga-Torremolinos. All  the Member States of the EEC  are parties to the ITC. 
As  a  private  operating agency recognized  as  such by  the  United  Kingdom,  BT 
participates  in  the work of the CCITT (International Telegraph and Telephone 
Consultative  Committee),  together with  the  national  administrations  of  all  the 
signatories to the ITU which are entitled to a seat there. 
The CCI1T issues  recommendations on operating and  tariff questions regarding 
· telegraphy and  telephony,  such  recommendations being  adopted  by  virtue  of the 
provisions  of the  ITC itself  and  the Telegraph  and  Telephone  Regulations  (the 
Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference held 
by the ITU in  Geneva in  1973). Those· regulations supplement the provisions of the 
IT·c pursuant to.Article 82  thereof, and govern the use  of te1ecommunications. 
Under Article 6 (3)  of ~he Telegraph Regulations of 11  April 1973, 
'Administrations  [or recognized private  operating agency(ies)]  shall  undertake to 
stop,  at  their  respective  offices,  the  acceptance,  transmission  and  delivery  of 
telegrams addressed to telegraphic re-forwarding agencies and other organizations 
set up  to forward telegrams on behalf of third parties so  as  to evade full  payment 
of the charges due for the complete route  ....  ' 
6  On  the  basis  of and  pursuant to  that provision,  the  CCI1T adopted in  October 
197  6 Recommendation F 60, Section 3.5.2. of which provides as  follows: 
'Administrations  and  recognized  private  operating agencies  shall  refuse  to  make 
the telex service available to a telegraph forwarding agency which is  known to be 
organized for the purpose of sending or receiving telegraphs for retransmission by 
telegraphy with a view to evading the full charges due for the complete route.' 
In reliance on those provisions BT started a campaign against the development, on 
United Kingdom territory, of private message-forwarding agencies. Those agencies 
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offered the general public a new service whereby a large volume of messages could 
be  received  and  forwarded  on  behalf  of  third  parties  at  prices  which  were 
appreciably lower than those charged under the tariffs for the conventional use of 
.  · telecommunication lines and systems. 
Availing  itself of the rule-making powers conferred on it by statute, BT adopted, 
in  the  first  instance,  Schemes  T7/1975  and  Tl/1976.  Those  schemes,  whilst 
leaving  subscribers  free  to  use  their  installations  for  forwarding  or  receiving 
messages on behalf of third parties, nevertheless provided, in Paragraphs 4  3 (2)  (b) 
(iii)  and 70 (2)  (b)  (iii},  that whenever a subscriber relayed a  telex message which 
both originated from, and was intended for delivery in, a foreign country he  could 
not apply a scale of charges which would have the result of enabling the originator 
of the  message to send it more cheaply than if he had forwarded it directly.  It is 
common  ground between  the  parties,  however,  that BT never actually enforced 
those provisions. 
"  BT subsequently supplemented those schemes by adopting Scheme Tl  I 1978, which 
came  into  operation  on  21  January  1978.  Paragraphs  44,  (2)  (a)  and  70  (2)  (b) 
thereof prohibited  forwarding  agencies  from  providing  iri'ternational  services  for 
their customers whereby: 
(a)  messages  in  data form were sent or received internationally by telephone and 
then  converted  into  telecommunication  messages  for  reception  in  telex, 
facsimile, written or other visual form; or 
(b)  telex  messages  were  forwarded  in  transit between  places  outside  the  United 
Kingdom and the Isle of Man; or 
(c)  telex messages were sent or received via other message-forwarding agencies. 
The above provisions of Scheme Tt  I 1978 were incorporated in their entirety into 
a new 1981  scheme, which revoked and replaced all previous schemes. 
10  By  Decision No 82/861/EEC of 10  December 1982 the Commission held  that the 
aforesaid  schemes  constituted  infringements  of  Article  86  of  the  Treaty,  and 
required BT to bring them to an end - in  so far as  it had not already done so -
within two months of notification of the decision. 
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In  its  statement of the  reasons  on which  the decision  is  based,  the Commission 
claims  that  the  restrictions  imposed  by  BT  and  the  sanctions  which  may  be 
incurred  by  their  infringement,  namely  the  cutting-off or  disconnection  of the 
apparatus provided, (a) prevent message-forwarding agencies from offering cenain 
services, to the detriment of. their· customers ~erating in other .Member .States, (b) .. 
subject the  use  of telephone and tel"ex  equipment to obligations unrelated to the 
provision of telephone or telex services, and (c)  place the agencies at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the national telecommunications authorities and agencies in 
other Member States not bound by such rules. 
Notwithstanding the infringements recorded, the  Commission  considered that,  in 
view  of the  special  circumstances  of the  case,  in  particular the  duty  to  observe 
international commitments and the fact that BT had not penalized infringements 
of  the  restrictions  by  disconnecting  the  facilities  of  the  mess~ge-forwarding 
agencies, no fine should be imposed on it. : 
In  support of its  claim  that the  Commis~ion decision should be  declared void,  the 
I  tali an  Republic denies,  in  the  first  place,  that the disputed  schemes were  in  la"r 
open to appraisal in  re~lation to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. In that connection it 
argues, first,· that the. rule-making activities of a body governed by public law may 
not be  regarded as  the activities of an  undertaking for the purposes of Article  86. 
Secondly, it argues that, since  BT holds  a  statutory monopoly,  it  is  exempted by 
Article  222  of  the  Treaty  from  the  application  of  the  Community  rules  on 
competition. 
In the second place, the Italian Republic maintains that the schemes at issue  may 
not  in  law  be  regarded  as·  contrary  to  Article  86  inasmuch  as,  first,  they  are 
intended  to  counter unfair practices  on the  part of private  forwarding  agencies, 
secondly, the Community rules on competition cannot apply, except within certain 
limits,  to  BT  as  a  public  undertaking  for  the  purposes  of Article  90  (2)  of the 
Treaty, and lastly,  the ICT provisions mentioned above required BT to adopt the 
measures complained of. 
,r,  'The Italian Republic concludes by maintaining that the contested decision does not 
contain an  adequate statement of reasons. 
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I - Submissions to the effect that BT'  s schemes are not open to appraisal for their 
compatibility with Article 86 of the Treaty 
1.  The  applicability  of the  Community  rules  on  competition  in  the  light  of the 
activities covered by the decision at issue 
16  The  Italian  Republic  argues  that Article  86  of the TTeaty ·applies  solely  to  the 
activities  of business  concerns  carried  out under  private  law,  and  not  to· rule-
making activities carried out pursuant to a statute by a public body functioning in 
conformity with  conditions  laid  down  by  central  government.  Inasmuch  as  the 
contested  decision  is  directed,  not  to  BT's  conduct  in  its  capacity  as  a  body 
responsible for the operation of certain equipment or as  a supplier of telecommuni-
cations  services  to  users,  but  rather to  its  rule-making  activities  under the  Post 
Office Act 1969 and the British Telecommunications Act 1981, the applicant takes 
the view that the Commissiorf has misapplied Article 86. The rule-making activities 
complained  of can,  at  most,  provide  the  basis  for  an  action  against  the  United 
Kingdom under Articles 90  or 169 of the Treaty. 
11  The  Commission,  supported  in  its  conclusions  and  arguments  by  the  United 
Kingdom, contends that the provision of telecommunications services  is  a business 
activity. Although United Kingdom statute law empowered BT to have recourse to  . 
schemes, it did so solely for the purpose of establishing the charges and conditions 
subject to which such services  are offered. The schemes at issue therefore perform 
the same function as  contractual terms, and were freely adopted by BT pursuant to 
the  powers  vested  in  it  and  without  any intervention  on  the  part of the  United 
Kingdom  authorities.  Even  if  the  United Kingdom could  be  held  responsible  in 
these circumstances, that would have the effect, at most, of diminishing the under-
taking's  responsibility  for  the  purposes  of  calculating  the  fine,  but  would  not 
prevent the Community rules on competition from being 4pplied to it. 
1s  It should be noted in the first place that the applicant does not dispute that, despite 
- BT's  status  as  a  nationalized  industry,  its  management  of public  telecommuni-
cations  equipment and  its  placing  of such equipment at the disposal  of users  on 
payment of a fee  do indeed amount to a business activity which as  such  is  subject 
to the obligations imposed by Article 86  of the Treaty. 
19  In the second place it should be  observed that, by virtue of Section 28  of the Post 
Office Act  1969  and then  of Section  21  of the  British  Telecommunications Act 
1981, the power conferred on BT to introduce schemes has been strictly limited to 
laying  down  provisions  relating  to  the  scale  of  charges  and  other  terms  and 
conditions under which it provides services for users. In the light of the wording of 
those  provisions  it  must  further  be  acknowledged  that  the  United  Kingdom 
legislature  in  no  way predetermined  the content of the  schemes,  which  is  freely 
determined by BT.  .. 
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In those circumstances, the schemes referred to by the contested decision must be 
regarded as an integral part of BT's business activity. The submission to the effect 
that  it  was  not  in  law  open  to  the  Commission.  to  appraise  them  for  their 
compatibility with Article 86 of the Treaty must therefore be rejected. 
2.  The question whether the Community rules on competition are applicable in view 
of  the monopoly held by BT 
The applicant argues that, by virtue of Article 222 of the Treaty, which provides 
that the Treaty 'shall in  no way prejudice the rules in  Member States governing 
the system of property ownership', Member States are free to determine, in  their 
internal systems, the activities which are reserved to the public sector and to create 
national  monopolies. Thus BT is  entitled  to preserve its  monopoly by preventing 
the  operation  of  private  agencies  wishing  to  provide  services  covered  by  that 
monopoly.  By  condemning the  schemes  adopted  by BT in that regard  as  being 
incompatible with Article  86,  the Commission therefore  infringed Article  222  of 
the Treaty. 
~2  It is  apparent from the documents before the Court that, whilst BT has a .statutory 
monopoly,  subject  to  certain  exceptions  with  regard  to  the  management  of 
telecommunication  n<:_tworks  and  to making them  available  to  users,  it  holds  no 
monopoly over the  provision  of ancillary  services  such  as  the  retransmission  of 
messages  on behalf of third  parties.  At  all  events,  it  must  be  observed  that the 
schemes adopted  by BT are not designed to suppress any private agencies which 
tnay  be  created  in  contravention  of  its  monopoly  but  seek  solely  to  alter  the 
conditions in  which such agencies operate. Accordingly, Article 222 of the ·rreaty 
did not prevent the Commission from appraising the schemes in question for their 
compatibility with Article 86  thereof. 
1.1  The submission based on infringement of Article 222 of the Treaty must therefore 
be rejected. 
II - Submissions to the effect that BT's schemes are not contrary to Article 86  of 
the Treaty 
1.  The claim that BT's schemes were consistent with the need to prevent the improper 
use of  telecommunications ~quipment by private forwarding agencies 
24  The Italian  Republic has submitted, both in  its  pleadings and in  its oral argument 
before  the  Court,  that  the  private  message-forwarding  agencies  established  on 
lJnited  Kingdom  territory  abuse  the  public  telecommunication  network.  It 
maintains that such abuse resides,  in  the first  place, in  the abnormal utilization of 
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point-to-point circuits,  that is  to say,  public circuits  hired  out to  individuals  for 
their  exclusive  use,  at  a  fixed  tariff  determined  by  the  number  of  messages 
normally transmitted by that category of user. By transmitting messages on behalf 
of third parties via such circuits, the agencies evade the normal tariff terms. The 
agencies  further abuse the  public network, according to the Italian Government, 
by using special equipment which, with the aid of cornputer techniques, enable a 
large number of messages to be forwarded in a very short time. Those practices are 
especially harmful to the proper running of the international telecommunications 
system because they use the lines carrying the heaviest traffic. BT could therefore, 
without infringing Article  86  of the Treaty, adopt the measures  needed to put an 
end to such unlawful activities. 
2s  The  Commission  and  the  United  Kingdom  deny  that  the  forwarding  agencies 
make  use  of  point-to-point  circuits.  The  fact  that  such  agencies  employ  new 
techniques  and  introduce  a  modicum  of  competition  into  international 
telecommunications traffic cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse. 
26  In  that connection,  it  is  sufficient to  note that neither the  documents  before  the 
Court nor the oral argument presented to it have  provided any confirmation that 
the  message-forwarding  agencies  established  in  the  United  Kingdom  abuse  the 
public  telecommunication  networks.  In the first  place  it  has not been shown  that 
such agencies use point-to-point circuits for the purpose of retransmitting messages 
on behalf of third parties. In the second place the employment of new technology 
which  accelerates  the  transmission  of messages  constitutes  technical  progress  in 
conformity with the public interest and cannot be regarded per seas an abuse. The 
Italian  Republic  has  not,  moreover,  claimed  that  the  forwarding  agencies  are 
attempting  to  evade  payment of the  charges  covering  the  periods  during which 
they actually use the public network. 
21  In those circumstances, the submission  to the effect that the schemes  at issue  are 
justified by abuses on the part of the private forwarding agencies must be rejected. 
2.  The  claim  that  the  measures  adopted  by  BT are  covered  by  the  provisions  of 
Article 90 (2) of  the  Treaty derogating from  the  rules  on competition and applying for 
the benefit of  undertakings entrusted with the operation of  services of  general economic 
interest 
111  According to the applicant, the Commission disregarded the terms of the  1~reaty in 
so far as  it took the view that Article 90  (2) was inapplicable to the present case. 
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Before  considering  the  merits  of that  submission  it  must  be  observed  that  the 
Commission states that it has doubts as  to whether the applicant is  entitle'd to rely 
on it. Article 90 (2) of the Treaty, whose purpose is to safeguard the tasks which a 
Member State sees fit to entrust to a specified body, presupposes, according to the 
Commission,  a  situation  in which  conflicting interests  are  delicately poised  and 
which  involves  facts  and appraisals  which  are  peculiar to the  Member State  in 
question and extraneous to other Member States which bear no responsibility for 
them and therefore have no interest in defending a position in regard to them. 
;;  It should be borne in  mind in  this regard that, pursuant to the first paragraph of 
Article  173  of the Treaty, Member States may bring actions  against any measure 
adopted by the Commis'sion in  t~e form of a regulation or an individual decision, 
and may, in support of their claims, plead  inter alia the infringement of any stipu-
lation in  the Treaty. It must further be observed that the application of Article 90 
(2)  of the  Treaty  is  not  left  to  the  discretion  of the  Member  State,  which  has 
entrusted  an  undertaking  with  the  operation  of  a  service  of  genera]  economic 
interest.  Article  90  (3)  assigns  to  the  Commission  the  task  of  monitoring  such 
matters,  under the supervision of the Court. It follows  that Article  90  (2)  of the 
Treaty ranks among those provisions whose infringement may be pleaded by any 
Member State in support of an action to have a measure declared void. 
,I  The  Italian  Republic- contends  that,  by  declaring  that  the  schemes  which  BT 
adopted are contrary to Community law,  the  Commission  is  placing in  jeopardy 
the performance by BT of the tasks entrusted to it. 
->2  The  first  argument  adduced  by  the  applicant  is  that  the  acuvtues  of  private 
message-forwarding agencies cause  economic damage to the public telecommuni-
cations service in the United Kindem. 
-'-"  It should be  observed that, whilst the speed of message-transn1ission  n1aJc possible 
by technological advances undoubtedly leads to some decrease in  revenue for B'r, 
the presence in the United Kingdom of private forwarding agencies attracts to the 
British  public network, as  the applicant itself observes,  a certain volume of inter-
national  messages  and the revenue which  goes  with  it.  The Italian  Republic  has 
totally failed  to demonstrate that the results  of the activities  of those agencies  in 
the  United  Kingdom  were,  taken  as  a  whole,  ~nfavourable to  BT,  or that the 
Commission's censure of the schemes at issue put the performance of the particular 
tasks entrusted to BT in jeopardy from the economic point of view. 
34  The  Italian  Republic  puts  forward  a  second  argument based  on  the  need  for  a 
system of world-wide cooperation as  instituted by the ITU, in  order to ensure the 
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proper running of international telecommunications  serv~ces, an? on the legitimate 
expectation of other national administrations that the  International  rules  for  the 
time being in force which are designed to prevent the a~tivities of private me~sage­
forwarding agencies will  be complied with. By  prevent_tng  BT from honounn·g· to 
the.  full  the obligations of such international  cooper~uo!l, the contested  dectsto~ 
again threatens to jeopardize the performance of the particular tasks entrusted to It 
as  a nationalized industry. 
3s  In reality, the question raised by that argument is  whether or not the ITC or the 
law derived from it required BT to adopt the measures at issue. It is  precisely that 
question which  is  covered  by  the  third submission  made  by the  Italian  Republic 
which  is  designed  to  show  that  BT  was  not,  in  the  circumstances,  obliged  to 
comply with the Community rules on competition. It must therefore be considered 
below. 
3.  The claim that the fTC and the law derived /rom it required BT  to prevent - as 
it  did  - the  activities  of private  forwarding  agencies  operating  in  the  United 
Kingdom 
36  The  Italian  Republic  maintains  that  the  Commission  disregarded  the  terms  of 
Article  234  of the Treaty. Article  234  resolves  any conflict between  Community 
law and the pre-existing rules of international law, by giving the latter precedence 
over  the  former.· The  applicant  claims  that  the  provisions  of the  ITC  and  its 
administrative regulations have  always forbidden national administrations to allow 
the re-routing of the international traffic in telegraph or telephone messages when 
such  re-routing is  caused  by  the attempt of private forwarding agencies  to  evade 
the  full  charges  due  for  the  complete  route.  By  virtue  of  Article  6.3  of  the 
Telegraph Regulations of 1973,  on the one hand, and CCITf Recommendation 
F 60, on the other, BT was obliged to adopt the schemes to which the Com1nission 
objects. 
J7  The Commission  and  the  United Kingdom state  that the provisions  at issue  are 
des.igned  solely  to  put  an  end  to  a  practice  whereby  communications  evade 
payment  of the  full  charges  due  for  the  complete  route,  and  not  to  prevent  a 
message  from  passing via  an  intermediate  cotintry merely on  the  ground  that it 
thereby incurs a lower charge. The schemes adopted by BT can therefore find  no 
justification in those provisions. 
)~  The Commission  further argues  that Article  234  of the Treaty is  not applicable 
becaus·e the ITC was revised at Malaga-Torremolinos on 25 October 1973, that is, 
on a date subsequent to the United Kingdom's accession to the Communities. The 
arguments put forward by the applicant on the similarity of the provisions in  force 
prior to that date are, the Commission alleges, irrelevant, because members of the 
ITU recover their freedom of action and enter into a fresh commitment whenever 
a  revision  occurs.  Even  on  the  suppositiop  that  there  are  international  rules 
predating the EEC Treaty which demand the course of action for which BT was 
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criticized, Article 234 does not, however, override the prohibition under Article 86 
except in  so  far  as  con1pliance  therewith  would  prevent  a  Member  State  from 
fulfilling its obligations towards non-member countries. 
The United Kingdom states that it does not share the view of the Commission on 
'  the revision, subsequent to the accession of a  Member State to the Communities, 
of an  international treaty concluded before the EEC Treaty. It contends for its 
part that, as  is  clear from the judgment of the Court of 27  February 1962  (Case 
10/61  Commission v  Italy [1962]  ECR 1},  by virtue of Article 234 of the Treaty, 
Member States waive all rights accruing under an earlier treaty which are contrary 
to  Community  rules.  Inasmuch  as  BT  drew  no  distinction  between  the  inter-
national and the Community obligations of the United Kingdom and consequently 
failed  to  confine  the  effects  of ·]ts  schemes  to  those  activities  of  forwarding 
agencies  which  adversely  affect  comparable  activities  in  non-Inernbcr  countncs, 
those schemes do indeed infringe Article 86 of the Treaty. 
Without there being any need to rule on the point whether the aforesaid provisions 
of  Article  6.3  of  the  Telegraph  Regulations  of  197 3  or  of  CCITI 
Recommendation F 60 were or were not binding on BT, it is  sufficient to note that 
they  differ  in  their  purpose  and  content  from  the  BT  schemes  to  which  the 
Commission objected. 
It follows from the very wording of Article 6.3  of the Telegraph Regulations and 
of CCITr Recommendation F 60 that their sole purpose is  to prevent the activities 
of message-forwarding  agencies  which  are  'set  up'  or 'known  to  be  organized' 
with a view to evading the full  charges due for the con1pletc  route. 1  .. hc  Illcasurc~ 
envisaged  by those  provisions  can  therefore affect only those  agencies which,  by 
the  use  of improper means,  attempt to  avoid payment of the  full  charges due  in 
respect of certain messages. 
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Whenever a  Member State, or a  recognized private operating agency to which a  Sc( 
Member State has entrusted the operation of telecommunications services, permits  co1 
transmissions  which  are  not  improper  in  the  sense  described  above  and  are  the 
therefore not prohibited by the aforesaid ·provisions, there can be no question of a 
breach by the State concerned of commitments undertaken at international level. 
It  follows  from  the  foregoing  that the  schemes  adopted  by BT  had  a  different 
purpose from the one pursued by the aforesaid provisions of the Telegraph Regu-
lations  and  by  the  CCITT  recommendation  and  were  concerned  with  private 
message-forwarding agencies whose activities were in no way improper. 
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In  those  circumstances,  the  submission  to  the  effect  that the  ICT and  the  law 
derived from it placed BT under an obligation to adopt the schemes at issue must 
in  any event be rejected. 
III - The submission that the statement of reasons given for the decision at issue is 
inadequate 
The Italian Republic argues that the obligation under Article 190 of the Treaty to 
state the reasons on which decisions are based was infringed, as  the Commission 
failed to give the reasons for which it had taken the view that: 
(a)  BT's statutory monopoly was contrary to Community law; 
(b)  the exercise of rule-making powers could \be equated with a business activity; 
(c)  Community  rules  on  competition  took  precedence  over  pre-existing  inter-
national rules. 
First, it should be borne in  mind that, according to a consistent line of decisions of 
the Court, the statement of the reasons on which a  decision having adverse effect 
is  based must enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide 
the party concerned with details sufficient to allow that part}r to ascertain whether 
or  not the  decision  is  well-founded. The  requirement of a  statement of reasons 
n1ust  be viewed in  the context of the ci-rcumstances of the case,  and in  particular 
the content of the measure in  question, the nature of the reasons relied on and the 
interest which addressees, or other persons to whom the measure is  of direct and 
individual concern, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article  173  of 
the Treaty, may have in obtaining explanations. 
Secondly, it should be observed that the contested decision in no way disputes the 
compatibility of BT's statutory monopoly with Community law.  No reasons  had 
therefore to be given by the Commission on that point. 
Lastly,  with regard to the other two points. ~isputed by  the Italian Republic,  the 
recitals in the preamble to the contested dectston show that the Commission noted 
that BT, as  a statutory corporation, was an economic entity carrying on activities 
of an economic nature and was,  as  s~c~, an undertaking within the  meaning of 
Article  86  of the  Tr~aty. ~e  Commtsston_ further noted that, whilst it  accepted 
BT's  argument that tnternattonal  cooperation and compliance with  international 
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commitments were essential  to the  efficient provision of international communi-
cation  services,  such  cooperation  could  not  go  so  far  as  to  authorize  an 
infringement of the competition rules under the Treaty. 
49  The statement of reasons satisfies  the requirements of Article  190 of the Treaty, 
inasmuch  as  it enables  the  Court to  exercise  its  power of review  and  makes  it 
possible for the parties concerned effectively to convey their point of view on the 
correctness and the relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged. 
so  In the  circumstances,  the submission  that the statement of reasons is  inadequate 
must be rejected. 
st  It follows  from  all  the foregoing considerations that the application of the Italian 
Republic must be dismissed. 
Costs 
s2  Under Article  69  (2)  of the  Rules  of Procedure the  unsuccessful  party is  to  be 
ordered to pay the costs. Since the Italian Republic has failed  in  its submissions, it 
must be ordered to pay the costs. 
On those grounds, 
THE COURT 
hereby: 
( 1)  Dismisses the applic~tion; 
(2)  Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs. 
Mackenzie  Stuart  Bosco  Due  Kakouris 
Koopmans  Everling  Bahlmann  Galmot  Joliet 
Delivered in open court it?  Luxembourg on 20 March 1985. 
P.  Heim  A. J.  Mackenzie Stuart 
Registrar  President 
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Centre beige d'etudes demarche- Telemarketing (CBEM) SA 
v 
Compagnie luxembourgeoise de telediffusion SA 
and Information publicite Benelux SA 
(reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Tribunal de commerce, Brussels) 
'Dominant position - Telemarketing' 
Summary 
1.  Competition - Dominant position - Position  resulting from provisions laid down by law 
-Application of  Article 86 of  the  Treaty 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 86) 
2.  Competition  - Dominant position  _,..  Abuse  - Case  where  an  undertaking  holding  a 
dominant position reserves to  itself  an activity which might be carried out by another under-
taki~g 
(EEC Treaty,  Art. 86) 
1.  Article  86  of the  EEC Treaty applies  to 
an  undertaking  holding  a  dominant 
position  on  a  particular  market,  even 
where  that  position  is  due  not  to  the 
activity  of the  undertaking  itself  but  to 
the fact that by reason of provisions  laid 
down by law there can be no competition 
or only very limited  competition on that 
market. 
2.  An  abuse  within  the  meaning  of Article 
86  is  committed  where,  without  any 
objective  necessity,  an  . ~ndenaking 
holding  a  dominant  positiOn  on  a 
particular market reserves  to  itself or to 
an  undertaking  belonging  to  the  same 
group  an  ancillary  activity which  might 
be  carried out by another undertaking as 
part  of  its  activities  on  a  neighbouring 
but separate  market,  with  the  possibility 
of eliminating all  competition from  such 
undertaking. 
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 
3 October 198 5 * 
..... 
In Case 311/84 
REFERENCE to the Coun under Article  177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tribunal 
de  commerce  [Commercial  Coun],  Brussels,  for  a  preliminary  ruling  in  the 
proceedings pending before that court between 
Centre beige d'etudes demarche- Telemarketing (CBEM) SA 
and 
Compagnie luxembourgeoise de telediffusion SA, 
Information publicite Benelux SA 
on the interpretation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 
composed  of:  Lord  Mackenzie  Stu  an,  President,  0.  Due,  C.  Kakouris,  U. 
Everling and Y.  Galmot, Judges, 
Advocate General: C. 0. Lenz 
Registrar: P.  Heim 
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: 
Centre beige  d'etudes de  marche - Telemarketing SA,  the  plaintiff in  the  main 
proceedings, by W. Pissoort of the Brussels Bar, 
Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  de  telediffusion  SA,  the  first  defendant,  by  Mr 
Kirschen and Mr Huisman of the Brussels Bar, 
Information  publicite  Benelux  SA,  the  second  defendant,  by Mr Colinet  of the 
Brussels Bar, 
•  Language of the Case: French. 
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the Commission of the European Communities, by its Legal Adviser, N. Coutrelis, 
after  hearing  the  Opinion  of the  Advocate  General  delivered  at the  sttttng  on 
11 July 1985, 
..  . 
gives the following 
JUDGMENT 
(The account of the facts and issues which is  contained in the complete text of the 
judgment is  not reproduced)  __ 
Decision 
By  an  order  of  21  December  1984,  which  was  received  at  the  Coun  on  27 
December 1984, the Vice-President of the Tribunal de commerce, Brussels, sitting 
on behalf of the President of the Tribunal in  proceedings for an interim injunction, 
referred to the Coun for a preliminary ruling under Anicle 177 of the EEC Treaty 
two questions on the in~erpretation of Article 86 of the Treaty. · 
Those questions were raised  in  proceedings brought by the Centre beige d'  etudes 
de marche - Telemarketing SA  (hereinafter referred to as  'Centre beige')  against 
the  Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  de  telediffusion  SA  (~ereinafter referred  to  as 
'Compagnie luxembourgeoise'), which runs the RTL television station, and against 
Information  publicite  Benelux  SA  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'Information 
publicite'), which  is  RTL's exclusive  agent for television  advertising aimed  at the 
Benelux countries. In its  action Centre beige  is  claiming an injunction restraining 
the Compagnie luxembourgeoise and Information publicite from refusing to sell  it 
television  time  on  the  RTL  station  for  telephone  marketing  operations  using  a 
telephone number other than that of Information publicite. 
It  appears  from  the  documents  before  the Court that Centre beige  is  a  trading 
company which, since  1978, has been studying the technique known as  'tele-sales' 
or 'telemarketing', whereby an advertiser places in one of the media, in the present 
case  television,  an  advertisement  carrying  a  telephone  number  which  those  at 
whom  the  advertisement  is  aimed  may call  either to  obtain  information  on  the 
product offered or to respond to the advertising campaign iri some other way. 
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4  Centre  beige  organized  its  first  telemarketing  operation  on  the  RTL  television 
station in  1982. In 1983  it concluded an agreement with Information publicite for 
a  period of 12  months which gave it the exclusive right to conduct telemarketing 
operations  qn  the  RTL  ~tati_on  aimed. at  the  Benelux  market.  The  telephone 
number shown·· to· television ·viewers  was 'that of Centre  beige,  which  made  its· 
telephone  lines  and  team  of  telephonists  available  to  advertisers  and  to  the 
television station. 
5 
6 
7 
On  the  expiry  of that  agreement  Information  publicite  notified  advertisers  that 
from  April  1984  RTL  would  no  longer  accept  advertising  'spots'  involving  an 
invitation  to make a  telephone call  unless  the telephone number used  in  Belgiun1 
was  that  of Information  publicite.  It was  against  that  notice  that  Centre  beige 
brought an  action  for  an  injunction  before the Tribunal de  commerce,  claiming 
inter alia that it constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86 of the EEC' T reary. 
In  its  order for reference  the Vice-President of the Tribunal de commerce states 
that  Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  and  its  subsidiary, . Information  pub  licit(~, 
dominate the rnarket in  television advertising aimed at viewers in  French-speaking 
Belgium by reason of the fact that in  Belgium itself there is  as  yet no commercial 
advertising  on  national  television  stations  and  the  advertising  of other  French-
language stations which can be received jn  Belgium is  aimed only rarely or not at 
all  at  .the  Belgian  public.  However,  the  Vice-President  of  the  Tribunal  de 
commerce  raises  the  question  whether the  two  undertakings  occupy a  dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 86  of the Treaty, since under the relevant 
treaties and laws Compagnie luxembourgeoise has a legal monopoly in the market 
and there is  no real freedom of estabtishment. 
As  regards telemarketing activities, the Vice-President comes, after considering the 
forms of agreement which Centre beige entered into and the conduct of the parties 
in the main action, to the conclusion that, if Centre beige is  engaged in an activity 
ancillary to  advertising, it  must be regarded as  operating on behalf of advertisers 
rather  than  on  behalf of the  broadcaster.  Telemarketing  constitutes  a  separate 
market from that of television advertising and one which is  extremely open and in 
which extensive competition is  possible. If Compagnie luxembourgeoise and Infor-
mation  publicite  do  occupy  a  dominant  position  in  the  television  advertising 
market  for  the  purposes  of Article  86,  the  question  then  arises  whether  their 
conduct amounts to an abuse of that position. 
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1  s  In those circumstances the Vice-President of the Tribunal de commerce stayed the 
r  proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court for a  preliminary 
~  ruling:  . 
t 
1 
r 
) 
f 
'(I)'. The interpretation of the concept-of. a dominant po~ition 
Is  there  a  dominant position within the meaning of Article  86  of the EEC 
Treaty where  an  undenaking  enjoys  a  legal  monopoly  for  the  supply  of 
certain goods or services and where, ·as a result, competition in the supply of 
those goods or services is  excluded? Does the concept of a dominant position 
imply  a  real  possibility  of  competition  suppressed  or  extinguished  by  the 
action of the party which occupies the dominant position or may it apply in  a 
context in which such competition cannot exist or is,  in any event, extremely 
limited? 
(2)  Interpretation of the concept of abuse of a dominant position 
Where, in  the situation envisaged in  the first question, it  is  accepted that the 
undertaking in  question occupies a  dominant position within the meaning of 
Article  86  of  the  Treaty,  must  the  conduct  of  such  an  undertaking  be 
interpreted  as  constituting  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  where  that 
conduct consists in  reserving for itself or for a subsidiary- under its control, to 
the exclusion of any other undertaking, an ancillary activity which could be 
carried out by a third undertaking as part of its activities?' 
9  It must be observed at the outset that several of the arguments put to the Court by 
the  parties  to  the  main  proceedings  and  by the  Commission  relate  to  problems 
whicli are not covered by the above questions. They include arguments relating to 
the financial  and commercial relations  between Compagnie luxembourgeoise and 
Information publicite, the nature and geographical extent of the market or markets 
in  issue, the position in  law and in fact of Compagnie luxembourgeoise and Infor-
mation  publicite  on  those  markets,  the  question  whether  the  conduct  of  the 
companies  has  any effect on trade between  Member States  and  the  reasons  for 
requiring  that  the  telephone  number  of  Information  publicite  be  used  in  any 
telemarketing transactions involving the RTL station. 
to  In that regard it must be emphasized that, by virtue of the division of jurisdiction 
provided for by Article 177 in preliminary-ruling proceedings, it is  for the national 
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court alone to assess the relevance of such arguments and to make a fresh  request 
to the Court if  it considers that it  is  necessary to obtain a  further ruling on the 
interpretation  of  Community  law  for  the  purpose  of giving  its  judgment.  The 
Court need not therefore consider those a~guments. 
First question 
''  In substance the first question asks whether Article 86 of the Treaty applies to an 
undertaking  holding  a  dominant  position  on  a  particular  market  where  that 
position is  due not to the actiyities of the undertaking itself but to the fact that by 
reason of provisions  laid  down by law there can be no competition or only very 
limited competition on the market. 
12  The Centre beige proposes that the Court should answer that question in the affir-
mative.  It maintains that, according to the case-law of the Court, an  undertaking 
holding a monopoly in  a particular service has a dominant position on the market 
in  that service within the meaning of Article 86  and that that article applies  to the 
conduct of broadcasting organizations.  Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  cannot  rely 
on the proviso in Article 90  (2), since it is  not an undertaking 'entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest' for the purposes thereof. 
u  Compagnie luxembourgeoise states that the Court held, in its judgment of 30 April 
1974  in  Case  155/73 (Sacchi  [1974]  ECR 409),  that a  State may,  for  reasons  of 
public interest of a non-economic nature, remove radio and television broadcasting 
from  competition  by  conferring  a  monopoly on  an  undertaking.  Extending  the 
scope  of the  question  put  to  the  Court,  Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  proposes, 
therefore,  that  the  Court should  reply  that  it  is  not  as  such  incompatible  with 
Article 86 of the Treaty for an undertaking to which a State has granted exclusive 
rights within the meaning of Article 90 to enjoy a monopoly. 
14  Information  publicite  does  not agree  with  the  abstract definition  of a  dominant 
position which in its opinion is  suggested by the question. It maintains that it is  not 
possible  to disregard the product or service  at issue  or the extent of the  relevant 
market.  Further, to fall  within the provisions of Article  86  the dominant position 
must affect trade between Member States and exist within a substantial part of the 
common  market.  Information publicite  therefore proposes  that the  Court should 
3274 • 
CBEM  v  CLT  AND  IPB 
reply that the existence of a  legal  monopoly does not in  itself entail a  dominant 
position within the meani~g  of Anicle 86. 
1s  In the Commission's view,  the notion of a  dominant position, as  defined by the 
Coun, refers  to a  factual situation independent of the reasons giving rise  to that 
situation. The question must therefore be answered in the affirmative. 
16  With regard to the first question, it must first of all be remembered that, according 
to the established case-law of the Coun, most recently confirmed by the judgment 
of 9  November 1983  in  Case 322/81 (Michelin v  Commission  (1983]  ECR 3461), 
an undertaking occupies a dominant position for the purposes of Article 86  where, 
it  enjoys  a  position  of economic strength which  enables  it  to  hinder the  main-
tenance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to 
an  appreciable  extent  independently  of  its  competitors  and  customers  and 
ultimately of consumers. The fact that the absence of competition or its  restriction 
on the relevant market is  brought about or encouraged by prpvisions laid down by 
law in  no way precludes the application of Article 86, as  the Court has  held,  inter 
alia,  in  its  judgments  of  13  November  1975  in  Case  26/75  (General  Motors  v 
Commission  [1975]  ECR 1367),  16  November 1977 in Case 13/77 (/nno v ATAB 
[ 1977]  ECR 2115)  and most  recently in  its  judgment of 20  March  1985  in  Ca~c 
41/83 (Italy v  Commission [1985] ECR 880). 
11  Although it is  true, as  Compagnie luxembourgeoise has pointed out, that it is  not 
incompatible  with Anicle  86  for  an  undertaking  to  which  a  Member State  has 
granted exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90 of the Treaty to enjoy a 
monopoly, it is  none the less app-arent from the same article that such undertakings 
remain subject to the Treaty rules on competition and in particular those contained 
in  Article  86.  In its  aforesaid  judgment of 30  April  197  4  in  the  Sacchi  case,  the 
Court  also  stressed  that,  if  certain  Member States  treat  undertakings  entrusted 
with the operation of television, even as  regards their commercial activities and in 
particular advertising,  as  undertakings entrusted with the operation of services  of 
general  economic interest,  the  prohibitions  of Article  86  apply,  as  regards  their 
behaviour within the  marke~, by reason of Article 90 (2), so long as  it is  not shown 
that the said prohibitions are incompatible with the performance of their tasks. 
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ts  The reply to the first question must therefore be that Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
·must be interpreted as  applying to an undertaking holding a dominant position on 
a  particular market,  even where that position  is  due not to the  activities  of the 
undertaking itself but to the fact that by reason of provisions  laid down by law 
there can be no competition or only very lintited compet~tion on that market. 
Second question 
t9  The second question asks whether an undertaking holding a dominant position on 
a  particular market,  by reserving  to itself or to  an  undertaking belonging to the 
same group, to the exclusion of any other undertaking, an ancillary activity which 
could  be  carried  out  by  another  undertaking  as  part  of  its  activities  on  a 
neighbouring but separate market, abuses its dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 86. 
20  Centre  beige  considers  that  such  conduct  constitutes  an  abuse  under  several 
provisions of Article 86. Where a television station subjects the sale of broadcasting 
time  for  any  telemarketing operation  to the  use  of the  telephone  number of an 
exclusive advertising agent belonging to the same group, such conduct amounts to 
a  refusal of sale to other telemarketing undertakings. As  regards advertisers, such 
conduct amounts to the imposition of an associated service  and the limitation of 
markets  prohibited by Article  86  (d) and (b).  Ultimately  it  enables  the  agent to 
impose on advertisers unfair prices COJ:!.trary to Article 86 (a). 
21  Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  and  Information  publicite  maintain  that,  where  an 
undertaking to which a State has granted exclusive rights and which thus occupies 
a  dominant position reserves to itself or to a  company with which it has common 
interests ancillary activities which could be carried out by another undertaking, this 
does  not in  itself  amount to  an  abuse  of a  dominant position. The undertaking 
which occupies the dominant position must in addition use it to obtain advantages 
which it could not obtain if there were effective competition and its conduct must 
be  likely  to  harm consumers,  for example,  by the imposition of unfair prices or 
conditions.  * 
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Compagnie  luxembourgeoise  maintains  that  the  decision  no  longer  to  use  the 
services of Centre beige and its  telephonists cannot be regarded as  an abuse when 
it  is  due  to  the  laws  of trade;  nor can  the  requirement that advertisers,  in  any 
'tele-answer' operation conducted by RTL, should use only the telephone number 
of RTL's exclusive agent amount to an abuse when it is  inspired by the close links 
between  the  two  services  supplied  and  is  necessary  in ·practice  to  preserve  the 
television  s~ation's image  . 
.  • 
The Commission infers from the judgment of the Court of 6 March 197  4 in ] oined 
Cases 6 and 7/73 (Commercial =solvents and Others v Commission [  197  4]  ECR 223) 
that there is  an abuse of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 86 where 
an undertaking which occupies a dominant position on a market and which is  thus 
able  to  control  the  activities  of other  undertakings  on  a  neighbouring  market 
decides to establish itself on the second market and for no good reason refuses to 
supply the product or service in question on the market where it already occupies a 
dominant position to the undertakings whose activities are centred on the market 
which it is penetrating. 
Even  if the conduct in issue  in  the ma·in  proceedings were to be  regarded not as  a 
refusal to supply but as  the imposition of a contractual condition, it would, in  the 
Commission's  view,  be  contrary to  Article  86.  First,  Information  publicite,  as  a 
seller  of  television  time,  imposes  on  all  other  undertakings  for  telemarketing 
operations a condition which it does ·not impose on itself for the same operations, 
namely the  condition that it  must not use  its  own telephone·  number; that is  an 
unfair- trading  condition  within  the  meaning of Article  86  (a).  Secondly,  Infor-
mation  publicite  subjects· the  conclusion  of contracts  to  the  acceptance  of sup-
plementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of the contracts, 
and that is contrary to Article 86 (d). 
In  order to  answer the  national  court's second question,  reference  must  first  be 
made to the aforesaid judgment of 6 March 197  4 (Commercial Solvents),  in  which 
the Court held that an undertaking which holds a dominant position on a market 
in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving those materials for its own 
production of derivatives,  refuses  to supply a  customer who also  produces.  those 
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derivatives, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from that customer> 
is  abusing its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. 
26  That ruling also applies to the case of an undertaking holding a dominant position  t 
on  the  market  in  a  service  which  is  indispensable  for  the  activities  of another 
undertaking on another market.  If,  a.s  the  national court has  already held  in  its 
order for reference, telemarketing activities constitute a  separate market from that 
of the chosen advertising medium, although closely associated with it, and if those 
activities mainly consist in making available to advertisers the telephone lines  and 
team of telephonists of the t~lemarketing undertaking, to subject the sale of broad-
casting  time  to  the  condition  that.  the  telephone  lines  of  an  advertising  agent 
belonging to the same group as  the television station should be  used  amounts  in 
practice  to  a  refusal  to  supply  the  services  of  that  station  to  any  other 
telemarketing undertaking. If,  further,  that refusal is  not justified by technical or 
commercial requirements relating to the nature of the television, but is  intended to 
reserve  to  the  agent any  telemarketing  operation  broadcast by  the  said  station, 
with the possibility of eliminating all  competition from another undertaking, such 
conduct  amounts  to  an  abuse  prohibited  by Article  86,  provided  that the  other 
conditions of that article are satisfied. 
21  It must therefore be held in answer to the second question that an abuse within the 
meaning  of Article  86  is  committed  where,  without  any objective  necessity,  an 
undertaking holding a  dominant position on a  particular market reserves  to itself 
or  to  an  undertaking  belonging  to  the  same  group 'an  ancillary  activity  which 
might  be  carried  out  by  another  undertaking  as  part  of  its  activities  on  a 
neighbouring  but  separate  market,  with  the  possibility  of  eliminating  all 
competition from such undertaking. 
Costs 
2s  The costs incurred by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and by 
the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted observations 
to the Court, are not recoverable. As  these proceedings are, in so far as  the parties 
to the main proceedings are concerned, in the nature of a step in  the proceedings 
pending before the national court, the decision on costs is  a matter for that court. 
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On those grounds, 
THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), 
in  answer to the questions referred to it by the Vice-Pres.ident of the Tribunal de 
commerce, Brussels, by order of 21  December 1984, hereby rules: 
(1)  Article  86  of the  EEC Treaty must be interpreted as  applying  to an under-
taking holding  a  dominant position on a  particular market, even where  that 
position is  due not to the activity of the undertaking itself but to the fact that 
by reason of provisions laid down by law there can be no competition or only 
very limited competition on :that market. 
(2)  An abuse  within  the meaning of Article  86  is  committed where,  without  any 
objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular 
market reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same group an 
ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as  part of 
its  activities  on  a  neighbouring  but  separate  market,  with  the  possibility  of 
eliminating all competition from such undertaking. 
Mackenzie Stuart  Due 
Kakouris  Everling  Galmot 
Delivered in  open court in Luxembourg on 3 October 1985. 
P.  Heim  - A. ]. Mackenzie Stuart 
Registrar  President 
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Summary of the Judgment 
1.  Preliminary questions -Jurisdiction of  the  Court- Extension of  the  subject-matter of  the 
question  submitted for a preliminary  ruling  in disregard of  the jurisdiction of  the  national 
court - Not permissible 
(  EEC Treaty,  Art. 177) 
Z.  Competition -Agreements, decisions  and concerted practices - Dominant position - Effect 
on trade between Member States- Condition for the application of  Community rules 
(EEC Treaty,  Arts 85 and 86) 
3.  Competition - Dominant position - Concept 
~::.·:~  ~  (EEC Treaty,  Art. 86) 
4.  Competition - Dominant position -Relevant market- Determination - Supply  of tele-
phone installations by authorized undertakings under a State monopoly-Domestic market 
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5.  Competition- Dominant  position -Existence-Large  market  share -Insuffici 
evidence 
(EEC Treaty, Art.  86) 
1.  The Court cannot,  whether it be  at the 
request  of  a  party  to  the  main 
proceedings  or  at  the  request  of  an 
institution which has exercised its right to 
submit observations,  extend  the  subject-
matter of a  question referred to it for a. 
preliminary ruling  where  it appears  that 
that extension was expressly sought by a 
party before  the  national  court and  was 
refused. 
2~  The  interpretation  of the  condition  that 
trade  between  Member  States  must  be 
affected,  which  is  set  out  in  Articles  85 
and  86  of the Treaty, must be based  on 
its  purpose,  which  is  to  determine  the 
scope  of  application  of  Community 
competition law.  Community law applies 
to any agreement,  decision or concerted 
practice  which  may  influence,  directly 
or  indirectly,  actually  or  potentially, 
patterns  of  trade  between  the  Member 
States  and  thereby  hinder  the  economic 
interpenetration  intended  by  the  Treaty 
by partitioning the market. 
3.  The  dominant  posltlon  referred  to  in 
Article  86  is  a  position  of  economic 
strength  enjoyed  by  an  undertaking 
which  enables  it  to  hinder  the  main-
tenance  of effective  competition  on  the 
relevant market by allowing  it  to behave 
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4.  Contractual practices, even  abusive ones) 
on the part of an undertaking supplying·f 
telephone installations which  has  a  large.( 
share of a  regional market in  a  Member  1 
State do not fall· within the prohibition in·. 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty where that: 
undertaking does not occupy a dominant' 
position  on  the  domestic  market  in: 
telephone  installations. Only that  market~ 
may  be  taken  into  consideration  in  that:: 
sector since it is  only at that level that the~ 
conditions of competition are sufficiently;l 
homogeneous, in view of the existence of~ 
a  telecommunications.  monol?oly  which"J 
means that telephone mstallattons can be ·l 
supplied only by the postal and telecom-t 
munications  authorities  or  by  private I 
installers  to  whom  those  authorities! 
delegate  in  part  the  exercise  of  the :f. 
monopoly,  by  means  of  authorizations t 
valid throughout the country.  1 
j 
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5.  While the fact that an undertaking holds ·l 
a  very  large  market  share  may  be  : 
important evidence of the existence of a j 
dominant  position,  that  factor,  taken ~ 
separately,  is  not necessarily decisive  but :i 
must  be  taken  into  consideration ; 
together with other factors. 
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber) 
5 October 1988 * 
In  Case 247/86 
REFERENCE to the Court under Article  177  of the EEC Treaty by the tribunal 
de  grande· instance  (Regional Court), Strasbourg, for a  preliminary ruling  in  the 
proceedings pending before that court between 
Societe alsacienne et lorraine de  telecommunications et d'electronique  (Alsatel) 
and 
SA  Novasam, 
on  the interpretation of Article  86  of the  EEC Treaty, 
THE COURT (Sixth Chamber) 
composed  of:  0.  Due,  President  of  Chamber,  G.  C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias,  T. 
Koopmans,  K.  Bahlmann and C.  N.  Kakouris, Judges, 
Advocate General: G.  F.  Mancini 
Registrar:  B.  Pastor, Administrator 
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of 
Alsatel,  the  plaintiff in  the main proceedings, by M. Meyer, 
SA  Novasam, the defendant in  the main proceedings, by L.  Anstett-Gardea, 
the  Commission of the  European Communities,  by its  Legal  Adviser  C.  Durand 
and  by  N. Coutrelis, 
..  -language of the Case: French . 
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having  regard  to  the  Repon  for  the  Hearing  and  further  to  the  hearing  on 
17  November 1987, 
after  hearing  the  Opinion  of the  Advocate  General  delivered  at  the  Sltttng  on 
31  May 1988, 
gives  the following: 
Judgment 
By  a judgment of 17  September 1986, as explained and supplemented by a decision 
of  10  December  1986,  which  were  received  at the  Court on 2  October and  29 
December respectively, the tribunal de grande instance, Strasbourg, referred to the 
Coun for a preliminary ruling under Anicle 177 of the EEC Treaty a question on 
the interpretation of Ani  de 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
That  question  arose  in  a  dispute  between  Alsatel,  the  plaintiff  in  the  main 
proceedings, and Novasam, a temporary employment agency, the defendant in  the 
main  proceedings,  concerning  Alsatel's  claim  for  compensation  amounting  to 
three-quarters of the annual  payments outstanding under three  contracts  for the 
rental  and  maintenance  of telephone  installations  that  were  terminated  by  the 
defendant.  The  installations  in  question,  each  of  which  comprises  several  tele-
phones, are 'complex' installations. 
3  It is  apparent from  the order for reference that the  contracts for the rental  and 
maintenance of telephone equipment which the plaintiff offers  to subscribers  are 
concluded for an initial duration of 15  years, but are to be renewed for a  further ; 
term of 15  years if,  as  a result of one or more modifications to the installation, the 
initial rental  ~s increased by 25°/o  or more. 
According  to  the  national  court,  the  contract binds  the  customer to  deal  exclu-
sively  with  Alsatel  for  any changes,  moves,  extensions,  putting  lines  into  service 
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an~, in general, any modifications of the installation. That obligation in  practice 
prohibits customers from dealing with another supplier of equipment throughout 
the  duration  of  the  contract.  Any  modifications  to  the  installation  entail 
supplements to the contract,. for which the price  is  not determined and  ~ay, in 
view of the exclusive-dealing clause imposed on customers, be fixed unilaterally by 
the plaintiff. 
The  defendant  contended  that  the  contracts  which  had  been  terminated  were 
contrary to  the  competition  rules  of the  EEC Treaty,  whereupon  the  national 
court decided  to  stay  the:·proceedings  and. referred  to  the  Coun the  following 
question for a preliminary ruling: 
'In view of Alsatel's  major share of the regional market, are the contracts drawn 
up by it evidence of its  abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Artick 
86 of the EEC Treaty?' 
Reference is  ntade  to the  Report for the Hearing for a  fuller account of the  fat·i  '-~ 
of the  case,  the  course  of the  procedure  and  the  observations  submitted  to  the 
Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in  so far as  is  necessary 
for the reasoning of the Court. 
In view of the fact that the Commission and the defendant have asked the Cou n 
to consider the problems raised not o"nly  from the point of view of Article  86 ·of 
the Treaty, which  is  the only article  referred to in  the  national court's question. 
but also from the point of view of Article 85  of the Treaty, it must be pointed out 
at once that this course of action is  not open to the Court. 
It is  apparent from  the documents before the Court that in  this  case  the nationJI 
coun,  which  alone  is  competent under the  system  established  by Article  177  to 
assess  the relevance of questions concerning the interpretation of Community b w 
in  order· to resolve the dispute before it,  has refused by implication, inasmuch as  it 
has  referred only to Article 86  in  its  question, to seek from the Court a ruling on 
the interpretation of Article  85  of the Treaty, notwithstanding an  express  requc~t 
to that effect made by the defendant during the main proceedings. 
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9  In order to answer t.he  question submitted, it must be borne in  mind in  the first 
place  that Article  86  of the Treaty prohibits  any abuse  of a  dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it in so far as  it may affect 
trade between Member States. According to the defendant. and the Commission, 
the clauses concerning duration and rental imposed by the plaintiff in  the contracts 
which it concludes constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 
10  Although the obligation imposed on customers to deal exclusively with the installer 
as regards any modification of the installation may be justified by the fact that the 
equipment  remains  the  property  of  the  installer,  the  fact  that  the  price  of the 
supplements to the contract entailed by those modifications is  not determined but 
is  unilaterally fixed by the installer and the automatic renewal of the contract for a 
15-year term  if  as  a  result of those modifications the rental  is  increased by more 
than 25°/o  may constitute unfair trading conditions prohibited as  abusive  practices 
by Article 86 of the Treaty if all the conditions for the application of that provision 
are met. 
11  ~fhe  first  condition  for  the  application  of  that  provision  is  that  trade  between 
Member States must be affected. The interpretation of that condition, which is  set 
out in  Articles 85  and 86  of the Treaty, must be based on its  purpose, which  is  to 
determine  the  scope  of application  of Community competition  law.  Community 
law applies to any agreetnent, decision or concerted practice which rnay influence, 
directly  or  indirectly,  actually  or  potentially,  patterns  of  trade  between  the 
Member States and thereby hinder the economic iiuerpenetration intended by the 
Treaty. That condition would be satisfied, in  particular, if the contractual clauses 
referred to above had the effect of restricting imports of telephone equipment from 
other  Member  States,  thereby  partitioning  the  market.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
documents before the  Court which suggests that such is  the case.  However, it  is· 
for the national court to make the necessary findings of fact in that regard. 
12  The second condition  laid  down  by Article  86  is  that there  must be  a  dominant 
position within the common market or in  a  substantial part of it.  The Court has 
defined such a dominant position (see the judgment of 9  November 1983  in  Case 
322/81  Michelin  v  Commission  [1983]  ECR  3461)  as  a  position  _of  economic 
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strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance ,  )f 
effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appre-
ciable extent independently of its competitors and customers. 
In  order to ascertain whether a dominant position of that kind exists in  a case such 
as  this,  it  is  necessary to  assess  the  economic  strength  of  the  undertaking  in 
question on the relevant market, that market to be defined from the point of vie\v 
of both the activities concerned and its geographical extent. 
For  those  purposes,  it  is  necessary  to  take  account of the  following  facts  to  be 
found  in  the documents before the Court: the contratts which  have  given  rise  to 
the main proceedings are concerned with the rental and maintenance of telephon<: 
installations;  because  of the  telecommunications  monopoly  in  France,  telephone 
installations  may  be  provided  only  by  the  postal  and  telecommunications  auth-
orities  or  by  private  installers  such  as  Alsatel  to  whom  the  exercise  of  the 
monopoly  is  in  part delegated;  those  private  installers  must  be  approved  by  the 
authorities; finally,  the authorizations granted are valid throughout the country. 
It follows that the framework within which the conditions of competition are suffi 
ciently  homogeneous  to  enable  the  economic  strength  of  the  undertaking  in 
.  question to be assessed  is  the market in telephone installations throughout France. 
The  Commission  has  none  the  less  argued  that within  the  market  in  telephone 
installations  as  a  whole  it  is  possible  to  identify,  from  the  point of view  of the 
activities  concerned,  a  market  in  the  rental  and  maintenance  of  telephone 
equipment,  and  that  on  that  market  competition  between  installers  operates 
primarily at the local  and regional level,  particularly in view of the importance uf 
the  maintenance  factor.  It is  therefore on that geographical sub-market that the 
position of installers should be  assessed in order to ascertain whether or not they 
occupy  a  dominant  position  on  the  market  for  the  rental  and  maintenance  of , 
telephone installations. 
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11  In\  ascertaining whether the economic strength of an undertaking is  sufficient t 
enable  it to hinder the' maintenance  of effective  competition  it is.  impossible  t' 
isolate  the· rental  and  maintenance  market  as  the  relevant  market  when  it  i  ·, 
· apparent that users have a choice between a rental and maintenance contract an<. 
the .purchase .of the same equipment. The Commission's argument that those tw( 
possibilities  ar~ not interchangeable, which is  baseo on the point of view solely 0  • 
users who have  already opted for a  rental and maintenance contract, cannot bt 
accepted. 
18  There  is  nothing  in  the  documents  before  ..  the  Court  which  suggests  that  the 
plaintiff enjoys  a .  dominant position  throughout France.  The only fact  which  is 
referred  to  in  the  order  for  reference  with  regard  to  the  plaintiff's  economtc 
strength is  the large share it holds of -the regional market. 
.  19  A fir:tding  of that kind  is  insufficient to establish that the undertaking in  question 
occupies  a  dominant position. In the  first. place,  the  Court has  con§istently  held 
that while the fact that an undertaking holds a very large market share may indeed 
be  important evidence of the existence of a  dominant position, that factor,  taken 
separately, is  not necessarily decis~ve but must be taken into consideration together 
with  other  factors  (see  the  judgment  of  13  Feb"ruary  1979  in  Case  85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [  1979]" ECR 461 ).  Secondly, it is  apparent from  _..,. 
the foregoing that i~ circumstances such as  tho$e of the present case the economic 
strength of an undertaking can be assessed only in the geographical context of the 
national territory as a whole. 
20  If the large· share of the· regional market held by the plaintiff was the result of an 
agreement  between  ~uthorized installers  to  share  out regional  markets  between 
them, such an agreement ought to be caught by Article 8  5 of the Treaty.· It is  only 
if such .an  allocation  of markets  were  carried out by a  number of undertakings 
belonging to the same group that Article 86  could be applicable, as  the Court has 
consistently held (see the judgments of 8 June 1971  in Case 78/70 Deutsche Gram-
mophon v Metro (1971] ECR 487, and of 16 December 1975 in Joined Cases 40  to 
48,  50,  54  to  56,  111,  113  and  114/73  Suiker  Unie  v  Commission  [1975]  ECR 
1663). 
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However, the Commission has sugge.sted that the Court should coQsider whether 
par.allel  behaviour on the part of several independent undertakings, in particular 
·  with regard to prices and. trading conditions, which does not leave their customers 
any possibility of negotiating the terms of the contracts to be concluded may place 
those undertakings collectively in a dominant position· coming within  th~ scope of 
Article 86 of the Treaty.  ·  .  .  ·  i 
22  The Court cannot consider that possibility when it  is  unconnected with the facts 
before the national court and is  based solely on information in the Commission's 
possession  which,  on  its  own  admission,  is  not  sufficiently  precise.  If  the 
Commission considers that there is  evidence of the existence of practices that are 
contrary to  the  competition  rules  in  the Treaty,  it  must  exercise  the  powers  of 
investigation which it has in order to ensure the application of those rules. 
The answer to the question submitted by the  nation~! court must therefo're be that  .. 
contractual practices, even 'if abusive ones, on the part of an undertaking supplying 
telephone installations which has a  large share of a  regional market in  a  Member 
State do not fall within the  pro~ibition in Article 86 of the EEC Treaty where that 
undertaking does not occupy a  dominant position on the relevant market, in  this 
case the domestic market in telephone installations. 
Costs 
The  ~osts incurred by the Commission of the European Communities, which has 
~ubmitted qbservations to the Court, are not recoverable. As  these proceedings are, 
tn so far as  the parties- to the main ·proceedings are concerned, in  the nature of a 
step  in  the  action  pending before  the  national  court,  the  decision  on costs  is  a 
matter for that court. 
/11/39 
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On those grounds, 
THE COURT (Sixth Chamber}, 
in  answer  to  the  question  referred  to  it  by  the.  tribunal  de  grande  instan 
Strasbourg, by judgment of 17 September 1986, as  efCplained  and supplemented b . 
the decision of 10  December 1986,  hereby rules:  :  I 
t 
Article  86  of the  EEC  Treaty must  be  interpreted as  meaning  that  contractuaL 
practices, even if abusive ones,  on the part of an undertaking supplying  telephond 
installations which has a large share of a regional market in a Member State do not 
faD  within the prohibition in that article where that undertaking does not occupy ~ 
dominant  position  on  the  relevant  market,  in  this  casf!  the  domestic  market  h{ 
telephone installations.  1 
;t· 
Due  Rodriguez  Iglesias 
Koopmans  Bahlmann 
'  l 
Kakouris 
Delivered in  open court in  Luxembourg on 5  October 1988. 
].-G. Giraud  0. Due 
Registrar  President of the Sixth Chamb~r 
6012 Case C-18/88 
Regie des  telegraphes  et des  telepho-nes 
v 
GB-Inno-BM  SA 
(Reference for a  preliminary ruling 
from the T ribun~_l de Commerce de Bruxelles) 
(Free  rnovement of goods - Competition -
Type-approval of telephone equipment) 
Report for the Hearing  ...............................................................................................  I - 5943 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 15  March 1989  ..........  I - 5957 
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 13  December 1991  ..............................  I- 5973 
Summary of the Judgment 
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I.  Competition - Public undertakings and undertakings to  which Member  States grant special 
or exclusive rights- Undertaking  having a monopoly over operating  the public telecommu-
l'  nications  network - Sale,  on  a competitive  basis,  of  telephone  equipment-Power  to  Lay 
down  technical  standards  applicable  to  telephone  equipment  and  to  check  that  competing 
undertakings have complied with those standards - Not pennissible 
(  EEC  Treaty,  Arts  3(/),  86 and 90))  .. 
I - 5941 SUMMARY -CASE C-1~/88 
2.  Free  movement  of goods- Quantitative  restrictions-Measures  having  equivalent 
effect - Type-approval by a public  undertaking of telephone  equipment  not supplied by it 
and intended to  be connected to  the public network -Absence of  any right of  appeal to  the 
courts - Not pennissible  .. 
. (~EC !reaty, 1rt. 30)  .... 
1.  Articles  3(£),  86  and  90  ·of  the 
EEC Treaty  preclude  a  Member  State 
from  granting to the  undertaking which 
operates  the  public  telecommunications 
network  the  power  to  lay  down 
standards  for  telephone  equiP.ment  and 
to  check  that  the  economic  operators 
meet  those  standards  when  it  is  itself 
competing with  those  companies  on the 
market for that equipment. 
To  entrust  to  an  undertaking  which 
markets telephone equipment the task of 
drawing  up  specifications  for  such 
equipment,  of  monitoring  their 
application and granting type-appro,•al in 
respect  thereof  is  tantamount  to 
conferring  on it the  power to determine 
at  will  which  equipment  can  be 
connected to the public network and thus 
gives  it  an  obvious  advantage  over  its 
competitors  which  is  inimical  to  the 
equality  of  chances  of  traders,  without 
which  the  existence  of  an  undistoned 
system  of  compeuuon  cannot  be 
guaranteed. Such a restriction on compe-
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tition cannot be regarded as justified by a 
public  service  of  general  economic 
interest  within  the. meaning  of  Article 
90(2) of the Treaty. 
2.  Article  30  of  the  Treaty  precludes  a 
public undertaking from  being given  the 
power  to  approve  telephone  equipment 
which is  intended to be  connected to the 
public  network  and  which  it  has  not 
supplied  if  the  decisions  of that  under-
taking  cannot  be  challenged  before  the 
courts. 
Althoug~  overriding  requirements 
concermng  the  protection  of  users  as 
consumers of services  and the protection 
of  the  public  network  and  its  proper 
functioning  justify  the  existence  of  a 
procedure  for  type-approval  of the  said 
equipment, the absence of any possibility 
of  challenge  before  the  courts  could 
enable  the  authority  granting  type-
approval  to adopt an attitude which was 
arbitrary  or  systematically  unfavourable 
to imported equipment. 
l 
" ,._  .. 
GB-INNO-BM. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 
13  December 1991 * 
In Case C-18/88,  · 
.. 
REFERENCE to the Court under Article  177  of the  EEC Treaty by  the Vice-
President  of  the  Tribunal  de  Commerce  (Commercial  Court),  Brussels,  for  a 
preliminary ruling in  the proceedings pending before that court between: 
--
Regie  des  Telegraphes et des  Telephones (R1T) 
and 
GB-Inno-BM SA, 
on the  interpretation of Anicles  30  and 86 of the EEC Treaty,. 
THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), 
composed  of:  R.  Joliet,  President  of  the  Chamber,  Sir  Gordon  Slynn, 
].  C.  Moitinho de Almeida, G.  C.  Rodriguez Iglesias  and M~ Zuleeg, Judges, 
Advocate  General: M. Darmon, 
Registrar: B.  Pastor, Administrator, 
after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of: 
- Regie  des  Telegraphes  et Telephones,  by Eduard  Marissens,  ~f the  Brussels 
Bar, 
•  Language  of the case:  French. 
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- GB-lnno-BM SA, by Louis van Bunnen, of the Brussels Bar, 
- the  Commission of the European Communities, by Eric L.  White and  Edith 
Buissart, members of its Legal Service, acting as Agents, 
. ..  . . . . . .  .  .. .. .  :  .··  ..  .  ........  ,,.  . . .  .  ~  ..  .  ..  .  ·-
having regard to the Report for the Hearing, 
after hearing  the  oral  observations of the  Regie  des Telegraphes et Telephones, 
GB-Inno-BM SA  and  the Commission, at the hearing on 25  January 1989, 
after  hearing  the  Opinion  of the  Advocate  General  at the  sitting  on  15  March 
1989, 
gives  the following 
Judgment 
By  order of  11  January  1988,  which  was  received  at  the  Court on  18  January 
1988, the Vice-President of the Commercial Court, Brussels, referred to the Court 
for a  preliminary ruling under Article  177  of the EEC Treaty three questions on 
the interpretation of Articles 30  and 86  of the Treaty for the purpose of assessing 
the compatibility with  those provisions of national rules  giving  the public under-
taking which is  responsible, subject to the authority of the Minister, for the estab-
lishment and operation of the public telephone network and which sells  telephone 
equipment the power to grant type-approval to telephone equipment which it did 
not supply itself with a view to the connection of that equipment to the network. 
'Those questions were raised in  a dispute between the Regie des Telcgraphes et des 
Telephones  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'R'f'r')  and  the  company  GB-Inno-BM 
(hereinafter referred to· as  'GB'), which sells  in  its shops non-approved telephones 
for use  as  second telephones  to  be  connected to  an  existing  installation  at  price~ 
far lo·wer than those charged by the RT.'f for such equipment. 
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On the basis of Articles 54  and 55  of the ·taw on Comtncrcial  Practic~s of 14 .July 
1  ~71 (Moniteur Belge  of 30  July  1971),  which prohibits  all  acts  contrary to fair 
trading and which enables the President of the Commercial Court to order that 
such an act shall  cease,  the RTT has brought proceedings for an order that GB 
cease  selling  telephones,  largely  of  Far  Eastern  origin,  without  informing 
purchase.rs, by appropriate advertising:or any.other effec~iv~ means, that the tele=-
phories  are  not  approved.  The  RTf  claims  that,  by  selling  the  telephones  in 
question  without  informing  the  purchasers  that  they  are  not  approved,  GB  is 
encouraging the purchasers to connect-or have connected-the non-approved 
telephones to the network, which, it says, impairs the functioning of the network. 
In  its  defence in  those proceedings, GB argu·ed that since Articles 13, 91  and 93  of 
the  Ministerial  Order  of  20  September  1978  laying  down,  in  particular,  the 
conditions  governing  the  connection  of  telephones  (Moniteur  Beige  of 
29  September  1978,  p.  11166),  as  last  amended  on  24  September  1986,  which 
contain provisions governing the type-approval procedure, are illegal,  it would be 
improper to impose on a  trader the duty of pointing out that the telephones sold 
are  not approved,  and  to  prohibit him  from  selling them  without providing  that 
information. Furthennore GB  has lodged a counterclaim for a declaration that the 
RTT  has  infringed  Article  86  of the  Treaty.  GB  contends  that,  by bringing  the 
aforementioned  action,  the  result  of which  would  be  to  set  up  an  obstacle  to 
competition  from  retailers  of non-approved telephone equipment so  as  to favour 
the  sale  of its  own equipment or of equipment approved  by itself,  the RTf has 
abused its n1onopoly situation. 
It is  apparent frorn the.file that Article  l  of the Belgian Law of 13  October 1930l 
which  consolidates  the  various  legislative  provisions  governing  telegraph  and 
telephone communications, gives  the RTf a  monopoly over the establishment and 
operation of telegraph and telephone lines and offices for use by the public. 
Under the first paragraph of Article  13  of the Ministerial Order of 20  September 
1978, 'unless authorized by the RTf in writing, a subscriber shall not connect any 
wire, apparatus or object to the equipment which he is  permitted to use, nor open 
or  dismantle  the  equipment,  or  alter  in  any  way  the  position  or  use  of  the 
.  .  ) 
eq  utpment or Wires . 
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,  Article 91  of the said Ministerial Order provides that equipment connected to the 
circuits  made  available  to  the  public  upon  their  becoming  subscribers  must  be 
supplied or approved by the RTf. Under that same provision, it is  for the RTT to 
determine the disposition of subscriber's circuits and their technical characteristics  . 
. The technical specifications  adopte~ by the RTf under Article 91  are set out in a 
document  ~entitled 'Specificati6ns· No 'RN/SP 208\··t.he· editio·ri  currently· in  force··· 
being that of 21  April  1987. A copy of the said specifications, which are applicable 
to the second or third telephones connected up in  addition to the first  standard 
RTf telephone, is provided to any applicant for type-approval. 
s  It is  also apparent from the file that as regards the equipment sold by the RTf, the 
technical  specifications  to  be  complied  with  are  laid  down  in  the  General 
Conditions that it imposes on its  suppliers. Accordingly, that equipment does not 
have to be  subject to a specific type-approval procedure in  order to be  connected 
up to the public network.  · 
"  ·rhe file  also  shows. that as  regards telephones the RTT has  reserved  to itself the 
right to  supply  the  first  telephone  but has  abandoned,  during  recent years,  the 
exclusive  position  that  it  formerly  held  in  respect  of  additional  telephones. 
However,  Article  93  of the  aforementioned  Ministerial  Order of 20  September 
1978  also  provides  that the RTf may,  at any time,  reassert  the  right  to supply 
equipment  which  is  left  to  the  private  sector  and  may  thereupon  require  that 
equipment in  use be withdrawn from service. 
D  In  those circumstances the Vice-President of the Commercial Court, Brussels,  has 
stayed the proceedings pending a preliminary ruling on the following questions: 
' ( 1)  Interpretation of Article 30 of the Treaty: 
In  so  far as  the Regie des Telegraphes et Telephones (RTf), in  addition to 
operating the public network in Belgium, also sells  equipment intended to be 
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connected  to  the  network,  to  what extent  is  Article  13  of the  Ministerial 
Order of 20  September 1978 compatible with Article 30 of the Treaty where: 
·A.  it ··einpbwers the R:rr·  t<f decid.e·:whether ·~qtiipineni not ·supplied and·· sold 
by it is  to be approved for connection to the public network, and therefore 
leaves to the discretion of the R1T the establishing of the technical and 
administrative  criteria  that  such  equipment  must  meet  in  order  for  the 
R 1T to grant its approval? 
B.  although  the  R1T  is  a  competitor  on  the  Belgian  market  with  private 
sector  suppliers  and  importers  in  Belgium,  no  procedure  involving  the 
hearing of both parties would appear to exist as  regards the setting of the 
standards and as  regards ascertaining whether the equipment meets  tho.se 
standards, and no opportunity is  given to the subscriber or to the importer 
of the equipment in question to establish that during the procedure for the 
granting of the approval no arbitrary or discriminatory action was taken, 
and no appeal lies  against a decision taken by the RTf? 
(2)  To what extent does  the fact that the subscriber is  made liable  for the costs 
incurred by the R 1T by reason of an infringement of the first paragraph of 
Article  13  of the Ministerial Order in question, including the costs of seeking 
out  and  eliminating  any  interference  caused  by  a  non-authorized  piece  of 
equipment constitute a  measure equivalent to a  quantitative restriction where 
no procedure exists  for both parties  to be heard by an independent body to 
assess whether and to what extent a causal link exists and, therefore, a user or 
subscriber desiring to connect a  piece of equipment in such a  manner will  be 
inclined, so as to avoid any risk, to buy from the RTf itself? 
(3)  Interpretation of Article 86 of the Treaty: 
To what extent does the monopoly given to the R1T to grant authorizations 
for  connection  to  the  public  ne.twork  and  to  lay  down  the  detailed  rules 
governing the connection of equipment not SJ.lpplied  or sold by it, with the 
related  power for the RTf arbitrarily to determine the standards which the. 
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equipment must meet, constitute a practice prohibited by Article 86(b) and (c) 
of the Treaty?' 
.  ;  .. . . .. .  ..  ·~  ... 
11  Reference  is  made  to  the  Report  for  the  Hearing  for  a  fuller  account  of the 
relevant  Belgian  legislation,  the  facts  and  the  background  to  the  case,  the 
procedure  and  the  written  observations  submitted  to  the  Court,  which  are 
mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in  so far as  is  necessary for the reasoning 
of the Court. 
12  In its order for reference, the Commercial Court, Brussels, noted at the outset that 
neither  the  RTf's  legal  monopoly  over  the  public  network,  nor  the  fact  that 
telephone  installations  must  meet  certain  technical  requirements  in  order  to  be 
connected to the public network was in  question. It pointed out that Belgian legis-
lation leaves it  to the R·rr to dcterrnin<' the technical requirements that cquip1nent 
n1ust  satisfy  in  order to  be  connected  to the  network and  also  to assess  w hrthci 
those  requirerilen~s have  been  n1et.  It observed  that  that situation  bccanH.'  highly 
dcb~teable where the RT'r, which  itself sells  equipment intended to be  connected 
to the  network,  is  competing with the  company against which  it  has  brought an 
action on the ground that that company has sold telephones without informing the 
consumers  that  those  telephones  were  not  approved.  The  Commercial  Court 
considered  that it  needed  to  submit to the  Court questions  as  to the conformity 
with  the  1'reaty of provisions  that place  the  R'IT in  a  situation where  it  is·  both 
judge and party, on the grounds that if those provisions were to be  found  to  be 
illegal,  'any prohibition and any measure demanded on the basis  of them would 
constitute  an  unacceptable  distortion  of competition  and  an  abuse  of economic 
power by  means  of the  RTT's uncontested  monopoly over the  operation of the 
network'. 
t3  Although  the  national  court considered  the  question  of the  compatibility  of the 
national legislation  ~rith the Treaty rules on the free  movement of goods and on 
competition,  it  is  apparent,  in  view  of  the  grounds  of  the  order  making the 
reference mentioned above, that the questions raised by the national court should 
be exatnined by interpreting the rules on competition. 
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The competition rules 
'l'hc  national  court  asks  whether  Articles  3(£),  90  and  86  of the  EEC Treaty 
preclude a Member State  fro~ granting to the company operating the public tele-
.  ~:qrnm.uni~~ions .  .11:etwor~  ..  ~he  power .  to .lay :.dow.p.  ~he  stel:nd.~rps .for.  tt:~eph9n.~ 
equipment and· to check that·economi~ operators ·meet thbse ·standards when it is 
con1peting with those operators on the market for terminals. 
Under  Belgian  law,  the  RTf  holds  a  monopoly  for  the  establishment  and 
operJ.tion  of the  public  telecommunications  network.  Moreover, only equipment 
~upplied by the RTf or. approved by it can be connected to the network. The RTf 
thus  has  the  power  to  grant  or  withhold  authorization  to  connect  telephone 
equipment to  the  network,  the  power to lay  down the  technical  standards to  be 
met  by  that  equipment,  and  the  power  to  check  whether  the  equipment  not 
produced by it is  in  conformity with the specifications that it has laid down. 
Ar.  the present stage of development of the Community, that monopoly, which is 
intended  to  rnake  a  public  telephone  network  available  to  users,  constitutes  a 
service  of general  economic  interest  within  the  meaning  of Article  90(2)  of the 
1'reaty. 
'J"hc  Court has  consist.cntly  held  that an  undertaking vested with a legal monopoly 
tnay  be  regarded as  occupying a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
86  of the Treaty and that the territory of a Member State to which that monopoly 
extends  may  constitute  a  substantial  part of the  common  market  (judgments  in 
Case  C-41/90  Hafner (1991]  ECR I-1979,  paragraph 28,  and in  Case C-260/89 
ERT[1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 31). 
The  Court  has  also  held  that  an  abuse  within  the  meaning  of  Article  86  is 
committed  where,  without  any  objective  necessity,  an  undertaking  holding  a 
dominant  position  on  a  particular  market  reserves  to  itself  an  ancillary  activity 
m/49 
I - SY7Y which might be .  carried ·out by another  un~ertaking as  part of its  activities  on a 
neighbouring: but separate market, with the possibility of  elimi~ating all  comp_e-
tition. from  such  undertaking  (judgment. in  Case  311/84  CBEM  [1985] 
ECR  ~261).  . • 
.....  . .  .  ..  "  . .... 
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t9  Therefore the fact that an undertaking holding a monopoly in the market for the 
establishment  and  operation  of  the  network,  without  any  objective  necessity, 
reserves to itself a  neighbouring but separate market, in this  case the market for 
the  importation,  marketing,  connection,  com~issioning  and  maintenance  of 
. equipment for connection to the said network, th.ereby eliminating all  competition 
from other undertakings, constitutes an infringement of Art_icle  86 of the Treaty. 
20  However, Article 86 applies only to ~nti-competitive conduct engaged in by under-
takings  on  their  own  initiative  (see  judgment  in  Case  C-202/88  France  v 
Commission  . 'Telecommunications  terminals',  [1991]  ECR I-1223),  not  to 
measures  adopted by  States.  As  regards  measures  adopted by States,  it ·is  Article 
90(1) that applies.  Under that provision,  Member States must not,  by laws,  regu-
lations  or adminis-trative  measures,  put public undertakings  and  undertakings  to 
which they grant special  or exclusive  rights  in  a  position which the  said  under-
takings could not themselves attain by their own conduct without infringing Article 
8"6. 
21  Accordingly, where the extension of the dominant position of a public undertaking 
or undertaking to  which  the  State has  granted special  or exclusive  rights  results 
from a State measure, such ·a  measure constitutes an infringement of Article 90  in 
conjunction with Article 86 of the Treaty. 
22  The  exclusion  or  the  ·restriction  of  compeuuon  on  the  market  in  telephone 
equipment cannot be  regarded as  justified by a task of a public senrice of general 
economic  interest  wit~in  the  meaning  of Article  90(2)  of  the  Treaty.  The 
production and sale of terminals, and in particular of telephones, is  an activity that 
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should be open to any undertaking. In  ~rder to ensure that the equipment meets 
the essential requirements of, in particular; the safety of users, the safety of those 
operating the network and the protection of public telecommunications networks 
against damage of any kind,  it is  sufficient ·to lay down specifications which the 
·.said equip:ment: must meet and··to. establish.  a·  .. propedure~  for· type-approv.al to ~heck  .. ·  .. 
whether those specifications are met.  ,  ·  ·  ·  .  · 
According  to  the R'IT,  there  could  be  a  finding  of an  infringement of Article 
90(1) of the Treaty only if the Member State had favoured an abuse that the RTT 
. itself  had  in  fact  committed,  for :-example  by  applying  the  provisions  on  type-
approval  in  a  discriminatory manner.  It emphasizes,  however,  that the order for 
reference does not state that any abuse has actually taken place, and that the mere 
possibility of discriminatory application of those provisions  by· reason of the  fact 
that the R TT is  designated as  the authority for granting approval and is  competing 
with the undertakings that apply for approval cannot in itself amount to an abuse 
within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
That argument cannot be accepted. It is  sufficient to point out in this regard that it 
is  the  extension  of  the  monopoly  in  the  establishment  and  operation  of  the 
telephone  network to  the  market in  telephone  equipment, without any objective 
justification,  which  is  prohibited  as  such  by  Article  86,  or  by  Article  90( 1)  in 
conjunction with Article  86,  where that extension results from a measure adopted 
by a  State. As  competition may not be  eliminated in  that manner, it may not be 
distorted either. 
A  system.  of  undistorted  compeuuon,  as  laid  down  in  the  Treaty,  can  be 
guar~nteed only  if  equality  of  opportunity  is  secured  as  between  the  various 
economic operators. To entrust an undertaking which markets terminal equipment 
with the task of drawing up the specifications for such equipment, 1nonitoring their 
application  and  granting  type-approval  in  respect  thereof  is  tantamount  r 
conferring upon it the power to determine at will which terminal equipment may 
he connected to the  public  network, and thereby placing that undertaking at an 
obvious  advantage over its  competitors  (judgment in  Case  C-202/88,  paragraph 
51). 
Itt {s1 ... 
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26  In tho·se  circumsta~ces, ·the maintenance of .effective cop1petition and the guaran-
teeing of transparency require that the drawing up of technical specifications, the 
monitoring of their application, and the granting of type-approval must be carried 
out by a  body which  is  independent of public or private  undertakings  offering 
competing goods or services in the telecommunications sector (judgment in Case 
C-202/88·; ·paragraph 52).  ·.  ~.  · ·.  ·  .:  ·  ·· .  · · · ·  ·  ·  ~  · · ·.  : ·· .'.  · ·  ·  · 
27  Moreover,  the provisions of the national regulations  at issue  in  the  main  action 
may influence the imports of telephone equipment from other Member States, and 
hence may affect trade between  :Member States within the meaning of Article 86 of 
the Treaty. 
2s  Accordingly, it must first be stated, in reply to the national court's questions, that 
Articles  3(£),  90  and  86  of  the  EEC Treaty  preclude  a  Member  State  from 
granting to the undertaking which operates the public telecommunications network 
the  power  to  lay  down  standards  for  telephone  equipment  and  to  check  that 
economic  operators -meet  those  standards when  it  is  itself  competing  with  those 
operators on the market for that equipment. 
The free movement of goods 
29  The national court asks secondly whether Article 30 prevents a public undertaking 
from being given the power to approve telephone equipment which is  intended to 
be connected to the public network and which it has not supplied if the decisions 
of that undertaking cannot be challenged before the courts. 
3o  As the Court has  consist~ntly held (see in particular the judgment in Case 120/78 
REWE-Zentral [1979]  ECR 649,  'Cassis  de  Dijon'),  in  the  absence· of common 
rules  applying to the products concerned, the obstacles to free  movement within 
the  Community  resulting  from  disparities  b-etween  national  provisions  must  be 
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. '" accepted  in  so  far  as  those  national  provtstons,  which  are  applicable  without 
distinction to national products and to imported products, can be justified as  being 
necessary  in  order  to  satisfy  imperative  requirements  of  Community  law.  The 
Court has, ho·wever, held that such rules must be proportionate to the object to be 
achieved  and  that,  where  a  Member State  has  a  choice  between  a  number  of 
:riteas~res···suited. to. achieving the same  ··purpose~ it musi "choose :the mearis "that "te·ast .. 
hinders the. free movement of goods. 
In  the absence  of Community rules  on the establishment of public telecommuni-
cations  networks,  and  in  view  of  the  technical  diversity  of the  networks  in  the 
Member  States,  the  Member  States  retain,  on  the  one  hand,  the  power  to  lay 
down technical specifications which telephone equipment must meet to be  capable 
of being connected to the public network and, on the other, the power to examine 
whether the said equipment is  fit to be connected to the network in order to satisfy 
the  imperative  requirements  regarding  the  protection  of users  as  consumers  of 
services and the protection of the public network and its proper functioning. 
It  is  true  that  the  requirement  that telephone  equipment  must  be  granted  type-
approval  to  be  capable  of being  connected  to  the  network  does  not  absolutely 
exclude the in1ponation into the Member State concerned of products from other 
Member  States.  But  that  requirement  does  nonetheless  render  the  sale  of such 
equipment  more  difficult  or  more  onerous.  Such· a  requirement  means  that  a 
man~facturer in  the Member State of exportation has to take into account, when 
manufacturing the products concerned, the criteria for  type~approval laid down in 
the  Member State  of importation.  Moreover,  the  procedure  for  obtaining  type-
approval  necessarily entails delay and expense, even where the imported products 
meet the criteria for approval. 
An  exception  to  the  principle  of  the  free  .movement  of  goods  based  on  an 
imperative  requirement is  justified only if the  national rules  are proportionate to 
the object to be achieved. 
111 (s 3 
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ECR  1227, paragraph 46, that it must be  open to traders to  challeng<.~ before tht' 
couns an  unjustified  failure  to  grant authorization  for  imports.  The same  pos-
sibility  must exist with  regard to decisions  refusing to grant type-approval  since 
they can lead in practice to denial of access .to  the market of a  Member State to 
·  t~iephone  .  equipment i~p-ort~d from  a~oiher.  Membe~  s·tate. and nence  ·to ·a  barri~r · . . 
to the free movement of goods. 
35  If  there  were  no  possibility  of  any  challenge  before  the  courts,  the  authority 
granting type-approval could adopt an attitude which was arbitrary or systemati-
cally  unfavourable  to  in1ported  equipment.  Moreover,  the  likelihood  of  the 
authority granting type-approval adopting such an attitude is  increased by  the fact 
that the procedures for obtaining type-approval and for laying down the technical 
specifications do not involve the hearing of any interested parties. 
36  The second answer to be  given to the national court is,  therefore, that Article  30 
of  the  Treaty  precludes  a  public  undertaking  from  being  given  the  power  to 
approve  telephone  equipment which  is  intended  to  be  connected  to  the  public 
network and which it has not supplied if the decisions of that undertaking cannot 
be challenged before the courts. 
Costs 
37  The costs  incurred by  t~e Commission of the European Communities, which  has 
submitted observations to· the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings 
are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the 
national court, the decision on costs is  a matter for that court. 
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On· thvse grounds, 
THE COURT (Fifth.Chambcr), 
·  i~ a~$Wer·  ~~· th·{!· questio.ns ·rde.i:ied to it by the Vice-Presi~Cnt ohlie.·Co-nimetCial  • ·· 
,  Court, Brussels, by  order of 11  January 1988, hereby rules: 
~- f  '  .. 
1.  Articles  ..  3{£),  c/o  and  86  ·of  the  EEC  Treaty preclude  4  Member State from 
granting  to  the  undertaking  which  opc:r;1 tes  the  pub  lie  telecommunications 
network the power to lay down standards for  ··.~lcphone equipment and to check 
that economic operators meet those standard.}  ·-vhcn  it is  itself competing with 
those operators on the market_ for that eq·1ipmer. ..  ~ 
2.  Article  30  of the Treaty. precludes a  put:lic und,·.:·!_aking  from being  given  the 
power to approve telephone equipment ·w.~uch is  in.~,Ct\ded to be connected to the 
public network and which it has not suppJ~cd if the -.i·,·..:isions  of that undertaking 
ca1mot be challenged before the cou  ..  ~·~·'· 
Joliet  Slynn 
Moitinho  de  Almeida  Rodriguez  Iglesias  ZLieeg 
Delivered in  open court in  Luxembourg on 13  December 1991. 
J.-G. Giraud  R. Joliet 
Regtstrar  Prr..:.s;~e-<lt of the  ~.  . Chamber 
-ru/ss 
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I.  Competition - Public  undertakings  and  undertakings  to  which  the  Member  States  have 
granted  special  or  exclusive  rights  -- Powers  of the  Commission-Adoption  of directives 
specifying  in general tenns  the obligations of  the Member States 
(EEC Treaty,  Art.  90(1) and (3)) 
2.  Competition- Undertakings  to  which the Member  States  have granted special or exclusive 
rights - Compatibility  with  the  Treaty  of  the  rights  con/erred-· No  presumption  to  that 
e./feet 
(EEC  Treaty,  Art.  90(1)) 
3.  Competition- Public  undertakings -and  undertakings  to  which  the 'Member  States  have 
granted  special  or  exclusive  rights - Powers  of the  Commission  by  virtue  of its  duty  of 
supervision and legislative powers of  the  Council 
(  EE C Treaty,  Arts 8  7,  90(  3) and 1  OOa) 
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4.  Free  movement  of goods - Quantitative  restrictions-Measures  having  equivalent 
effect-Interpretation of  Article 30 of  the  Treaty in the light of  Articles 2 and 3 - Telecom-
munications tenninals -Exclusive importation and marketing rights granted by the Member 
States·-. Not  permissible- ..  ·Corollary.-Exclusive rights· regarding-the connection;··bringing · 
into Jervice  and mainten.ance  of  terminal equipment not pennissible - Withdrawal legally 
required by Directive 881301- Obligation,  in order to  ensure  equal opportunities between 
economic agents,  to  entrust the  drawing  up of  technical specifications  and type-apprQval of 
equipment to an independent body 
(EEC Treaty, Arts 2,  3(/) and 30; Commission Directive 88/301, Arts 2,  3 and 6) 
5.  Competition- Undertakings  to  which the  Member States  have granted special or exclusive 
rights- Recourse  to Article 90 of  the  Treaty in  order to  deal with anti-competitive conduct 
engaged  in  by  undertakings  on  their  own  initiative - Illegality-Appropriate  legal 
basis -Articles 8  5 and 86 of  the  Treaty 
(  EEC Treaty, Arts 8  5,  86 and 90;  Commission Directive 88/301, Art.  7) 
1.  Article 90(3) of the Treaty empowers the 
Commission  to  specify  in  general terms, 
by  adopting  directives,  the  obligations 
imposed on the Member States by Article 
90( 1)  as  regards public undertakings and 
undertakings to which they have granted 
special  or  exclusive  rights.  That power, 
which  is  exercised  without  taking  into 
consideration  the  situation  prevailing  in 
any  particular  Member State,  differs  by 
its very nature from that exercised by the 
Commission  when  seeking  a  declaration 
that a Member State has  failed  to fulfil  a 
particular obligation under the Treaty. 
2.  The fact that Article 90(1) of the Treaty 
presupposes  the  existence  of  under-
takings  which  have  special  or  exclusive 
rights  cannot  be  construed  as  meaning 
3.  The  subject-matter  of  the  power 
conferred on the  Commission  by  Article 
90(3)  of  the  Treaty,  namely  supervision 
of  measures  adopted  by  the  Member 
States  in  relation  to  undertakings  with 
which they have  certain specific  links,  is 
different  from,  and  more  specific  than, 
that  of  the  powers  conferred  on  the 
Council by either Article  1  OOa  or Article 
87.  Furthermore, the possibility that rules 
containing  provisions  which  impinge 
upon  the  specific  sphere  of  Article  90 
might  be  laid- down  by  the  Council  by 
virtue of its  general power under certain 
articles  of the Treaty does  not preclude 
the  exercise  of the  power which  Article 
90 confers on the Commission. 
that  such  rights  are  necessarily  4  .. The  grant  by  a  Member  State  of 
compatible  with  the  Treaty.  They  must  exclusive  importation  and  marketing 
be  assessed  in  the light of different rules  rights  in  the  telecommunications 
of  the  Treaty,  to  which  Article  90(1)  terminals  sector  is  capable  of restricting 
refers.  intra-Community  trade  and  therefore 
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constitutes  a  measure  having  an  effect 
equivalent  to  a  quantitative  restriction 
within the  meaning of Article  30  of the 
Treaty. In the first place, the ~xistence of. 
· s·uch·  rights deprives traders·· without such  · · 
rights of the opportunity of having their · 
products  purchased  by  consumers,  and 
secondly  the  diversity  and  technical 
nature of the products in  that sector are 
such  that there  is  no  certainty  that the 
holder  of exclusive  rights  can  offer  the 
entire  range  of models  available  on  the 
market, inform customers about the state 
and  operation  of  all  the  terminals  and 
guarantee  their  quality.  Accordingly, 
Article  2  of  Directive  88/301  rightly 
requires  such  rights  to  be  withdrawn, 
whilst Article 3  sets  limits  thereto which 
are  imposed  by  the  requirements  of 
safety,  protection of networks and inter-
working of equipment. 
Furthermore,  Article  30  et  seq.  of  the 
Treaty has  to be  interpreted  in  the light 
of Articles 2 and 3. Those articles set out 
to establish a market characterized by the 
free  movement of goods where the terms 
of  competition  are  not  distorted,  which 
means  that  the  competition  aspect  of 
Article 3(f)  has to be taken into account. 
In addition,  if  exclusive ·rights  regarding 
the connection, bringing into service and 
maintenance of terminal equipment were 
retained,  traders  engaged  in  the 
marketing of such  equipment might  not 
be able to carry on business in conditions 
of competition  which  are  not distorted, 
since there would be no certainty that the 
holder of those exclusive rights would be 
able  to  guarantee the reliability of those 
services  for  every  type  of  terminal 
available  on  the  market  and  the  utili-
zation of all  those  terminals,  nor would 
he  have  any  incentive  to  do  so.  Conse-
quently  the  directive  rightly  requires 
those rights to be withdrawn also. 
That same  need  to  ensure  that  compe-
tition  is  not  distorted  and  to  secure 
equality  of  opportunity  as  between  the 
various  economic  operators  justifies  th~ 
· requirement laid· down in Artrcle 6 ·of the 
directive to the effect that Member States 
must  entrust  responsibility  for  drawing 
up  technical  specifications,  monitoring 
their  application  and  granting  type-
approval to a body independent of public 
or  private  undertakings  offering 
competing goods  and/  or services  in  the 
telecommunications sector. 
5.  Where  undertakings  to  which  Member 
States  have  granted  special  or exclusive 
rights engage in  anti-competitive conduct 
on theit own initiative,  Article  90  of the 
Treaty,  which  confers  powers  on  the 
Commission  only  in  relation  to  State 
measures,  does  not constitute  an  appro-
priate  legal  basis  · for  requiring  such 
conduct to  be  brought to  an  end.  Such 
conduct can be called in question only by 
individual  decisions  adopted  under 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
Consequently,  it  is  necessary  to  annul 
Article  7 of Directive  88/301,  by  which 
the  Commission  sought  to  require 
Member  States  to  make  it  possible  to 
terminate,  with  maximum  notice  of one 
year,  leasing  or  maintenance  contracts 
which  concern  terminal  equipment 
subject  to  exclusive  or  special  rights 
granted  to  certain  undertakings  at  the 
time  of the  conclusion  of the  contracts, 
since it has  not been established that the 
conclusion of long-term contracts, which 
are regarded as  anti-competitive, was  the 
result of encouragement or coercion  on 
the part of the national authorities. 
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of  16  May 1988  on competition  in  the  markets  in  telecommunications  terminal 
equtpment, 
THE COURT, 
composed of: 0. Due,  President,  G.  F.  Mancini, T. F.  O'Higgins, J.  C.  Moitinho 
de  Almeida  and  G.  C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias  (Presidents  of  Chambers), 
C. N.  Kakouris,  R.  Joliet,  F.  A.  Schockweiler and M.  Zuleeg, Judges, 
Advocate General: G.  Tesauro, 
Registrar: J.-G. Giraud, 
having regard to the  Report for the  Hearing, 
after hearing oral  arguments  by  the panics at the  hearing on  26  October  1989, 
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on  13  February 
1990, 
gives  the following 
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Judgment 
By application lodged at the Court Registry on 22 July "1988,  the French Republic 
brought an action before the Court under the first paragraph of Article 173 of the 
EEC Treaty for  the  annulment of Articles  2,  6,  7  and,  in  so  far  as  necessary, 
Article 9 of Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in 
the  markets  in  telecommunications  terminal  equipment (Official Journal  1988  L 
131,  p.  73). The Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Belgium,  the Federal Republic 
of .Germany  and  the  Hellenic  Republic  have  intervened  in  the  proceedings  in 
support of the form of order sought by the French Republic. 
z  Directive  88/301  was  adopted  on  the  basis  of  Article  90(3)  of  the  Treaty. 
According to Article 2 of that directive, Member States which have granted special 
or exclusive  rights  to  undertakings  for  the  importation,  marketing,  connection, 
bringing  into  service  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  and/  or  main-
tenance of such equipment are to ensure that those rights  are withdrawn and are 
to inform the Commission of the measures taken or draft legislation introduced to 
that end. 
According to Article 3,  Member States are to ensure that economic operators have 
the  right  to  import,  market,  connect,  bring  Into  service  and  maintain  terminal 
equipment. However, Member States may: 
in  the absence of technical specifications, refuse to allow terminal equipment to be 
connected and brought into service where such equipment does not, according to a 
reasoned  opinion  of  the  body  referred  to  in  Article  6,  satisfy  the  essential 
requirements  laid  down in  Article  2(17)  of Council Directive  86/361 /EEC of 24 
July 1986 on the initial stage of the mutual recognition of type approval for tele-
communications terminal equipment (Official Journal 1986 L 217, p.  21); 
require  economic  operators  to  possess  the  technical  qualifications  needed  to 
connect,  bring  into  service  and  maintain  terminal  equipment  on  the  basis  of 
objective, non-discriminatory and publicly available criteria. 
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4  According to Article 6 ·of  the directive,  Member States are to ensure that, from  1 
July 1989, responsibility for drawing up specifications, monitoring their application 
and granting type-approval is  entrusted to a body independent of public or private 
undertakings offering goods and/  or services in the tele~ommun_ic~tions sector. 
. ·. 
Article 7 requires Member States to take the necessary steps to make it possible for 
customers to terminate, with maximum notice of one year, leasing or maintenance 
contracts relating to terminal equipment which at the time when the contracts were 
concluded  were  subject  to  exclusive  or special  rights  granted  to  certain  under-
takings. 
6  Finally,  according to Article 9,  Member States  are to provide the Commission  at 
the  end  of each  year with  a  report allowing  it  to  monitor compliance with  the 
provisions of Articles 2,  3,  4,  6 and 7. 
For a fuller  account of the  facts  of the  case,  the course of the procedure and  the 
submissions  and arguments of the parties, reference is  made to the Report for the 
Hearing,  which  are  mentioned  or  discussed  hereinafter  only  in  so  far  as  is 
necessary for the reasoning of the Court. 
The French Government relies  on four pleas in law,  alleging misuse of procedure, 
lack of powers of the Commission, breach of the principle of proportionality and 
infringement  of  essential  procedural  requirements.  As  part  of  its  plea  in  law 
alleging lack of powers, the  French Government also claims that the Commission 
has  misapplied  the  rules  of the Treaty.  Since  that allegation  in  fact constitutes a 
separate plea, it will be considered on its own. 
I - Legal background to the dispute 
T'he  pleas  in  law  and arguments put forward  in  this  case  relate essentially to  the 
interpretation  of Article  90  of the  Treaty.  According  to  paragraph  (3)  of that 
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article,  on  the  basis  of  which  the  contested  regulation  was  adopted,  'the 
Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this article and shall, 
where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States'. 
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant 
special  or exclusive  rights,  Article  90(  1)  prohibits  the  Member States  generally 
from enacting or maintaining in force any measure contrary to the rules contained 
in  the Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 aQd  Articles 8  5 
to 94. 
Article 90(2) provides that undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest are to be subject to those rules, in particular to the rules 
on  competition,  in  so  far  as  the  application  of such  rules  does  not obstruct the 
performance,  in  law  or  in  fact,  of  the  particular  tasks  assigned  to  them,  on 
condition, however, that the development of trade is  riot affected to such an extent 
as would be contrary to the interests of the Community. 
In allowing derogations to be  made from the general rules of the Treaty on certain 
conditions, that provision seeks  to reconcile the Member States' interest in  using 
certain  undertakings,  in  particular  in  the  public  sector,  as  an  instrument  of 
economic or fiscal  policy  with  the  Community's  interest in  ensuring compliance 
with  the  rules  on competition  and the  preservation of the  unity of the  Common 
Market  . 
In  paragraph  11  of the preamble to the contested directive, the Commission states 
that the  conditions for applying  the exception  in  Article  90(2)  of the Treaty are 
not fulfilled.  Neither the French Government nor the interveners have challenged 
that. It follows that this dispute falls  within the scope of paragraphs (1)  and (3)  of 
Article 90 of the Treaty. 
Inasmuch  as  it makes  it  possible  for the Commission to adopt directives,  Article 
90(3)  of the Treaty empowers  it  to  lay down general  rules  specifying  the  obli-
gations  arising  from  the  Treaty  which  are  binding  on  the  Member  States  as 
regards the undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) and (2) . 
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Accordingly,  the parties'  pleas  in  -l~w and arguments  must be  considered  in  the 
light of the question whether in this case the Commission .has remained within the 
bounds of the legislative power thus conferred upon it by the Treaty. 
II - Misuse of procedure 
t6  In its  first plea in law the French Government claims that the Commission adopted 
the contested directive pursuant to Article 90(3) of the Treaty instead of initiating 
the procedure provided for in  Article  169. In its view, Article 90(3)  is  intended to 
enable the Commission to inform the Member States, in  cases where it is  unclear 
how compliance with  the Treaty is  to be  achieved,  of the  means  which  must be 
used  in  order to  ensure such  compliance.  In contrast,  recourse  must be  made  to 
Article  169  where it  is  clear that a  measure is  wholly contrary to the Treaty and 
must be brought to an end forthwith. 
11  It  must  be  held  in  that  regard  that  Article  90(3)  of the  Treaty  empowers  the 
Commission to specify in  general terms the obligations arising under Article 90( 1) 
by  adopting  directives.  The  Commission  exercises  that  power  where,  without 
taking into  consideration  the  particular situation existing  in  the  various  Member 
States,  it  defines  in  concrete  terms  the  obligations  imposed  on  them  under  the 
Treaty. In view of its very nature, such a power cannot be used to make a finding 
that a Member State has failed to fulfil  a particular obligation under the Treaty. 
1x  However, it appears from the content of the directive at issue in  this case that the 
Commission merely determined in general terms obligations which are binding on 
the Member States under the Treaty. The directive therefore cannot be interpreted 
as  making specific findings that particular Member States failed to fulfil  their obli-
gations under the Treaty, with the result that the plea in  law relied  upon by the 
French Government must be rejected as unfounded. 
III - Competence of the Commission 
19  In  its  second plea  in  law  the  French  Government, supported by  the  interveners, 
argues that by ~adopting a directive providing simply for the withdrawal of special 
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and  exclusive  rights  for  the  importation,  marketing,  connection,  bringing  Into 
service  and/  or  maintenance  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment,  the 
Commission exceeded the supervisory powers conferred upon it by Article 90(3) of 
the  Treaty.  In  the  French  Government's  view,  that  provision  presupposes  the 
existence· of .special  and .exclusive  rights.  Accordingly, to  ~ak~ the. vie:w  that  th~ 
maintenance of those rights constitutes in itself a  measux:e  within the meaning of 
Article 90 disregards t~e scope of that article. 
The  Belgian  and  French  Governments  further  consider  that  a  policy  on  the 
restructuring of the telecommunications sector, as  envisaged by the Directive, fell 
within the sole competence of the Council, acting under Anicle 1  OOa.  The Belgian 
and  Italian  Governments  maintain  in  addition  that  the  directive  is  contrary  to 
Article 87  of the Treaty inasmuch as  only the Council is  empowered to lay down 
rules for the application of Articles 85  and 86 of the Treaty in specific sectors. 
As  far as  the first argument is  concerned, it must be held in the first place that the 
supervisory power conferred on the Commission includes the possibility of spec-
ifying,  pursuant to Article 90(3), obligations arising under ·the Treaty. The extent 
of that power therefore depends on the scope of the rules with which compliance 
is  to be ensured. 
Next, it should be  noted that even though that article presupposes the existence of 
undertakings which have certain special or exclusive rights, it does not follow that 
all  the special or exclusive rights are necessarily compatible with the Treaty. 1~hat 
depends on different rules, to which Article 90(1)-refers. 
As  regards  the  allegation  that  the  Commission  has  encroached  on  the  powers 
conferred on the Council by Articles  87  and  1  OOa  of the Treaty, those provisions 
have to be compared with Article 90, taking into account their respective subjecL-
matter and purpose. 
24  Article  1  OOa  is  concerned with the adoption of measures for the approximation of 
•  the  provisions  laid  down by  law,  regulation  or administrative  acuon  1n  Member ..... 
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States which have as  their object the· establishment and functioning of the internal 
ntarkct. Article  87  is  concerned with the adoption of any appropriate regulations 
or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85  and 86, that is  to 
say the  competition  rules  applicable  to  all  undertakings.  As  for Article  90,  it  is 
concerned  with  measures  adopted  by  the  Member  States  in  relation  to  under-
takings  with which  they have  specific  links  referred io  in ·the·  provi~ions ·of that 
article.  It is  only with  regard  to  such  measures  that Article  90  imposes  on  the 
Commission  a  duty  of  supervision  which  may,  where  necessary,  be  exercised 
through the adoption of directives. and decisions addressed to the Member States. 
~s  It  must therefore be  held  that the subject-matter of the power conferred on the 
Commission by Article 90(3)  is  different from, and more specific than, that of the 
powers conferred on the Council by either Article 1  OOa or Article 87. 
26  It should  also  be  noted  that,  as  the  Court held  in  Joined  Cases  188  to  190/80 
(France,  Italy and United Kingdom v  Commission  [1982]  ECR 2545, at paragraph 
14), the possibility that rules containing provisions which impinge upon the specific 
sphere  of Article  90  might be  laid  down  by the  Council by- virtue of its  general 
power  under other  articles  of the Treaty does  not  preclude  the  exercise  of the 
power which Article 90 confers on the Commission. 
u·  The  plea  in  law  alleging  lack  of  powers  on  the  part of the  Commission  must 
therefore be  rejected. 
IV - The principle of proportionality 
'il  In  claiming  that there  has  been  a  breach of the  principle  of proportionality the 
French Government alleges  that the Commission failed  to use  appropriate means 
·to bring to an end any abuse by telecommunications undertakings of their special 
or  exclusive  rights.  As  a  result,  that plea  in  law  merges  with  the  pleas  in  law 
alleging a  misuse  of procedure and lack of powers which have  been dismissed; it 
therefore does not have to be considered separately. 
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V - Application of the rules of the Treaty 
The French Government and the interveners allege that Articles 2,  6,  7  and 9 of 
the directive are unlawful, on the ground that those provisions are wrongly based 
on· an infringement by the  Member States· of Anicles  30,  37,  59  and  86  of the 
Treacy.  · 
On the basis  of the observations set out above, that complaint must be  construed 
as  being directed  against the misapplication  by the  Co~mission of the  aforesaid 
provisions of the Treacy. Anicles 2, 6, 7 and 9 of Directive 88/301  must therefore 
be  considered in the light of the grounds on which they are based. 
1.  Legality  of  Article  2  of Directive  881301  (withdrawal of special  and exclusive 
rights) 
Jt  Article  2  of the  contested  directive  requires  Member States  which  have  granted 
undertakings  special  or  exclusive  rights  regarding  the  importation,  marketing, 
connection,  bringing  into  service  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment 
and/  or maintenance of such equipment to withdraw those rights and to inform the 
Commission of the measures taken or draft legislation introduced to' that end. 
n  It follows  that the directive  is  concerned with exclusive  rights,  on the  one hand, 
and  special  rights,  on the  other.  It is  appropriate  to follow  that classification  in 
considering this complaint. 
33  With  regard to exclusive  importation and marketing rights,  it should be borne in 
mind  that; as  the Court has  consistently held  (see,  in  particular,  the judgment in 
Case  8/74  Procureur du  Roi v  Dassonville [1974]  ECR 837,  at paragraph  5),  the 
prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions laid 
down  in  Article  30  of the Treaty applies  to all  trading rules  enacted by  Member 
States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Community trade  . 
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34  In that regard it should be noted first that the existence of exclusive importing and 
marketing  rights  deprives  traders  of  the  opportunity  of  having  their  products 
purchased by consumers. 
Js  It should be pointed out, secondly, that the terminals sector is  characterized by the 
diversity  and  technical  nature  of  the  products  concerned  and  by  the  ensuing 
constraints.  In  those  circumstances  there  is  no  certainty that  the  holder  of the 
monopoly can offer the  entire  range of models  available  on the  market,  inform 
customers about the  state  and operation of all  the terminals  and guarantee  their 
quality.  --
J6  Accordingly, exclusive importation and marketing rights in  the teleconHnunication.s 
terminal sector are capable of restricting intra-Community trade. 
37  With  regard  to  the  question  whether  such  rights  can  be  justified,  it  should  be 
noted that in  Article  3  of the  contested  directive  the  Commission  specified  the 
extent and the limits of the withdrawal of special and exclusive rights so  as  to  take 
into account certain requirements such  as  those  listed  in  Article  2(17)  of Council 
Directive  86/361, namely user safety, safety of employees of public telecommuni-
cations network operators, protection of public telecommunications networks from 
harm and interworking of terminal equipment in justified cases. · 
Hi  For its  part, the French Government has not challenged Article 3 of the contested 
directive,  nor has  it  argued that there are other essential requirements which the 
Commission should have complied with in this case. 
39  In  those  circumstances,  the  Commission  was  right  to  consider  exclusive 
importation  and  marketing  rights  in  the  telecommunications  terminal  sector 
incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty. 
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So  far as  concerns exclusive rights regarding the connection, bringing into  !)crvie<.~ 
and  maintenance of telecommunications  terminal equipment,  paragraph 6  of the 
preamble to the directive states that: 
' ...  The retention of exclusive rights in this field would be tantamount to retention 
of exclusive marketing rights ... '. 
In that regard it should be borne in mind, in the first place, that, as the Court has 
consistently held, Articles 2 and) of the Treaty set out to establish a market char-
acterized by the free  movement of goods where the terms of competition are not 
distorted  (see,  in  particular,  the judgment in  Case 229/83  Leclerc v  Au Ble  Vert 
rt 985]  ECR 1,  at paragraph 9). Article 30  et seq. must therefore be interpreted in 
rhc  light of that principle,  which  means that the competition aspect of Article  3(f) 
of the 'l'rcaty has to be taken into account. 
Next,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  a  market  which  exhibits- the  characteristics 
described above (see paragraph 35), there is  no certainty that a holder of exclusive 
rights regarding the connection, bringing into service and maintenance of terminal 
equipment can guarantee the reliability of those services for every type of terminal 
available  on the market and thereby enable them all  to be  used,  nor that he will 
have any incentive to do so.  Accordingly, when the exclusive marketing right has 
been withdrawn,  an economic agent must himself be  able  to connect,  bring into 
service  and  n1aintain  equipment  in  order  to  be  able  to  carry  on  his  marketing 
:1ctivity in  conditions of cornpetition which are not distorted. -
Accordingly,  the  Commission  rightly  regarded  exclusive  rights  regarding  the 
connection, bringing into service and maintenance of telecommunications terminal 
equipment as  incompatible with Article 30. 
It follows  from  the foregoing that the Commission was justified in  requiring the 
withdrawal of exclusive  rights  regarding the importation, marketing,  connection, 
bringing  into  service  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  and/  or  main-
tenance of such equipment. 
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45  As  far  as  special  rights  are  concerned,  it  should  be  noted  that  neither  the 
provisions  of the  directive  nor  the  preamble  thereto  specify  the  type  of  rights 
which  are  actually  involved  and  in  what respect the  existence  of such  rights  is 
contrary to the various provisions of the Treaty. 
46  It  follows  that the  Commission  has  failed  to  justify the  obligation to withdraw 
special  rights  regarding  the  importation,  marketing,  connection,  bringing  into 
service and/  or maintenance of telecommunications terminal equipment. 
<+7  Accordingly,  Article  2  must be  declared void  1n  so  far  as  tt  concerns  the with-
drawal of those rights. 
2.  Legality  of  Article  6  of Directive  88/301  (drawing  up  specifications,  monitoring 
their application and granting type-approval for terminal equipment) 
4K  According to Article 6 of the contested directive, Member States are to ensure that 
from  1 July  1989  responsibility  for  drawing  up  the  specifications  referred  to  in 
Article 5 _of  the directive,  monitoring their application and granting type-approval 
is  entrusted  to  a  body  independent  of  public  or  private  undertakings  offering 
goods and/  or services in the telecommunications sector. 
4')  Paragraph 9 of the preamble to the directive states that: 
' ... To  ensure  that  [technical  specifications  and  type-approval  procedures]  are 
applied transparently, objectively and without discrimination, the drawing-up and 
application of such rules should be entrusted to bodies independent of competitors 
in the market in question ... '. 
so  Paragraph 17 of the preamble to the directive states that: 
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'Monitoring  of type-approval  specifications  and  rules  cannot  be  ep.trusted  to  a 
competitor in  the  terminal  equipment market in view  of the  obvious  conflict of 
interest. Member States should therefore ensure that the responsibility for drawing 
up  type-approval specifications and rules is  assigned to a body independent of the 
operator of the network and of any other competitor in the market for terminals.' 
t 
It should be observed that a system of undistorted competition, as  laid down in the 
Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as  between the 
various  economic operators.  To entrust  an  undertaking which  markets  terminal 
equipment  with  the  task  of drawing  up  the  specifications  for  such  equipment, 
monitoring  their  application  and  granting  type-approval  in  respect  thereof  is 
tantamount to  conferring upon- it the  power to determine at will  which terminal 
equipment  may  be  connected  to  the  public  network,  and  thereby  placing  that 
undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors. 
Consequently, the Commission was justified in  seeking to entrust responsibility for 
drawing  up  technical  specifications,  monitoring  their  application  and  granting 
type-approval  to  a  body independent of public  or private  undertakings  offering 
competing goods and/  or services in the telecommunications sector. 
3.  Legality  of  Article  7 of Directive  88/301  (termination  of  leasing  or  maintenance 
contracts) 
sJ  Article  7 of the contested directive  requires  Member States to take the  necessary 
_steps  to rnake it possible to terminate, with maximum notice of one year, leasing or 
- maintenance  contracts  which  concern  terminal  cquipn1ent subject to exclusive  or 
special  rights granted to certain undertakings at the time of the conclusion of the 
contracts. 
Paragraph 18  in the preamble to the directive states that: 
'The holders of special  or exclusive  rights  in  the  terminal equipment in  question 
have  been  able  to  impose  on their customers long-term contracts preventing the 
introduction of free competition from having a practical effect within a reasonable 
period. Users must therefore be given the right to obtain a revision of the duration 
of their contracts.' 
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ss  In that regard, it should be noted that Article 90 of the Treaty confers powers on 
the  Commission only in  relation  to  State measures  (see  paragraph  24)  and  that 
anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative can be 
called in question only by individual decisions adopted under Articles 85  and 86 of 
the Treaty. 
56  It does not appear either from the provisions of the directive or from the preamble 
thereto  that  the  holders  of  special  or  exclusive  rights  were  compelled  or 
encouraged by State regulations to conclude long-term contracts. 
s1  Article  90  cannot therefore be regarded as  an appropriate basis  for dealing with 
the  obstacles  to  competition  which  are  purportedly  created  by  the  long-term 
contracts  referred  to  in  the  directive.  It follows  that Article  7  must be  declared 
void. 
4.  Legality of  Article 9 of  Directive 88/301  (annual report) 
ss  Article 9,  which requires Member States to provide the Commission at the end of 
each year with a report allowing it to monitor compliance with certain provisions 
of the directive, must also be declared void in so far as it refers to the provisions of 
Article 2 which are concerned with special rights and to Article 7 of the contested 
directive. 
VI- Infringement of essential procedural requirements 
s9  The  French  Government  funher  claims  that  the  contested  directive  does  not 
contain an adequate statement of reasons. 
6o  It should be pointed out in limine that that plea in law must be considered only in 
so far as it relates to aspects of the contested directive which have not already been 
declared invalid. 
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In  that regard, it  should be  noted that the reasons which led the  Commission  to 
require  the  withdrawal of exclusive  rights  regarding the importation,  marketing, 
connection, bringing into service and maintenance of terminal equipment are suffi-
ciently clear from  the  preamble to the directive. The same  is  true as  regards  the 
obligations imposed on the Member States by Article 6 of the contested directive  . 
The  plea  in  law  a~leging  infringement  of  essential  procedural  .requirements 
therefore cannot be upheld. 
VII- Costs 
Under Article  69(2)  of the  Rules  of Procedure,  the  unsuccessful  party  is  to  be 
ordered to pay the costs. However, the first subparagraph of Article 69(3) provides 
that the Court may order the parties to bear their own costs  in  whole or in  pan; 
each party succeeds on some and fails  on other heads. As  the French Republic has 
only been partially successful, each of the parties,  including the  interveners,  is  to 
bear its own costs. 
On those grounds, 
THE COURT 
hereby: 
(1)  Declares Article  2  of Commission Directive SS/301/EEC of 16 May 1988  on 
competition in the markets in telecommunications  terminal equipment void in 
so  far  as  it requires  Member States  which  grant ·undertakings  special  rights 
regarding  the  importation,  marketing,  connection or bringing  into  service  of 
terminal equipment and/  or maintenance of such equipment to  withdraw such 
rights and to inform the Commission of the measures taken or draft legislation 
introduced to that end; 
(2)  Declares void Article 7 of the directive; 
(3)  Declares Article 9 of the directive· void in so far as  it refers to the provisions of 
Article  2  which  are  concerned  with  special  rights  and  to  Article  7  of  the 
directive; 
/11(77 
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(  4)  Dismisses the remainder of the application; 
(  5)  Orders the parties to bear their own costs. 
Due  Mancini  O'Higgins  - Moitinho  de  Almeida 
Rodriguez  Iglesias  Kakouris  Joliet  Schockweiler 
Delivered in  open court in  Luxembourg on 19  March  1991. 
].-G. Giraud 
Registrar 
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<<Agrement national de terminaux de radiocommunication -- Autorisation pour 
!'utilisation de tels terminaux -- Articles 30 a  37 et 86 du traite CEE -- Directive 
88/301/CEE de la Commission» 
Dans les affaires jointes C-46/90 et C-93/91, 
ayant pour objet des demandes adressees a  la Cour, en application de I'article 177 
du  traite CEE,  par le  tribunal  de  premiere instance  (57e  et 55e  chambres)  de 
Bruxelles et tendant a obtenir, dans les  litiges  pendants devant cette juridiction 
entre 
M. le Procureur du Roi 
Jean-Marie Lagauche, 
Constant De Munck, 
Jacques Paulissen, 
Alain Delerue, 
Jean-Oaude Lambert, 
Willy Cleynen, 
Serge Hoffman, 
Pierre Lemoine, 
Pierre Evrard, 
* 
Langue de procedure:  lc  franc;ais. 
et, d'une part, 
' 
et, d'autre part, . ·.·: 
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une decision a titre prejudiciel sur !'interpretation des articles 30 a 37 et 86 du 
traite CEE, ainsi  que de la  directive 88/301/CEE de la Commission,  du  16  mai 
1988, relative a  Ia concurrence sur les marches de terrnin~ux de telecommunication 
(JO L  131~ p. 73), 
..  ,  :  ... 
LACOUR, 
composee de MM. 0. Due, president, G. F. Mancini, J.  C. Moitinho de Almeida, 
M. Dfez de Velasco, D. A.  0. Edward, presidents de chambre, C.  N. K.akouris, R. 
Joliet, F. A. Schockweiler, G. C. Rodriguez Iglesias, F. Grevisse, M. Zuleeg, P. J. G. 
Kapteyn et J.  L.  Murray, juges, 
avocat general: M.  C.  0. Lenz, 
greffier: M. H. A.  Rilhl, administrateur principal, 
considerant Jes  observations ecrites presentees: 
pour le gouvernement beige, par M. Jan Devadder, conseiller au ministere 
des Affaires etrangeres, en qualite d'agent, et Me Eduard Marissens, avocat 
au barreau de Bruxelles, 
pour  le  gouvernement  britannique,  par  Mme  Rosemary  Cawdwell,  du 
Treasury Solicitor's Department, en qualite d'agent, 
pour Ia  Commission  des  Communautes europeennes,  par MM.  Richard 
Wainwright,  conseiller juridique, et Bernhard Jansen, membre du service 
juridique, en  qualite  d'agents, assistes  de Me Herve Lehman, avocat au 
barrea  u de Paris, 
vu  les  rapports d'audience, 
ayant entendu les observations orales du gouvernemen't beige et de la Commission, 
representee  par M.  Richard  Wainwright,  Me  Herve  Lehman  et Mme  Virginia 
Melgar, fonctionnaire national mise a  la  disposition de Ia  Commission, en qualite 
d'agents, a  !'audience du 9 juin 1992, 
ayant entendu l'avocat general en ses conclusions a  !'audience du 2 decembre 1992, 
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1  Par  jugements  du  19  avril  f989  et  du  11  mars  1991,  parvenus  a la  Cour 
respectivement  le  28  fevrier  1990  et le  15  mars  1991,  le  tribunal  de  premiere 
instance (57e et 55e chambres) de Bruxelles a pose, en application de !'article 177 
du traite CEE, deux questions prejudicielles sur }'interpretation des articles 30 a  37 
et 86 du traite CEE, ainsi que de Ia directive 88/301/CEE de Ia Commission, du 16 
mai  1988,  relative  a la  concurrence  sur  les  marches  de  terminau~  de 
telecommunication (JO L 131, p.  73), en vue d'apprecier la compatibilite avec ces 
dispositions  d'un  regime  national  qui,  d'une  part,  subordonne  Ia  detention 
d'appareils emetteurs ou  recepteurs de  radiocommunication a une  autorisation 
ministerielle et, d'autre part, interdit la mise en vente au en location d'appareils 
emetteurs ou recepteurs dont un exemplaire n'aurait pas ete prealablement agree 
par un organisme public, place sous l'autorite .hierarchique du ministre competent, 
comme satisfa.isant aux prescriptions techniques fixees par ce ministre. 
2  Ces questions ont ete soulevees dans le  cadre de deux procedures penales. 
3  La premiere procedure, qui a donne lieu a  l'affaire C-46/90, a ete introduite contrc 
M.  Jean-Marie Lagauche et sept autres personnes, prevenus notamment d'avoir 
detenu des  telephones sans  fil  et une  paire de walkie-talkie,  sans  avoir obtenu 
I'autorisation  ministerielle  requise,  et d'avoir  mis  en vente  ou  en  location  des 
telephones sans fil  dont aucun exemplaire n'avait prealablement ete agree par la 
Regie  des telegraphes et telephones (  ci-apres «RTT»  ). 
4  La deuxieme procedure, qui a donne lieu a  !'affaire C-93/91, a ete introduite contre 
M. Pierre Evrard, prevenu d'avoir detenu et mis en vente, entre le 1er janvier 1989-
et le 2 fevrier 1989, un telephone sans fil  non agree par la RTf, et d'avoir, le  23 
janvier  1990,  detenu  et  rnis  en  vente  onze  appareils  de  radiocommunication, 
egalement non agrees, sans avoir obtenu I'autorisation ministerielle exigee. 
5  Pour sa defense, M. Evrard a fait valoir que l'un de ces appareils portait la marque 
de la  Deutsche Bundespost qui  l'avait  homologue.  II  a  produit par ailleurs  une 
attestation d'un laboratoire agree par British Telecom, selon laquelle certains de 
ces  appareils produisent une puissance inferieure a dix  milliwatts.  Il  estime que 
dans ces conditions, et comme l'admet d'aiiJeurs le ministere public, la  detention 
de  ces  appareils  n'etait soumise a aucune autorisation  ministerielle.  II  conteste 
cependant Ia  position  de ce  dernier, selon  laquelle  !'ensemble des  appareils en 
cause devaient neanmoins repondre aux normes techniques belges et etre agrees 
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comme tels par la RTT, et invoque les dispositions de la directive 88/301, precitee, 
au soutien de son argumentation. 
6  11  ressort ·du dossier que l'article  3,  paragraphe  1,  de  la  loi  du  30 juillet 1979, 
·.  relative aux radiocommunications ·(Mn:niteur beige du 30 aout. 1.979),  prevoit que 
<<nul  ne peut dans le  royaume (  ... ) detenir un 'appareil emetteur ou recepteur de 
radiocommunication ( ... )sans avoir obtenu l'autorisation ecrite du Ministre (ayant 
les telegraphes et les telephones dans ses attributions)». Cette meme disposition 
precise que .l'autorisation ministerielle est personnelle et revocable. 
7  Habilite en vertu de !'article 3,  paragraphe 2,  de la meme loi a deteqniner les cas 
dans  lesquels  les  autorisations  ne  sont  pas  requises,  le  Roi  a,  par  l'article  5, 
paragraphe 3, de rarrete royal du 15 octobre 1979, relatif aux radiocommunications 
privees (Moniteur beige du 30 ectobre 1979), accorde une dispense d'autorisation 
pour  <des  dispositifs  radioelectriques  agrees  par  1?.  Regie  dont  Ia  puissance 
d'emission ne depasse pas 10  milliwatts», ce qui  inclut les telephones sans fil. 
8  En vertu d'une loi  du 13  octobre 1930,  Ia  RTf detient en Belgique le monopole 
de l'etablissement et de I' exploitation, pour la correspondance du public, des lignes 
et des bureaux telegraphiques et telephoniques (y  compris la  telephonie sans fil). 
En outre, selon l'article 2 de la loi relative aux radiocommunications, precitee, elJe 
est autorisee «a entreprendre et a  exploiter tout service de radiocommunication». 
9  I1  n~sulte par ailleurs de l'article  17  de l'arrete royal du  15  octobre 1979, precite, 
que Ia  RTT est chargee «de la  gestion du spectre des frequences radioelectriques 
et du  contr6le de leur utilisation  dans  le  royaume».  II  lui  appartient a cette fin 
d'assigner les frequences necessaires au fonctionnement des stations et reseaux de 
radiocommunications autorises et de proceder a  leur coordination, tant sur le plan 
national qu'international. La RTI est charg~e egalement d'instruire 1es demandes 
introduites aupres du ministre en vue de !'obtention de l'autorisation de detenir un 
appareil emetteur ou recepteur de radiocotnmunication. 
10  II  ressort en  fin  de }'article  7  de  la  Joi  beige  relative  aux  radiocommunications, 
precitee, qu'  «3UCUn  appareiJ  emetteur o·u  recepteur de  radiocommunication  ne 
peut etre mis  en vente ou  en location si  un  exemplaire n'a pas ete agree par la 
Regie comme satisfaisant aux prescriptions techniques fixees  par Je  Ministre» et 
que «les modalites de I'agrement sont arretees par le Ministre». 
11  A  cet egard, }'article  1er de l'arrete ministeriel  du  19  octobre  1979,  relatif aux 
radiocommunications  privees  (Moniteur beige  du 30 octobre  1979),  qui  fixe  les 
modalites de l'agrement, precise que ce regime vise taus les appareils construits ou 
importes en Belgique en vue de la vente ou de la location ainsi que tout appareil 
construit par un particulier pour son propre usage. La RTf peut toutefois agreer, 
sans essai prealable, des appareils emetteurs ou recepteurs de radiocommunication 
importes,  qui  ant  deja  ete  homologues  dans  l'un  des  Etats  membres  de  Ia 
Conference europeenne des  administrations ·des  Pastes et Telecommunications, 
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comme satisfaisant a  des specifications techniques equivalentes a  celles definies  ~l 
l'article 6 de cet arrete ministeriel. 
12  · Le  · nCin-respect  des  ·  ·exigences  ··d'autorisation  et  d~agrement  ~st  sanctionne 
penalement. A cet egard, les  agents de  Ia RTI, agissant en qualite  d'officier~ de .... 
police judiciaire, veillent au respect par les usagers des dispositions applicables et 
constatent les infractions a  la  Joj du 30 juillet 1979 et aux arretes d'execution. 
13  La  directive  88/301,  precitee,  concerne  les  n1arches  de  terminaux  de 
telecommunication,  entendant  par  l'expression  «appareil  terminah>, · scion  son 
article  1  er,  tout  appareil  qui  est  connecte  directement  ou  indirectement a la 
terminaison d'un reseau public de telecommunication pour transmettre, traiter au 
recevoir des informations. 
14  L'article 5 de Ia  djrectivc prevoit Ia  publication, par les Etats membres, de  toutes 
les specifications et procedures d'agrement pour les appareils terminaux. 
15  L'article 6 de Ia  directive dispose: 
«1es Etats membres assurent qu'a partir du ler juillet 1989 la formalisation 
des specifications mentionnees a l'article. 5 de la directive et le controle de 
leur  application  ainsi  que  !'agrement  sont  effectues  par  une  entite 
independante des  entreprises publiques ou privees offrant des biens et/ou 
des services dans le  domaine des telecommunications.» 
16  Ayant  des  doutes  quant  a la  conformite  avec  le  droit  communautaire  de  la 
legislation invoquee par le  ministere public pour demander la  condamnation des 
prevenus au  principal,  le  tribunal  de  premiere  instance de  Bruxelles  a  sursis a 
statuer et a pose, dans }'affaire C-46/90, Lagauche e.a., les questions prejudiciel1es 
suivantes: 
<<Les  articles  'J7  et  86  du. traite  instituant  la  Communaute  economique 
europccnnc doivent-ils  ctre intcrpretes cornme interdisant dans le  sec1cur 
des radiocommunications et radiocommunications privees, des dispositions 
legales du type de Ia  loi du  30/7/1979 et de J'AR du  15/10/1979, lesquelles 
sanctionnent par des peines de prison et/ou d'amende ceux qui  auront: 
1.  mis  en  vente  ou  en  location  un  appareil  emetteur  ou  recepteur  en 
l'espece des TSF sans qu'ils aient ete agrees par la  RTT 
ou 
2.  detenu, etabli ou  fait  fonctionner un  appareiJ emetteur, en l'espece  de~ 
TSF et une  paire de  walkie-talkie  sans  avoir  obtenu J'autorisation  ecrite, 
personnelle et revocable du  ministre competent?» 
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ct, dans J'affairc C-Y'J/9),  Evrard, les  questions suivantes: 
«LeS articles 30 a  37 et 86 du traite instituant la 9ommunaute economique 
europeenne, ainsi que la directive de la Commission europeenne du 16 mai 
1988  r:elatjve  ·a  la  concurrence  sur  les- ·¥larches.· des  .terminaux  de. 
telecommunication, doivent-ils etre interpretes comme interdisant dans le 
secteur des radiocommunications des dispositions legales du type de Ia  loi 
du  30  juillet  1979  et  de  )'arrete  royal  du  15  octobre  1979,  lesquels 
sanctionnent  par des  peines d'emprisonnement et/ou d'amende ceux qui 
auront: 
1) dans le Royaume de Belgique ou a bard d'un navire, d'un bateau, d'un 
aeronef ou de tout autre support soumis au droit beige, detenu un appareil 
emetteur ou recepteur de-radiocommunication, ou etabli et fait fonctionner 
une  station  ou  un  reseau  de  radiocommunication  sans  avoir  obtenu 
l'autorisation ecrite, personnelle et revocable du Ministre au du Secretaire 
d'Etat ayant les telegraphes et les  telephones dans ses attributions; 
2)  mis  en  vente  ou  en  location  un  appareil  emetteur ou  recepteur  de 
radiocommunication sans qu'un exemplaire ait ete agree par la  Regie des 
Telegraphes  et  des  Telephones  comme  satisfaisant  aux  prescriptions 
techniques fixees  par le  Ministre competent, 
ct ce  malgre,  lc  cas  echeant, !'existence d'une agreation obtenue dans  le 
cadre  d'une  proc{~dure  etablie  par  un  autre  I~tat  membrc  de  Ia 
Communaut~ t.:uropecnne'!» 
17  L'affaire C-46/90,  ayant ete renvoyee devant Ia  cinquieme chambre, a fait  l'objet 
d'une audience puhlique le 2 mai  1991  et de concl~sions de l'avocat generalle 11 
juillet 1991. Par Ia  suite, en application de !'article 95,  paragraphe 3, du reglement 
de procedure, cette affaire a ete renvoyee devant la  Cour pleniere. A la suite des 
conclusions de l'avocat general, il  a ete decide, par ordonnance du 14 jui11et 1993, 
de joindre les deux affaires aux fins  de l'arret.  · 
1  H  Pour un  plus ample expose des faits des litiges au principal, de la legislation beige 
applicable,  du  deroulement  de  la  procedure  ainsi  que  des  observations  ccrites 
deposecs devant Ia  Cour, il  est renvoye aux rapports d'audience. Ces elements du 
dossier ne sont repris ci-dessous que dans Ia  mesure necessaire au  raisonnement 
de  la  Cour. 
19  Par ses  questions,  Ia  jundiction  nationalc  cherche a savoir  en  substance  si  les 
articles 30 a  37 et 86 clu  traite, d'une part, et les dispositions de la directive 88/301, 
d'autre part, s'upposent  :~1  !'application de dispositions nationales, telles que celles 
decrites ci-dessus (point::;  6 a 12). 
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.. 20  A  cet egard,  iJ  y a  lieu  de preciser tout d'abord que,  pour ce qui  concerne les 
dispositions  du  traite  relatives a Ia  libre  circulation  des  marchandises,  il  suffit 
d'examiner ces questions successivement sous l'angle de.l'article 30 et de l'article 
· ·37 du traiie.  ·  · 
21  II  convient  de  relever  ensuite  que  l'article  86  du  traite  ne  visant  que  Jes 
comportements anticoncurrentiels qui ont ete adoptes par les entreprises de leur 
propre initiative (voir notamment arret du 19 mars 1991, France/Commission, C-
202/88,  Rec. p. 1-1223,  point 55),  alors que les  questions posees concernent des 
mesures etatiques, c'est au regard de )'article 90, paragraphe 1, du traite,. en liaison 
avec )'article 86,  que ces questions doivent etre examinees. 
22  II  y a  lieu  de  relever  encore 'que,  dans  }'affaire  C-46/90,  les  faits  du  litige  au 
principal sont anterieurs au ler jui11et  1989, date d'entree en vigueur de l'article 6 
de  Ia  directive  88/301,  alors  que,  dans  !'affaire  C-93/91,  ils  sont  pour  partie 
anterieurs et pour partie posterieurs a  cette date. 
23  II  y a lieu de souligner enfin que Je  champ d'application materiel de 1a  directive 
88/301  est  limite  aux  appareils  connectes  directement  ou  indirectement  a Ia 
terminaison  d'un  reseau  public  de  telecommunication,  de  sorte que seulement 
certains des appareils dont il  est question dans Jes affaires au principal relevent du 
champ d'application de celle-ci.  · 
24  II  s'ensuit que, independamment de l'interpretation des articles 30 et 37 du traite, 
les  questions  posees  doivent  etre  examinees  au  regard  des  articles  86  et  90, 
paragraphe 1, du traite pour ce qui concerne les faits anterieurs au ler juillet 1989 
et  au  regard  des  dispositions  de  Ia  directive  pour  ce  qui  concerne  Jes  faits 
posterieurs a  cetie date, tout en operant la distinction entre les appareils relevant 
du champ d'application de la directive et ceux qui n'en relevent pas. 
Sur l'article 30 du traite 
25  Dans l'arret du 13 decembre 1991, GB-Inno-BM (C-18/88, Rec. p. I-5941), Ia Cour 
a dit pour droit que }'article 30 du traite s'oppose a  ce qu'une entreprise publique 
se voie accorder le  pouvoir d'agreer les  appareils telephoniques destines a etre 
raccordes  au  reseau  public  et  non  fournis  par  elle,  si  les  decisions  de  cette 
entreprise ne sont pas susceptibles de faire l'objet d'un recours juridictionnel. 
26  Cette interpretation doit etre etendue au cas ou une entreprise publique agree les 
appareils  emetteurs  ou  recepteurs  de  radiocommunication,  que  ceux-ci  soient 
destines ou non a fonctionner par le  biais du reseau public. 
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27  Le gouvernement belge a  affirrne dans ses  observations qu'un refus par la R IT 
d'accorder l'agrement en  question  est susceptible  de  faire  l'objet d'un recours 
devant le Conseil d"E.tat beige. 
28·  Des lors, et dan~  ~a mesure .ou-la procedure ·d'agrement en· question respecte.les 
criteres enonces dans J'arret GB-Inno-BM, precite, elle ne saurait etre consideree 
comme contraire a  l'article 30 du traite.  · 
29  II  en resulte que l'article  30  du  traite  ne  s'oppose  pas a ce qu'une entreprise 
publique se voie accorder le pouvoir d'agreer les appareils emetteurs ou recepteurs 
de  radiocommunication non fournis  par elle,  des  lors que les decisions· de cette 
entreprise sont susceptiblcs de fairc !'objet d'un recours juridictionnel. 
Sur l'article 37 du traite 
30  Il y a lieu de rappeler a  titre liminaire que }'article 37 qui prevoit l'amenagernent 
des monopoles nationaux :presentant un caractere commercial s'applique «a  tout 
organisrne par lequel un Etat membre, de jure ou de facto,  controle, dirige  ou 
influence  sensiblement,  directement  ou  indirectement,  les  importations  ou  les 
exportations entre les Etats membres. Ces dispositions s'appliquent egalement aux 
monopoles d'Etat delegues)). 
31  II  y a lieu, en outre, de souligner qu'une interdiction de detenir certains appareils 
sans autorisation ministerielle n'entre pas dans Ie  champ d'application de !'article 
37 . 
.12  I  .cs  prt.':rogatives dont est investi  un organisme public tel que Ia  RTf portent sur 
!'instruction des  dcmandcs introduitcs  aupr~s du  ministrc  en  vue de !'obtention 
d'une  autorisation  de  detention  d'un  appareil  etnetteur  ou  recepteur  de 
radiocommunication, sur }'assignation et la coordinat.ion des frequences hertziennes 
ainsi que sur la delivrance des agrements apres verification de la conformite des 
appareils commercialises avec les  normes techniques fixees  par le .ministre. Elles 
sont destinees a eviter la perturbation des radiocommunications: 
33  L'exercice  de  ces  prerogatives  repond  done  a des  preoccupations  de  nature 
regalienne, a  savoir la  police du domaine public hertzien, et ne constitue pas une 
prestation de services. Une telle activite est,  en tout etat de cause, etrangere au 
champ d'application de l'article 37 du traite qui,  ainsi que l'a juge Ia  Cour (voir 
notamrnent arret du 28 juin 1983, Mialocq, 271/81, Rec. p. 2057), vise les echanges 
de rnarchandises et ne concerne les prestations de services que dans la mesure oil 
le  monopole de telles prestations contreviendrait au principe de libre circulation 
des  marchandises  en  discriminant  les  produits  imp?rtes  au  profit  de  produits 
d'origine nationale. 
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34  II  convient  done  de  constater  que  l'article  37  du  traite  ne  s'oppose  pas  a 
!'application  de  dispositions  legislatives  ou  reglel)lentaires  nationales  qui 
~omportent )'interdiction de  vend~e ou  de  donner  en  location  des  appareils 
emetieurs oti recepteurs· de· radiocommunication, dont un exemplaire n'aurait pas 
ete prealablement agrte par ]'organisme public competent, comme satisfaisant aux 
prescriptions techniques fJXees  par le ministre. 
Sur Ia directive 88/301/CEE 
35  II  convient, a ce stade, d'examiner Ia  portee de Ia  directive 88/301  pour ce  qui 
concerne les  appareil~ relevant de son champ d'application. 
36  Cette directive  a  ete arretee par Ia  Commission  dans l'exercice de son  pouvoir 
normatif, qui lui  est confere par l'articJe 90,  paragraphe 3,  du traite, d'edicter des 
regles  generales  precisant les obligations  resultant du traite, qui s'imposent aux 
Etats membres en ce qui  concerne  Jes  entreprises visees aux deux paragraphes 
precedents du meme article (arret France/Commission, precite, points 14 et 15). 
37  L'article 6 de ladite directive opere une distinction entre les activites ou fonctions 
tenant, d'une part, a  ]a formalisation des specifications des appareils terminaux, au 
controle de leur application et a  )'agrement de tels  appareils et, d'autre part, a 
l'offre par une entreprise publique ou privee des biens et/ou des services dans le 
domaine des telecommunications. 
38  L'articJe 6 precise l'obligation pour les Etats membres d'assurer qu'a par!ir du  ler 
juillet 1989 les activites de Ia  premiere categoric scient effectuees par une entite 
independante  des  entreprises  qui  s'engagent  dans  les  activites  de  la  deuxieme 
categorie. 
39  Or,  il  est  constant,  ainsi  que  le  gouvernement  beige  l~a  admis  au  cours  de 
!'audience,  qu'au  cours  de  la  periode  posterieure  au  ler juillet  1989,  visee  en 
l'espece au principal, cette division des activites n'avait pas ete operee en Belgique.· 
40  II  s'ensuit  que,  pour  autant  que  les  appareils  en  cause  relevent  du  champ 
d'application materiel de  Ia  directive  88/301,  et dans Ia  mesure ou il s'agit de  Ia 
periode posterieure au 1er juillet 1989, !'article 6 de cette directive s'oppose a une 
reglementation nationale qui interdit, sous peine de sanctions, la mise en vente au 
en  location d'appareils sans  qu'un exemplaire  ait ete agree par une  entreprise 
publique  offrant  des  biens  et/ou  des  services  dans  le  domaine  des 
telecommunications.  I1  appartient au juge national d'en tirer Jes  consequences. 
41  Pour ce  qui  concerne  Ia  periode anterieure au  ler juillet  1989,  et pour  ce  qui 
concerne les  appareils qui  ne  relevaient  ni  avant ni  apres cette date du  champ 
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d'application materiel de Ia directive, il y a lieu d'examiner le probleme sous I'  angle 
de l'article 90, paragraphe 1,  en liaison avec l'article 86 du traite. 
Sur I'  article 90; pa:ragraphe 1, .e~ liaison ·avec ].'article 86 du trai~e 
42  II  convient de relever a titre liminaire que les  articles 86 et 90 font partie d'un 
ensemble de regles qui, aux termes de }'article 3, sous f), du traite, visent a  assurer 
que la concurrence n'est pas faussee dans le marche commun. 
43  Comme  i1  a  ete  precise  ci-avant,  le  controle  du  domaine  public  hertzien  est 
necessaire au bon fonctionnement des radiocommunications, tant dans le domaine 
des services publics que dans celui des  activites commerciales et privees. Un tel 
controle est egalement necessaire a  la  realisation d'une concurrence non faussee 
entre les operateurs economiques qui  sc servent des radiocommunications, ainsi 
qu'entre les producteurs et entre les vendeurs des appareils, ces operateurs ayant 
tout interet a ce que leurs appareils puissent etre utilises sans perturbation. 
44  Il  y  a  lieu  cependant  de  signaler,  dans  le  meme  temps,  qu'un  systeme  de 
concurrence non faussee, tel que celui prevu par le traite, ne peut etre garanti que 
si l'egalite des chances entre les diffcrents operateurs economiques est assuree. Tel 
ne serait pas le cas si  une entreprise qui commercialise des appareils terminaux se 
voyait confier la tache de formaliser les specifications auxquelles devront repondre 
les  appareils  terminaux,  de  controler  leur application et d'agreer ces  appareils 
(arrets France/Commission, precite, point 51,  et GB-Inno-BM, precite, point 25).· 
45  C'est a la  lumiere de ces considerations que doit etre appreciee la compatibilite 
d'une  legislation  nationale,  telle  que  Ia  loi  beige  du  30  juillet  1979,  avec  les 
exigences du  traite. 
46  Quant a  l'exigence, pour la  detention d'un appareil emetteur ou recepteur,. d'une 
autorisation ecrite du  Ministre ayant les  telegraphes et les  telephones dans ses 
attributions,  telle  que  prevue  par  !'article  3,  paragraphe  1,  de  Ia  loi  beige,  i1 
convient de relever que seules entrent dans le champ d'application d·e  l'article 90, 
paragraphe 1,  les  mesures prises par les  Etats membres a l'egard des entreprises 
publiques  et  des  entrep.rises  auxquelles  ils  accordent des  droits  speciaux  et/ou 
exclusifs. Cette disposition du traite ne saurait des lors etre invoquee a  l'encontre 
d'un  pouvoir d'autorisation  confen! a un  ministre  dans  le  cadre normal  de ses 
attributions. 
47  La  meme constatation s'impose en ce qui concerne la simple fonction,  telle que 
celle qui a ete confiee a  la RIT, d'instruire les demandes d'autorisation introduites 
aupres  du  ministre,  cette  fonction  n't~tant qu'accessoire a l'exercice  du  pouvoir 
ministeriel. 
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48  Quant au  pouvoir d'agrement,  iJ  y a lieu  de constater que Ia  loi  beige s'applique 
indistinctement a  tout appareil emetteur ou  recepteur de radiocommunication, y 
compris  les  appareils destines,  comme  les  telephones sans  fil,  a etre connectes 
indirectement a  un  reseau public de· tel~communicatioo.. .  . 
49  Or, il ressort des termes de !'article 7 de la loi beige, precite, que, a  Ia difference 
de  Ia situation visee par ]'affaire GB-Inno-BM, precitee, c'est le ministre qui  fixe 
Jes prescriptions techniques necessaires pour I'  agrement de tels appareils, ainsi que 
les modaiites de )'agrement, et ceci dans le cadre de ses attributions de controle de 
Ia radiocommunication sur le territoire beige. S'il est vrai que Ia RTI est autorisee 
par )'article 2 de  cette meme  loi a entreprendre et a exploiter  tout service  de 
radiocommunication, il ressort des termes dudit article 7 que, en ce  qui concerne 
!'agrement d'appareils emetteurs ou recepteurs, Ia seule mission de Ia RIT consiste 
en Ia verification de Ia  conformite de tels appareils aux prescriptions fixees  par le 
Ministre. 
50  Pour ce  qui  concerne les appareils agrees par l'organisme competent d'un autre 
Etat  membre,  iJ  y  a  lieu  de  relever  qu'aussi  longtemps  que  les  systemes  de 
telecommunications et de radiocommunications des Etats membres n'ont pas ete 
harmonises,  ]'homologation  accordee  par un  Etat membre  ne  garantit  pas  que 
I'appareil en question ne  perturbe pas le bon fonctionnement de ces systemes sur 
le  territoire d'un autre Etat dont Ies prescriptions techniques peuvent encore ctre 
differentes. 
51  II  s'ensuit que  l'article 90,  paragraphe  1,  en liaison avec ]'article 86  du  traite,  ne 
s'oppose pas a  I'  application de dispositions nationales qui comportent ]'interdiction, 
en  premier  lieu,  de  detenir  des  appareils  ernetteurs  ou  recepteurs  de 
radiocommunication sans autorisation ministerielle, et, en deuxieme lieu, de vendre 
ou  de  donner en  location  de  tels  appareils dont un  exemplaire  n'aurait pas  ete 
agree . comme  satisfaisant  aux  prescriptions  techniques  ,fJXees  par  le  ministre 
competent, meme si  l'appareiJ a ete agree dans un autre Etat membre. 
Sur les depens 
52  Les  frais  exposes  par Je  gouvernement beige,  par Je  gouvernement du  Royaume-
Uni  et par Ia  Commission  des  Communautes europeennes, qui  ont soumis  des 
observations a  Ia Cour, ne peuvent faire I'  objet d'un remboursement. La procedure 
revetant, a l'egard  des  parties  au  principal,  le  caractere  d'un  incident  souleve 
devant la juridiction nationale, il appartient a  celle-ci de statuer sur les depens. 
I - 11 
ta (a9 
-....  ····· ,..  ·•·  ........  . 
ARRffi" DU  27.  10.  1993 •• AFFAIRES JOINTES C-46190  ET C-93/91 
Par ces motifs, 
LACOUR, 
statuant sur les questions a  elle soumises par le  tribunal de premiere instance de 
Bruxelles, par jugements du 19 avril  1989 et du  11  mars 1991, dit pour droit: 
1)  L'article 30 du traite CEE ne s'oppose pas ace qu'une entreprise publique 
se voie accorder le pouvoir d'agreer les appareils emetteurs ou recepteurs 
de radiocommunication non fournis par elle, des Iars que les decisions de 
cette entre  prise sont susceptibles de faire I'  objet d'un recours juridictionnel. 
2)  L'article 37 du traite CEE ne s'oppose pas a  l'application de dispositions 
legislatives ou reglementaires nationales qui  comportent l'interdiction de 
vendre ou de donner en location des appareils emetteurs ou recepteurs de 
radiocommunication, dont un exemplaire  n'aurait pas ete prealablement 
agree  par  l'organisme  public  competent,  comme  satisfaisant  aux 
prescriptions techniques fJXees  par le ministre. 
3)  Pour autant que les  appareils en  cause relevent du champ d'application 
materiel de Ia  directive 88/301/CEE de la Commission, du 16 mai 1988, 
relative  a  la  concurrence  sur  les  marches  de  terminaux  de 
telecommunication, et dans Ia mesure ou il s'agit de Ia periode posterieure 
au  1er  juillet  1989,  ]'article  6  de  cette  drrective · s'oppose  a  une 
reglementation nationale qui interdit, sous peine de sanctions, ]a nuse en 
vente ou en location d'appareils sans qu'un exemplaire ait ete agree par une 
entre  prise publique offrant des biens et/ou des services dans le domaine des 
telecommunications.  ll  appartient  au  juge  national  d'en  tirer  les 
consequences. 
4) 
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L'article 90,  paragraphe 1,  en liaison  avec )'article 86 du traite CEE, ne 
s'oppose  pas a )'application  de  dispositions  nationales  qui  comportent 
)'interdiction,  en  premier  lieu,  de  detenir  des  appareils  emetteurs  ou 
recepteurs de radiocommunication sans  autorisation  ministerielle,  et, en 
deuxieme lieu, de vendre ou de donner en location de tcls appareils dont 
un excmplairc n'aurait pas ete agree commc satisfaisant aux prescriptions .=  \. 
techniq..- fix6es  par le ministre competent, meme si l'appareil beneficie 
d'un agr6mcnt accorde par un autre Etat membre  • 
.  ·.  . . 
Due  Mancini  '.  Moitinho de Almeida  Diez de Velasco 
Edward  Kakouris  Joliet 
Schockweiler  Rodriguez Iglesias  Grevisse 
Zuleeg  Kapteyn  Murray 
Ainsi pronon= Cll audience publique a  Luxembourg,  le 27 octobre 1993. 
U  greffier  Le pr~ident 
J.-G. Giraud  0. Due 
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Dans  les affaires jointes 
C-271/90, 
Royaume  d'Espagne,  represente  initialement par  M.  Carlos  Bastarreche 
Sagues,  puis  par  M.  Alberto  Jose  Navarro  Gonzalez,  directeur general 
de  la  coordination  juridique  et  institutionnelle  communaut~ire,  et 
Mme  Rosario  Silva de  Lapuerta,  abogado  del  Estado,  chef du  service du 
contentieux communautaire,  en  qualite d'agents,  ayant  elu domicile  a 
Luxembourg  au  siege  de  l'ambassade  d'Espagne,  4-6,  boulevard  E. 
Servais, 
partie  requ~rante, 
soutenu  par 
Repub 1  i que  franc; a  i se,  representee  par  M.  Jean-Pierre  Pu i ssochet, 
directeur  des  affaires  juridiques  au  ministere  des  Affaires 
etrangeres,  et par  M.  Geraud  de  Bergues,  secretaire-adjoint principal 
ace meme  ministere,  en  qualite d'agents,  ayant  elu  domicile  a 
Luxembourg  au  siege  de  1' ambassade  de  France,  9,  boulevard  Pri nee 
Henri, 
partie  intervenante, - 2 -
c-281/90, 
.  ·  .. 
Royaume  de  Belgique,  represente  par  Me  Eduard  Marissens,  avocat  au 
barreau  de  Bruxelles,  ayant  elu  domicile  a Luxembourg  en  l'etude de 
Me  Lucy  Oupong,  14a,  rue  des  Bains, 
partie requerante, 
et C-289/90, 
Republique  italienne, representee  par  M.  le professeur Luigi  Ferrari 
Bravo,  chef  du  service du  contentieux diplomatique  du  ministere des 
Affaires  etrangeres,  en  qualite  d'agent,  assiste  de  M.  Ivo  M. 
Braguglia,  avvocato  della Stato,  ayant  elu  domicile  ~  Luxembourg  au 
siege  de  l'ambassade  d'Italie,  5,  rue  Marie-Adelaide, 
partie requerante, · 
contre 
Commission  des  Communautes  europeennes,  representee,  dans  les 
affaires  C-271/90  et  C-281/90,  par  M.  Bernhard  Jansen,  consei ller 
juridique,  ainsi  que,  respectivement,  par  ·Mme  Blanca  Rodriguez 
Galindo  et M.  Xavier  Lewis,  membres  du  service  juridique  en  qualite 
d'agents, et, dans  l'affaire C-289/90,  par  M.  Enrico  Trave~sa, membre 
du  service  juridique,  en  qualite  d'agent,  ayant  elu  domicile  a 
Luxembourg  au pres  de  M.  Roberto  Hayder,  representant  du  service 
juridique,  Centre  Wagner,  Kirchberg, 
partie defe'nderesse, 
Arret  C-271/90,  C-281/90  et C-289/90 
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ayant  pour  objet  l'annulation  de  la  directive  90/388/CEE  de  la 
Commis,sion,  du  28  juin  1990,  relative  a la  concurrence  dans  les 
marches  des  services  de  telecommunications·  (JO  L 192,  p.  10), 
LA  COUR, 
compose  de  MM.  G.C.  Roqrfguez  Iglesias,  president de  chambre,  faisant 
fonction  de  president,  M.  Zuleeg  et  J.L.  Murray,  presidents  de 
chambre,  G.F.  Mancini,  R.  Joliet,  F.A.  Schockweiler,  J.C.  Moitinho  de 
Almeida,  F.  Grevisse  et D.A.O.  Edward,  juges, 
avocat  general 
greffier 
M.  F.G.  Jacobs, 
M.  D.Triantafyllou,  administrateur, 
vu  le rapport  d'audience, 
ayant  entendu  les  parties  en  leur plaidoirie a l'audience du  31  mars 
1992,  au  cours  de  laquelle,  dans  l'affaire  C-271/90,  le  Royaume 
d' Espagne  a  ete  represente  par  M.  Antonio  Hierro  Hernandez-Mora, 
abogado  del  Estado,  et la Commission  des  Communautes  europeennes,  par 
M.  Francisco  Enrique  Gonzalez  Diaz  et M.  Enrico  Traversa,  membres  du 
service  juridique,  en  qualite d'agents, 
ayant  entendu  l'avocat general  en  ses  conclusions a l'audience du  20 
mai  1992, 
rend  le  present 
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Arret  . 
1  Par  requetes  deposees  au  greffe  de  la Cour  respectivement 
les 7,  14  et 20  septembre  1990,  le Royaume  d'Espagne,  le Royaume 
de  Belgique  et  la  Republique  italienne  ont,  en  vertu  de 
l'article  173,  premier  al inea,  du  traite  CEE,  demande 
l'annulation de  la directive 90/388/CEE  de  la Commission,  du  28 
juin  1990,  relative_ a la  concurrence  dans  les  marches  des 
services de  telecommunications  (JO  L 192,  p.  10).  La  Republique 
fran~aise est intervenue  a la procedure  C-271/90  au  soutien des 
conclusions  du  Royaume  d'Espagne. 
2  La  directive 90/388  a ete adoptee  sur la base  de  l'article 
90,  paragraphe  3,  du  traite.  L'article  ler  contient  une 
definition de  differents termes  utilises dans  la directive, tels 
que,  notamment,  "organi smes  de  tel ecommun i cations",  "dro its 
speciaux  ou  exclusifs",  "reseau  public  de  telecommunications .. , 
"services  de  telecommunications",  "point  de  terminaison  du 
reseau",  "exigences  essentielles".  11  precise  e·n  outre  que  la 
directive  ne  s'applique  pas  au  service  telex,  a  la 
radiotelephonie  mobile,  a  la  radiomessagerie  et  aux 
communications  par  satellite. 
3  En  vertu de  l'article 2 de  la directive,  les  Etats  membres 
assurent  l'abolition  des  droits  exclusifs  ou  speciaux  pour  la 
fourniture  de  services  de  telecommunications  autres  que  le 
service de  telephonie vocale et prennent  les mesures  necessaires 
afi n  de  · garant i r  1  e  droit  de  tout  operateur  economi que  de 
fournir  lesdits services  de  telecommunications. 
4  L'article 4 impose  aux  Etats membres  de  prendre  les mesures 
necessaires  pour  assurer  la  publicite,  l'objectivite  et 
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l'egalite des  conditions d'acces  aux  r~seaux et de  communiquer, 
lors de  chaque  augmentation  des  tarifs applicables  aux  circuits 
loues,  les  elements  permettant  a la  Commission  d'apprecier  le 
bien-fonde  de  ces  augmentations. 
5  L'article 6  prevoit,  entre  autres,  l'abrogation,  par  les 
Etats membres,  d~s restrictions existantes en  ce  qui  concerne.le 
traitement  des  signaux  avant  leur  transmission  sur  le  reseau 
public  ou  apres  leur  reception,  ainsi  que  l'obligation  de 
communiquer  a la Commission  les mesures  adoptees  a cet egard. 
6  L'article  7  prevoit  que  les  Etats  membres  attribuent,  a 
partir du  ler juillet 1991,  certaines fonctions  administratives, 
techniques,  de  controle  et  de  surveillance  a  une  entite 
independante  d~s organismes  de  telecommunications. 
7  L'article 8 reconnait  aux  utilisateurs lies par  un  contrat 
de  fourniture  de  services  de  telecommunications  qui,  lors  de  sa 
conclusion,  faisait  l'objet de  droits exclusifs ou  speciaux,  le 
droit  de  resilier ledit contrat  avec  un  certain preavis. 
8  Enfin,  selon  l'article 9,  les Etats  membres  communiquent  a 
la  Commission  les  informations  necessaires  pour  lui  permettre 
d'etablir pendant  une  periode  de  trois  ans,  a la  fin  de  chaque 
annee,  un  rapport  d'ensemble  sur l'application de  la directive. 
9  Pour  un  plus  ample  expose  des  faits  du  litige,  des 
dispositions  de  1  a  directive  en  cause,  du  deroul ement  de  1  a 
procedure  ainsi  que  des  moyens  et arguments  des  parties,  il  est 
renvoye  un  rapport  d'audience.  Ces  elements  du  dossier  ne  sont 
repris ci-dessous  que  dans  la mesure  necessaire  au  raisonnement 
de  la  Cour. 
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10  A l'appui  de  leur  recours,  les  Etats  membres  invoquent 
di fferents  moyens  tires  en  substance  de  ·1 ,., ncompetence  de  1  a 
Commission,  du  defaut  de  motivation  et  de  la  violation  du 
principe  de  proportionnalite. 
Sur  la competence  de  la Commission 
11  Dans  ses  observations  ecrites,  le gouvernement  belge  fait 
valoir,  en  premier  lieu,  que  les  dispositions  de  l'article 90, 
paragraphe  3,  du  tra  i te  ne  conferent  pas  a  1  a  Commission  un 
pouvoir  normatif mais  se  bornent  a lui  attribuer une  mission  de 
surveillance  des  regles ·communautaires  deja  existantes.  Selon 
lui,  la  Commission  ne  pouvait  pas  edicter de' regles  nouvelles 
sur le fondement  de  l'article 90,  paragraphe  3,  du  traite, comme 
elle  l'a  fait  aux  articles·  1,  2,  4  et  6  de  la  directive 
litigieuse. 
12  Cet  argument  doit  etre ecarte.  Ainsi  que  l'a juge  la  Cour 
dans  l'arret du  19  mars  1991,  France/Commission  (C-202/88,  Rec. 
p.  1-1223,  point  14),  en  permettant  a la  Commission  d'adopter 
des  directives,  l'article  90,  paragraphe  3,  du  traite,  lui 
confere  le pouvoir  d'edicter des.regles  generales  precisant  les 
obligations  resultant  du  traite,  qui  s'imposent  aux  (tats 
membres  en  ce  qui  concerne  les  entrepri ses  vi sees  aux  deux 
paragraphes  precedents  du  meme  article.  Le  pouvoir  de  la 
Commission  ne  se  limite  done  pas  a la  simple  surveillance  de 
l'application des  regles  communautaires  deja  existantes. 
13  Le  gouvernement  belge  fait valoir,  en  deuxieme  lieu,  qu'en 
prescrivant  l'abolition  des  droits  speciaux  et  exclusifs,  la 
Commission  empiete  sur  les competences  conferees  au  Conseil  par 
les  articles  100  A et 87  du  traite. 
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14  A cet  egard,  i 1  suffi t  de  raflpe 1  er  que  1 'objet  de  1  a 
competence  conferee a 1a  Commission  par l'article 90,  paragraphe 
3,  est different  et  plus  specifique  que  celui  des  competences 
attribuees  au  Conseil  par  l'article  100  A,  d'une  part,  et  par 
l'artic1e  87,  d'autre  part,  et  que  l'eventualite  d'w;e 
reglementation  edictee  par  le  Conseil  en  application  d'un 
pouvoir  general_  qu'il  detient  en  vertu  d'autres  articles  du 
traite  et  comportant  des  dispositions  qui  toucheraient  au 
domaine  specifique  de  l'article  90  ne  fait  pas  obstacle  a 
l'exercice de  la competence  que  ce  dernier article confere ala 
Commission  (arret du  19  mars  1991,  France/Commission,  precite, 
points  25  et_ 26). 
15  A 1' audience;  le  gouvernement  belge  a,  en  outre,  fait 
valoir  les  arguments  suivants. 
16  11  a  soutenu,  d'une  part,  que,  si  la  Commission  avait  pu 
valablement  definir,  dans  la  directive  88/301/CEE,  du  16  mai 
1988,  relative a la concurrence  dans  les marches  de  terminaux  de 
telecommunication  (JO  L 131,  p.  73),  dite directive "Terminaux", 
les obligations decoulant  de  l'article 30  du  traite, puisque  cet 
article  avait  ete  suffisamment  precise,  au  prealable,  par  les 
regles du  droit derive,  elle n'avait pas  pu  valablement definir, 
dans  la  directive  litigieuse,  les  obligations  decoulant  de 
l'article 59  du  traite, dont  l'application souleve des  problemes 
complexes  dans  le secteur des  telecommunications,  sans  que  soit 
intervenue,  au  prealable,  une  directive du  Conseil  precisant  la 
portee  de  cet  article. 
17  Il  a  soutenu,  d'autre  part,  que,  dans  la mesure  ou  il  est 
'  possible d'envisager plusieurs manieres,  pour  les Etats membres, 
de  s'acquitter des  obligations  qui  leur  incombent  en  vertu  de 
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l'ar.ticle  86  du  traite  dans  le  secteur  des  services  de 
telecommunication,  la  Commission  n'etait·pas  en  droit  de  leur 
imposer  un  moyen  particulier de  parvenir a un  resultat. 
Il  y a  l~eu de  rappeler que,  dans  l'arret du  19  mars  1991, 
France/Commission  (C-202/88,  precite,  point  21),  la Cour  a juge 
que  le pouvoir  de  surveillance confie  a la  Commission  comporte 
la  possibilite,  fondee  sur  l'article  90,  paragraphe  3,  de 
preciser  les  obligations  decoulant  du  traite,  et  que,  par 
consequent'  1'  etendue  de  ce  pouvoi r  depend  de  1  a  portee  des 
regles  dont  il  s'agit d'assurer le  respect. 
\ 
19  En  vertu  de  l'article 59  du  traite,  les  restrictions a la 
libre  prestation  des  services  a l'interieur  de  la  Communaute 
devaient  etre  supprimees  a l'expiration  de  la  periode  de 
transition  a  l'egard  des  ressortissants  des  Etats  membres 
etablis  dans  un  pays  de  la  Communaute  autre  que  celul  du 
destinataire  de  la  prestation.  Lcs  imperatifs  de  cette 
disposition  comportent  notamment  l'el imination  de  toute 
discrimination a l'encontre d'un  prestataire etabli dans  un  Etat 
membre  autre  que  celui  ou  la prestation est  fournie. 
20  .  11  est de  jurisprudence constante  (voir notamment  arret du 
17  decembre  1981,  Webb,  279/80,  Rec.  p.  3305,  point  13)  que 
l'article 59  prescrit  une  obligation  de  resultat precise,  dont 
l'execution devait etre facilitee, mais  non  conditionnee,  par  la 
mise  en  oeuvre  d'un  programme  de  mesures  progressives.  Partant, 
les  dispositions  de  l'article  59  du  traite  sont  devenues 
inconditionnelles  a l~expiration  de  la  periode  de  transition 
(arret  du  3  decembre  1974,  Binsbergen,  33/74,  Rec.  p.  1299, 
point  24). 
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21  L'article  59  ctant  done,  commc  l'article  30,  une 
disposition  directement  applicable,  la  Commission  pouvait,  en 
vue  de  favori ser  1  'ex  ere ice  effect if  du  droit  a  1  a  1  i bre 
prestation des  services,  preciser les  obligations decoulant  de 
cet  article  sans  qu'une  action  legislative  du  Cons~il  ait ete 
necessaire au  prealable.  Dans  ces  conditions,  une  restriction du 
pouvoir  de  la  Commission  du  type  de  celle  envisagee  par  le 
gouvernement  belge  conduirait a priver 1 'article 90,  paragraphe 
3,  de  son  effet utile.  Le  premier  argument  du  gouvernement  belge 
doit,  par  consequent,  etre rejete. 
22  En  ce  qui  concerne  1 'art  i c  1  e  86  du  tra  i te,  il  suffi t  de 
constater  que,  contrairement  a ce  que  pretend  le gouvernement 
belge,  la  directive  90/388  ne  determine  pas,  de  maniere 
exhaustive,  les  moyens  dont  disposent  les  Etats  membres  pour 
s'acquitter des  obligations qui  leur incombent  en  vertu de  cette 
disposition.  Ainsi,  l'article  7 de  la  directive  90/388,  qu'au 
cours  de  l'audience  le gouvernement  belge  a  pris  comme  exemple 
des  contraintes  imposees  aux  Etats membres  se  borne a prescrire, 
conformement  ace qu'exige  le regime  de  concurrence  non  faussee, 
prevu  a l'article 3,  sous  f),  du  traite  (voir,  notamment,  arret 
France/Commission,  precite,  points  51  et  52),  que  le titulaire 
des  pouvoirs  d'autorisation,  de  controle et de  surveillance des 
services  de  telecommunications  doit  etre  independant  des 
organismes  de  telecommunications.  Cette  disposition  enonce  une 
regle de  droit et laisse aux  instances  nationales  un  larg~ choix 
des  moyens  pour  la mettre  en  oeuvre.  L'argument  selon  lequel  la 
Commission  a  excede  les  pouvoirs  qu'elle  detient  au  titre  de 
l'article  90,  paragraphe  3,  en  fixant  un  cadre  trap  rigide  a 
l'elimination  des  infractions  a  l'article  86,  doit  done 
egalement  etre  rejete. 
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23  Les  gouvernements  espagnol  et  italien  relevent  pour  leur 
part que  l'article 90,  paragraphe  3,  du  traite n'attribue pas  a 
la Commission  le  pouvoir  d'obliger les  Etats  membres  a i~poser 
la modification des  contrats qui  ont  ete librement conclus entre 
gestionnaires et utilisateurs de  services de  telecommunications, 
comme  le prevoit  l'article 8 de  la directive. 
24  Dans  l'arret Fr~o.ce/Commission, precite (point 55),  la Cour 
a rappele  que  l'article 90  du  traite ne  conferait  de  pouvoir  a 
1  a  Commission  quI a 1' egard  des  mesures  etat  i ques  et  que  1  es 
comportements  anticoncurrentiels qui  avaient ete adoptes  par  les 
entreprises  de  leur  propre  initiative ne  pouvaient  etre mis  en 
cause  que  par des  decisions  individuelles  prises en  application 
des  articles 85  et 86  du  traite. 
25  Tout  comme  la direct1ve  .. Terminaux .. , precitee, la directive 
visee par  les presents  recours  ne  fait aucunement  appara1tre.que 
les  detenteurs  des  droits  speciaux  ou  exclusifs  aient  ete 
contraints  ou  incites,  par  des  reglementations  etatiques,  a 
conclure  des  contrats  de  longue  duree. 
26  L' article  90  ne  saura it des  1  ors  etre  regarde  comme  une 
base  appropriee  pour  supprimer  les  obstacles  a la  concurrence 
qui  resulteraient  de  contrats  de  longue  duree,  vises  par  la 
directive. 
27  I1  s'ensuit  que  l'article  8  de  la  directive  do'it  etre 
annul e. 
Sur  le defaut  de  motivation 
f 
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28  Le  gouvernement  espagno 1  sout.i ent  q~e  1  a  directive 
litigieuse,  en  ce  qu'elle  concerne  les  droits  speciaux,  est 
insuffisamment  motivee. 
29  Dans  l'arret  du  19  mars  1991,  France/Commissien,  precite 
(point  45},  la  Cour  a  juge,  a  propos  de  la  directive 
"Terminaux",  p~ecitee,  que  doit  Atre  regardee  comme 
insuffisamment  motivee  une  directive qui,  alors qu'elle vise  la 
suppression  de  droi ts  sp(k i aux  dans  un  secteur  determine,  ne 
precise,  dans  ses  dispositions  ou  ses  considerants,  ni  le  type 
de  droits  speciaux  qui  est  concretement  vise  ni  en  quai 
l'existence  de  ces  droits  serait  contraire  aux  differentes 
dispositions  du  traite. 
30  Or,  la  directive  litigieuse  ne  comporte  pas  de  telles 
precisions. 
31  En  particulier,  la definition  figurant  a son  article 1er, 
·selon  laquelle on  entend  par  "droits speciaux et exclusifs" "les 
droits octroyes  par  un  Etat  membre  ou  une  autorite publique a un 
au  plusieurs  organismes  publics  ou  prives  au  moyen  de  tout 
instrument  legislatif,  reglementaire  ou  administratif,  leur 
reservant  la  fourniture  d'un  service  ou  l'exploitation  d'une 
activite  determinee",  ne  permet  pas  de  determiner  le  type  de 
droits  speciaux  vise  par  la  directive  litigieuse  ni  en  quai 
1  'existence  de  ces  droit  s  sera it  cant ra ire  aux  d  i fferentes 
dispositions  du  traite. 
32  Par  suite,  il  y  a  lieu  d'annuler  les  dispositions  de  la 
directive litigieuse en  tant qu'elles visent a regler les droits 
~ 
speciaux. 
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Sur  la  justification  de  l'interdiction  generale  des  droits 
exclusifs 
33  le gouvernement  italien estime  que,  dans  la mesure  ou  la 
concession  de  droits  speciaux  ou  exclusifs  n'est  pas,  en  tant 
que  telle,  contraire  au  traite,  la  Commission  n'aurait·pas  dO 
formuler  l'obligation  generale  d'abolir  ces  droits,  dans  le 
domaine  considere,  ~.ans  avoir,  au  prealable,  procede  a  une  · 
enquete  circonstanciee sur les  differents comportements  adoptes 
dans  l'exercice de  ces  droits.  De  l'avis de  ce  gouvernement,  une 
interdiction  generale  ne  pouvait  etre  justifiee  que  si  une 
enquete  avait  releve  que  l'octroi  de  droits  speciaux  ou 
exclusifs  excluait  toute  possibil ite  de  concurrence  dans  le 
secteur  en  cause.  11  estime  toutefois  qu'une  enquete  n'aurait 
fait  apparaitre  que  des  restrictions  ponctuelles  a l'acces  au 
marche,  dues,  par exemple,  a  des  charges  pecuniaires excessives. 
Dans  ces  conditions,  il  appartenait  a la  Commission  de  prendre 
des  mesures  tendant  exclusivement  a eliminer  les  cas  concrets 
d'abus,  conformement  au  principe  de  proportionnalite. 
34  11  convient  de  relever,  a titre  liminaire,  que  ce  moyen 
n'est  examine  que  dans  la  mesure  ou  il  porte  sur  les  droits 
exclusifs,  la directive devant  etre annulee  pour  autant  qu'elle 
vise  a regler  les  droits  speciaux  (voir  point  32  du  present 
arret). 
35  11  resulte  de  la  jurisprudence  de  la  Cour  que  le  simple 
fait  de  creer  une  position  dominante  par  1  'octroi  de  droits 
exclusifs,  au  sens  de  1  'article  90,  paragraphe  1,  du  traite, 
n'est  pas,  en  tant  que  tel,  incompatible  avec  1  'article  86 
(voir,  notamment,  arret  du  10  decembre  1991,  Merci,  C-179/90, 
Rec.  p.  1-5889,  point  16). 
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36  Toutefois,  la  Cour  a  egalement.  juge  que  l'extension  du 
monopole  de  l'etablissement  et  de  l'exploitation  du  reseau 
telephonique  au  marche  des  appareils  telephoniques,  sans 
justification  objective,  etait  prohibee  comme  telle  par 
l'article 86  ou  par l'article 90,  paragraphe  1,  en  relation avec 
l'article 86,  lorsque  cette extension  est le  fait d'une  mesure 
etatique,  conduisant  ainsi  a eliminer  la concurrence  (arret  du 
13  decembre  1991,  RTT/GB-Inno-BM,'18/88,  Rec.  p.  1-5941,  point 
24}.  La  meme  conclusion  s'impose  lorsque  le  monopole  de 
l'etablissement  et  de  l'exploitation  s'etend  au  marche  des 
services  de  telecommunications. 
37  A cet  egard,  i1  resul te  du  sei z i eme  cons ide rant  de  1  a 
directive litigieuse dont  le gouvernement  italien n'a aucunement 
conteste  les  termes,  que  l'octroi  de  droits  exclusifs  aux 
organismes  de  telecommunications  conduit  ces  derniers a exclure 
les concurrents du  marche  des  services de  telecommunications  ou, 
a tout le mains,  a restreindre leur acces  a ce  marche.  Or,  selon 
ce  meme  considerant,  tous  les  services  en  question  peuvent,  en 
pr;ncipe,  etre  offerts  par  des  fournisseurs  etablis  dans 
d'autres  Etats  membres. 
38  La  Commission  etait  done  fondee  a exiger  l'abolition  des 
droits exclusifs,  pour  ce  qui  concerne  la fourniture de  certains 
services  de  telecommunications.  Le  moyen  invoque  a cet  egard 
doit,  des  lors,  etre rejete. 
Sur  les depens 
39  Aux  termes  de  l'article 69,  paragraphe  2,  du  reglement  de 
procedure,  toute  partie  qui  succombe  est  condamnee  aux  depens. 
Toutefois,  selon  le  paragraphe  3,  premier  alinea,  du  meme 
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article, la Cour  peut  repartir les depens  ou  decider  que  chaque 
partie  supporte  ses  propres  depens  si  les  parties  succombent 
respectivement  sur  un  ou  plusieurs  chefs.  Les  parties 
requerantes  n'ayant  obtenu  que  partiellement  gain  en  cause,  il 
y a lieu de  condamner  chacune  des  parties,  y compris  la partie 
intervenante,  a supporter  ses  propres  depens. 
Par  ces  motifs, 
LA  COUR 
declare  et arrete: 
1.  La  directive 90/388/CEE  de  la Commission,  du  28  juin 1990, 
relative a la concurrence  dans  les •arches des  services de 
telecommunications,  est annulee  pour  autant qu'elle vise a 
regler les droits  speciaux. 
2.  l'article 8 de  la directive est annule. 
3.  le recours  est rejete pour·le surplus. 
4.  Chacune  des  parties supportera  ses  propres  depens. 
Rodriguez  Iglesias  Zuleeg  Murray 
Mancini  Joliet  Schockweiler 
Moitinho  de  Almeida  Grevisse  Edward 
Arret  C-271/90,  C-281/90  et C-289/90 
It/ 1 05 - 15  -
A  ins i  prononce  en  audience  pub 1  i que  a Luxembourg,  1  e  17  novembre 
1992. 
Le  greffier 
J.-G.  Giraud 
Le  president  faisant  fonction 
G.C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias 
Pres·ident  de  chambre 
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ccOirectives 83/189/CEE du Conseil et 88/301/CEE de Ia  Commission • 
Notification des specifications en matiere de telecommunications - lndependance 
de J'entite chargee de Ia  reglementation - Sanctions penalesn 
Dans l'affaire C-69/91, 
ayant pour objet une demande adressee a  Ia  Cour, en application de !'article 177 
du traite CEE, par Ia  cour d'appel de Douai (France) et tendant a  obtenir, dans 
Ia  procedure penale poursuivie devant cette juridiction centre 
Francine Decoster, epouse Gillon, 
une decision a  titre prt!judiciel sur !'interpretation de Ia  directive 83/189/CEE du 
Cortseil, du 28 mars 1983, prevoyant une procedure d'information dans le domaine 
des  normes  et  reglem~ntations techniques  (JO  L  109,  p.  8) et de  Ia  directive 
88/301/CEE de Ia  Commission, du  16 mai  1988, relative a  Ia concurrence dans les 
marches de terminaux  d~ telecommunication (JO L 131,  p.  73), 
LACOUR, 
composee de MM. 0. Due,  president, G.C.  Rodriguez Iglesias, M.  Zuleeg et 
J.L~ Murray,  presidents de  chambre, G.F.  Mancini,  R.  Joliet, F.A. Schockweiler, 
J.C. Moitinho de Almeida et F. Grevisse, juges, 
* 
l..an,ue de pmcidure: lc  rraa~:llll. 
/tt/1 07 CORRIGENDUM  DANS  L'ARRET 
c - 69/91 
Decoster  .·  . .  . : 
Veuillez lire dans  l'arret sus-mentionne 
page  1 : 
au  lieu de 
composee  de  MM.  0.  Due,  pr~sjdent, G.C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias,  M.  Zuleeg  et J.l. 
Murray,  presidents de  chambre,  G.F.  Mancini,  R.  Joliet, F  .A.Schockweiler,  J.C. 
Moitinho  de  Almeida  et  F.  Grevisse,  juges, 
veuillez lire: 
composee  de  MM.  0.  Due,  president,  G.F.  Mancini,  J.C. Moitinho  de  Almeida,  M. 
Diez  de  Velasco  et  D.A.O.  Edward,  pr~sidents de  chambre,  C.N.Kakouris,  R. 
Joliet,  F.A.  Schockweiler,  G.C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias,  F.  Grevisse,  M.  Zuleeg, 
P.J.G.  Kapteyn  et J.L.  Murray,  juges, 
page  11: 
au  lieu de: 
Due 
Murray 
Schockweiler 
veu ill  ez  1 ire: 
Due 
Diez  de  Velasco 
Joliet 
Grevisse 
Rodriguez  Iglesi~s 
Mancini 
Moitinho  de  Almeida 
Mancini 
Edward 
Schockweiler 
Zuleeg 
Murray 
Zuleeg 
Joliet 
Grevisse 
Moitinho  de  Almeida 
Kakouris 
Rodriguez  Iglesias 
Kapteyn avocat general: M.G. Tesauro, 
greffier: M. J  ... Q. Giraud, 
\ ...  .· 
considerant les observations ecrites presentees: 
pour l'appelante au  principal,  par Mes  S.  Bailleul, avocat au barreau de 
Lille, et L  Misson, avocat au barreau de  Liege, 
pour Je  gouvernement de  Ia  Republique fran<iaise,  par MM·.  P.  Pnuzoulct, 
sous  .. directeur a  Ia direction des affaires j.uridiqu~s au ministere des Affaircs 
etrangeres, en qualite d'agent, et G. de Bergues, secretaire adjoint principal 
au meme ministere, en qualite d'agent  suppl~ant, 
pour le gouvernement de Ia  Republiqu~ fedc!rale d'AIIemagne, par MM.  E. 
Roder,  Ministerialrat  au  ministere  fc!deral  de  l'Ecunomie,  et  J.  Karl, 
Regierungsdirektor au  meme minhnere, en  qualit~ d'agents, 
pour le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par Mile R. Caudwell, du Treasury 
Solicitor's Department, assistee de  Me  E. Sharpston, barrister, en  qualitc,; 
d'agents, 
pour Ia Commission des Communautes t:uropc!ennes, par M. R. Wainwright, 
conseiller juridique, en qualite d'agent, assistt! de Me  H. Lehman, avocat au 
barreau de Paris,  · 
vu le rapport d'audience, 
ayant entendu les observations orales de l'appelante au principal, du gouvcrncment 
fran<_iais,  do gouvernement allemand, du  gouvt=rnement du  Royuumt=-Uni  t=t  de  Ia 
Commission a  }'audience du  22 janvier 1992, 
ayant entendu l'avocat general en ses conclusions a l'audience du  3 juin  1Y92, 
rend le present 
Arret 
1  Par arret du 6 fevrier 1991, parvenu a  Ia Cour It!  18  f~vrier suivant, Ia cour d'appel 
de  Douai  (France)  a  pose,  en  application  de  I'  art  ide  177  du  traite  CEE,  trois 
questions prejudicielles sur !'interpretation de  Ia directive 83/189/CEE du Conscil, 
du  28  mars  1983,  prevoyant  une  procedure  d'information  dans  le  donwinc  des 
I.- 2 ..  , .. 
normes et reglementations techniques (JO L 109,  p.  8),  modifiee par Ia directive 
88/182/CEE du Conseil du 22 mars 1988 (JO L 81, p. 75, ci-apres "directive normes  .. 
techniques  .. ),  et .de  Ia  directive  88/301/CEE de  Ia  Commission,  du  lQ  mai  1988, 
r~t~tiv~  ~a ia .co~cur.;ence  da~~ ies ~arch~~ de ter~inau~  .Qe  titecamin~'nication (JO 
L  131,  p.  73,  ci-a pres "directive  terminaux"),  en  vue d'apprecier Ia  compatibilite 
avec celles-ci du regime mis en place par le decret  fran~ais n° 85-712, du  11 juillet 
1985,  portant  application  de  Ia  loi  du  ler  aout  1905  et  relatif  aux  materiels 
susceptibles d'etre raccordes au reseau des  telecommunications de l'Etat. 
2  Ces  questions  ant ete  soulevees  dans  le  cadre  d'une  procedure  penale  dirigee 
contre  Mme  Decoster,  prevenue  d'avoir  vendu,  entre mai  et octobre  1989,  des 
terminaux de  telecommunications (telecopieurs) sans avoir sollicite  ni  obtenu au 
prealable le  certificat d'homologation exige  par ]'article L 48 du  code des  Pastes 
et Telecommunications et les  articles  ler a  7 du  decret no  85-712, susmentionne. 
Estimant que  Ia  commercialisation  de  terminaux  non  homologues constituait un 
delit de fraude commcrciale, au  sens de  l'article  ler de Ia  loi  du  ler aout 1905,  le 
tribunal correctionnel de  Lille a condamne Mme Decoster en premiere inst_?lnce a 
une  amende de  50 000  FF. 
3  II  ressort du dossier qu'cn vertu du decret susmentionne, les materiels susceptibles 
d'etre  raccordes  au  n!seau  public  nc  peuve~t etre  fabriques  pour  le  marche 
interieur, importes pour Ia  mise a Ia  consommation, detenus en vue de  Ia  vente, 
mis en vente ou distribues a  titre gratuit ou onereux.que s'ils sont conformes a  ses 
dispositions  et  s'ils  satisfont a un  certain  nombre. de  prescriptions  qui  visent a 
preserver le  bon  fonctionnement du  reseau et Ia  securite des  utilisateurs (  articJes 
3 et 4). Pour justifier de  Ia conformite des appareils a  ces exigences, les operateurs 
concernes doivent presenter soit  un  rapport etabli par un  organisme agree par le 
ministere charge de J'Industrie, soit un agrement delivre en application du code des 
P et T,  soit  un  certificat  de  qualification  delivr~ en  application  de  Ia  loi  sur  la 
protection et !'information des  consommateurs ou  un  autre document justificatif 
reconnu comme equivalent par arrete du  ministre charge de l'lndustrie (article 6). 
I - 3 .. 
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L'article 7 du  decret precise  Ia  penalite encouruc:  par ceux  qui  contreviennent  ~l· 
l'obligation de justifier de Ia confo_rmite des appareils  ~n question. 
.  ..  ·  .  . . ..  .  . .  .. .  ... 
Pour I' application du decret n° 85-712, le ministre du  Red~ploiement industriel: et: 
du Commerce exterieur a emis,_le ler novembre 1985, un avis relatif aux terminau» 
susceptibles d'!tre raccordes au  reseau des  telecommunications de  I'Etat.  L'avis. 
precise,  entre  autres,  de  quelle  fa~on  les  interesses  peuvent  justifier  de  Ia 
conformite des terminaux. A cet egard,  il  dispose que le Centre national d'e.tudes. 
des telecommunications (CNET);a ete agree par le  ministre charge de  l'lndustri,e 
pour Ia delivrance du rapport vise a  I' article 6 du dec ret  pn!cit~, que !'agrement. est 
delivre  par Ia  direction generale des telecommunications. en  application du  code· 
des  P et T,  pour les  materiels conformes  aux  specifications  figurant  sur  Ia  liste· 
annexee a  l'avis, et que Ia mise en place des autres modes de justification  pr~vus 
a ]'article  6 se  fera  ulterieurement.  Les  debats  devant  Ia  Cour  n'ont  pas  fait 
apparaitre si, posterieurement a  l'avis de novemhre  1985, le  syst~me de delivrance 
des documents  autres que  l'agrement et du  rapport du  CNET avait  et~ mis  en 
place. 
5  Devant ]a cour d'appel de  Douai,  Mme  Decoster a fait  valoir qu'a l'epoque dc:s 
faits du litige au principal, et ce en violation de I' obligation pour les Etats membres, 
prewe a  !'article 6 de Ia  dir~ctive 88/301, precitee, l'autorite chargee en Franct!·de 
formaliser les specifications techniques et de  v~rifier _Ia  conformite des appareils. 
aux  conditions  requises  ne  presentait  aucune  ind~pendance  par  rapport  a 
l'organisme qui gere le  reseau public des telecommunications et qui,  par· ailleurs,. 
commercialise lui-meme des appareils terminaux. Elle a affirm~ en second lieu que 
les specifications techniques permettant de justifier de Ia  conformite des appareils. 
au decret susmentionne n'avaient pas fait  l'objet de  Ia  notification  prevue par les 
directives  83/189  et  88/301,  precitees,  et  que  celles~ci  lui  etaient  des  lors 
inopposables . 
1-4 
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6  Compte tenu des allegations de Ia  prevenue, Ia cour d'appel de Douai a decide de 
poser a  Ia  Cour les trois questions prejudicielles suivantes: 
...  .  .  . 
eel)  La directive 83/189/CEE du 28 mars 1983 qui ~'a pas ete suivie d'un 
texte national d'application dans le delai de 12 mois est-elle d'effet 
direct en droit fran~ais? 
2)  La directive 88/301/CEE du 16 mai  1988 qui n'a pas ete suivie d'un 
texte national d'application dans le  delai expirant le  ler juillet 1989 
est-elle d'effet direct en droit fran~ais? 
3)  Des  lors  les  effets  .. combines de ces deux directives commandent-ils 
d'ecarter l'application du decret de  1985?>) 
7  Pour  un  plus  ample  expose  des  faits  et  du  cadre  reglementaire  du  litige  au 
principal,  du  deroulement  de  Ia  procedure  ainsi  que  des  observations  ecrites 
deposees devant Ia  Cour,  il  est renvoye au  rapport d'audience. Ces elements du 
dossier ne sont repris ci-apres que dans Ia  mesure necessaire au raisonnement de 
Ia  Cour. 
Sur Ia directive 88/301/CEE 
R  Par Ia deuxieme question, qu'il convient d'examiner en premier lieu, en liaison avec 
Ja  troisieme  question,  Ia  juridiction  nationale  cherche  en  substance a savoir  si 
l'article  6  de  Ia  directive  88/301  s'oppose a l'applicat!on  d'une  reglementation 
nationale, teJie que celJe visee en J'espece au principal, qui interdit, sous peine de 
sanctions, aux operateurs economiques de fabriquer, d'importer, de detenir en vue 
de Ia  vente, de vendre ou distrihuer des appareils terminaux sa~s justifier, par Ia 
presentation  d'un  agr~ment  ou  de  tout  autre  document  considere  comme 
equivalent,  de  Ia  conformite  de  ces  appareils a certaines exigences  essentielles 
tenant notamment  ~l  Ia  securite des usagers et au bon fonctionnement du reseau, 
alors que n'est pas assuree l'independance, par rapport a  tout opera.teur offrant des 
biens et/ou des services dans le  domaine des telecommunications, de l'organisme 
I - 5  • qui  delivre  l'agrement  ou  tout  autre  document  equivalent  et  formalise  1es 
.  spedfications techniques· auxquelles ces appareils doivent  repondr~. 
\  . . ..  . .  . .  .  ..  . ... 
9  L'article 6 de Ia directive 88/301  dispose: "les Etats membres assurent qu'a partir 
du 1er  juil~et 19891a formalisation des sp~cifications, le controle de leur application 
ainsi  que !'agrement sont effectues par une  entite  independante des  entreprises 
publiques  ou  privees  offrant des  biens  et/ou  des  servicc:=s  dans  lc::  domuine  tks 
telecommunications." 
10  II ressort des pieces du dossier qu'en vertu des dispositions du decret n° H6-129 du 
28 janvier 1986 (articles 13 a 15)  Ia  direction  g~nerale des  telecommunications du 
ministere des P et T etait chargee de  I' exploitation du  reseclU  puhlic, de Ia  mise en 
oeuvre de la politique commerciale des telecommunications, de Ia forn1alisation des 
specifications  techniques,  du  controle  de  leur  application  et  de  l'agr~ment des 
appareiJs terminaux.  Oevant  Ia  Cour,  le  gouvernement  francsais  a  precis~ que  le 
Centre national d'etudes des  telecommunications (CNET), dont  le  rapport  t.!tait 
considere comme equivalent a  l'agremcnt, faisait partie de Ia direction gt!ncralc des 
,  telecommunications en tant que centre::  de  rc::ch«!rche. 
11  Par  decret  no  89-327,  du  19  mai  1989,  modifiant  It:  d~cr«!t  n°  H6-129;  Ia 
formalisation  des  specifications  techniquc::s,  le  contr6lc::  'de  lc::ur  application  «!t 
!'agrement des appareils terminaux ont C:te  transf~res i1  Ia  nouvelle dir«!ction de  Ia 
reglementation generale du  meme  minist~re. 
12  II  resuJte  done  de  Ia  reglementation  c::n  cause::  que,  durant  Ia  p~riodc::  vis~e en 
l'espece au principal, differentes directions du  minister~ fran~ais des P et T etaient 
chargees tout a  la fois de  l'exploitation du  reseau public. de  Ia  mise  en oeuvre! de 
Ja  politique  commerciale  des  h~lecommunications,  de  Ia  formalisation  tks 
specifications  techniques,  du  contr6k de  l«!ur  application  et  dt!  l'agrt.!mcnt  des 
appareils terminaux. 
I - 6 13  Dans ces  circonstances,  il  y a  lieu  de  vc!rifier,  a Ia  lumiere  des  dispositions  de 
l'article 6 de Ia  directive, d'une part, si  )'administration  fran~aise des P et T peut 
etre consideree comme uqe entreprise puhlique au sens du droit communautaire 
et,  .d'autre  p~rt,  si.  ie ·  ~rit~re ·de  l'inde.penda.nce·  d~  l'entite ·chargee ··de  Ia·: 
formalisation des specifications, des controles et de J'agrement est respecte.  , 
14  S'agissant de la  notion  d'entreprise,  l'articJe  ler, deuxieme tiret,  de  la  directive 
precise que celle-ci vise "les organismes publics ou prives auxquels l'Etat octroie des 
droits speciaux ou exclusifs d'importation, de commercialisation, de raccordement, 
de mise en service d'appareils ierminaux de telecommunications et/ou d'entretien 
de tels appareils". 
15  IJ  y a lieu d'observer,  ~l cet c!gard, que le  fait  que, comme en l'espcce au principal, 
!'exploitation du reseau puhlic et de  Ia  commercialisation des appareils terminaux 
est  confiee  a  des  entites  integrees  dans  !'administration  publique  ne  saurait 
soustraire ces dernieres  <1  Ia  qualification d'entreprise publique. En effet, comme 
Ia Cour l'a constate dans le contexte de Ia directive 80/723/CEE de Ia  Com~ission, 
du  25 juin 19RO,  relative  ~l  Ia  transparence des relations financieres entre les Etats 
membres et Jes  entreprises publiques (JO L  195,  p.  35),  un  organe  exer~ant des 
activites  economiques  de  caract~r~  industriel  ou  commercial  ne  doit  pas 
necessairement  posscder une  personnalite juridique distincte de l'I;:tat  pour etre 
considerce comme une  entreprise puhlique. S'il  n'en etait pas ainsi,  il  serait porte 
atteinte a  l'efficacitc des dispositions de Ia directive en cause ainsi qu'a l'uniform!te 
de  son  application  dnns  tous  les  Etats  memhres  (voir  arret  du  16  juin  1987, 
Commission/Ita lie,  11 H/S5,  Rec.  p.  2$99,  point  13). 
16  En  ce  qui  concerne  l'exigence  de  l'independance  de  l'entite  chargee  de  la 
formalisation  des  specifications,  du  controle  de  leur  application  ainsi  que  de 
!'agrement,  il  suffit  de  constater  que  des  directions  differentes  d'une  meme 
administration ne sauraient etre considerees com me independantes l'une de l'autre, 
au sens de  )'article 6 de  Ia  directive. 
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17  II y a lieu de relever enfin que les faits  d~ Ia  presente affaire se sont deroules entre 
mai et octobre 1989, c'est-a-dire pendant Ia  period~ au cours  d~  laquell~ Je  d~lai 
prevu a l'article 6 de  Ia  directive  88(301  est. venu a echeance.  Pour  l~t. p~riode  .  ..  .  ..  . .  . 
anterieure au ler  juillet 1989, Ia question pos6e doit  ~tre consideree commc= visant 
egalement les articles 3 (t), 86 et 90 du traite (voir arrC::t  du  13  decc=mhre  1991, 
GB-Inno-BM, C-18/88, Rec. p.  1-5941,  point  14). 
18  Mme Decoster estime que Ia combinaison de Ia fonction de commercialisation des 
appareils terminaux avec celle d'homologation des appare!ils commercialises parses 
concurrents est susceptible de  creer, au sein  du  rninist~re des  P et T,  un  contlit 
d'interets, puisque le  ministere sera en mesure de  mettre en oeuvre une politique 
anti-concurrentielle au detriment de ses concurrents. 
19  Dans ]'arret du 19 mars 1991, dit "Terminaux", frunce/Commission (C-202/XS, Rec. 
p.  1-1223, point 51),  Ia  Cour a reconnu qu"un  systc!me de concurrence non  faussce 
tel  que celui  prevu  par k  traite  ne  peut etre garanti que si  l'egalite des  chances 
entre les differents operateurs economiqucs est assurec. La  Cour t:n  a condu (1uc 
le maintien d'une concurrence effective et Ia garantie de transpart:nce exigent que 
Ia  formalisation  des  specifications  techniqut:s,  le  contrt>le  de  leur  application  et 
!'agrement scient effectues par une entite  ind~p~ndante des entreprises puhliques 
ou  privees  offrant  des  biens  au  des  services  concurrents  dans  le  domainc=  des 
telecommunications. 
20  Dans l'arret GB-Inno-BM (precite, point 2H),  Ia  Cour a juge que les articles 3 (t), 
90  et  86  du  traite  s'opposent  a ce  qu'un  Etclt  memhre  conft:rc  i1  Ia  societe 
exploitant le reseau public de  tc~lecommunications It:  pouvoir d'~dictt!r des normt:s 
relatives aux appareils telephoniques et de verifier leur rc:spect  par le!s  op~rateurs 
economiques, alors qu'elle est  Ia  concurrente de  ces  op~rateurs sur  I~ man:he tie 
ces appareils. 
I • 8 21  A Ia  difference de  Ia  situation qui  a donne  lieu a  l'arret GB-Inno-BM, precite,  c:!t 
dans laquelle Jes functions susmentionnees etait:!nt exercees par Ia RTT, organisme 
beige  d'interet  p~blic, ces  memes  functions  ont ete  exercees,  dans  Ia  presente 
.  .  . 
affaire, par Je  ministere  fran~ais des Pet T. Toutefois,  ~insi qu'il resulte des points 
~4 et 15 de cet arret, il  est indifferent de savoir si  Je  cumul de ces fonctions existe 
au niveau d'un organisme juridiquement distinct de  l'Etat ou d'un ministere. 
22  Dans  ces  conditions,  il convient  de  repondre a Ia  juridiction  nationale  que  les 
articles 3 (t), 86 et 90 du traite et l'article 6 de Ia directive 88/301 s'opposent a  une 
reglementation  nationak  qui  interdit,  sous  peine  de  sanctions,  aux  operateurs 
·economiques de fahriquer, d'importer, de detenir en vue de Ia vente, de vendre ou 
distrihuer des appareils terminaux sans justifier, par Ia presentation d'un agrement 
ou de  tout autre document considere comme equivalent, de  Ia  conformite de ces 
appareils a certaines exigt:!nces  essentidks tenant  notamment a Ia  securite  des 
usagcrs  et  au  hon  fonctionnement  du  n~seau,  alors  que  n'est  pas  assuree 
l'indt.pcndancc,  par  r<tpport  ;\  tout  opL~ratL~ur offrant  des biens  ct/ou des services 
dans le domaine des tcl2communications, c.k  l'organisme qui delivre l'agrerpent ou 
tout autre document e4uivalent et formalise les specifications techniques auxquelles 
ces  appareils doivent n!pondre. 
Sur Ja  directive 83/189/CEE 
23  Compte tenu de  Ia  rcponse  don nee  ci-dessus,  il  n  'y  a  pas  lieu de statuer  _sur  les 
yuestions relatives a  Ia directive H3/1H9. 
Sur les dcpens 
24  Les  frais  exposes  par  les  gouvernements  de  Ia  Republique  francsaise,  de  la 
repuhlique  federak d'AIIemagne  et  du  Royaume-Uni  et par Ia  Commission des 
Communautes europeenne.s, qui ont .soumis des observations a  Ia Cour, ne peuvent 
. I - 9  .. faire l'objet d'un remboursement. La  proc~dur~ rev~tant, a l'egard dt=s  parties au 
principal,  le  caractere  d'un  incident  soul~ve dt=vant  Ia  juridiction  nationalc.:,  il 
appartient a  celle-ci de statuer sur les depens. 
Par ces motifs, 
LACOUR, 
statuant sur les questions a  eiiC!  soumis~s par Ia  cour d'appd de Douai, par arret 
du 6 fevrier 1992,  dit pour droit: 
I - 10 
Les articles 3  (t),  86 et ·90  du  traite et I'  article 6  de  Ia  directive  AA/30 I 
(CEE) de Ia Commission, du 16 mai 19HH, relative a  Ia concurre.nce durrs les 
marches  de  terminaux  de  telecommunication,  s'opposent  a  une 
reglementation  nationale  qui  interdit,  sous  pcine  de  sanctions,  aux 
operateurs economiques de fahriquer, d'importer, de detenir en vue de Ia 
vente, de vendre ou distribuer des appareils terminaux sans justifier, par Ia 
presentation d'un agrement ou de tout autre document considcrc commc 
equivalent,  de  Ia  conformitc  de  ces  apparcils  a certaines  exigcnccs 
essentielles  tenant  notamment  a Ia  securite  des  usagers  et  au  bon 
fonctionnement du reseau, a1t>rs  que n'c.:st  pas assurec l'indcpendance, par 
rapport a tout  operateur  offrant  des  biens  ct/ou  des  services  dans  lc 
dornaine des telecommunications, de l'nrganismc qui dclivre lkcosler 
l'agrement ou tout autre document equivalent et formalise les specifications 
techniques auxquelles ces appareils doivent repondre. 
Due  Rodriguez Iglesias  Zuleeg 
Murray  Mancini  Joliet 
Schockweiler  Moitinho de AJmeida  Grevisse 
Ainsi prononce en audience publique a  Luxembourg, le 27 octobre 1993. 
Lc greffier  Le  p~esident 
J.-G. Giraud  0. Due 
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«  Rectification d'arret >> 
ayant pour ohjet une demande adressee a  Ia  Cour, en application de I'article 177 
du traite CEE, par Ia  cour d'appel de Douai (France) et tendant a  obtenir, dans 
Ia  procedure penale poursuivie devant cette juridiction contre 
Francine Decoster, epouse Gillon, 
une decision a titre prejudiciel sur !'interpretation de Ia directive 83/189/CEE du 
ConseiJ, du 28 mars 1983, prevoyant une procedure d'information dans le domaine 
des  normes  et  reglementations  techniques  (JO  L  109,  p.  8)  et de  Ia  directive 
88/301/CEE de Ia Commission, du 16 mai 1988, relative a  Ia concurrence dans les 
marches de terminaux de telecommunication (JO L 131,  p. 73), 
LACOUR, 
composee  de  MM.  0. Due,  president,  J.C.  Moitinho  de Almeida,  M.  Diez de 
Velasco,  D.A.O. Edward,  presidents de chambre, C.N.  Kakouris,  R.  Joliet, F.A. 
Schockweiler, G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, F. Grevisse, M.  Zuleeg et P.J.G. Kapteyn, 
juges, 
avocat general: M.  G. Tesauro, 
greffier: M. J.-G. Giraud, 
• 
I.An«u~ de:  procedur~: le  rran~ais. OROONNANCE DU 22 NOVEMBRE 1993 • AFFAIRE C-69t91 
l'avocat general entendu, 
rend Ia presente 
ORDONNANCE 
Le 27 octobre 1993, Ia  Cour a rendu son arret dans )'affaire C-69/91.  · 
L'arn!t contient des erreurs de plume qu'il convient de rectifier d'office en vertu 
de )'article 66 du reglement de:procedure. 
Par ces motifs, 
LACOUR 
ordonne que l'arret precite soit rectifie comme suit : 
1)  A Ia page 1, il y a lieu de rectifier Ia composition de Ia Cour comme suit : La Cour 
composee de MM. 0. Due, president, G.F. Mancini, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, 
presidents de chambre, R. Joliet, F.A Schockweiler, G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias,  F. 
Grevisse, M. Zuleeg et J.L Murray, juges, 
2)  A Ia page 5, point 8, 3eme ligne, il y  a lieu de lire "s'oppose a  une regJementation 
nationale". 
3)  A  Ia  page 7,  point 15,  2eme ligne, il  y a  lieu de lire ")'exploitation du rcseau 
public et Ia commercialisation des appareils terminaux". 
4)  A Ia page 11, il y a lieu de rectifier Ia composition de Ia Cour comme suit :  Due, 
Mancini, Moitinho de Almeida, Joliet, Schockweiler, Rodriguez Iglesias, Grevisse, 
Zuleeg, Murray.  · 
5)  La minute de la presente ordonnance est annexee a  Ia  minute de l'arret rectifie. 
Mention de cette ordonnance est faite en marge de Ia minute de l'arret 
I'- 2 , 
Fait a  Luxembourg, le 22 novembre 1993 
Le greffier  Le .Pr&ident 
J.-G. Giraud  0. Due 
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Fait a Luxembourg, le 22 novembre 1993 
......  ...... 
Le greffier  Lc .Pr&ident 
. J.-G. Giraud  O.Due 
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«Directive 88/301/CEE de la Commission - lndependance de l'entite 
chargee de Ia  reglementation- Sanctions penales)) 
Dans l'affaire C-92/91, 
ayant pour objet une demande adressee a  Ia  Cour, en application de l'article 177 
du  traite CEE, par le  tribunal de  police de Vichy (France) et tendant a  obtenir, 
dans Ia procedure penale poursuivie devant cette juridiction centre 
Annick Taillandier, epouse Neny, 
et 
une decision a  titre prejudiciel sur !'interpretation de Ia  directive 88/301/CEE de 
Ia  Commission,  du  16  mai  1988,  relative a  Ia· concurrence dans les  marches ·de 
terminaux de telecommunication (JO L 131,  p.  73), 
LACOUR, 
composee de MM. 0. Du_e,  president, G .C. Rodriguez Iglesias, M.  Zuleeg et 
J.L Murray, presidents qe  chambre, G.F. Mancini, R. Joliet, F.A. Schockweiler, 
J.C. Moitinho de Almeida et F.  Grevisse, juges, 
· avocat general: M. G.  T~sauro, 
Langue de proddun:: le  rran~ais. greffier: M.  J.-G. Giraud, 
considerant les observations ecrites presentees: 
pour le  gouvernement de Ia  Republique  fran~aise, par t-v1M.  P.  Pouzoulet, 
sous-directeur a  Ia direction des an·aires juridiques au ministere des Affaires 
etrangeres, en qualite d'agent, et G. de Bergues, secretaire adjoint principal 
au meme ministere, en qualite d'agent suppleant, 
pour le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par MileR. Caudwell, du Treasury 
Solicitor's Department, assistee de Me  E.  Sharpston. barrister, en qualite 
d'agents, 
pour Ia Commission des Communautes europeennes, par M. R. vVainwright, 
conseiller juridique, en qualite d'agent, assiste de Me H. Lehman, avocat au 
barreau de Paris, 
vu  le  rapport d'audience, 
ayant entendu les observations orates du gouvernement fran~ais, du gouvernement 
du Royaume-Uni et de Ia  Commission a  !'audience du 22 janvier 1992. 
ayant entendu l'avocat general en ses conclusions a }'audience du 3 juin 199Z, 
rend le  present 
Arret 
1  Par jugement du 5 mars 1991, parvenu a  Ia Cour le  13 mars suivant, le tribunal de 
police de Vichy (France) a pose, en application de l'article 177 du traite CEE, une 
question  prejudicielle  sur  !'interpretation  de  Ia  dir~ctive  88/301/CEE  de  Ia 
Commission,  du  16  mai  1988,  relative  a Ia  concurrence  dans  les  marches  de 
terminaux  de  telecommunication  (JO  L  131,  p.  ·73)  en  vue  d'apprecier  la 
compatibilite avec celle-ci du regime mis en place par le decret fran~ais no  85-712~ 
du 11  juillet 1985,  portant application de Ia  loi  du  ler aout 1905  et relatif aux 
materiels susceptibles d'etre raccordes au reseau des telecommunications de l'Etat. 
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CORRIGENDUM  DANS  l'ARRET 
c - 92/91 
Taillandier 
Veuillez lire dans  l'arret sus-mentionne 
page  1 
au  lieu de 
composee  de  MM.  0.  Due,  president,  G.C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias,  M.  Zuleeg  et J.L. 
Murray,  presidents  de  chambre,  G.F.  Mancini,  R.  Joliet,  F.A.  Schockweiler, 
J.C.Moitinho  de  Almeida  et  F.  Grevisse,  juges 
veuillez lire: 
composee  de  MM.  0.  Due,  president,  G.F.  Mancini,  J.C.  Moitinho  de  Almeida,·M. 
Diez  de  Velasco  et  D.A.O.  Edward,  presidents  de  chambre,  C.N.Kakouris,  R. 
Joliet,  F.A.  Schockweiler,  G.C.  Rodriguez  Iglesias,  F.  Grevisse,  M.  Zuleeg, 
P.J.G.  Kapteyn  et J.l. Murray,  juges, 
page  9: 
au  lieu de 
Due  Rodriguez  Iglesias  Zuleeg 
Murray  Mancini  Joliet 
Schockweiler  Moitinho  de  Almeida  Grevisse 
Veuill~z lire 
Due  Mancini  Moitinho  de  Almeida 
Diez  de  Velasco  Edward  Kakouris 
Joliet  Schockweiler  Rodriguez  Iglesias 
Grevisse  Zuleeg  Kapteyn 
Murray 
trrj127 2  Cette question a ete soulevee dans le cadre d'une procedure penale dirigee contre 
Mme  Taillandier,  prevenue  d'avoir  vendu,  le  5  avril  1990,  des  terminaux  de 
telecommunications (  appareils tclephoniques) sans a  voir ohtenu l'agremcnt prcvu 
par les  articles  ler a 7 du  decret susmentionne. Celle-ci  a cependant  excip~ de 
l'illegalite de ce decret par rapport a  Ia  directive 88/301,  precitee. 
3  II ressort du dossier qu'en vertu du decret susmentionne, les materiels s~sceptibles 
d'etre  raccordes  au  n!seau  public  ne  peuvent  etre  fabriques  pour  le  n1arche 
interieur, importes pour la  mise a Ia  consommation, detenus en vue de la vente, 
mis en vente au distribues a  titre gratuit au onereux que s'ils sont conformes a  ses 
dispositions  et  s'ils  satisfont a un  certain  nombre  de  prescriptions  qui  visent a 
preserver le  bon fonctionnement du  reseau et la  securite des utilisateurs (articles 
3 et 4). Pour justifier de Ia conformite des appareils aces exigences, les operateurs 
concernes doivent presenter soit un  rapport etabli par un  organisme agree par le 
ministere charge de l'lndustrie, soit un agrement delivre en application du code des 
P et T,  soit  un  certificat  de  qualification  delivre  en  application  de  la  loi  sur la 
protection et !'information des  consommateurs ou  un  autre document justificatif 
reconnu comme equivalent par arrete du  ministre charge de l'Industrie (article 6). 
L'article 7 du  decrct precise  la  penalite encourue par ceux qui  contreviennent a 
}'obligation de justifier de  la  conformite des appareils en question. 
4  Pour !'application du  decret no 85-712, le  ministre du Redeploiement indu&triel et 
du Commerce exterieur a emis, le  ler novembre 1985, un avis relatif aux terminaux 
susceptibles d'etre  raccordes  au  reseau des  telecom~nunications de  l'Etat. L'avis 
precise,  entre  autres,  de  quelle  fa~on  les  interesses  peuvent  justifier  de  Ia 
conformite des terrninaux. A cet egard,  i1  dispose que le Centre national d'etudes 
des telecommunications (CNET) a ete agree par le  ministre charge de l'Industrie 
pour la delivrance du rapport vise a  !'article 6 du decret precite, que }'agrement est 
delivrc  par Ia  direction generalc des  telt~communications, en  application du code 
.des  P et T,  pour les  materiels conformes  aux  specifications  figurant sur la  liste 
I - 3 annexee a  l'avis, et que la mise en place des autres modes  li~ justificaticn  pr~vus 
a \'article  6  se  fera  ulterieurement.  Lcs  d~hats devant  la  Cour  n'ont  pas  fait 
apparaitre si,  posterieurement a  l'avis de novembr~ 1985, le systeme de delivrance 
des  documents autres que !'agrement et du  rapport du CNET avait ete rnis  en 
place. 
5  Estimant que le litige  posait un  probleme d'interpretation de  Ia  reglementation 
communautaire en cause,  le  tribunal de  police  de  Vichy  a  saisi  la  Cour de  Ia 
question prejudiciel1e suivante: 
«La directive de Ia  Commission du  16  mai  1988 relative a la  concurrence 
dans  les  marches  de  terminaux  de  telecommunication  prohibe-t-elle  la 
procedure consistant a  soumettre a  l'homologation de Ia societe nationale 
des telecommunications les appareils telephoniques proposes ala vente aux 
consommateurs,  et  prevoyant  que  le  dt!faut  de  n:!ference  de  cette 
homologation sur lesdits  appareils sera  puni d'une amende de  mille  trois 
cents francs a  deux mille cinq cents francs, reglernentation telle qu'instituee 
par le decn!t numero 85-712 du ll  juillet 1985)). 
6  Pour  un  plus  ample  expose  des  faits  et  du  l'adre  reglementaire  du  Jitige  au 
principal,  du  deroulement  de  Ia  procedure  ainsi  que  des  observations  ecrites 
deposees devant Ia  Cour, il est renvoye au rapport d'audience. Ces elements du 
dossier ne sont repris ci-apres que dans la  mesure ::ecessaire au raisonnement de 
Ia  Cour. 
7  Par sa question, la juridiction nationale cherche en substance a  savoir si }'article 6 
de la directive 88/301 s'oppose a  l'application d'une n!glementation nationale, telle 
que celle visee en l'espece au principal, qui  interdit, sous peine de sanctions, aux 
operateurs economiques de fabriquer, d'importer, de detenir en vue de la vente,. 
de vendre ou distribuer des appareils terminaux sans justifier, par la presentation 
d'un agrement ou de  tout autre  document considere  comme equivalent, de la 
conformite de ces appareils a  certaines exigences essentielles tenant notamment a 
ia securite des usagers et au bon fonctionnement du reseau, alors que n'est pas 
1-4 assuree l'independance, par rapport a tout operateur offrant des  biens et/ou des 
services  dans  le  domaine  des  telecommunications,  de  l'organisme  qui  delivre 
!'agrement  ou  tout  autre  document  equivalent  et  formalise  les  specifications 
techniques auxquelles ces appareils doivent repondre. 
8  L'article 6 de la directive 88/301  dispose:  <des Etats membres assurent qu'a partir 
du ler juillet 1989la formalisation des specifications, Ie contr6le de leur application 
ainsi  que ]'agrement sont effectues  par une  entite  independante des  entreprises 
publiques  ou  privees  offrant  des  biens  et/ou  des  services  dans  Ie  domaine  des 
telecommunications.» 
9  II ressort des pieces du dossier qu'en vertu des dispositions du decret no 86-129 du 
28 janvier 1986 (articles 13 a 15)  Ia  direction generale des telecommunications du 
ministere des P et T etait chargee de !'exploitation du reseau public, de la mise en 
oeuvre de Ia politique commerciale des telecommunications, de Ia formalisation des 
specifications  techniques,  du  controle  de  leur  application  et de  ragrernent  des 
appareiJs  terminaux.  Devant  Ia  Cour,  le  gouvernement  fran~ais a precise  que  k 
Centre national  d'etudes des  telecommunications  (CNET), dont  le  rapport etait 
considere comme equivalent a  )'agrement, faisait partie de la direction generale des 
telecommunications en tant que centre de recherche. 
10  Par  decret  no  89-327,  du  19  mai  1989,  modifiant  le  decret  no  86-129,  Ia 
formalisation  des  specifications· techniques,  le  controle  de  leur  application  et 
l'agrement des appareils terminaux ont ete  transfer~s a  Ia  nouvelle direction de  Ia 
. reglementation generale du  meme ministere. 
11  II  resulte  done  de  Ia  reglementation  en  cause  que,  durant  Ia  periode  visee  en 
l'espece au principal, differentes directions du ministere franc;ais des Pet T etaient 
chargees tout a Ia  fois  de  !'exploitation du  reseau public, de la mise en oeuvre de 
Ia  politique  commerciale  des  telecommunications,  de  Ia  formalisation  des 
I - 5 
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specifications  techniques,  du  centrale de  leur  application  et de  l'agn!ment des 
apparei1s terminaux. 
12  Dans ces  c,irconstances,  il y a  lieu  de verifier,  a Ia  lumiere  des  dispositions  de 
!'article 6 de Ia  directive, d'une part, si  ]'administration  fran~aise des P et T peut 
etre consideree comme une entreprise publique au sens du droit communautaire 
et,  d'autre  part,  si  le  critere  de  l'independance  de  I'entite  chargee  de  Ia 
formalisation des specifications, des controles et de !'agrement est respecte. 
13  S'agissant de  Ia  notion d'entreprise, l'article  ler, deuxieme  tiret,  de  Ia  directive 
precise que celle-ci vise  «les organismes publics ou prives auxquels l'Etat ot:troie 
des  droits  speciaux  ou  exclusifs  d'importation,  de  commercialisation,  de 
raccordement,  de mise  en service  d'appareils  terminaux de  telecommunications 
et/ou d'entretien de tels appareils». 
14  II y  a lieu d'observer, a  cet egard, que le fait que, comme en l'espece au principal, 
}'exploitation du n!seau public et de la commercialisation des appareils term_inaux 
est  confiee  a des  entites  integrees  dans  }'administration  publique  ne  saurait 
soustraire ces dernieres a Ia  qualification d'entreprise publique. En effet, comme 
Ia Cour l'a constate dans le contexte de Ia directive 80/723/CEE, de la Commission, 
du  25  juin  1980,  relative a Ia  transparence des relations financieres  entre .Etats 
membres  et entreprises  publiques  (JO  L  195,  p.  35),  un  organe  exer~ant des 
activites  economiques  de  caractere  industriel  ou  commercial  ne  doit  pas 
necessairement posseder une  personnalite juridique distincte de l'Etat pour etre 
consideree comme une entreprise publique. S'il n'en etait pas ainsi, il serait porte 
atteinte a  l'efficacite des dispositions de Ia directive en cause ainsi qu'a l'uniformite 
de  son  application  dans  taus  les  Etats  membres  (voir  arret  du  16  juin  1987, 
Commission/ltalie, 118/85, Rec. p. 2599, point 13). 
15  En  ce  qui  concerne  l'exigence  de  l'independance  de  l'entite  chargee  de  Ia 
formalisation  des  specifications,  du  confrOie  de  leur  application  ainsi  que  de 
I - 6 }'agrement,  il  suffit  de  constater  que  des  directions  differentes  d'une  meme 
administration ne sauraient etre considerees comme independantes l'une de !'autre, 
au sens de }'article 6 de Ia directive. 
16  Dans ces conditions, il convient de repondre a  Ia juridiction nationale que I' article 
6 de )a directive 88/301  s'oppose a  une reglementation nationale qui interdit, sous 
peine  de  sanctions,  aux  operateurs  economiques  de  fabriquer,  d'importer,  de 
detenir en vue de  Ia vente, de vendre ou distribuer des appareils terminaux sans 
justifier, par Ia  presentation d'un agrement ou de  tout autre document considere 
comme  equivalent,  de  la  conformite  de  ces  appareils  a certaines  e:Ogences 
essentielles tenant notamment a  la securite des usagers et au bon fonctionnement 
du reseau, alors que n'est pas assuree l'independance, par rapport a  tout operateur 
offrant des biens et/ou des services dans  Ie  domaine  des  telecommunications,  de 
l'organisme qui delivre l'agrement ou tout autre document equivalent et formalise 
les specifications techniques auxquelles ces  appareils doivent repondre. 
Sur les depens 
17  Les  frais  exposes  par  les  gouvernements  de  Ia  Republique  fran<iaise  et  du 
Royaume-Uni  et  par  Ia  Commission  des  Communautes  europeennes,  qui  ant 
soumis des observations a Ia  Cour,  ne  peuvent faire  l'objet d'un remboursement. 
La procedure revetant, a  l'egard des parties au principal, le caractere d'un incident 
souleve  devant Ia  juridiction nationale,  il appartient a celle-ci  de  statuer sur les 
de pens. 
Par ces motifs, 
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LACOUR, 
statuant sur  Ia  question a elle  soumise  par  le  tribunal  de  police  de  Vichy,  par 
jugernent du 5 mars 1991, dit pour droit: 
I- 8 
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L'article 6 de Ia directive  88/301 (CEE) de la Commission, du 16 mai 
1988,  relative a Ia  concurrence dans  les  marches  de terminaux de 
telecommunications  s'oppose a }'application  d'une  reglementation 
nationale  qui  interdit,  sous  peine  de  sanctions,  aux  operateurs 
economiques de fabriquer, d'importer, de detenir en vue de la vente, 
de vendre ou distribuer des appareils terminaux sans justifier, par la 
presentation  d'un  agrement  ou  de  tout  autre  document considere 
comme  equivalent,  de  Ia  conformitc  de  ces  appareils a certaines 
exigences esscntiellcs tenant notamment a Ia  securite des usagers et 
au  bon  fonctionnement  du  reseau,  alors  que  n'est  pas ·assuree 
l'ind~pendance, par rapport a  tout operateur offrant des biens et/ou 
des services dans le domaine des telecommunications, de l'organisme Due 
Murray 
Schockweiler 
qui dclivre l'agrcment ou tout autre document equivalent et formalise 
les  specifications  techniques  auxquelles  ces  appareils  doivent 
rep<?ndre. 
Rodriguez Iglesias  Zuleeg 
Mancini  Joliet 
Moitinho de Almeida  Grevisse 
Ainsi  prononce en  audience publique a  Luxembourg,  le  27 octobre 1993.· 
Le greffier  Le  pr~sident 
1.-G. Giraud  0. Due 
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ROUFFETEAU AND BADIA 
Costs 
The costs incurred by the French Government and the Commission of the Euro-
pean  Communities,  which  have  submitted  observations  to  the  Court,  are  not 
recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a 
step in the proceedings pendi~_g before the national court, the decision on costs is 
a matter for that court. 
On those grounds, 
THE COURT, 
in ans~er to the question referred to it by the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Reims, 
by judgment of 18  March 1993, hereby rules: 
Neither  Article  30  of the  EEC  Treaty nor Directive  88/301/EEC  precludes 
national rules  which prohibit traders, with penalties  for  infringement, from 
importing terminal equipment which  has  not been  approved for  release  for 
consumption, possessing it with a view to sale, selling, distributing or advertis-
ing it, even if the importer, holder or vendor has clearly stated that such equip-
ment is  intended solely for re-export, where there is  no certainty that it will 
actually be re-exported, and is therefore not suitable for connection to the pub-
lic  network. 
I- 3279 JUDGMENT OF 12.  7. 1994- CASE C-314/93 
Due  Mancini  Edward 
Joliet  Schockweiler ·  R<?driguez Iglesias 
Grevisse  Zuleeg  Murray 
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 July 1994. 
R.  Grass  0. Due 
Registrar  President 
.. 
l  - 32 so Case C-314/93 
Criminal proceedings 
against 
Fran~ois Rouffeteau and Robert Badia 
(Reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Reims (France)) 
(Article 30 of the EEC Treaty - Directive 88/301/EEC - Telecommunications 
terminals - Prohibition on telephones which have not been 
approved - Re-export) 
Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 19  April 1994  .....................  I - 3259 
Judgment of the Coun, 12 July 1994  ... : ....................................................................  I- 3274 
Summary of the Judgment 
Free  movenzent of goods - Quantitative restrictions - lv! easures  having equivalent effect -
LVational rules prohibiting the marketing of telecommunications terminals which have not bee-n 
approved,  even where those arc  stated to  be intended for re-export - Whether permissible  ---
Corollary of the po-wer conferred on  the Member Stcttes by  Directive 88/301 
(EEC Treaty,  Art. 30;  Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, Art. 3) 
I - 3257 SUMMARY- CASE C·314/93 
Neither Article  30  of the  EEC Treaty  nor 
Directive 88/301  on competition in  the mar-
kets  in  telecommunications  terminal  equip-
ment, certain provisions of which implement 
Article  30,  precludes  national  rules  which 
prohibit traders, with penalties for infringe-
ment,  from  importing  terminal  equipment 
which has not been approved for release for 
consumption,  possessing  it  with  a  view  to 
sale,  selling,  distributing  or  advertising  it, 
even  if  the  importer,  holder or vendor  has 
clearly  stated  that  such  equipment  is 
intended solely for re-export, where there is 
no  certainty  that  it  will  actually  be 
re-exported, and is  therefore not suitable for 
connection to the public network, but where 
on the contrary the findings  of the national 
court  indicate  that  most  of  it  is  not 
re-exported. 
I -·  3258 
While  Article  3  confers  on  traders  the 
right to import and market terminal equip-
ment,  it  permits  the  Member  States  to 
check  the  equipment  in  order  to  establish 
whether it satisfies certain essential  require-
ments,  that  is  to  say  in  particular,  user 
safety,  safety  of employees  of  public  tele-
communications network operators, protec-
tion of public telecommunications networks 
from  harm  and  interworking  of  terminal 
equipment  in  justified  cases.  The  power 
so  conferred  on  the  Member States  would 
be  rendered  ineffective  if  it  were  possible 
to  undertake  the  abovementioned 
activities  without  any  guarantee  that  the 
equipn1ent  in  question  will  actually  be 
re-exported. In Case C-314/93, 
JUDGMENT OF 12. 7.  1994- CASE C-314/93 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
12 July 1994,. 
REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tribunal 
de Grande Instance, Reims {France), for a preliminary ruling in the criminal pro-
ceedings pending before that court against  -
Fran\ois Rouffeteau, 
Robert Badia, 
on  the  interpretation of Article  30  of the  EEC Treaty  and  Commission  Direc-
tive  88/301/EEC of 16  May 1988  on competition in  the markets in telecommuni-
cations terminal equipment (OJ 1988  L 131, p.  73), 
THE COURT, 
composed of:  0  Due, President, G.  F.  Mancini and D.  A.  0. Edward (Presidents 
of Chambers), R. Joliet, F.  A. Schockweiler, G. C. Rodriguez Iglesias, F.  Grevisse, 
M.  Zuleeg (Rapporteur) and J.  L.  Murray, Judges, 
Advocate General: G. Tesauro, 
Registrar: R.  Grass, 
"·  Language of rhe  case:  French. 
I- 3274  /It/ 139 
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{ ROUFFETEAU AND BADIA 
after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of: 
- the French Government, by J.-M.  Belorgey, Charge de mission in the  Legal 
Department of the 1v1inistry of Foreign Affairs, and C. de Salins, Adviser on 
foreign affairs in the same department, acting as  Agents, 
- the Commission of the European Communities, by A.  C. Jessen, of the Legal 
Service, and V.  Melgar,  a, national civil servant seconded to the Legal Service, 
acting as  Agents, 
having regard to the Report for the Hearing, 
after hearing the oral observations of the French Government and the Comn1is-
sion,  represented by V.  Melgar,  acting  as  Agent, assisted by A. J  aume,  technical 
expert, at the hearing on 2 Ivlarch  1994, 
::tftcr  hearing the Opinion of the  Advocate General at the sitting on 19  April  1994, 
gives  the following 
Judgment 
By judgment of 18 May 1993, received at the Court on 14 June 1993, the Tribunal 
de Grande Instance (Regional Court), Reims (France), referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling under Article  177 of the EEC Treaty a question on the inter-
pretation of Article 30  of the Treaty and of Commission Directive 88/30 1/EEC 
of 16  May 1988  on competition in  the  markets  in telecommunications terminal 
equipment, with a view to ascertaining the compatibility therewith of the system 
I - 3275 JUDGMENT OF 12. 7. 1994-CASE C-314/93 
established in France by Decree No 85-712 of 11 July  1985 itnplementing the Law 
of 1 August 1905 and relating to equipment capable of being connected to the State 
telecommunications  network  (Official  Journal  of  the  French  Republic  of 
14 July 1985, p. 7976) and by Law No 89-1008 of 31  December 1989 on the devel-
opment of commercial and craft undertakings and the improvement of their eco-
nomic, legal and social environment (Official Journal of the French  Republic of 
2 January 1990, p. 9). 
2  That question was raised in criminal proceedings against Mr  Rouffete~u and Mr 
Badia,_  the former charged with advertising, possessing and offering for sale-,  and 
the latter with possessing and offering for sale telephone equipment in Septem-
ber 1991  without obtaining type approval or any other document certifying com-
pliance with the specifications required in respect of equipment capable of being 
connected to the public network, being offences contrary to  Decree No 85-712 
and Law No 89-1008. Mr Rouffeteau and Mr Badia have objected that the legisla-
tion is  unlawful in relation to Article 30 of the Treaty and Directive 88/301. 
U IJder Decree No 85-712, equipment capable of being connected to the public net-
work may be manufactured for the domestic market, imported for release for con-
sumption, held with a view to sale, offered for sale or distributed only if it com-
plies with a number of requirements intended to ensure the proper functioning of 
the network and user safety (Articles 2, 3 and 4  ).  As evidence that the equipment 
complies with those requirements, the traders concerned must produce a  report 
drawn up by a body approved by the Minister for Industry, type approval granted 
pursuant to  the  Postal  and Telecommunications  Code,  an  evaluation  certificate 
issued pursuant to the law on consumer protection and information or other doc-
umentary evidence recognized as  equivalent by order of the Minister for Industry 
(Article 6).  Article 7 of the decree lays down the penalty for breach of that obli-
gation to provide evidence. 
I - 3276 ROUFFETEAU AND BADIA 
Article 8 of Law No 89-1008  provides that it is  prohibited, and punishable by a 
fine, to advertise in any way equipment which is capable of being connected to the 
State telecommunications network but which cannot be shown to comply with the 
regulations concerning such equipment. 
Taking the view that the case involved the interpretation of the Comnntnity legis-
lation  at  issue,  the  Rei1ns  criminal  court  referred  the  following  question to  the 
Court for a preliminary ruling: · 
'Must Article 30  of the Treaty and Directive 88/301/EEC be  interpreted as  pre-
cluding  national  legislation,  such  as  the  French  legislation,  which  prohibits  the 
import, possession with a view to sale and offering for sale of  _all  telephone equip-
ment which has not been granted type approval, even where it is  clearly stated by 
the importer,  holder or seller of that equipment, in this  case  cordless telephones 
and answering machines, that the equipment is  intended solely for re-export and is 
not, therefore, suitable for connection to the public network?' 
6  The first sentence of Article 3 of Directive 88/301  confers on traders the right to 
import and market terminal equipment. In accordance with the second sentence 'of 
that provision, however, Member States may check terminal equipment in order to 
establish whether it satisfies certain essential requirements such as  those listed in 
Article 2(17) of Council Directive 86/361/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the initial stage 
of the mutual recognition of type approval for telecommunications tern1inal equip-
n1ent  (  0 J 1986  L  217,  p.  21 ),  that  is  to  say  in  particular  user  safety,  safety  of 
employees of public telecommunications network operators, protection of public 
telecommunications networks from harm and interworking of terminal equipment 
in  justified cases. 
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7  It should be borne in mind that Directive 88/301 was adopted by the Commission 
in the exercise of the legislative  power conferred on it  by Article  90(3)  of the 
Treaty to lay down general rules specifying the obligations arising from the Jreaty, 
which are binding o~\  the Member States as  regards the undertakings re~erted to in 
Article 90(1) and (2)  (judgment in Case C-202/88 France  v  Commission  ('Termi-
nals') [1991]  ECR I-1223, paragraph 14).  Article 3·of the directive  form~ part of 
the provisions implementing Article 30 of the Treaty (see to that effect the same 
judgment, paragraphs 37 to 39). 
s  The power so c'onferred on the Member States would be rendered ineffective if  it 
were possible to import equipment which has not been approved for release  for 
consumption, to possess it with a view to sale, to sell or distribute it or to advertise 
it without any guarantee that it will actually be re-exported. 
9  According to the French Government, most of the equipiJlent which has not been 
approved and is  marketed in a Member State is  in fact subsequently connected to 
the public  network, despite the written or oral  information which  is  sometimes 
provided  at  the  time  of sale,  to  the  effect  that  the  equipment  is  intended  for 
re-export and is  not suitable for connection to the public network. 
10  It is  for the national coun to establish whether that statement is  true. 
11  In those circumstances, the answer to the·question from the national court must be 
that neither Article 30 of the Treaty nor Directive 88/301  precludes national rules 
which prohibit traders, with penalties for infringement, from impo'ning terminal 
equipment which has not been approved for release for consumption, possessing it 
with  a  view  to  sale,  selling,  distributing or advertising  it,  even  if  the  importer, 
holder or ·vendor  has  clearly  stated  that  such equipment is  intended  solely  for 
re-export, where there  is  no certainty that it will  actually be  re-exported and is 
therefore not suitable for connection to the public network. 
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Costs 
12  The costs incurred by the French Government and the Commission of the Euro-
pean  Communities,  which  have  submitted  observations  to  the  Court,  are  not 
recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a 
step in the proceedings pending before the national court, the decision on costs is 
a matter for that court. 
On those grounds, 
THE COURT, 
in answer to the question referred to it by the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Reims, 
by judgment of 18  March 1993, hereby rules: 
Neither Article  30  of  the EEC Treaty  ~?-Or  Directive  88/301/EEC  precludes 
national rules which prohibit traders, with penalties  for infringement, from 
importing terminal equipment which has  not been approved for release  for 
consumption, possessing it with a view to sale, selling, distributing or advertis-
ing it, even if the importer, holder or vendor has clearly stated that such equip-
ment is  intended solely for re-export, where there is  no certainty that it will 
actually be re-exported, and is therefore not suitable for connection to the pub-
lic network. 
trt 11 4  4 
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'-EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/86/379 
COMMISSION ENFORCES COMPETITION  RULES  IN TERMINALS  MARKET IN  GERMANY 
After intervention by the Commission under Article 90( I) in conjunction with Articles 37 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 
the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to allow modems - both separate and built into other equipment such 
as  personal computers - to  be supplied direct by suppliers other than the  national  posts and telecommunications 
authority, the Bundespost. Previously the situation in the Federal Republic was that the Bundespost had a monopoly 
for  supplying any  modem  to  be  connected to the  public telephone network.  This  meant  that  users  of the  public 
telephone network could not always obtain the type of modem best suited to their needs and that only the market 
for modems to be used in  private networks was open to suppliers of devices imported from  other Member States. 
The Commission considered that the German rules giving the Bundespost a monopoly to supply modems were in 
breach of  Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 37 of  the EEC Treaty because they denied users a choice between 
equipment available from  different suppliers and closed a very  large part of the market to direct access  by such 
suppliers. The tying of the sale or leasing of modems to the provision of network services was furthermore an abuse 
of a dominant position under Article 86 of the Treaty. After the Commission had made these objections clear to the 
German Government, the Government agreed to amend its rules and to publish technical specifications for modems 
applicable to domestic and imported products alike. Suppliers other than the Bundespost will now be able to supply 
modems (both separate and built-in devices) for connection to the public telephone network. The Commission  is 
continuing its examination of  the legality or otherwise under the Treaty of monopolies held by Member States' posts 
and telecommunications authorities for supplying terminal equipment to be connected to the telephone network. Its 
general position is  that the claiming of a monopoly for the supply of  terminal equipment breaches Article 37(2), of 
the Treaty as  its restricts imports from other Member States. 
4/V'NEX'I- 3 EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/88/99 
SUMMARY OF ADDRESS BY MR SUTHERLAND  AT THE EUROSTRA TEGIES TELECOMMlJNICA TIONS 
FORUM  - BRUSSELS,  FEBRUARY  25  1988  : TIIE  APPLICATION  OF  COMPETITION  POLICY  IN  THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR 
The  weight  and  complexity  of national  telecom  regulations  is  inhibiting  the  development  of an  efficient 
telecommunications  industry  in Europe  and placing an  intolerable burden on the  European economy.  Private and 
professional  users  are  still  faced  with  an  entirely  uncompetitive,  monopoly  situation  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications. Most public telecommunication operators remain the sole purchasers of  transmission, switching 
and  receiving  equipment  and  the  sole  providers  of network  facilities,  telecommunications  services  and  of user 
equipment. Telecommunications are at the cross roads of future high technology and service economies. The changes 
that  are  taking  place  will  affect  the  very  basis  future  economic  development  in  Europe.  The  strengthening  of 
European telecommunications has become one of the major conditions for achieving the internal mrket,  improving 
the competitivity of  the European economy and strengthening European cohesion. The difference of interest between 
the  competitive  industry  and  the  telecommunications  monopolies  is  at  the  heart  of the  technological  push  for 
institutional change at European and national level. It is within this context that the Commission, at the end of June 
last year,  issued its Green Paper on telecommunications which aims at advancing an open, competitive Community 
wide market in this area and diminishing restrictive policies which hamper the ability of European firms to compete 
on a world wide basis.  Following the  consultations on  its  Green  Paper,  the Commission  is  now embarking  on  its 
ambitious programme of opening the telecommunications sector progressively by 1992. With regard to two essential 
parts of this programme,  the Commission  has decided to  use the legal instruments available under the competition 
rules  of the  ·Treaty.  Under  Article  90,  the  Commission  is  required  to  control  the  behaviour  of public  or 
privately-owned enterprises, to which  Member States give exclusive or special rights.  Member States must  ensure 
that  there  are  no  measures  in  existence  in  regard  to  such  enterprises  which  would  lead  to  inffringements  of the 
Treaty.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  issue,  within  the  next  few  months,  a  directive  on  the 
liberalization of the terminal equipment market and before the end of  the year, a second directive on the liberalization 
of telecommunication services,  based on  Article 90(3) of the Treaty.  In  regard to the liberalization of the terminal 
equipment,  the  Commission  will  establish  rules  requiring  Member  States  to  abolish  the  exclusive  import  and 
distribution rights which most Member States have delegated to their national telecommunications administrations. 
Users  in  future will be free  to choose the equipment they want and not be bound to one supplier. Consumers will 
be free to have the equipment installed by the supplier and have the maintenance done by a firm of their choice.  On 
the  important question of the  liberalization of telecommunication services,  the Commission's directive will define 
the scope of the activities which can be maintained under monopoly of the state and of services which will have to 
be  liberalized and may  thus  be provided by private operators. The Commission will  seek to ensure that  there  is  a 
separation between  regulatory powers and commercial  activities and  the directive will  establish the conditions of 
access to the network by independent, private operators. Procedures will be established to ensure that the Commission 
is  kept  informed of all  new  legislation the  Member  States  intend to  implement,  as  well as  financial  arrangements 
between the State and public enterprises,  in order to verify that no  cross subsidization takes place to the detriment 
of  users or competitors. The Commission welcomes the enthousiastic support by the industry for the ideas which have 
been set out in the Green Paper. Support for the common  objective of ensuring that Europe will have a healthy and 
competitive telecommunications industry. Europe cannot afford to maintain the monolithic and inefficient structures 
of the past. Only through market oriented enterprises with the flexibility to adapt rapidly to the swift technological 
changes of this  industry can we  hope not only to prosper but  indeed to survive as a modem economic power. 
ltNNeJ( I- [~ EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/88/251 
COMMISSION PRESENTS A DIRECTIVE TO INTRODUCE COMPETrfiON INTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TERMINAL  MARKETS 
The Commissioner for Competition,· Mr.  Peter Sutherland, today presented a new Commission  Directive based on 
Article 90 of the  EEC  Treaty which  requires  Member States to develop competition  in the Community  market  for 
telecommunications  terminal  equipment.  At  the  informal  meeting  Mr.  Sutherland  informed  the  Ministers  a.f the 
Commission's decision to adopt the Directive, outlined its principal provisions and underlined the significance of the 
Directive as the first major concrete step to implement the programme set out in the Commission's Green Paper on 
Telecommunications.  Article 90 of the EEC  Treaty requires  in the case of public undertakings and undertakings to 
which  Member States grant special or exclusive rights that Member States neither enact nor maintain  in  force  any 
measure contrary to the rules of the EEC Treaty,  including applicable rules on competition, free movement of goods 
and  right  of establishment.  Where  necessary,  the  Commission  is  required  to  address  appropriate  directives  or 
decisions to Member States. Such directives or decisions may include measures taken in pursuit of  the Commisison's 
role of surveillance in regard to Community law and specifying the particular obligations that flow from the directly 
applicable rules of  the Treaty in situations where otherwise infringement of  the Treaty rules would be liable to occur. 
The liberalization of telecommunications terminal markets is the first major step in implementing the Green Paper. 
Hitherto the market for such equipment, which includes, inter alia, telephone sets, modems and telex terminals, were 
often maintained as separate controlled national markets because national telecommunications administrations have 
had  a monopoly of importing  and  supplying terminals.  The  last  few  years  have  seen  major  improvements  in  the 
performance of terminal equipment.  A more open market-oriented environment  is considered necessary  to  develop 
swiftly the commercial opportunities  in  Europe afforded  by rapid technological  innovation  in  terminal equipment. 
A sharp rise in sales, which are now worth about 9.5  billion ECU, can be expected with growth around 6-7% a year 
provided the restrictive national  barriers challenged  by the directive are removed.  - 2 - It  is therefore vital  that  EC 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers should be able to sell terminals  throughout the Community  and  that 
users  be able  to choose the equipment that best  meets their needs  at  the  lowest cost so that  they  can  benefit  fully 
from  the technological advances made  in the sector. The situation that has existed until now in most Member States 
has  caused their markets  to  be  tightly segregated. Only the telecommunications  authority had the  right to  supply 
terminal equipment to users and not infrequently it ordered all  its equipment from  domestic suppliers. Abolition of 
the monopolies held by PTTs will make  it possible for suppliers to deal directly with users.  The restrictive barriers 
separating  the  markets  will  thus  be  removed  and  a common  market  for  terminal  equipment  created  by  1992.  In 
addition, Member States will be required to publish the technical specifications they lay down for equipment to meet 
so  that  manufacturers  from  other Member  States can  adapt  their equipment  to  the characteristics of each  national 
network.  As  the  technical  characteristics of networks  vary  considerably  in  the  12  Member  States,  so  too  do  the 
technical specifications that terminal  equipment  has  to  meet  in  order to  enable 'connection without damaging  the 
network.  Another  requirement  in  the  Commission's  Directive  is  for  Member  States  to  separate  the  regulatory 
functions of  their telecommunications administrations from their commercial interests as network operator. At present 
the regulatory functions held by the telecommunications administrations alongside their business interests enable them 
to  keep products supplied by competitors off the market.  The Directive also requires users to be given the right to 
connect  terminal  equipment  they  have  obtained  in  the  free  market  to  the  network without having  to  rely  on  the 
national telecommunications administration.  For this purpose the Member States will have to ensure that users have 
access  to  the  points  where  terminals  are  connected  to  the  network  and  to  publish  their  technical  characteristics. 
Liberalization of the market  would not  be effective  if network termination  points were  not accessible and  if their 
technical characteristics were not  published because then only the  PTT (which may still be the monopoly  network 
operator) would be able to connect up equipment. Another barrier to competition addressed by the Directive are the 
long-term  contracts  which  subscribers  have  often  been  obliged  to  make  with  the  national  telecommunications 
administration  in  order to  be  supplied with  terminal  equipment.  Subscribers  had  no choice but to enter into  such 
contracts  because  frequently  the  PTT  as  network operator was  the  only  body  allowed to  supply  them  with  - 3 -
terminals.  In  the  past  telecommunications  administrations  often  would  not  sell  terminal  equipment  to  users  but 
insisted on their renting it, sometimes at inflated prices compared with the equipment's purchase price. The Directive 
requires  Member  States  to  oblige  their  telecommunications  administrations  to  release  subscribers  from  contracts 
entered into during the time  the administration had a monopoly so that if they wish they can obtain the equipment 
from another supplier. The Commission Directive thus provides a legal framework  for all the areas that are essential 
A!V/IIt x  :z  - 5 for  a genuine liberalization of telecommunications  terminal  markets  in  the Community,  so that not only can  users 
fully  benefit from  the technological advances  in  the sector but the EC  telecommunciations equipment industry can 
develop  its  competitiveness vis-a-vis non-EC  producers. EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/89/49 
FIRST STRATEGIC  PLAN  FOR ADVANCED  COMMUNICATIONS  FOR EUROPE  fN THE  1990s 
Vice-President Pandolfi, responsible for research and telecommunications, yesterday stressed that effective, advanced 
communications will be essential  for European business competitivity, employment and prosperity in the  I  <NOs and 
beyond.  Advanced  communications  will  also  open  up  new  possibilities  in  such  areas  as  education,  health  care, 
cultural and leisure activities. Mr. Pandolfi was speaking at the presentation of the first report of a series of Strategic 
Audits of the situation in  Europe  for the development of advanced communications, carried out in the framework 
of  the European Commission's RACE programme. Practically all EC and EFTA Telecommunication Administrations 
and telematic equipment manufacturers have joined together in the framework of  the Community's RACE programme 
(Research in advanced Communications technologies in Europe), aimed at providing Europe rapidly and etliciently 
with  advanced telecommunications services.  The  work  in  RACE  will  help to clarify techno-economic oprions but 
needs  to  be complemented  by strategic analyses.  Therefore when  RACE  was officially  launched on  December  14 
1987,  it  was decided to carry out annual  Strategic Audits of developments  in  advanced communications  and  their 
implications.  The first such Strategic Audit has  now  been  completed.  It has concentrated on global objectives and 
priorities, taking into account political, social, economic, technical and industrial developments and the evolution of 
demand  for  advanced telecomunnications( 1  ).  (  1)  The  Strategic  Audit  has  been  carried out  by  seven  experienced 
advisors acting in an independent, personal capacity: John Alvey, a senior UK telecommunications advisor Jose Viana 
Baptista, President of  the Portuguese Telecommunication Administration John Barret, Director of  the RACE industrial 
consortium responsible for RACE consensus management Basilio Catania, General Manager ofCSEL  T in Italy Jozef 
Cornu,  Executive  Vice-President, Alcatel Jacques  Dondoux,  President of IREST,  formerly  Director of the  DGT  in 
France Dietrich Elias, former State Secretary and President ofDETECON  In the FRG.- 2- The audit has identified 
key issues in the establishment of advance communications in  Europe and formulated a set of recommendations  for 
action  by  Governments,  the  European  Commission,  Telecommunication  Administrations,  European  industries, 
telecommunications service providers and standardization organisations. The set of recommendations constitutes the 
first comprehensive strategic plan for the establishment of advanced communications  in Europe and will provide the 
basis for debate on the very important and wide-ranging issues related to regulatory frameworks, investment strategies 
and  technical  options.  Summary  of  recommendations  for  action  The  introduction  of advanced  broadband 
communications will provide potentially enormous benefits to Europe.  However, these can only be realised through 
innovative services relying on a new generation of terminal facilities and infrastructures. This large-scale deployment 
of new technologies and services will involve a major investment programme by telecommunications administrations, 
businesses and individuals of about 500 billions ECU over a decade. While R&D cooperation has been successfully 
established  in  the framework of RACE,  it is considered that further action  is now needed both in the  industrial and 
regulatory  areas to exploit the  results  for the benefit of Europe's telecommunications  users.  The  following  further 
actions  are  recommended  tor  consideration:  A)  National  governments  should  collaborate  to  define  by  199:2  the 
conditions  and  regulatory  provisions  which  should  be  applied  to  the  introduction  of pan-European  advanced 
communications services.  B) Telecommunications,  broadcasting and cable TV  administrations should propose,  by 
mid-1989,  a concerted  approach  to,  and  a timetable  for,  development  and  use  of IBC  infrastructures  for  both 
telecommunications and enterntainment service's including HDTV (high definition television), teking full advantage 
of private sector investment initiatives when appropriate. C) Telecommunications administrations should prepare an 
initial memorandum of  understanding by 1990 on closer collaboration in their intra-European long-distance links and 
operations.  D) Service providers should specify, by the end of 1990, a first set of service requirements, commercial 
conditions and  regulatory  provisions  which  would  favour  an  early  and widespread  use  of IBC  services.  - 3 - E) 
Telecommunications, broadcasting and cable TV administrations, service providers and the telematics industry should 
agree  a memorandum  of understanding  by  mid  1989  to  complement  the  collaborative  R&D  in  RACE  by  pilot 
implementation  of some  IBC  services  on  a European  scale  for  a business-led  introduction  of IBC  by  1992.  F) 
Collaborative R&D should be extended to include integrated service engineering, fixed and mobile applications and 
techniques  for verification and testing of communications equipment and service functions  by the end of 1989.  G) 
European standardization bodies should reinforce and coordinate their etforts towards international standardization 
for IBC and advanced services. A standardization schedule should be established by mid-1989, particularly for A  TM 
(asynchronous transfer mode)(2).  H)  Member State should address the problem of frequency  allocation  in  Europe 
over the whole range of frequencies and applications. They should permit,  by  1992, a rationalization of frequency 
allocations reflecting evolving needs and priorities. For further information:  Willy HELIN  : 235.75.22 I 235.00.86 Mrs.  SANGLIER:  235.61.88  (2) ATM is  a  switching  and  transmission  technique  that  allows  flexible  use  of 
transmission capacity 
,' 
1/NNEX.  1- 8 EC  Commission  Press Release - Ref:  IP/89/256 
"COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS" : EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH BY SIR LEON BRITI  AN 
AT  THE  SECOND  INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE  ON  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  -AMSTERDAM,  18 
APRIL  1989 
"Competition has traditionally been turned away at the door of  the telecoms market as an undesirable influence. But 
times change; ever since the presentation of the Commission's Green Paper on Telecommunications  in  1987 major 
developments  have  occurred. Now  it  is a question of opening the door:  means,  motive and opportunity are all  to 
hand.  We  have  two  reasons  to  introduce fair  competition  into  this  sector.  The  need  for  an  efficient service and 
choice; and the need to bring some order to the path towards deregulation which is already being trod.  We also have 
a unique opportunity: the creation of the European single market  in  1992.The breaking down of barriers to  trade 
between  Member States will  bring a new dimension to  this process of change and provide the opportunity to take 
up the full challenge of technological development. Given these reasons and such an opportunity, the Commission's 
philosophy is to prevent Member States or particular undertakings from erecting or maintaining artificial barriers to 
the  single  market,  in  the  interests  of the  whole  economy.  At  the  same  time,  we  will  encourage  all  forms  of 
cooperation which foster innovation and economic progress, as Article 85(3) of the Treaty envisages. Now, what arc 
the  means  at  our  disposal  to  progressively  liberalise  the  telecoms  market?  It  has  sometimes  been  argued  that 
liberalisation should be based on harmonisation directives by the Council-of Ministers of Member States rather than 
on  directives  by  the Commission.  Such arguments  are  based on the assumption  that the Commission  has a choice 
between the different procedures available. This  is not so. The liberalisation of telecommunications markets implies 
in  the  first  place  the  application  of existing  Community  rules.  Article  90  of the  Treaty  of Rome  obliges  the 
Commission to  monitor enterprises under state ownership or those in a privileged position because they have been 
granted special or exclusive rights. Member States may not enact or maintain, in respect of  such enterprises, measures 
contrary to the rules of the Treaty.  After careful examination of the situation  in the telecommunications sector, the 
Commission identified several infringements of  the rules on competition, free circulation of goods and free provision 
of services.  It could have started individual actions against several Member States.  But that would have resulted in 
much  duplication  and  delay.  The  fact  was  that  we  were  facing  a general  problem  and  a global  approach  was 
obviously necessary. That is why it was appropriate to use Commission directives to open up the telecommunications 
markets to competition. A first directive liberalising the markets  for terminals was adopted in May of last year and 
a second directive liberalising services should be  adopt~d shortly. I think it is important to stress again that these two 
directives  do  not  introduce a new  policy:  they  implement  the  principles  laid down  by  the  Treaty.  Directives are 
necessary  because  the  Treaty  is  drafted  in  broad  language  which  requires  interpretation  according  to  changing 
circumstances.  We are  implementing a legal  provision, but  it  is of a constitutional character and therefore  it  has  to 
be given  fresh  meaning as circumstances change.  Economic  and technological changes make  it  necessary  to  adopt 
these rules now."  For  further  information please contact:  Michael  Berendt : 235  8562 Elisabeth  JS.aiser : 235  2210 
IIAINEX  I- 9 EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/89/274 
COMMISSION CLOSES PROCEDURE FOR ITALIAN MODEM SUPPLY 
The  Commission  has  decided  .  .to  close a procedure against the  Italian government concerning restrictions on  the 
supply of  telecommunication modems, 'following changes in Italian legislation. The action followed a complaint made 
in  1986 concerning the monopoly for supplying modems which was enjoyed by S.l.P., the concessionaire for internal 
telephone traffic in Italy. Under this monopoly arrangement users were often unable to instal the modem best Sllited 
to their needs, while alternative suppliers were unable to market their products. Now they are free to do so subject 
to  type  approval  conditions.  The  Commission's action  was  taken  under Community competition rules  and the 
Commission's  Article 90 directive of May  1988 on terminals.  for  further  information  please contact : Michael 
Berendt : 235  8562 Elisabeth Kaiser : 235 2210 
ANNE;( 1-1  Q EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/89/948 
COMMISSION OUTLINES  CONDITIONS  FOR EXEMPTING  TELECOMS  COOPERATION  PLAN  UNDER 
COMPETITION  RULES 
.· 
The Commission  has  been  informed  that the  project of 22  European  Telecommunications  Administrations  and 
Recognized  Private  Operators  Agencies  (RPOAs) to  form  a joint venture company  in  the  Netherla,nds  offering 
international managed data network services (MONS) has been abandoned at a meeting in Copenhagen on I 3 October 
1989 because the commercial and regulatory environment was no longer favourable. The project would have oftered 
standard enhanced data communications services on a pan-European basis. The services would have included features 
such as one-stop shopping and network management.  The project had been discussed with the Commission in the 
context of  the competition rules of  the Treaty and the Commission's general policy in the telecommunications sector. 
The Commission's Services considered that the MONS project presented certain risks of restriction of competition 
not only between the operators themselves by limiting their commercial autonomy, but also from  private service 
suppliers because the Telecommunications Administrations concerned have an effective monopoly in  the network 
infrastructure.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  accepted  that  the  project  also  offered  economic  benefits  to 
telecommunications users such as access to European-wide services through a single operator. Such cooperation could 
also have accelerated European standardization, reduced costs and increased the quality of the services. To ensure 
that these benefits took full effect,  in conformity with the EC  rules on competition, the services of the Commission 
had informed the participants that approval of  the project would have to be subject to guarantees designed to prevent 
undue restriction of competition in  the telecommunications services markets, such as discrimination against private 
services  suppliers and cross-subsidization.  Such  guarantees would  be  essential  conditions for  the  granting of an 
exemption under the competition rules to cooperation agreements involving Telecommunications Administrations. 
For further information contact:  Mr.  Michael  Berendt 235.85.62 
tfNN&X" /-11 EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/9Q/67 
MODIFICATION  OF  THE  CONDITIONS  UNDER  WHICH  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  CIRCUITS  ARE 
LEASED  IN BELGIUM FOLLOWING  INVESTIGATIONS  BY THE  COMMISSION 
The Commission has taken action  in respect of the  Belgian Regie des telegraphes et telephones after receiving a 
complaint  concerning  an  alleged  abuse  of  dominant  position  from  a  private  supplier  of  value-added 
telecommunications  services relating to  the conditions  under  which telecommunications  circuits are  being  leased. 
Following discussions with the Commission, the RTI has authorised the private supplier concerned to use the leased 
telecommunications circuits subject to no restrictions other than that they should not be used for the simple transport 
of data.  After the complaint was withdrawn, the Commission and the RIT commenced discussions with a view to 
ensuring that all clients of the Regie  in a comparable situation received the same treatment.  The outcome of these 
negotiations was that the RTT decided that from now on they would not apply the standard conditions concerning 
the access of third parties to  international data transmission circuits which contained restrictions likely to  infringe 
the competition  rules.  Pending the possible adoption of new  rules  in Belgium,  and without prejudice to any  such 
rules,  the  RTI has undertaken that  all  its existing and  potential  clients  for  !.eased telecommunications  circuits to 
which third parties may have access shall be governed by the same conditions as those which have been agreed with 
the  private sector supplier mentioned above,  that is to  say that they  will  not be subjected to any  restrictions apart 
from  the  requirement  that  the  circuit shall  not  be  used  for  the  simple transport  of data.  The  context of this  case 
provides  an  opportunity  for  the  Commissit:>n  to  reiterate  that,  under  the  competition  rules,  an  undertaking  in  a 
dominant position on a market for telecommunications  services may not impose any restrictions on the use of such 
services unless they are necessary to the task of providing the service of.general economic interest with which it has 
been entrusted. * * * 
k/VIii£X I - 1 2 EC  Commission  Press Release - Ref:  IP/901188 
TELECOMS OPERATORS ABOLISH TAR1FF RECOMMENDATIONS  ... FOLLOWING COMMISSION ACTION 
Following  the  intervention.' of  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Conference  of  Postal  and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) has decided to abolish a Recommendation to its member organisations 
which fixed the terms for leasing out international telecommunications circuits. The Commission had found that the 
Recommendation  amounted  to  a  price  agreement  under  Article  85  of the  Treaty  which  substantially  restricted 
competition within the European Community. This is a landmark case in the application of  Community competition 
law to telecommunications: - it re-establishes competition between telecoms operators for the supply of international 
leased cicuits, to the benefit of  users and notably suppliers of value-added services; - it applies the competition rules 
for the first time to the activities undertaken by the CEPT. The CEPT represents the telecoms administrations of 26 
European  countries,  including  the  12  Community  member  states.  From  time  to  time  the  Conference  adopts 
recommendations on the technical, supply and usage conditions as well as tariffs of international services. In April 
1989  it  revised its Recommendation on the General Principles for  the Lease of International Telecommunications 
Circuits and the Establishment of  Private International Networks. This revision provided~ inter alia, for the imposition 
of a 30% surcharge or an access charge where third-party traffic was carried on an  international telecommunications 
leased  circuit,  or  if  such  a  circuit  was  interconnected  to  the  public  telecommunications  network.  The 
Recommendation  also provided for  the application of uniform tariff coefficients for the detennination of the price 
of international telecommunications leased circuits. The Commission investigated the matter on its own initiative and 
also  received  two  complaints  alleging  violation  of the  compet.ition  rules  by  the  CEPT  and  claiming  that  the 
Recommendation would substantially increase telecommunications costs and limit the growth of  value-added services. 
- 2- After investigating the matter, the Commission informed the CEPT that the Recommendation could be deemed 
as  a decision by an association of undertakings (i.e.  Telecommunications  Administrations and Recognized Private 
Operating Agencies) having the object and effect of  restricting price competition for international leased circuits, and 
therefore, contrary to Article 85( l) of the Treaty.  In these circumstances, the CEPT decided at its meeting of 20-21 
February 1990 to abolish the Recommendation, since it had no real significance if it was deprived of the provisions 
the Commission  identified as  anti- competitive and  not qualifying for  an  exemption.  However,  the Commission 
indicated that it  was prepared to  examine the possibility of an  exemption  under Article 85(3) of the Treaty  upon 
notification of  a Recommendation which would harmonize tariff principles without any price-fixing agreement insofar 
as  this would bring economic advantages, for example by making tariffs more cost-related, and transparent and so 
benefiting  users.  This  case  provides  an  opportunity  for  the  Commission  to  reiterate  that  Telecommunications 
Administrations  are  undertakings  in  the  meaning  of the  competition  rules  of the Treaty,  and  any  agreement  or 
decision by association between them which is  restrictive of competition is  prohibited under Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty,  unless it is  exempted under Article 85(3) thereof. For further information contact Mr.  Michael Berendt 
,fN/1/GX' I  - 1 3 EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/90/375 
COMMISSION ENQUIRY INTO  INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE  CHARGES 
The European Commission i;las confirmed that it is examining the arrangements governing international telephone 
charges, to see whether they are compatible with the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome. This examination is 
being  undertaken  because  of the  significance  of international  communications  for  the  Community's  economy. 
Vice-President  of the  Commission  Sir  Leon  Brittan,  who  is  responsible  for  competition  policy,  stressed  the 
importance of the enquiry.  "We have to ensure that consumers  benefit from  an  international telephone charging 
system which allows genuine competition between the telecommunications operators. This is essential for European 
business and also for individuals." 
AIYNGX'I·-1 4 EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/90/589 
DAWN OF A NEW ERA IN  EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS  MEMBER STATES NOTIFIED OF TWO 
NEW  DIRECTIVES 
.· 
The Community member states have· now received formal  notification of two directives in the telecommunications 
sector which mark the beginning of  a new era in European telecoms and the creation of  a single market in this sector. 
The  two  measures  relate  together.  Liberalisation  will  for  the  first  time  open  up  unlimited  opportunities  for  the 
telecommunications  industry, for  business users and for the  individual consumer as  the range of services expands, 
made possible on a Community  basis  by the harmonisation of use and access conditions. The directives  are:  - the 
open  network provision (ONP)  framework  directive,  which  facilitates  access  of private companies  to  the  public 
networks  and  certain  public  telecommunications  services;  - the  Article  90  telecoms  services  directive,  which 
establishes the right for independent undertakings to offer new services on the telecommunications network. The ONP 
directive  was  adopted  by  the  Council  of Ministers  at  its  meeting  on  June  28.  The  Article  90  directive  was  a 
modification of the text agreed by the Commission  in June  1989. The two should be seen in parallel. Until  now, the 
provision  of pan-European  services  has  often  been  made  impossible  by  the  absence  of harmonised  technical 
interfaces,  by  divergent  conditions  of use  or discriminatory  tariff principles.  The  ONP  directive  lays  down  the 
principles for creating a European market by harmonising technical interfaces, it outlines conditions for supply and 
usage  and  proposes  the  harmonisation  of tariff principles.  Technical  harmonisation  will  be  achieved  in  close 
collaboration with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).  The telecommunications  industry 
has often found it difficult to provide new or alternative services on the existing national networks due to the existing 
monopoly rights which vary  from country to country. The Article 90 directive limits the exclusive rights which can 
be given to the telecommunications monopolies, confining them to control of the basic network and voice telephony. 
This  means  that  in  future  independent suppliers will  have a guaranteed right of access to the national networks  for 
new and developing services. This provision takes immediate effect for all value-added services. The resale of leased 
line  capacity may  be restricted  until  the end of 1992. - 2 - The  major features  of the ONP directive  I) Technical 
interfaces and service features will become the subject of European standards to be adopted by ETSI. These standards 
will  in principle be of a voluntary nature.  However, there is  a presumption in favour of those who comply with the 
standard, i.e. service providers complying with that standard will be able to offer their services throughout the whole 
European Community. 1bis is an  important  incentive, but no obligation to apply the standard. 2)  If the working of 
this  presumption  in  practice does  not  suffice to  guarantee  the  ineroperability of trans-frontier services  within  the 
Community,  the Commission  can  make  the reference  to  the  standard  in  question  mandatory  to  the  extent  strictly 
necessary to ensure such interoperability and to  improve  freedom  of choice for users. There will most probably not 
be  any  mandatory  standards  for  value- added  services  since  the  procedure  mentioned  above  was  conceived  for 
application to basic services such as packet-switched data transmission and the ISDN. 3) Since the Commission will 
have to improve the freedom of  choice for users when making the reference to a European standard mandatory, this 
will  not prevent a company that offers services related to mandatory standards also to offer other services. 4) The 
ONP Directive is a "framework" directive, to be followed by directives on specific issues. In this context the Council 
decided on the work programme  in the field of ONP for the next years.  In particular, this programme provides that 
:there will be specific ONP Directives for  leased lines and voice telephony;  by  1 January  1991, technical interfaces 
and services features concerning packet-switched data transmission and the  ISDN  will be established and could be 
made  mandatory  according  to  the  procedure  mentioned  above;  ONP  conditions  will  be  adopted  in  the  form  of 
recommendations  by  I  July  1991  and  1 January  1992  for  packet-switched  data  transmission  and  the  ISDN 
respectively; the Council will examine Commisson proposals in  1992 and thereafter by which the recommendations 
mentioned above would be transposed into directives. The Services Directive On 28 June 1989, the Commission had 
adopted a first draft of the Services Directive on the basis of Article 90(3) of the Treaty.  However, the Commission 
postponed its entry into force so that the Council of Ministers would have sufficient time to adopt the Directive on 
Open Network Provision (the ONP Directive). Thus, the Commission wished to see the Services Directive entering 
into  force  on the same day  as  the ONP  Directive.  - 3 - The  basic concept of the Services Directive is as  follows  : 
The exclusive or special rights of the  PTTs  in the  field of telecommunications services have to be abolished,  with 
the exception of voice telephony and the network infrastructure. The  Directive does not apply to the telex service 
and allows the Member States to prohibit the simple resale of capacity of leased lines for a transitional period ending, 
in principle, on 31  December  1992. As soon as this Directive enters into force,  private service providers will be able 
to offer value-added telecommunications services in competition with the PTTs throughout the European Community. 
A/'IIIBX  I  - 1  5 From  1 January 1993, they will also be able to offer basic services by way of the simple resale of capacity of leased 
lines.  The  basic  thrust  of the  liberalization  of basic  data  transmissiof!_  services  from  l  January  1993  will  be 
maintained. In addition, all valued- added services will be liberalized immediately upon the Directive's entering into 
force. At the meeting ofthe Council of  Ministers of7 December 1989, the Commission accepted, as part of a global 
compromise, to  modify certain· aspects of the Services Directive as  follows :  l) The Commission may  consider to 
prolong the transitory period during which the simple resale of  capacity may be prohibited beyond 31  December 1992 
up  to  1 January  1996 for individual Member States whose network for packet-switched data transmission services 
is  not yet sufficiently developed.  2) The  second change which the Commission  accepted concerns  the so-called 
"cahier de charges" (set of obligations) that may, under certain conditions, be imposed by a Member State on private 
service providers to the extent that this  is  necessary  to  safeguard the operation of services of general  economic 
interest which have been entrusted to a public undertaking in the sense of Article 90(2) of the Treaty. Such a set of 
obligations can  only be used  in  the  field  of basic packet- or circuit -switched data transmission and  only if the 
activity of  competing service providers risks to obstruct the performance of  the particular tasks asigned to the national 
PTT in question. In all other instances, the provision of basic data transmission services will be free from  1 january 
1993. It is provided that the Commission will scrutinize any set of obligations which a Member State may want to 
propose. The Member States will therefore have to notify their proposed sets of obligations at the planning stage by 
30 June  1992  so that the Commission can  check on their compatibility with Community law before they will be 
implemented.  3) The revised version  of the  Services  Directive contains a review  clause according to which the 
Commission will examine,  in  the course of the year  1994,  the  working of the  provisions concerning the  set of 
obligations with a view to determine whether they have to be changed. This permits the Commission to take account 
of the technological change on the one hand and possible distortions of trade between Member States on the other 
hand. 
ANN€XI-1 6 EC  Commission  Press Release - Ref:  IP/90/670 
COMMISSION  SUPPORTS  COOPERATION  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  A  PAN-EUROPEAN  MOBILE 
TELEPHONE  SYSTEM 
The  European  Commission  has  formally  reassured  three  major  European  electronics  and  telecommunications 
companies - the Gennan AEG Aktiengeselischaft, the French/Dutch Alcatel NV and the Finnish Oy Nokia - that the 
consortium  they  have  fonned  to  develop  a  pan-European  mobile  telephone  system  does  not  contravene  the 
Community's competition rules.  In  1987, European  telecommunications administrations signed a memorandum  of 
understanding  in  the  context  of the  CEPT  (Conference  europeenne  des  administrations  des  pastes  et  des 
telecommunications)  to  introduce  a  pan- European  public  digital  cellular  telecommunications  system  in  their 
respective countries by  1991. This planned system,  called the GSM (for "Group special  mobile") system,  is a new 
communications sytem which does not yet exist. The  only potential buyers with respect to the GSM system  are at 
present the national network operators in the CEPT countries, or the companies acting on behalf of those operators. 
In  order to participate in this new project, Alcatel and Nokia set up a consortium known as ECR 900,  which will 
jointly develop, manufacture and sell the pan-European digital cellular mobile telecommunications system, and parts 
thereof.  Most  other communications  have  likewise  grouped  together  in  order  to  bid effectively  for  the  calls  for 
tenders  which  have  emanated  from  the  network  operators  (PTTs).  More  than  half a dozen  consortia  are  thus 
participating in the development of  the pan-European system which is presently under way. AEG, Alcatel and Nokia 
were the first consortium to notify their cooperation agreement to the Commission, seeking assurances that  it did not 
entail any competition problems. The Commission  has now con finned by way of a fonnal  decision that  in the very 
special circumstances surrounding the development of  the GSM system the cooperation does not fall within the scope 
of Article 85(1):  the companies acting individually could ·not,  in  view of the  very  heavy  investment involved  and 
the  tight time-schedule  imposed  in  the  calls  for  tenders,  have  been effective  competitors  for  the  purpose  of this 
project. Other consortia will be dealt with where appropriate along similar lines.  · 
1//'INEX I  -1 7 EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/90/896 
THE COMMISSION TERMINATES  INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDIN<1S  AGAINST IRELAND CONCERNING 
THE TELEPHONE  SET MONOPOLY 
The  Commission  has  decided  to  terminate  the  infringt:mcnt  proceedings  it  initiated  in  February  in  respect  of 
Ireland's failure to fulfil its obligation to apply Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets 
in telecommunications terminal equipment. Under that Directive, member states had to withdraw the exclusive cights 
enjoyed by their telecommunications administrations in relation to the marketing of  terminal equipment and inform 
the  Commission  of the  measures  taken  to  that  effect.  The  Irish  Government complied only partially  with that 
obligation, maintaining the monopoly held by the public enterprise TELECOM EIRANN in respect of  the marketing 
of the first telephone set.  Following a number of discussions between the Commission and the Irish Government, 
the  latter  finally  agreed  to  abolish  the  monopoly  as  from  1 July  1990.  TELECOM  EIRANN's  private-sector 
competitors  can  now  market  such  equipment  on  an  equal  footing.  The  Commission  is  also  monitoring  the 
implementation of the Directive by the other member states. Further infringement proceedings have been initiated 
against Belgium and Denmark. The Commission has decided, however, to terminate the proceedings against the latter 
country as  it  has since complied with the  Directive by abolishing the exclusive rights granted in connection with 
PABXs. EC  Commission  Press  Release- Ref:  IP/91/48 
EUROPEAN  COMMISSION CLEARS  THE  AT&T/NCR  CONTESTED  TAKEOVE~ BID 
The  American  Telephone and  Telegraph  Company  (AT&T)  has  made  a takeover  bid  for  all  the  shares of NCR 
Corporation (NCR).  The  bid  is  resisted  by the  13oard of NCR,  and  AT&T  is  now  trying to collect proxy votes  in 
order to gain control at a forthcoming general  meeting of the shareholders of NCR. AT&T  is the worldwide leader 
in  the  telecommunications  business.  It  manufactures and  distributes  the  whole  range  of telecommunications 
equipment, computers, and data networking products. NCR is the world's 12th largest information service company. 
Its  main  business  is  the  manufacture,  installation  and  servicing  of business  information  processing  systems  and 
automatic retail and financial workstations. The Commission's appraisal, under the Community Merger Regulation, 
has concentrated mainly on the vertical an4 the conglomerate aspects of the concentration: - NCR, although not one 
of the major overall  manuf~cturers of hardware in  the Community,  has a strong position on the financial  and retail 
workstations markets (Automatic Teller Machines, Electronic Points of  Sale, Electronic Cash Registers), while AT&T 
has a wide range of activities  in  markets  which are  linked,  mainly upstream,  to  the  workstations business.  One of 
the  most  important  of these  is  the  control  of the  source  of the  UNIX  operating  system  software,  which  AT&T 
licenses very widely;  - The conglomerate aspect  is  mainly concerned with  the possible technical complementarity 
of AT&T's  telecommunication and computer networking and NCR's workstation business. The Commission  found 
that  the  proposed  concentration docs  not  create or  strengthen  a dominant  position on  these Community  markets. 
Therefore,  it  has decidcu  not  to  oppose the operation and  to declare  it compatible with  the common  market  under 
the  Merger Regulation. The ready availability of the UNIX operating system  to competitors of AT&T and  NCR  is 
an  important  aspect  of the  overall  market  picture,  and  the  Commission  will  pay  particular  attention  to  the 
maintenance of this  aspect of current competitive conditions. 
,fNNEX I -1 9 EC  Commission  Press Release- Ref:  IP/91/303 
THE COMMISSION IMPOSES STRICT OBLIGATIONS IN ITS APPROVAL TO THE ALCA TELITELETTRA 
MERGER 
In  its  first  decision  under  the  merger  Regulation  after a full  enquiry,  the  Commission  has  approved  the  merger 
between the French group Alcatel and Fiat subsidiary Telettra, subject to strict obligations which have been imposed 
on Alcatel and firm assurances given by Telefonica, the Spanish telecommunications operator. Sir Leon Brittan,-Vice 
President  of the  Commission  in  charge  of competition  policy,  said:  "This  merger  raised  serious  questions  of 
competition policy because of its impact on the telecommunications markets  in Spain, where the parties' combined 
market share for transmission equipment is around 80  %.  Normally,  this would  be unacceptable.  I have however: 
- Obtained significant commitments  from  Alcatel as  a result of which  it has  agreed  to  buy Telefonica's shares  in 
Alcatel and Telettra.  In this way, competition will  be opened up between suppliers of equipment to Telefonica.  My 
concern was that links between a telecommunications operator and  its suppliers may distort competition by giving 
those suppliers privileged market  access.  The Commission's  decision therefore imposes  strict legal obligations  in 
order to ensure that these commitments are fully respected. - In addition, I have received assurances from  Telefonica 
that it will pursue a diversified buying policy and will respond to approaches from  new suppliers. It has agreed to 
clarify  its technical approval  procedures and has  declared that an  industrial presence  in  Spain will  no  longer be a 
decisive  factor  in  awarding  contracts".  On  this  basis,  the  Commission  is  satisfied  that  the  Spanish  market  for 
transmission equipment is open to competition and that there is no danger that this merger will lead to the creation 
of a dominant market  position there. Suppliers other than the combined Alcatel/Telettra group, whether established 
in  Spain  or  not,  will  be  able  to  compete  effectively  for  orders  in  Spain. 1  Background  Alcatel  is  the 
telecommunications subsidiary of the French Alcatel- Alsthom group. Telettra is the telecommunications subsidiary 
of the Italian Fiat group. Telefonica is the Spanish telecommunications operator. Alcatel and Telettra notified their 
merger to the Commission  on  10 December  1990. The Commission decided on 21  January  1991  to carry out a full 
enquiry under the merger Regulation. With the parties' cooperation, it has been possible to complete this case a full 
six weeks  before the expiry of the  legal deadline laid down  in  the  Regulation.  * * * 
I/11/'IEX 1-2 ~ EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/91/648 
COMMISSION LAUNCHES  FORMAL INVESTIGATION  INTO INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE  CHARGES 
A preliminary examination of-international telephone charges has given the Commission  reason to believe that the 
level of these charges both within the 'European Comunity and between Member States and other parts of the world 
might  result  from  anti-competitive  arrangements  between  Telecommunications  Organisations  in  breach  of EC 
competition rules. The Commission has therefore decided to proceed to a full and formal inquiry. The Commission 
has written to the Telecommunications  Organisations  in the  12 Member States requesting detailed information  on 
their prices, costs and international pricing arrangements.  This will enable the Commission to assess whether there 
is  indeed  a violation  of the  competition  rules  and  to  ensure  that  the  level  of international  telephone  charges  is 
proportionate to the costs of the services provided. The  investigation covers  both the charges to  the  users  (known 
as  collection  charges) and  the  prices  paid  by  each  Telecommunications  Organisation to  its  counterparts  in  other 
countries for the delivery of the calls originating in those countries (known as accounting rates).  The Commission 
will assess whether any arrangements  between the organisations violate Article 85  of the Treaty,  or whether they 
constitute the imposition of unfair selling prices  in  breach of Article 86.  The  investigation  is  being pursued  under 
Council Regulation 17/62, which gives the Commission considerable powers of investigation in order to enforce the 
competition  rules.  Sir  Leon  Brittan,  Commissioner for competition  policy,  said:  "The  decision  to  proceed with  a 
formal  investigation shows the Commission's determination to ensure that consumers and business users benefit from 
maximum price transparency and full compliance with the competition rules". Contact for journalists: Mr. P. Guilford 
ANNEX;. - 21 EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/91/935 
COMMISSION ADOPTS FIRST EXEMPTION  DECISION  IN  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR 
The Commission  has  adopted  its  fi~st fonnal  decision  applying  the  competition  rules  of the  EEC  Treaty  to  a 
cooperation agreement between a telecommunications organisation (TO) and a private operator for the provision of 
a telecommunications service. As outlined in the Commission's recently adopted "Guidelines on the application of 
the EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector" (1), cooperation between TO's and other operators is 
increasing.  The  Commission  recognizes  that such  cooperation  can  bring about  important  benefits,  such  as  the 
improvement of existing services or the transfer of technology. However, such agreements can restrict competition 
not only between the two partners themselves but also vis-a-vis third parties where the TO gives more favourable 
network  access  to  its  cooperation  partner  than  to  other competing  service  providers.  Moreover,  a  cooperation 
involving the monopolist for  the network provision may have an  undesirable dissuasive effect vis-a-vis potential 
market entrants. The benefits and adverse effects must be weighed in each case. The case at hand involves the Irish 
telecommunications organisation, Bord Telecom Eireann (Irish Telecom) and Motorola Ireland Ltd., a subsidiary of 
the US  Motorola Group, who have jointly set up  a company,  Eirpage  Ltd.,  to  provide a nationwide radiopaging 
service interconnected to Irish Telecom's telecommunications network. Paging is a one-way means of  communication, 
with  the simplest  fonn enabling the carrier of a "beep" device to  call back after being paged while on  the move. 
Following the principles set out in the Guidelines, this cooperation between two potential competitors was found to 
fall  under  Article  85( 1  ).  But  it  also  made  possible  the  rapid  introduction  of a  new  paging  service  previously 
unavailable to consumers and businesses in Ireland, such as nationwide coverage and direct contact with the paging 
service  subscriber.The  market  for  the  sale  of paging  receive  equipment  may  also  be  expected  to  benefit,  as 
subscribers to the Eirpage service are  free  to  use any brand of compatible receive units on the system,  which has 
been  so  construed  as  to  allow  the  broadest  possible  range  of compatibility.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
Commission  concluded  that  the  cooperation  could  be  exempted  under  Article  85(3)  of the  EEC  Treaty.  This 
favourable attitude was subject to several conditions, including assurances by  Irish Telecom  as  the public network 
provider that it will make available to independent companies who wish to  provide paging services in  competition 
with Eirpage the required facilities such as antennae and transmitters.  Market entrants may  also choose to  buy and 
install such equipment themselves.  It should be noted that the  Eirpage company pays Irish Telecom an annual fee 
designed to cushion the investment in the paging infrastructure, which was partLy  funded under the Community's 
"STAR"  programme  aimed  at  developing  less  forward  regions  of  the  Community  through  improved 
telecommunications services. In addition, Eirpage is charged full commercial rates for all Irish Telecom's facilities 
such  as  the  use  of leased  lines.  Competing  operators  would  be  subject to  the  same  tenns.  (1)  OJ C  233  of 6 
September 1991  * * * 
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EC  Commission  Press Release- Ref:  IP/91/1192 
COMMISSION CLEARS ALCA  TEL'S ACQUISITION OF  AEG'S CABLE BUSINESS 
The Commission has approved the merger between Alcatel  Cable and AEG  Kable.  Alcatel  is  taking over AEG's 
cable business in Germany, with the exception of the motor vehicle cable activity which will be retained by AEG. 
The Commission  examined the effect of the concentration on  five  different markets,  namely  telecommunic_ation 
cables, power cables, installation power cables, and enamelled wire as well as overhead aluminium bare conductors. 
Cable  markets  in  the  Community  are  at  a  transitional  stage,  shifting  from  national  markets  to  one  that  is 
Community-wide,  but the transition  has  not  yet  been  completed and progress  varies  between product  markets. 
However, only the power cable market, among the markets examined in  this case, can still be considered to  be a 
national market. The Commission concluded that the merger will  not create or strenghten a dominant position for 
the parties on any  of these markets.  During the investigation of the case, the Commission received a request from 
the German authorities under Article 9 of the Merger Regulation for referral of the case to the Federal Cartel Office 
on the basis that the merger threatened to damage competition on the German market. The German authorities were 
particularly concerned about the positio'n  in  relation to  telecommunication cables and power cables.  After careful 
consideration,  the  Commission  decided  that  it  did  not  accept  that  the  concentration  would  adversely  affect 
competition on a national German market and therefore rejected the request for referral. * * * 
ANIIIe"J< 1-2 3 EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/92/42 
COMMISSION APPROVES JOrNT VENTURE  IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIPMENT  INDUSTRY 
The Swedish telecommunications group Ericsson and the German  manufacturer of radio and television receiving 
antennas Hans Kolbe & Co (Kolbe) have agreed to form a joint venture (Ericsson Fuba Telekom GmbH) which will 
be involved in the field of  telecommunications equipment. It will manufacture line transmission systems,  espe~ially 
digital cross-connect (DXC) technology.  Kolbe will transfer to the new company all of its tangible and intangible 
assets relating to its digital transmission equipment business. Ericsson will acquire a 51% stake in the new company 
and 49% will be held by Kolbe. Digital cross-connect transmission is an emerging technology which enables network 
operators to optimize the use of  the existing telecommunications infrastructure by looking for unused or under-used 
lines. The joint venture has been examined under the Community's Merger Regulation. The Commission has come 
to the conclusion that the operation does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, 
since the affected market is still in a development stage and there are strong actual as well as potential competitors. 
* * * 
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EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/92/576 
COMMISSION APPROVES JOINT VEN1URE rN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY 
ERICSSON  and  ASCOM  HOLDING  AG  (Ascom)  have  agreed  to  fonn  a  joint  venture  (Ascom  Ericsson 
Transmission AG) which will be  engaged in  the field of public line transmission, mainly in  Switzerland. Ericsson 
is a Swedish group which operates in the telecommunications sector and related fields. Ascom is a Swiss electr~mics 
and telecommunications group, the ultimate parent company of which is the Hasler Foundation. The joint venture 
has been examined under the Community's Merger Regulation. The Commission has come to the conclusion that 
the operation does not raise serious doubts as to its serious compatibility with the common market, since it affects 
competition in the Community only in the long tenn and not significantly. * * * 
tf/(Ne-1.  I  - 2  5 EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/92/585 
PROPOSALS  FOR ACTION  IN  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SERVICES  SECTOR 
On the initiative of Vice-President Pandolfi, the Commission has decided to adopt four documents concerning the 
telecommunications sector in preparation of  the single market.  In this framework the Commission has launched two 
proposals for Council directives which represent important steps forward in the harmonisation of  telecommunications 
services  and  in  particular voice  telephony.  The  basis  for  the  proposals  is  the  directive  adopted  in  1990  on  the 
establishment of the  internal market through the application of the principles of open network provision (ONP)  to 
telecommunications services. The first proposed directive concerns the application of ONP to voice telephony. The 
proposed directive aims  to  provide  for a minimal harmonisation of the quality of telecommunications services and 
to define the rights of users of such services.(*) The second proposed directive supports the mutual recognition of 
national  authorizations  for  telecommunications  services  and  the  establishment  of  a  Single  Community 
Telecommunications  Licence.  Both  proposals  are  the  result  of long  consultations  with  all  interested  parties. 
Furthennore, the Commission has adopted two communications examining the situation and future challenges in two 
other important areas. The first paper, which deals with telecommunication tariffs in the Community, points out that 
important intra-Community price disparities for telephone calls persist. These could affect the implementation of  the 
Single Market and the competitivity of businesses. The second paper,  which has been prepared at the invitation of 
the  Council,  covers  the  European  industry  for  telecommunications  equipment.  Equipment  manufacturers  in  the 
Community  have engaged in a process of re- structuring and today we need to  reinforce their presence in  key  high 
growth segments and markets. The Communication discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the European  industry 
compared to  the Japanese and American  and puts forward several  proposals for  improving its  competitiveness . ./. 
(*)The  text of this proposal should be  finalised  in  the  next  few  days.  - 2 - 1.  Open Network Provision (ONP) for 
voice telephony This proposal is an important step in the harmonisation strategy of  Community's Telecommunication 
policy.  The proposed directive on the application of open network provision to  voice telephony services has  three 
basic goals:- To improve the quality of  telephone services for private and business users by setting minimum quality 
standards to be provided by member  States. This would include the time  it takes  to have a phone installed, and the 
right to be compensated if quality standards are not met.  - To open  up access to the public telephone infrastructure 
for service providers and other telecom operators, including mobile phones,  on an equitable and non-discriminatory 
basis.  - To  enhance Community-wide  provision  of voice  telephony  services.  This  would  include  fixing  common 
technical specifications, for example for sockets, enabling the same equipment to  be  used through the  EC.  It would 
also  aim  to  harmonise phone numbers  on  an  EC-wide  basis,  as  well  as  establishing access  to  telephone  inquiries 
services covering the whole Community.  2.  Licences The Commission  is  proposing a directive- which  is  also part 
of the  harmonization strategy - aiming to establish a balanced and efficient procedure  for the mutual recognition of 
licences, across the Community including a single Community licence, and other authorisations for the provision of 
telecommunications services issued by the member states. A Community Telecommunications Committee would assist 
the  Commission  in  carrying  out  this  work.  3.  Communication  on  tariffs  The  paper  reviews  progress  towards 
achieving the 'progressive implementation of  the general principle that communications tariffs should follow overall 
cost trends', which was given as  a major goal  in the Commission Green Paper on the development of the common 
market  for  telecommunications  services  and  equipment  adopted  in  1988.  There  is  still  a lack  of trans-European 
structures  and  major  bottlenecks  remain.  in  the  Community  hindering  telecommunications  development.  The 
Commission's Communication on telecommunications  tariffs  in  the Community shows the continuing 'surcharge' 
for crossing national borders in the Community: -3- - Firstly, there is a 'frontier effect'. A three-minute call in peak 
time from  one Member State to  another costs, on average,  between 2.5  and 3 times the  price charged for the most 
expensive  national  long- distance  call,  over a comparable  geographical  distance.  In  off-peak periods  the  ratio  is 
between  5 and 6 times as  much,  thus especially penalising  residential users.  - Secondly, the  price of a call  in  one 
direction within the Community  often differs  significantly,  up  to  a factor  of two,  from  the  price  in the opposite 
direction. -Thirdly, there is a continuing lack of night-time and weekend tariff offerings for international telephony. 
In the vast majority of Member States, off-peak reductions on national calls in the Community range from  32% to 
69% whereas the reductions  for  intra-Community  calls are  at most  33%.  Three countries offer no  off-peak tariffs 
to other Community countries. 4. Communication on the state of Europe's telecommunications equipment industry. 
This  examines  the  competitive state of EC  suppliers,  and  assesses  their strengths and  weaknesses  affecting  their 
ability to  meet the demands of a genuine single telecommunications  market,  as  well  as their capacity to  compete 
internationally, especially with Japan  and the US.  The  industry's strengths  include a broad operational base in the 
/tiNt:!\ I  - 2  6 Community,  a strong relationship with the TOs  and a comprehensive product range,  while among  its weak points 
are market fragmentation and the duplication of R&D inherited from the past. Community action should aim at four 
key objectives: the creation of a genuine internal market through further liberalisation and harmonisation within the 
industry; supporting technological  progress, above  all  by financing  "priority technology  projects";  improving  the 
industry's position  in  the  terminal  equipment sector through regular  consultation  with  the operators  themselves; 
working to create a level playing field  worldwide by  launching multilateral  (GATT,  OECD),  bilateral  (Japan and 
US) and other initiatives.  • • • EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/92/837 
COMMISSION LAUNCHES REVIEW OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SERVICES SECTOR 
.· 
At the initiative of Vice-Presidents Brittan and Pandolfi, the Commission has today adopted a report carrying out 
an overall assessment of the situation in the telecommunications services sector. To tackle the problems identified, 
the Commission has decided to launch a wide consultation of all interested parties on the basis of various options. 
This approach  is  fully  consistent with the declaration of Birmingham  where the Commission  commits  itself 'to 
consult more widely before proposing legislation which could include consultation with all the Member States and 
a more systematic use of consultation documents'. 
This review  was  required by  two directives.  The  Commission's  1990  directive on  telecommunications  services 
(90/388/EEC) provided for the opening up of services such as  leased lines to competition, but granted a temporary 
exception allowing monopolies on voice telephony to continue, subject to a reconsideration by the Commission in 
1992.  The  Council's  1990  directive  on  Open  Network  Provision  (90/387/EEC)  set  out  a  framework  for  the 
hannonisation of access to public telecommunications networks and, where applicable, services and provided for a 
1992 review of progress in this direction. 
On the basis of this assessment, the Commission has found that, despite progress made since it published a Green 
Paper on the sector in  1987, a number of bottlenecks remain,  in  particular that telephone users are obliged to  pay 
excessively high tariffs for  intra-Community services. These are impeding the development of the internal market, 
and have a detrimental impact on cohesion as  well as  limiting the growth potential of the sector. 
The  European  Community  is  characterised  by  the  existence of twelve technically diverging  national  networks. 
Community-wide services cannot therefore be guaranteed solely by the full  implementation of the competition rules 
and the freedom to provide services. There is a need for harmonisation measures to ensure interoperability. Therefore, 
the continuity of Community telecommunications policy and the stable framework provided by the Green Paper for 
Community and national reforms must be maintained. This concerns, in particular, the principle of balance between 
liberalisation and harmonisation which has underpinned Community telecommunications policy since  1989. 
In accordance with this approach the Commission has analysed the situation envisaging the four following possible 
options for dealing with the problems identified : 
Option  1 : Freezing the liberalisation process (which was  started by  the Green Paper and Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC), effectively maintaining the status quo. 
Option 2 : Introducing extensive regulation of both tariffs and investments at Community level in order to remove 
the bottlenecks and in  particular the surcharge on intra-Community tariffs. 
Option 3  : The  liberalisation of all  voice  telephony,  i.e.  international  (inside and  outside the Community)  and 
national calls. 
Option 4 : An  intennediate option of opening up  voice telephony between Member States to competition. 
Option I (maintaining status quo) would involve a steady falling back of the Community market with regard to the 
United States and the Japanese markets and therefore does not seem acceptable. Option 2 could resolve some of the 
problems identified in the Review by means of e.g.  price- capping, but risks foregoing the efficiency gains of other 
options and furthennore would involve introducing extensive regulation at national and/or Community level. Option 
3 and Option 4 both represent substantial opportunities for  moving forward although their implications must be 
carefully studied. 
The  Commission's  policy  on  telecommunications  has  always  been  to  introduce  compet1t10n  gradually. 
Implementation of Option 3 would depart from  this approach by  introducing full  liberalisation. The  Commission considers,  at  this stage, that such an option would give rise to  practical problems  unless questions such  as  tariff 
rebalancing, access charges, etc. have been resolved. Therefore Option J  ... can only be contemplated if introduced in 
phases.  However, Option 4 provides one of the possible intermediate steps which moreover provides a solution to 
one of the most serious bottlenecks identified in the Review (the 'frontier' effect). At this stage, the Commission 
therefore considers that  Optio~ 4 seetns better suited than others to the fundamental  objectives of the Community 
in  this policy area. 
In  launching this consultation,  the  Commission  seeks  comments  on  all  the  options set  out  in  this  Review.  In 
particular,  comments  will  be  sought  on  the  actions  envisaged,  the  appropriate  timescale,  the  maintenance  and 
expansion of universal access, and any specific situations which need to be taken into account.  •  •  • EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  TP/92/932 
COURT JUDGEMENT  ON  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SERVICES  DIRECTIVE 
Sir  Leon  Brittan,  EC  competition  commissioner,  today  welcomed  the judgement of the  Court of Justice  in  the 
telecoms  services case. 
In  1988, the Commission adopted Directive 90/338/EEC under Article 90(3) of the EC Treaty. This directive had 
the  effect  of  obliging  the  Member  States  to  abolish  any  existing  monopoly  rights  on  the  supply  of 
telecommunications services other than simple voice telephony.  It also obliged them  to take all  necessary measures 
to  ensure that any company  is  able  to  supply  these  newly  liberalised services. 
The  Court  yesterday  confim1cd  the  Commission's  power  to  issue  this  Directive,  taking  the  same  line  as  in  its 
judgement in the terminals equipment case. The Court confirmed the Commission's jurisdiction to prohibit the grant 
of maintenance  of monopoly  rights  that  are  contrary to  the  free  movement  and  competition  provisions of the  EC 
Treaty.  In annulling part of the Directive, the Court took exactly the same position that it had taken in the tem1inals 
case. This concerns specific provisions regarding the grant of  special rights and the renegotiation of existing contracts 
bctwceu telecommunications companies and purchasers of the services which arc libcralised under the Dii·cctive. The 
Commission  will  consider what measures  it  needs to  take  in this  rcg<~rd, but this will not effect the substance of the 
Directive, any  more  than  the similar judgement of the  Cnmt did  in  the  terminals  case. 
* * * EC  Commission  Press Release- Ref:  IP/92/1076 
COMMISSION REQUESTS  INFORMATION  FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS  ORGANIZATIONS 
The Commission has noted reports on certain practices on the part of telecommunications organizations in  various 
Member States which could be  in  breach of the Community rules on competition. 
On examining published data on  charges,  it has  found  that there  are differences  between the rental/maintenance 
charges for lines leased by such organizations to third parties and rental/maintenance charges for lines offering direct 
access to public data-switching networks. 
The  Commission  is  not  at  present  aware  of any  objective  factors  providing justification  for  the  differences  in 
charges. 
On the basis of the information at its disposal, the Commission considers that the differences in charges could be 
found  to  be  contrary  to  the  Community  rules  on  competition.  If confirmed.  these  practices  on  the  part  of 
telecommunications organizations enjoying inter alia exclusive rights with regard to the establishment and operation 
of public networks would run counter to the principles defined by the Council and the Commission  in  the context 
of the liberalization of the telecommunications  sector. 
ror the  purpose  of vetting  those  practices,  the  Commission  has  requested  additional  information  from  the 
telecommunications  organizations concerned. 
It  will  also examine any other infonnation sent to  it. 
• • • • 
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COMMISSION OPENS SECOND-PHASE PROCEEDINGS INTO SIEMENS/PHILIPS MERGER IN THE CABLE 
BUSINESS 
On  November  II,  1992,  Siemens  and  Philips  notified  their  intention  to  bring  the  optical  fibre  and 
telecommunications cable business of Philips under the control of two jointly controlled companies, one for optical 
fibres  and  one  for  telecommunications  cables.  Following  this  notification,  the  Bundeskartellamt  informed  the 
Commission  that this merger  threatened to  create  or  strengthen  a dominant  position  on  the  German  market  and 
requested referral of the case  to  the German cartel authority. 
Following  its  own  investigation,  the Commission  found  that  the  proposed  merge  raised serious  doubts  as  to  its 
compatibility with the co·mmon market. It decided to initiate second-phase proceedings in order to further investigate 
the case, in particular in view of the narrow supply structure created by the merger both at national and Community 
level.  A referral to the Bundeskartellamt is therefore not envisaged. 
* * * EC  Commission  Press Release- Ref:  IP/93/189 
COMMUNICATION  FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
ON TRANS-EUROPEAN  Dt\TA  COMMUNICATIONS  NETWORKS  BETWEEN  ADMINISTRATIONS 
Following an  initiative by Vice-President Bangemann, the Commission today adopted a communication  from  the 
Commission  to  Parliament and the Council together with two proposals for Council Decisions, one on a series of 
guidelines for trans-European data communications networks between administrations and the other on the adoption, 
in this sector, of  a multiannual Community support programme (IDA -Interchange of  Data between Administrations). 
This  initiative constitutes the  first  application,  within  the  telecommunications  sector,  of the Community  actions 
envisaged  in the domain  of trans-European networks. 
It seeks to reinforce the introduction of the functions essential for the efficient management of  the internal market 
through  the  use  of high- performance  data communications  networks,  while  at  the  same  time  ensuring  that  the 
citizens of the Union and the economic  players derive maximum  advantage  from  the  four  freedoms  of movement 
defined  in  the Treaty of Rome. 
From  the European citizen's point of view, and by way of a practical example, the data communications networks 
between administrations will  help to ensure the rapid processing of case files on social security benefits outside the 
national  territory,  promote personal  mobility  through  the  creation  of a network  linking the national employment 
agencies and set up networks for the prevention and control of natural disasters. 
The  budget requested for the execution  of the development work entailed under the  IDA  programme amounts  to 
J 80  MECU  for  five  years,  supplemented over the same  period  by  75  MECU  in  the form  of a contribution to the 
development  of the statistical  information  network (COMEDI  project) and  by  85  MECU  for  the development  of 
various priority networks (taxation, veterinary and phytosanitary information, education and training, monitoring of 
exports). 
Like the trans-European transport and energy network projects, the proposal for a programme on the development 
of data communications  networks between 
administrations comes within the scope of the  implementation  of the growth  initiative because: 
- it  will  facilitate,  through  the  implementation  of  the  master  plans  and  following  consultations  with  the 
administrations,  the  introduction  of a network  architecture  which,  by  reason  of the  necessary  harmonization  of 
specifications, will result in the gradual upgrading of the physical infrastructures and their associated services in the 
least well  endowed Member States,  thus reinforcing the cohesion of the Community; 
- it  places  at the disposal of the  Community a system  for  the administration of Community rules to  promote  the 
functioning  of the  internal  market  for  the  benefit  of economic  operators,  while  at  the  same  time  offering  them 
substantial advantages in terms of  speed and efficiency.  In this respect, the  assur~ce given to the economic players 
guaranteeing  them  equitable treatment  as  far as  Community  rules and  the stepping-up of anti-fraud measures  are 
concerned will help to restore a climate of confidence (an indispensable requirement for enterprises and consumers 
alike).  In the same spirit, the steps being taken to modernize the administrative environment in which the enterprises 
operate will  produce an overall  improvement  in their competitiveness; 
- the  general  availability  within  the  Community,  as  the  result  of a consistent  programme  of investment,  of 
high-performance hardware and software tools will  provide  incentives for  using data communications  systems  for 
the exchange of information - an activity currently inhibited by the non-existence of consistent standards and by the 
incompatibility of the basic national services. 
As regards the prospects held out for European industry, the nature and extent of public investment over the coming 
.,fNNGx  ,  - 3  3 years will have a positive impact on growth and will contribute substantially to efforts to trigger economic recovery, 
in  keeping with the priority objectives established at the  Edinburgh  EcOftomic  Council held  in  December  1992. 
Indeed,  the creation of  high-p~rformance data communications services and  innovatory applications which  bt:nelit 
both the national and the Community administrations will eventually produce: 
- a spin-off effect on the market which will  favour the development of similar services on a Community  scale to 
the advantage of the commercial  operators.· This,  in tum, should help to ensure the profitability of the investments 
initially authorized both by the suppliers of the equipment and by the telecommunications operators; 
- positive consequences for the Community research programmes dedicated to the development of  a new generation 
of enhanced-performance networks (ISDN,  wideband).  · 
Lastly,  this  initiative  will  devote  special  attention  to  the  harmonization  of the  administrative  rules  among  the 
Community's  partners,  notably  within  the  European  Economic  Space  and  especially  against  the  background  of 
enlargement. 
The  contributions mentioned  above  represent  only  a minute  proportion of the  investment  needed  to  set  up  and 
operate the data communications networks between administrations: according to initial estimates, which these studies 
will examine in greater detail, Member States will be required to invest a minimum of  6 000 MECU over five years. 
Furthermore, for the peripheral regions of the Community, the modernization and upgrading of data-processing and 
telecommunications equipment as a prelude to the introduction of these networks would necessitate an  investment 
of 7 000  MECU  over  the  next  seven  years.  A detailed  business  plan  and  a schedule  of commitments  dealing 
specifically with  these  investments  will  need  to  be drawn  up jointly by all  the user administrations. 
Apart  from  Community  budget  tinancing  in  line with  the needs of projects of common  interest,  the master  plans 
and  the  declaration  of European  interest  will  provide  the  basis  for  mobilizing  the  financing  of the  EIB  and  the 
European  Investment Fund. 
* * * EC  Commission  Press Release • Ref:  IP/93/277 
TELECOMS:  THE  ROAD  AHEAD· SPEECH  BY  MR VAN  MIERT,  TO  THE  POSTAL,  TELEGRAPH  AND 
TELEPHONE  INTERNATIO,NAL- BRUSSELS,  15  APRIL  1993 
Is there any need to  point out why the telecommunications sector in the Community  has to evolve? 
. its economic importance (more than  ECU  100 billion a year for telecommunications services and ECU 30 billion 
for equipment) 
. its  importance  for the development  of new technology and  for employment 
. the  role  it  plays  in  guaranteeing social cohesion,  through  the  benefits  it  provides for  less-favoured groups and 
outlying regions  ·  · 
. regional  planning 
Now there are a number of factors the Community has to  take  into account here.  It  has  to consider technological 
development  (at  a time  when  satellites  are  gradually  replacing copper  wire),  the  new  dimension  of the  internal 
market,  the  sometimes  very  high  cost  of telephone  communications,  the  poor  use  made  of infrastructures,  and 
international competition. 
The challenge facing the Community  is to strike a balance between these various aspects so as to enable businesses 
and  society  in  general  to  reap  the  benefits of technological  progress,  the  single  market  and  competition  without 
sacrificing any  particular group  in  the pursuit of dogmatic  objectives such  as  the  immediate  introduction  of fuly 
fledged  competition.  This  has  to  be  done  against  the  background  of the  already  well-developed  policy  of 
harmonization,  standardization and  liberalization.  · 
The  present situation 
The  Commission's  interest  in  this  sector  is  nothing  new.  It  is  discernible  in  the  1987  Green  Paper  on 
telecommunications,  in research and development programmes, and in the work on standardization. All of  these were 
necessary preliminaries to the establishment of Community-wide competition,  which has been introduced gradually 
in the area of  terminal equipment and in that of  services with a high value-added component. The time has now come 
when we simply must tackle the field  which accounts  for  80% of the sector, namely  voice telephony. 
Liberalization must  continue 
Telecommunications cannot go on being a special case, a sector apart.  It must  be opened up within the context of 
the  liberalized  single  market;  but  liberalization  will  need  the  assent  of those  involved.  As  was  the  case  with 
Community civil aviation policy,  it  will  have to  be gradual  so  as  to  allow  organizations to adapt. 
That  is why the publication of the Commission's telecommunications review at the end of last year was  followed 
by a very wide-ranging consultation exercise during which  the Commission  sounded out more than  170 different 
groups. 
Leaving aside differences of opinion on points where  individual  interests are at stake, this process of consultation 
has  established the  existence of a consensus  on  the  main  options  for  the  future.  Telephony  should be  liberalized 
gradually  over  a  fixed  period  throughout  the  Community,  without  an  intermediate  stage  in  which  only 
communications  between Member States would be  liberalized. 
What proposals can the Commission  put forward? 
~NNe.l\ 1- 3 5 The objective of  eliminating monopolies in voice telephony in the Community could be achieved in two stages. The 
lirst stage would see the application of the policies already decided; this would include the approval of the planned 
measures regarding mobile telephony by the end of 1993. In the second stage, running from  1994 to  1997, telephone 
services  would be opened up ··to  competition  by a process of controlled liberalization (with the  maintenance of a 
high-quality universal service; charges for  access to  the defined  networks,  mutual  recognition of export licences, 
structural adjustments, etc.). 
The Commission should also be publishing a green paper on public telecommunications infrastructures by the end 
of 1995. 
These are some of the main options emerging from  consultations between the Commission and interested parties; 
they have still to be discussed with my fellow member of the Commission, Mr Bangemann, after which the two of 
us should very shortly be recommending a detailed proposal to the whole Commission. 
* * • 
. 
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COUNCIL  ADOPTS  COMMON  POSITION  ON  A  COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE  lN  THE  SATELLITE 
COMMUNICATION SECTOR 
Today,  16  June  1993,  the  Council  of Telecommumnications  Ministers.  acting  on  a  proposal  of Mr  Martin 
Bangemann of the Commission of the European Communities, adopted a Common  Position on a Council Directive 
'On the approximation of the laws of the Member states concerning satellite earth station equipment, amending the 
scope of council Directive 91/263/EEC'. 
The development of  satellite communication has been up to n'ow held back by the fragmentation of  the Commumnity 
market, in contrast to the situation in the United States where this technology is more widespread. A dynamic market 
in the field of  satellite communications equipment and services would bring substantial benefits to the European space 
and telecommunications  industry,  as  well as the European economy as a whole. 
This  is  particularly  important  for  the  proposed  European  Ecnonomic  Area  and  as  regards  communications 
requirements in Central and Eastern Europe, where satellite communication systems are well suited for infrastructure 
requirements  and the Commumnity's Trans-European Networks initiative. 
With a view  to allowing the Community to achieve the full  potential of stallite communications, the Commission 
adopted, on 20 November  1990, the 'Green Paper on a Common Approach  in the field of Satellite Communications 
in  the  European Community'  which  set out the proposals for a coherent Community policy  in the sector. 
TI1e Council, in its corresponding Resoluti<m of 19 December 1991, confirmed its agreement with the overall policy 
goals set out by the Commission. 
The Council Directive on which a common  position was adopted in the Council today, responds to the first of the 
four  major  policy  goals  set  out  in  the  Satellite  Green  Paper,  namely  ' ... hannonisation  and  liberalisation  for 
appropriate satellite earth sations ... '. 
An  advanced open Community-wide  market  for  satellite earth  station equipment requires  effective  and  efficient 
harmonised procedures for certification, testing, marking,  quality assurance and product surveillance. The Council 
Directive covers these procedures and conditions for the placing on the market of satellite earth station equipment 
and  includes  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  second-phase  Terminals  Directive  (911263/EEC),  i.e.  the  mutual 
recognition of conformity. 
Besides  the  harmonised  provisions  set  out  in  the  Directive,  satellite  earth  station equipment  may  be  subject to 
licensing terms. 
In creating an  open Community-wide market  for satellite earth stations, the  Directive will  assist manufacturers of 
satellite communications equipment to achieve the economies of scale necessary to compete etTectively  in  European 
and world markets. 
The  Council  has  accordingly  adopted  a Common  Position  on  a fundamental  measure,  the  tirst  in  a series  of 
proposals in the satellite communications sector, which will now be rapidly proposed and will remove the remaining 
obstacles  in  the Community market  for satellite communications equipment and services. 
The Common Position on the Council Directive on Satelite Earth Station Equipment will now be forwarded to the 
European  Parliament for a second reading. 
* * * 
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OPENING  UP THE  ITALIAN  MOBILE TELEPHONE  MARKET 
.· 
On  19  July the Italian Minister for posts and telecommunications, Mr Pagani, and the member of the Commission 
responsible for competition policy, Mr Van Miert, discussed the problems raised by the opening-up of the I!alian 
mobile telephone market. 
Mr Pagani confirmed that the Italian Government intended to liberalize the market as rapidly as possible. He drew 
Mr Van Miert's attention to the special features of  the Italian system and the legal difficulties which arose as a result. 
Mr Pagani had not yet decided upon the best approach to the problem in the light of experience in other Member 
States and the requirements of Community law.  He  said that whatever course was chosen he  intended to act in  a 
spirit of clarity and non-discrimination.  A special committee would be set up shortly to consider the procedure to 
be followed. 
Mr Van Miert welcomed the constructive intentions Mr Pagani had expressed; he took note of  the difficulties which 
Mr Pagani had pointed out, but said that action was urgently needed if a situation was not to become established on 
the mobile telephone market which would make it very difficult to open it up to fair competition. 
He said that in conducting the proceedings it had initiated, the Commission would take account of the foreseeable 
progress along the lines indicated by Mr Pagani. 
The Commission departments would be pleased to collaborate with the Italian authorities in order to arrive at a form 
of liberali7.ation  which was compatible with Community  law. 
Mr Pagani and Mr Van  Miert agreed to  meet again when Mr Van  Miert visited Rome  in  September. 
* * * 
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SUMMARY OF A SPEECH BY MR VAN MIERT IN ROSMALEN (NETHERLANDS): 'THE ROLE OF CABLE 
. IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPETITION IN EUROPE' 
Speaking on  'The role of cable in  the context of competition in  Europe',  Mr Van Miert began by examining the 
main issues over the coming years and stressed that, alongside technological development, the decisions and choices 
of political authorities, including the Commission, would continue to be of vital importance. 
Thus, faced with the objective of  full liberalization of voice telephony services scheduled for 1998, the Community 
would have to take a view on all  types of cooperation projects currently being developed by operators. 
The question of vertical integration would have to be addressed, as  would,  in  the context of the liberalization of 
services, the future status of infrastructure, a White Paper on which had been announced by the Commission for 
1995. 
Mr Van Miert was convinced that some degree of liberalization of infrastructures would be needed in the medium 
term. 
It  was here that alternative infrastructures, such as cable television networks, would be able to play a key role. 
Mr Van Miert then referred to the projects announced recently by the Dutch Government, in particular the setting-up 
of a second national network to foster cooperation between the different operators of alternative networks, stressing 
straight away that this was a step in the right direction. In any case, these projects would. generate debate and perhaps 
lead to similar initiatives in other Member States. At the end of  a transition period, and in the context of  competition 
in  Europe,  it  would clearly be difficult to retain a second, purely national operator. 
Mr Van Miert concluded by calling on cable operators to have the boldness and enterpreneurial spirit to seize the 
new opportunities open to  them:  development of new  services and  optimal  use of capacity were  the challenges 
awaiting them. 
The  Commission  would  make  every  effort  to  contribute  to  the  development  of an  open  and  competitive 
telecommunications market that would serve the needs of businesses and the public. 
* * * 
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'THE  FUTURE  OF  PUBLIC  SERVICES':  SUMMARY  OF  SPEECH  BY  MR  KAREL  VAN  MIERT  - 21 
OCTOBER  1993 
There  is increasing concern  in the Community about what is  felt to be a threat to those functions which,  sine~;: the 
second world war,  have generally been perfonned by the welfare state.  -
Mr Van  Miert takes the view that a number of principles do not entirely hold true.  For instance: 
- the equation  'public service = public enterprise'  does  not correspond to any tangible reality; 
- on  the  basis of a comparison of the situation  in  our Member States,  it  would take a particularly gifted observer 
to  establish  a  cause- and-effect  relationship  between  the  relative  size  of the  public  sector  and  the  quality  of 
perfonnance of public services;  · 
- another equation often  put  forward  - the  identification  of public service  with  state monopoly  - has  also  been 
severely shaken by reality. 
Why  is  this  concept  of public  service  becoming  so  important  at  this  time?  Since  the  mid-1980s  and  the 
implementation of the measures set out  in the Commission's  White Paper,  the common market has been extended 
to  services. 
Several  service industries are dominated  by public monopolies. 
The success  of Community  integration  will  increasingly come  to  depend  on  the  efficiency of the  trans-European 
networks  (energy,  telecommunications,  postal  services,  transport),  and  this  is  a  tield  in  which  public  service 
monopolies  predominate. 
If,  in the years to come, the Community  is to develop into a political entity (European Union), this new dimension, 
which  will  encompass social policy (social charter), cannot overlook the concept of public service. 
The  continued  existence  of national  enterprise  monopolies  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  Community's  political 
objective of establishing an  integrated single market  in  which every  finn  can operate at will. 
Can we,  for example, continue to tolerate a situation where the Gennan or French telecommunications monopolies 
can offer voice-telephony services to the British and,  soon,  the Swedish public (the United Kingdom  and Sweden 
have both abolished their telecommunications monopolies) whereas British or Swedish enterprises may not offer the 
same services  in Gennany or France? 
The Commission, supported and often even anticipated by the Court of Justice, has merely ensured the application 
of the decisions  taken  by the  Member States  in  the treaties  by  beginning to  open  up  the most cloistered markets, 
including those dominated  by  the national  monopolies,  to competition and free  movement. 
Yet, according to Mr Van Miert, the Commission  is perfectly aware of the serious dangers attendant on any sudden 
disturbance of the  balance  in sectors which are  both sensitive and of vital  importance to  the economy  as  a whole. 
We also know that the market cannot solve everything and that, without going to far as to eliminate all competition, 
public  intervention may  sometimes  be needed to satisfy what are considered to  be socially essential needs. 
At all events, the Commissi0n has chosen a gradual approach, so as to arrive at a balance between what is desirable 
and what is immediately feasible, this being an approach which gives those concerned the time to make the necessary 
adjustments  (for example,  in  their scales of charges);  it  is also an  'educational' approach  insofar as  it allows those 
concerned to  come  to terms  with the new circumstances. A gradual approach therefore, but coupled with careful preparation of  a new frame of  rules to replace the monopolist 
structure of the industries concerned. Contrary to what is  often said, European-style liberalization does not  lead to 
the introduction of cut-throat competition where the weak are crushed by  the strong and where the most essential 
social needs are sacrificed m~ely for the sake of short-term profitability! 
In  fact,  we are not faced with a choice between monopoly, ensuring that every citizen everywhere can always rely 
on receiving public services, and a system of free competition, leading inexorably to the marginalization of the least 
advantaged individuals· or regions.  · 
The market can sometimes satisfy a demand which is not necessarily met by the monopolies, and experience shows 
that, in a competitive environment, the additional costs entailed in maintaining a reasonable level of  public services 
can be covered. 
It must be said that, contrary to a widespread notion, there has never been any dispute between the Member States 
and the Commission or the Court of  Justice as to the definition of 'services of  general economic interest', the concept 
used,  in  the Treaty (Article 90(2)) which roughly corresponds to that of public service. 
For example, the Commission has not questioned the fact that the basic postal .service (standard letter) corresponds 
to  a public  service obligation.  The  Commission  has  also  agreed  that electricity  distribution companies  provide 
'services of general economic interest', as do postal administrations or telecommunications corporations setting up 
or operating a universal network. 
Thus, neither the existence of public services, nor even their delimitation, particularly as regards the basic services 
provided by sectors organized as  networks, has ever been the cause of litigation within the Community. 
Up to now, the Community has therefore left it up to the Member States to determine what constitute public service 
obligations and has been content to ensure that the ways and means used to satisfy these obligations have not been 
excessively restrictive in  terms of the competition rules or the four freedoms. 
However,  if fair  and balanced competition is  to  become the  rule,  there  must  be  a modicum of harmony  in  the 
obligations imposed on public enterprises by  reason of their public service function.  It  is  for this reason that the 
forthcoming Council meeting of  telecommunications ministers is expected to pass a resolution concerning the concept 
of the universal service and the resources need to  finance  it.  The  fact  remains that this will be a delicate exercise 
and that, at all  events, the Member States will have to be allowed a certain margin of manoeuvre in  order to cope 
with their specific constraints. 
Mr Van Miert brought his speech to a close by saying: 'We are only at the beginning of a long process culminating 
in the opening up of  the European market in sectors as essential and present in our daily lives as telecommunications, 
transport, energy and postal services. Throughout this process,  it will be up to the Community to demonstrate that 
Europe is  able to contribute an  'extra something' to the public in  terms  of the quality of public services and that 
there is no irreconcilable opposition between enterprise and the needs of the public or between the quest for greater 
economic efficiency and the drive for social and regional cohesion, which must continue to be the hallmark of the 
European model.' 
* * * EC  Commission  Press Release - Ref:  IP/93/907 
THE  COMMISSION  CLEARED  A JOINT  VENTURE  IN  THE  SATELLITE  NEWS  GATHERING  SECTOR 
UNDER THE  COMPETITION  RULES 
JOINT  VENTURE  COOPERATIVE 
The Commission has cleared an arrangement whereby PTT Telecom  B.V., the public telecommunications operator 
(TO)  in the Netherlands, and Nederlands Omroepproduktie BedrijfN.V. (NOB), the main television facilities house 
in  the  Netherlands,  have set  up  a joint venture company,  Intrax  B.V ..  The  object of this  company  is  to  provide 
'Satellite News Gathering'  services both within and outside the Netherlands.  Satellite news gathering involves the 
use of transportable equipment allowing for the rapid audio-visual registration and transmission of  television signals 
via satellite from  remote  locations not served by the terrestrial  network. 
This  case  illustrates  an  increasingly  common  phenomenon  whereby  Telecommunications  operators  (TOs) join 
together with  companies  not  operating  in  the  telecommunications  area  in  order to  venture  into  new,  not  strictly 
telecom-related business activities.  In  each case of this type,  on top of the traditional analysis of cooperative joint 
ventures under the competition rules, the Commission must examine whether the still existing special and/or exclusive 
rights of  the TO in question cause its participation in the joint venture company to place the latter in an unjustifiably 
favourable  position vis-a-vis competitors. 
In the case at hand, the Commission found that satellite news gathering service providers who wish to compete with 
lntrax on  the Dutch market are  not  faced  by  any  major barriers to  entry. 
- The up linking of signals to satellites, traditionally an activity reserved exclusively for the TOs,  was liberalized in 
the Netherlands  in  1991  as  far  as  satellite news gathering  is  concerned. 
- Furthermore,  as  far  as  capacity  on  satellites  is  concerned,  PTT  Telecom  has  assured  the  Commission  that  as 
Signatory to international TO-run satellite-operating consortia such as Eutelsat,  it will deal with Intrax on the same 
footing  as  competing companies. 
- Secondly,  even  when  uplinking  in  the  Netherlands  these  companies  are  free  to  acquire  capacity  on  Eutelsat 
satellites via the Signatories in at  least France,  Germany and the  United  Kingdom.  As a third possibility, capacity 
is available on  independent satellites not belonging to  the TO-run  consortia. 
- In  countries  other than  the  Netherlands,  Intrax  will  be  subject  to  the  same  operational  constraints  relating  to 
uplinking and satellite capacity  as  its competitors. 
In  view of these circumstances,  the Commission  published  its favourable attitude to the operation  in  the Official 
Journal (C  117/3 of 28/04/1993), which did not give rise to any comments. The Commission has now closed the file 
by  means  of an  administrative or  'comfort'  letter,  after consultation of the national competition authorities. 
* * * EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/93/988 
EC  GREENLIGHT FOR TRANSNATIONAL TELECOM NETWORK 'F.N.A. 
The Commission has cleared the creation of a Belgian cooperative company called FNA  (standing for Financial 
Network  Association).  The  association  embraces  twelve  leading  telecommunication  organisations*,  including  6 
European companies. 
This joint venture will develop a wide range of telecommunications services to customers active  in  the financial 
services sectors. such as  banks and insurance companies. 
Such companies have particular requirements regarding telecommunications,  in particular the transmission of large 
quantities of data. The joint yenture will therefore offer services especially adapted to suit the requirements of the 
companies combining voice, data and image services. 
The joint venture will be able to offer these services world-wide through its parents' networks ('one-stop shopping') 
and furthermore,  will be able to offer 'one-stop billing', where the customer receives a single invoice irrespective 
of the number of networks that it uses. 
The members are individually responsible for their own tariffs, for their investments, and for the marketing and the 
provision of the services.  The joint venture therefore acts as  a vehicle for  offering these independently managed 
services in a coordinated and efficient manner. The agreements were notified under the competition rules. 
The Commission accepted that the FNA agreements offered benefits to telecommunication users and to other service 
providers : 
- centralised management and optimization of the  existing national networks and international lines will  increase 
quality and reduce costs. 
-bandwidth flexibility and improved trouble management will benefit end users and service suppliers using the FNA 
backbone network. 
- third party billing and will facilitate one-stop shopping. 
* France Telecom; Belgacom; Italcable S.p.A.; Mercury Communications Ltd; Telefonica de Espana S.A.; Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom; Telstra; Hong Kong Telecom International Limited; Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co  .•  Ltd (KDD) 
MCI;  Singapore Telecom;  Stentor. 
However, the Commission considered that as originally notified the agreements were incompatible with Article 85( l) 
of the EEC  Treaty. This was because there was a risk that they would result in  cross- subsidization between those 
services reserved to the telecommunications organizations ('reserved services') and those- such as data transmission 
-open to free competition ('non-reserved services'). The agreements were also considered as likely to result in the 
bundling of reserved and non-reserved services and discrimination against private service suppliers. 
During  the  course  of the  Co~mission's procedure,  its  concerns  regarding  cross-subsidization,  bundling  and 
discrimination were resolved by  way of undertakings given by the parties based in the EC. 
As  a result, the Commission has concluded that the conditions for granting an  individual exemption to FNA are 
fulfilled and consequently has closed the case by means of a comfort  letter. 
In  commenting  on  the  case,  Mr  Van  Miert,  Commissioner  responsible  for  competitiOn  policy,  stated 
'telecommunications markets are evolving very rapidly, with new  technologies being introduced almost on a daily 
basis.  This joint venture represents an  attempt to  react to  this changing situation.  Whilst  I believe  that such  an initiative is to be welcomed,  it is important that we ensure that it does not result in raising barriers to entry to new 
competitors. The undertakings taken by the Telecommunications organizations meet this need, because they ensure 
that  the  Telecommunications  organisations,  which  retain  certain  monopoly  rights,  will  not  be  able  to  use  their 
privileged position to limit the opportunities to other companies in the areas where competition exists. l am pleased 
that it is possible to give the g{een light to this operation which will offer new and improved services to an industry 
that  is  of great  importance  to  the  Community's  overall  competitiveness.  This  approach  balances  the  needs  of 
competition,  efficiency and global competitiveness. 
• • • 
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ADJUSTMENT OF THE COMMUNITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR FORLIBERALISATION STARTS 
The Commission adopted on  15 November 1993 a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 
developing universal service in the new competitive environment, following a proposal of  Commissioners Bangemann 
and Van  Miert. 
The Communication  is  a  first  vital  step  in  assisting  Member States and Telecommunications  Operators  in  their 
p.reparations for the full  liberalisation of telecommunications services by  l  January  1998, - the date agreed at the 
Telecommunications Council of 16 June 19931. 
The Communication identifies the current scope of universal service at a Community level and establishes general 
principles concerning the future approach to covering the cast of universal service. 
The Scope of Universal Service 
The provision and further development of  a universal telecommunications service for all users at an affordable price 
is  the cornerstone of Community telecommunications policy. 
Universal service, as  identified in  the Communication  includes,  for example, the right for all customers : 
- to have a phone connected, 
- to obtain ser.vices  meeting defined quality standards (for installation times;  fault repairs, etc.), 
- to benefit from  clear procedures to sort out problems between the customer and the telecommunications operator, 
and 
- progressively to have access to a range of  new services (such as itemised billing, access to emergency services and 
for business users,  for example, a minimum  set of high capacity leased lines). 
The bene tits of liberalisation should through lower costs and the introduction of new services help the provision of 
universal service. 
l Council Resolution 93/C213/l, OJ  C213, 6.8.93 
This will be particularly true for  services in the peripheral regions of the Community, where improvements in  the 
basic phone service and the introduction of  new advanced services will strengthen economic and social development. 
At the same time, appropriate regulatory safeguards will ensure that universal service is provided to all  customers 
in  order to meet specific social obligations, such as  the provision of services to customers with special needs or in 
remote areas. 
This Communication will help regulators, operators and customers launch their preparations for  liberalisation by 
focusing on what should be a key element of their evolving plans. 
The Communication builds on basic elements of universal service at a Community level , some mandatory, some 
optional at this stage,  which can  already be found  in  the Community's  existing telecoms  legislation (  the  Open 
Network Provision (ONP) rules). 
Ensuring the Provision of Universal Service in  a Competitive Environment 
t/N#ex 1-4  5 The guidance provided by this Communication will also help Member States in meeting their existing obligations 
to ensure that call and other charges in the sector move towards cost. 
Whilst tariff rebalancing  resulting  from  liberalisation  promotes  greater efficiency  and  is  leading to  lower  long 
distance and international charges, it is reducing the contribution which these profitable services can make to the cost 
of universal service. 
Estimates suggest that as  much  as  16 Billion ECU  each year is  currently transferred from  profitable. international 
and long distance calls throughout the Community to cover losses made in providing the basic phone connection and 
a local service,  as  well  as  in  meeting other obligations imposed by Member States, such as  access to emergency 
services and operator assistance. 
A major aim of the Communication is to show how the cost of universal service can be covered in future,  in those 
cases where the losses which may  be made  in serving a particular customer would otherwise deter the provision of 
a full  universal service. 
The cost of universal service should be met from  a combination of : 
- greater direct contributions from  subscriber revenue and from  rebalanced tariffs ; 
- access charges paid by new operators and service providers, and 
- where appropriate, funding in the peripheral regions from  the Community support framework. 
The Communication and the proposal for a Council Resolution should also initiate a broad discussion on the issue. 
* * * 
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COMMISSION OPENS COMPETITION  IN  SATELLITE  COMMUNIC'A  TIONS 
Following a proposal of  Commissioners Van Miert and Bangemann, the Commission has adopted today (by written 
procedure) in first reading, an amendment to its  1988 and  1990 Directives concerning telecommunications terminal 
equipment  and  telecommunications  services  respectively,  and  which  addresses  the  Community's  satellite 
communications industry. 
The amendment aims to liberalize the satellite communications equipment and services sectors with the effect that 
private operators can offer satellite based services in all  Member States in competition with the national operators 
and that equipment suppliers can offer their products directly to consumers. 
The extension of the scope of the two abovementioned Directives to include satellite communications was  indeed 
one of the proposals set out in  the Commission's Green Paper on satellite communications of November  1990. 
The  initiative was already welcomed by the Council,  first of all  in  its  Resolution of 19  December  1991  on the 
development of  the common market for satellite communications services and equipment and again in its Resolution 
of 22  July 1993. 
In  its Resolution of 18 January 1993 on the Hoppenstedt report, the European Parliament also expressed its support 
for  such an extension. 
Enhancing the use of satellite services in  the Community The amending directive intends to abolish restrictions in 
- the provision of all satellite earth station equipment such as  Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSA n equipment 
for business networks, mobile satellite equipment, Satellite News Gathering units, Direct-to-Home television reception 
equipment etc, 
- the provision of satellite services over satellite business networks to allow e.g . 
. corporate voice services (not connected to the public switched network), 
. interactive data services from  a central location to  retail outlets 
. videotransmissions for the training of corporate staff located on  various sites, 
. transmission of the content of a daily paper to remote printing locations 
- the provision of mobile satellite services to allow e.g.  tracking of and communications with road haulage fleets 
or fisheries fleets,  the monitoring of dangerous transports, satellite links to aircraft, etc. 
The Directive does not apply to voice telephony for the public (allowing the Member States to maintain the vocal 
telephony monopole until 1998) • such as the satellite links used by the telecommunications organizations for calls 
to other continents - neither to  the provision of direct television broadcasting links. 
Although the satellite communications sector is, and will remain, only a relatively small part ( 1-3 %) of the overall 
telecommunications services sector provided by cable, optical fibre or terrestrial microwave, it is a market with high 
growth potentials, which until  now could not yet be  fully  realised  due to a various regulatory restrictions of the 
Member States. The implementation of the Directive is expected to give a major boost to the Community's satellite 
communications sector. 
,filA/ex '  - 4  7 The central aim of the Directive is therefore to abolish these restrictions in order to grant both current operators and 
new  entrants  new  opportunities  and  to  enhance  the  development  of Satellite  communications  services  in  the 
Community, while stimulating new  opportunities and employment. 
The  Commission  is  fully  aw~e that it  is  necessary to  avoid,  for  example, harmful  interference between satellite 
telecommunications systems and other space-based or terrestrial services. The Directive therefore allows Member 
state to  maintain transparent, objective and non-discriminatory authorization procedures to  warrant these types of 
essential requirements. 
When will the Directive enter into force ? The Commissioners  Van  Miert and Bangemann will now  present the 
amending directive to the Council of Ministers of  7 December 1993 and take note of its position. They will also hear 
possible comments by the European Parliament and the Social and Economic Committee.  Both Commissioners wilt 
then  finalize the text and propose it  for  final  adoption to the Commission.  · 
The Commission expects a quick response from the other Community institutions which would allow for the final 
adoption ·of the Directive in February 1994. The  Directive gives the Member States nine months to implement its 
provision. This would mean that by the end of  next year, most of  the remaing rstrictions on the provision of  satellite 
services and equipment could be removed and thus bring the satellite sector fully  in  line with telecommunications 
sector in  general. 
Some Member States (in fact those which account tor a substantial part of the Community market  in  this sector, 
i.e.  France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have already liberalized to a significant extent the 
activities covered by the Directive and thus anticipated its adoption. 
Legal basis The draft Directive is, like the two Directives it is intended to amend, based on Article 90(3) of  the EEC 
Treaty.  This means that it will be adopted by the Commission and not by the Council. 
The  text adopted by the Commission  is however the result of one year of detailed consultations of Member States 
and of a representation of major operators concerned. The Commission's original draft has been thoroughly recast 
in  the light of observations made  in the course of this  long consultation process. 
Further initiatives The implementation of  the Satellite Green Paper is now in full progress. Last month, the co·uncil 
adopted the Satellite equipment Directive concerning the hannonised procedures for equipment type-approval and 
the mutual  recognition thereof in  every Member State. 
The  Commission,  convinced that the satellite communications  sector is  in  urgent need of a coherent regulatory 
framework and a clear and focused policy initiative at Community level, can be expected to adopt further measures 
and develop further actions in  the very near future,  especially concerning the licensing of satellite services, and a 
Community approach to satellite based personal communications. 
At  the  forthcoming Council of Ministers of 7 December  1993, Commissioner Bangeman is  furthennore planning 
to outline a complete package of measures and actions for the satellite sector while some of these will be discussed 
in  detail. 
* * * 
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COMMISSION CLEARED A JOINT VENTIJRE BETWEEN MANNESMANN R  WE- DEUTSCHE BANK IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATION  NETWORKS  AREA 
MERGER  REGULATION 
Deutsche Bank AG, Mannesmann AG and R  WE-Energie AG, a subsidiary of R  WE- AG, intend to contribute assets 
to  a jointly owned  and  controlled company  which  will  provide  closed  user  group  corporate telecommunication 
networks and value-added services. The services on offer will include voice telephony and data transmission, basic 
value-added  services  such  as  electronic  mail  and  some  more  advanced  value-added  services,  particularly 
sectorially-specific applications. 
The parent companies will transfer their telecommunication equipment (although R  WE will retain its utility network) 
to the joint venture. The new entity provides its services to parents and third parties. The proposed concentration does 
not raise serious doubts as  to  its compatibility with the common  market.  DB  Telekom  held a monopoly over the 
provision of  voice telephony network for corporate clients until January 1993. It will remain the leading supplier for 
the foreseeable future. The joint venture will also experience competition from other specialised· companies and from 
the new  'global  outsQ,_u~cing'-companies formed  by national telecommunication operators like France Telekom/DB 
Telekom or British Telecom/MCL  This market  is developing quickly and high growth rates are expected. There are 
thought to  be a large number of potential entrants including utilities, other telecom operators, software houses, etc. 
The concentration will therefore not  lead to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant  position  in  the  relevant 
markets and furthermore this new entrants will enhance the competition in a fast growing market. Commissioner Van 
Miert  wellcomed  this timely  decision  while  alliances such  as  FT-DB  telekomm  or  BT-MCI  are  currently under 
consideration. 
* * * * 
~  11/11£  ;<..  1  - 49 EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/94/66 
COMMISSION  DECIDES  THAT  STATE  AID  IS  NOT  INVOCVED  IN  THE  FORMATION  AND 
PRIVATIZATION OF TELEDANMARK  A/S 
- State aid No N  558/  A/93  and NN 6/94 - Telecommunications sector - Denmark 
-
In view of the future liberalisation of  the telecommunication sector, the Danish Government considered it desirable 
to restructure the Danish tele- sector to make it more competitive. By a political agreement in  1990 it was decided 
by  way  of legislation to  fonn  a  new  public  holding company,  TeleDanrnark  A/S,  which should acquire  the  5 
telephone companies in the Danish telecommunication sector (carrying out telephone network operations and other 
tele-activities : 
- Copenhagen Telephone Company (KT  AS) - Jutland Telephone Company (JTAS) - Funen Telephone Company 
- South Jutland Telephone comapny and - Telecom NS 
The political agreement moreover, stipulates that the State, after the acquisition of the 5 existing companies, shall 
bring down its stockholding in  TD to 51  %,  i.e.  a semi-privatisation. 
The Commission has decided that the formation ofTeleDanmark A/S, in particular the acquisition of  the two Danish 
telephone companies KTAS and JTAS, and the subsequent privatisation ofTeleDanmark A/S does not involve state 
aid within the meaning of Article 92,1  of the EC-Treaty. 
- The Commission has examined the different share-transactions involved in these two operations and has concluded 
that the Danish State's behaviour, in view of the fact that the State remains a majority- shareholder in TeleDanmark 
A/S and that TeleDanmark A/S is a company with good prospects, is equivalent to that of  a private investor operating 
under normal  market conditions.  · 
- The Commission has, moreover, decided that the State guarantee granted to TeleDanmark A/S for existing loans 
in  KTAS and JTAS at the time TeleDanmark A/S acquired the two companies does not involve state aid within the 
meaning of Article 92, I of the EC-Treaty, as TeleDanmark A/S with effect from the date the guarantee was granted 
will pay a premium of 0,15% of the remaining loans the majority of which will expire in  1994/1995. In view of the 
high credit-worthiness of the company the premium  is considered to  be correct. EC  Commission  Press Release- Ref:  IP/94/164 
COMMISSION CLEARS A JOINT VENTIJRE BETWEEN R  WE AND MANNES MANN IN THE MOBILE DATA 
TRANSMISSION  SECTOR 
Merger regulation 
The  Commission  has  approved  a proposed joint venture  between  Mannesmann  Eurokom  GmbH,  belonging  to 
Mannesmann  AG,  and RWE-Energie  AG,  a subsidiary of Germany's  largest electricity utility. 
The object of the newly created company is to apply for an operating licence from  the German Ministry for  Postal 
Services  and  Telecommunications  which  would  subsequently  enable  it  to  install  and  operate  a  mobile  data 
transmission network  in Germany.  The clearence of the proposed transaction by the competent anti-trust authority 
is a precondition for the granting of the licence. 
At  present,  Deutsche  Bundespost Telekom  is  the only supplier for  mobile data transmission  services  in  Gennany. 
The creation of the joint venture would  lead to  the entry of a new competitor in  the developing data transmission 
market and would have the pro-competitive effect of increasing the choice  for the customers  in  this area.  So,  the 
Commission  has decided to approve the proposed joint venture . 
••• 
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COMMISSION  FINDS  BANCO  SANTANDERIBT  TELECOMS  AUREEMENT  TO  BE  OUTSIDE  THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE MERGER  REGULATION 
Merger Regulation 
-
The European Commission has found the agreement between Banco Santander and BT to set up a telecoms company 
in  Spain  to  be  outside the jurisdiction of the  merger  control  regulation.  Consequently,  it  has  not  assessed  the 
competitive impact of the operation. 
Banco Santander (BS) and BT notified to the Commission an operation to set up a company to offer managed data 
network  services  (MDNS)  in  Spain.  This  company  would  compete  against  the  current  monopoly  supplier  of 
telecommunications in Spain, Telefonica. The new company would use the existing BS MDNS network and expand 
it to offer MDNS services to other companies under the BT brand name. 
After assessing the operation, the Commission found that BS and BT would have joint control of the company for 
the  first  three years  and  after that period BT would  have  sole control.  This three year period was judged to  be 
insufficient to decide that the company would be jointly controlled. BT was, therefore, judged to have sole control. 
The operation was,  therefore, an  acquisition by  BT of certain assets of a BS subsidiary. As  a result, the operation 
did not exceed the threshold set out in  the merger control regulation which requires that at least two of the parties 
to  an  operation each have an  EU  wide turnover of 250 million ECU. 
The Commission has declared that the operation does not  fall  under the merger control regulation. 
* * * EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/94/409 
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT Of TELECOMUNICA  TIONS  - (SPEECH 
GIVEN BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT IN BRUSSELS ON  17 MAY  1994) 
.· 
The telecommuncations sector is  important for the European Union in a number of ways: 
- economically,  since  it  generates  revenue  of more  than  ECU  100  billion  in  services  and  ECU  30  billi;n  in 
equipment, - socially, since it  provides employment for more than a million people, - for the efficiency of firms, 
since it allows communication, - in  human terms,  since it brings people together. 
It is one of  the Union's booming sectors, with a projected growth rate of 8% a year in services up to the year 2000. 
At present, telecommunications are handicapped by the fragmentation of  the Community market and by monopolistic 
situations  that  penalize  consumers  (higher  costs  than  in  the  United  States,  particularly  for  cross-frontier 
communications). 
The only way to overcome such handicaps is to abolish national monopolies and open networks up to competition, 
on the basis of Community competition policy.  · 
The  Commission  has  gradually  introduced  competition  policy  legislation  in· the  telecommunications  sector. 
culminating in the adoption in July last year of a precise timetable for opening up voice telephony to competition. 
So  long  as  infrastructures  remain  under the  control  of national  monopolies,  discriminatory  access  charges  and 
overpricing may persist. The Commission has accordingly announced that it will publish a green paper on this subject 
in  1995. 
Although cooperative arrangements are necessary between  the telecommunications  organizations in  Europe  if an 
optimum network and service are to be provided for consumers, the Commission must examine each strategic alliance 
between  companies so  as  to  ensure that it  does  not  result  in  restrictions  of competition.  Thus,  among  the few 
instances of  joint ventures so far dealt with by the Commission, the companies have had to undertake not to eliminate 
competition. 
The  new  strategic  alliances  emerging  in  the· sector  are  on  a  much  larger  scale  than  the  previous  cooperative 
arrangements.  If such  alliances  result  in  the  creation  of activities  that  could  not  be  engaged  in  by  the  parent 
companies individually, Article 85(1) should not normally apply to them.  However, if they create combinations of 
activities  in  which  each  of the  parent  companies  is  already  in  a  very  powerful  position  on  its  own  market, 
unacceptable situations may develop. 
Mr Van Miert stressed the strategic importance of  mobile communications and referred to the recently adopted green 
paper in this sector, where the aim is to achieve a combination of harmonization and liberalization. He said that the 
Commission would ensure that at  least two mobile telephony operators could co-exist in each Member State. The 
suppliers of  the final service to the consumer must have full commercial freedom and not be impeded by restrictions 
stemming from the granting of licences. Interconnection between mobile and fixed networks must be possible on the 
basis of objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 
Mr Van Miert said that cable networks could be useful in the provision of non-reserved services. He did not believe 
that the opening-up of  cable networks to activities other than television would impede the current telecom operators 
in their public-service activities. The access of  cable networks to non-reserved services should therefore be liberalized 
soon. 
Mr Van Miert said in conclusion that competition policy had a key role to play in a sector that was undergoing very 
rapid growth. Flexibility should be the watchword if we were to keep up with rapid technological developments and 
the globalization of markets. Community policy must therefore promote beneficial cooperative arrangements while 
~IVIVE;<  I  - 53 stamping out anti-competitive collusive practices  . 
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.· EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/94/675 
COMMISSION OPENS  IN-DEPTH  lNVESTIGA TION  IN  THE  CASE"'MSG  MEDIA  SERVICE 
Merger regulation 
The Commission has decided to carry out an in-depth investigation into the proposed creation of the Media Service 
GmbH  (MSG) in  a second phase of proceedings. On  6 June  1994, the operation was  notified to the Commi;sion 
under  the  EC  Merger  Regulation.  It  concerns  the  creation  of a joint  venture  between  Bertelsmann,  Deutsche 
Bunderpost Telekom and the Kirch-group which will be active  in technical and administrative services for Pay-TV 
and other TV  communication services. 
The operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation since MSG will perform all 
the functions of  an autonomous entity and will be active itself on the market for technical and administrative services 
for  Pay-TV.  It  is  considered  that  this  market  will  evolve,  in  particular,  following  the  introduction of digital  TV 
broadcasting. In Germany, this development is favoured by the extraordinarily high number of  households which are 
able, already today, to receive TV by cable or satellite. The proposed concentration raises the question whether MSG 
could  obtain,  on  a permanent  basis,  a dominant  position  on  the  German  market  for  technical  and  administrative 
services  for  Pay-TV.  Telekom  is by far the leading Gennan cable network operator.  Moreover,  it recently acquired 
a substantial stake in the European satellite operator SES-ASTRA.  Bertelsmann and Kirch have widespread  activit1~s 
in  the  field  of audiovisual  media  and,  together  with  Canal  plus  Premiere,  operate  the  only  Pay-TV  channel  in 
Germany  to  date.  It  is,  therefore,  particularly  important  to  examine  the  etTects  which  may  result  from  the 
combination of companies which probably would have a leading position in Pay-TV and cable networks in the future. 
In  this context,  the Commission  also  has to examine the extent to  which  the proposed concentration could have  a 
negative  impact  on  the  development  of the  German  Pay-TV  market,  in  particular  in  relation  to  access  for  other 
programme suppliers. 
The Bundeskartellamt requested referral of the case to the German cartel authority since,  in its view, the proposed 
concentration  threatened  to  create  or  strengthen  a dominant  position  on  the  aff~cted market  in  Gennany.  The 
Commission  has decided  not  to  refer the case to  the Bundeskartellamt.  After a preliminary  investigation it cannot 
be  excluded that  the  proposed concentration  may  also  affect  the  access  of Pay-TV  suppliers  from  other Member 
States  of the  Community  to  the  Gennan  market.  Furthermore,  the  future  competitive structure of the  market  for 
technical and administrative services in Germany could also  have an  impact  on the development of the conditions 
of  competition throughout the Community, given the importance of the German market. The Commission, therefore, 
will decide itself on  the case after an  in-depth  investigation. 
* * * 
/!IVNel{  I  55 EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/941767 
COMMISSION  CLEARS  TRANSACTIONS  CONCLUDED  BETWEEN  BT  AND  MCI  IN  THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR UNDER THE COMPETITION RULES OF THE EC  TREA  TV  AND THE 
EEA  AGREEMENT 
At the proposal of  Mr. Van Miert, Commissioner in charge of  competition policy, the Commission has taken its first 
formal decision regarding one of  the global strategic alliances which are developing in the telecommunications ~ea. 
The alliance involves British Telecommunications plc. (BT) of  the United Kingdom and MCI of the United States. 
The notified operation comprises two main transactions: 
1.  BT  is  to  take  a  20  %  stake  in  MCI,  worth  $ 4.3  billion.  By  so  doing,  BT will  become  the  largest single 
shareholder in MCI, with proportionate board representation and investor protection. Several provisions have however 
been included in the relevant agreements to impede BT from  controlling or influencing MCI. 
2.  the creation of a joint venture company, Concert, formerly  known as Newco, for the provision of enhanced and 
value-added global telecommunications  services to  multinational  (or large regional)  companies.  The  Parties will 
contribute their existing non- correspondent international network facilities and Syncordia, BT'  s existing outsourcing 
business, to Concert. 
Concert is expected to offer a portfolio of  global products included in 6 categories of  service offerings. Those global 
products will originally be based on  a blend of existing products of the parent companies. 
The 6 categories are the following : . data services : low speed packet, high speed packet and frame relay services, 
pre-provisioned, managed and circuit switched bandwidth, 
. value-added application services : value added messaging and video conferencing services, 
. traveller services : global calling card services, 
. intelligent network services, 
. other services : Integrated VSA T network services, 
. global outsourcing that will allow the distributor to offer its  customers the ability to transfer responsibility and 
ownership of  their global networks to either the distributor or New co.  In this respect, Newco will be able to integrate 
within its own offering third party products already owned by customers that they want to keep. 
Given  the  needs  of big  companies  to  link  locations  geographically  dispersed  over the  world  (that  means  also 
providing broad coverage of delivery capacity and in-country support), those products must be global in  nature and 
respond to  a very particular set of requirements. 
In  addition,  in  the  framework  of  Concert,  the  parties  will  rationalise  their  respective  holdings  in  other 
telecommunications operators (TO) and groupings in the world.  In this respect, MCI has already acquired most of 
BT' s existing business in North America, and has withdrawn from  the Infonet consortium. 
This very complex operation was first notified as a concentration under the Merger Control Regulation. However, 
the  Commission  having  concluded  in  September  1993  that  none  of the  transactions  notified  constituted  a 
concentration,  the notification  was  converted  into  a notification  for  negative  clearance  and/or  exemption  under 
Regulation  17/62 (see IP(93) 757). 
The decision is one of the first where the Commission has applied both Article 85  of the EC  Treaty and Article 53 
of the European Economic Area (EEA)  Agreement.  It contains different elements: l. Some are not falling under article 85, the Commission finds that there are no grounds for action. 
-The acquisition by BT of a 20% stake in  MCI.  After a careful study of the way  in  which the transaction has  bet~n 
built up and of the market context of the case, the Commission tinds that there is  no  risk that this acquisition may 
result in the competitive behavi_our of  the parties being coordinated or influenced (the investment agreement has been 
drafted in such a way that BT does not have the possibility to seek to control or influence MCI) 
- Those parts of the two  transactions affecting only the Americas  (North and South).  Given the current state of 
development of  the overall market for 'telecommunications, the stipulations affecting only the Americas, will  n~t at 
present produce any appreciable effect in the EEA. 
- Other provisions in the agreements, namely a non-compete obligation on BT and MCI as  regards the activities to 
be undertaken by Concert and an obligation on BT and MCI, as exclusive distributors of  Concert's services, to obtain 
from  Concert all of their requirements  for global telecommunications  services. The Commission  finds  that these 
provisions are ancillary to  the creation and successful initial 
operation of Concert. 
2.  Some are  not  falling  under Article 85  and are  benefiting of an  Exemption  under both Article 85(3) of the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA  Agreement 
- The creation of Concert is  found to restrict competition because BT and MCI are,  and for the foreseeable future 
will continue to be, at least potential competitors not only in the overall market for telecommunications, but also in 
the enhanced and value-added global telecommunications services segment of  that market to be addressed by Concert. 
However, the Commission has concluded that Concert satisfies the conditions for receiving an individual exemption l, 
which will apply until  16 November 2000. 
In particular, Concert is going to more quickly develop and offer to customers a set of new global services of  a more 
advanced nature than either BT or MCI would be capable of providing alone under their existing technologies. By 
creating Concert, each parent will also substantially reduce the costs and risks inherently associated with the offering 
of such services at the scale and with the particular features required by multinationals and other big international 
users.  In  addition,  the services are going to  be offered on  an  end- to-end and seamless  basis.  The Commission 
considers this to be a genuine advantage over existing international services that are provided by  interconnecting 
incompatible national networks, because the result of the combined network thus created is as strong as  its weakest 
link, so that the services provided, and their features, are those supported by the least performant network involved. 
- Other provisions of the agreements, namely the appointment of BT as exclusive distributor of Concert within the 
EEA and a provision intended to dissuade MCI from  entering some sectors of the telecommunications market ofthe 
EEA not to be addressed by Concert, are also found restrict competition as both provisions tend to isolate the entire 
EEA  from  competition by companies located outside the EEA.  Although a number of  :lfguments were given by BT 
and MCI to justify those provisions, an exemption could only been granted by the Commission once assurances were 
received that, despite the appointment of BT as  exclusive distributor in  the EEA,  any user in  the EEA  can obtain 
Concert's services through MCI instead of BT, and once the parties amended the dissuasive provision on MCI so 
that it only will last for 5 years in  so far as the territory of the EEA  is concerned. 
In  its assessment of this strategic alliance,  as  reflected in  the  decision,  particular attention  has  been  paid by the 
Commission to the evolving nature of the telecommunications market resulting from  the quick convergence of 
1 The  provision of basic correspondent services through Concert is  not covered by the decision. 
telecommunications and information technology, from  the gradual process of liberalization of telecommunications 
in  the Community and from  the significant third party increasing competition as  well as  the important bargaining 
power of the  purchasers.  In  addition,  the decision  is  a clear reflection  of the stated  aim  of the  Commission  of furthering  beneficial forms  of cooperation between TOs  while ensuring that the  competition rules of the EC  are 
observed. 
.· EC  Commission Press Release - Ref:  IP/94/815 
COMMISSION  APPROVES  JOINT  VENTURE  BETWEEN  GEC  AND  FINMECCANICA  FOR  CERTAIN 
ELECTRONIC AND COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCTS 
Merger Regulation 
The European Commission today approved the creation of  a concentrative joint venture between GEC of  the UK and 
Finmeccanica of Italy, for certain products in  the field of  civil and military radio communications, electronics and 
telematics. All of  Finmeccanica' s activities in the relevant areas will be transferred to the joint venture, as will those 
of a GEC subsidiary in  Italy,  Marconi S.p.A.  ("Marconi"). 
The joint venture's military products will include high frequency and VHF/UHF radios, global positioning systems, 
communications electronic warfare and integrated radio/navigational systems.  On  the civilian side,  it will produce 
private mobile radio systems, PIT network management systems, mobile cellular radio infrastructure and ter.minals, 
air traffic  control  equipment  and  a range  of special  data processing  or telematic  S}Stems  (eg  automatic  vehicle 
monitoring/road pricing, public information displays, building automation). The joint venture will also supply satellite 
groundstations for both military and civilian use. 
In the case of  the military products, the joint venture will face not only the monopsonist buyers of  the defence sector, 
but also competition from  between four and six other major European and US  defence contractors with capabilities 
in  the products concerned. In  the case of the dual use and civilian products, the joint venture's market shares will 
only exceed  I  0% in two products, PIT network managements systems and private mobile radio systems, and then 
only on the hypothesis of national markets (21% and 23% respectively of the Italian market). In both cases the range 
of potential suppliers in  these markets is so large and includes such powerful international groupings as the major 
telecommunications equipment suppliers, information technology and software houses that the Commission does not 
consider that these markets shares are such as to prejudice effective competition. 
In  the light of the above,  the Commission has decided  not to oppose the operation since it does not raise serious 
doubts as to  its compatibility with the common market. 
• • * EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/94/864 
THE  COMMISSION  HAS DECIDED  THE  JOINT VENTURE  DEI<RJWHONE  NOT TO  FALL  WITHIN  THE 
SCOPE OF THE  MERGER  REGULATION 
,' 
Merger regulation 
Dekraphone has been notified to the Commission as a concentrative joint venture on  24 August  1994. Dekraphone 
will provide services for mobile telephony and sell mobile phones. 
The three parent undertakings are Rheinelektra AG ("Rheinelektra") controlled by R  WE AG, COFIRA (Deutschland) 
Telekommunikations- und  Vertriebsgesellschaft  mbH  ("COFIRA"),  which  belongs to the  French CGEaux  Group 
(Compagnie  Generale  des  Eaux),  and  the  German  undertaking  DEKRA  e.V.  ("DEKRA").  Rheinelektra  is  a 
manufacturer of  electrical equipment and plants and has also interests in telecommunications. COFIRA/CGEaux have 
mobile telecommunication activities in several Member States. of the European Union.  DEKRA  primarily operates 
technical  inspections of vehicles  in  GermfllY· 
The parent companies will transfer the whole of  two German service providers for mobile telephony to the new joint 
venture. COFIRA and DEKRA will transfer their joint venture Dekratel to Dekraphone and Rheinelektra will transfer 
the company  Unicorn. 
Dekraphone is a cooperative joint venture, because two of  the parents undertakings have not exited the joint venture's 
market ·on a permanent basis. 
COFIRA will remain active as a service provider for  mobile telephony  in  France,  Luxembourg  and the  UK. 
Rheinelektra has transferred its participation in Unicorn  to  Dekraphone and hence it has exited the joint venture's 
market on a transitory basis.  However,  the R  WE  group  to  which  Rheinelektra belongs,  plans to acquire  Preussag 
Mobilfunk  GmbH  from  the  German  Preussag  group.  Talkline,  a competitor  of Dekraphone,  is  a subsidiary  of 
Preussag Mobilfunk GmbH.  Hence, a re-entry of the  RWE  group  in  the market of Dekraphone  is  likely. 
On  the  basis of these facts  a coordination of competitive behaviour can not  be excluded. 
Since the Merger Regulation does not apply to cooperative joint ventures, the Commission has decided Dekraphone 
not to  fall  within the scope of the Regulation. 
* * * EC  Commission  Press  Release - Ref:  IP/94/948 
COMMISSION LIBERALISES  SATELLITE  COMMUNICATIONS  MARKETS 
Following a proposal from Commissioners Van Miert and Bangemann, the Commission has today adopted a directive 
liberalising satellite telecommunications equipement and services throughout the European Union. Liberalisation of 
satellite markets has been strongly supported by the European Parliament as well as the Council which has marked 
introduction of competition into satellite markets as  major goal  for  EU  telecoms  policy.  -
The directive  liberalises  both  the  establishment  and operation of satellite networks,  as  well  as associated satellite 
dishes across the Union.  It covers in particular the establishment of the new-advanced so- called VSAT (very small 
aperture  satellite terminals)  as  well  as  larger satellite dishes  used  for  news  gathering and  other forms  of satellite 
business and of  particular relevance in the context of satellite proposal and mobile communications. The major users 
are expected to  be  in  the  retailing distribution and financial  sectors.  Many  similar potential users  in the  EU  have 
pan-European requirements and few suppliers can offer credible, fully supported pan-European service in the present 
environment. Satellite communications networks, now liberalise across the Union, are expected to be a major means 
of implementing Trans  European Networks  in these areas. 
This  initiates a completely  new  stage  of development  for  the  European  Satellite  market.  Due  to  liberalisation  a 
ten-fold incease  in the volume of satellite communications  before the year 2000  can  be expected.  Studies estimate 
that as  much  as  80 000  VSAT satellite dishes may  be deployed across the Union  by that time. 
Regulatory restrains to  date  were restrictive  for  users  and  service providers  alike,  contrary to  the  situation  in  the 
United States where an  "Open Skies"  policy greatly stimulated the satellite market  fince  the early  1980s. 
The state of liberalisation is the most important determinant of the size and the nature of  the satellite telecoms market 
in  Europe and rapid deployment of Trans-European  Networks.  As such the new directive is also a vital step on the 
way to the European  Information Society, as detined in  the Commission's response to the report established on  the 
issue  by  leading industrialists under chairmanship of Commissioner  Bangemann. 
The  benefits which the new  Satellite Directive will bring to  this  market  include : 
-Reduction of  costs of deploying and operating satellite networks which will be translated into lower prices for the 
consumer. Competition and liberalisation will mean lower charges for licensing terminal type-approvals (which will 
become  "one stop"  and space segment access. 
- Pan-European networks. The harmonised regulatory environment will facilitate the establishment of pan-European 
satellite networks which has been frequently recognised as a key requirement for market growth. This will be critical 
in  the development of trans- European communications  networks. 
- The rapid deployment, especially in  less developed or remote areas of multimedia applications and access to the 
developing date superhighways of the  information society. 
- Removal  of prohibitions on service and  interconnection 
- Simplification of operations such  as  licensing equipment  registration and  installation 
- Increased confidence of users,  operators and  investors  in  satellite solutions  for  Europe. 
The directive  is  an  amendment  to  the  1990 directive on  the  introduction of competition  in  the telecommuniations 
services market and has been issued by the Commission  under Treaty Article 90. Article 90 provides for application 
of competition rules to  sectors where  Member States allocate exclusive or special rights. 
11Use of directives based 
on Article 90 is an efficient tool for the application of  competition law to such sectors, providing investment certainty 
4A'Vex  1 - 61 to market agents and cutting red tape" states Commissioner Van Miert. "However, this instrument must be used with 
care and  in  clearly circumscribed circumstances". 
The  provisions of the directive are  immediatley  applicable.  Member States have 9 months  after publication of the 
directive to communicate the fi?.easures  taken to comply.  However, the Commission will also take  into account the 
situation of those Member States in which the terrestrial network is not yet sufficiently developed and which could 
justify defennent of full  application of the directive until  1 January  1996. 
The satellite directive is  issued by the Commission  in the context of the follow-up of the Council resolution on the 
liberalisation of  satellite services. Before issuing the directive, the Commission awaited confinnation of its approach 
to  competition  in  the  telecommunications  services  markets  by  the  European  Court  of Justice  in  autumn  1992. 
Subsequent to  preliminary adoption of the directive  by  the Commission  in  December  1993,  the Commission  has 
completed extensive consultations with the European  Parliament and Council. 
Together with an already adopted Directive on satellite equipment, and a proposal for a directive on satellite service 
lice~ces currently  in  discussion  in  Council  and  Parliament,  the  new  Directive  completes  a package of measures 
intended to rapidly develop the  European satellite sector. 
* * * 
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COMMISSION OPENS  IN-DEPTH  INVESTIGATION  IN THE  CASE SIEMENS/ITAL TEL 
:· 
Merger regulation 
The  Con1mission  has  decided  to  carry  out  an  in-depth  investigation  in  a second  phase  of proceedings  into  the 
proposed creation of a joint venture between Siemens of Germany  and  STET of Italy,  for certain products  in· the 
fields of public and private telecommunications  equipments. · 
On  13  September  1994,  the operation was notified to  the Commission  under the  EC  Merger Regulation.  Siemens 
will contribute its  Italian subsidiary (Siemens Telecomunicazioni) to  the new joint venture and STET will transfer 
its  manufacturing  subsidiary  Italtel.  STET  is  a holding  company  which  also  controls  the  Italian  public  telecom 
operators, recently merged under Telecom  Italia. 
The joint venture between STET  and  Siemens  raises both horizontal and  vertical  issues,  especially in  the markets 
of public telecommunications equipment  in  Italy. 
With  regard  to  horizontal  aspects,  the joint venture  will  hold  a substantial share (about half of the market)  of the 
public switching and  transmission  equipment market  in  Italy.  Elsewhere  the  operation  is  not  likely  to  have  major 
effects,  since ltaltel's sales arc  basically restricted  to  Italy. 
In relation to the vertical aspects, Siemens will, through the joint venture, share the pre-existing vertical link between 
the  Italian  telccom  operator (Telecom  Italia,  previously  SIP)  and  the  telecom  equipment  manufacturer  ltaltel.  In 
public telecommunications,  vertical  links are  an  issue given  that the activities of the companies  in  the downstream 
markets  are not subject to  the  usual  competitive conditions. 
It is, therefore, particularly important to examine the effects which may result from  the combination of companies 
which will have a leading position in telecommunication services and in the manufacture of  public telecommunication 
equipment  in  the future. 
In  this context, the Commission  has  also  to  examine the extent to  which  the proposed concentration would have a 
negative  impact  on  the  implementation  of public  procurement  rules  and  the  progressive  opening  up  of national 
markets  to Community  competition. 
After a preliminary investigation, the Commission has sufficient reasons to open an in-depth investigation in the case. 
* * • 
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FINANCING OF COMMUNICATIONS  INFRASTRUCTURE  WILL  NOT REQUIRE  ANY  PUBLIC  FUNDING 
IF  WE  LIBERALIZE  IMMEDIATELY 
At  the  opening  of the  "Electronica"  trade  fair  in  Munich  on  7 November,  Martin  Bangemann,  the  Commission 
member  responsible  for  industrial  policy,  pointed  to  the  major  role  of modem  information  and communications 
technologies  in  the  global  information  society.  "Electronica"  is  the  world's  largest  trade  fair  for  electronic 
components and for measuring and testing technology, with 2 800 exhibitors from  48  countries. 
The move to a global information society has,  in Mr Bangemann's view, gathered a momentum that is unstoppable. 
There  are  hardly  any  firms  now,  whether  small  or  large,  that  can  get  by  without  advanced  information  and 
communications technologies. More and more  private households too are using PCs,  not only for games,  but also 
for  learning.  "We  are  all  moving  at  incredible  speed  into  an  increasingly  network-linked world,  which  in  many 
respects can  bring us enormous advantages if we so wish,"  Mr Bangemann stated. 
Mr Bangemann firmly  believes that the information society can help to solve more effectively problems for which 
we have not yet found the right answers. One example was growing traffic congestion, which could be substantially 
reduced by means of intelligent, computer-assisted traffic control systems; such systems would also make it possible 
to charge more equitably to the individual the costs generated by use of the private car. To widen the scope for such 
future-orientated  applications, services and  infrastructure should,  in  Mr  Bangemann's view,  be  liberalized rapidly. 
"Liberalization of services also requires the removal of existing network monopolies",  Mr Bangcmann said. This was 
necessary  in  order  to  create  the  necessary  planning certainty  for  network  investments.  "The  establishment  of an 
efficient global communications infrastructure does not require any  public funding,  but  is self-financing - provided 
that we  liberalize now and do  not wait until  it  is too  late,"  Mr Bangemann  stated. 
"I  therefore hope that the Council  meeting of Ministers for Telecommunications  on  17 November will accept our 
proposals and agree to  this timetable,"  Mr Bangemann continued. 
In  Mr Bangemann's view, the main technical prerequisites for the infomtation society are already largely established 
with the PC and telephone. The main  obstacle to broad acceptance of the new uses to which they could be put was 
unduly high telephone charges. "A reduction in charges can be achieved only ifthere is more competition, in services 
as well as  in networks," Mr. Bangemann said.  In his view, the electronics industry would also benefit considerably: 
"The more people use the new technologies at home and at work, the greater will be the demand for better and better 
equipment."  This  applied not  only  to  PCs,  which  would  have  to  be  made  easier to  use,  but  especially  to  new, 
complex transmission systems. "In my opinion, the telephone has not as yet by any means been developed to its full 
potential,"  Mr Bangemann stated. 
The  European  Union  is,  in  Mr  Bangemann's  view,  fully  aware  of the  major  importance  of electronics  as  a key 
strategic industry  for  many  other branches of industry. It was precisely for  this reason  that the Union was making 
a special effort to  promote research  and development on  this enabling technology.  However,  this was not enough, 
since for many  finns the main problem was the introduction of new products onto the market.  "We have plenty of 
good ideas" Mr Bangemann said. "What we still need is to convert them rapidly into competitive products." In order 
to create an innovation incentive for small and medium-sized business in particular, the Commission had introduced 
a special innovation prize, the "Information Technology European Award 95", to  be awarded in  1995.  "We will be 
awarding  three  prizes  of ECU  200  000  and  20  prizes  of ECU . 5  000  to  innovative  products  with  a  high 
information-technology content," Mr Bangemann continued. The Commission would thus also be demonstrating that 
it  was  in  favour of research  that was  near the  market  in  the  field  of information and communication technologies 
in  particular. 
Mr  Bangemann thought that the future  prospects  for the European electronics industry were extremely promising. 
"European  firms  are  once  again  confident  in  their  own  competitive  strength.  The  billions  invested  in  new  chip 
factories show that the industry faces the future with  self-as~urance. The European Commission at any rate will play 
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.. its part in ensuring that Europe will continue to be an attractive location for  industry and commerce." 
• • • EC  Commission Press Release- Ref:  IP/94/1082 
THE  COMMISSION  AUTHORIZES  THE  CREATlON  OF  A JOINT-V£NTIJRE  BETWEEN  ERICSSON  AND 
RAYCHEM 
.. 
Merger RegulationLM ERICSSON AG (Sweden) and RA YCHEM CORPORATION (USA) jointly notified to the 
Commission  an  agreement by  which  they will  create a joint-venture which will  incorporate substantially all  the 
activities and assets ofRA  YNET CORPORATION, a wholly owned subsidiary ofRA  YCHEM prior to the operation. 
ERICSSON is one of  the major players worldwide in the manufacturing and selling of telecommunications systems 
and equipment. RA YCHEM develops and sells high performance industrial products used inter alia by the aerospace, 
automotive, electronic and telecommunications industries and RA YNET activities consist in the manufacturing and 
selling of fibre optic transmission systems for access telecommunications networks. 
The Commission after examination of  the notified operation has decided not to oppose it and to declare it compatible 
with the common market and with the functioning of the EEA  Agreement since, on the one hand, the addition of 
market shares is  not significant in  any  of the geographic markets concerned and, on the other hand, the operation 
is  not  likely to  give  rise of a coordination of the  competitive  behaviour of the parent companies  neither in  the 
joint-ventures product markets  nor in  any other product market within the overall telecommunications equipment 
markets. 
* * * 
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COMMISSION CLEARS THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SATELLITE PARTNERS, A JOINT 
VENTURE  IN  THE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  AND  THE  SATELLITE  SECTORS,  UNDER  THE 
COMPETITION  RULES  OF'THE EC  TREATY  AND THE  EEA  AGREEMENT. 
At the proposal of Mr.  Van  Miert, Commissioner in charge of competition policy, the Commission has given its 
formal green light to the creation of International Private Satellite Partners (IPSP), a limited partnership organized 
under US  law  among nine partners(!) to  provide international private business telecommunications  services via 
satellites to businesses in Europe and North America. IPSP will also offer bulk satellite transmission capacity to third 
parties,  but only to the extent that IPSP or its  partners do  not use  all  the available capacity.  IPSP will own and 
operate two high power telecommunications satellites to be located in geosynchronous orbit over the Atlantic ocean, 
the first of which was launched on 29 November last and is  expected to  be operational by the end of the year. 
In the decision, the creation of IPSP has been concluded to  fall  outside the scope of both Article 85(1) of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, because IPSP, which is a venture the partners of which are mostly 
private companies active in  the telecommunications and aerospace areas,  will not restrict competition but actually 
have a positive impact; IPSP will be a new competitor to the big strategic alliances being established, often between 
public operators, in the market for advanced telecommunications services. It will furthermore increase competition 
in  the market for satellite transmission capacity,. as  it  is a new and private alternative to the international satellite 
organisations (INTELSA  T,  EUTELSA  T and INMARSA T) and national systems (generally owned by governments 
or  public  companies  which,  in  most  cases,  are  also  the  national  signatories  to  those  international  satellite 
organisations) that currently control almost every aspect of the satellite market. 
A number of provisions in the agreements, namely a non compete obligation imposed only on the general partner 
of IPSP (Orion Satellite Co.),  several  provisions intended to  ensure that IPSP  will offer to  its  partners,  that will 
normally also be  its customers, the best prices, terms and conditions that it will be offering to third customers for 
the provision of  services or capacity (the "most favoured nation" provisions) and the preference to be given to limited 
partners in respect of  certain calls for tenders issued by IPSP have been considered restraints ancillary to the creation 
and successful operation of IPSP. 
Two  other provisions,  namely  the  exclusive  right  to  promote  the  sale  of the  IPSP  services  in  Italy  once  full 
liberalization of telecommunications is  in  place, and the appointment of STET as exclusive representative agent of 
IPSP in Austria have been concluded as non appreciable restrictions of competition given, in particular, the inherent 
international dimension of the IPSP services, the big size of potential customers and the small market share that IPSP 
is  expected to  achieve. 
( 1) The partners of IPSP are  the following:  Orion Satellite Co.  (USA), Orion Networks Systems (USA),  British 
Aerospace  Communications  (UK),  COM  DEY  Satellite  Communications  Ltd  (Canada),  General  Dynamics 
Commercial Launch Services (USA), Kingston Communications International Ltd. (UK), MCN Sat US (USA), STET 
(Italy) and Trans-Atlantic Satellite, Inc.  (Japan). 
* * * 
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THE COMMISSION OPENS CABLE TV NETWORKS TO LIBERALIS'ED TELECOMS SERVICES- A FIRST 
STEP TO THE MULTI-MEDIA  WORLD 
.· 
On the initiative of Commissioners Van Miert and Bangemann, the Commission has today adopted a directive for 
public consultation which will lift restrictions on the use of cable TV  networks for the carriage of all  liberalised 
telecommunications services. The proposal represents a modification of the Article 90 directive liberalising those 
services (90/388). It aims, in particular, to allow new multi-media telecoms services to be carried on cable networks, 
throughout the European Union, by  1 January 1996. During 1995, the Commission will be presenting the directive 
to the Member States and the European Parliament and consulting with other interested parties on the draft directive 
before formally adopting a decision, in an  open procedure ensured by Mr Van Miert at the last Telecoms Council. 
The precedent for such a procedure was set with consultations on the satellite amendment to the services directive 
which was finally adopted in  October of this year. 
Liberalising access to cable infrastructure should permit a lowering of costs and a significant increase in the amount 
of capacity available for new services. Alongside this it encourages use of state of the art technology and represents 
an  important contribution to  the development of the informations society. 
The goal:  multi-media services 
In  many of the Member States existing national regulation restricts  use of cable TV  networks for all  but simple, 
one-way broadcasting services (see table 1  ).  The regulatory restrictions which would be abolished by the directive 
currently  prevent  cable  TV  operators  from  offering  carriage  or  provision  of any  of the  new  interactive  and 
multimedia  srervices.  Most  of these  involve  the  digital  transmission  of moving  pictures  which  the  traditional 
telecommunictions networks are not designed to - and in  many cases can not carry 
The main goal of the Commission is  to lift those restrictions in order to foster pilot projects and new initiatives in 
the multi-media field.  This area was highlighted in  the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 
as  of fundamental  importance in  realising the  information society. 
Examples of such new services include: 
* Home shopping (including catalogue browsing, live video displays, "navigation" around the "shopping mall" from 
home,  viewing real estate); 
*Home transaction packages (banking, reservations, buying, trading) 
•"Edu-tainment" (interactive video games which entertain and educate) 
*specialised  interactive  on-line  databases  (for example  for  the  medical  or dentistry  professions,  which  involve 
detailed and/or moving images) 
The lifting of current restrictions will also encourage the provision of new distributive applications, such as home 
alarms  and  telemetry  (i.e.  distance  meter  reading).  Cable  operators  can  offer  capacity  for  such  services  at  a 
significantly lower cost than telecom operators. 
A further important market for cable capacity concerns mobile services. New entrants are looking for alternatives 
to  using the TO's network since the latter is  often a competitor in their own mobile market.  Once liberalised, the 
fast growing market of  mobile communications is expected to generate sufficient revenues to allow cable operators 
to  upgrade and expand their infrastructure for increasingly sophisticated multi-media services. 
The advantage of CATV networks 
AtiNGx ,_ 6  g The  "final drop"  is  that step of the network which  actually runs  into  the home  and  connects the tenninal (TV, 
telephone, computer or some hybrid combination).  It is, without doubt, the most important gateway to the benefits 
of "the infonnation superhighways". 
The advantage of using Cable :rv networks is that, as they are designed for the carriage of TV signals, they reach 
the end user with broad-band "co- axial" cable capable of providing up large amounts of capacity, such as is required 
for  moving images, especially enhanced quality signals ("enhanced reality"). with a high degree of reliability. This 
allows provision of  the new multi-media services without major adaptions of  the lines running into customers' homes. 
Such services cannot,  in  general, be efficiently carried over the local networks currently provided by the national 
telecoms  operators  in  the  Member  States.  TOs  connection  to  households  is  by  "copper pairs"  only  capable  of 
providing reliable services of relative low capacity which is not appropiate, for example,  for even standard quality 
TV signals, except in particular sitations 1. This is because such networks were set up some years ago and designed 
for carying voice telephony which requires a very small fraction of the capacity. 
I That is, without involving significant trade-offs concerning lack of  reliability and increased error rates and severly 
limiting the distance which the end user may  be from  a central switch. 
Form  and Content of the  Directive 
Like  the  satellite directive adopted  in  October,  the cable directive  involves an  amendment  to  the  1990  telecoms 
services  directive.  The  amendment  allows service  providers the choice of offering their services over cable TV 
networks. This does not effect the Member States' rights to maintain monopolies in provision voice telephony unit! 
1998 as the directive concerns only the provision of non-reserved services. 
The current situation in most of the member States, whereby only the telecoms organisations are allowed to  lease 
out  capacity  for,  or to  carry,  telecoms  services  on  behalf of anyone  else,  severely· constrains  possibilities  and 
opportunities for both service providers and users (see table).  Furthennore, the tariffs for lease of  high-capacity lines 
from  the TOs  in  the  EU  is,  on  average,  10  times  higher than  in  liberal environments such as  Sweden  and North 
America.  Maintaining restrictions on CATV networks means that, while capacity is  restrained, the cable operators 
are oot investing in  adapting their infrastructure to provide high capacity for telecoms services, since they are not 
allowed to  respond to the demand for  it. 
After the adoption of the services directive 90/388, which was based on Article 90 of the Treaty, the Commission 
organised consultations from  which  it emerged that the goal of effective liberalisation of telecoms services would 
remain  unsatistied unless the network  infrastructure overwhich they are provided was also liberalised. 
The extension of the Article 90 directive must be seen  in  the context of the following points: 
*the benefits of services  liberalisation  in  the  multi-media context  will  not  be  realised  without  liberalsiation of 
available CATV network capacity 
*Many of the Member States, also the most important in terms of  the EUs telecoms markets, urged the Commission 
at the last Telecoms Council to present proposals as soon as  possible for rapid liberalisation of CATV networks. 
*The Commission has underlined its intention to present its  proposals in this context to both the Council and the 
Parliament and to proceed in  close cooperation with them.  with utmost respect for  transparency 
*the development of  new, multi-media services is increasingly rapid with the anticipation of  the infonnation society. 
The market expanding. The  revenues of the TOs are not threatened by a transfer of customers, since they are,  for 
·the most part, not even providing these new  services yet. The directive also introduces competition safeguards aimed at preventing operators using a dominant position in one 
market to impose predatory prices in another. requires the Member States to adopt measures to allow the monitoring 
of cross subsidies between reserved and liberalised activities, when a single operator provides both. This concerns, 
on the one hand, TOs which also operate CATV networks, and on the other, CATV operators enjoying exclusive 
for their broadcasting activeity who also enter the liberalised telecoms market. 
"This draft should be seen as a major step towards the early introduction of multi-media services throughout the 
European Union", explains Mr Van Miert. "It will also favour initiatives from small and medium sized enterprises 
by opening up the cable TV  networks.  It  thus  responds to  specific requests  we  have  received from  them  in  the 
context <;>f telecommunications liberalisation." 
Table 1 
Current provisions concerning use of cable TV networks for the provision of telecommunications services can be 
summarised as follows: 
Use of cable TV networks for liberalised services 
Belgium No Denmark No France Non-voice services only Germany No Greece---------* Ireland No legal provision 
Italy  ---------* Luxembourg No  legal  provision Netherlands Limited  use  Portugal  No  Spain No UK  Yes 
Source:  "L'  impact  de  I'  authorisation. de  Ia  foumiture  de  services  de  telecommunications  liberalises  par  les 
cAblo-operateurs", I  DATE,  1994, and additional analysis 
* No cable TV networks available 
Table 2 
Minimum Capacity requirements (approximate) for services 
Speech: 64 kilo-bits/second 
ISDN:  140 kilo-bits/second 
Standard quality moving images:  2 mega-bits/second 
Enhanced quality moving images:  I 0 mega-bits/second 
Table 3 
Technical  limits on network infrastructure to  the home· 
i.  Twisted Copper pairs: used by TOs to connect end users to the  local switch: 
up to 257 kilo-bits/second: reliable service to all customers on local network 
the greater the capacity requirement above 257 mega-bits the greater the trade-offs of increased error rates, lack of 
reliability and limits on the distance which the end user can be from  a central switch. 
2 mega-bits and overOnly in particular, limited situations. 
e.g Not appropriate for: users in less densely populated areas, users requiring high reliability, or users preferring high 
quality pictures and "enhanced realism" 
• 
A/'INtJI\  I-7  0 ii.  Broadband coaxial cable:  used  by cable operators  to connect end users to head-end 
up to  500 mega-bits/secondreliable service to all  customers  irrespective  CJf distance 
Table 4  .. 
Cable TV Networks  in  the European  Union * 
Number of Households Subscribers Operators passed 
Belgium  38 97.4% 95.5% Denmark 6500 73.6% 57.3% Germany  1 64.6% 40.5% Greece------ ------ ------ Spain 
30 8.1 o/o  1.1 o/o  France  16 25.8% 6% Ireland  13  >50% 40% Italy ------ ------ ------ Luxembourg  120 99.5% 81.4% 
Netherlands 358 90.3% 86.4% Portugal  I 1.6% 0.3%  Ui<  23  12.6% 2.8% 
• Source:  IDATF.,  1994 
• * * 
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LIBERALISING  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  INFRASTRUCTURE  :  PUBLICATION  OF  PART  II  OF  11-IE 
GREEN  PAPER AND CONSULTATION  ON THE  FUTURE  REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK 
The  Commission  has today adopted as  proposed by Mr  Bangemann  and Mr Van  Miert Part II  of the Green Paper 
on  the Liberalisation of Telecommunications  Infrastructure and Cable TV  Networks.  While Part  I,  adopted on the 
25  October  1994,  set  out the  general  principles  and  proposed  timetable  for  liberalisation,  Part  II  examines the 
substantive issues involved in establishing the regulatory framework for full competition in the telecommunications 
sector. Part II of the Green Paper logically follows the Resolution of the Council of Telecommunications Ministers 
meeting of the  17 November  1994,  which confirmed the principle of full  liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector by the  1 January  1998.( 1) 
The  "Bangemann Group" Report earlier in  1994 on Europe and the Global Information Society had already stressed 
that "the  key  issue for  the emergence of new  markets  is  the need for  a new  regulatory environment allowing full 
competition"  and  urged  Member  States  to  "accelerate  the  on- going  process  of  liberalisation  of  the 
telecommunications  sector by opening up  to competition  infrastructures and services still in the monopoly area". 
Infrastructure  liberalisation,  whereby  operators  will  be  permitted  to  apply  for  licenses  to  build  or  develop  new 
telecommunications networks, backed up  by a well functioning regulatory framework will be one of the key factors 
in  encouraging the  development of communications  and  the  information society  in  the  Union.  In  particular it  will 
l9wer the price of telecommunications, encourage innovation and the exploitation of new technologies. improve the 
provision of telecommunications services to both industrial and residential consumers and stimulate the injection of 
private  capital  into  the  sector.  Services  conveyed over telecommunications  infrastructure  in  the  European  Union 
amounted to  about  120 billion ecu during 1993 and are at the heart of the Union's information sector- see Figure 
l attached. 
The  Major Issues 
The second part of the Green  Paper deals with the substantive issues  involved in establishing the future regulatory 
framework. 
Universal service consists of access  to a defined minimum  service of specified quality to  all  users at  an  affordable 
price based on the principle of universality, equality and continuity.  With  respect to  universal service, three major 
issues are raised: the definition and scope of universal service, a common approach to costing universal service and 
the  financing  of universal  service  in  a competitive  environment.  Concerning  scope  and  definition,  Union  wide 
standards for  universal service have already been  proposed under the auspices of the application of Open Network 
Provision rules to the voice telephony service. On financing, the Green Paper adopts a relatively novel approach and 
indicates a preference for using universal service tunds rather than access charges. This  is based on the view that in 
the  future,  more  than  one operator may  be competing to  provide universal service. 
Interconnection and inter-operability of infrastructures and services will be a major commercial issue. Interconnection 
will  primarily  be  a matter  for  national  regulatory  authorities  within  an  overall  framework.  All  interconnection 
agreements are subject to the competition rules. In addition, the Green Paper outlines the scope of  an Interconnection 
Directive,  foreseen  in  the Commission's Action  Plan on  the  Information Society,  which will  govern access to and 
interconnection with public infrastructure networks.  Some major issues of the directive will be:  . set out the rights 
and  obligations  on  public  telecommunications  infrastructure  providers  with  regard  to  interconnection  requests, 
including  obligations  to  interconnect  and  provide  standard  interconnnect  offerings;  .  common  rules  for  fair 
competition;  . dispute resolution mechanisms. 
On  licensing,  the  Green  Paper recognises  that the  licensing of telecommunications  infrastructures,  networks and 
services will remain a matter for national regulatory authorities. At the same time an overall framework  is required 
which  sets  the  general  principles  and  procedures  for  granting  licences  and  which  strikes  an  appropriate balance 
,fNNi: X  I  - 7  2 between excessive regulation and reasonable safeguards. The Green Paper stresses the need for  fair and effective 
competition in the new environment through the enforcement of  the Treaty competition rules. The competition rules 
will have a key role to play in providing a predictable environment wittrin which companies can plan and invest. 
With respect to the  intematio~al dimension, full account must be taken of the current WTO/GA TS  negotiations on 
basic telecommunications services, (which include infrastructure). The major objective of the European Union is  to 
ensure comparable and effective access to  global markets. 
Towards the Information Society The Green Paper sets the common approach to infrastructure more broadly ~ithin 
the  context  of the  overall  approach  to  the  Information  Society.  Although  it  focuses  on  telecommunications 
infrastructures,  the  Green  Paper shows  that  the  worlds  of telecommunications,  broadcasting  and computing  are 
moving  together.  This  is  because  many  of the  new  digital  telecommunications  services  lie  between  traditional 
telecommunications and broadcasting. The Green Paper does not aim to extend telecommunications regulation to 
other sectors of the economy.  Rather  it  recognises  that there  are  different policy objectives which  underlie the 
regulatory approach in the various sectors and that these different objectives will remain even when technoldgies and 
markets converge. A clear framework  for  infrastructure liberalisation is therefore complementary to the evolution 
of Union policy in  other neighbouring fields such as  intellectual property rights,  audio- visual policy and media 
concentration - all areas which are central to the emerging Information Society. 
Consultations In conjunction with  Part I of the  Infrastructure Green  Paper, the Commission has opened a broad 
consultation  on  the  future  regulatory  framework  for  infrastructure  liberalisation  in  the  European  Union.  The 
Commission is inviting comments on all the issues raised and will also organise hearings in Brussels with interested 
parties early in  1995. The Commission intends to complete its consultations during the French Presidency in the first 
half of the year, enabling  it  to  come  forward,  before  the  end of 1995,  with a proposed package of measures  for 
widespread reform of the regulatory environment. 
Figure  I -Turnover of EU  information sector in  1993.(2) 
Telecom services 27% Publishing 22% Software and services 15% Computer equipment  II% Audiovisual services 
l 0% Telecom equipment 6% Consumer electronics 5%  Micro-electronics 2% Electronic publishing 2% 
Total Market : 414 billion ECU 
( l) subject to  additional transitional  periods  for  certain  member  states,  i.e.  up  to  five  years  for  Greece,  Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain and up to two years for  Luxembourg.  (2) Source : Commission Studies 
* * • 
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LIBERALISING CORE SECTORS OF INFORMATION SOCIETY IN EOROPE:  "NO FORTRESS EUROPE BUT 
NO BLUE-EYED  APPROACH EITHER"  SAYS COMMISSIONER VAN MIERT  . 
.  · 
"The global issue of  the world-wide tn1de-offbetween competition and the traditional mechanisms for ensuring public 
service will  come  to  a head at the G7  conference ...  The Co.mmission  has  been  asked to play a major part  ill. this 
meeting, and I myself, will be participating in the debate concerning the  dev~lopment of infonnation infrastructure 
and the provision of access to  it. tl  . 
"In  the  interests  of consumers,  business  and  the  industry  itself it  is  important  that policy  does  not. pre-empt  or 
straight-jacket market development with unnecessary regulations and standards. On this point we are in full agreement 
with our friends on the other side of  the Atlantic. However, this does not mean a "blue-eyed" or "one-sided" approach 
to  EU  liberalisation and  this  will  also  be  made  very clear to  our 07 partners.  ",  Mr  Van  Miert  said  in  a speech 
delivered  on  friday  the  lOth  of February at  the  Conference  on  European  Pubiic  Service organised by  the  Trans 
European  Policy Studies Association. 
''The message the EU will bring to the G7 debate is not "fortress Europe" but global progress, Mr Van Miert added 
I. rapid progress in liberalising the core sectors of  the information society in Europe.  In our own interests as well as 
the  international  credibility of the  Union,  we  must  carry  through  a tight  programme  of concrete  liberalisation 
measures this year. This relates in particular to cable networks, alternative infrastructures and mobile communications 
ii encouraging our competitors to offer the same  level of market access as  will  be available here 
iii but also  protecting our cultural identity and ensuring fairness  in future issues concerning content." 
The  key  point  of the  discussion  concerned  the  relationship  between  the  objectives  for  the  European  Union  of 
liberalisation on the one hand and development of public service on the other.  . 
I 
If Mr Van Miert gave particular emphasis to the significaace of the G7 conference on the information society in this 
context, which will take place  in  Brussels at the end of this month,  he generally drew the following conclusions : 
* Competition and public service are compatible,  in fact they may be mutually reinforcing, as long as it is recognised 
that public service does not necessarily mean  (a) monopoly  provision nor (b)  public operator 
* Rigid and over generalised dogma concerning policy in these areas  is not appropriate. Overall principles must be 
tempered  by the d,emands of subsidiarity, flexibility (vis avis technology and development of market structure) and 
the reality of significant differences betWeen sectors (such. as telecoms, post and energy). This concerns, for example, 
the approach  to a European Public Service Charter and to use of particular Treaty articles. 
•  It  is  critical  for  the  Union  that existing  Treaty rules  be  respected,  not  tampered  with  for  short term  political 
motives. 
* Given rapid technological change and pressure from  competitors  in  the  US and Japan/SE  Asia in the context of 
the information society, we cannot afford to let unnecessary delays block progress in  liberalisation. Time  is short in 
this area.  We must  run to a tight time table. 
• In the course of 1995 the schedule for liberalising telecoms services and infrastructure must be written up in  EC 
law.  This  involves both  1998  measures  and more  immediate proposals  for mobile services and concerning use of 
available capacity for already liberalised services. -. 
~· 
• 
* In the international context the EU  must encourage market access to third countries as well as the protection of 
European cultural identity and intellectual property rights. 
* • * 
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COMMISSION  CLEARS  PROPOSED  JOINT  VENTURE· BETWEEN  .SIEME~S AND  ITALTEL  IN  THE 
SECTOR  OF  TELECOMM~CATION EQUIPMENT 
- Merger regulation 
· Jbe Commission  adopted  today  a decision  to  authorise  the  merger  of the  activities  of the  Italian  subsidiary of 
Siemens  for  the manufactUre  of telt~communication equipment (Siemens  Telecomunicazioni  SpA) and Italtel, the 
manufacturing  subsidiary  of the  STET  group  in  the  sector. of telecommunication  equipment.  STET  is  a holding 
company which also controls the  Italian public telecom operators,  recently merged under Telecom  Italia. 
On  13  September  1994 the operation was notified to the Commission under the  EC  Merger Regulation.  After the 
initial one month assessment provided for under the Merger Regulation, the Commission considered that the proposed 
operation raised serious doubts  as  to its compatibility with the common  market (IP No 94/951 ).  The Commission 
stated that the joint venture between STET and Siemens raised both horizontal and vertical issues in the markets of 
public telecommunication equipment. With regard to horizontal aspects the joint venture will hold a substantial share 
· of the public switching and transmission equipment market  in Italy.  In other countries the operation would not be 
likely  to  have  major  effects,  since  ltaltel's  sales  are  basically  restricted  to  Italy.  In  relation  to  vertical  aspects, 
Siemens will, through the joint venture, share the pre-existing shareholder link between the Italian telecom operator 
(Telecom  Italia) and the telecom equipment manufacturer  ltaltel. 
The  second  phase  investigation,  during  which  the  Commission  consulted  a large  number  of telecommunication 
equipment manufacturers and telecommunication operators, has shown that in spite of the· substantial market shares, 
the creation of the joint venture will  not result  in market dominance.  ' 
Firstly,  the Commission  has  taken  into consideration that,  with regard  to  the  longer term,  and  in  particular to the 
introduction of  new technologies, the markets for telecommunications equipment are in the process of  transformation 
due to i) the possible development of large markets because of technological developments, ii) the fact that the effects 
of standardization and public procurement legislation will progressively have a larger impact in opening up national 
markets,  iii) the further progress towards liberalization of  services and, foremost, the liberalization of infrastructures 
which will lead more and more to the creation of  a worldwide market for public telecommunications equipment. The 
effects  of the  combination of these developments  have  already  been  seen  in  the area of mobile  communications, 
where  the  definition  of a  European  standard  (GSM),  the  liberalization· of services  and  the  liberalization  of 
infrastructures  have  resulted  today  in  the  cre~ion of a European,  if not  worldwide,  market  for  the  supply  of 
telecommunication  equipment. 
Secondly, as to the shareholding link between the new joint venture and Telecom  ltalia, it has to be considered that 
the  benetits of any privileged treatment to the joint venture  imposed on Telecom  ltalia by STET  would be shared 
with Siemens.  The  notified operation reduces therefore the objective interest of.STET or Telecom  Italia to favour 
the joint venture at the expense of Telecom  Italia. This  is more so since Siemens gains a direct influence only over 
the equipment supplier (ltaltel) and no influence at all over the telecom operator (Telecom Italia) or over its parent 
(STET).  Such an operation would be of a very different nature. 
Thirdly the distinction between the interests of  the service activities and the manufacturing activities within the STET 
group has been further reinforced in the framework of  the reorganization of  STET,  through the creation of  Tecnitel, 
a 100% owned company of STET.  Tecnitel constitutes a separate organizational level  in the structure of the STET 
group whose main  function  is the supervision of the manufacturing activities of STET. 
Furthennore,  in the course of the proceedings, STET  has  given assurances to the Commission  with respect to the 
non  interference of STET  in  the  purchasing policy of Telecom  Italia, more  in particular with regard to the choice 
of suppliers  and  to  a clear  separation  of the  Boards  of Directors,  the  CEO,  and  in  general  the  management  of 
Telecom  Italia, Tecnitel and the companies ofthe Italtel group.  · 
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In the other affected markets,  mobile radio networks and private telecommunication equipment, the investigation 
confirmed that the liberalisation has already resulted in a competitive market situation and that the positions of  the 
joint venture in these sectors do not raise competition concerns.  ~ 
For the reasons outlined above~·.the Commission has considered that the proposed concentration does not lead to the 
creation or reinforcement of  a dominant position in any of  the markets identified in the sectors of public and private 
telecommunication  equipment,  as  a result  of which  effective competition .would  be  significantly  impeded  in  the 
common  market  within  the  meaning  of Article  2,  paragraph  3 of the  merger  regulation.  The  Commission_ has 
therefore adopted a decision of  compatibility with the common market pursuant to Article 8(2) of  Council Regulation 
(EC)  n.  4064/89.  .  . 
• • • 
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COMMISSION EXAMINES A THIRD STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN THE tELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
l 
In  July  1994,  the  Commission  cleared  the  joint .  venture  between  British  Telecommunications  and· the  US · 
long-distance carrier MCI.  A second  proposed alliance,  between Deutsche Telekom  and France Telecom  -· cailed 
ATLAS -is presently being examined by the Commission. Regarding a third impOrtant alliance the Cornmissiol) has 
just sent a formal request to all the so-called."Unisource" partners asking them for informations; on the basis of the 
answers received, the Commission  will pursue its procedure  in this case. 
This third important alliance developing in this sector involves the telecommunications operators of  the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, which have set up a ~ompany named  "Unisource"~ as confinned by press statements made 
by  the  parties,  the  Spanish  ~elecommunications operator Telefonica  is  to join Y.nisource  as  a fourth  shareholder. 
Unisource  has  also  entered  into· several  forms  of cooperation  with  the  US  long-distance  carrier  and  equipment 
manufacturer AT&T.  Given the Importance of these parties on the telecommunications market and in order to ensure 
a fair and balanced scrutiny under the  EU  competition rules of all the alliances  in this sector,the Commission  has 
at  its  own  initiative  launch~d an  examination  of the  arrangements  regarding  Unisource  as  well  as  its  links  with 
AT&T.  A formal  request for  infonnation  has  been sent to  the companies concerned. 
During the last two to three years, the  telt~communications market  in the European Union has been characterized by 
two parallel developments, namely an accelerating liberalization process and at the same time the emergence of  what 
is commonly referred to as "strategic alliances" involving the public telecommunications operators which previously 
enjoyed monopoly rights  in their domestic  markets. 
These  strategic alliances  generally  aim  at  providing  highly-advanced,  end- to-end,  seamless  telecommunications 
services  over a wide geographic area,  often the whole world.  The  very  fast  development  of the new  technologies 
involved in these services and the pressure to go global felt by service providers from the companies which represent 
the  main  target  customers,  namely  powerful  multinational  firms,  have  led  to  the  perceived  need  by 
telecommunications operators to cooperate together to offer such services, rather than enter this new market alone. 
From the point of view of competition policy, it is not possible to say beforehand whether such alliances -which are 
in  any event  by  no  means  uniform  • are  good or  bad.  As  a general  rule,  however,  given  the strong  position  and 
technical  skills  of the  telecommunications  operators  involved,  a careful  examination  under the  European  Union 
competition  rules  will  be  required  with  respect  to  each  alliance,  to  .ensure  that  the  liberalization  which  is 
painstakingly being achieved in this area is  not thwarted  by anticompetitive cartel-like arrangements. 
Until now, the Commission has issued one formal exemption decision  in this area, with respect to the "Concert" joint 
venture  established  by  the  UK  operator  British  Telecommunications  and  the  US  long-distance  carrier  MCI  (see 
IP/941767).  A favourable position was  possib_le among other reasons  becaus~ of the genuinely global nature of the 
services offered through "Concert" and the fact  that the telecommunications  markets of both parent companies  are 
open to competition. 
• • • 
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THE  COMMISSION  HAS CONSIDERED  THAT 1;1ffi CREATION  OF OMNITEL-PRONTO  ITALIA  IS  NOT 
A CONCENTRATION  AND HAS TO  BE ASSESSED  UNDER ARTICLE  85 
.· 
Merger regulation 
The Omnitel-Pronto  ltalia operation, which was notified to the Commission  on 24 February  1995, consists of the 
creation of a joint venture which will operate the second GSM mobile telephone system  in Italy. 
Since,  from  a procedural point of view,  the  Merger Regulation does  not apply to cooperative joint ventures,  the 
Commission  has decided that the notified operation  is not a concentration and does not,  therefore, fall  within the 
scope of application of the Merger Regulation and should thus be examined under the provjsions of Article 85  of 
·the Treaty where it will benefit from  the acc::elerated  ~reatment applied to structural joint ventures. 
Omnitel - Pronto Italia was created by two undertakings Omnitel Sistemi Radio Celtulari SpA (Omnitet) and Pronto 
ltalia SpA  which  initially competed separately  for the award of the second  GSM  licence  in  Italy  and  afterwards 
decided to join forces to submit a joint bid. Both parents, Omnitel and Pronto- Italia are themselves Joint Ventures 
created by several industrial and tinancial undertakings for the purpose of obtaining the GSM licence  in  Italy.  The 
major shareholders ofOmnitel are Olivetti, Belt Atlantic,.CellularCommunications Inc., Telia and Lehman Brothers. 
Pronto  ltalia,  which  is  a consortium  of 14  undertakings,  has  as  its  main  shareholders  Air  Touch  International, 
Mannesmann and Banca di  Roma.  · 
On 22 December 1994, the Commission had already decided, to grant the parties a derogation in order to implement 
the concentration before its notification. The decision of  the Commission was justified by the necessity for the parties 
to begin without delay the build-up of their GSM network in order to meet the strict deadlines imposed by Italian 
authorities and also in otder to prevent  t~e reinforcement of the current position of strength held by Telecom  ltalia 
which had already built its own GSM network and was selling this ser:vice. 
After examination,  the Commission  has considered that 'the proposed operation  takes  place  in a services  market, 
where a rapid evolution is observed with a rising trend towards a progressive interaction of the markets.  Some of 
the joint venture's ultimate parents, which are GSM operators in other EU countries, could be in competition in this 
increasingly global market, and therefore a risk of coordination of their competitive behaviour.could not be excluded.
1 
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TilE  COMMISSION  IS  INITIATING  A  DETAILED  INVESTIGKfiON  INTO  "NORDIC  SATELLITE 
DISTRIBUTION" 
The  cooperation  project  "Nordic  Satellite  Distribution"  (NSD),  grouping  Norsk  Telekom  AS,  a wholly-owned 
subsidiary  of  the  Norwegian  telecommunications  operator  Telenor  AS,  TeleDanmark  AS,  the  Danish 
telecommunications operator and the Swedish group Kinnevik will be the subject of a detailed investigation by the 
European  Commission.  · 
The project, which was notified to the Commission on 23  February last,  is mainly concerned with the distribution 
of television  channels  to cable distributors,  operators of multiple-user antennae and  individuals with  dish aerials 
through the  leasing of satellite capacity covering the Nordic region (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland). 
The Commission has decided to initiate this second, four-month stage of detailed investigation in order to ascertain 
whether the project will  give NSD a permanent dominant position in several sectors on the Nordic market. 
Basically, NSD will  be the only operator covering the Nordic region whose programmes can be received by small 
dish  antennae. 
·Moreover, the partners  in NSD hold a major share of the cable network  in the region. 
The vertical integration between satellite operators and television programme distributors combined with the strong 
position held by the parent companies  in markets both upstream and downstream (satellite owners, cable operators 
and distributors) would give NSD a competitive advantage  in all market sectors. 
A major concern for the Commission will be to ascertain whether such an advantage would prevent new competitors 
from  entering the Nordic market. 
• • * 
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COMMISSION APPROVES  CREATION  OF SWEDISH TEtECOM,S. Jt>INT VENTURE 
The  European  Commission  yesterday 11pproved the creation of a telecommunications joint venture  in  Sweden  by 
British Telecom, Tele Danmark and Telenor, the Danish and Norwegian public telecom operators. The new company 
will  provide  domestic  and  international  services  for  bpth  voice  and  data  in, competition  with  existing  Swedish 
operators such as Telia and Tele2.  ·  • 
The new joint venture • provisionally called TBT Communication AB • will combine the existing telecom service 
activities of the three parents in Sweden.  It will offer telecom services .to both residential and corporate customers. 
TBT  will  be  both  a network  operator  and  service  provider.  It  will, · in  principle  offer  communication  ser:vice 
throughout all of  Sweden. At first, however, its efforts will be concentrated on the triangle represented by Stockholm, 
Goteborg and Malmo which represent 50% of the business market.  Initially, for reasons of necessity and economy, 
the TBT network will be fully  based on leased lines  from  Telia, Tele2 or Banverket (the Swedish railway agency 
owning the railway infrastructure). However, as from  1998 TBT plans to undertake its own infrastructure investment. 
At present, the combined market share of the three parents activities in Sweden is relatively insignificant. TBT will 
face strong competition with the existing operators providing telecom services in Sweden especially Telia, the former 
monopoly operator as well  as Tele2  and AT&T Nordics,  th~ Swedish subsidiary of AT&T. 
Competitive asessment 
The  markets  for  telecommunications  services  are  evolving  very  rapidly  as  a  result  of technical  change  and 
liberalisation  of the  regulatory  environment.  Sweden  (along  with  the  UK)  has  ·one  of the  most  liberalised 
telecommunications  regulatory  regimes  in  Europe.  This  has  led  to  a number  of overseas  telecommunications 
companies setting up operations in Sweden to take advantage of this regime. Neverthless, despite the establishment 
of these competitors,  the state owned national telecom operator •  Telia- still enjoys an overwhelming market share 
for the voice market (90% according to the parties) and a stron market share in data communications (70%). 
In  comparison,  the  market  share  acquired  by  new  entrants  has  been  relatively  small  -none -has  a market  share 
exceeding 5% for either voice or data. AT&T Nordics- the. Swedish subsidiary of AT&T established in  1985- has 
a market share of less than  1% for voice, BT's existing Swedish subsidiary has less than  1% of voice and less than 
5% of  data whilst Tele2 (the only Swedish operator apart from Telia to hold a Recognised Private Operating Agency 
status) has secured a market share of only 2% of voice and 3% of data since  its formation  in  1991. 
In the light of the above facts,  the Commission has decided that the operation does not raise serious doubts. as to its 
compatibilty with  the common  market and has .therefore approved the operation. 
* ...  ... 
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"GLOBAL EUROPEAN NETWORK" PROJECT FOR OPTICAL-FIBRE TRANSMISSION OF DATA: MR VAN 
MIERT SEEKS CLARIFICATION OF INFRASTR.ll.CIIJRE-· PRICES 
.· 
The Commission  is seeking more information on the prices to be charged to users of the future "Global European 
Network" (GEN) for data transmission before taking a position on the project, which was submitted at the beginning 
of 1994  by a number of telecommunications network operators in Europe. 
The GEN  project involves the creation of a network of optical-fibre communications  linking Frankfurt,  London, 
Madrid, Milan and Paris. The· initial partners in the project (British Telecom,  Deutsche Telekom,  France Telecom, 
STET and Telefonica,  later joined by Belgacom and by the Swiss, Dutch and Portuguese telecoms administrations) 
intend to  install  and  manage the  computer equipment  needed  to  set up sub-circuits  through this  network and to 
connect them  to  the national circuits  in  their countries  in  order to offer advanced,  ultra-rapid data-transmission 
services. 
While  recognizing  the  strategic  nature  of the  GEN  project,  which  has  significant  value  added  in  relation  to 
international  digital  half-circuits,  Mr  Van  Miert,  Member  of the  Commission  with  special  responsibility  for 
competition  policy,  has asked his  departments to find  out more about the price levels and costs of national and 
international digital circuits. 
The aim  is  to check,  in  particular, whether the prices currently charged are justified. 
Mr Van  Miert's departments will focus on the level of prices that competitors would be required to  pay in  order to 
acquire the technological resources needed to  launch a system  in  competition with  GEN: 
- the competitors would undoubtedly not have the option of supplying large- scale infrastructures and of using the 
profits thus made to  finance the supply of non-reserved services such as  international network circuits; 
- potential competitors, in particular suppliers of  alternative infrastructures, will have to pay the official price to buy 
the equipment needed to launch systems in competition with GEN. On the other hand, traditional telecoms operators 
have always used each other's equipment at a substantially lower price, on the basis of reciprocity. 
Not only should the prices charged between partners in GEN not cause discrimination, but there should be no abuses 
in  the prices charged to the public for hiring the digital circuits needed to implement GEN,  in accordance with the 
principles of open network provision. 
The latter point is of  particular interest. With regard to digital circuits, price differences are very striking throughout 
the world:  for  example, the prices charged in  Europe are up to  ten times higher than those in  the United States. 
*** 
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RESULTS  OF  THE  CONSULTATIONS  ON  THE  GREEN  PAPl!R  ON  THE  LIBERALISATION  OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE  FOR  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  AND TV  WIRED  NETWORKS. 
The Commission  has  today adopted( I) , following the proposal  by Mr Bangemann and  Mr Van  Miert,  the  report 
on  the  results  of the  consultation  on  the  Green  Paper  (2) concerning  the  Liberalisation  of Telecommunications 
Infrastructure and Cable TV  networks. 
The consultations have attracted a wide-ranging response. Several hundred organisations, companies and associations, 
including trade unions and user and consumer organisations have taken part in hearings in Brussels. In addition, over 
100  written  submissions  have  been  received.  The  consultations  have  produced  widespread  support  for  the 
liberalisation proposals and programme of the Commission  in the telecommunications  sector. 
Moreover,  the consultations have demonstrated the wish for the Commission to come forward  as soon as  possible 
with  its  package of proposals on  the  regulatory .framework which  encourages dynamic  competition  and  promotes 
interconnection  and  interoperability.  In  particular,  the  consultations  have  re-emphasised  the  need  for  effective 
measures  in the key areas highlighted in the Green Paper : i.e.  licensing, interconnection, financing universal service 
in  a competititve environment and the full  and effective implementation  of competition rules. 
The  key role of the Telecommunications  sector Modernisation, reform and a transition to effective competition are 
the  key  to  continuing  growth  and  prosperity  of  the  European  Union's  telecommunications  sector.  I'IH.: 
telecommunications sector in the European Union has a yearly turnover of  more than  140 billions ecu, i.e. more than 
3 per cent of GOP,  and growing strongly.  Cross-border and  international telecommunications  usage on the  public 
networks has  been  increasing at  over  10  per cent annually on  average  in  recent years,  with an  even  faster  growth 
on  private networks.  There are  over  170  million  main  telephone  lines  in  the  Union  and  nearly  15  million  mobile 
telephone subscribers,  with  the  latter grqwing rapidly  in some of the more  competitive markets. 
Moreover,  the  modernisation,  growth  and  cost effectiveness  of telecommunications  infras.tructures  underpins  the 
whole development of telecommunications in the Union and the increasing use of communications and information 
services  by  businesses and consumers,  large and small. 
The  Major  issues  and  results  of the  consultations  Above  all,  the  consultations  have  shown  that  there  is  general 
agreement on the need  for a transparent predictable and effective regulatory framework  across the  Union  to  allow 
effective competition,  particularly on  the  issues of universal service,  interconnection and  licensing. 
On  licensing  of  infrastructure  and  services,  transparent  measures  and  procedures  for  licensing  or  granting 
authorisations need to  be  in place in advance of 1998 so that the liberalisation deadline that has been agreed can  be 
respected. 
Interconnection between existing and new networks, fixed and mobile has been recognised as a key ingredient in the 
new  competitive  environment.  There  are  both  technical  and  financial  aspects  to  interconnection  and  there  is 
widespread  support  for  a common  regulatory  framework  at  a European  level  to  ease  and  resolve  difficulties  in 
negotiating interconnection arrangements. 
With respect to universal service there was recognition for the need of a common concept at a European  level.  Most 
operators,  service providers and  user organisations felt that  the definition as  the  basic  voice telephone service was 
an  appropriate starting point.  This  concept could evolve with  changes  in technology and  market  demand  but  any 
evolution should not create disproportionate barriers to  market entry. 
As to the mechanisms of financing the universal service there was agreement that key characteristics should be that 
it does  not distort market structure or delay the introduction of competition and that it  places pressure on operators 
to  improve  their performance. 
ANNl X.  I- 8  3 Although  there  was  considerable  support  from  the  consultations  for  the  use  of universal  service  funds,  the 
Commission believes on the basis of subsidiarity that, member states can choose the method in which the cost is 
financed,  provided it  is through a transparent and agreed mechanism. 
With  respect to  the international dimension, there was also strong agreement on the need  for  the European  Union 
to seek comparable and effective access to third country markets both for operators and the equipment sector. 
The Next steps The Commission believes that the Consultation has  established a clear consensus around the main 
proposals  put  forward  in  the  Green  Paper and  in  addition  has  provided a major  input to  the  measures  that the 
Commission will now table. 
On  the  liberalisation aspects, the Commission will draft amendments  to  the  1990 Services Directive(3) in  order to 
assure full  liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and services at the beginning of 1998. In addition, the 
Commission  will  draft  amendments  to  the  Service  Directive  with  regard  to  liberalising  mobile  and  personal 
communications.  The Commission has  already proposed measures  to  liberalise the use of Cable TV  networks to 
supply liberalised telecommunications services. 
(1) COM(95)  158  (2) Part  1 of the Green  Paper (COM(94) 440) was  published on 25  October  1994  and Part  II 
(COM(94)682 on 25  January  1995) (3) (90) 388 EEC 
*** 
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COMMISSION  LAUNCHES  INVESTIGATIONS  INTO  GLOBAL  MOBILE  SATELLITE 
SYSTEMS 
By  the  year 2000  millions  of subscribers worldwide are expected to  be offered satellite personal communications 
services. In this sector global consortia start are being set up involving major american and european companies. This 
new  phenomenon which is set to  become a dominant feature of the international satellite market in the second half 
of this decade has  attracted the attention of the European Commission,  among  others as far as competition policy 
is concerned. 
Hence,  Mr.  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  European Commissioner in  charge of competition matters  has recently asked his 
services to send out requests for  information regarding two  mobile satellite systems (MSS), Globalstar (led by  the 
US companies  Lora!  and Qualcomm)  and  Iridium  (led  by  the  US company  Motorola).  Inmarsat-P,  another  major 
MSS,  has already notified its system and partnership agreements to  the Commission's competition services.  Since 
Iridium  and  Globalstar  have  not  yet  followed  suit,  the  Commission  has  commenced  investigations  at  its  own 
initiative. 
Although MSS systems are inherently global and the establishment of such systems,  in principle procompetitive.  it 
is  important that they are screened from  the outset under the EC competition rules.  The aim  of the investigation  is 
to ensure level playing fields  in the EU and, in particular, to assess the impact of  the consortia and their partnership 
and related agreements on future  competition in the relevant more  localised markets within the European  Union. 
As  part  of its  examination  of these  ventures,  the  two  consortia  have  been  asked  to  provide  a comprehensive 
description of  their systems  from  the technical, tinancial and commercial point of view.  Moreover, the investigation 
also  addresses  the  major  areas  of potential  concern  which  these  projects  present  from  the  point  of view  of the 
competition rules of  the EC Treaty;  in particular the nature, terms and conditions of the distribution policies chosen 
by  the  consortia,  the  nature  of links  with  cellular  terrestrial  networks  and  the  access  by  competing  MSS  to 
infrastructure owned by partners in one of  them. Most of  these areas of  concern have also been identified with regard 
to  lnmarsat-P. 
Satellite-based, global mobile communications  using hand-held terminals· represent a market which  is  expected to 
result  in  revenues of I  0 to  20  Billion  ECU  during the  next decade.  The  indirect effects which will  ripple through 
related  markets  will  be  much  greater.  Due  to  the  scarcity  of frequencies,  the  very  heavy  financial  implications 
involved  in  launching  and  operating the  large  number  of satellites  needed  for  such  systems,  and  a high  level  of 
market uncertainty, however, it is unlikely that there will be more than a few major players. Given this small number 
of alternatives and the potential market power of these global satellite system operators,  it  is particularly important 
that competition is maximised in the European Union for the other, "downstream", elements of  the market involving 
local service provision, distribution and equipment supply. Open, non-discriminatory and fair conditions regarding 
partnerships and agreements will  need to be maximised. 
The  Mobile Satellite Systems  Services Market 
The  general  service to  be  offered  involves the  full  coverage of a roaming  satellite system,  using  LEO  (low earth 
orbit) or MEO (medium earth orbit) satellites, which will also support full user mobility~ as well as offering the user 
a light hand-held portable terminal and identification by a single number anywhere in the world. Entering the global 
age,  it  is  clear  that global service  is  becoming the  most  appropriate solution to  solving an  increasing  number  of 
communication  needs.  It  is  expected that mobile  voice service will  be  the primary application for  these networks. 
but two other signiticant segments  will  involve so-called mobile  personal digital assistants,  data transmission  and 
paging. 
In essence,  MSS  represent the ability to  maximise  mobility of users,  by providing global roaming and coverage  in 
remote areas where terrestrial services may be uneconomic. "Global coverage" means not only that the user can move 
/INN£;< 1- 8  5 anywhere, but also that the communications system can "move" to serve new fixed or "stationary" users. Thus, these 
systems are not aimed only at the international business traveller.  In fact Commission studies predict that by far the 
greatest potential (in terms of  numbers of  subscribers) in the MSS market  ~ill be for communities in less developed 
regions of the world as a substitute for "fixed service" where fixed  networks have yet to  be rolled out or are very 
poor. Central and Eastern Europe represent an important customer base in this context, which could be accessed from 
gateways within the EU. A third important use of MSS will be as a substitute for cellular mobile telephony in areas 
where the cellular network has failed to penetrate (i.e.  rural  parts of the developed world and both urban and rural 
parts of lower income countries). 
MSS is expected to act as complement to both GSM and DECT wireless technologies as well as the public telephone 
network,  enhancing  universal  service  coverage  since  it  is  uniquely  well  suited  to  areas  of low  population 
density. 
Iridium 
Motorola, a major US telecommunications equipment manufacturer, plays the leading role in the Iridium consortium. 
A number  of European  companies  are  participating  by  way  of partnership  agreements  and/or  investment.  This 
includes  companies  such  as  STET  (the  Italian  state  holding  company,  majority  owner  of Telecom  Italia)  and 
Vebacom  (subsidiary of the major German  telecom corporation VEBA  AG). 
Motorola Satellite Communications  is  in  charge of spacecraft construction but  Iridium  itself will  own  and operate 
the system once in place.  Lockheed Corp. (USA) is contracted to actually build  125 satellites for Iridium by the year 
2003. Other partners/investors include Krunichev Enterprise (CIS) who will launch the satellites with Proton rockets, 
Scientific Atlanta  Inc  (USA)  who will  develop  and manufacture  the  hand-held units  as  well  as  the satellite earth 
terminals, and Sprint, the third US long-distance telecommunication carrier. The total cost of the system is estimated 
at  US$  3.8  billion. 
In  1990  Motorola filed  its application  to  operate a global  satellite personal  communications  system  with  the  US 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Approval was given and frequencies allocated by the FCC in January 
1995.  Iridium  plans  to  be  operational  with  a limited  number  of satellites  by  1997-98,  and  expects  1.5  million 
subscribers  by the year 2000.  It will offer voice,  paging and data services. 
Global Star 
The G  lobalstar consortium is led and sponsored by the Lora! Corporation, a leading US defence electronics company 
which  acquired  Ford  Aerospace  in  1990.  Loral  Qualcomm  Satellite Service has  bypassed many  funding  problems 
experienced  by  other  players  in  the  satellite  industry  by  use  of existing,  in  orbit,  satellites.  Partners/contractors 
include the European companies Alcatel (France), Aerospatiale (F), Alenia (I) and Deutsche Aerospace (D). The total 
cost of the system  is estimated at  US$800  million. 
Like  Iridium,  Globalstar has  been approved  in  the  US  by the FCC  in January  1995.  It expects to  be operational  in 
the  US  around  1999-2000 and globally, around five years later. Globalstar will also  be offering voice and data,  as 
well  as  tracking services 
Inmarsat-P 
Inmarsat-P  is a MSS  system sponsored by the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat)  and a large 
number of its signatories, including the European companies Telefonica de Espana (E), Telecom Finland (SF), OTE 
(Gr),  Swiss Telecom  (Swt), CPRM (P),  PTT Telecom (Nl) and Detemobil (D). The  lnrnarsat-P system which will 
consist of 12 satellites in  intennediate circular orbit, will  be operational around the tum of the century.  • •  • 
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laws of~he Member States relating to turnover 
taxes:  OJ  L 280,  29.9.1989;  Bull.  EC 4-1989, 
point 2.1.42 
Adopted by  the Commission on 27 Febru-
ary.  Purpose:  to  authorize  the  United 
Kingdom to continue applying after 1 April 
a derogation which is  aimed at combating 
the tax avoidance which may occur on the 
transfer  of  certain  assets  to  a  company 
which is  a  member of a  group; to ooodify 
the scope of the derogation authorized by 
Council Decision 89/  533/EEC; to clarify the 
legal basis of the new derogation. 
COM(90) 45  final 
Trans-European networks 
1.1.32.  Council  resolution  concerning 
trans-European networks 
•  Council endorsement: Bull.  EC  12-1989, point 
2.1.7 
Formally adopted on 22 january. 
OJ C 27, 6.2.1990 
Competition 
Eighteenth Report 
on Competition Policy 
1.1.33.  Parliament resolution on the Com-
mission's  Eighteenth  Report  on  Compe-
tition Policy. 
•  Eighteenth  Report:  Bull.  EC 7/8-1989,  point 
2.1.62 
•  Economic and Social  Committee opinion: 0 J 
C 62, 12.3.1990; Bull. EC 12-1989, point 2.1.77 
Adopted on 18. January.  Parliament exam-
ined recent developments in the competition 
field,. notably in  relation to merger control, 
State  aid,  liberalization  of  telecommuni-
cations markets, competition in the services 
sectors and certain procedural matters. 
Bull. EC 112·1990 
" 
0 J c 38,  19.2.1990 
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Competition 
Application of the compe'ti-t'i"on 
rules to businesses  ! " 
RTf 
1.1:34.  Intervention  by  the  Commission, 
without a formal decision, following a com-
plaint by a private supplier of value-added 
teleco-mmunications services alleging abuse 
by  the  Regie  belge  des  telegraphes  et 
telephones  of its  dominant  position.  The 
complaint  related  to  the  terms  on  which 
telecommunications  circuits  were  leased. 
The Regie has decided no longer to apply 
the  standard  conditions  governing  access 
by  third  parties  to  an  international  dat.l 
transmission  network,  which  contained 
restrictions  prima facie  incompatible with 
the competition rules. It has undertaken. as 
regards  leased  international  telecommuni-
cation circuits  to which third parties  nuy 
have access, to impose no restrictions other 
than  a  ban on the  mere  transfer of data. 
On  the  strength  of this  undertaking,  the 
Commission ·closed the file  on the case on 
19 January. 
CEPT 
1.1.35.  Intervention  by  the  Commission, 
without a formal decision, in response to :1 
measure  by  the  European  Conference  of 
Postal  and  Telecommunications  Adminis-
trations  (CEPT).  Following  this  inter-
vention,  the  CEPT  withdrew,  on 
21  February, a recommendation to its mem-
ber organizations concerning the terms for 
leasing  out  international  telecommuni-
cations circuits. The Commission had found 
that  the  recommendation  amounted  to  a 
price-fixing agreement caught by Article 85 
of  the  EEC  Treaty  .which  substantially 
restricted  competition  within  the  Com-
munity. 
Alcatel-ANT 
1.1.36.  Commission  Decision  90/46/EEC 
based on Article 85(3)  of the EEC Treaty. 
Exemption of an R&D agreement between 
19 
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COUNCIL  RESOLUTION  of 22  December  1994  on  further  development  of the  ...  p.450 
Community's satellite communications policy. especially with regard to the provision 
of, and access to, space segment capacity (94/C 379/04; OJ C379/5, 3 .1.12.94) 
This list does not  include the basic policy documents published by the Commission  in  this 
field: 
Green Paper on the development of the Common Market for Telecommunications services 
·and equipment (COM(87)290, 30.06.87) 
Green Paper on a common approach in the field of  satellite communications in the European 
Community (COM(90)490, 20.11.90) 
1992 Review ofthe Situation in the telecommunications services sector (SEC(92) 1048) and 
Communication  to  the  Council  and  European  Parliament  on  the  consultation  on  the  the 
review of  the situation in the telecommunications sector (COM(93) 159 final) 
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These documents should be ordered separately 
Policy  documents  in  neighbouring  fields,  such  as  the  Green  Paper  on  the  development  of the 
single market for postal services (COM(91)476,  11.06.92) have not been included. 
Also not included are  references  to  specific IT application programmes  such as:  Drive,  Delta, 
Aim  and the  Insis  and  Caddia progranunes  and  the  implementation of the  infonnation services 
market (programme IMPACT). Most of the fonner programmes are now integated in the general 
programme on telematics systems: 91/3 5  3/EEC 
Reports on the above initiatives are also not included. 
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